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The metaphysics of morals
... Given a totally ordered set (S, ≤) and totally ordered substructures of (S, ≤), we denote the ordering as x ≤ S y (or equivalently, y ≥ S x) when comparing an element x in one substructure with an element y in another substructure with respect to (S, ≤). For example, if (S, ≤) = N and there exist two substructures of N, namely ({1, 2}, ≤) and ({3, 4}, ≤), where ≤ is given by {(1, 1), (1,2), (2, 2)} for the first substructure and { (3,3), (3,4), (4,4)} for the second, then it follows that 3 ≤ N 4. By adopting this notation, we define a totally ordered family of sets (F, ⪯) over (S, ≤). The element-wise ordering axiom can be interpreted as follows: For any two totally ordered sets A and B in a family of sets (F, ⪯), if every element x in A is less than or equal to every element y in B regarding a totally ordered set (S, ≤), then the set A is considered less than or equal to the set B (denoted A ⪯ B). ...
... Given a totally ordered set (S, ≤) and totally ordered substructures of (S, ≤), we denote the ordering as x ≤ S y (or equivalently, y ≥ S x) when comparing an element x in one substructure with an element y in another substructure with respect to (S, ≤). For example, if (S, ≤) = N and there exist two substructures of N, namely ({1, 2}, ≤) and ({3, 4}, ≤), where ≤ is given by {(1, 1), (1,2), (2, 2)} for the first substructure and { (3,3), (3,4), (4,4)} for the second, then it follows that 3 ≤ N 4. By adopting this notation, we define a totally ordered family of sets (F, ⪯) over (S, ≤). The element-wise ordering axiom can be interpreted as follows: For any two totally ordered sets A and B in a family of sets (F, ⪯), if every element x in A is less than or equal to every element y in B regarding a totally ordered set (S, ≤), then the set A is considered less than or equal to the set B (denoted A ⪯ B). ...
... Given a totally ordered set (S, ≤) and totally ordered substructures of (S, ≤), we denote the ordering as x ≤ S y (or equivalently, y ≥ S x) when comparing an element x in one substructure with an element y in another substructure with respect to (S, ≤). For example, if (S, ≤) = N and there exist two substructures of N, namely ({1, 2}, ≤) and ({3, 4}, ≤), where ≤ is given by {(1, 1), (1,2), (2, 2)} for the first substructure and { (3,3), (3,4), (4,4)} for the second, then it follows that 3 ≤ N 4. By adopting this notation, we define a totally ordered family of sets (F, ⪯) over (S, ≤). The element-wise ordering axiom can be interpreted as follows: For any two totally ordered sets A and B in a family of sets (F, ⪯), if every element x in A is less than or equal to every element y in B regarding a totally ordered set (S, ≤), then the set A is considered less than or equal to the set B (denoted A ⪯ B). ...
In artificial intelligence (AI) and decision-making systems, structured approximations play a crucial role in balancing model interpretability and predictive accuracy. Coarse Set Theory (CST) introduces a mathematical framework to formalize Coarse Ethics (CE), which models coarse-grained decision-making processes commonly used in human evaluations and AI classification systems. CST defines hierarchical relationships among sets using totally ordered structures and coarse mappings, enabling us to adjust decision granularity dynamically.
Furthermore, coarse evaluations inherently involve a trade-off between efficiency and information retention, as they simplify complex data representations at the cost of precision. To quantitatively assess this trade-off, we introduce Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence as a measure of information loss in coarse evaluations, demonstrating the impact of coarse partitioning on decision accuracy. This study employs CST in grading systems, automated recommendations, and risk assessments, demonstrating its potential to enhance fairness, reduce bias, and improve transparency in AI-driven decision-making.
... For instance, Kant (2012Kant ( , 1785 in his foundational book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals sets out a system of practical philosophy that argues as moral law "must carry with it absolute necessity" and empiricism only yields "contingent and uncertain" results we must proceed by way of "pure practical reason." Beyond this foundation, Kant (1996Kant ( , 1797 in The Metaphysics of Morals develops his ethical system into a doctrine of right comprising strict duties of justice and virtue involving broader duties of merit. His theory of justice is developed further in Metaphysical Elements of Justice, which constitutes the first part of his Metaphysics of Morals. ...
... For instance, Kant (2012Kant ( , 1785 in his foundational book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals sets out a system of practical philosophy that argues as moral law "must carry with it absolute necessity" and empiricism only yields "contingent and uncertain" results we must proceed by way of "pure practical reason." Beyond this foundation, Kant (1996Kant ( , 1797 in The Metaphysics of Morals develops his ethical system into a doctrine of right comprising strict duties of justice and virtue involving broader duties of merit. His theory of justice is developed further in Metaphysical Elements of Justice, which constitutes the first part of his Metaphysics of Morals. ...
Social justice is often theorized as fairness and expressed in equity as part of public administration and associated budgeting practices. Whereas much literature contrasted deontological positions, emphasizing a procedural justice with fairness based on rules, with consequentialist theory that emphasizes a distributional justice based on outcomes, this paper addresses lack of social justice research into practices. As politics of the budget process is fundamental to who gets what, calling upon practice theory, this paper's theorization of “a practice of fairness” is anchored and operationalized in Social Equity Budgeting (SEB) in context of austerity‐localism in English local government from 2010 to 2024 under Conservative led coalition and Conservative Governments, with specific examples from a longitudinal case study of Newcastle City Council (NCC). The paper suggests social justice needs a practice focus embracing interactions for practical intelligibility and understanding, alongside procedural and distributional aspects found in deontological and consequentialist approaches to justice.
... Otherwise, Belief is just a basic recalling of God through memory and is a general and all encompassing phenomenon: "You succeed because you think there is only one God. The devils themselves are persuaded and shudder" (James 2: 19), by which, one may know God but would lack the knowing of his/her knowing, which is the very trust in and reliance on God; or simply put, by Belief alone, the person may have no Faith in God: "God loved the world so much that He offered His one and only begotten Son, so that everyone who have Faith in Him would not perish but instead have eternal life" (John 3: 16), stating the it is the Faith in God which saves a person and not a Belief alone. Hence, Remembering God is not enough, because it does not affect actions of a believer: "Even similarly, Belief if being alone and has not actions, is dead" (John 2:17); and respectively, it does not change person's path of life toward God per se and it is just a memory recalled. ...
