Militarist Peace in South America, Conditions for War and Peace
Abstract
Martin derives several realist and liberal propositions on the causes of war and peace and tests them, utilizing evidence from the peace in South America, as well as developing and discussing the "Militarist Peace" hypothesis.
... There are multiple explanations offered for the long South American peace within this first group, ranging from the traditional Liberal triangulation of peace: democracy, economic inter-dependence, and institutions (Peceny 1994;Kacowicz 1998;2000;cf. Kahhat 2003), the hegemonic role of the United States (Desch 1998;Treverton 1986;Sicker 2002;Molineu 1990;Butt 2013), the roles of military confraternities (Martín 2006a;Little 1986;Andreski 1980), shared cultural identities, religion, language, and a common anti-monarchical past (Thies 2008;Miller 2007: 306-336;Barletta & Trinkunas 2004;Foote & Harder Horst 2010), and the construction of a "zone of peace" or pluralistic security community (Hurrell 1998a;Oelsner 2005a;2005b;Flemes 2005;Buzan & Waever 2003). ...
... Despite these methodological and historical quibbles, the majority of scholars commonly agrees on marking the beginning of the regional peace either in 1935-when the last major war ended (according to the COW Project) -or in 1941, when the Peru-Ecuador dispute ended (according to the MID dataset) (see, e.g., Holsti 1996;Mares 2001;Martín 2006a;Miller 2007;Buzan & Waever 2003). ...
... Since many scholars identify a short "long peace" in Latin America, from 1935 (with the end of the Chaco War) to the present, an interesting puzzling question emerged: during most of this period (1930s-1980s), governments in Latin America were overwhelmingly controlled-wither directly or indirectly-by their respective armed forces. This makes the Latin American long peace quite distinctively a "militarist peace" (Martín 2006a). However, with the final collapse of military rule in the continent in the late 1980s, the new democracies inherited a period of inter-state peace after the trauma of systematic human rights violations of the preceding years. ...
Latin America is often hailed as "the most peaceful region in the world." In both academic and policy circles, this view has taken root under the common perception of the region as a "zone of peace" where war and interstate armed conflict have largely disappeared and are now unthinkable. The present article offers an extensive, critical review of the existing literature. It identifies areas of overlap and convergence, as well as areas of discord and intense disagreement among the multiple works which make up the Latin American "long peace" debate in the discipline of International Relations. Especial emphasis has been placed on analyzing contributions from within, as much as without, the region itself. In the first two sections, the article focuses on the academic debate and its main theoretical assumptions and hypotheses, and situates the debate in both historical and disciplinary context. In the third section, the article offers a critical re-assessment of the fundamental conceptual disagreements that continue to plague the debate; while in the final section, the article centers on a number of important areas of research still unexplored, under-theorized, or worthy of closer attention by those interested in conducting further research in this area.
... Although a burgeoning literature on regional security governance has started to explore more systematically the dynamics on why and how mechanisms of balance of power and security community overlap across non-Western regions (e.g., Khoo 2015;Bagayoko, Eboe, and Luckham 2016;Feraru 2018;Cannon and Donelli 2020), scant attention has been paid to Latin and, more specifically, South America. Prior to the 1980s, scholarship characterized South America's security governance as dominated by hard power-balancing discourses and practices-the result of trenchant historic geopolitical rivalries (e.g., Argentina and Brazil, Bolivia and Chile, or El Salvador and Honduras; Barletta and Trinkunas 2004;Martin 2006). In contrast, from the 1990s onward, security community-oriented practices and narratives emerged and developed, leading some analysts to state the end of balance of power configurations in South America (Hurrell 1998). ...
... Balance of power, as hinted above, is seen as the provider of order to political systems where rational mistrust predominates, that is, through rational risk-taking calculations considering others' behaviors. Recent research, however, has raised doubts over the alleged thesis that balance of power practices has disappeared from the region since the 1980s (Barletta and Trinkunas 2004;Martin 2006). ...
Regional security in South America cannot be explained simply by considering balance of power or security-community governance mechanisms. In this article, we present and discuss a hybrid security-governance approach for talking about governance security in the Americas, particularly, South America. We hypothesize that there exists a new security-governance configuration in which the traditional governance mechanisms—balance of power and security community—are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and coexist, leading to the emergence of a regional hybrid security architecture. Beyond explaining the reasons and causes for the overlap between security community and balance of power, we show the hybrid nature of regional security governance and point out how taking the hybridity conceptual approach fills the gaps within current research. We first offer a critique of two leading approaches to thinking about security in the Americas (balancing and security communities). Next, we show how the overlapping configurations in South America's regional security governance happen, testing Adler and Greve's (2009, “When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance.” Review of International Studies 35[S1]: 59–84) framework against historical evidence. Last, we provide evidence of a hybrid security governance in the region. We complement our analysis with qualitative data from interviews with scholars, political, diplomatic, and military actors conducted in various countries across the region. Our contribution is a significant step toward understanding how security-governance formations come about in non-Western regions of the world, privileging its specificities. More importantly, we offer a novel angle to escape straitjacket hypotheses to security governance grounded in Western hegemonic ideal types, which have focus either on balance of power or on security-community models.
... The notion of dialogue and elements of concertacion are present also among the military forces of the distinct South American countries. As Felix Martin (2006) demonstrated, there is a transnational confraternity among the military in South America. For the author, over the last decades in the region there is an increasing political power and autonomy of the military, which controls the warmaking decision, changing progressively their mission from external to internal protection of the state. ...
... In South America, according to Martin (2006), there is a "militarist peace" where the soldiers and other members of the armed forces, tend to develop "similar values, beliefs, and principles that foster an increasing identification with the interest, progress, and success of the military institution in their respective countries" (p. 181). ...
What accounts for the paradoxical militarization, which occurs simultaneously to processes of cooperation in Defence in the South American region? With an analysis informed by a theoretical framework which combines the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) with the English School of International Relations approach and based on systematic review methodology, this research seeks to contribute to answering this question in order to understand International Security in South America. Evidence suggests the centrality of the regional primary institutions, which both stimulate and restrain conflicts, but also effective cooperation and integration in the region, remaining a security regime.
... KAKOWICZ, 1998;MARTÍN, 2006); e disputas geopolíticas por recursos naturais (ARNAUD, 2014;BLACKWILL;HARRIS, 2016;KLARE, 2003;KOUTOUDJIAN, 2019;SENHORAS;MOREIRA;VITTE, 2009;WIKTER, 2012, entre outros). Para tratar da definição dos atores e seu interesse dentro de um conflito, o trabalho se apoiou nas definições de Cal et al. (2016) e Frischknecht & Lanzarini (2015).Como fontes, levantaram-se documentos de tratados e acordos assinados entre a Argentina e a Inglaterra sob o marco da ONU; o Informe Shackleton (1976) e convenções internacionais sobre o uso de recursos e espaços marítimos; fundamentalmente a UNCLOS (1982); diretrizes científicas e técnicas da CLPC 2 e o Tratado Antártico (1961). ...
... Esta perspectiva, permite ainda focalizar o conflito das Malvinas à luz da visão sobre os mesmos no marco regional (América do Sul). Um consenso internacional sobre a literatura argumenta que a América do Sul é uma área marcada por uma 'longa paz' (BATTAGLINO, 2008(BATTAGLINO, , 2012CENTENO, 2002;KACOWICZ, 1998;MARTÍN, 2006), em comparação com a magnitude dos eventos ocorridos no século XX no restante do mundo, fundamentalmente as duas guerras mundiais em 1914-1918; 1939-1945, ou a intensidade das guerras levadas a cabo contra o Iraque em 1991 e 2003 (FRANCHI; GLASER; VILLARREAL, p. 8). A literatura especializada sugere que os conflitos interestatais na América do Sul são de menor importância, tanto quanto à sua duração quanto ao equipamento e a tecnologia utilizados. ...
El objetivo de esta investigación cualitativa, exploratoria, es proporcionar una visión geopolítica del conflicto de Malvinas, desde la perspectiva de los Recursos Naturales Estratégicos, para inferir elementos esenciales de análisis que pueden marcar el derrotero del conflicto en los próximos años. La cuestión Malvinas y su consecuente proyección hacia el continente antártico pueden presentar nuevas perspectivas para América del Sur en general, pero principalmente para Argentina, teniendo en cuenta que el Atlántico Sur está prodigiosamente dotado de naturaleza, con una pesca abundante y variada, rica en minerales e hidrocarburos, y que, al mismo tiempo, existen demandas superpuestas de jurisdicciones marítimas por parte de Argentina y Gran Bretaña.
