Philosophical Problems of Space and Time
Chapters (19)
The metrical comparisons of separate spatial and temporal intervals required for geo-chronometry involve rigid rods and isochronous clocks. Is this involvement of a transported congruence standard to which separate intervals can be referred a matter of the mere ascertainment of an otherwise intrinsic equality or inequality obtaining among these intervals? Or is reference to the congruence standard essential logically to the very existence of these relations?
On the conception of time congruence as conventional, the preference for the customary definition of isochronism—a preference not felt by Einstein in the general theory of relativity (GTR), as we shall see in Section B—can derive only from considerations of convenience and elegance so long as the resulting form of the theory is not prescribed. Hence, the thesis that isochronism is conventional precludes a difference in factual import (content) or in explanatory power between two descriptions one of which employs the customary isochronism while the other is a “translation” (transcription) of it into a language employing a time congruence incompatible with the customary one. As a test case for this thesis of explanatory parity, the general outline of a counter-argument has been suggested which we shall be able to state after some preliminaries.
In Der Raum,1 Carnap begins his discussion of physical space by inquiring whether and how a line in this space can be identified as straight. Arguing from testability and not, as we did in Chapter One, from the continuity of that manifold, he answers this inquiry as follows: “It is impossible in principle to ascertain this, if one restricts oneself to the unambiguous deliverances of experience and does not introduce freely chosen conventions in regard to objects of experience.”2 And he then points out that the most important convention relevant to whether certain physical lines are to be regarded as straights is the specification of the metric (“Mass-setzung”), which is conventional because it could “never be either confirmed or refuted by experience:” Its statement takes the following form: “A particular body and two fixed points on it are chosen, and it is then agreed what length is to be assigned to the interval between these points under various conditions (of temperature, position, orientation, pressure, electrical charge, etc.).
Since Einstein’s central thesis concerning the epistemological status of physical geometry will be seen in Section C to be a geometrical version of Pierre Duhem’s conception of the falsifiability of isolated empirical hypotheses, this first section will be devoted to a critical examination of Duhem’s conception as articulated by W. V. O. Quine.
A very brief review of the account of our knowledge of visual space given by Carnap, Helmholtz, and Reichenbach will precede the discussion of some problems posed by very recent experimental studies of the geometry of visual space.
It is a commonplace in the analytic geometry of physical space and time that an extended straight line segment, having positive length, is treated as “consisting of” unextended points, each of which has zero length. Analogously, time intervals of positive duration are resolved into instants, each of which has zero duration.
The causal theory of time, which had occupied an important place in the thought of Leibniz and of Kant, again became a subject of central philosophic interest during the current century after its detailed elaboration and logical refinement at the hands of G. Lechalas,1 H. Reichenbach,2 K. Lewin,3 R. Carnap,4 and H. Mehlberg.5 Specifically, it earned its new prominence in recent decades by its role in the magisterial and beautiful constructions of the relativistic topology of both time and space by Reichenbach6 and Carnap.7 More recently, I used the causal theory of time to show semantically that, with respect to the relation “later than” the events of physics can meaningfully possess the seemingly counter-intuitive denseness property of the linear Cantorean continuum. And, in this way, I was able to supply the semantical nervus probandi which had been lacking in Russell’s mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion.8
The temporally asymmetric character of the entropy statistics of branch systems has a number of important consequences which were not dealt with in Chapter Eight and to which we must now turn our attention. In particular, our conclusions regarding the entropy statistics of branch systems can now be used to elucidate (1) the conditions under which retrodiction of the past is feasible while prediction of the future is not,1 (2) the relation of psychological time to physical time, (3) the consequence which the feasibility of retrodictability without corresponding predictability has for the compossibility of explainability of the past and the corresponding predictability of the future, and (4) the merits of the controversy between philosophical mechanism and teleology.
It is clear that the anisotropy of time resulting from the existence of irreversible processes consists in the mere structural differences between the two opposite senses of time but provides no basis at all for singling out one of the two opposite senses as “the direction” of time. Hence the assertion that irreversible processes render time anisotropic is not at all equivalent to such statements as “time flows one way.”
The success of empiricism in accounting for our knowledge of the tri-dimensionality of the physical world is intimately connected with its ability to refute Kant’s claim that the existence of such similar but incongruent counterparts as the left and right hands constitutes evidence for his transcendental a priori of space.1 Since the reasons for the untenability of this particular Kantian contention are not given even in Reichenbach’s definitive empiricist critique of the transcendental idealist theory of space2 and are not sufficiently known to the philosophical public, I shall give a brief statement of them.
Since the publication of Hans Reichenbach’s definitive books on the philosophy of the theory of relativity during the nineteen twenties,1 the literature on the philosophy and history of Einstein’s special theory of relativity (hereafter called STR) has been enlarged by contributions which call for critical evaluation. In this chapter, I shall give such an evaluation in the course of presenting: (a) an up-to-date analysis of the intertwined philosophical and empirical foundations of the kinematics of the STR, with attention to neglected issues and prevalent misconceptions, and (b) a demonstration that a rigorous grasp of the philosophical conceptions underlying the fully evolved STR and distinguishing it from its ancestors is decisively prerequisite to (1) the very posing of well-conceived, searching historical questions in regard to the STR, and hence to (2) the provision of a historically sound and illuminating account of its genesis.
