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Philosophical Psychology
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The good of boredom
Andreas Elpidorou
To cite this article: Andreas Elpidorou (2017): The good of boredom, Philosophical Psychology,
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1346240
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1346240
The good of boredom
Andreas Elpidorou
Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA
ABSTRACT
I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-
pathological experience of boredom) should be understood
to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to
promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth
and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful
life.
1. Boredom: A tale of two constructs
In recent years, boredom has become the topic of an active inter-disciplinary
research program. What is at least partly responsible for this surge of interest
in boredom research is the development and validation of various ways of con-
ceptualizing and measuring boredom. Two such measures focus on job bore-
dom (Grubb, 1975; Lee, 1986), one examines the ability to cope with boredom
(Hamilton, Haier, & Buchsbaum, 1984), one assesses leisure or boredom during
free time (Iso-Ahola & Weissinger, 1987; Ragheb & Merydith, 2001), one appraises
sexual boredom (Watt & Ewing, 1996), one investigates academic boredom (Acee
et al., 2010), and yet another considers purposelessness, under-stimulation, and
boredom in cancer patients (Passik, Inman, Kirsch, eobald, & Dickerson, 2003).
Despite the availability of such measures, most of them are limited in scope: they
measure boredom only in specic contexts. Two existing measures that are not
subject to such a shortcoming are the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer
& Sundberg, 1986) and the Boredom Susceptibility Scale (ZBS) (Zuckerman,
1979). Of these two scales, only BPS is a full-scale measure of boredom; ZBS is a
subscale of the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979; Zuckerman, Eysenck,
& Eysenck, 1978). On account of its full-scale character, BPS is to date the most
commonly used measure of boredom.
BPS is designed to “assess one’s proneness toward experiencing boredom” and
as such it is a measure of trait boredom—the propensity to experience boredom
frequently and in a wide range of situations (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986, p. 5). Its
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
KEYWORDS
Affect; boredom; emotion;
locomotion; self-regulation;
well-being
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 17 November 2016
Accepted24 April 2017
CONTACT Andreas Elpidorou andreas.elpidorou@louisville.edu
2 A. ELPIDOROU
use has allowed researchers to study the correlates of boredom proneness (i.e.,
the construct that BPS operationalizes and measures and which is thought to
correspond to trait boredom) and to document its profoundly harmful eects (for
reviews see Vodanovich, 2003; Vodanovich & Watt, 2015). For example, boredom
proneness has been found to be positively correlated with anger and aggression
(Gana & Akremi, 1998; Gordon, Wilkinson, McGown, & Jovanoska, 1997; Mercer-
Lynn, Flora, Fahlman, & Eastwood, 2011; Rupp & Vodanovich, 1997), depression
(Ahmed, 1990; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Goldberg, Eastwood, LaGuardia, &
Danckert, 2011; Malkovsky, Merrield, Goldberg, & Danckert, 2012), anxiety
(Fahlman, Mercer, Gaskovski, Eastwood, & Eastwood, 2009; Fahlman, Mercer-
Lynn, Flora, & Eastwood, 2013), hostility (Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman,
2004; Vodanovich, Verner, & Gilbride, 1991), apathy (Goldberg et al., 2011),
loneliness (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), and hopelessness (Farmer & Sundberg,
1986). Within an educational context, boredom proneness has been linked to
poor grades (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993) and early dropout rates (Farmer &
Sundberg, 1986; Farrell, Peguero, Lindsey, & White, 1988). Within the workplace,
boredom has been associated with lower job satisfaction (Abdolahi, Damirchi,
& Ganjeh, 2011; Kass, Vodanovich, Stanny, & Taylor, 2001) and job involvement
(Seib & Vodanovich, 1998), increased accident rates (Kass, Beede, & Vodanovich,
2010; O’Hanlon, 1981; Weinger, 1999), and increased job stress (Wan, Downey,
& Stough, 2014). In everyday life, boredom proneness is related to poor perfor-
mance on tasks that require sustained attention (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Seib &
Vodanovich, 1998; Watt & Blanchard, 1994). It is also related to a propensity to
make mistakes in completing common tasks (Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008).
In turn, boredom proneness has been found to lead to poor interpersonal and
social relationships (Leong & Schneller, 1993; Tolor, 1989; Watt & Vodanovich,
1999). It is also associated with lower life satisfaction (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986),
and boredom prone individuals have a harder time nding meaning in life than
those who are not prone to boredom (Fahlman et al., 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou,
2011; Vodanovich & Watt, 1999; Watt & Vodanovich, 1999; Weinstein, Xie, &
Cleanthous, 1995). What is more, boredom prone individuals experience impulse
control decits (Dahlen et al., 2004; Leong & Schneller, 1993). Looking for some-
thing to excite them, they are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior, such as
reckless driving (Dahlen, Martin, Ragan, & Kuhlman, 2005; Kass et al., 2010), and
are more prone to binge eating (Stickney & Miltenberger, 1999; see also Ganley,
1989), drug and alcohol abuse (Lee, Neighbors, & Woods, 2007; LePera, 2011;
Paulson, Coombs, & Richardson, 1990), and problem gambling (Blaszczynski,
McConaghy, & Frankova, 1990; Mercer & Eastwood, 2010).
Much of boredom research can thus be seen as an attempt, on the one hand,
to understand the nature of trait boredom and its correlates and, on the other
hand, to explore ways in which the eects of trait boredom can be mitigated. Still,
not all of boredom research concerns itself with trait boredom and it would be a
mistake to suggest so. Recently, boredom researchers have begun to explore the
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 3
nature of the state of boredom, a construct distinct from trait boredom. Unlike
trait boredom, which is a personality trait, the state of boredom is a transitory,
aversive experience that signals a failure to engage with one’s environment in
a desired manner despite one’s desire to do so (Danckert & Merrield, 2016;
Eastwood, Frischen, Fenske, & Smilek, 2012).
An adequate account of the state of boredom—a description of its antecedents,
eects, experiential prole, and neurophysiological correlates—turns out to be
crucial for our understanding of the phenomenon of boredom. First, the idea of
state boredom is conceptually prior to the idea of trait boredom. at is, the actual
experience of boredom is presupposed both by our notion of trait boredom (aer
all, trait boredom is a propensity to frequently experience boredom) and by the
manner in which trait boredom is measured (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; see also
Fahlman et al., 2013). us, without an adequate understanding of state boredom
(to which I will subsequently refer simply by the term “boredom”), it is unclear
whether we can have a good grasp of the notion of trait boredom.