... Border tensions are unavoidable in the regional setting prior to the CDS of UNASUR (Bons, 2015), and the consequent fear of escalation within the hybrid peace has been latent. South America has a significant record of MIDs (Mares, 2001;Martín, 2006). Almost two of every three MIDs took place between Colombia and Venezuela (Palmer, d'Orazio, Kenwick, & Lane, 2015), showing a historical rivalry beyond their ideological conflicts. ...
... Specialized literature starts from the idea that autonomy has been a national objective, and that the ideal means to achieve it is regional integration (Briceño Ruiz, & Simonoff, 2014;Rivarola Puntigliano, & Briceño Ruiz, 2013). In international politics, maximum autonomy would be achieved in security and defense, the goal function of the CDS, but latent intraregional rivalries and territorial conflicts (Mares, 2001;Martín, 2006), distinct intra-regional sub-complexes of regional security (Buzan & Waever, 2003), conflicting concepts on security and defense (Comini, 2015), and competing ideological projects have limited the operability of security regionalism. They undermine the performance of the CDS and favor a vision of national (individual) autonomy over a project of regional (collective) autonomy. ...
This article evaluates the performance of the South American Defense Council, based on the rational institutional design and the concept of the operability of alliances. The trajectory of the Council between 2009 and 2018, is examined through a theoretical approximation inspired by neoclassical realism and by applying the descriptive inference method of process tracing. The results indicate that in almost a decade, the Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations did not achieve full operability according to its institutional design. The evidence suggests that aspirations of national autonomy undermined the regional security autonomy project. The article affirms that the presence of a South American security regionalism problem resulting from national and regional autonomy tensions generated a paradox of autonomy.
... Border tensions are unavoidable in the regional setting prior to the CDS of UNASUR (Bons, 2015), and the consequent fear of escalation within the hybrid peace has been latent. South America has a significant record of MIDs (Mares, 2001;Martín, 2006). Almost two of every three MIDs took place between Colombia and Venezuela (Palmer, d'Orazio, Kenwick, & Lane, 2015), showing a historical rivalry beyond their ideological conflicts. ...
... Specialized literature starts from the idea that autonomy has been a national objective, and that the ideal means to achieve it is regional integration (Briceño Ruiz, & Simonoff, 2014;Rivarola Puntigliano, & Briceño Ruiz, 2013). In interna- tional politics, maximum autonomy would be achieved in security and defense, the goal function of the CDS, but latent intraregional rivalries and territorial conflicts (Mares, 2001;Martín, 2006), distinct intra-regional sub-complexes of regional security (Buzan & Waever, 2003), conflicting concepts on security and defense (Comini, 2015), and competing ideological projects have limited the operability of security regionalism. They undermine the performance of the CDS and favor a vision of national (individual) autonomy over a project of regional (collective) autonomy. ...
This article evaluates the performance of the South American Defense Council, based on the rational institutional design and the concept of the operability of alliances. The trajectory of the Council between 2009 and 2018 is examined through a theoretical approximation inspired by neoclassical realism and by applying the descriptive inference method of process tracing. The results indicate that in almost a decade the Defense Council of the Union of South American Nations did not achieve full operability according to its institutional design. The evidence suggests that aspirations of national autonomy undermined the regional security autonomy project. The article affirms that the presence of a South American security regionalism problem resulting from national and regional autonomy tensions, generating a paradox of autonomy.
... The structure of international politics in the Southern Cone has changed considerably over time. While today's scenario is one of cooperation under Brazilian unipolarity, Argentine preeminence was patent a century before, and the two-centuriesold rivalry between these two countries was still in place not many decades ago (Russell and Tokatlian 2003;Martín 2006;Lima 2013;Schenoni 2015;Flemes and Wehner 2015). Although structural theories expected the Brazilian takeover to increase the likelihood of conflict (Lemke 2002; cf. ...
... These two theoretical branches of realism developed separately, but many IR theorists implicitly accept that hegemonic or "suzerain" systems interact with balance of power systems (cf. Wright 1948;Keohane 1984;Ikenberry 2011;Mearsheimer 2001). But in such a world of "multiple hierarchies" (Lemke 2002), both approaches would have predicted conflict in the case of the power transition between Argentina and Brazil, somewhere between the 1950s and the 1990s. ...
Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structural theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do certain countries accept accommodation more leniently, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship—during the late 1970s and early 1990s—required concurrent structural changes, both at the international and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state.
... The present study is based both on theoretical landmarks and empirical elements. The literature review was built from bibliographical research on the following: Battaglino (2012Battaglino ( , 2008, Centeno (2002), Child (1985), Kacowicz, (1998), Lopes (2013), Mares (2012Mares ( , 2001, Martín (2006Martín ( , 2002, Medeiros Filho (2011, Pieri (2011), Rudzit (2013), Saint-Pierre (2013, 2011 and Saint-Pierre and Palacios Jr. ...
... An international consensus on the literature argues that South America is an area marked by a 'long peace' (BATTAGLINO, 2008(BATTAGLINO, , 2012CENTENO, 2002;KACOWICZ, 1998;MARTÍN, 2006), in comparison with the magnitude of events that occurred in the twentieth century, such as the two world wars (1914-1918; 1939- Bolivia. Therefore, according to Centeno (2002, p. 37), it can be said that "the last two centuries have not seen the level of war that was common to other regions. ...
This article revisits theoretical efforts to classify interstate conflicts. It analyses South America and discuss the adequacy of influential interpretations about the intensity of interstate conflicts in the region as compared to global or other regions ones. The literature takes for granted that South America is a peaceful region. Such interpretation results from the indicators adopted. We argue that traditional indicators do not fully capture latent tensions and the actual level of conflicts in the region. The article suggests an alternative taxonomy that better fits the South America context and argues that a research agenda on the extent and nature of interstate conflics is needed.
... 19 Correspondingly, others have portrayed the region as a space of 'hybrid security governance', combining balance of power and security community practices and discourses. 20 While highlighting the overlapping of cooperative efforts and practices with conflictive processes, 21 scenarios like a 'militarist peace' 22 or 'violent peace' 23 are rather static and do not reflect that the level of conflict and cooperation varies over time. In the decades following the transitions from authoritarian rule, South America moved towards cooperation, but in recent years the deterioration of regional organisations suggests that the region might be backsliding towards a more insecure and conflictual configuration. ...
While South America made significant strides in regional security cooperation since the 1990s, more recently the region seems to have entered a process of backsliding from its cooperative achievements and towards mere coexistence. This article proposes that an English School approach allows for a nuanced assessment of regional security cooperation. It contributes to the analysis of regional international societies and regional organisations as markers of fundamental institutional change. While scholars have studied how regional organisations shape the fundamental institutions of regional international societies as they emerge and evolve, little research has been done on whether a decline in regional organisations can lead to changes in the fundamental institutions of regional international societies. Using a set of indicators for coexistence and cooperative international societies, we analyse whether there is evidence of backsliding from cooperation to coexistence in South America with regard to three different types of security challenges: interstate conflict and militarisation; inter-mestic repercussions of internal conflict and violence; and extra-regional influences. We argue that a decline in regional organisations exacerbates those challenges, as they are no longer mitigated through institutionalised diplomatic procedures. However, despite the organisational decline, fundamental institutions in South America have so far proven relatively resilient.
... After the Second World War, the only international conflicts in South America included in the COW database are the Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 and the short war between Ecuador and Peru in the Cenepa Valley in 1995 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). In comparison with other regions of the world, South America in the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War, was an area of interstate peace-although other kinds of violence remained outstandingly high in several countries (Kacowicz 1998;Mares 2001;Martin 2006;. ...
... Other authors designate this period as "the long South American peace"(Battaglino 2012;Centeno 2002;Kacowicz 1998;Martín 2006), a "zone of no-war" period(Holsti 1996a, 154), or, instead, a "violent peace"(Mares 2001). ...
Objective/Context:
This article addresses the systemic and macro-historical meaning of the position of Brazil in South America. We argue that the Brazilian predominance was an outcome of structural changes in the regional system.