E. A. Milne, whose two logarithmically related t and τ scales of time were mentioned in Chapter One, Section C, has attempted to erect the usual space-time structure of the STR on the basis of a light signal kinematics of particle observers purportedly dispensing with the use of rigid solids and isochronous material clocks.1 In his Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of God,2 Milne begins his discussion of time and space by incorrectly charging Einstein with failure to realize that the concept of a rigid body as a body whose rest length is invariant under transport contains a conventional ingredient just as much as does the concept of metrical simultaneity at a distance.3 Milne then proposes to improve upon a rigid body criterion of spatial congruence by proceeding in the manner of radar ranging and using instead the round-trip times required by light to traverse the corresponding closed paths, these times not being measured by material clocks but, in outline, as follows.4 Each particle is equipped with a device for ordering the genidentical events belonging to it temporally in a linear Cantorean continuum. Such a device is called a “clock,” and the single observer at the particle using such a local clock is called a “particle-observer.”
The literature of recent decades on the philosophy and history of science has nurtured and given wide currency to a myth concerning the present status of the dispute between the absolutistic and relativistic theories of space. In particular, that literature is rife with assertions that the post-Newtonian era has witnessed “the final elimination of the concept of absolute space from the conceptual scheme of modern physics”1 by Einstein’s general theory of relativity and that the Leibniz-Huyghens polemic against Newton and Clarke has thus been triumphantly vindicated.2 In this vein, Philipp Frank recently reached the following verdict on Einstein’s success in the implementation of Ernst Mach’s program for a relativistic account of the inertial properties of matter: “Einstein started a new analysis of Newtonian mechanics which eventually vindicated Mach’s reformulation [of Newtonian mechanics].”3
Einstein’s theory of relativity was probably the most important influence on Whitehead’s philosophy of science. But Whitehead’s endeavor to reinterpret and modify Einstein’s STR and GTR in terms of the categories of his own natural philosophy issued in two important philosophical divergences from Einstein: first, as will be recalled from Chapter Twelve, Whitehead erects the STR on his espousal of a sensory absolute simultaneity for any given inertial system in opposition to Einstein’s theses on simultaneity, and second, Whitehead repudiates the GTR, because he rejects on epistemological grounds Riemann’s conception of the relation between geometry and physics, which Einstein had attempted to weave into the logical fabric of the GTR via Mach’s Principle, as explained in Chapter Fourteen.
Can we ascertain the falsity of a given scientific hypothesis H? Alternatively, could we ascertain the truth of H? One tradition answers these questions asymmetrically as follows: Alas, unfavorable results furnished by just one kind of experiment suffice to guarantee the falsity of an otherwise highly successful hypothesis. And would that favorable experimental findings had a comparable capability of establishing the truth of a hypothesis! Thus, the scientist is held to be laboring under a discouraging handicap in his quest to glean nature’s secrets. His most triumphant theories are never safe from refutation by potential contrary evidence. Hence, none of his hypotheses can ever be known to be true with certainty. But if even a small amount of contrary evidence does materialize, then the most celebrated of hypotheses is indeed known to be false.
In Chapter 8, I claimed that the coarse-grained classical entropy statistics of certain ensembles of branch systems contribute to the ‘arrow’ of time. And in Chapter 22, §4, we shall transpose this theme to a relativistic space-time. But it has been charged that the coarse-grained entropy of a physical system is an anthropomorphism, incapable of a role in physically undergirding time’s arrow. Hence it behooves us to face this charge. In the present chapter, I shall argue that the entropy in question can be validly construed in scientific realist fashion instead of being an anthropomorphism.
In his famous 1905 paper on the special theory of relativity (STR), before the subject of the relativity of simultaneity in systems in relative motion is even broached, Einstein enunciates explicitly his doctrine of the definitional character of simultaneity in a single “stationary” system ([2], p. 40). Subsequent interpreters, most notably Reichenbach, have maintained that Einstein was correctly claiming the relation of simultaneity in a single inertial system to be conventional in a significant and nontrivial sense ([4], p. 127). Einstein there describes a method of synchronizing clocks located at different places in the stationary system by a signalling process. Suppose two clocks U A and U B are located at places A and B respectively. Let a light signal be sent from A to B, where it is immediately reflected back to A. Let t 1 be the time at which the signal departs from A, and let t 3 be the time of its return to A after reflection at B, both times measured on U A. Einstein establishes a synchrony between U A and U B by stipulating that the time taken for the signal to travel from A to B equals the time it takes to return from B to A.