Second, as a transitory aective state, boredom appears to be ever-present.
It aects both healthy individuals and patient populations (Binnema, 2004;
Eastwood, Cavaliere, Fahlman, & Eastwood, 2007; Hamilton et al., 1984; Newell,
Harries, & Ayres, 2011; Seel & Kreutzer, 2003; Vodanovich, 2003). It aects indi-
viduals of all genders and from all cultures (see, e.g., Musharbash, 2007; Ng, Liu,
Chen, & Eastwood, 2015; Sundberg, Latkin, Farmer, & Saoud, 1991; Vodanovich,
Watt, & Piotrowski, 1997; Weinstein et al., 1995). And it is also experienced in a
wide range of situations (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007; Fisher,
1993; Game, 2007; Grassian, 2006; Grubb, 1975; Iso-Ahola & Weissinger, 1987;
Larson & Richards, 1991). erefore, any attempt to come to terms with our
aective existence needs to study and understand the state of boredom.
ird, there is strong evidence in support of the claim that boredom is an
emotion (or at least, an aective state) in its own right, and as such ought to be
distinguished from other related aective states. For example, Van Tilburg and
Igou (2012) found that boredom has a unique experiential content (study 1) and
that manipulation of the state of boredom did not aect other emotional states
(anger, sadness, or frustration) (study 4). Furthermore, using structural equation
modeling, Goldberg and colleagues found that boredom is distinct from apathy,
anhedonia, and depression—all of which are taken to be phenomenologically
akin to boredom (Goldberg et al., 2011).
Last, it has been recently proposed that the state of boredom could serve an
important function in our mental economy. Specically, it has been suggested
that boredom acts as a regulatory state that keeps one in line with one’s projects
(Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014, 2015a, forthcoming; Pekrun, Goetz,
Daniels, Stupnisky, & Perry, 2010; Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992;
Smith, Wagaman, & Handley, 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). e state of bore-
dom can motivate one to pursue a new goal when the current goal ceases to be
satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. As such, boredom can help to promote the
4 A. ELPIDOROU
restoration of the perception that one’s activities are meaningful and congruent
with one’s overall projects.
In this paper, my aim is to oer an in-depth and critical examination of bore-
dom’s role as a regulatory state and present both its nature and its potentially
benecial eects. Although the present article is not the rst study to propose a
relationship between boredom and self-regulation, it goes beyond the ndings
and claims of extant articles in at least two important respects. First, it articulates
clearly the relationship between the state of boredom and self-regulation. It does
so by emphasizing boredom’s distinctive capacity to move us out of uninterest-
ing, unfullling, or meaningless situations and relates this capacity to the loco-
motion aspect of the Regulatory Mode eory (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro,
2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Second, it makes a novel case for the importance
of boredom in our lives. Whereas extant studies on boredom and self-regulation
conclude by defending, proposing, or simply noting a link between boredom and
self-regulation, the present article takes a further step: it shows how boredom’s
capacity to keep us in motion is benecial to our well-being. To put it rather simply
and in a manner that passes over many of the complexities that will be addressed
later on, this article makes the following argument: boredom promotes move-
ment; movement is essential to well-being; ergo, boredom promotes well-being.
As agents with projects, goals, and inter-personal relationships, we are much better
o having the capacity to be bored than lacking it.
2. Caution!
is article does not argue that our well-being is promoted by the chronic or fre-
quent experience of boredom. Nor does it in any way suggest that we should strive
to be bored. I have already presented some of the many detrimental eects (or at
least, correlates) of boredom proneness. Still, there is value in boredom when it
is experienced occasionally by healthy individuals. To see where its value lies, it is
instructive to draw a parallel between pain and boredom. Although the sensation
of pain is unpleasant, the capacity to feel pain is good for us. Just consider what
happens in cases where the capacity to feel pain is missing. Subjects with con-
genital insensitivity to pain live dicult and oen short lives. eir lives contain
harmful and dangerous stimuli and their bodies become injured easily and oen
severely (Bar-On et al., 2002; Baxter & Olszewski, 1960; Nagasako, Oaklander,
& Dworkin, 2003; Swanson, 1963; rush, 1973). Yet, they cannot sense harm
done to them and thus, cannot protect themselves. Pain is a mechanism that both
signals the presence of harm and motivates us to change our behavior in order to
protect ourselves (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Koster, Crombez, Van Damme,
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Van Damme, Crombez, & Lorenz, 2007). As
such, pain is valuable to us.
Something similar holds for boredom. Or so this article will show. Boredom
protects us from certain situations. It does so by informing us of the presence of
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 5
situations that are not in line with our interests and desires and by motivating us to
do something else. If we were to lack the capacity to be bored, we would not notice
when we are faced with an unsatisfying, non-stimulating, or monotonous situation.
Nor would we do something to get out of it. So, the main claim that this article will
defend is that boredom (in its non-pathological, state form) is valuable to us precisely
because its presence helps us to keep moving, and in doing so, it brings us closer to
what is in line with our desires and goals. It is not news to state that there is a place for
negative emotions and aective states in our well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2002).
It is news, however, to propose that boredom can be an element of the good life.
3. Describing boredom
What is state boredom? Here is not the place to provide a systematic and exhaus-
tive review of the literature on the state of boredom—others and I have done
so elsewhere (see, e.g., Eastwood et al., 2012; Elpidorou, forthcoming; Fahlman
et al., 2013). Still, in order to be in a position to argue for the claim that boredom
is a regulatory state that has the potential to benet us I need to present, at least
in broad outline, the character of boredom. For ease of explication, I follow a
component processes account of emotions (e.g., Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981;
Scherer, 1984) and hold (a) that emotions consist of a set of interrelated compo-
nents1 and (b) that the task of characterizing a given emotion amounts to that
of specifying its dierent components. us, in order to describe boredom and
to separate it from other related aective states, we have to present its aective,
cognitive, physiological, and volitional components.2
3.1. Aective character
Boredom is an aversive state (Harris, 2000; Hartocollis, 1972; Mikulas &
Vodanovich, 1993; Pekrun et al., 2010; Todman, 2003). It does not feel good to
be bored. Bored individuals report feelings of constraint or a perceived lack of
agency (Eastwood et al., 2012; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1951; Geitwitz, 1966;
Hill & Perkins, 1985; Todman, 2013; Vodanovich & Kass, 1990). Furthermore,
individuals who nd themselves in a state of boredom comment both that they feel
tired and lethargic and that they experience feelings of restlessness and irritability
(Harris, 2000; Martin, Sadlo, & Stew, 2006; O’Brien, 2014).
