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European Union Enlargement Conditionality
Abstract
Introduction 1. Conditionality and EU Enlargement: A Conceptual Overview 2. EU Enlargement Conditionality in the Context of the 2004 Enlargement 3. EU Enlargement Conditionality in the Context of the 2007 Enlargement 4. EU Enlargement Conditionality in the Context of the South-Eastern Enlargements 5. The Evolution of EU Enlargement Conditionality: Overview and Key Findings
... Hence, even when trying to rethink it, they come to the conclusion that no substantial revision is needed -neither to the political approach itself (within which accession conditionality figures prominently), nor in regard to the paradigm of its interpretation, which is based on the assumptions of power asymmetry and external incentives (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020;Sedelmeier 2019;Grabbe 2014). Even when the transformation of the EU's enlargement policy is the focus of attention, any innovations are confined within the framework of a basic political approach, centred on conditionality (Gateva 2015(Gateva , 2014Fagan, Sircar 2015). On the other hand, a growing number of researchers question the efficacy of the EU's enlargement methodology, and the patterns of its academic understanding (Kmezić 2019(Kmezić , 2020Ágh 2019;Džankić, Keil and Kmezić 2018;Kochenov and Bárd 2018;Kochenov and Pech 2015;Fagan and Sircar 2015;Mendelski 2015;Slapin 2015;De Ridder and Kochenov 2011;Kochenov 2008;Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2005;Maniokas 2004). ...
... Besides, the EU, in turn, was not equipped with means for coercion of the "reluctant regimes" (Grabbe 2006). It is exactly in the context of this irreconcilable political controversy that the policy of enlargement through conditionality became crucially important (Chiva and Phinnemore 2012;Gateva 2015;Smith 2003), namely that the post-Communist countries had necessarily to be transformed, but they either could not be, or would do so with utter reluctance. Pre-accession conditionality deliberately introduced the element of competition amongst the applicant countries (Verheugen 2005), which became aware that they could not all join the Union. ...
... Presumably, these are the Copenhagen criteria from 1993, plus the 1995 Madrid criterion on administrative capacity for applying the EU acquis(Gateva 2015;Chiva and Phinnemore 2012;Maresceau 1997;Ludlow 2004;Vassiliou 2007; Smith 2003 and numerous others). Although the Copenhagen criteria are considered the unconditional standard for readiness for EU membership, it is very well known that these criteria are vague and vulnerable(Smith 2003;Kochenov 2008;De Ridder and Kochenov 2011), and the practical application of the enlargement methodology is greatly contested(Maniokas 2004;Hughes et al. 2005;Gallagher 2005;Bozhilova 2008). ...
In 2020, the European Commission proposed a new framework of the EU’s enlargement policy, justified by the deficiencies of the Bulgarian and Romanian EU membership. This article provides empirical evidence from the accession negotiation process that Bulgaria and Romania didn’t belong to a common group, separated from the other post-communist societies, which joined the EU in 2004. Our analysis identified several patterns of accession, distinguished by the number of negotiation chapters closed and the pace at which that was accomplished, which are counter-intuitive. They all fall under the rule: exceptional final outcomes are achieved by countries, which accelerated to the greatest extent. The acceleration matters a lot but it didn’t count in the Fifth enlargement. This ought to be remedied in the case of the Western Balkan, since any discrepancy between a country’s performance and its political evaluation hampers the credibility of EU accession, which in turn diminishes pro-European efforts.
... At the same time, enlargement remains one of the most imprecise and controversial EU policies. Reaching consensus on its principles and methodology has already proven to be extremely difficult in the case of the western Balkans and Turkey (Grabbe and Aktoudianakis 2022;Džankić et al. 2018;Fenko and Stal 2018;Karacarska 2018;Vachudova 2018;Zhelyazkova et al. 2018;Plachkova 2019;Gateva 2015). This will be challenged even further by the applications of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova with their urging for fast-track membership in response to the new geopolitical circumstances. ...