In what precise ways is philosophy instrumental in illuminating the genesis of the conceptual innovations wrought by a particular physical theory? In the first edition (1963) of this book and in some still earlier papers, I have used the unraveling of the history of the special theory of relativity to argue concretely that philosophy does have far-reaching relevance to the attainment of the following cardinal objectives of the historian of science: (i) the very posing of well-conceived, searching historical questions and (ii) the avoidance of serious historical blunders of certain kinds, and their discernment as such when they have been committed by those lacking the requisite philosophical mastery ([1], chap. 12; [2]). Specifically, I maintained in the context of the special theory of relativity that there is a symbiosis of the philosophy and the history of science as follows: no historically correct, let alone illuminating account of the development of that theory can be furnished without a prior rigorous comprehension of the philosophical conceptions underlying it and distinguishing it from its ancestors. At the same time, I recognized that the history of the theory, in its turn, may indeed contribute to the philosophical analysis of the theory by disclosing the vicissitudes in Einstein’s own philosophical outlook.
For nearly two decades before 1972, Professor John Wheeler pursued a research program in physics that was predicated on a monistic ontology which W. K. Clifford had envisioned in 1870 and which Wheeler (1962b, p. 225) epitomized in the following words: “There is nothing in the world except empty curved space. Matter, charge, electromagnetism, and other fields are only manifestations of the bending of space. Physics is geometry.” In an address to a 1960 Philosophy Congress (Wheeler, 1962a), he began with a qualitative synopsis of the protean role of curvature in endowing the one presumed ultimate substance, empty curved space, with a sufficient plurality of attributes to account for the observed diversity of the world. Said he (1962a):
... To describe motion of an endlessly extended particle field with granules of limited sizes, it will consist of inner and outer granules. The inner field granules show a gradual displacement, represented mathematically by equation (8). The outer particle field shows step wise displacement represented by (9). ...
... The outer particle field shows step wise displacement represented by (9). Because the largest granule within the moving space and the smallest granule of the outer part are somehow coupled, Equations (8) and (9) act simultane-ously. This means that that in the case of granulated fields, the momentum of a particle is mathematically described in two ways, resembling the particle-wave duality. ...
... Consequence of granulation is that the motion of the particle field needs to be split into an inner and an outer part. The inner part moves gradually with a moving space as point-like particles (8), the outer part coupled thereto consists of a series of jumping granules (9) that exhibit wave characteristics. ...
... There are other routes towards harmonizing relativity with quantum theory, where gravity is not being treated as a fundamental but an emerging force. All these attempts are closely linked to the metaphysical question, what space, time and matter actually are, even if this question does normally not stand at the first place in developing mathematical models of nature [1]. In this paper we proceed the reverse way. ...
... While relativity is per design a local theory, quantum physics definitely shows non-local features, which are not easily reconciled [2] 1 . A key notion of relativity theory is an "event" in space-time, which we define to be an (idealized) physical 1 , t x ∈ . ...
... While relativity is per design a local theory, quantum physics definitely shows non-local features, which are not easily reconciled [2] 1 . A key notion of relativity theory is an "event" in space-time, which we define to be an (idealized) physical 1 , t x ∈ . Einstein's equation encapsulates the local, metric relationship between events under the influence of gravity. ...
... But as Castagnino et al. (2003b) correctly remark, such distinctions are 1 The literature on the problem of the direction of time is vast and ever expanding. The reader may consult Reichenbach (1956), Grünbaum (1973), Sklar (1974), Horwich (1987, Albert (2000), Dainton (2010) and Callender (2016Callender ( , 2017 by way of general introduction to the topic. ...
... 24 The more ambitious project was pioneered by Reichenbach (1928Reichenbach ( , 1958Reichenbach ( , 1956, and was further developed by Grünbaum (1963Grünbaum ( , 1973, and van Fraassen (1970) however, was well aware of the difficulty of his project, given how natural it is to slip back to the Humean way of thinking: ...
The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to closely explore the nature of Einstein’s block universe and to tease out its implications for the nature of time and human freedom. Four questions, in particular, are central to this dissertation, and set out the four dimensions of this philosophical investigation: (1) Does the block universe view of time follow inevitably from the theory of special relativity? (2) Is there room for the passage of time in the block universe? (3) Can we distinguish past from future in the block universe? (4) Is there room for human freedom in the block universe? Although the answer of most philosophers would be yes, triple no, my own answer, controversially, is no, triple yes. I thereby challenge the status quo with respect to each of these metaphysical questions, and argue that none of these questions can be answered from looking at physics alone. Physics may constrain our metaphysics, but it certainly does not settle it. What is needed in order to answer these questions, are additional metaphysical assumptions that fall outside the scope of modern physics. My primary goal in this dissertation, therefore, is not to settle the debates on the nature of time and human freedom, but to clarify them by expliciting the metaphysical assumptions that are otherwise left implicit.
... I have critically analysed Boltzmann's approach to the arrow of time. For philosophers, the attempts of Reichenbach [14], and his followers (particularly Smart [15] and Grünbaum [16]) are perhaps better known. According to the approach initiated by Reichenbach, if we find some traces of the past, such as footprint shaped marks on the beach, we can infer from this that "at some earlier time an interaction took place, that a person's steps caused the ordered state of the sand" [14] (p. ...