3.2. Cognitive character
It is integral to the experience of boredom that one is both disengaged and dis-
satised with one’s environment (Anderson, 2007; Fahlman et al., 2009; Fenichel,
1951; Goldberg et al., 2011; Greenson, 1953; Passik et al., 2003). Bored individuals
experience diculties in concentrating and maintaining attention (Ahmed, 1990;
Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; Eastwood et al., 2012; Fisher, 1993; Gordon et al.,
6 A. ELPIDOROU
1997; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1984; Harris, 2000)3 and they oen engage
in mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006).
Furthermore, qualitative studies have found that bored individuals experience
an altered passage of time (Martin et al., 2006): during a state of boredom, time
appears to move more slowly (Gabriel, 1988; Greenson, 1953; Hartocollis, 1972;
London & Monello, 1974; Tze, Daniels, Klassen, & Johnson, 2013; Wangh, 1975).
When completing a tedious task, high boredom prone individuals perceived time
as passing more slowly than low boredom prone individuals (Watt, 1991). is
nding is consistent with a recent study by Danckert and Allman (2005) which
reports that individuals who are prone to boredom are likely to make mistakes in
judging the duration of perceptual events.
Finally, boring situations are ones that are perceived as being non-optimal for
the subject (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; De Chenne, 1988; Mann & Robinson,
2009; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993). Oen subjects report that boring situ-
ations are meaningless or trite (Barbalet, 1999; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Perkins
& Hill, 1985; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), that they lack a sense of challenge
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even that they are too
challenging (Daschmann, Goetz, & Stupnisky, 2011; Goetz, Pekrun, Hall, & Haag,
2006; cf. Pattyn et al., 2008).
3.3. Physiological character
Currently, there is no agreement as to whether boredom is a state of low or high
arousal. Indeed, in the literature one nds proposals that describe boredom as
a state of low arousal (Hebb, 1955; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Russell, 1980),
as a state of high arousal (Bench & Lench, 2013; Berlyne, 1960; Fisher, 1993;
Harris, 2000; Hill & Perkins, 1985; London, Schubert, & Washburn, 1972), or
even as a state that can be both (Bernstein, 1975; Eastwood et al., 2012; Elpidorou,
forthcoming; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1951; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; O’Brien,
2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Qualitative studies on the phenomenological
character of boredom and studies on the physiological correlates of boredom are
consistent with all three proposals (for a more detailed discussion of this issue,
see Elpidorou, forthcoming).
For instance, bored individuals not only describe boredom as a low energy or
apathetic state, but also as one that contains feelings of restlessness, anxiety, and
irritability (Goetz & Frenzel, 2006; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006). Furthermore,
boredom has been associated with both a decrease and an increase of physiological
arousal (Barmack, 1937; Braby, Harris, & Muir, 1993; Geiwitz, 1966; London et
al., 1972; Lundberg, Melin, Evans, & Holmberg, 1993; Pattyn et al., 2008). London
and colleagues (1972) reported that a boring task can yield an increase in levels of
galvanic skin potential (study 1) and heart rate (study 2). However, in a dierent
study, Pattyn and colleagues observed that during a prolonged target detection
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 7
task—a task that is oen described as boring—participants’ heart rate decreased
over time (Pattyn et al., 2008; see also Merrield & Danckert, 2014).
Although we do not have an adequate picture of the neurological underpin-
nings of boredom, the following ndings are noteworthy. First, Oswald (1962) has
reported the presence of alpha waves during the experience of boredom. is nd-
ing relates boredom to mental fatigue, insofar as studies of the neural correlates of
the latter show similar brain activation (Barwick, Arnett, & Slobounov, 2012; Fan,
Zhou, Liu, & Xie, 2015; Lal & Craig, 2002; Phipps-Nelson, Redman, & Rajaratnam,
2011; Schier, 2000; Zhao, Zhao, Liu, & Zheng, 2012). Second, there is evidence
suggesting that boredom might be correlated with lower beta activity in the le
Dorso-Lateral Pre-frontal Cortex area (DLPFC) (Tabatabaie et al., 2014). Such a
nding about the neurological correlates of boredom, coupled with the observation
that a similar activity reduction in DLPFC has been observed in ADHD children
(Sangal & Sangal, 2015), provides further support for the claim that attention is an
important mechanism of boredom (Eastwood et al., 2012). ird, Danckert and
Merrield (2016) undertook a comparative study of fMRI scans of individuals in
three dierent conditions: during resting state, during boredom mood induction,
and during a sustained attention task. A comparison of the scans showed that in all
three conditions there is common activation of components of the default mode
network (DMN). Such commonality supports the claim that boredom is similar
both to the resting state and to the sustained attention task condition insofar as it is
a state of disengagement from one’s environment. Having said that, Danckert and
Merrield note that despite similarities, observed brain activation in the resting
state diers from that of boredom in one important respect: only during bore-
dom was there anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex. Danckert
and Merrield propose that activity in that region may indicate a failed attempt
to engage with the situation, and in this way, the state of boredom diers from
the resting state. Even though both are states of disengagement, only the former
is one in which individuals were motivated to try to engage with their situation.
3.4. Volitional character
e state of boredom is marked by a strong desire to engage in a task other than
the one with which one is currently engaged. A state of boredom is a negative,
aversive state of discontent. As such, bored individuals wish to be doing some-
thing else and will try, when it is possible, to escape a boring situation (Bench
& Lench, 2013 Berlyne, 1960; De Chenne, 1988; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel,
1951; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Greenson, 1953; Hebb, 1966; Mikulas & Vodanovich,
1993; Todman, 2003; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). e motivational power of the
unpleasantness of boredom is strong. In fact, studies that have found that boredom
proneness is correlated with risk-taking activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al.,
2010) are indications of the ability of boredom to motivate individuals to search for
situations that will alleviate boredom, even if such situations are harmful to them.