Methodology:
We trace the process of formation of the South American regional system in the post-independence period, identifying four intervals of regional structural transformation: 1) anarchical system formation (1810-1870s); 2) anarchical stability (1880-1930s); 3) hegemonic transition (1940-2000s); and 4) hegemonic stabilization (2000-2010s). Process tracing and historical-comparative methods help to organize the corresponding causal chains.
Conclusions:
Our findings show that Brazil’s role in the region is the result of an ongoing process of regional hegemonic stabilization, characterized by (i) a unipolar distribution of power, (ii) a regional governance order, and (iii) a hegemonic ordering principle. Despite the existence of structural conditions for the configuration of a hegemonic structure, the country did not embrace its position as a regional hegemon.
Originality:
While the literature on the topic mainly focuses on foreign policy and interactional dynamics, this study proposes an explanation focused on regional structural changes, presenting: (i) a theory of systemic complexity and macro-historical changes, and (ii) a theory of systemic structure types, addressing relations between distinct structural elements at the regional level of analysis.
... Since then, scholars of international relations have suggested that a hegemon can use three different strategies to hold sway over another state: being a benevolent hegemon, or a coerciveassertive hegemon, or a self controlled-status-quo-driven hegemon. The benevolent hegemon creates and imposes norms and rules; such benevolence may be seen, for instance, in free trade mechanisms 13 adopted by countries like the United States (US). The coerciveassertive hegemon, meanwhile, as the name suggests will be aggressive and will aim to dominate another state under its influence; for example, 14 imperial Japan as a coercive hegemon to France under Napoleon. ...
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, India established official ties with the five former Soviet Republics of
... Between 1810 and 1828, South America became independent (Brazil in 1822, Argentina in 1816, Bolivia in 1825, Venezuela in 1821. During this process, that specific region of the globe developed, in a particular way, disputes that generated disagreements and wars (mainly border disputes or fight for a free pass to the sea) (BATTAGLINO, 2012;MARTÍN, 2006). ...
There are countless challenges regarding the construction of a certain degree of international security. The existing configuration of the international system has several mechanisms to minimize the recurrence of interstate conflicts, with the Organization of American States (OAS) being the main reference on the continent. In this context, South America stands out for the low rate of interstate conflicts throughout its history. Taking this unique feature into account, this article proposes the following starting question: to what extent does the OAS, in terms of conflict resolution and prevention, play an important role in South America? It is argued that the organization has a limited role regarding the potential for litigation in the region due to its sui generis characteristic of low-intensity intrastate and interstate conflicts. Methodologically, the deductive approach is adopted, based on a more general analysis of the region to understand its particularities in terms of conflicts, and subsequent OAS action in those conflicts. To this end, the historical procedural and case study methods help the article to map the intrastate and interstate conflicts in South America. The qualitative research technique is also used with literature reviews and documentary analysis. In agreement with the objectives proposed in this article, the role of this regional organization was obser- ved more in the prevention than in the resolution of conflicts in the region.
... No importa cómo se aborde, la América del Sur parece notablemente pacífica" (2002, p. 37). Algunos investigadores que sustentan la mirada de la larga paz suramericana son: Kacowicz (1998), Centeno (2002), Battaglino (2008;2005), Huth (2009Huth ( , 1996, Simmons (2005Simmons ( , 2008, Hensel (2012), Martín (2006), entre otros. Mientras los académicos que hablan de una paz violenta son: Robert Burr (1974), David Mares (2001, Rudzit (2013), Franchi et ai (2017). ...
Resumen Cada región del mundo e incluso cada país tiene aspectos que son similares entre sí y otros que no lo son. Las guerras en Sudamérica, aunque tienen motivaciones comunes que encontramos en otras partes del pla-neta, como disputas por recursos naturales, disputas territoriales o históricas, tienen características únicas, son diferentes de las grandes guerras en Europa y el Pacífico, o las guerras libradas en Oriente Medio y Asia recientemente. Para comprender mejor el fenómeno de la guerra en América del Sur, los autores e institucio-nes sudamericanos necesitan evolucionar en el estudio del tema. Este artículo busca reflexionar exactamente sobre esto, explorando el tema de la guerra y sus clasificaciones en América del Sur. Palabras clave: América del Sur.
... Levy 1988, 662. 23. Véase Kacowicz 1996Holsti 1996;Martin 2006. ...
Introducción a Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales y Polítical Global
... Considerando la larga experiencia regional con la diplomacia de defensa liderada por Estados Unidos, se puede argumentar que los mismos foros con China pueden tener consecuencias inesperadas que eventualmente podrían beneficiar tanto a China como a los países sudamericanos. La literatura sobre las relaciones internacionales de América Latina coincide en que Estados Unidos ha desempeñado un papel estabilizador en la seguridad regional, al menos en la medida en que facilitó los contactos directos entre el personal de seguridad y defensa de la región (Martín, 2006). Tal "triangulación" podría ocurrir cuando los y las oficiales sudamericanos coinciden en las academias militares de China y en ejercicios combinados. ...
El impresionante crecimiento económico de China en las últimas décadas y su relevancia en la escena mundial ha generado un amplio debate sobre su rol en el sistema internacional. Uno de los temas recurrentes en la literatura de relaciones internacionales ha sido el desafío que podría implicar el desarrollo de China para el orden liberal. Así, este capítulo analiza en profundidad la denominada crisis del orden internacional liberal, los cuestionamientos a las distintas dimensiones de este orden, cómo se ha posicionado China ante ellas y cuáles son las repercusiones para América Latina.
Mediante un repaso de las principales iniciativas globales de Xi Jinping, del debate sobre el rol de China en la recesión democrática y de un análisis sobre los intereses centrales del gobierno de Beijing, este capítulo plantea que las predicciones de China como un desafiante al orden internacional existente son exageradas, al menos en ciertas dimensiones de este orden. Considerando la creciente competencia entre China y Estados Unidos, los cruces de acusaciones y la narrativa de guerra fría, los países de América Latina tendrán en los próximos años la difícil tarea de desarrollar políticas exteriores inteligentes para evitar quedar entrampados en esta disputa y a su vez colaborar en la construcción de un orden internacional más justo.
... Considerando la larga experiencia regional con la diplomacia de defensa liderada por Estados Unidos, se puede argumentar que los mismos foros con China pueden tener consecuencias inesperadas que eventualmente podrían beneficiar tanto a China como a los países sudamericanos. La literatura sobre las relaciones internacionales de América Latina coincide en que Estados Unidos ha desempeñado un papel estabilizador en la seguridad regional, al menos en la medida en que facilitó los contactos directos entre el personal de seguridad y defensa de la región (Martín, 2006). Tal "triangulación" podría ocurrir cuando los y las oficiales sudamericanos coinciden en las academias militares de China y en ejercicios combinados. ...
Este estudio analiza participación desde 2018 de los países de América Latina y el Caribe (ALC) en la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China (BRI) iniciada en 2013. Adoptando una perspectiva constructivista, el análisis crítico de la literatura y de documentos oficiales muestran cómo la movilización de la retórica de la conectividad por parte del gobierno chino ha creado unas expectativas exageradas en los gobiernos de ALC cuyas economías están afectadas por un déficit estructural de infraestructuras. En realidad, el BRI no ha modificado substancial- mente las dinámicas anteriores presentes en las relaciones entre ALC y China, ni ha remediado los problemas relacionados con la dependencia de las economías de la región con la economía China. El examen de los mecanismos de participación en el BRI —memorándums de entendimiento y participación en foros oficiales— y de los factores que explican los diferentes grados de participación de los gobiernos LAC señalan que la iniciativa es en realidad una estrategia discursiva que da cobertura a una concepción de las relaciones internacionales no legalista y cuya esencia es el pragmatismo y la flexibilidad.
... Considerando la larga experiencia regional con la diplomacia de defensa liderada por Estados Unidos, se puede argumentar que los mismos foros con China pueden tener consecuencias inesperadas que eventualmente podrían beneficiar tanto a China como a los países sudamericanos. La literatura sobre las relaciones internacionales de América Latina coincide en que Estados Unidos ha desempeñado un papel estabilizador en la seguridad regional, al menos en la medida en que facilitó los contactos directos entre el personal de seguridad y defensa de la región (Martín, 2006). Tal "triangulación" podría ocurrir cuando los y las oficiales sudamericanos coinciden en las academias militares de China y en ejercicios combinados. ...