... 151) because "this orderliness is bought at the expense of an increased disorderliness (metabolic depletion) of the pedestrian who made it" [15] (p. 469) or-using Grünbaum's words-"we can reliably infer a past interaction of the system with an outside agency from a present ordered or low entropy state" [16] (p. 235). ...
The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, To this end, the approaches of Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific research programmes.
... In the other direction, one might argue against Line Hypothesis either (as floated by Sorabji [12] (p. 318)) by appeal to the claim that the past must be finite in duration or, following Grünbaum [17] (p. 202), by appeal to the following version of the Identity of Indiscernibles: PII: Necessarily, if x and y have exactly the same purely qualitative properties, then x = y. ...
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world of the first kind rather than a world of the second kind? We argue for the affirmative answer, contra Quine, Newton-Smith, and Bergström. Our argument for that conclusion differs from an argument for the same conclusion due to Weir. Weir’s argument is probabilistic and explicitly requires having evidence against determinism. Our argument is a direct appeal to the simplicity of laws, and it involves no probabilistic component. It is modeled on Shoemaker’s argument that one could have evidence of time without change.
... It is believed that time is a form of physical, biological and mental processes, a factor of change and evolution. It is a measure of the duration of the existence of all objects, a characteristic of the successive change of their states in the processes and the processes themselves, as well as one of the coordinates of a single space-time described in the special and general theories of relativity [1,2,3]. Moreover, in theoretical physics, starting with Newton, time is usually used simply as a mathematical parameter. ...
The evolutionary aspect of the nature of physical time is a scantily explored problem. However, the description of the observable Universe as an analogue of a white hole with the movement of observers in it can well explain the specifics of the flow of one-dimensional irreversible and evolutionary cosmological time. This irreversible movement that determines the flow of time is generated by gravity. At a quantum level, the evolutionary nature and the irreversibility of time is described by a continuous second-order phase transition that occurs during the condensation of primary Planck mass fermions in the superconducting cosmological model (CMS) proposed by the author. At the same time, the specificity of cosmological, macroscopic space-time is determined by the dynamics of microscopic quantum processes on Planck scales.
The antirealist position on temporal passage is that time exists but does not pass. Antirealists either claim that experiences of passage represent something that does not exist or that these experiences do not represent passage. This paper reconstructs and defends an argument for the reality of passage by Milič Čapek that is based on the idea of mental passage, the passage of experience itself. The belief that mental passage exists is introspectively justified. This justification is not undermined by perceptual illusions and is also compatible with antirealist explanations of why the belief arises. Both physicalism and psychophysical dualism justify the premise that mental passage implies physical passage. Arguments by Huw Price and Simon Prosser purport to show that experiences do not represent physical passage. However, these arguments rely on thought experiments that presuppose the non-existence of mental passage, and therefore miss the fact that mental passage enables the representation of physical passage.
In a rod of length AB , rotating uniformly, any two spatially separated points along the rod are connected in a way that shows analogies with the quantum entanglement of the spin of particles. This ”classical entanglement” reflects the simultaneity preset in the system, which can be used for syncing two distant clocks, one at A and the other at B. Since it differs from Einstein synchronization, this procedure can be adopted for testing the one-way light speed and Lorentz invariance. Applications to optical Sagnac effects confirm that a consistent interpretation requires the adoption of absolute versus relative simultaneity.
Geometric underdetermination (i.e., the underdetermination of the geometric properties of space and time) is a live possibility in light of some of our best theories of physics. In response to this, geometric conventionalism offers a selective anti-realism, refusing to assign truth values to variant geometric propositions. Although often regarded as being dead in the water by modern philosophers, in this article we propose to revitalise the programme of geometric conventionalism both on its own terms, and as an attractive response to the above-mentioned live cases of geometric underdetermination. Specifically, we (1) articulate geometrical conventionalism as we conceive it, (2) anticipate various objections to the view, and defend it against those objections, and (3) demonstrate how geometric conventionalism plays out in the context of a wide variety of spacetime theories, both classical and relativistic.
If God exists atemporally, could God still be temporally conscious? This article aims to clarify a conceptual space for a divine temporal mode of consciousness under the traditional assumption that God exists atemporally. I contend that an atemporally existing and conscious God – by the divine nature, and not just the human nature in Christ – could also be conscious of the temporal world – and indeed, all possible temporal worlds – through a temporal mode that is akin to human temporal consciousness, albeit exempt from its limitations. I submit that although (a) God exists atemporally (ontological atemporalism), (b) God could be both temporally and atemporally conscious (bimodalism of divine consciousness), and (c) these two modes of consciousness could be unified in an absolute divine consciousness without incurring schizophrenia-like problems (unity of bimodal divine consciousness).
Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics.