... That is why, the first coming of Jesus Christ, as the Perfect Human, was to save people and the second coming of Him, will be judgemental, which starts the no return point of a drastic transformation in the world that extends to beyond. 16 As HU, the sacrificial mind, of the righteous Human ascends to God, the Perfect Human, so the earthly man descends to or remains on earth, "because you are dust and you will return to dust" (Genesis 3 :19). Remarkably, Jesus who in flesh was sacrificed, is declared to be The Lamb Of God: "Behold, the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!", exclaimed John as he watched Jesus approach him the following day" (John 1:29). ...
The survey investigates the significant gap between Faith and Belief, using the conceptual distinction between Human and Man, highlighting the importance of divine reminding over mere remembering. The existence of a distinct genetic code in Humans known as Post Man Human (PMH) is proposed, which allows for a closer relationship with God, in contrast to men's materialistic character. The concept of the sacrificial mind, or "HU", is introduced as a key component of divine reminder that leads to spiritual ascent. The subject then shifts to the history of religious thought, stating that whereas religious systems emphasize memory and historical renewal, Faith is a direct, uncalculated link to God, that fosters love and mercy. I discuss the idea that God's presence transcends individual religious contexts, and argue that the actual essence of divinity can be comprehended through the oneness of diverse religious experiences. It is suggested that, while religious Beliefs and rituals are embedded in specific historical and cultural settings, the Human brain is predisposed to seek a higher power. This search stems from a pre existing ability to comprehend the divine, which develops alongside Human cognitive development. Unlike Belief systems, Faith does not rely on the brain's cognitive processes of memory and judgment, but rather, provides a direct spiritual connection that overcomes these constraints. This divine reminder method is viewed as a technique to avoid the confines of time, place and cognitive limitations, resulting in a more profound and immediate spiritual experience.
... Human capabilities that define individuals as ends in themselves encompass a basic capacity for reciprocity and acknowledgement of the moral standing of others. The respect we hold for others remains steadfast, irrespective of any feelings that may arise from comparing our own worth with theirs, as it your person or the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant, 1993(Kant, [1785: 6). 5. See Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine Virtue, Part II of Kant (2017Kant ( [1797). entails a principle of prioritising the dignity of humanity over our self-esteem -this is respect in its practical sense. ...
... Human capabilities that define individuals as ends in themselves encompass a basic capacity for reciprocity and acknowledgement of the moral standing of others. The respect we hold for others remains steadfast, irrespective of any feelings that may arise from comparing our own worth with theirs, as it your person or the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant, 1993(Kant, [1785: 6). 5. See Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine Virtue, Part II of Kant (2017Kant ( [1797). entails a principle of prioritising the dignity of humanity over our self-esteem -this is respect in its practical sense. ...
... Human capabilities that define individuals as ends in themselves encompass a basic capacity for reciprocity and acknowledgement of the moral standing of others. The respect we hold for others remains steadfast, irrespective of any feelings that may arise from comparing our own worth with theirs, as it your person or the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant, 1993(Kant, [1785: 6). 5. See Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine Virtue, Part II of Kant (2017Kant ( [1797). entails a principle of prioritising the dignity of humanity over our self-esteem -this is respect in its practical sense. ...
... Human capabilities that define individuals as ends in themselves encompass a basic capacity for reciprocity and acknowledgement of the moral standing of others. The respect we hold for others remains steadfast, irrespective of any feelings that may arise from comparing our own worth with theirs, as it your person or the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" (Kant, 1993(Kant, [1785: 6). 5. See Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine Virtue, Part II of Kant (2017Kant ( [1797). entails a principle of prioritising the dignity of humanity over our self-esteem -this is respect in its practical sense. ...
The pandemic crisis, particularly between 2020 and 2022, imposed restrictions that had reshaped our daily lives and continue to influence how we experience our existence today. It forced us to redefine the way we build intersubjective relationships in a globalized world and reconfigured our relationship with digital technologies. The reliance that various social institutions developed on digital mediation during the pandemic is clear evidence of this transformation. Our necessary interactions, whether with technology or with each other, were shaped by the type of mediation provided by social networking platforms. Though the ‘digital transition’ was already underway before the SARS-Cov2 pandemic, confinement, and social distancing accelerated its global implementation. More importantly, life during the pandemic highlighted structural issues within technological rationality, adopted as a civilizational paradigm and as the guiding principle in the fight against SARS-Cov2. The implementation of measures—ranging from confinement and social distancing to border control and contact tracing, along with the controversial institutional distinction between immunized and non-immunized citizens—has exposed the digital panopticon we now face. The control and surveillance imposed to safeguard public health raised questions about the role of freedom, tolerance, and civic responsibility in institutional and technological contexts. Reflections on the value of human life also gained new prominence, compelling us to rethink humanity’s role in the broader understanding of the world and our moral responsibility to those lacking access to the healthcare available in Western countries. The plight of refugees and citizens in third-world countries, unable to access basic healthcare and facing social justice issues, gained new attention during the pandemic and remains crucial to reflect on. Now, with the benefit of distance from these events, this book seeks to philosophically explore the intersections between Ethics, Technology, and the Pandemic that emerged during this period of our recent history.
... The basis of this view is that only moral agents have moral standing in virtue of their intrinsic, rather than instrumental, value (or innate dignity), realised via the distinctly human capacity of personhood or full autonomous agency. A view of this form is commonly ascribed to Kant, who holds that we can only have direct moral duties to other rational agents, whereas we can only have indirect duties to non-human animals in virtue of the impacts our treatment of them could have on ourselves and other rational agents (Kant, 1996; for critical attempts to expand Kantian views to other forms of agency see, e.g., Korsgaard, 2018;Wood, 1998;Formosa, 2017). ...
