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Marta Rodríguez Martínez
Globalisation and World Order
THE SINO-RUSSIAN AXIS AGAINST THE US HEGEMONY
- An approach to the power political strategies and world order policies of China
and Russia within a world in power transition
Introduction
Russia and China support the idea of a multipolar world, thus they both share the desire of
challenging the US world dominance. Many political science scholars affirm that the
current world order is experiencing a power transition. Rauch and Wurm (2013, 51) claim
that the enlargement from the G8 to the G20, the debates around a future reform of the
United Nations Security Council, the increasing academic literature about the decline of
the US, and the growing interest in the BRICS countries and its rapid economic growth
suggest a hint of this statement. Furthermore, they also analyze the symbiotic
relationships among the great powers as a symptom of the changing world order.
The presidents of Russia and China, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, met four times over the
course of 2015, a year in which both countries strengthen their common agenda for a
multipolar world by aligning their geopolitical and strategic interests in multilateral forums
(Kamalakaran, 2015). Moreover, they have successfully launched two international
financial infrastructures, The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), with the aim at disputing the supremacy of the multilateral
institutions of Bretton Woods (Liao, 2015). As The Guardian foreign correspondents point
out:
“Moscow and Beijing have lots in common apart from a 2,500-mile border, economies
dominated by state-run firms and oligarchies that can enrich themselves as long as they
play by the prevailing political mood of the day” (Graham-Harrison, Luhn, Walker, Sedghi &
Rice-Oxley, 2015).
Russia and China are both members of the same five world institutions. These include
core entities of the current system, such as the UN Security Council and the G20, as well
as alternative groups that aspire to reshape the world order, such as the BRICS and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This gives rise to the following question: are Russia
and China the new super-power coalition? Are they going to forge a Sino-Russian alliance
in order to end unipolarity and overthrow the current hegemon?
The aim of this paper is to describe and explain the power political strategies and world
order polices of China and Russia and to compare them within the overall context of power
transition. Theoretically, it attempts to demonstrate if the statement of Kagan (2007: 203)
that “Sino-Russian hostility to America predominance has not yet produced a concerted
and cooperative effort at balancing” is still valid and updated. Moreover it deals with the
decline of the US hegemony and the shift of the global power from West to East (Layne,
2012). Empirically, it includes examples of recent international politics, such as the
Russian annexation of Crimea and the tensions in the South China Sea, to grasp the
current scenario.
In order to reach a conclusion, the paper will proceed in four steps. Firstly, a theoretical
approach to Russia and China’s power capacities, measured in terms of military and
socioeconomic development, and strategies, considered in the framework of soft and hard
balancing, will be provided. Secondly, their conduct in the regional affairs will be studied
and contextualized according to two empirical cases, Ukraine and the South China Sea.
Thirdly, the paper will analyze the bilateral relation between China and Russia. Finally, the
conclusion will discuss whether a Sino-Russian alliance is a feasible path to challenge
unipolarity or the two great powers are not inclined to meet their multipolarity desires.
1. Chinese and Russian capacities and strategies within a changing world
For the past 25 years the US has entirely prevailed in great-power politics, a dominance
that is now being questioned. Layne (2012, 205) claims that unipolarity is coming to an
end:
“American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power
away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers” (Layne, 2012: 205).
China and Russia are two of these great powers that contest the hegemony of the US and
aim at dragging the nucleus of the international order towards Asia. Nonetheless, they
deeply differ in their developing stage: while China is a rising power, Russia is in long-term
decline. How to measure their actual power? This section is going to discuss the power
transition theory and the balancing power perspective to establish a number of indicators
of power capacities and strategies in Russia and China.
1.1. Power transition: embrace, balance or demolish the world order
Kagan (2007: 29) warns that the current world system offers no guarantee against major
conflict among the great powers and that it is being threaten by China and Russia.
Chinese do not share the European postmodern view that power is something from the
past, as their increasing military buildup has proven. Besides, Kagan (2007: 25) says that
Russian foreign policies have being driven by a “blend of national resentment and
ambition”, since Moscow attempts to regain influence over its neighbouring countries. The
power transition and balancing theories are going to be explained to assess the risks and
power aspirations of both countries.
- The power transition theory (PTT)
The power transition model, as Organski introduced it in 1958, conceives the international
order as a hierarchy. The most powerful nation, today the US, is placed at the top of the
hierarchical pyramid, while the rest of the great powers, such as China and Russia, are
arranged below the dominant nation. These nations do not have the current capacities to
overthrow the dominant power, but have the potential to challenge it in a future time
(Kugler & Organski, 1989: 173). The PTT is strongly attached to the realist perspective on
international relations, since the power of the nations, understood as its military capacities,
is crucial to shape the international order.