The evolution of gravitational tests from an epistemological perspective framed in the concept of rational reconstruction of Imre Lakatos, based on his methodology of research programmes. Unlike other works on the same subject, the evaluated period is very extensive, starting with Newton's natural philosophy and up to the quantum gravity theories of today. In order to explain in a more rational way the complex evolution of the gravity concept of the last century, I propose a natural extension of the methodology of the research programmes of Lakatos that I then use during the paper. I believe that this approach offers a new perspective on how evolved over time the concept of gravity and the methods of testing each theory of gravity, through observations and experiments. I argue, based on the methodology of the research programmes and the studies of scientists and philosophers, that the current theories of quantum gravity are degenerative, due to the lack of experimental evidence over a long period of time and of self-immunization against the possibility of falsification. Moreover, a methodological current is being developed that assigns a secondary, unimportant role to verification through observations and/or experiments. For this reason, it will not be possible to have a complete theory of quantum gravity in its current form, which to include to the limit the general relativity, since physical theories have always been adjusted, during their evolution, based on observational or experimental tests, and verified by the predictions made. Also, contrary to a widespread opinion and current active programs regarding the unification of all the fundamental forces of physics in a single final theory, based on string theory, I argue that this unification is generally unlikely, and it is not possible anyway for a unification to be developed based on current theories of quantum gravity, including string theory. In addition, I support the views of some scientists and philosophers that currently too much resources are being consumed on the idea of developing quantum gravity theories, and in particular string theory, to include general relativity and to unify gravity with other forces, as long as science does not impose such research programs.
The special theory of relativity holds significant interest for scientific perspectivists. In this paper, I distinguish between two related meanings of “perspectival,” and argue that reference frames are perspectives, provided that perspectival means “being conditional” rather than “being partial.” Frame-dependent properties such as length, time duration, and simultaneity, are not partially measured in a reference frame, but their measurements are conditional on the choice of frame. I also discuss whether the constancy of the speed of light depends on perspectival factors such as the idealized definition of the speed of light in a perfect vacuum and the Einstein synchronization convention. Furthermore, I argue for the view that the constancy of its speed is a robust property of light according to the conditions of currently acceptable experimental setups pertaining to special relativity, and conclude that this view supports perspectivism.
The arrow of time refers to the curious asymmetry that distinguishes the future from the past. Reversing the Arrow of Time argues that there is an intimate link between the symmetries of 'time itself' and time reversal symmetry in physical theories, which has wide-ranging implications for both physics and its philosophy. This link helps to clarify how we can learn about the symmetries of our world; how to understand the relationship between symmetries and what is real, and how to overcome pervasive illusions about the direction of time. Roberts explains the significance of time reversal in a way that intertwines physics and philosophy, to establish what the arrow of time means and how we can come to know it. This book is both mathematically and philosophically rigorous yet remains accessible to advanced undergraduates in physics and philosophy of physics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Providing a comprehensive exposition of the transactional interpretation (TI) of quantum mechanics, this book sheds new light on long-standing problems in quantum theory such as the physical meaning of the 'Born Rule' for the probabilities of measurement results, and demonstrates the ability of TI to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. It provides robust refutations of various objections and challenges to TI, such as Maudlin's inconsistency challenge, and explicitly extends TI into the relativistic domain, providing new insight into the basic compatibility of TI with relativity and the meaning of 'virtual particles.' It breaks new ground in approaches to interpreting quantum theory and presents a compelling new ontological picture of quantum reality. This substantially revised and updated second edition is ideal for researchers and graduate students interested in the philosophy of physics and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Combining twenty-six original essays written by an impressive line-up of distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics, this anthology reflects some of the latest thoughts by leading experts on the influence of Bell's theorem on quantum physics. Essays progress from John Bell's character and background, through studies of his main work, and on to more speculative ideas, addressing the controversies surrounding the theorem, and investigating the theorem's meaning and its deep implications for the nature of physical reality. Combined, they present a powerful comment on the undeniable significance of Bell's theorem for the development of ideas in quantum physics over the past 50 years. Questions surrounding the assumptions and significance of Bell's work still inspire discussion in the field of quantum physics. Adding to this with a theoretical and philosophical perspective, this balanced anthology is an indispensable volume for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Since their inception, the Perspectives in Logic and Lecture Notes in Logic series have published seminal works by leading logicians. Many of the original books in the series have been unavailable for years, but they are now in print once again. This volume, the sixth publication in the Lecture Notes in Logic series, collects the proceedings of the conference 'Logical Foundations of Mathematics, Computer Science, and Physics - Kurt Gödel's Legacy', held in Brno, Czech Republic, on the 90th anniversary of Gödel's birth. The broad range of speakers who participated in this event affirms the continuing importance of Gödel's work in logic, physics, and the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and computer science. The papers in this volume range over all these topics and contribute to our present understanding of them.
In a short 1997 book entitled Simplicity as Evidence of Truth , the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne has put forward the following thesis summarily: ‘… for theories (of equal scope) rendering equally probable our observational data (which, for brevity I shall call equally good at “predicting”), fitting equally well with background knowledge, the simplest is most probably true’.