The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems exhibiting complex and seemingly agentive behaviours necessitates a critical philosophical examination of their agency, autonomy, and moral status. In this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the differences between basic, autonomous, and moral agency in artificial systems. We argue that while current AI systems are highly sophisticated, they lack genuine agency and autonomy because: they operate within rigid boundaries of pre-programmed objectives rather than exhibiting true goal-directed behaviour within their environment; they cannot authentically shape their engagement with the world; and they lack the critical self-reflection and autonomy competencies required for full autonomy. Nonetheless, we do not rule out the possibility of future systems that could achieve a limited form of artificial moral agency without consciousness through hybrid approaches to ethical decision-making. This leads us to suggest, by appealing to the necessity of consciousness for moral patiency, that such non-conscious AMAs might represent a case that challenges traditional assumptions about the necessary connection between moral agency and moral patiency.
... 4. Contribution principle: the distribution of resources and opportunities should be based on individual contributions to society. (Kant, 1996) Through this principle, the position of the courier as a liaison party between the seller and the buyer in the payment mechanism with the COD system where the courier is entitled to get rewards for his contribution and workload in this COD system. But in fact this is not fulfilled. ...
Cash on Delivery (COD) is one of the frequently utilized payment methods in Indonesian e-commerce, enabling buyers to settle payments for purchased goods upon their arrival at the designated address. However, the limited comprehension among the public regarding the COD mechanism gives rise to various legal predicaments, encompassing both criminal and civil aspects. This research endeavors to ascertain the psychological state of logistics partners who fall victim to consumers misconstruing the COD process, the legal quandaries prompted by COD, and legal remedies to these issues. Employing the normative juridical method with a statutory approach, supplemented by concepts, cases, and interviews, this study finds that, according to the Job Stress Scale measuring instrument, couriers experiencing a substantial volume of daily COD deliveries endure significant stress levels at 58.5%. The stress among couriers emanates from rampant instances of legal transgressions associated with COD, encompassing both criminal and civil domains. Consequently, addressing this challenge necessitates the provision of alternative payment modes such as bank transfers, digital wallets, or installment payments. Furthermore, the establishment of specialized COD regulations is imperative to mitigate the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future.
... Dužnost za stvaranje takvog epistemičkog okruženja dijelom leži na samim pojedincima, ali u velikoj mjeri i na vladama i javnim institucijama, kojima je dužnost stvoriti uvjete u kojima njihovi građani mogu slobodno i autonomno koristiti vlastiti um (Kant, 2017). Ova dužnost bi, do određene razine, obuhvaćala i sprečavanje manipulacije kroz lažne vijesti, dezinformacije i mikrociljanje, kao i sprečavanje drugih oblika heteronomije volje koji proizlaze iz korištenja velikih jezičnih modela, izloženosti sustavima preporuka i boravka unutar epistemičkih balona. ...
Digitalne tehnologije radikalno mijenjaju epistemičko okruženje u kojem se građani nalaze. Oblikujući kako građani prikupljaju informacije, kako komuniciraju ili kako donose odluke, digitalne tehnologije formiraju nove epistemičke prakse koje otvaraju prostor za neke stare, kao i za nove oblike manipulacije. Rad započinje analizom Kantova pojma autonomije volje te pokazuje kako i u kojim slučajevima ova autonomija može biti ugrožena. Nastavlja pružajući uvide kako digitalne tehnologije mogu ugroziti autonomiju građana, te analizira sposobnost algoritama umjetne inteligencije da kroz mikro-ciljanje i sustave preporuka šire lažne vijesti i političku propagandu. Nadalje, rad razmatra štetan utjecaj ovih tehnologija na epistemičke prakse građana, naglašavajući tendenciju algoritama umjetne inteligencije da dovode do stvaranja epistemičkih balona ili do pretjeranog oslanjanja na velike jezične modele, pri čemu dolazi do slabljenja individualne sposobnosti prosuđivanja. Završno se razmatraju neki modeli regulacije ovih tehnologija te se ističe Kantovsko uporište za opravdanje takvih praksi.
... The deontological theory of Kant (2002) is a product of several works, which included the Groundwork for the Metaphysics or Morals (Kant, 1785), The Critique of Practical Reasons (Kant, 1788), and the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1797). The deontological theory of Kant (2002) as explained by McCartney and Parent (2015) posited that it is more important to consider morality from the intention level of an action than considering its end results. ...
To provide readers with an overview of, and summarize, the content of the chapter, the purpose is stated as to establish theoretical and conceptual frameworks around Artificial Intelligence in Education (AIEd). Against the background of supporting students' AI skills development, the main focus of the chapter will be on addressing ethical and social issues with regard to AI in education. Recommended topics around e.g., curricula and instructional design for AI, as well as tools and technologies for AI education; will also be discussed.
... By relying on our sufficient understanding of the nature of beneficence, we can ask whether there is a normative notion whose features match its normative profile, without having to spell out its individual requirements and their logical scope. Famously, it has been argued that the notion of an imperfect duty does this: beneficence places us under an imperfect duty and hence is normative (Kant 1797: 6: 450, Hill 1971. I suggest a similar approach for rationality. ...
... Supporters should fit to the learner's situation and institutional constraints [22,27], they should as well free themselves from the teaching posture "teacher habitus" [28]. According to Kant, the "other" is considered as an end in itself, never merely as a means, it is precisely in this that its dignity consists [29]. Thus, learners have the right to make mistakes, considered as a stakeholder in the process. ...
Educational support plays a pivotal role in enhancing the quality of the teaching workforce, significantly impacting the overall standard of teaching and learning within educational institutions. Just as educators shape students' daily experiences, those who guide and support teachers can profoundly influence their professional trajectories. This paper aims to align educational neuroscience with educational support, drawing upon the latest research in this interdisciplinary field. Furthermore, the objective is to inspire and enlighten stakeholders engaged in this endeavor. The effective provision of support unfolds through four distinct stages: the initial contact stage, the diagnostic stage, the restitution stage, and finally, the monitoring and impact stage. Each stage leverages specific characteristics of neuroscience, with clearly defined outcomes and anticipated impacts on the mentor-teacher relationship and the teacher's performance. Recognizing the unique nature of every educational system, we refrain from offering one-size-fits-all solutions. Instead, we present a nuanced exploration of insights from educational neuroscience, encouraging supporters to tailor their approach within each supporter-educator dynamic.