Besides, Kugler and Organski (1989: 173) claim that alliances among the dominant
nations and satisfied great powers are key to maintain the international order. Challengers
are dissatisfied great powers who believe that they are not receiving their due from the
international order (p. 175). Hence, the status quo of the countries within the international
order is a central concept that draws the difference between the PTT and most forms of
realism.
The conjugation of power and satisfaction determines whether a power transition is
peaceful or it drives to war. Chan warns about the risks of military conflicts during the
period in which the challenger is trying to overtake the hegemon, since the dominant
country could be tempted to attack the aspiring one before being overthrown (in Rauch &
Wurm, 2013: 54).
In this regard, Kagan (2007: 25) considers China and Russia two dissatisfied powers. In
the case of the Chinese, he believes that they aspire to win back its position of
predominance in East Asia, while Russians are not willing to be integrated in the new
European order and to tolerate the enlargement of the EU and NATO in the nearby of their
borders.
In conclusion, the power transition model measures power according to military strength
and the development of socioeconomic and political resources (Kugler & Organski, 1989:
190).
- Balancing power perspective
The balancing power model differs from the PTT in the belief that the states can be easily
manipulated through alliances and that their power remain practically unchanged, since
shifts can been compensated by restructuring the coalitions (Kugler & Organski, 1989:
176). Traditionalists consider military strength the main strategy of balancing power, which
is defined as hard power (Nye, 1990: 158). Nevertheless, Pape (2005, 36) explains that
balancing can also involve the utilization of tools that can dissuade superior states from
displaying military forces. This second aspect of power is defined as soft power and
implies that a country can get other countries to want what it wants without applying hard
or command power (Nye, 1989: 166). Pape (2005, 36) named some of these strategies of
soft balancing, such as economic strengthening or entangling democracy.
1.2. The moribund bear vs. the thriving dragon
Sørensen (2011: 462) classifies Russia and China as modernizing states, which indicates
that such states are undergoing a general process of transition. It also means that they are
participating in globalisation and embracing liberalism, without promoting real changes in
their economics and politics.
“They believe autocracy is better for their nations than democracy. They believe it offers order
and stability and the possibility of prosperity. They believe that for their large, fractious nations,
a strong government is essential to prevent chaos and collapse” (Kagan, 2007: 31).
In this subsection, Chinese and Russian power capacities are going to be measured in
terms of military forces and socioeconomic development according to the PTT, while their
strategies are going to be explained in the framework of hard and soft balancing.
- Russia, geopolitics strength and hard power strategy
Russia is still a fearful nuclear power, even though it is in clear decline in the post Cold
War world. Russia has retreated from Eastern Europe and lost half its population over the
past 25 years (Adelman, 2015). Besides, the country lacks modern consumer, agricultural
and hi-tech sectors and has suffered a 50 % drop in the price of its oil exports. Moreover,
Russia’s economy remains one-dimension, strictly attached to its vast reserves of oil and
natural gas, with a declining GDP projection of 3.8 % (IMF, October 2015). Its economic
power ranks under countries such as Japan, India or Germany (IMF, 2015).
Besides, the Russian currency, the Ruble, has deeply weakened in the course of the last
year due to the drop in the prices of the oil, while Moscow is still dealing with the
international economic sanctions post Ukraine 2014 (The Moscow Times, 2015). Apart
from its military strength, the second more powerful army in the world (Shen, 2015), the
Russian socioeconomic power capacities are experiencing a recession, which dissuade
Moscow from applying soft balancing strategies. Therefore, Russia has chosen being
strong in the geopolitics game, a “zero-sum territorial competition in a military-political
mode of relations among states” (Buzan and Lawson, 2014: 86).
Moscow’s last offensive actions in Syria and Ukraine have made some scholars question
whether the great power is experiencing a rebirth. Adelman (2015) stresses out that
Russia is on the offensive and willing to intervene to help its allies with its strong military
capabilities, as it has already done in Syria, where for the first time since the Cold War,
Moscow has deployed its forces far from home to crash jihadism and support a client
regime (The Economist, 2015).
Furthermore, the scholar claims that Russia has achieved again the status of major player
in geopolitics thanks to its “Eurasian geographic location, capable leadership, conservative
nationalism and resuscitation of old Cold War relationships”.