8 A. ELPIDOROU
4. Boredom and self-regulation
Some authors have suggested that boredom should be understood as a self-regu-
latory state (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014, 2015a, forthcoming; Pekrun
et al., 2010; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; Struk, Scholer, & Danckert,
2016; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012). Given the summary of boredom’s character
just oered, such a proposal is not only reasonable, but also warranted by what we
know about the experiential prole of boredom. Boredom is an aversive state from
which one seeks escape. During boredom one experiences feelings of weariness
and frustration. One is disengaged from and dissatised with one’s situation. e
situation does not capture the attention of, nor does it interest, the individual.
Instead, the individual is moved to consider alternative situations, goals, and
actions (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014, forthcoming; Fahlman et al., 2013;
Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Lastly, through its physiological features—increase in
arousal and the presence of anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex—
boredom can facilitate the pursuit of alternative goals and situations.
A synthesis of the above characteristics of boredom strongly suggests that
boredom is both an informative and motivational state: it signals that we need to
change something about ourselves or about our environment and it motivates us
to do so. Specically, what boredom does is to promote the pursuit of alternative
situations (physical or mental) when the current situation ceases to be interest-
ing, engaging, or meaningful. Boredom strives to get us unstuck when we nd
ourselves stuck (Fahlman et al., 2013, p. 68). It moves us out of non-interesting
situations and into interesting ones. For that reason, boredom is best understood
as a regulatory state that helps to keep us in line with what we nd interesting
and meaningful. Boredom’s function is movement, and through movement, it
promotes self-regulation.
4.1. Boredom’s relationship to movement and self-regulation
Self-regulation can be understood to be the set of processes that aim to minimize
the discrepancy between an individual’s current state and a desired state. rough
self-regulatory processes one becomes aware of such a discrepancy and utilizes
the needed resources to achieve the desired state (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins
et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1985). Self-regulation contributes to
the completion of goals and allows individuals to act, think, and even feel in
a way that is consistent with their standards and desires (Baumeister & Vohs,
2003). Self-regulation is oen hard and requires the exertion of eort (Baumeister,
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994) but success in self-regulation has been shown to be
associated with positive psychological adjustment, positive interpersonal rela-
tions, lower anger, better grades, and fewer impulse control problems (Tangney,
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Furthermore, in a longitudinal study that followed a
cohort of 1000 children from birth to the age of 32, Mott and colleagues (2011)
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 9
found that poor self-control in childhood can lead to poor health, nancial issues,
and even criminal convictions.
According to Regulatory Mode eory, a specic model of self-regulation,
human behavior is guided by two largely independent components: assessment
and locomotion (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Higgins,
2013; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Assessment constitutes the comparative aspect of
self-regulation (Higgins et al., 2003). It involves the critical evaluation and com-
parison of dierent entities (e.g., means and goals) in order to determine which
is most worthy of pursuit. In contrast, locomotion is the aspect of self-regulation
that involves the commitment of one’s psychological resources in order to initiate
and maintain goal-directed activity (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Locomotion is not
characterized by a specic end state but rather by movement itself (Higgins et al.,
2003; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2006), where movement is understood to
be any change from one state (psychological or behavioral) to another (Higgins
et al., 2003, p. 295).
A large body of evidence supports the claim that locomotion is a unique con-
struct. For example, locomotion is conceptually distinct from promotion (Higgins,
2012), implementation (Gollwitzer, 1990; Scholer & Higgins, 2012), and action
orientation (Kuhl, 1985). Furthermore, studies have obtained signicant locomo-
tion eects while controlling for the Big Five personality factors (Kruglanski et al.,
2000; Pierro, Giacomantonio, Pica, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2011). Locomotion,
just like assessment, is a dimension: it varies from low to high, and both indi-
viduals and situations can be characterized as low or high in locomotion. It is
measured by the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire (Kruglanski et al., 2000) and
can be induced experimentally (Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Mauro, Pierro, Mannetti,
Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009).
ere are conceptual reasons to think that the state of boredom and locomotion
are related. Given its aective, cognitive, volitional, and physiological aspects,
boredom is a psychological state that has the capacity to help us achieve move-
ment. Boredom not only signals a dissatisfaction with our current situation, it also
acts as a push that motivates us to get out of uninteresting or meaningless situa-
tions. As such, the state of boredom contributes to the exercise of locomotion. In
line with the characterization of movement assumed by Regulatory Mode eory
(Kruglanski et al., 2013), the movement that boredom calls for and promotes does
not have to be physical (or behavioral); it can also be mental. at is, in order
to alleviate boredom, an individual might be motivated to change her (physical
or social) situation or she might engage in a dierent mental activity, such as
mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006).
I should be quick to point out that although boredom promotes locomotion, its
proposed function is not movement pure and simple. Boredom aims not simply
to move us from one situation to another but to facilitate a type of goal-directed
motion—one that takes us from an uninteresting or meaningless situation into
one that is interesting or meaningful. Indeed, boredom would be incapable of
10 A. ELPIDOROU
playing an integral role in self-regulation if its aim were not this type of goal-di-
rected movement. But why suppose that boredom plays this self-regulatory role
by promoting goal-directed movement? I oer three reasons.
First, such a proposal is supported both by phenomenological descriptions of
the experience of boredom (Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Van Tilburg &
Igou, 2012) and by what we know about the aective, volitional, and cognitive
aspects of boredom. Although bored individuals have a strong desire to escape
their current situation, they do not simply wish to replace their situation with any
alternative situation. Clearly, they do not want to move from one boring situation
to another. Instead, in a state of boredom, one wishes both to stop doing what one
is currently doing and to engage in a more satisfactory task (Fahlman et al., 2013;
Harris, 2000; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). e latter aspect of the volitional content
of boredom is necessary because without a desire to engage in some other task,
the experienced state would not be one of boredom but perhaps one of apathy.
Furthermore, even if the volitional content of boredom is not fully specied, it is
still “thicker” than a mere “do something else!” at is to say, even if bored indi-
viduals do not know precisely what they want to do, they do know that they want
to be doing something that is interesting, exciting, or meaningful (Fahlman et al.,
2013).4 On account of this volitional content, boredom will motivate individuals
to seek out a more fullling task.