... As a decision process, phronesis thus became replaced by top-down procedures that better fit the post-Enlightenment frame of mind. There are many historical influences cast in the mold of that thought, including an instrumentalist cost-benefit analysis of the utilitarian kind [23,24], a formalistic deontological (rule-based) procedure emphasizing purely rational arbitration of decision-making [20,25], a sentimentalist philosophy that views desires and emotions (not reason) as the essential sources of decision-making [26], and a logical positivist philosophy of science that eschews values and ethics in science (critiqued by Richardson et al. [27]). These influences on psychology were all unfriendly to the concept of phronesis. ...
This article presents the development and validation of the Short Phronesis Measure (SPM), a novel tool to assess Aristotelian phronesis (practical wisdom). Across three studies, using large, nationally representative samples from the UK and US (demographically matched to census data), we employed a systematic and rigorous methodology to examine the structure, reliability, and validity of the SPM. In Study 1a, exploratory factor analysis identified ten distinct, internally reliable components of phronesis, challenging the traditional four-component Aristotelian model. Study 1b confirmed these findings in two additional nationally representative samples from the UK and the US. In Study 1c, the SPM demonstrated strong test-retest reliability over two months. Study 2 used network analysis to uncover interrelations among the components, allowing for the creation of a new and empirically driven neo-Aristotelian model of phronesis. In Study 3, we tested criterion validity, showing phronesis correlates positively with flourishing and predicts flourishing two months later, demonstrating strong predictive validity. Phronesis also correlated with Big 6 and Dark Tetrad personality traits, moral disengagement, and Moral Foundations in expected directions. Importantly, phronesis predicted key outcomes—related to flourishing, moral disengagement, and morally relevant aspects of personality—beyond what Moral Foundations alone explained, with an average increase in predictive power of 13.7% across all outcomes. The SPM is quick to administer (15–20 minutes), making it a valuable tool for researchers and practitioners in psychology, education, and professional ethics. The introduction of the neo-Aristotelian Phronesis Model, and the identification of central phronesis components, offers actionable insights for moral psychologists and moral educators, suggesting areas of focus that could yield broad, positive effects across related traits, providing a significant contribution to both theory and practice.
... However, he asserts that to fully comprehend and act in accordance with these obligations necessitates rational reflection. Kant posits that the recognition of moral truths is a pre-thinking act, whereas ethical knowledge-or the understanding of one's moral duties-demands active engagement with reason and the formulation of universal moral principles(Kant, 1991).Similarly, Alasdair MacIntyre offers a critique of the modern moral landscape, arguing that while individuals may intuitively recognize certain ethical values, they lack the philosophical coherence and narrative context necessary to fully know and apply these values in a context of moral fragmentation. MacIntyre posits that traditional ethical systems, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics, provide the framework for transitioning from moral recognition to moral knowledge. ...
The article presents a distinction between the cognitive processes of
knowing and recognizing from a variety of philosophical, psychological, and religious perspectives. The term "recognition" is used to describe an intuitive awareness or instinctive grasp of fundamental properties, whereas the term
"knowledge" is used to denote a more profound conceptual understanding that
emerges from experience and analysis. This research draws upon philosophical
theories such as Plato's anamnesis and theological concepts such as fitrah and
sensus divinitatis. This article examines the ways in which these processes complement each other in shaping moral awareness and intellectual development. It
emphasizes the role of both empirical and logical structures in understanding the
acquisition and verification of knowledge. The analysis posits that knowing and
recognition are inextricably linked components of human cognition, and that
both play a role in existential understanding and the validity of moral judgments
... However, he asserts that to fully comprehend and act in accordance with these obligations necessitates rational reflection. Kant posits that the recognition of moral truths is a pre-thinking act, whereas ethical knowledge-or the understanding of one's moral duties-demands active engagement with reason and the formulation of universal moral principles(Kant, 1991).Similarly, Alasdair MacIntyre offers a critique of the modern moral landscape, arguing that while individuals may intuitively recognize certain ethical values, they lack the philosophical coherence and narrative context necessary to fully know and apply these values in a context of moral fragmentation. MacIntyre posits that traditional ethical systems, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics, provide the framework for transitioning from moral recognition to moral knowledge. ...
... As a decision process, phronesis thus became replaced by top-down procedures that better fit the post-Enlightenment frame of mind. There are many historical influences cast in the mold of that thought, including an instrumentalist cost-benefit analysis of the utilitarian kind [23,24], a formalistic deontological (rule-based) procedure emphasizing purely rational arbitration of decision-making [20,25], a sentimentalist philosophy that views desires and emotions (not reason) as the essential sources of decision-making [26], and a logical positivist philosophy of science that eschews values and ethics in science (critiqued by Richardson et al. [27]). These influences on psychology were all unfriendly to the concept of phronesis. ...
This article presents the development and validation of the Short Phronesis Measure (SPM), a novel tool to assess Aristotelian phronesis (practical wisdom). Across five studies, using large, nationally representative samples from the UK and US (demographically matched to census data), we employed a systematic and rigorous methodology to examine the structure, reliability, and validity of the SPM. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis identified ten distinct, internally reliable components of phronesis, challenging the traditional four-component Aristotelian model. Study 2 confirmed these findings in two additional nationally representative samples from the UK and the US. In Study 3, the SPM demonstrated strong test-retest reliability over two months. Study 4 used exploratory network analysis to uncover interrelations among the components, allowing for the creation of a new and empirically driven neo-Aristotelian model of phronesis. In Study 5, we tested criterion validity, showing phronesis correlates positively with flourishing and predicts flourishing two months later, demonstrating strong predictive validity. Phronesis also correlated with Big 6 and Dark Tetrad personality traits, moral disengagement, and Moral Foundations in expected directions. Importantly, phronesis predicted key outcomes—related to flourishing, moral disengagement, and morally relevant aspects of personality—beyond what Moral Foundations alone explained, with an average increase in predictive power of 13.7% across all outcomes. The SPM is quick to administer (15-20 minutes), making it a valuable tool for researchers and practitioners in psychology, education, and professional ethics. The introduction of the neo-Aristotelian Phronesis Model, and the identification of central phronesis components, offers actionable insights for moral psychologists and moral educators, suggesting areas of focus that could yield broad, positive effects across related traits, providing a significant contribution to both theory and practice.