Reichenbach explains temporally asymmetric phenomena by appeal to entropy and ‘branch structure’. He explains why the entropic gradients of isolated subsystems are oriented towards the future and not the past, and why we have records of the past and not the future, by appeal to the fact that the universe is currently on a long entropic upgrade with subsystems that branch off and become quasi-isolated. Reichenbach’s approach has been criticised for relying too closely on entropy. The more popular approach nowadays is to appeal instead to a particular low-entropy initial state—Albert’s ‘Past Hypothesis’. I’ll argue that this neglect of Reichenbach’s approach is unwarranted. A Reichenbachian account has important advantages over Albert’s: it correctly identifies the minimal temporally asymmetric posit needed to derive key temporally asymmetries and it offers a more adequate account of the record asymmetry. While a Reichenbachian account needs to be supplemented, it provides the right foundations for explaining temporally asymmetric phenomena and what we might ultimately mean by ‘the direction of time’.
We deal intensively with the spatiotemporal structure and the related insights, such as general and special relativity, the three arrows of time, the thermodynamic, the psychological and the cosmological. The connections of the spatiotemporal structure and consciousness lead us to intentionality and selected behavioral aspects. The chapter concludes with the spatiotemporal relational framework for the individual events discussed.
This paper presents a line of thought against the possibility of causation without time. That possibility, insofar as it is supposedly rested upon a Lewisian counterfactual theory of causation, does not stand up to scrutiny. The key point is that, as a reflection on the trans-world identity of events reveals, (distinct) events deprived of times are—according to Lewis’s own semantics of counterfactuals—no longer eligible to stand in counterfactual dependence.
Both early analytic philosophy and the branch of mathematics now known as topology were gestated and born in the early part of the 20th century. It is not well recognized that there was early interaction between the communities practicing and developing these fields. We trace the history of how topological ideas entered into analytic philosophy through two migrations, an earlier one conceiving of topology geometrically and a later one conceiving of topology algebraically. This allows us to reassess the influence and significance of topological methods for philosophy, including the possible fruitfulness of a third conception of topology as a structure determining similarity.
How is it that the basic structures of space and time come to manifest themselves in physical theories and theorising, and in our empirical experience of the world? This question is central to an important field of the philosophy of physics: the epistemology of spacetime. In this article, we survey systematically the various responses which have been offered to this question, highlighting little‐explored connections and open research questions.
Eternalism is the view that the past, the present and the future exist simpliciter. A typical argument in favor of this view leans on the relativity of simultaneity. The 'equally real with' relation is assumed to be transitive between spacelike separated events connected by hyperplanes of simultaneity. This reasoning is in tension with the conventionality of simultaneity. Conventionality indicates that, even within a specific frame, simultaneity is based on the choice of the synchronization parameter. Hence the argument for eternalism is compromised. This paper lays out alternative eternalist strategies which do not hinge on hyperplanes. While we lack a rigorous proof for eternalism, there are still cogent reasons to prefer eternalism over presentism.
La epistemología ha buscado dar cuenta de la validez del cambio científico mediante la formulación de reglas metodológicas que permitieran establecer, sin ambigüedad de por medio, cómo y cuándo seleccionar o rechazar las teorías científicas. Sin embargo, la tesis de Duhem (1906) socava este proyecto: si ninguna ley general tiene consecuencias observacionales por sí misma, entonces resulta ilusorio suponer que tales leyes generales o hipótesis pudieran ser verificadas y/o refutadas hic et nunc. Esta tesis es el principal motivo de que los intentos de garantizar la imparcialidad del progreso científico mediante una metodología algorítmica (Kuhn dixit) hayan sido abandonados y, al mismo tiempo, abre la posibilidad de explicar dicha justificación mediante una racionalidad práctica y, específicamente, recurriendo a una epistemología de la virtud (verbigracia, Velasco 1997). En este artículo sostengo que el intento de dar cuenta de la validez del cambio teórico-conceptual mediante una racionalidad práctica resulta tan inadecuado como el intento de hacerlo recurriendo a la tradición metodológica. Para sustentar mi tesis, primero reconstruyo el debate que hubo entre Grünbaum (1976), Feyerabend (2016), Laudan (1976) y Ariew (1984) sobre la exégesis que brinda Quine (1961) de la tesis de Duhem. El resultado de esta discusión consiste en que identificar la tesis de Duhem con la llamada tesis de Duhem-Quine es un malentendido exegético. Enseguida, abordo la pregunta acerca de si el buen sentido [bon sens] de Duhem permite explicar la imparcialidad durante la elección entre teorías que sean empíricamente equivalentes, pero distintas e incompatibles entre sí. Tras exponer, examinar y, en la medida de lo posible, contribuir con la argumentación al respecto llevada a cabo por Stump (2006), Ivanova (2010) y Fairweather (2011), concluyo que semejante tentativa resulta insatisfactoria.
The true nature of space and time has been a topic of natural philosophy, passed down since the presocratic era. In modern times reflection has particularly been inspired by the physical theories of Newton and Einstein and, more recently, by the quest for a theory of quantum gravity. In this paper we want to specify the idea that material systems and their spatio-temporal distances emerge from quantum-events. We will show a mechanism, by which quantum-events induce a metric field between material systems, which is governed by Einstein's equation including a cosmological constant.