La cooperación en seguridad ha sido un área secundaria en la relación entre China y América Latina, después de los temas económicos y financieros. Sin embargo, las distintas formas de cooperación en seguridad se han ido desarrollando y expandiendo entre las dos partes. Estos desarrollos, si bien graduales y cautelosos, generaron disgusto en Estados Unidos, país que tradicionalmente mantuvo una posición de supremacía en lo que durante mucho tiempo consideraba su ‘patio trasero’. Considerando distintas formas de cooperación en seguridad —cooperación funcional, diplomacia de defensa, iniciativas de cooperación a largo plazo y la venta de armas— este capítulo proyecta una rivalidad entre Estados Unidos y China en el área en consideración. Al mismo tiempo, debido a la poca relevancia estratégica de la región, se argumentará que la probabilidad es baja que esta rivalidad se transforme en un conflicto donde los países sudamericanos se vieran presionados a elegir entre un lado y el otro. En este escenario, los países sudamericanos se verán beneficiados por la competencia entre las grandes potencias que cada una buscará tener el mayor número de socios internacionales siempre que los países regionales procuran tener una diplomacia hábil y proactiva, y no se vuelvan demasiado dependiente ni de Estados Unidos ni de China.
... As a result, interstate war lead to indebtedness rather than the creation of consolidated state bureaucracies. Other authors have elaborated on this point, emphasizing the need to consider internal conflict and interstate rivalry that falls below the level of war (Mares, 2001;Thies, 2005;Martín, 2006). ...
Recent accounts in Historical International Relations (HIR) attempt to move past the Eurocentric narrative of the "rise of the West". Yet they struggle to come into terms with Latin America, the large and heterogeneous region that encompasses the former Iberian colonies in the Americas. Latin America is neither fully Western nor clearly outside the West. It is deeply influenced by European colonialism, but not an "outsider" of the Western world. This chapter argues that Latin America's ambiguous "in-betweenness" has hindered understanding the region's historical place in global politics. The chapter first reviews how conventional accounts have (mis)construed this place. It then discusses scholarship that engages with Latin America's ambiguity in both historical and theoretical terms, rather than treating the region merely as an appendix of Europe and the West. The chapter concludes by identifying future directions for research, highlighting the need to consider the nature and scope of Latin Americans' agency in historical international relations.
... Uti possidetis de jure doctrine is defined as "old administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence". Paul R. Hansel, et al The hegemonic role of the US is to promote, maintain intra-regional peace in Latin America (Martin 2006). The third reason is the long tradition of using non-violent means namely mediation, arbitration and third-party intervention (especially the OAS) in Latin America conflicts. ...
This paper aims to explain the shift in Latin America’s level of conflict and internal violence relative to other regions in the world. It examines a single regional subsystem, Latin America within the framework of conflict and peace as well as the role of the United Nations. First, it aims to shed lights on main transformations and changes in terms of political, economic, social and cultural issues in Latin America. Second, the concept of the zone of peace is examined within the context of Latin America. The main activities of the United Nations in relation to conflict and peace are investigated in the third section. In conclusion, it underlines the lessons learned from conflict and peace processes in Latin America.
... Outra razão pela qual a América Latina limita o uso da força está relacionada à "hipótese de paz hegemônica" de que a hegemonia dos EUA causa paz interestadual na América Latina. Por ser considerado o quintal da América, as capacidades e os interesses dos EUA restringem os comportamentos e atitudes conflitantes de atores internacionais e regionais; assim, o papel hegemônico dos EUA é promover e manter a paz intra-regional na América Latina (Martin 2006). A terceira razão é a longa tradição de uso de meios não violentos, tais como a mediação, a arbitragem e a intervenção de terceiros (especialmente a OEA) em conflitos na América Latina. ...
A América Latina é relativamente uma das regiões menos conflituosas do mundo. É um continente relativamente pacífico e tem sido especialmente um dos lugares mais pacíficos em termos de ausência de violência direta e guerras interestaduais. Houve conflitos bilaterais ou trilaterais entre os vizinhos, mas a maioria dos conflitos na América Latina é categorizada em conflitos internos e intra-estaduais. Desde a Guerra do Chaco de 1935 entre o Paraguai e a Bolívia, conflitos interestatais raramente ocorreram entre os países da América Latina. Além disso, a mais longa disputa interestadual do mundo aconteceu na América Latina entre o Equador e o Peru, começando em 1809 e terminando em 1998. A guerra tem sido a exceção e não a regra desde 1883 no continente. O último conflito interestatal na região foi a Guerra das Malvinas, entre uma potência externa e uma potência média regional, nomeadamente a Grã-Bretanha e a Argentina.
A relação entre os esforços de paz das Nações Unidas e a política internacional na América Latina hoje requer nossa atenção e exige reflexão e estudo sérios. As mudanças na América Latina foram notavelmente rápidas e generalizadas desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Como resultado, é necessário dar atenção acadêmica à explicação e compreensão do conflito, da paz e do papel das Nações Unidas na América Latina. A continuidade significativa também é visível nas instituições, ideias e perspectivas sobre conflito e a paz na América Latina (Özçelik 2018). Muito do conflito na América Latina foi explicado com o significado de pobreza e o lugar apropriado dos mais pobres na sociedade e na política latino-americana moderna. Se um estudioso definir adequadamente os pobres e lançar luzes sobre a explicação adequada acerca da pobreza, torna-se mais fácil encontrar e resolver as causas profundas dos
conflitos na América Latina (Özçelik 2016).
Nos dias atuais de globalização e Indústria 4.0 (4a Revolução Industrial),
novas ameaças e desafios geram novos tipos de conflitos e violência. A lista
de ameaças e desafios globais atuais e futuros ficou mais longa com o fim da
Guerra Fria: terrorismo transnacional, armas de destruição em massa (ADM),
crime organizado, epidemias de saúde global, AIDS, boom populacional, seca,
mudança climática, conflitos regionais, migrações em massa, degradação
ambiental, insegurança energética, pobreza, Estados falidos, poluição,
crises econômicas globais, abusos dos direitos humanos, crimes contra a
humanidade, genocídio, crimes de guerra, etc. (Özçelik 2019). Essas novas
ameaças e desafios podem ter a capacidade de atingir todos os cantos do
mundo. Por exemplo, as mudanças climáticas podem ter efeitos desastrosos
nas nações das ilhas do Caribe porque podem destruir o mapa mundial
(Özçelik 2015). A paz e a estabilidade podem ser garantidas em qualquer
Estado em qualquer parte do mundo, independentemente de quão remoto
e distante esteja esse ator internacional do sistema internacional. O mundo
pós 11 de setembro abriu a caixa de Pandora para os assuntos mundiais. Os
atores internacionais foram movidos para escolas de pensamento mais (neo)-
realistas e construtivistas que minam qualquer percepção de paz regional e
um futuro estável. Os Estados mais provavelmente cuidam de seus próprios
interesses, lutam pela sobrevivência e contam com sistemas de autoajuda.
O sistema das Nações Unidas enfraqueceu porque os atores internacionais
perceberam que nenhum Estado deve depender de ninguém para a segurança
nacional e internacional, uma vez que as ameaças e desafios à segurança
vêm de novos tipos de inimigos, a maioria dos quais provavelmente não são
estatais e transnacionais.
Mesmo que muitos estudiosos acreditem que a importância dos
Estados vem diminuindo no sistema internacional, os Estados ainda podem
buscar alianças, ações de segurança coletiva e o sistema das Nações Unidas.
A América Latina como um sistema sub-regional tem se desenvolvido como
uma zona de paz nos últimos trinta anos (Oelsner 2009).
Este artigo tem como objetivo explicar a mudança no nível de conflito
e violência interna da América Latina em relação a outras regiões do mundo.
Ele examina um único subsistema regional, a América Latina no contexto do
conflito e da paz, bem como o papel das Nações Unidas. Em primeiro lugar,
visa lançar luzes sobre as principais transformações e mudanças em termos
de questões políticas, econômicas, sociais e culturais na América Latina. Em
segundo lugar, examina-se o conceito de zona de paz na região. As principais
atividades das Nações Unidas em relação ao conflito e à paz são na terceira seção. Em conclusão, destacam-se as lições aprendidas com os
processos de conflito e paz na América Latina
... Uti possidetis de jure doctrine is defined as "old administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence". Paul R. Hansel, et al The hegemonic role of the US is to promote, maintain intra-regional peace in Latin America (Martin 2006). The third reason is the long tradition of using non-violent means namely mediation, arbitration and third-party intervention (especially the OAS) in Latin America conflicts. ...