... gopthq; Fk; eP jp (Retributive justice) jtWfSf; fhd jz; lidap y; epahakhf ele; J nfhs; fpwJ. ,k; khDNty; fhd; l; > The Metaphysics of Morals ,y; > Moral autonomy kw; Wk; cyfshtp a xOf; f rl; lq; fspd; gb jdp egu; fs; jq; fs; nray; fSf; F nghWg; Ngw; f Ntz; Lk; vd; w fUj; ij mbg; gilahff; nfhz; l eP jpf; fhf thjpLfpwhu;(Kant, 1991). Nkw; fj; jpa rpe; jidapy; gopthq; Fk; eP jpahdJ ngUk; ghYk; 'tpfpjhrhu jz; lid' (proportional punishment) vd; w fUj; Jld; ,izf; fg; gl; Ls; sJ> mq; F jz; lid Fw; wj; jpw; F nghUj; jkhdjhf mika Ntz; Lk; . ...
This study examines how ethical standards established by stakeholders such as developers and policymakers provide top-down guidance aligned with deontological ethics or utilitarian goals. It also highlights a complementary bottom-up approach, rooted in virtue ethics, in which individuals engage in ethical deliberations shaped by their moral values. Both approaches have limitations, and, at times, ethical standards can clash with moral values, thus blurring lines of responsibilities. Deontological principles may offer a structured framework, but often lack adaptability to diverse cultural contexts; bottom-up approaches foster intrinsic moral intentions, but universal applicability may be challenging, thus raising moral dilemmas. Through a theoretical literature review, this study explains how different ontological and normative ethical perceptions lead to moral dilemmas in various AI application scenarios (e.g., algorithmically managed platforms, crime detection systems, medical AI assistants). It addresses top-down and bottom-up approaches that may help account for moral dilemmas ethically. The study discusses the balance between top-down regulatory frameworks and bottom-up community-driven ethics to navigate the complex ethical landscape of AI applications, whose increasing capabilities alter expectations of AI’s agency and morality. This study calls for holistic and multi-objective ethical frameworks that incorporate diverse normative ethical perspectives and recognizes context-specific ontologies throughout the AI lifecycle. It emphasizes a nuanced and context-specific combination of top-down standards (e.g., regulatory oversight, clear guidelines) and bottom-up fostering of moral values (e.g., by improving ethical knowledge). This tailored and ongoing reflection of ethical standards and moral values accounts for an ethical development, deployment, and utilization of AI technologies.
This paper examines the evolving dynamics of human-AI interaction, emphasizing the ethical challenges and responsibility gaps that emerge as AI technologies become more autonomous and integrated into society and business. We analyze, utilizing a systematic literature review, how various ethical views influence our understanding of morality and responsibility in human-AI collaborations. Deontological ethics emerge as a dominant theme, with much of the literature centered on ethical principles shaped by powerful nations. The study highlights the need to integrate diverse ethical perspectives into AI research to address contradictions in ethical frameworks across various cultural contexts. While respecting cultural differences, achieving a common ground among these frameworks requires increased dialogue among AI researchers and practitioners. Our findings further underscore the importance of future research in developing a more cohesive understanding of how AI transformation challenges previous assumptions about AI’s role in moral agency and responsibility.
Law regulates the behaviour of human beings in their interaction with other human beings and the world around them. What Law can or cannot dictate is thus intimately related with the way we conceive our environment. In the present paper I explore the way Kant presents the path leading from sense data to the discursive conceptualization of that sense data, and from that conceptualization to the discursive conceptualization of a moral world—the kingdom of ends—or, more specifically, a juridical world—the civil state. The paper details how the categorical imperative, understood as a test of imperative categoricity, and the typic of practical judgment play a critical role in the thought process required for that conceptual movement. Thus framed, Law finds itself bound by limits imposed by the non-discursive data that allows us to interact with the sensible world, on one side, and by other co-existent conceptualizations of the way we interact with the world around us.
Russell (Proc Aristot Soc 11:108–128, 1911; The Problems of Philosophy, Thornton Butterworth Limited, London, 1912) argued that perceptual experience grounds a species of non-propositional knowledge, “knowledge by acquaintance,” and in recent years, this account of knowledge has been gaining traction. I defend on its basis a connection between moral and epistemic failure. I argue, first, that insufficient concern for the suffering of others can be explained in terms of an agent’s lack of acquaintance knowledge of another’s suffering, and second, that empathy improves our epistemic situation. Empathic distress approximates acquaintance with another’s suffering, and empathic agents who are motivated to help rather than disengage exhibit an important epistemic virtue: a variety of intellectual courage. A key upshot is that an independently motivated account of the structure and significance of perceptual experience is shown to provide theoretical scaffolding for understanding a famously elusive idea in ethics—namely, that the failure to help others stems from a kind of ignorance of their situation.
