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Debating REDD+and its implications:
reply to Angelsen et al.
Robert Fletcher,1∗Wolfram Dressler,2Bram B¨
uscher,1and Zachary R. Anderson3
1Sociology of Development and Change, Wageningen University, De Leeuwenborch, Hollandseweg 1, 6707 KN, Wageningen,
Netherlands
2School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia
3Department of Geography and Planning, University of Toronto, 100 St. George Street, Room 5047, Toronto, ON M55 3G3, Canada
Introduction
We appreciate Angelsen et al.’s (2017) response to our
Diversity piece (Fletcher et al. 2016) in which we aimed
to inspire just this sort of serious public discussion about
how to address the implications of the widespread failure
of REDD+to realize its original ambition to develop a
global market for conservation funding. That most of the
response’s authors represent the Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR), one of the main centers for
investigation of REDD+and related issues, makes their
confirmation that a “global carbon market has not mate-
rialized and is unlikely to emerge” especially important.
Equally significant is Angelsen et al.’s affirmation that, in
practice, REDD+has largely evolved “into a light form
of result-based aid,” with the “tiny segment” comprising
“payments for verified emission reductions from the vol-
untary carbon market” being “about the only genuine MBI
[market-based instrument] left” of the envisioned global
market.
Yet, there are important elements of our original anal-
ysis that we believe they either overlooked or misinter-
preted. We hope to publish a more thorough analysis
soon. In the meantime, here, we seek to clarify briefly
several key issues in the interest of moving the discussion
forward.
The Nature of Payments for Ecosystem Services
One of Angelsen et al.’s main points is that we misun-
derstand the nature of payments for ecosystem services
(PES). Although REDD+is of course not synonymous
with PES, its development was strongly informed by
PES logic. Angelsen et al. claim we assert that PES requires
∗email robert.fletcher@wur.nl
Paper submitted January 2, 2017; revised manuscript accepted March 7, 2017.
that “extractive companies (or local forest users) have to
be compensated for the external costs they cause,” in
which case “the company gets an additional benefit from
imposing such costs on others and therefore needs more
compensation.”
This is certainly not what we argue. Our central point
is that there seems to be an inherent contradiction in
the PES logic that has informed REDD+development
in terms of the basic disjuncture between the source
and aim of payments. Although buyers pay only to off-
set their emissions, sellers need their entire opportunity
costs covered. Hence, basic dynamics of supply and de-
mand seem grossly mismatched in this ostensive market.
As far as we can tell, this fundamental issue of PES design
has never been identified or addressed directly and is
likely the reason that, like REDD+, in practice most PES
programs have largely failed to function as the MBIs they
were envisioned to be (Wunder 2015; Fletcher & B¨
uscher
2017). Thus, it is not just that “[t]he PES approach has
been less universally viable than mainstream REDD+ac-
tors had initially hoped”; rather, it is that PES, like the
REDD+mechanism modeled on it, has become a very
different entity than originally envisioned. Although it
is certainly true that a company “would only need to
be compensated for the loss of profit related to switch-
ing to more environmentally benign practices” such as
sustainable forestry, in our experience this is a minor
aspect of the overall REDD+landscape, which focuses
mostly on forest conservation (Turnhout et al. 2017).
In this case, to compete on market terms, payments
would indeed need to match, or exceed, the full po-
tential profits lost when other land-use opportunities are
foregone. This is the opportunity cost side of the PES
equation.
1
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2017 Society for Conservation Biology
DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12934
2Debating REDD+
The other side is that even if PES and REDD+can out-
compete conventional production, this would still not
be enough to make it the environmentally and socially
beneficial (i.e., sustainable) practice that many propo-
nents desire. Making REDD+function in this way would
require generating even more resources to fill the gap
between competitive market payments and truly sustain-
able livelihoods.
Consider Costa Rica’s national PES program, widely
considered a model for global best practice, and the
country’s nascent REDD+initiative (Fletcher & Breitling
2012). Payments for forest conservation—the program’s
main aim—are far below what most participants can earn
through alternate land use such as production of palm
oil (Fletcher 2012). Hence, the program relies on a legal
prohibition on land-use change for which payments serve
as something of a “quid pro quo” rather than an actual
incentive for conservation (Pagiola 2008:9). And even
though activities such as palm-oil production are more
lucrative than PES, they still do not generally provide
more than a base subsistence living (Beggs & Moore
2013). Hence, many forest owners must rely on cheap
food and other products that have their own social and
environmental costs.