- China, geoeconomics strength and soft power strategy
China has already became the largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power
parity (PPP), after 140 years of US supremacy, with a GDP growth projection of 6.8 %
(IMF, October 2015). Since the establishment of the market reforms in the late 1970, the
size of its economy has quadrupled. China has also raised as one of the world’s major
manufactures and consumers of the global supply of iron, steel and coal (US Energy
Information, 2015). Furthermore, China’s demographics also carries weight into its vast
economic development as its populations is the equivalent to 19.24 % of the total world
population (world meters, 2015).
Simply put, China has decided to stand out in geoeconomics, which means “a zero-sum
developmental competition in an economic–political mode” (Buzan and Lawson, 2014: 86).
China’s incredibly growth is already shaping East Asia and the global market (Ikenberry,
2008). The late IMF recognition of the Chinese official currency, the Renminbi, as a main
world currency illustrates its increasing influence in geoeconomics (IMF, 2015). This is a
milestone decision that “paves the way for broader use of the renminbi in trade and
finance, securing China’s standing as a global economic power” (Bradsher, 2015).
Layne (2012: 205) claims that in order to spur the growth of its economy, China had
decided to take a low profile in the international order to avoid the conflicts with the US
and its regional neighbours:
“China’s self-described ‘peaceful rise’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘Lie
low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time’’’.
According to this scholar, the ultimate goal of Beijing is not only to become rich, but also to
achieve enough wealth to acquire the military capacities that could allow to challenge the
US in the East Asian region. Nye (1989: 259) says that money is a fungible power, hence
Chinese economic growth can be converted into military forces.
Ikenberry (2008) warns that China’s military spending has growth at an inflation-adjusted
rate of over 18 % a year. Therefore the Asian country is “emerging as both a military
competitor and an economic rival”. Nonetheless, China seems more prompted to appeal to
soft balancing strategies in international matters, rather than its military power.
China’s diplomacy has expanded beyond Asia, in Africa, Latin America and the Middle
East, to create shared interests and apply soft balancing strategies.
It has also promoted some remarkable diplomatic approaches in its region. China’s
president, Xi Jinping, has paid a historical visit to his Taiwanese counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou,
on November 7th of 2015 in Singapur, after nearly six decades of broken relations. Even if
the danger of escalation between the two countries, involving the US as an ally of Taiwan,
cannot be overlooked, some scholars, like Chan (2008, 4), say that China’s neighbours,
including Taiwan, “are more likely to engage China’s prosperity than resist it”. China has
also lately visited Vietnam, another US ally. Some vietnamese leaders argue the
importance of maintaining a balance between the two great powers, since “America is
fickle, whereas China will always be next door” (The Economist, 2015). Besides, Beijing
has started to work on a “new silk road” . On the one hand, this project will employ China’s
1
wealth to encourage the development of neighbours and regional allies, on the other hand
it will indirectly expand the Chinese soft power in the region (Graham-Harrison et al.,
2015). This diplomatic moves seem to contradict the idea of China as a revisionist great
power, however Beijing conduct towards its region sometimes differs from soft balance
methodology as it will be studied in the following section in two empirical examples.
2. Chinese and Russian’s delusions of regional hegemony
Kagan (2007: 25) outlines that Chinese are “powerfully motivated to return to what they
regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia”. Rising powers
always seek to dominate the regions in which they are situated (Mearsheimer in Layne,
2012: 206). He also warns that Russians insist on expanding their influence over its “near
broad”, because they fear the West advance. In this section, the conduct of the two
countries towards their neighbours is going to be discussed through two empirical cases.
- The Peninsula of Crimea, Russia’s red line
In spite of the economic sanctions approved by the international community against
Russia, Moscow prompted a military intervention in Ukraine that drove to the following
adhesion of Crimea in March 2014. The Crimean peninsula, placed in the northern coast
of the Black Sea, is a strategic point for Russia, as it provides military access from
Moscow to the naval base at Sevastopol. After the removal of the president Viktor
Yanukovych, Putin decided to send troops to Ukraine to destabilize the new pro-Western
government and annex Crimea. He feared that Crimea could host a NATO naval base
“The Belt and Road” is a development program that focuses on connectivity and cooperation among the countries of
1
the Silk Road route that join Central Asia with Europe.
which would threaten Russian territory. The international community leaded by the US
considered the annexation a violation of the international law and strongly condemned it:
"Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbours, not out of
strength but out of weakness. (…) We have considerably influence on our neighbours, but
we generally don't need to invade them in order to have a strong cooperative relationship
with them” (Obama, Nuclear Security Summit 2014).
In Ukraine, Russia showed that it is ready to mobilize its troops, which means to apply
hard balance tactics, in order to keep the Western influence far from its territory.