Second, the proposed function of boredom is consistent with the commonplace
observation that mere movement is not always capable of alleviating boredom.
e act of ipping through channels, for example, constitutes both some type of
movement and change—at the very least, we have changed our immediate sen-
sory environment and we are directing our attention to something else. Yet, such
a change does not guarantee that boredom will be removed. e same holds for
certain types of physical movement. Truck drivers driving through a monotonous
desert road experience boredom (Drory, 1982) despite the fact that they are clearly
moving and experience some kind of change. e observation that boredom can
be present during change (physical or psychological) makes it unlikely that bore-
dom’s function is the promotion of movement pure and simple. If boredom had
such a function, then it would be out of line with what we seem to know about the
function of other (negative) emotions. Disgust and fear, for example, dissipate once
their function has been fullled. More importantly, if boredom’s function were
simply motion, it would be hard to make sense of boredom within a functional
account of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006;
Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). According to such an account, emotions are solutions
to problems of physical or social survival. Pure movement, however, does not seem
sucient to oer such solutions for complex organisms like us. Or, alternatively,
if pure movement is capable of solving problems pertaining to physical or social
survival, then the need for boredom as a distinct aective state becomes hard to
discern. Other aective states or physiological states could serve the same function
and do so more eciently.
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 11
ird, the proposed claim about the function of boredom has the additional
theoretical benet that it allows us to make sense of boredom proneness as the
result of a dysfunction of the state of boredom. Boredom may fail to fulll its
function either because it fails to move us or because it moves us into situations
that fail to alleviate our boredom—that is, it moves us into situations which are not
meaningful or interesting to us. In either case, such a failure of boredom’s function
could lead—if it is systematic—to the more frequent or prolonged experience of
boredom (i.e., boredom proneness).5
In making such a claim about the function and dysfunction of boredom, the
proposal leads to empirically testable predictions. For one, it predicts that lack of
movement will be a good indicator of boredom proneness—either because one is
incapable of moving out of uninteresting situations when such situations arise, or
because by remaining stuck in the same situation for a prolonged period of time,
one ceases to be interested in the situation. Additionally, the proposal predicts
that having the ability to move from one situation to another will decrease the
likelihood of being stuck in unsatisfactory situations and consequently decrease
the frequency with which one experiences boredom. e latter prediction is in
fact supported by evidence that shows that high locomotion is strongly negatively
correlated with boredom proneness (Struk et al., 2016).
In turn, it has been shown that high boredom prone individuals are more
likely to engage in risky behaviors than low boredom prone individuals. Such a
nding is prima facie puzzling. If high boredom prone individuals tend to engage
in risky behavior, shouldn’t then that tendency reduce the frequency of their
experience of boredom? Aer all, isn’t risky behavior exciting and as such not
boring? Unfortunately, this is not an issue that has received sustained attention
in the literature. Still, the proposed account of the function (and dysfunction) of
boredom allows us to make some progress in accounting for it. Boredom functions
optimally when it (a) informs us of the presence of a boring situation and (b)
successfully motivates us to pursue a more interesting, fullling, or meaningful
situation.6 Boredom proneness could thus be the result of a lack of motion, but
it could also be the result of a failure to properly direct the motivating force of
boredom. In the case of high boredom prone individuals who engage in risky
behavior, it is more reasonable to maintain that boredom proneness is the product
of the latter type of failure. In their attempts to escape boredom, such individuals
may rely on what situations most readily aord them or on quick xes of boredom
instead of trying to nd activities that are in line with their personal interests.
Engaging in risky activities is the easy solution and one that in all likelihood will
temporarily assuage one’s feelings of boredom. But if such an activity is not one
that is in some sense meaningful to the agent and does not promote the agent’s
interests, boredom will return.
All in all, we have strong reasons to accept the claim that boredom is a self-
regulatory state. Not only is this conclusion supported by what we know about the
character of boredom —its aective, cognitive, and motivational aspects—it also
12 A. ELPIDOROU
carries a number of important theoretical advantages. It permits us to account
for boredom proneness in terms of the function or dysfunction of the state of
boredom; it gives rise to empirically testable predictions; and lastly, it is in line with
functional accounts of emotions. By promoting movement, boredom contributes to
locomotion. But boredom does more than that. Due to its aective, cognitive, and
volitional character, boredom can, when it functions optimally, facilitate goal-directed
movement and move us closer to what we nd interesting and meaningful.
4.2. The limits of boredom
e fact that boredom can promote the pursuit of more interesting, stimulating, or
meaningful situations does not render it a psychological panacea. Most emotional
states are ones that have both benecial and harmful consequences—fear, for
example, protects us from threats and dangers, yet it oen forecloses opportunities
and possibilities for action. Boredom is no exception and, in this section, I high-
light three potential issues with boredom, that is, three ways in which boredom
may cease to be benecial to us. I argue, however, that the fact that boredom does
not always play a salutary role in our lives does not mean that it is not valuable.
An understanding of the limitations of boredom is not a demonstration of its
uselessness, but a necessary step in seeing more clearly how boredom can be used
optimally and to our own advantage.
4.2.1. From boredom to boredom
Boredom, I have argued, serves a two-fold function. First, it informs us of a mis-
match between what we desire and what is being oered to us; in doing so, it
signals the presence of an unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation. Second,
boredom acts as a motivational force that helps us to move out of such unsat-
isfactory, meaningless, or trite situations. It should be noted that the very state
of boredom does not always carry information about what would alleviate our
boredom. It is common among bored individuals to have a strong desire to do
something other than what they are currently doing without knowing exactly what
that alternative is (e.g., Fahlman et al., 2013). Still, boredom’s motivational force
is not aimless: even if boredom itself does not specify what we should be doing,
it does motivate us to seek out a more interesting or fullling task. However, our
pursuit for an interesting or fullling task need not always be successful. In an
attempt to escape boredom, it is possible that we nd ourselves in yet another
unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation—one that did not appear to us to
be so beforehand. Of course, if boredom is successful in promoting movement,
then it should motivate us once again to do something else and, hopefully, this
time we will be more successful in nding something that satises our need for
stimulation and engagement. Having said that, the very possibility that boredom
may lead to another boring state highlights the need both for self-knowledge and
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 13
for knowledge of our possibilities. Motion is good, but not when it is purposeless.
In order to fulll its potential, boredom needs our guidance.