... This presumed effectiveness of conditionality is closely related to the taken-forgranted 'power of attraction' attached to the EU by both policy makers and academics. According to the dominant rational institutionalist rhetoric, the instrument of conditionality was deemed successful in preparations for enlargement to central and eastern Europe since it stemmed from the power asymmetry between the main actors in the process and the intrinsic interest of local governments in complying with the set conditions (Gateva 2015;Sedelmeier 2012;Grabbe 2006;Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). ...
... It is interesting to note that this role does not occupy one of the leading positions. According to the academic literature, providing expertise was a main function of the work of the Commission (Gateva 2015;Sedelmeier 2012;Grabbe 2006;Smith 2003), but this remained somewhat marginal in the memories of the Bulgarian participants in the process. Even more interestingly, the opposite role -that of a player with a shortage of expertise -received almost the same number of references. ...
Within the current geopolitical atmosphere of instability and insecurity on the eastern borders of the EU, enlargement has resurfaced as a topic of high priority, being a basic condition for the future of European integration. The effectiveness of EU enlargement policy, largely considered as the most successful EU policy, is starting to raise serious concerns. A key problem of the EU’s approach so far has been the extreme role of the European Commission as a political actor conducting a discretionary policy, hidden behind the claim of a completely strict, objective assessment based on the merits of the candidate countries. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative empirical analysis, and using the symptomatic example of Bulgaria, this article aims to understand how the Commission has perceived the specificities of the task of expanding to the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe and how, based on this perception, it has built its interaction with them. The author concludes that the failures of the policy need to be remedied if future enlargements to the western Balkans are to be successful.
... For the EU's global use, see for instance Saltnes 2018. For a short selection of entries on EU's relations to affiliated nonmembers (including applicant states), see: Gateva 2015Gateva , 2018Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004;Sedelmeier 2011. 5 Scholars identify a wide range of types of conditionality, which include: enlargement conditionality; membership conditionality; accession conditionality; acquis conditionality; democratic conditionality; and political conditionality. ...
... Austria and Germany allowed such access only after seven years after entry, i.e. 2011. 24 See for instance Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 2005a, 2005bGateva 2015. Applicant states and EU member states are subject to monitoring from the European Commission, which is in charge of ensuring the application of the Treaties and of overseeing the application of all Union law (Art 17 Treaty of the EU TEU). ...
... (accessed 4 November 2020).27 For an overview and a four stage model of conditionality, seeGateva 2015. institutions -especially through veto power in the European Council; hence have the capacity to block measures bent on reinforcing EU monitoring or sanctioning. ...
... The reason is not only that both countries appeared similar, seen through the prism of the EC's political evaluations (throughout the course of their EU accession, and, subsequently, that they both became EU members in 2007on common, harder termsthree years later than the other post-communist countries of the CEEC group). These facts are important, of course, but there is a deeper reason for the EU's political decision initially to postpone their accession and later on to implement the unprecedented postaccession conditionality (Chiva & Phinnemore, 2012;Gateva, 2015;Papadimitriou & Gateva, 2009;Papakostas, 2012). ...
... The real preparedness of the societies of Bulgaria and Romania for effective membership was placed in a secondary rank of importance, as the decision to accept them in the EU was mostly the result of a situational accumulation of specific circumstances and geo-political considerations in the second half of the 1990s. 17 The 2007 phase of the Fifth EU enlargement deserves some particular attention because it has led to changes in the way the EU manages the enlargement process (Gateva, 2015;Phinnemore, 2009). The accession of Bulgaria and Romania became far more contested at national parliamentary and general public levels in several major EU member states -Germany, France, the Netherlands. ...
... The accession of Bulgaria and Romania became far more contested at national parliamentary and general public levels in several major EU member states -Germany, France, the Netherlands. At that point in history there were increasing political and popular concerns about the enlargement and, hence, additional provisions were necessary to ensure that this enlargement would neither cause damages to the EU nor run counter to public opinion (Chiva & Phinnemore, 2012;Gateva, 2015;Papakostas, 2012;Phinnemore, 2009). Thus, the introduction of a post-accession EU conditionality became inevitable. ...