- The South China Sea, no country’s land
China is building up artificial islands in the South China Sea, a global trade route that
generates more than $5 trillion every year (Reuters, 2015). These islands are creating
disputes with is regional neighbours, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines
and Taiwan, on overlapping claims. Yet, China is imposing its power by raising military
forces. Reuters (2015) claim that China has dozens of naval and coastguards deployed in
the area at any given moment, a fact that shows the rapidly growing Chinese naval might.
Two decades ago, the US warship were able to sail there with impunity, nowadays the sea
of the South China Sea has became hostile waters (The Economist, 2015). It was clear
last October when China accused the US of violating its waters, since the US navy had
sent a destroyer within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Archipelago, part of the Chinese
artificial islands (Reuters, 2015). This reflects how the power gap between China and the
US is getting closer in the Asia-Pacific region, where the US is risking its preponderant
position (Mearsheimer, 2010: 381).
The Economist (2015) claim that China is creating islands “because it can”. Similarly,
Russia intervened in Crimea because it had calculated that its power was superior to the
Ukrainian one (Spencer, 2014). These cases prove that both countries are applying hard
balance strategies when they have the chance to do it and that their regional affairs have
often encountered the US opposition.
Beijing remained neutral over the annexation of Crimea in the UN Security Council and
refused to condemn Russia (Borger, 2014). Besides, Russian weapon systems and related
technology are helping the development of China’s naval surface capabilities (Schwartz,
2015). Both great powers share its dissatisfaction with their status in the current global
order and attempt to reach the hegemony within their regions against the US interests. For
that it seems that they are willing to cooperate or at least not to obstacle the other. Are
Russian and China on their way to forge a solid superpower axis against the US
hegemony? This is going to be evaluated in the next section.
3. Towards a Sino-Russian alliance?
Pape (2009, 17) suggests that on the one hand the power of a hegemon may dissuade the
other countries from forming a balancing coalition, but on the other hand it is still a key
reason why these states may wish to align themselves against the system. China and
Russia are second-ranked states, which means that they do not have the military
capacities to overthrow the hegemon according to the PTT. Instead they can appeal to soft
balancing measures to achieve this aim.
Kagan (2007, 21) do not see likely a coalition between China and Russia as he considers
them traditional rivals and unable to balance the US without the support of other great
powers, such as India, Europe or Japan. He agrees with Mead (2014, 3), who includes
Iran in the Sino-Russian coalition and call them “the axis of the weevils”, on the fact that
Russia fears the rise of China as much as the US do:
One should not speak of a strategic alliance among them, and over time, particularly if they
succeed in undermining US influence in Eurasia, the tensions among them are more likely
to grow than shrink (Mead, 2014: 3).
This section is going to draw some points of confluence between Russian and Chinese
interests to explain their current bilateral relations.
- In the clubs, side by side
China and Russia share membership in five international organizations. On the one hand,
they hold a privilege position in the current world order as they are permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council, where they can wield vetoes against the US interests.
In fact, China and Russia are hesitant to expand the permanent membership of the UNSC,
since it would diminish its uniqueness (Armijo & Roberts 2014, 511). The two great powers
often find themselves on the same side in this institution, as it has proven the six UN
resolutions that they have jointly vetoed, four of them regarding an intervention in Syria
(Graham-Harrison et al., 2015).
On the other hand, they are part of the group of emerging countries gathered in the
BRICS, that attempt to challenge the given system. Stuenkel (1989: 91) points out that
despite the domestic differences, the BRICS countries face similar challenges regarding
their societies’ transition to middle-income classes.
The BRICS countries have recently started a new bank the NDB with the goal of financing
infrastructure and developing countries of the group and reduce its dependency to the IMF
and the World Bank (Kamalakaran, 2015). Aside from this financial institution, Russia,
China and India has launched the AIIB. Both institutions seek to overshadow the Western
financial patterns. Armijo and Roberts (2014: 515) point out that the main dilemma of the
World Bank and the IMF is that in a world of globalized capital, they are simply too small.
Beijing and Moscow have also shown coordination in other organisms. For example, when
China took over the G20 presidency from Turkey, its president Xi Jinping told Putin that
they were willing to strengthen communication and cooperation with Russia in the course
of hosting the G20 summit (Kamalakaran, 2015).
Graph 1: the international organizations in which Russia and China share membership (Source: The
Guardian)
- Military choreographies
The growing military cooperation between China and Russia has been publicly displayed
during the war games in the Mediterranean Sea in May 2015. For the first time, a Sino-
Russian naval army completed a joint exercise, showing its naval strengths and capacities
of coordination (Gady, 2015).