Albert Einstein a proposé trois tests de relativité générale, appelés plus tard les tests classiques de relativité générale, en 1916 : la précession de l'orbite de Mercure, la déviation de la lumière du soleil, et le décalage vers le rouge gravitationnel de la lumière. Dicke et Schiff ont établi un cadre pour tester la relativité générale , y compris par le biais d'expériences nulles et en utilisant la physique de l'exploration spatiale, de l'électronique et de la matière condensée, comme l'expérience Pound-Rebka et l'interférométrie laser.
We investigate the dynamics of dust matter with bulk viscosity effects. We explored the analogy dynamical problem to Chaplygin gas. Due to this analogy we give exact solutions for the FRW cosmology with viscosity coefficient parameterized by the Belinskii–Khalatnikov power law dependence with respect to energy density. These exact solutions are given in the form of hypergeometrical functions. We proved simple theorem which illustrated as viscosity effects can solved the initial singularity problem present in standard cosmological model.
The claim that some assertion is true “as a matter of convention” is likely to arise only in the circumstance that the assertion is allowed to be true, though an account of its believability as being warranted by its conformity to observable facts is taken to be inadequate.
Given the central role played by space and time both in our ordinary experience and in our attempts to understand the world by means of scientific theory, it is no surprise that attempts to understand space and time form a central locus of the interaction of philosophy and the physical sciences.
Galileo Galilei was born at Pisa in Italy on 18 February 1564 and died at Arcetri, near Florence, on 8 January 1642. He excelled in observational and theoretical astronomy, natural philosophy, and applied science. An outstanding theoretical and experimental physicist, he is perhaps best known for his defense of the Copernican heliocentric theory in astronomy, and for his humiliating treatment at the hands of the Catholic Inquisition, following the papal condemnation (23 February 1616) of heliocentrism as heretical and at odds with biblical teaching. Forced to recant his Copernican convictions, Galileo spent the last years of his life under house arrest in Arcetri. Even though completely blind and continually harassed by his enemies, in his last years he completed his Discorsi e Dimonstrazioni matematiche intorno a due nouve scienze (1638), a work that created modern mechanics.
Grünbaum's three chief fields of research were space-time philosophy, the methodological credentials of psychoanalysis, and reasons given in favor of the existence of God. Grünbaum defended the so-called conventionality thesis of physical geometry. He partially followed Hans Reichenbach in this respect but developed a new ontological argument for the conventionality claim in addition. In addressing the physical basis of the direction of time, Grünbaum advocated that there is a physical basis for the distinction between the past and the future (or the anisotropy of time), but no such basis for the idea of a ‘present’ moving through time. His main claim in scrutinizing Freud’s theory methodologically was that supporting the causal claims Freud made would have required data that go beyond the clinical setting. Finally, Grünbaum worked on the philosophy of religion and set out to undermine arguments for the existence of God.
Wir befassen uns intensiv mit der Raum-Zeit-Struktur und den damit vebundenen Erkenntnissen, wie Allgemeine und Spezielle Relativitätstheorie, den drei Zeitpfeilen, dem thermodynamischen, dem psychologischen und dem kosmologischen. Die Verbindungen der Raum-Zeit-Struktur und dem Bewusstsein führen uns hin zur Intentionalität und ausgewählten Verhaltensaspekten. Das Kapitel schließt mit dem raum-zeitlichen Beziehungsrahmen für die diskutierten Einzelereignisse.
In the previous chapter, we have deepened some formal issues developed in Chap. 3. Now, we shall deepen the related conceptual issues. I have stressed that notions like causal constraints and potentiality need to be effective in solving our problems in interpreting QM. In general, I have piecewise proposed a schematic interpretational framework that needs now to be constructively developed, improved and tested. In the first section, a preliminary examination of the concepts of quantum events and quantum features is developed, two notions that are problematic to deal with in a classical framework.
In this paper, I develop an original view of the structure of space—called infinitesimal atomism—as a reply to Zeno’s paradox of measure. According to this view, space is composed of ultimate parts with infinitesimal size, where infinitesimals are understood within the framework of Robinson’s (Non-standard analysis. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1966) nonstandard analysis. Notably, this view satisfies a version of additivity: for every region that has a size, its size is the sum of the sizes of its disjoint parts. In particular, the size of a finite region is the sum of the sizes of its infinitesimal parts. Although this view is a coherent approach to Zeno’s paradox and is preferable to Skyrms’s (Physics, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Volume 76 of the series Boston studies in the philosophy of science, pp 223–254, 1983) infinitesimal approach, it faces both the main problem for the standard view (the problem of unmeasurable regions) and the main problem for finite atomism (Weyl’s tile argument), leaving it with no clear advantage over these familiar alternatives.