This article provides a test for the relevance of the major conceptual framework used in Europeanization literature on EU political conditionality for promoting effective democracy and rule of law (RoL). It highlights a major enlargement policy problem which should challenge the basic assumption of this academic tradition. The main focus is on the Bulgarian-Romanian case which illuminates much broader processes in Central and Eastern European countries in recent years. They are a serious reason for reconsidering the premises, logic and mechanisms of the ‘Enlargement-led Europeanization’. After a brief socio-political argumentation of the need to discuss the Bulgarian and Romanian case jointly (as ‘the only laggards of the Fifth Enlargement’), the paper traces back a complex connection: post-accession conditionality’s failure – pre-accession political methodology – paradigm alternatives of enlargement research. Empirical arguments are provided for the general assessment that EU’s post-accession conditionality (in the form of a Cooperation and verification mechanism – CVM) is undergoing a deep crisis since it is unable to achieve its own goals within the span envisioned by its initial political design.
... However, after Turkey was given the membership status in Helsinki and accession negotiations started in 2005, the studies were concentrated on the democratisation and human rights reforms in Turkey (Öniş, 2009;Tocci, April 2005;Sipahioğlu, 2017;Müftüler-Baç, 2005). When the momentum of the accession process began to decline after 2009, because of internal and external factors, cost and benefit analysis of the membership (Uğur, 2010;Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003), conditionality of the EU (Kubicek, 2011;Müftüler-Baç, 2019a;Saatçioğlu, 8 2009; Gateva, 2015), decline in democracy and rule of law in Turkey (Özbudun, 2015;Müftüler-Baç, 2015;Sipahioğlu, 2017;Tocci & Düzgit, 2015;Arat, 2019) and alternatives other than full membership (Moldovan, 2020;Müftüler-Baç, 2019b;Zucconi, 2020;Pierini, 2019;Perchoc, 2018) became the areas that scholars mainly focused on. ...
... The first one is the conditions demonstrated by the European Union; which every candidate country needs to follow. The second one is an incentive form based on reward-threat equilibrium and lastly is the monitoring principle (Gateva, 2015). Assistance and organisational ties are examples of rewards offered to the non-member countries in the democratic conditionally. ...
... If the opinion is positive, either the Council recognizes the applicant as a candidate country or the Council concludes to start accession negotiations. The EU can also set up special conditions which the applicant country should reach to start the negotiating accession (Gateva, 2015). ...
Turkey is not only a geographical centre for the regional cooperation but also an attractive economic hub with a massive market and a high young population. For more than 50 years, Turkey has tried to become a member of the European Union. Turkey was formally acknowledged as a full membership candidate in 1999. The accession process has since shifted slowly, reached a full standstill and the process seems to be failing. While there is general consensus among member states that Turkey is a significant strategic partner and should be strongly linked with the EU, there is an arousing scepticism to the prospect of full membership. Turkey is not ready and willing to completely abandon the European prospect, but also wants to enter the EU on its own terms. The absence of human rights, limited freedom of faith and speech, Cyprus conflict , recent weakening of the economy are the most frequently known deficiencies of Turkey. Turkey would significantly boost the EU's heterogeneity and contribute to the Union's decision-making and distribution issues, however will also bring problems to the stability of the Union. What are the main political and economic obstacles of Tur-key's accession process? What are the near future scenarios? Turkey-EU relations are not a simple matter as there are many actors involved and many dimensions to be taken into account. The purpose of this study is to analyse, identify and find answers to these research questions; by investigating some political and economic reasons behind this failure.
... As we demonstrate, the EU's democratic conditionality has emerged and became more specific through the interaction with the waves of enlargement of new members to the EU. In this research agenda, most contributions address the influence and the role of democratic conditionality on countries' political regimes that apply for membership in the European Union (Simmons 2011:133;Gateva 2015). ...