4.2.2. The interesting isn’t always benecial
Boredom may be successful in moving us both out of unsatisfactory and unin-
teresting situations and into situations that are perceived by us to be interesting,
engaging, and stimulating. Nonetheless, the fact that boredom has the ability to
do so does not guarantee that the new interesting, engaging, or stimulating sit-
uation is one that is benecial to us. As was already discussed, individuals who
score high on BPS are more likely than low boredom prone individuals to engage
in potentially unsafe and dangerous activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al.,
2010). Such risky behavior is exciting but may either harm individuals or fail to
promote their well-being.
4.2.3. The boring shouldn’t always be avoided
A subject may experience a situation as boring for a variety of reasons. Oen, such
a reaction is deemed to be appropriate insofar as it correctly represents features of
the situation. Consider, for example, waiting in line to pay for groceries, attending
a lecture on a topic that is utterly familiar to us, or having the same conversation
over and over again. Such situations are not only boring from the perspective
of the agent (insofar as they fail to stimulate her), but they are appropriately
boring: we recognize that these are situations in which the agent is not aorded
with meaningful or engaging opportunities. However, not all situations that are
experienced as boring are appropriate in this sense.
Consider, for instance, the experience of boredom within an academic context.
Students oen experience boredom when they are attending lectures or complet-
ing challenging assignments (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007;
Mann & Robinson, 2009). In one sense, such an experience is a tting reaction to
the situation insofar as the situation is one that has failed to engage the subject.
In another sense, however, boredom can be said to be an inappropriate reaction.
Assuming that the class is important for the subject, the experience of boredom
does not allow the subject to focus on the material, leading potentially to a bad
outcome. Classes may be boring, but oen they should not be.
If I am correct to emphasize the motivational and aversive character of bore-
dom, the onset of boredom will motivate the individual to do something that
alleviates the experience of boredom. In doing so, boredom could lead to harmful
results. If one is bored during class, boredom could lead to irrelevant mind-wan-
dering or motivate the individual to engage in an activity that is unrelated to the
class. While, such actions are oen employed as means to alleviate boredom, they
are not the only ones available to the agent. For example, there is some preliminary
evidence that suggests that boredom can foster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood,
2014; Mann & Cadman, 2014). us, as a response to the experience of bore-
dom, individuals could engage in creative thinking about the material at hand
14 A. ELPIDOROU
or attempt creative or novel solutions to questions or exercises. Furthermore, a
number of studies have found that boredom promotes the reestablishment of a
sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012). Such an attempt to nd
meaning could allow a student to engage with the material in a dierent way or to
discover something that was not immediately evident to her. Lastly, it is important
to emphasize that the fact that boredom promotes movement does not necessarily
entail that boredom will promote movement away from the task at hand. Indeed,
even though individuals high in locomotion have a preference for multi-tasking,
they are capable of remaining focused on a given task (Pierro et al., 2011): ey
can secure sustained attention on a task by moving from one state of knowledge
or understanding to another, while engaging in that task.
4.2.4. Lesson
What do the above limitations tell us about boredom and its value? ey underline
that boredom will not by itself solve our problems. It needs direction and a kind
of know-how that allows us to use boredom in the right way. In other words, we
need to have the ability to know how to read the situation and how to respond to
it. us, listening to what boredom tells us when it arises, and being able to use its
motivational power in order to promote movement, can help not only to reduce
the duration of our current boring experience but also to increase the chances
of later nding ourselves in situations that are congruent with our desires and
in line with our interests. Such a conclusion might seem to suggest that what is
benecial for us is not boredom itself but knowledge about boredom and its uses.
Such a reaction underestimates—severely, I believe—the motivational power of
boredom. Boredom is a powerful emotional state that can at once disengage us
from uninteresting or meaningless situations and move us away from them. It has
been reported, for example, that individuals who are le alone in a room with
their thoughts (a situation that is considered to be boring) are willing to shock
themselves as a way to stimulate themselves and escape the monotony of their
situation (Wilson et al., 2014). Clearly, on account of its motivational character,
boredom diers from apathy and other states of disengagement. But it also diers
from other related negative states like frustration. Whereas frustration (at least
sometimes) can be understood as a call to persist in what we are doing (Amsel,
1992), boredom can be understood as a call to switch our activity. Boredom dis-
engages us from our current situation, makes salient to us our alternative possi-
bilities, and motivates us to do something else. As such, boredom plays a unique
and useful role in our mental economy.
5. Boredom and well-being
So far, I have argued that an important part of boredom’s function is to move us:
on account of its character, boredom can move us out of uninteresting situations
and into ones that are closer to our desires, goals, and projects. As such, it can
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 15
regulate our behavior. But if boredom has the capacity to promote motion and
in doing so to bring us closer to what can be important, relevant, or exciting to
us, doesn’t it also, at least sometimes, have the capacity to promote well-being?
In this section, I shall argue precisely for that claim. We do not want boredom to
arise. We do not like it when it does arise. Still, its presence informs us that our
current situation is not satisfactory to us. More importantly, boredom also oers
us an aective force that can motivate us to pursue our goals. Hence, boredom
can be valuable even if it is unpleasant.
5.1. Beyond happiness
ere is more to living a good life than living a life that is mostly devoid of
pain, distress, and physical and mental illnesses. Although this point has been
acknowledged for decades now (Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 2002; Ry, 1989; Ry &
Singer, 1998), the precise nature of the good life still remains a matter of debate
(e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001). If the absence of pain, distress, and illnesses is not su-
cient for well-being, then what is needed for an individual to achieve well-being?
Current empirical psychology on well-being is divided into two broad camps. On
the one hand, theorists who espouse a hedonic view of well-being (Kahneman,
Diener, & Schwarz, 1999) hold that well-being consists in pleasure or happiness
(e.g., Diener, 2000; Diener, Sapyta, & Suh, 1998). On the other hand, theorists
committed to a eudaimonic account of well-being insist that well-being requires
more than pleasure and happiness: to live well, an individual must be capable of
realizing one’s true potential, or, at the very least, an individual must be capable
of exercising certain human capacities (e.g., Aristotle, 1925; Fromm, 1981; Ryan
& Deci, 2000; Ry, 1989; Ry & Singer, 1998, 2000; Waterman, 1993).