Latin America is relatively one of the least conflict-ridden regions in the world. It is a relatively peaceful continent. South America has especially been one of the most peaceful places in terms of the absence of direct violence and interstate wars. There have been bilateral or trilateral conflicts between the neighbors. Most of the conflicts in Latin America is categorized under internal and intra-state conflicts. Since the 1935 Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, inter-state conflicts have rarely occurred among the Latin America countries. Also, the longest interstate dispute in the world happened in Latin America between Ecuador and Peru, which started in 1809 and finished in 1998. War has been the exception rather than the rule since 1883 in Latin America. The last inter-state conflict in the region was the Falkland/Malvinas War between an outside power and a regional middle power, namely the Great Britain and Argentina.
The relation between peace efforts of the United Nations and international politics in Latin America today requires our attention and calls for serious reflection and study. Changes in Latin America have been remarkably rapid and widespread since the end of the Cold War. As a result, it is necessary to give scholarly attention to the explanation and understanding of conflict, peace and the role of the United Nations in Latin America. Significant continuity is also visible in the institutions, ideas, and perspectives about conflict and peace in Latin America (Özçelik 2018). Much of the conflict in Latin America has been explained within the meaning of poverty and the proper place of poor in modern Latin America society and politics. If a scholar properly defines the poor and shed lights on the proper explanation of poverty, it becomes easier to find and solve the root causes of conflicts in Latin America (Özçelik 2016).
In the present day of globalization and Industry 4.0 (4th Industry revolution), new threats and challenges generate new types of conflicts and
violence. The list of current and future global threats and challenges have
become longer with the end of the Cold War: Transnational terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), organized crime, global health epidemics,
AIDS, population boom, drought, climate change, regional conflicts, mass
migrations, environmental degradation, energy insecurity, poverty, failed
states, pollution, global economic crises, human rights abuses, crimes against
humanity, genocide, war crimes, etc. (Özçelik 2019). These new threats
and challenges may have a capacity to reach every corner of the world. For
example, climate change may have disastrous effects on the Caribbean Island
nations because they may be wiped out the world map (Özçelik 2015). Peace
and stability can be guaranteed in any state anywhere in the world, regardless
of how remote and distant that international actor from the international
system.
The post 9/11 world has opened the Pandora’s box for world affairs.
International actors have been moved towards more (neo)-realist and
constructivist schools of thoughts that undermines any perception of regional
peace and stable future. States more likely look after their own interests,
struggle for survival, and rely on self-help system. The United Nations system
has weakened because international actors perceive that no state should
depend on anyone else for national and international security since security
threats and challenges come from new types of enemies most of which are
more likely non-state and transnational. Even though many scholars believe
that the importance of states has been diminishing in the international
system, states may have still searched for alliances, collective security actions,
and the United Nation system. Latin America as a sub-regional system has
been developing as a zone of peace over the past thirty years (Oelsner 2009).
This paper aims to explain the shift in Latin America’s level of conflict
and internal violence relative to other regions in the world. It examines a
single regional subsystem, Latin America within the framework of conflict
and peace as well as the role of the United Nations. First, it aims to shed lights
on main transformations and changes in terms of political, economic, social
and cultural issues in Latin America. Second, the concept of the zone of peace
is examined within the context of Latin America. The main activities of the
United Nations in relation to conflict and peace are investigated in the third
section. In conclusion, it underlines the lessons learned from conflict and
peace processes in Latin America.
... The Hispanic South American states were born bound to the principle of uti possidetis iuris, making territorial integrity a sub-stantial part of national identities. The historical experience of the region is not without interstate violence (MARES, 2001;MARTÍN, 2006;THIES, 2008), but it is much less severe than that of Europe, and the level of perceived external threats is substantially less (BATTAGLINO, 2012). Moreover, the region is not in the immediate military reach of great powers beyond the US. ...
This article addresses the South American difficulties in the consolidation of regional security mechanisms, developing the explanatory model of “paradox of autonomy.” This was developed through inductive and deductive criteria, based on recent history observations, in order to attain generalizable lessons from a relevant case for South American international relations, and using rational analytical approaches that allowed their construction within the framework of collective action problems. From the observation on the emergence and performance of the South American Defense Council, it was identified that the allowing conditions for a novel mechanism of regional (collective) autonomy for security, paradoxically offered opportunities for the exercise of national (individual) autonomy. The article concludes that, although the conditions for the paradox of autonomy are difficult to overcome in cases of security regionalism initiatives, there are possibilities to do so. The key would be in less ambitious institutional designs that recognize the inherent difficulties for institutional regional security cooperation in South America
... Under this type of peace, the use of force is probable and conflicts present themselves in the form of militarized crises (Battaglino 2012b, 134). In this sense, the region has a long history of militarized inter-state disputes (Mares 2001;Martín 2006), and there is insufficient evidence to indicate a change stemming from the CDS. South American hybrid peace continues to be a product of political dynamics and the limited military capabilities of member states (Jenne 2016), not of security regionalism. ...
In 2008-09, nascent Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, agreed and formalized the creation of one of its most ambitious bodies, its Defense Council. The origin of this council was surprising as some rival states, as well as others whose security and defense interests were distant from each other, participated in it. Its performance was marked by this contradictory origin, which resulted in its failure a decade later, in 2018, with the division of UNASUR. This article proposes elements for a complementary explanation of the trajectory of the UNASUR Defense Council, pointing out geopolitical links.
Methodology: This is an empirical case study that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of both national capacities and contemporary geopolitical trends. It also includes the review of official documents and the presentation of processed results of semi-structured interviews with South American diplomats and military officers.
Conclusions: The main contribution of this article is that it shows how global (de)concentration, the geostrategic (re)orientation of the United States and the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the regional
institutions, form an adequate set of causes for a structural explanation on the origin, performance and decline of the South American Defense Council.
Originality: Unlike most of the giving explanations about the fate of the South American Defense Council, and UNASUR in general, focused mainly on domestic causes, this article presents a systemic and structural explanation that links institutional and institutional dynamics.
... Os conflitos armados irregulares na América do Sul são responsáveis pelos altos índices de violência na região (Martin 2006;Mares 2012;Battaglino 2012). Esse apontamento vai contra a tese de que a região é pacifica. ...
... AMORIM, 2012, p. 270 -271. 2 BATTAGLINO, 2013 KACOWICZ, 1998, p. 68; LEMKE, 2002, p. 80 -81;MARES, 2001;MARTÍN, 2006, p. 1 -2. ...
... Latin American scholars and diplomats are fond of asserting that the region has been especially peaceful (cf. Amorim, 2010;Kacowicz, 2005;Martin, 2006;Oelsner, 2007;Pion-Berlin, 2016). The empirical record, however, does not bear out this claim, either in terms of war (defined by the standard 1,000 battlefield related deaths) or in the use of military force at lower levels of violence (cf. ...
In this chapter I present empirical and theoretical puzzles that should be of interest to scholars of international security and international political economy across regional focus. In the first section the empirical record of Latin American interstate violence is presented and its relationship to the region’s use of international fora to peacefully resolve some conflicts is explored. A second section turns to the favored explanatory variables. Here I demonstrate that the causal logic underlying these variables is generally mis-specified in studies of Latin American security relations. These analytic errors render most explanations offered in the literature drawing on Latin American cases incorrect. Unfortunately, much of Latin American academic research is not useful for scholarly purposes because it focuses on having an impact on perceptions and policy, rather than the pursuit of rigorous scientific research (whether qualitative or quantitative). (Mu and Pereyra-Rojas 2015) In recognition of the different incentives for publication, scholars of Latin American international relations, or those scholars who would use Latin American cases, should not rely on most Latin American published accounts for explanations of Latin American international behavior. Indeed, the failed explanations themselves offer new puzzles for scholars of international relations. The conclusion suggests that scholars of international relations can benefit from studying the actual empirical history of Latin American interstate relations with the correctly specified causal variables offered by the various theories of international relations.