... As aforementioned, most of the academic production on this topic focuses on the normative and transformative power of the EU over its aspiring member states (Simmons 2011:133;Gateva 2015). This literature is called Europeanisation and is currently defined as the study of transformative dynamics of norm transfer from states to the EU and vice versa. ...
This article aims at explaining the changes in the democratic conditionality of the European Union over time from the institutional contexts of the domestic and regional levels. The comparison milestones regard enlargements that happened between 1993 and 2014. Variations on the dependent variable are analysed in light of the principles and procedures of the concept of polyarchy (Dahl 1989). This analysis demonstrates and explains that the democratic conditionality of the EU has changed over time, becoming more complete and with more pluralist principles when applied to the enlargements. It also highlights the relation between the democratic conditionality and the democratic deficit of the EU by the incorporation of democratic principles and procedures in EU institutions.
... Dimitrov et al. 2014, Ganev 2013Papakostas 2012;Mendelski 2012;Tanasoiu and Racovita's 2012;Toneva-Metodieva 2014). One crucial design flaw of the CVM that these sceptical analyses identify is its lack of enforcement powers (Gateva 2015). 3 Although these sceptical assessments provide nuanced insights into the shortcomings of the CVM, they might conclude too readily that monitoring without enforcement cannot have an impact on domestic change. ...
... The material incentive structure of the CVM is very weak (Gateva 2015). The only sanction is the possibility for other member states not to recognise and execute decisions by Bulgarian or Romanian courts. ...
The European Union (EU) has made effective corruption control a condition for membership, but it cannot sanction non-compliance once a country has joined. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was an institutional experiment to compensate the loss of sanctioning power after accession with continued monitoring. Most commentators dismiss the potential of such monitoring without enforcement. This article’s original coding of the CVM reports with regard to corruption control in Romania and Bulgaria provides an empirical basis to assess the CVM’s ability to foster compliance. It suggests that monitoring can have a positive impact on state compliance even without material sanctions: despite the low expectations in the literature, compliance in Romania was significantly better than in Bulgaria. We explain Romania’s better compliance record with successful domestic institution-building. In contrast to Bulgaria, Romania created strong anti-corruption institutions that served as a powerful institutional base for the fight against corruption. The CVM has not only had a direct effect on institution-building, but also an important indirect effect. As the anti-corruption institutions remain vulnerable to governmental interference, the CVM played a key role as a social constraint on attempts by the government to curb their power and as a focal point for societal mobilisation.
... First, the studies focused on EU enlargement policy through conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005;Ekiert, 2008;Sedelmeier, 2011;Toshkov, 2012;Gateva, 2015) fail to explain the way in which that policy is formed and established as an essential instrument of the Europeanisation of central and eastern Europe. In these works, the enlargement approach of the EU appears as a natural self-evident fact. ...
... Such an approach would, however, overturn the dominant research perspective in relation to eastern enlargement which considers enlargement conditionality as a natural fact in relation to which member states and candidate countries are 'external' influencing factors (Gateva, 2015(Gateva, , 2018. It adopts the national interests of EU countries as an irresistible, albeit dynamically changing, fact in relation to which enlargement policy is only a tool. ...
This article aims to present a clear picture of the attempts towards the normalisation of relations in the western Balkans between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia via the process of the dialogue, facilitated by the UN General Assembly and mediated by the EU, which began more than eight years ago. The dialogue has produced different results for both countries so far, including various consequences and implications which have a constitutional nature. Taking this into account, this article offers an analysis of the perspective and the constitutional dimensions of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, drawing on the legal and factual actions that have been undertaken by the parties in the process thus far. The article analyses this dialogue and draws conclusions regarding the ending of the process and, in practice, how the final normalisation of relations should look, including the drawing up of a final agreement of reconciliation between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia. The constitutional consequences which can be the product of such an agreement are also examined.
... According to research, the EU prefers to negotiate with groups of States that have already established relations with one another. 116 The accession process can be advanced not only by good relations between Member States and a candidate country or a group of candidate countries, 117 but also by fostered links between aspiring States. 118 As early as 1994, the European Council emphasised the importance of 'cooperation between the associated countries for the promotion of economic development and good neighbourly relations' to ensure they can assume their responsibilities as future Member States. ...