Ryan and Deci (2001) note that there are ndings that suggest that well-being
is a multidimensional construct and as such includes aspects of both views of
well-being (e.g., Compton, Smith, Cornish, & Qualls, 1996; King & Napa, 1998;
McGregor & Little, 1998). For example, King and Napa (1998) surveyed lay people
about the character of the good life and found that both happy and meaningful
lives were desirable. McGregor and Little (1998) conducted factor analyses of
a number of diverse well-being measures and found two distinct factors—one
for happiness and one for meaningfulness—suggesting that happiness might be
disconnected or independent from meaningfulness and that well-being is com-
posed of both.
A conceptual investigation into the notion of well-being favors the eudaimonic
view. at is to say, it supports the claim that even though happiness is an impor-
tant—perhaps even a necessary—component of well-being, it is not sucient. A
vicious and immoral life that is nevertheless lled with pleasure and happiness
is not a good life. e same goes for a simulated life such as a life in the matrix.
Although such a life might be infused with positive aect and experiences, it is
not a good life (Nozick, 1974). It lacks grounding in reality, and it is devoid of
16 A. ELPIDOROU
autonomy—one’s choices and decisions are not one’s own. Whatever else a good
life is, it must be a life that is our own.
Other theoretical articulations of mental health and well-being also support
the conclusion that happiness is not the be-all and end-all of the good life (e.g.,
Allport, 1961; Fromm, 1981; Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 1998; Rogers, 1961; Ry, 1989;
Ry & Keyes, 1995). A good life is one that contains not just happiness or positive
aects but also the determination and pursuit of goals. In living the good life, one
discovers and exercises one’s talents. One grows as a person. One builds his or
her social and physical environment. ere is no denying that happiness is good
and benecial to us (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Lyubomirsky & Layous,
2013). But happiness is not equivalent to well-being: the latter requires the former
(a good life is a happy life), but the former does not guarantee the latter (a happy
life is not necessarily a good life).
5.2. Boredom and psychological well-being
In developing their eudaimonic account of well-being, Ry and Singer articulate
six dimensions of psychological well-being: positive relations with others, environ-
mental mastery, autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, and purpose in life
(Ry, 1989; Ry & Singer, 1998). Accordingly, individuals ourish in life when they
have trusting and loving relationships with others, when they are in the position
to shape their environment in order to satisfy their desires and accomplish their
goals, when they can make their own independent decisions and are internally
motivated, when they see themselves as developing and growing, when they are
satised with most aspects of themselves, and when they perceive their lives to
have meaning, coherence, and direction. What such an account makes clear is
that living well is a multi-dimensional dynamic process. It involves movement
and progress. It involves the taking up of interests. It requires the expression and
exercise of a number of human capacities.
Reecting on Ry and Singer’s (1998) psychological well-being account—spe-
cically, on personal growth and purpose in life—allows us to see how bore-
dom can contribute toward our well-being. According to Ry and Singer, what it
means to ourish is to continue to develop one’s potential. A good life is one that
is marked by a certain kind of progression: in living such a life one gets better
(intellectually, socially, and even morally). One grows as a person by realizing one’s
opportunities and talents and by being open to new experiences and challenges
(Ry, 1989; Ry & Singer, 1998).
e state of boredom can promote personal growth. By moving us out of unin-
teresting situations, boredom motivates us to pursue what we already nd inter-
esting (Elpidorou, 2014, forthcoming; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; Van
Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012). As such, it can help us to realize and practice our
talents. By helping us to get unstuck and by promoting movement, boredom can
also contribute to the development of our projects and to the achievement of our
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 17
pre-established goals. Furthermore, boredom promotes the pursuit of interest, and
the experience of interest leads to openness to new situations and activities (Cohn,
Fredrickson, Brown, Mikels, & Conway, 2009; Fredrickson, 2013; cf. Bench &
Lench, 2013). Being bored is not good in and of itself. It is an aversive experience
that signies lack of interest and engagement. Yet precisely because of its aversive
nature, boredom can help us to get back on track by invigorating interest in one’s
projects (Elpidorou, 2014). Although boredom itself is a form of stagnation, it can
promote movement if we know how, and are able, to utilize its potential.
In addition to contributing to personal growth, boredom can also help in the
construction of a meaningful life. Individuals with personal projects that are con-
sistent with elements of their self-identity report higher levels of meaning than
those whose projects are not in line with their self-identity (McGregor & Little,
1998). Such coherence and meaningfulness in one’s life has been shown to be
associated with certain aspects of well-being such as self-actualization and vitality
(Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Furthermore, a meaningful
life is not only a consistent or coherent life, but also one that possesses a sense of
direction or purpose (Ry, 1989).
If boredom signals a lack of meaning (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012) and at
the same time promotes the pursuit of meaningful activities (Barbalet, 1999;
Elpidorou, 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012), then boredom can contribute
to the buildup of personal meaning. It does that not by being itself a meaningful
experience, but by providing the agent with information about her situation and
by motiving her to pursue alternative projects when the current projects lose their
meaning and signicance. Boredom has the capacity to trigger certain self-reg-
ulatory processes and such processes are capable of causing a change in one’s
behavior (e.g., Elpidorou, forthcoming; Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Mikulas
& Vodanovich, 1993; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; cf. Csikszentmihalyi,
1975). Ultimately, the state of boredom can help one to establish or reestablish a
sense of meaningfulness and coherence, when such a sense is missing (Barbalet,
1999; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011, 2012).
6. Connections and further directions
Either in passing remarks or in sustained articulations of its nature, boredom
gures in the works of authors such as Dante, Pascal, Novalis, Schopenhauer,
Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Pessoa, Heidegger, Russell, and Brodsky. Indeed, discus-
sions of boredom can be traced at least as far back as the writings of early Christian
fathers who were concerned with a type of spiritual boredom (acedia) responsible
for neglecting one’s religious duties. Despite its long and intricate history, philo-
sophical and literary discussions of boredom have tended to emphasize its negative
character. Although not everyone would agree with Kierkegaard’s pronouncement
that “boredom is the root of all evil,” many have argued that boredom is a problem
(Kierkegaard 1843/1987, p. 285). Understood as a short-lived state, boredom is a
18 A. ELPIDOROU
burdensome distraction, unbecoming of our goal-orientated lives. Understood as
a prolonged condition, boredom is an existential malaise: a source of unhappiness
and an obstacle to the development of one’s capacities.7
By synthesizing recent work from the psychology of boredom, I have oered a
complementary perspective to predominantly negative articulations of boredom’s
character. I have argued that through an investigation of the experiential prole
of boredom we can begin to understand boredom’s function. Specically, I have
suggested that boredom is a self-regulatory state capable both of informing us of
the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and of pushing us out of such a situation
and into one that is deemed to be more interesting, meaningful, or fullling. In
this respect, the current article is in agreement with a recent trend in boredom
literature that takes boredom to be an emotional or aective state that serves a
purpose in our everyday lives. However, it diers from existing literature in at
least two crucial ways. First, the present account articulates boredom’s function
by relating it to a specic aspect of self-regulation (namely, locomotion) and by
emphasizing its capacity to move us. Second, it makes a novel case for boredom’s
value by describing the ways in which the state of boredom can promote aspects
of eudaimonic well-being. As far as I know, no other work on boredom has sug-
gested that boredom can play a role in our well-being.