A szerző dolgozatában az idő szerepét vizsgálja a versenyképes vállalati működés aspektusában. Az idő szerepének érzékeltetésére – rövid „elméleti alapvetést” követően – először azt kísérli meg áttekinteni, hogy mi jellemzi az idő ütemének változását. Majd azt vázolja fel, hogy milyen időtípusok játszanak szerepet a vállalatok üzleti stratégiájának és terveinek kialakításában. Ezt követően sorra veszi a vállalatok vezetésében megjelenő időfogalmakat. Végül részletesen bemutatja a 3MAST modellt.
The article discusses the problem of the possibility of knowing the future, especially the future of social phenomena compared with the future of natural ones. This problem is formulated as a dilemma: the future can be explored or can be only constructed. The idea of constructive character of knowledge of the future is viewed in two possible interpretations.The first one is a special case of the constructivist interpretation of knowledge, according to which different pictures of the future are arbitrarily constructed on the basis of information about the past and current state. The second interpretaion can be presented in the form of a praxeological question: what should be an action in relation to the future, first and foremost to the future of social phenomena - cognitive or creative. It is shown that, in the first case, there is an ability to interpret knowledge of the future from the point of view of epistemological realism, in the second case, both cognitive and creative types of activity as a pragmatic position in relation to the future are necessary and cognitive activity cannot be reduced to creative one. It is also shown that forecaster’s dilemma reflects the problematic nature of forecasting under the conditions of transformation of scientific rationality and point of view of common sense, which is observed in recent decades.
We prove three obstruction results on the existence of equations of state in clusters of stellar systems fulfilling mass-radius relations and some additional bound (on the mass, on the radius or a causal bound). The theorems are proved in great generality. We start with a motivating example of TOV systems and apply our results to stellar systems arising from experimental data.
anet Folina ha propuesto una interpretación del convencionalismo de Poincaré frente a Michael Friedman y Robert DiSalle. Ambos afirman que la propuesta de Poincaré queda refutada por la relatividad general, por suponer una noción restrictiva de los principios a priori. Folina sostiene que el convencionalismo de Poincaré no resulta contradictorio con la relatividad general, en cuanto permite una noción relativizada de los principios a priori. Pretendemos mostrar que la estrategia de Folina es ineficaz, por cuanto Poincaré no puede explicar el papel de la variedad de Riemann en la relatividad general. Concluiremos que la tentativa de reconstruir el desarrollo de la relatividad general a partir de la filosofía de Poincaré puede constituir un obstáculo para comprender la radicalidad del cambio que la relatividad generó en las relaciones entre física y geometría.
An attainable way to understand why we must reasonably doubt about a definite aspect of Albert Einstein´s geometric theory of gravitation, when he denies the character of force for gravity, is throughout the history of Relativity Principle and Inertial Law, from its postulation by Galileo Galilei, its rectification by Newton for the infinite space without resistance to movement, its transformation in the Special Theory of Relativity to receive the Constancy Principle of the Speed of Light, and its final role in the General Theory as a way to explain gravity by means of the solecurvature of space.Keywords: gravedad, inercia, movimiento, teoría, Lógica de la Representación.
Discussions about the nature of space and time in Western thought can be traced to the early Pre-Socratic philosophers.
In relativistic theories the effect of nonconservation of simultaneity can be separated from that of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction. Since with absolute synchronization simultaneity is conserved, we show that a simple kinematic test may discriminate absolute from Einstein synchronization, settling the century-long debate on the conventionality of the one-way speed of light. An immediate consequence is that Einstein’s postulate of a universal light speed can actually be tested and the unique physical meaning of special relativity (SR) is restored. Only an experiment can corroborate SR or identify the preferred frame of reference.
A recently published hypothesis on the nature of time by physicist Robert Muller seeks to provide an objective account of the present moment (the ‘now’) and the ‘flow’ of time. Muller also claims that his hypothesis makes testable predictions. It is shown that the predictions offered cannot be used to test Muller’s hypothesis, that the hypothesis (as presented) does not rate scientific status, has a number of questionable metaphysical premises, and is merely a re-fashioning of the Growing Block theory of time.
First published 1970 by Random House; second edition published 1985 by Columbia University Press. Copyright reverted to author in 2015. This is electronic edition prepared since then
The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time (in presentism and eternalism) have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance.
To apply effective teaching and learning strategies, it is essential to
understand the complexity of human groups, especially in educational contexts. To look for the relationship between the contributions that people make, it is critical to understand the singularities of cultures when developing innovations and to foster leadership in education. This chapter presents an experience developed in Higher Education in Chile focused on the ability of preservice teachers to enhance the development of individual talents as an active teaching and learning strategy to create a society made up of integrally developed people in educational contexts. In addition, we use virtual learning environments as a vehicle to connect students between physical and virtual boundaries. This strategy is based on the Talent Management Model which was implemented in intercultural primary schools by professors and preservice teachers from the south of Chile. The virtuality dimension promoted the detection of individual traits of students and contributed to the development of a cultural identity. Additionally, it offered theoretical and practical knowledge that implied an innovation in the training of future teachers.
Keywords: Preservice teachers; virtuality; higher education; interculturalism; talent management; teaching and learning strategies
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