... The Eastern enlargement, which began in 2004 and continued in 2007 and 2013, was an unprecedented step, in terms of both the scale and scope of EU integration (Gateva 2016). Although Slovakia applied to join the EU back in 1995, the semi-authoritarian governance of then-Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar posed a significant threat to the country's accession efforts. ...
... Conditionality entails the linkage between fulfilling particular tasks (conditions) and receiving distinct benefits (rewards). The Copenhagen criteria and the acquis establish it, and EU conditionality influences the domestic structures in the applicant countries [Eli, 2015]. Thus, Georgia, as a candidate country for EU membership, fulfills its obligations within the framework of the conditionality mechanism, which should result in the transformation of the country in all areas of internal politics, the convergence of the legislation with the EU legislation and, first of all, the fulfilment of the membership requirements. ...
Georgia is a candidate country for EU membership and has undertaken the obligations of implementing reforms in the country and fulfilling the conditions of the EU accession process. Among these obligations, one of the most important is the political criteria for accession, and more specifically the fulfillment of the fundamentals of accession, which refer to the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the development of democratic institutions. Since 2016, since the entry into force of the Association Agreements, Georgia has been implementing various reforms in order to bring Georgia’s legislation closer to the EU standards, and has made some progress in various fields. Georgia’s candidate status was granted under certain conditions, and in recent years it has been a special challenge to fulfill the foundations of the EU accession process, and accession negotiations with the country have not been opened in 2024. This paper discusses the progress of Georgia in the direction of the foundations of accession.
... EU uses its transformative power through the discretionary decision of technocratic groups at the expense of political ones. Therefore, many technical reports are often used as instruments of political pressure on candidate countries (Gateva 2015). In addition, alongside the preferences of the governments of member states, the preferences of various interest groups must also be taken into account because they will bear a disproportionate share of the short-term costs (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). ...
The article analyses how Romania promotes its national preferences in the EU enlargement process, with a particular focus on supporting the Republic of Moldova in becoming an EU member. The characteristics and dynamics of the current wave of EU enlargement are examined and several challenges that may delay the accession of some of the candidate countries are discussed. Additionally, the opportunities and challenges related to Romania's contribution in helping the Republic of Moldova prepare for the pre-accession stage and subsequently for EU membership are explored.
... Conditionality entails the linkage between fulfilling particular tasks (conditions) and receiving distinct benefits (rewards). The Copenhagen criteria and the acquis establish it, and EU conditionality influences the domestic structures in the applicant countries [Eli, 2015]. Thus, Georgia, as a candidate country for EU membership, fulfills its obligations within the framework of the conditionality mechanism, which should result in the transformation of the country in all areas of internal politics, the convergence of the legislation with the EU legislation and, first of all, the fulfilment of the membership requirements. ...
... Even taking them only in the internal territoriality, these borders overcome the prime frontiers of identity, nation and State (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). They link to the geopolitics of EU enlargements contributions of culture (Armstrong & Anderson, 2007;Gateva, 2015;Vos, 2017), besides the processes of European integration/differentiation by countries; sub-transnational spaces, regional formations. One of the miniatures below is a table done by me accounting 70 EU Regions. ...
... The patterns of conditionality established by the EU for the Eastern enlargement in 2004 were the most comprehensive in history (Grabbe 2002). Concurrently, the effectiveness of this conditionality has been theorised, differentiating at the most basic level, between positive (carrots) and negative (sticks) conditionality by providing incentives for change (rewards) and threatening with sanctions (withholding benefits) (Gateva 2015;Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Theories trying to explain the impact of conditions on national contexts of applicant states put emphasis on either a) the strategic calculation logic of actors involved; b) the process of socialisation (internalisation) of EU rules; or c) the added-value of EU rules for the solution of domestic problems (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005;Zhelyazkova et al. 2019). ...