Although research on boredom is witnessing a growing popularity, many issues
regarding its nature, antecedents, and eects remain unresolved. For instance, the
neurological and somatic correlates of boredom have not been isolated, boredom’s
connections to mind-wandering, attention, and perception of meaningfulness are
currenlty being explored, and boredom’s potential eects on morality is a topic
that only very recently has received empirical attention (e.g., Elpidorou, 2017; Va n
Tilburg & Igou, 2016). ere is even disagreement about the factor structure of
the BPS (e.g., Melton & Schulenberg, 2009; Struk, Carriere, Cheyne, & Danckert,
2017; Vodanovich, Wallace, & Kass, 2005).
Perhaps the most pressing issue within the psychological literature on boredom
is the question of how to alleviate the harms associated with boredom proneness.
e relationship between locomotion and the function of boredom proposed in
this article has the potential to help. A suggestion that naturally emerges from
the present discussion is that the eects of repetitive induction of locomotion on
boredom ought to be experimentally investigated (Struk et al., 2016). Specically,
it is expected that if boredom proneness is low when locomotion is high, then
the repetitive induction of a locomotion orientation should reduce scores on BPS
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Such a suggestion is consistent with ndings that
show that high boredom prone individuals are unable to initiate action (e.g., Blunt
& Pychyl, 1998; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; McGiboney & Carter, 1988) and feel
stuck in their situations (Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1951; Todman, 2003).
Given boredom’s relationship to attentional diculties (Eastwood et al., 2012),
the suggestion is also in line with studies showing that high locomotors can stay
focused and resist distractions (Pierro et al., 2011).
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 19
7. Conclusion: The value of negativity
ere is much discussion about the benets of positive states (e.g., Cohn et al.,
2009; Fredrickson, 1998, 2000, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Garland et al.,
2010; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013) but very little men-
tion of how negative states have the capacity to enhance our lives and help us
to ourish. is is unfortunate. To restrict our attention to positive states and
feelings (e.g., pleasure, joy, interest, hope, trust) would be to miss out on the full
potential that lies within our rich psychological worlds. States of discontent might
be unpleasant, but they are powerful, moving, and instructive.
ere is a place for negative emotions in well-being (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Diener & Seligman, 2002). Such an assertion does not
mean that we should pursue negative emotions. Well-being is not promoted by
the chronic or frequent experience of those negative emotions. Still, the ability
to have those emotions and the fact that we can react to them in the right way is
valuable to us. Negative experiences and emotions are unavoidable. Yet, how we
react to them depends to a certain extent on us. Articulating boredom’s function
allows us to discover what it can do for us. And knowing what boredom can do
for us is the rst step in being able to use boredom to our advantage.
Notes
1. Most emotions involve an aective component that amounts to the phenomenology
or felt quality of the emotion, a cognitive component that consists of the eects of the
emotional state on perceptual and cognitive processes and vice versa, a physiological
or somatic component that includes the physiological and neurological correlates of
the emotional state, an expressive component that consists of the associated facial and
bodily expressions, and lastly a volitional component that is composed of the actions,
thoughts, and desires prompted by the presence of the emotion.
2. In my presentation, I ignore the expressive component of boredom (see instead
Elpidorou, forthcoming). is is a topic that has received very little attention. In one
of the few investigations on this topic, Wallbott (1998) reported that bored individuals
tend to lean their heads backwards (i.e., to raise their chins), to collapse their bodies,
and to restrain from movement.
3. Attentional failures seem to be an important mechanism of boredom (Eastwood
et al., 2012; cf. Leary, Rogers, Caneld, & Coe, 1986; Skowronski, 2012). Such a
judgment is corroborated by ndings that show that manipulation of attention can
aect the experience of boredom (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989). Furthermore, it has
also been reported that tasks that require sustained attention are oen perceived as
boring (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Pattyn, Neyt, Henderickx, & Soetens, 2008; Scerbo,
Greenwald, & Sawin, 1992).
4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I discuss in more detail the
volitional content of boredom.
5. To be clear, the claim that boredom proneness is the result of a dysfunction of the
state of boredom does not mean that the mere disposition to experience boredom is
dysfunctional. Sometimes the disposition to experience boredom can have salutary
eects. For example, it can promote escape from an unsatisfactory situation (Bench
20 A. ELPIDOROU
& Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014), help to establish a sense of meaningfulness (Van
Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even bolster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood, 2014;
Mann & Cadman, 2014). At the same time, however, if one is disposed to experience
boredom oen and in a wide range of situations, as is the case for individuals who
score high on BPS, then such a disposition will be harmful. Understanding boredom
as a functional emotional state that may malfunction allows us to make sense of how
boredom can be both good and bad for us. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer
for helping me see the value of distinguishing between state boredom, boredom
proneness, and the disposition to experience boredom.
6. Boredom does not seek merely to promote movement but to contribute to the
realization of goal-directed movement. is aspect of the function of boredom is
reected, I suggested, in its volitional character: boredom motivates one to engage in
a task that is more stimulating, interesting, or meaningful than the current one. us,
boredom would not be alleviated unless one succeeds in nding and engaging with
such a task.
7. e history of boredom does contain some dissenting voices. Most notably, these
include Russell (1996), Heidegger (1983/2001), and Brodsky (1997). Brief and
sometimes enigmatic remarks about the value of boredom can also be found in
Nietzsche (2001, p. 57), Sontag (2012), Higgins (1981) and in novels by D. F. Wallace
(e Pale King) and E. Levé (Suicide). Elpidorou (2015b) uses Sartre’s theory of
emotions to propose a function for boredom.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.
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