The paper questions the normative framework of the designation of body parts as things in civil law doctrine and the possibility of legal disposal of body parts in the context of Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant derives the formation of private legal (subjective) rights from the preliminary separation of things and persons and the second formulation of the categorical imperative. In discussing the concept of private law and property rights that are possible only concerning the human-thing relationship, Kant consequently talks about issues of self-ownership and property rights to one’s body and its parts. Although he explicitly wrote about the impossibility of self-ownership of the body and, in principle, the impossibility of disposing of its parts, it must be remembered that Kant could not foresee all the possible achievements, perspectives, and trials of modern transplant medicine. In the paper, Kant’s basic bioethical and private law concepts (primarily ownership and property rights) are placed in the context of (legal) disposal of body parts. In any exposition and discussion of the Kantian-based opinion on dispositions of body parts, we should not necessarily and exclusively be guided by Kant’s explicit writings on actual legal dispositions of body parts. We should consider the broader framework of Kant’s deontological ethics and Kant’s understanding of persons andthings. Such an interpretation can lead to the conclusion that there are no obstacles to basing property rights in body parts but limited property rights, with the classification of body parts as things restricted in legal circulation, which is the opinion that prevails in certain statutory private law provisions and writings of civil law doctrine.
The concept of “moral sense”, introduced into the philosophical lexicon by Ashley-Cooper Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, has found a place in the teachings of many thinkers. Immanuel Kant was one of them. The position of the theory of moral sense, which exerted a formative influence on Kant’s moral philosophy, varied as it evolved from the pre-critical to the critical period of Kant’s work. In order to find out what this influence was, I first reconstructed the views of Shaftesbury on the nature of the moral sense and then proceeded to analyse the place of this concept in Hutcheson’s philosophy. In the case of the former the moral sense is closely linked with the aesthetic categories of the beautiful and the ugly which correspond respectively to the aesthetic categories of good and evil. The latter associates the moral sense with reason. I then examine Kant’s attitude to the concept of moral sense. First I look at the works of the pre-critical period in which this concept is used and conclude that Kant may have borrowed the concept from Hutcheson. At the same time Kant makes this concept an object of his immanent critique because already now the question arises of the nature and character of virtue and the possibility of its being estimated impartially. Next I turn to Kant’s works of the critical period in which he is more emphatic in claiming that the moral sense cannot be a criterion in making ethical judgments. However, Kant does not exclude this concept from his practical philosophy, but explains it in a different way from the views both of British sentimentalists and from his own views of the pre-critical period. Accordingly, the moral sense is no longer a sensation, but occupies a place in-between feelings as such and reason.
The biblical assertion regarding human credibility of “dominion over all the earth,” the Aristotelian idea regarding the existence of nature, plants and animals as “instruments” to be used for human purposes, Locke’s supposition that “the inferior ranks of creatures” are “made for human use,” and Marx’s depiction of nature as “man’s inorganic body” and “the instrument of his life-activity” have led the Western canon of thought and philosophy to justify the domination of humans over nature and the nonhuman others. Radically shifting from this line of thought, Sharon R. Krause and Romand Coles hold this biased attitude responsible for ecodisaster that, in a persuasive turn, opens towards the ‘manifold’ of ‘eco-emancipation’ that vindicates ‘human and more-than- human assemblages’. As theorised by Krause, the ‘polyface ethos’ of ‘eco-emancipation’ and ‘assemblage’ finds its representations in Ruskin Bond’s short stories. Included in Treasury of Stories for Children, Bond’s texts like “Tiger Tiger Burning Bright” and “Panther’s Moon” critique the ruthless killing of non-human animals and unyielding destruction of forests as signifiers of greater upcoming ecocatastrophe and endorse emancipatory “practices of worldmaking in tandem with…Earth others”. Bond’s novella, Angry River delineates the rage of nature and denotes ecodisaster as an agent of ‘eco-emancipation’ that looks forward to releasing the ecosystem from the speciesist and humanist “entrapment and exploitation that constitute environmental domination” and preventing humans both from exercising domination on nature and from suffering it. My paper seeks to explore how select short stories of Ruskin Bond posit ecodisaster (and even the understanding of upcoming ecocatastrophe) to play a catalytic role in driving home the idea of ‘eco-emancipation’ that champions human attunement and engagement with nonhuman nature and envisions a dynamic world order.
In Immanuel Kant’s ethical philosophy, the autonomy of the will stands as a foundational concept that not only delineates but also profoundly shapes human morality and individual autonomy. Kant posited that human beings, through their capacity for rational deliberation, actively construct moral principles and retain the freedom to exercise moral judgment. Central to his ethical framework, the categorical imperative serves as a fundamental cornerstone of morality, underscoring both the intrinsic autonomy of the human will and the attendant moral responsibilities that ensue. This research article critically examines Kant’s theory of autonomous will, delving into its implications for moral autonomy and the interplay between natural necessity and the dichotomy of determination versus freedom. By exploring these facets, the study elucidates Kant’s enduring relevance in contemporary ethical discourse, offering insights into how his philosophical constructs continue to inform debates on moral agency, ethical decision-making, and the broader landscape of moral philosophy.
One of the significant effects of technology on human relations is visible in friendship. Positively technology through its digital spaces is facilitating friendship that is instant and beyond the limitations of time and space. However, such digital friendships that operate through social media often suffer from issues of trust and sustainability. To resolve this predicament, we need to pause and reflect on how digital friendship can be reframed to improve its sustainability in a practical manner. The primary purpose of this article is to examine how helpful the early Buddhist concept of mittatā (friendship) is in sustaining friendship in the digital age. The article begins by eliciting the moral challenges people encounter in online friendships. The objective is to highlight the need for a more vital concept of friendship, such as the early Buddhist concept of mittatā, that can mitigate the moral concerns in digitized friendship, making it genuine and sustainable. The subsequent part of the article offers an overview of some of the significant theories of friendship upheld in the West and examines whether they can support the sustainability of a digitized friendship. The objective is to reflect upon the lacuna in the practice of such ideas of friendship in the contemporary digital age. To replenish the lacuna, the following section articulates the early Buddhist concept of mittatā as a noble concept of friendship that can be morally relevant and sustainable in this digital world. Based on the philosophical study of the early Buddhist literature, the present article investigates how helpful mettā (loving kindness) in this society to sustain a trustworthy friendship. It proposes an ethical and noble way to nurture and savour an honourable friendship relevant to the digital era by inculcating specific virtues advocated by the Buddha.