This open access book aims at discussing the manifold consequences that the War against Ukraine bears for the European Union and EU Studies. It takes stock of the fact that the Russian Attack on Ukraine and the ensuing War not only affects the Global Order, but also has challenged a number of established narratives and convictions for the European Union and its member states. The EU now needs to position itself in the changing world order. Concretely it needs to deal with a number of membership applications, internal and external challenges to liberal democracy, and the development of its strategic autonomy in a number of decisive policy fields. The book convenes experienced scholars, with chapters covering the following themes and fields: Theories, approaches and concepts in EU studies and IR; the EU and the changing European and Global Order; the War and defence of liberal democracy; Membership Politics; Energy Policy.
... The patterns of conditionality established by the EU for the Eastern enlargement in 2004 were the most comprehensive in history (Grabbe 2002). Concurrently, the effectiveness of this conditionality has been theorised, differentiating at the most basic level, between positive (carrots) and negative (sticks) conditionality by providing incentives for change (rewards) and threatening with sanctions (withholding benefits) (Gateva 2015;Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Theories trying to explain the impact of conditions on national contexts of applicant states put emphasis on either a) the strategic calculation logic of actors involved; b) the process of socialisation (internalisation) of EU rules; or c) the added-value of EU rules for the solution of domestic problems (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005;Zhelyazkova et al. 2019). ...
Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 has not only brought war back to the European continent, it has also created a new urgency for the European Union to allow new members to find economic and strategic protection within its confines. While no accession procedure has been successfully concluded since 2013, the list of candidates is growing. In June 2022, the European Council decided to grant the status of candidate country to both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. This was greeted with great enthusiasm, in particular in Ukraine—which now expects a swift accession in reward for the enormous price it has had to pay for its European choice.
The key question this chapter addresses is which dynamics have evolved in this early accession process under the conditions of war, where the EU strives to defend the rule of law and democracy internally and externally simultaneously (in particular because of past experiences of how vulnerable democratic achievements are to recession), while at the same time trying to prove its geopolitical capacities by providing credible accession perspectives. The literature on EU conditionality provides us with helpful insights into factors conducive to the transformation of a candidate country along EU conditions (e.g. clarity, tangibility of rewards, absence of veto-players). This seems to make Ukraine an ideal candidate for successful transformation, as the renewed emphasis of the ‘geopolitical’ EU on enlargement strengthens the credibility of the promise, and a renewed enlargement methodology contributes to clarity and increases (tangible) rewards along the way. Additionally, an active Ukrainian civil society is putting pressure on political elites to continue on their European path. The close linkage of EU accession with reconstruction plans for Ukraine also makes successful EU integration an effective remedy for domestic challenges.
We argue, however, that in order to comprehensively understand ‘membership politics’ and the politicisation of EU conditions, it is essential to address the contextual interpretation of the norms posed by the EU as part of its accession conditionality. For this, we combine the concept of conditionality with approaches to norm contestation from International Relations (IR) Research. This induces a shift of perspective from a unidirectional norm-giver/norm-taker perspective, closely assigned to conditionality approaches, towards a focus on the web of interactions between actors on the EU and the Ukrainian side as they engage with, interpret and enact norms based on their social context. By example of the reform of the Ukrainian judiciary (and here in particular the Constitutional Court of Ukraine) we show how the ‘sovereignty argument’ is put forward to challenge the “West’s right to evaluate”. Furthermore, the contestation of time frames is of high salience not only because Ukraine demands a ‘fast track accession’ against the will of some EU Member States, but also because it raises the stakes as to how ‘sufficient progress’ for gaining promised rewards is assessed. It is thus indispensable to conceptualise and address contestation in order to understand the current challenges of turning Ukraine’s candidate status into a meaningful membership perspective under increased geopolitical pressure, and while a war is raging on the EU’s doorstep.