... Más allá de su pérdida de influencia en los círculos académicos de la región, la lógica neorrealista fue preeminente en los análisis de política exterior sudamericanos hasta hace no mucho tiempo 8 . En la práctica diplomática, la lógica del equilibrio de poder proporcionó una guía de conducta estándar en la región, al menos hasta que la competencia argentino-brasileña dio paso a una lógica más cooperativa en el nuevo contexto de unipolaridad regional (Martín, 2006;Lima, 2013). Desde entonces, algunas segundas potencias regionales como Argentina renunciaron al intento de contrabalancear la primacía brasileña. ...
En los últimos cincuenta años, la participación de Brasil en el total de capacidades materiales de América del Sur ha aumentado de un tercio a la mitad de las mismas. Semejante cambio en la estructura de poder regional no puede haber pasado desapercibido para los vecinos de Brasil. En este artículo intento resolver el puzle principal de la unipolaridad sudamericana: ¿por qué la mayoría de los países de la región no ha aplicado estrategias consistentes de balancing o bandwagoning frente a Brasil?Basándome en algunas intuiciones del realismo neoclásico, propongo que ciertas variables internas (la inestabilidad de gobierno, la baja institucionalización del sistema de partidos y presidentes delegativos) han desviado la atención de las elites políticas y poderes ejecutivos de los desafíos generados por el crecimiento de Brasil. Un análisis comparativo cualitativo de conjuntos nítidos (csQCA) compara esta hipótesis y otras explicaciones alternativas para el desequilibrio regional.
... Governments are unlikely to promote regional integration when they are in conflict with a neighbouring state, but instead we expect presidents to speak about cooperation in situations of interstate dispute with the same frequency or even more so than in times of amicable relations. Disputes between Latin American states have seldom disrupted diplomatic relations or worse, escalated into armed conflict (Martín 2006). Rather, governments turned to the region for help to mediate quarrels formally or informally (Domínguez 2003). ...
The idea of an integrated Latin American region goes back to the early postindependence period, and yet, in substance, Latin American regionalism has remained far behind its stated aims. The perceived implementation gap has raised the question why policymakers continued to talk about something they appeared to avoid in practice. This article contributes to the debate on Latin America’s integration gap by exploring the phenomenon of declaratory regionalism – the practice of referring to the region and its institutions in political speeches. Based on quantitative text analysis of the speeches presidents delivered annually at the UN’s General Assembly between 1994 and 2014, we show that this practice has not been uniform. Presidents distinguish between different forms of regionalism, integration and cooperation, and frame the geographical region they refer to accordingly. In motivating presidents to speak about integration as opposed to cooperation, ideology and democratic performance stand out as crucial factors.
... The dashed line shows a system changefrom bipolar to unipolar, or from hegemonic to unipolar, and so on. The threshold commonly used to differentiate bipolar from unipolar settings using the CINC (Schweller 2004;Martín 2006;Schenoni 2015Schenoni , 2017 13 suggests that the Angolan rise had turned the Southern African subordinate system into a bipolar by by the early 2000sas suggested by the light-grey dashed line on the right. This change is still not manifest in the foreign policy behaviour of Angola, but may become increasingly so. Figure 3 shows an even clearer trend towards bipolarity in Southern Africa. ...
Despite the tectonic changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since the demise of apartheid, South Africa is still widely considered a hegemonic regional power by scholars, practitioners and pundits. This article challenges this interpretation, asserting that both Pretoria’s foreign policy and that of its neighbours fit the concept of regional unipolarity with more precision. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has pursued leadership within binding regional institutions and invested resources in order to reinforce the sovereignty of second-tier states such as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which have in turn disputed its diplomatic and military primacy, achieving impressive results. This behaviour is characteristic of unipoles rather than hegemons. In this article I revisit the evolution of South African relations with its more proximate neighbours in a transition from hegemony (1961–1990) to unipolarity. I start by defining both concepts and clarifying the behaviours that regional powers and small states are expected to have under hegemonic and unipolar settings. Then, I examine inter-state relations in the region, showing that the concept of unipolarity best describes power distribution and best predicts foreign policy in Southern Africa since the 1990s. Finally, I show that this exercise in concept rectification illuminates comparisons with other regional unipoles, and provides a useful framework to forecast the consequences of an eventual Southern African bipolarity, if Angola continues to catch up.
... Argentina y Brasil poseían en 1950 el 22 y el 35 por ciento del poder sudamericano, respectivamente (CINC, 2013) 3 , conformando un balance bipolar en América del Sur. Hoy, Brasil representa el 50 por ciento del poder regional y Argentina sólo un 10 por ciento (Merke, 2013) lo que nos lleva a concluir que el subsistema sudamericano se ha tornando unipolar (Martin, 2006) 4 , aunque no hegemónico. ...
The literature on Paraguay’s political regime labels it as an incomplete or flawed democracy without systematically analyzing how Paraguay is actually governed. The concept of multicracy can describe Paraguay’s political organization and analyze Stroessner’s rule and the post-Stronato period. The governability of Paraguay’s democracy is weak, various kratiae (powers) intervene in policymaking, and the state's regime is an unstable multicracy consisting of the presidential autocracy, the Congress partocracy, democratic institutions, plutocracy, inefficient bureaucracy, theocracy, technocracy, and still-in-power aristocracy. Further political development suggests a redistribution of power between the kratiae by changing their power percentage within a power pie.
What is the future of sovereignty? This work argues that the size and shape of nations is likely to continue to devolve, and the Americas offer a helpful laboratory for thinking about new forms of sovereignty because of their diverse experiments with decentralization. All parallels are imperfect, but the early Americas in particular provide unusually good examples of how small numbers of people with force projection problems cobble together cohesive polities across a range of geographic, economic, military, and ideological circumstances.
Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar cómo el proceso de control civil sobre los militares ha influido en la pérdida de autonomía de las Fuerzas Armadas sudamericanas. Durante el siglo XXI, la mayoría de los países de la región han enfrentado crisis económicas y políticas sin que las instituciones militares se presentaran como una solución. Un indicio de ello es el cambio en el espectro político en estos países, que ha pasado de derecha a izquierda (y viceversa) sin que ningún gobierno electo haya sido derrocado. Un golpe militar ya no es una opción en las crisis. La maduración de las instituciones públicas y de la sociedad civil, el fortalecimiento de la democracia, una reestructuración de las relaciones cívico-militares y la pérdida de autonomía de las fuerzas armadas son algunos de los factores que influyeron en esta situación. El estudio se fundamenta en referentes teóricos y elementos empíricos. La revisión de la literatura respalda las bases teóricas y el mapeo de la información a la estructura práctica. Aquí se propone un Índice de Autonomía de las Fuerzas Armadas basado en variables que indican el nivel de autonomía y control civil de las Fuerzas Armadas Sudamericanas.El trasfondo de este trabajo es la clásica cuestión del control civil sobre los militares; más allá de las normas y documentos oficiales, se observa una pequeña parte de la historia de la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas en los gobiernos de la región.
O presente trabalho tem como foco o exame de um desafio
de governança regional importante para o Brasil, ligado
à implementação dos Objetivos do Desenvolvimento
Sustentável (ODS), e que demanda estreita cooperação com
organismos internacionais: a promoção da paz e justiça
diante de um contexto social permeado pela criminalidade
organizada. Configurado como o 16o ODS, a temática “Paz,
Justiça e Instituições Fortes” (ODS 16) aparece como uma das
novidades entre as metas para o desenvolvimento divulgada
em 2015 pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). Em seu
parágrafo 4º, o ODS 16 (ou ODS 16.4) coloca a meta de reduzir
até 2030 “significativamente os fluxos financeiros e de armas
ilegais, reforçar a recuperação e devolução de recursos
roubados e combater todas as formas de crime organizado”
(ONU, 2015). No presente relatório, apresentamos como a
temática pertinente ao 16.4 vem sendo debatida nos últimos
anos em dois organismos regionais latino-americanos:
União das Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) e Organização
dos Estados Americanos (OEA). Ao final, após comparar
ambas organizações, examinamos as possibilidades que tal
cooperação abre para a administração pública federal.