This paper explores how Eurocentric ideas of nationalism and cosmopolitanism differ from Indian thinker and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore's views and in what ways the intersection between nationalism and cosmopolitanism takes place in his novel The Home and the World (1919), originally published as Ghare-Baire in 1916. The novel will be analyzed mainly through Kai Nielsen's philosophy of cosmopolitan nationalism (1999) and Kwame Anthony Appiah's concept of rooted cosmopolitanism (2005). Tagore yearned for the conglomeration of different cultures and despised narrow perspectives on nationalism as constricted by geographical boundaries. As per his humanitarian worldview, he prioritized cosmopolitanism as his forte. The novel does not propose any conflict between ʻthe homeʼ and ʻthe worldʼ; rather, it suggests a state in which the home and the world would be negotiated to form a harmonious whole. In the Swadeshi period (1905-1911), when the future of Indian self-rule was being mulled over, Tagore began to renounce aggressive nationalism and envisioned India as a land of all communities. The novel's depicted vision of cosmopolitan nationalism received critical appreciation globally after the English translation of the original Bengali text became available. Here, Tagore called for a transnational understanding of empathy and fellow feeling in which humanity would thrive beyond fishy earthly gains.
Many philosophers hold that we never owe others gratitude in return for their treating us in ways that we are owed. Instead, we owe others gratitude only for treating us in ways that go above and beyond the demands of morality. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken: we sometimes owe others gratitude for treating us in ways that we are owed. In particular, I argue that some moral duties require us to act in ways that express good will to one another, and when we act in accordance with these duties, we trigger duties of gratitude on the part of others.
This article explores how our understanding of justice and responsibility is shaped by the discourse of war. It begins by highlighting the impotence of the United Nations and other international peacekeeping organisations in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine, demonstrating the failure of the “humanitarian turn” in international law and politics. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the law of war, René Girard’s description of the genesis of the legal system, and Emmanuel Levinas’s “law of being”, the author examines the relationship between violence and law, distinguishing two variations of justice: justice as the victor’s justice and justice as the principle of retribution. By discussing the relationship with the Other, the author shows that war destroys not only the otherness of the Other but also one’s own identity, which, in its turn, implies a kind of reciprocity of forces in which, ultimately, no interpersonal relationship remains. The paper argues that the sense of injustice and the demand for justice arise from a much deeper source than the sphere of law and politics. Through an analysis of Emmanuel Levinas’s and Paul Ricœur’s notions of responsibility, it is shown that the relationship between justice and responsibility allows us to conceive of justice as an effort to reconcile two incommensurable demands: equality and proximity to the Other. A comparison of Levinas’s and Ricœur’s positions reveals how the radical (Levinas) and moderate (Ricœur) concepts of the Other are defined in relation to the discourse of war: the radical otherness of the Other implies the irrevocable responsibility of the self, while the moderate otherness of the Other implies responsibility in the form of resistance to the aggressor.
Beyond the deep affinities linking Immanuel Kant’s declared “primacy of practical reason” and Emmanuel Levinas’s “ethics as first philosophy,” these thinkers radically diverge, as do modern rationalism and contemporary phenomenology. The paper shows that Kant, despite his declaration, continues to give primacy to epistemology and reason, as evidenced by the supreme status of law – both in nature, to be sure, and in the autonomy of rational self-legislation. This contrasts with Levinas who recognizes as “original right” a moral imperative more exigent than the rule of law, emanating from the alterity or face of the other person. Such original right orders the self pre-originally or “an-archically” to a moral responsibility to and for the other person before all else. In this way, Levinas, in contrast to Kant, understands the source of intelligibility – including the rationality of logic and science – in and as the goodness of the priority of moral obligation.
The end of a long-term romantic relationship ranks among the most stressful and momentous events in life. Thus, the decision of whether to break up with someone whom one has been with for many years should generally be made very carefully. Unfortunately, decision theory is often thought to be unable to provide rational guidance in such high-stake life choices due to the outcomes’ presumed transformative character. The present paper shows how agents can rationally decide whether to leave their romantic partner even if the decision is transformative. It does so by using a novel five-level account of transformative decision-making, which can also be used for other key life choices, and which is the first to integrate in a systematic way several approaches for making (certain types of) transformative decisions that have been proposed in recent years.
Research in older populations is necessary for scientific knowledge production aimed at improving older people’s health and well-being. However, a special approach to research ethics is mandatory to address the special needs of this particularly vulnerable group. In this chapter, we revisit the international ethical framework for research in persons to later discuss specific concerns related to the principles of autonomy, dignity, vulnerability, and justice in the context of physician–patient relationships, power relations, social responsibilities, and historical older people exclusions.
Focusing on Sally Haslanger’s conceptual framework, where ‘gender’ and ‘race’ are perceived as social kinds, the paper reconstructs Haslanger’s view, subsequently extending her analysis to the realm of ‘disability.’ The central thesis posits that ‘disability,’ akin to ‘gender’ and ‘race,’ can be understood as a social kind, asserting that disability involves systemic subordination marked by perceived bodily impairments. The paper addresses several objections, including the natural kind standpoint and the claim of disability as a valuable cultural kind. Furthermore, it grapples with Haslanger’s non-reductive and politically engaged stance by examining whether disabilities, despite their inherent physical and mental impairments, comprise social constructs with profound normative implications.
Wollen (Libertarianism and conjoined twins) argues that libertarianism premised on absolute property rights founders where physical boundaries between two persons cannot be discerned, as is the case with conjoined twins. In this rejoinder, we make a three-pronged argument against Wollen’s claim. First, it is demonstrated that even if conjoined twins really do not hold self-ownership rights against one another, they still have one bodily ownership right against the rest of the world. Second, two alternative resolutions of Wollen’s hypothetical dispute between conjoined twins that derive from two different versions of libertarianism are set forth. Third, it is shown that the quandaries engendered by the existence of conjoined twins not only are not specific for libertarianism but there also are political philosophies to which conjoined twins pose even greater a challenge.