... In general, the logic of EU conditionality can be divided into two main phases: pre-accession and post-accession. While the former is based on the interrelated mechanisms of EU conditionality, incentives, and monitoring measures, the latter is limited to the second element, i.e., financial rewards for fulfilling the EU's conditions (Gateva, 2015). ...
p>This article summarizes the findings of research articles examining the consequences of the eastward enlargement of the European Union after 20 years. Experiences from the processes of adjustment to the EU’s governance regime prior to accession have been interpreted as a success story as the Central and Eastern European new member states moved from the EU periphery “back to the heart of Europe”. However, assumptions about the EU’s transformative power on the new members after accession are rather ambiguous. This is partly due to the inability of the EU to enforce the rules once the candidate country became a member, but also due to the fact that the countries were ready to join a completely different Union, which at that time was not yet characterized by economic crises, migration, security threats, or centrifugal forces leading to disintegration. This thematic issue aims to contribute to a better understanding of the processes underlying the EU’s changing political order by answering the following questions: To what extent, why, and how have Central and Eastern European countries contributed to the transformation of the EU political system?</p
... Conditionality entails the linkage between fulfilling particular tasks (conditions) and receiving distinct benefits (rewards). The Copenhagen criteria and the acquis establish it, and EU conditionality influences the domestic structures in the applicant countries (Eli, 2015). ...
This chapter examines the processes of democratic transformation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. These countries must meet the political criteria for membership established by the European Union. To achieve this goal, they should implement reforms in the rule of law, protection of human rights, judicial independence, the fight against corruption, and building stable institutions, among others. The chapter discusses the common and differing challenges countries face in democratic transformation, particularly those under consideration for candidate status by the European Union as of June 2022. The chapter's various studies, reports, expert assessments, and documents confirm that these states must make significant changes in the coming years.
... We contrast such approaches with pragmatic discourses that emphasize compliance and stabilisation. These issues have come to the fore as enlargement has extended to countries with lower economic and especially democratic standards than those prevalent among member states, resulting in increasingly formalised conditionality and an emphasis on strict monitoring of domestic reforms by the EU (Sedelmeier 2008;Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010;Gateva 2015). In contrast to normative discourses, which highlight democratisation as a positive outcome of the EU accession process, pragmatic discourses treat democratisation as secondary to concerns about protecting the EU against political risks such as destabilisation or declining democratic quality stemming from the enlargement region. ...
This article explores enlargement discourses as a way to gauge the broader dynamics of European integration since the historical Eastern accession round. Studying debates in the national parliaments of France, Germany, Hungary, and Poland between 2004 and 2017, we use qualitative frame analysis to discern three types of political discourse on EU widening: normative discourses stress the EU’s soft power and its moral obligation towards candidate countries; pragmatic discourses concentrate on conditionality and enlargement as a stabilisation tool; and institutional discourses emphasize efficiency and state capacity. Our findings point to a diminished relevance of the external projection of EU values and practices and instead a stronger introspective emphasis on democratic quality and internal consolidation. Overall, discourses on EU enlargement thus mirror a broader shift in the perceived nature and direction of European integration. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
... This is because an opportunity for EU membership that is credible is the most powerful tool influencing the target states towards domestic transformation, with Brussels benefitting both from the respective power asymmetry in relation to the accession states, and from the consistency of the measures applied. This asymmetry assumes withholding rewards with relatively little or no cost to Brussels' interests, thus demonstrating that the accession states, as the 2004 accession indicated, needed the EU more than vice versa (Gateva, 2016). ...
The prospect of accession of the Western Balkans into the EU has been declining, with Brussels unwilling to accept new members, and the Western Balkan region becoming indifferent towards adopting EU-imposed norms. Although this process has been extensively studied, the academic literature has largely omitted the roles of external actors. This article fills the gap by focusing on China and its role vis-à-vis the ongoing Europeanisation of Serbia and Montenegro, both of which host significant Chinese investments and are regional frontrunners in the EU enlargement process. We begin by addressing theoretical aspects of Europeanisation and then apply this framework to our case studies. Our position is that the two states' turn to the policy of alternatives is the result of failing Europeanisation, allowing them to deepen their engagement with China-an action that has become synonymous with the policy of alternatives to EU enlargement.