For PES to not only outcompete palm-oil profits, but
also support an adequate standard of healthy living would
thus require generating even more funding to cover these
extra costs. To stay directly competitive with alternate
land use, by contrast, would require PES itself to ex-
ternalize social and environmental costs that must be
borne elsewhere for the program to survive (Lohmann
2014). For instance, the program does not account for
emissions caused by representatives driving to PES field
sites or the relatively low salaries these representatives
receive. And even so, funding barely keeps pace with
growing demand and relies on grants and loans from the
World Bank and other organizations whose own funding
entails externalization of various costs. Where program
funding comes directly from the profits of conventional
production, even relatively benign activities such as bev-
erage manufacturing, this revenue is itself at least partially
generated through externalization of social and environ-
mental impacts only some of which are addressed in the
offset payments themselves.
These are the issues we sought to call attention to.
Although REDD+cannot be expected to address all
these alone, they are important considerations in terms
of the mechanism’s contribution to a truly sustainable
development.
Thinking Globally and Acting Locally
Beyond such misunderstandings, however, Angelsen
et al. neglect to directly address the main aims of our
intervention. Rather than debating the precise nature
of REDD+, we primarily sought to call attention to the
implications of the challenges it has faced, both for
communities targeted for REDD+implementation and
for conservation strategies more generally. Starting with
the latter point, we suggested taking this moment to
rethink the current trajectory of the global conservation
movement generally. Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of
REDD+, after all, further market engagement continues
to be promoted widely. Since Fletcher et al. (2016) was
published, for instance, the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature held its 2016 World Conservation
Congress (WCC), where a main topic of discussion was
the intensification of market-based approaches under
the banner of “natural capital valuation” (B¨
uscher &
Fletcher 2016). In support of this approach, many of the
world’s most influential conservation organizations came
together at the WCC to form a Coalition for the Private
Investment in Conservation (http://sdg.iisd.org/news/
coalition-for-private-investment-in-conservation-natural-
capital-protocol-presented-at-iucn-wcc/) to build on
the newfound campaign, highlighted in our original
commentary, to promote conservation as a distinct
“asset class” within conventional financial markets. It
is this trajectory, of which REDD+is only a small and
increasingly insignificant piece, which we sought to
highlight and question. We hope that Angelsen et al. and
others will take this issue up in the future as well.
Finally, Angelsen et al. devote scant attention to what
most inspired our original commentary: Our concern that
rural communities around the world promised REDD+
benefits would be left hanging if the mechanism fails
and hence that both their own development aspirations
and the prospects of their support for future conserva-
tion interventions would be shattered in the process. If
“[i]mplementers of REDD+clearly attempt to involve
local people in REDD+and to promote equitable out-
comes” (Angelsen et al.) then, we hope that they will
also consider our plea to address the consequences of
REDD+funding shortfalls for affected local people.
Sharing the Wealth
Our original engagement with these issues was not, as
Angelsen et al. contend, to advance mere “devolution
of rights to local people” as yet another “single, one-
dimensional solution.” Rather, we sought to shift the
focus to the overarching political economy of conserva-
tion funding and implementation. Had space permitted,
we would have expanded on our brief observation that
transferring rights locally with redistributive elements (in
the form of commons) is not necessarily synonymous
with community-based natural resource management ini-
tiatives, which rarely grant communities the autonomy,
politically or economically, to effectively manage and
control their own resources (Dressler et al. 2010). Hence,
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Volume 00, No. 0, 2017
Fletcher et al. 3
their efforts to do so must be supported by political action
to promote community interests in the face of compet-
ing claims on their resources often exerted by power-
ful multinational extractive enterprises and other actors.
Likewise, communities must be provided with sustain-
able funding streams that do not require them to submit
to competitive global markets in which they have little
power. New initiatives must be promoted that explicitly
shift the dominant focus away from market engagement
toward a dramatic redistribution in access and control
of existing resources. Indeed, it was the emergence of
critical voices within civil society calling for social safe-
guards that helped shape the current extra-market forms
of both REDD+and PES programs. If in practice REDD+
thus contributes to the “incipient mobilization of forces
to effectively contain business-as-usual interests, includ-
ing the use of command-and-control tools rather than
incentives” (Angelsen et al.), then this effort should be
continued. As we asserted, the task now is to build on this
base to develop policy measures that embody an equally
explicit acknowledgment that the future of conservation
in general lies not in expanding markets but in better
sharing the wealth we already have.
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