Moreover, Russia exports arms to China with a value of circa $ 1 billion a year. Russia has
also agreed to supply China with S-400 surface-to-air missile system (Graham-Harrison et
al., 2015). While China is consolidating as naval power and seeks new technologies,
Russia is certainly willing to feed the dragon.
- Economic ties
The economic sanctions imposed by the international community to Russia after the
annexation of Crimea has driven Moscow to look at Beijing as a new field of opportunities.
The director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, Dmitry Trenin, wrote that "the epoch of post-
Communist Russia's integration with the West is over”:
"Russia's confrontation with the United States will help mitigate Sino-Russian rivalries,
mostly to China's advantage. But this doesn't mean Russia will be dominated by China;
Moscow will likely find a way to craft a special relationship with its partner” (Trenin, The
Moscow Times 2015).
The economy is one of the strategic issues in which the two great powers are
strengthening the ties. Last May, amid the celebrations of the Russia’s victory day, the
Russian president and his Chinese counterpart closed 32 deals that aspire to link two of
their economic integration projects: the Russian Eurasian Economic Union and the
Chinese silk of road (The Moscow Times 2015).
Furthermore, both countries are interested in challenging the US dollar preeminence in the
world trade. In fact, Russia accepts now yuan for oil. What is more, as a consequence of
the latest round of EU sanctions the market ruble-yuan reach a historic figure last Summer
(Galouchko, 2014).
China’s interests in Russia exports are mainly focused on military equipment and natural
resources. China is the second trading partner for Russia, behind the UE, and Russia has
overtaken Saudi Arabia as the main supplier of oil to China for the first time. Both countries
should be natural energy partners, but they are still struggling with the complications in the
construction of the gas pipelines to link its lands (Graham-Harrison et al., 2015).
- World policies, friends in common
China and Russia share interests at stake in Syria. The replacement of Bashar Al Assad
government would mean for both of them the loss of its last mean for influencing the
Middle East. Russia has a longstanding alliance with Syria, a traditional Russian arms
exporter. In addition, Russia has its last significant military base outside of the former
Soviet Union territory placed in the Syrian port of Tartus (Buckley, 2012: 82). For its part,
China depends on the region for the supply of oil (Buckley, 2012: 89). A change in the
current regime will endanger all these conditions. Therefore, both of them have agreed on
blocking the international interventions several times through the UNSC until Russia took
the initiative last September. The Sino-Russian pressure is the reason why Al Assad has
been able to hold his position so far against the international community wish to remove
him (Graham-Harrison et al., 2015).
Another mutual ally is Iran. Mead (2014) claims that China, Iran and Russia are all
confronting the political establishment of the Cold War. “What binds these powers together
is their agreement that the status quo must be revised”, he affirms (abstract). The US
needed Russia to close the Iran’s nuclear programme and Russia cooperated just
because the influence of China. As Baev (2015) explained it, even if Moscow knew that it
would lose from the Iranian nuclear deal, it couldn't act otherwise because the main winner
was certainly China:
“Having isolated itself from the West, Russia has effectively become reliant on its China
patron for financing and for markets. Aware of this, Beijing is driving an increasingly tough
bargain with a Russia that has fewer and fewer options” (Baev, 2015).
Moreover, Russia has been recently bolstering ties with North Korea, a deep-rooted
Chinese partner. In fact, both of them are expected to veto the UN resolutions to punish
North Korean violations of human rights (Padden, 2015). All these cases show how the
two great powers are woven a mutual network of alliances that are willing to protect by
working closely and defying the international community.
4. Conclusion
This paper has described the power political strategies and world order policies of China
and Russia in the background of a global power transition with the goal of assessing the
capacity and will of a Sino-China axis to balance against the supremacy of the US. Kagan
(2007, 21) said that “the rise of China inspire at least as much nervousness in Russia as it
does in the United States”. However, Russia is playing a key role in the expansion and
modernization of Chinese military forces.
The scholar also questions if it exists a real Chinese opposition to the US, since it still
depends on the American market. Nevertheless, China has already shown that its capable
of deploying its naval power in the South China Sea against the US navy to impose its
regional aspiration of hegemony.
Kagan (2007: 203) affirms that “Sino-Russian hostility to America predominance has not
yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing”, but this statement is not
valid anymore. Russia and China share the strategic goal of challenging the US hegemony
in favor of a more multipolar world in which they can hold the dominance of their regions.
Although several challenges lie ahead, they have already started to forge financial, military
and institutional strategic ties to balance the US hegemony and bring a multipolar world in
the long run.
Characters counter: 28.473
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