As devices powered by artificial intelligence (AI) become increasingly prevalent, the following question arises: How can these technologies improve human well-being? Transparency, defined as traceability and explainability under the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act, is vital to human well-being. Given the citizens’ varying levels of education and understanding, it is unrealistic to expect a single, uniform eXplainable AI framework to the public; a variety of explanations is necessary. This issue, long known as the tradeoff between AI accuracy and interpretability, remains unresolved. This chapter addresses this topic from a fresh perspective: coarse ethics. The author contends that full traceability is essential for professionals, whereas a coarse explanation of an AI system is sufficient for ordinary citizens and those with comprehension difficulties. Consequently, transparency should encompass not only a narrow concept centered on traceability and accountability but also a basic foundation that non-experts can comprehend. Under this broad definition, an AI must be explainable to the extent that it allows for reasonable informed consent. Adopting this method will alleviate the explanatory burden on developers while avoiding information overload for users and regulators, thereby promoting human well-being.
The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason . First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck.
It is conventional wisdom that appreciating the role of luck in our moral lives should make us more sparing with blame. But views of moral responsibility that allow luck to augment a person’s blameworthiness are in tension with this wisdom. I resolve this tension: our common moral luck partially generates a duty to forgo retributively blaming the blameworthy person at least sometimes. So, although luck can amplify the blame that a person deserves, luck also partially generates a duty not to give the blameworthy person the retributive blame that he deserves at least sometimes.
Hermann Cohen, the founding father of Marburg neo-Kantianism, is known for criticising capitalism from a Kantian ethical perspective. Thus far, the role of the notion of humanity in this critique has been viewed as grounding what I shall call the ‘purposive labour reading’. This reading takes Cohen’s primary interest to lie in a reorganisation of work so that our humanity, which requires us to be treated as ends, remains intact. With the aim to better understand the relevant notion of humanity, I contextualise the discussion within the overall framework of Cohens’ neo-Kantian account of ethical cognition and situate his ideas in the context of his contemporary interlocutors. Revisiting Cohen’s remarks on socialism and capitalism against this backdrop reveals that his discussion of labour serves as an exemplar, showcasing how ethical rationality manifests in the liberal socialists’ demands. I argue that his primary aim was not to prepare the ground for a prescriptive labour theory – though this is likely to follow – but to argue for a framework alternative to historical materialism, allowing us to perceive and interpret social practices in an ethical light.
In this paper I respond to the replies of David Heyd and Yitzhak Benbaji to my paper ‘War and Self-Defense: Reflections on the War on Gaza’. Heyd’s relativizing of narrative overlooks the epistemic hierarchy among narratives and their important role in establishing facts, and his claim that Israel’s history is not colonialist in character fails because it is based on a misunderstanding of colonialism in general and settler colonialism in particular. Historically, I outline how Benbaji’s appeal to the legal status of the Mandate is problematic, because it ignores the illegitimacy of the legal regime behind it, such that accepting his argument would be to legitimize colonialism. Theoretically, I defend the view contrary to Benjabi, that instead of their being a moral tie between two equal sides, the Palestinians have always had fundamental legal and moral rights that the Zionist project violated ab initio and continues to violate.
The review of the conference offers views on law that are widespread in Russian theoretical and legal science. The outstanding role of the founder of German classical philosophy I. Kant in the formation of the Philosophy of Law is noted. His idea of a categorical imperative is aimed at creating a model of a state governed by the Rule of Law, where a person is declared not only a means, but also a goal. Kant is one of those who formed the metaphysical Philosophy of Law, i. e. the branch of knowledge that creates semantic models in the world of political and legal reality. The influence of Kant on the Russian and European Philosophy of Law, the importance of his ideas for modernity is shown.
This article shows how Kant’s framework of domestic right can be understood as a model for modern employment law, a suggestion made by Garrath Williams in a commentary on Kant’s Theory of Labour. I begin by exploring how Kant’s historical context informed his account of labor relations and argue that he made three key innovations: the theorization of domestic right, the linkage of work and political standing, and the development of contract right to make sense of the material dependency and formal equality of “free” contract workers. This account of contract-based work, however, sketches a dangerous “fantasy” of free contract that we see echoed in contemporary defenses of the gig economy. I show that this argument is central to understanding Kant’s evolving conception of the relationship between labor and citizenship, but I defend the claim that modern employment resembles domestic right more closely than contract right, by attending to both the formal structures of modern employment law and the lived experiences of professional employment in the digital age. Finally, I explore how drawing on the domestic model for understanding modern employment can help us to see the limits of both Kantian and contemporary accounts of the public good, by highlighting the ways that public law is deployed to formalize asymmetrical relations of dependence, to check their capacity for exploitation and domination. In so doing, public law acts to limit the scope of the state’s responsibility for both the formal and material conditions of equality, freedom, and flourishing, enforcing conditions in which citizens must rely on private employers for goods like health insurance, sick leave, and a minimum income.
Philosophers and scholars often overlook Kant’s foundational contribution to the concept of recognition (Anerkennung), yet it proves challenging to develop a comprehensive theory without integrating Kantian moral philosophy, particularly his conceptualization of respect. I contend that the demand for recognition necessitates a Kantian moral perspective, which revolves around the feeling of respect. In this regard, I draw upon the insights of contemporary philosopher Axel Honneth, who acknowledges the influence of Kant’s moral philosophy in shaping the conceptualization of the struggle for recognition.
This paper aims to show the significance of respect in revealing the normative structure of Kant’s ethics to the agent as a finite rational being. I argue that understanding the moral law as a fact of reason is insufficient for fully recognizing its absolute value and the normative consequences it entails. Indeed, the finiteness of the human agent requires the experience of the feeling of respect, which not only has a motivational role but also an epistemic one. I thus start by clarifying the nature of feeling for Kant in a way that highlights its complex structure. Then, I show how respect – as a particular kind of feeling – gives the agent a deeper understanding of her relationship with the moral law, thereby allowing the unveiling of Kant’s normative theory.
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