Mudanças estruturais pós guerra
fria aumentaram o risco no sistema internacional. A isto, acrescentou-se a recente crise da Covid-19, com a expansão da percepção do risco global, incluindo ameaças múltiplas, difusas e inéditas,
cada uma criando um número maior de elementos desconhecidos e rupturas no sistema. Ademais, o ambiente de risco destas novas crises globais também
revela vulnerabilidades que podem ser discretamente exploradas em mobilizações de guerra híbrida para afetar nocivamente inimigos/rivais e causar rupturas sistêmicas capazes de solapar a confiança em instituições sociais e governamentais
— tudo sem o emprego de força militar convencional. Este novo risco deixa menos claro o nexo civil-militar e tem impacto sobre o processo global de gestão de
risco. Portanto, faz-se necessária uma reavaliação do(s) papel(papéis) das forças armadas na gestão de crises globais, uma vez que requisitos, práticas e normas funcionais essenciais de guerra também começam a sofrer o impacto destas mesmas mudanças.
Post-Cold War structural changes have augmented risk in the international system. This has been further compounded by the recent Covid-
19 crisis with the perception of global
risk expanding to include multiple, diffused and unprecedented threats, each generating a greater number of unknowns and disruptions in the system. Furthermore, the risk environment of these new global crises also reveals vulnerabilities that can be discreetly exploited in hybrid warfare engagements to adversely affect enemies/rivals and cause systemic disruptions capable of undermining trust in social and governmental institutions — all without the employment of conventional military force. This
new risk environment blurs the civil- military nexus and impacts the global risk management process. Thus, a re-assessment of the role(s) of the armed forces in global crisis management is required as key functional requisites, practices, and norms of warfare also begin to be impacted by these changes.
Taking as a starting point that Brazil cannot be analyzed without a thorough analysis of its sociogeographical surroundings—in this case, the subcontinent of South America—this chapter aims to offer an alternative perspective, based on the concepts of Peace Studies, for understanding the violence and social conflicts in South America. Although this approach is appropriate for understanding the direct and structural violence that permeates South American societies, Peace Studies has rarely been applied to the analysis of the region’s social conflicts. However, traditional approaches to the study of international security are inadequate to understand the current violence in South America. The chapter will first provide the current status of the study of violent conflicts in South America, explaining the conceptual frameworks most commonly used to observe social conflict and violence in the region: state-centered theories, the Copenhagen School, and the human security approach. The relevant concepts of Peace Studies will then be explored as a means to revisit the alarming prevalence of violent deaths, direct, and structural violence seen in poor neighborhoods of South America. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that concepts such as structural violence and positive peace create new opportunities for a multidisciplinary analysis.
This chapter considers grassroot social actors’ peaceful responses to violence in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro and is based on eight months fieldwork in the city. Through a critical lens, it considers Brazil as a violent state where the historical and continuous state exclusion, criminalisation, and murder of favela residents feed a violent cycle of drug-related crime and violence in the favelas. In the favelas, local community leaders, activists, and other social actors respond to social violence deriving from exclusion and marginalisation, as well as state violence from warlike public security operations in their communities. The chapter shares their critical perspectives on the state’s marginalisation of vulnerability and shows how they navigate both direct and structural violence in order to construct their own, alternative peace, through denunciation of state violence, conflict mediation, youth programmes, drug rehabilitation, education, knowledge production, and more. It proposes and discusses favela peace formation as a concept to describe these alternative processes in the favela that work to reduce manifest and structural violence: a nonviolent, favela grassroot, locally legitimate peace process that navigates various blockages and opportunities within and outside the state in its construction of a future with more social justice and less violence.
The central question posed by this policy paper is: do peace missions contribute to civil-military relations in Brazil? Based on a literature review, the authors first analyse the “hidden side of the Moon”, that is, how Brazilian military participation in peace missions have had a disruptive effect on civil-military relations in the domestic context; and, finally, they
recommend actions to mitigate such effects.
This article is concerned with groups of states that do not fight each other and, moreover, hold stable expectations that war between them is unlikely to occur in the future. Such no-war communities can be seen as a particular, minimalist form of the concept of international security communities as coined by Karl Deutsch and further developed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The security community literature has identified several potential communities across the globe but failed to offer a conclusive explanation for how these emerged because, as I shall argue, insufficient attention has been paid to the domestic conditions of state capacity. This article proposes an alternative path to community in which a lack of state capacity forms the common knowledge foundation between states. Under certain conditions, a low level of capacity to fight can assure states of their common desire to avoid war and gives rise to mutual recognition and toleration. I demonstrate the argument based on two cases that have commonly been seen as the most likely candidates for security communities beyond Europe, the regions of South America and Southeast Asia.
Quatro décadas se passaram desde que o equilíbrio do poder argentino-brasileiro no Cone Sul deu lugar a uma indiscutível primazia do Brasil. A natureza pacífica e cooperativa dessa transição de poder regional representa um enigma interessante para as teorias estruturalistas atuais que preveem as crescentes tensões entre os Estados Unidos e a China Por que alguns países aceitam seu declínio de uma forma mais branda, como a Argentina fez nesse momento? Neste artigo, ofereço um modelo formal e uso a técnica de rastreamento de processos para demonstrar que a principal reviravolta cooperativa nessa relação ocorreu entre o final da década de 1970 e o início da década de 1990. Minhas conclusões sugerem, ao contrário da narrativa predominante, que a cooperação entre a Argentina e o Brasil não foi produto da democratização. Em contraste, o caso sul-americano sugere que as transições pacíficas de poder ocorrem quando os custos do confronto são altos e as coalizões de política externa são redefinidas no estado em declínio. Abstract: Almost four decades have passed since the Argentina-Brazil balance of power gave way to a Brazilian uncontested primacy in the Southern Cone. The peaceful and cooperative nature of this regional power transition poses an interesting puzzle for structural theories and those concerned with the US-China transition. Why do certain countries accept accommodation more leniently, like Argentina did? I offer an explanatory model and use process tracing to show that key cooperative turns in this bilateral relationship—during the late 1970s and early 1990s—required concurrent structural changes, both at the international and domestic levels. My conclusions suggest, against the prevalent narrative, that cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was not a product of democracy. Instead, peaceful power transitions take place when the costs of confrontation are high and social coalitions are largely redefined in the declining state. Key-words: South America; Argentina; Brazil; Transition of power; Hegemonic transition. Recebido em: Agosto/2018. Aprovado em: Setembro/2018.
Latin America is relatively one of the least conflict-ridden regions in the world. It is a relatively peaceful continent. South America has especially been one of the most peaceful places in terms of the absence of direct violence and interstate wars. There have been bilateral or trilateral conflicts between the neighbors. But the most conflicts in Latin America is categorized under internal and intra-state conflicts. Since the 1935 Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, inter-state conflicts have rarely occurred among the Latin America countries. Also, the longest interstate dispute in the worldhas been happened in Latin America between Ecuador and Peru, which started in 1809 and finished in 1998. War has been the exception rather than the rule since 1883 in Latin America. The last inter-state conflict in the region was the Falkland/Malvinas War between an outside power and a regional middle power, namely the Great Britain and Argentina.
This chapter seeks to explain the shift in Latin America’s level of conflict and internal violence relative to other regions in the world. It examines a single regional subsystem, Latin America within the framework of conflict and peace as well as the role of the United Nations. First, it aims to shed lights on main transformations and changes in terms of political, economic, social and cultural issues in Latin America. Second, the concept of the zone of peace is examined within the context of Latin America. The main activities of the United Nations in relation to conflict and peace are investigated in the third section. In conclusion, it underlines the lessons learned from conflict and peace processes in Latin America.
This chapter discusses a nonlinear theoretical framework to explain high violence in the barrios of Caracas. Zinecker’s (Gewalt im Frieden: Formen und Ursachen der Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika, 2014, 42–43) structural model of violence frames the theoretical model proposed in this chapter to explain high violence rates. Her structural model states that macrostructural variables can explain susceptibility to high violence rates, but only substructural variables, like social capital, can explain the actual appearance of high violence rates. Such theoretical framework helps explain why violence in the barrios of Caracas remained high while socioeconomic conditions improved. Hence, it helps to interpret why violence rates behaved pro-cyclically in Venezuela’s capital. In addition, this chapter reviews the critical shortcomings of competing theories of urban violence such as oil-rent windfalls, economic deprivation, and subcultural factors. Discussing these theoretical approaches to urban violence shows how the moderating role of social capital can help explain the “causes of causes” of urban violence. After that, this chapter elaborates on a theoretical model developed where social capital in the barrios of Caracas moderates violence rates in these urban spaces. The model developed in this chapter identifies and discusses two factors of social capital’s moderating effects: Social network density and collective efficacy. The former factor refers to the connectedness of an urban neighborhood, and the latter refers to two sub-factors, which are social disorganization and collective action within the institutional context.
China's unprecedented economic growth led some scholars to conclude that it will replace the United States as the future global hegemon. However, China's intentions in exercising future global leadership are yet unknown and difficult to extrapolate from its often contradictory behaviour. A preliminary overview of China's island building in the South China Sea reveals its potentially coercive intentions. This inference is consistent with the analysis of those who prognosticate China's violent rise. Conversely and simultaneously, China's participation in peacekeeping operations and its global investments evince its benevolent hegemonic intentions, which are congruent with the argument of those who predict China's peaceful hegemonic ascent. Confronted with these divergent tendencies in China's recent international relations, and assuming its continued rise, it is, thus, essential to examine China's strategic intentions and how these may ultimately project its violent or peaceful hegemonic rise. This article argues that the “Third Way” or “Dutch‐style” hegemony is highly instructive in this context and, thus, should be examined and added to the existing debate on China's rise as either a benevolent or coercive hegemon. We argue that Dutch‐style hegemony may be the most viable way for China to proceed in its global hegemonic ascendancy.
Authorities at the United Nations have repeatedly called on regional organizations to step up their commitment in the area of peacekeeping. These calls are based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which gives regional organizations a role in international peace and security. While organizations in Europe and Africa have created regional peacekeeping arrangements, such have failed to emerge in Latin America. This is puzzling, for different reasons. On the one hand, several countries have recently sought to increase their peacekeeping profile. States have strong incentives to pool their resources, especially if they face budgetary constraints such as the developing countries of Latin America. On the other hand, peacekeeping might provide an answer to some of the security problems the region faces. This article provides an evaluation of how Latin America has responded to the global demand to develop regional peacekeeping capacities. I argue that cooperation in peacekeeping has mainly been the result of foreign policy considerations rather than a concern for peacekeeping per se. In light of past experiences of shallow institutionalization, the article concludes with a reflection on the future prospects for a Latin American peacekeeping framework.
Özet
Ülkeleri arasında ikili düşmanlıkların olduğu, devletler arası uyuşmazlıkların zaman zaman askerî düzeyde yaşandığı ve şiddet içerikli içsel politik süreçlerin sık sık görüldüğü kıta olmasına karşın, Latin Amerika’da paradoksal olarak, Bolivya ve Paraguay arasında yaşanan 1935 Chaco Savaşı’ndan bu yana bölge-içi savaşlar görülmemiştir. Bu çalışma, Latin Amerika’da özellikle 20. yüzyılda iç politikadaki şiddet olaylarını, devletler arası çatışmaları, yapısal ve çevresel şiddeti, devlet-içi ve etnik çatışmaları incelemektedir. “Barış kuşağı” olarak anılmasına rağmen, Latin Amerika, şiddetin karmaşık şekillerde ortaya çıktığı ve yaygınlaştığı yeni bir döneme girmiştir. Bölgede yaşayan halklar için şiddetin gölgesi hayatın ayrılmaz parçası hâline gelmiştir. Bu bölümün amacı, disiplinler arası çatışma analizi ve barış bilimi yaklaşımları ile Latin Amerika’da çatışma ve şiddet hakkında devam eden tartışmalara bilimsel katkı sağlamaktır. Pax Latino Americana; kimi araştırmacılara göre, güçlü ve bağımsız devletlerin topraksal statükodan memnun olmaları ile tarihsel gelişimin sonucu oluşan bir normdur. Başka görüşlere göre, Latin Amerika barışı, dünyanın diğer bölgeleri ile kıyaslandığında anomi durumudur. Üçüncü görüşe göre, Latin Amerika’da içsel politikada yüksek derecede şiddet ve askerî darbelerin görülmesi aynı zamanda 75 yıl süren devletler arası barışın olması tarihsel paradokstur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Latin Amerika, Çatışma, Barış, Şiddet.
Latin America Conflicts and Analyses
In Latin America, even though there has been bilateral rivalries between countries, occasionally inter-state conflicts at the military level and often violent domestic political processes, the inter-state wars have not been occurred since the 1935 Chaco War betweeen Bolivia and Paraguay. This study especially attempts to examine domestic political violence, inter-state conflicts, structural and environmental violence, intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts in Latin America in the 20th century. Despite it has been referred as “peace zone”, Latin America has entered a new phase of violence that has emerged and spread in complex forms. The shadow of violence has become an integral part of life for the people living in the region. This chapter aims to provide a scientific contribution to the ongoing debate on conflict and violence in Latin America with interdisciplinary conflict analysis and peace intelligence approaches. According to the some researchers, Pax Latino Americana is formed as a norm with strong and independent states being satisfied with the status quo by the end of their historical development. According to other views, Latin American peace is an anomaly when compared to other parts of the world. The third approach stated that it is a historical paradox that there has been high level of violence and military clashes in internal politics and at the same time, inter-state peace during the last seventy years in Latin America.
Keywords: Latin America, Conflict, Peace, Violence.
Today, extensive interconnected global processes provide non-state actors with a degree of agency that a ‘System of States’ paradigm cannot account for alone. Using Russia-Latin America relations as a case study and applying a Complex Adaptive Systems perspective, this work explores alternative international mechanisms of order and organization.
One of the current controversies within international relations deals with the “stability” of bipolar as opposed to multipolar stratifications of world power. Morton Kaplan, in codifying the views of classical balance of power theorists, advances the view that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems. Kenneth Waltz, sagely pointing to the relatively peaceful international arena since World War II, argues that a bipolar distribution of power can guarantee world stability. Many a priori arguments have been presented to buttress the Kaplan and Waltz hypotheses. In one of the most elaborate such formulations, the “interaction opportunity” hypothesis of Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, the presence of stabilizing crosscutting alliances is postulated to be most likely within multipolar systems, which in turn are a function of the number of major powers and members of a system. In an attempt to bring the two opposing strands of theory into a larger framework, Richard Rosecrance more recently has suggested that bipolarity and multipolarity may each have their peculiar costs and benefits. Bipolarity, according to Rosecrance, is distinguished by (1) an absence of “peripheries,” such as areas for colonial expansion or neutral powers to woo; (2) all international behavior is highly politicized; (3) there are many crises; (4) changes in power confrontations are either significant or trivial, with no intervening shades of gray; (5) each pole is dominated by major powers highly motivated to expand their domains, willing even to incur brinksmanlike situations and hostility spirals; (6) no detente is possible. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is hypothesized to have (1) more interaction opportunities and thus less preoccupation (or obsession) with any one set of states; (2) fewer arms races; (3) more international conflicts; (4) the outcomes of international conflicts are harder to predict in advance; (5) changes in power confrontations have ambiguous consequences for the overall distribution of power. Rosecrance, therefore, urges a “bi-multipolar” arrangement that would combine the best features of both alternatives. The empirical questions and intriguing hypotheses so eloquently raised by Kaplan, Waltz, Deutsch, Singer, and Rosecrance have remained largely unexamined, however.
In his article in the June 1991 issue of this Review, Ted Hopf challenged the argument that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations of power. He reported that the international situation in sixteenth century Europe became only marginally more stable with a shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system. He argued for attention to the offensive-defensive balance, rather than systemic polarity. Manus Midlarsky accounts for Hopf's findings, and for evidence of multipolarity and increased conflict in the early seventeenth and twentieth centuries, by proposing a relationship between polarity and war that is contingent on scarcity of desired international resources. Midlarsky argues for more attention to contingent relationships generally and draws implications for current and future probabilities of conflict in a multipolar world. Hopf responds by pointing out the need for further development of Midlarsky's analysis, the possible compatibility between Midlarsky's formulation and his own focus on the offensive-defensive balance, and the desirability of a productive unity of the two research programs.
Many primitive peoples have political systems which are very much like the international political system. If the characterization of world politics as mere 舠anarchy舡 is an exaggeration, surely anarchy moderated or inhibited by a balance of power is a fairly accurate description of the rivalry between sovereign nation-states. The Nuer, a primitive African people, have been described as living in an 舠ordered anarchy舡 which depends on a 舠balanced opposition of political segments.舡 It is commonplace to describe the international system as lacking a government, so that 舠might makes right.舡 舠In Nuerland legislative, judicial and executive functions are not invested in any persons or councils舡; hence, throughout the society, 舠the club and the spear are the sanctions of rights.舡