... became EU members in 2004, the undertaken reform commitments for good governance faded 25 For example, disclosure of bank, insurance and tax secret, access the database of the Central Credit Register, the obligation to declare property and income, including those of couples in de facto unions, acceptance of anonymous corruption signals, etc. (For more details see Centre for the Study of Democracy 2016).away. The case in Bulgaria and Romania was especially precarious and considerably more rigorous accession conditionality was inacted to them(Chiva and Phinnemore 2012;Gateva 2015; ...
This article discusses to what extent Bulgaria has attempted to establish the Rule of Law in recent years and the reasons this aim has remain unattained. It outlines the “peripheral status” of law in Bulgarian society because of the society’s unaccomplished modernization. Next, the manifestation of deficiencies in the development of the Rule of Law is analyzed following Martin Mendelski’s conceptual model ( de jure and de facto legality), in particular, in relation to the fight against corruption. The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative evidence from the Legal Barometer project and the Study of Legislative Activity of the 44th National Assembly. The empirical facts prove that the state mostly produces legal texts and creates administrative structures (in its anti-corruption reforms as well), but not actual results in legal defence of human rights, property rights and in defence of public interests in general.
... Still, the literature finds that EU conditionality made a difference when empowering pro-reform constituencies and silencing (or coopting) potential veto players. This has happened relatively late in the accession process, and after the EU realized that the marginalization and postponement strategy it followed did not lead to the expected results (Gateva, 2016). But when an accession date for Romania and Bulgaria was finally set, reforms took place even in sensible areas such as the (neo-)liberalization of economic policies (Appel & Orenstein, 2018;Ban, 2016), industrial restructuring (Varga & Freyberg-Inan, 2015), the reform of the judiciary (Hipper, 2015;Mendelski, 2012), fight against corruption (Ivanov, 2010) or the promotion of minority rights (Dobre, 2003;Rechel, 2008;Schwellnus, Balázs, & Mikalayeva, 2009) that were strongly contested before. ...
The overwhelming part of EU scholarship has singled out Romania and Bulgaria as examples of failed integration. Studies dealing with these two countries’ EU accession have highlighted that EU membership was premature and found pre-accession expectations largely confirmed when looking at failures to implement anti-corruption policies, deficiencies in the use of rule of law or backsliding in democratic practices. This contribution takes issue with these pre-accession expectations in the literature and focuses on legal compliance with EU legislation as the most direct way to assess whether EU rules are followed or not. Based on transposition data and infringement proceedings between 2007 and 2017, the contribution shows that while the number of infringements from the two countries has increased over time, the record does not show extreme developments when compared to other groups of EU member states.
This research article analyses the conditionality related to conflicts in the Western Balkans. It examines the qualitative nature of conflict conditionality and its evolution in three different stages of contractual relations between the EC/EU and the Western Balkan states. Utilising a six-dimensional comparative framework in a longitudinal case study design, the study reveals that conflict conditionality comprises two different categories: reactive and preventive. These two groups differ primarily in their purposes, but also in their qualitative nature and evolution. The findings also indicate that the EU still lacks the resolve to settle conflicts between non-member neighbouring countries. However, this approach bears the risk of further slowing the Western Balkans’ EU integration.
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) which was specifically provided for Bulgaria and Romania at the moment of accession, because the two countries did not fully satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. It explains why this tool is considered “exceptional” and why it has proven to be ineffective. At the beginning of the chapter, it provides the context of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania and how the EU Institutions were forced to frame the CVM. Afterwards it analyses pitfalls and shortcomings of the CVM as well as criticisms made by academic scholars; hence, through a comparative analysis, the application of the CVM Romania and Bulgaria is addressed in turn. The conclusive remarks, taking into account the CVM repeal in 2023, argue that its functioning has become informally and then formally part of a new rule of law oversight tools; in addition, it is recommended to carefully assess the compliance with the European Union values of the new candidates States.
This article examines the position of Serbia as a small state in the context of external pressures, largely reflecting an ambition to balance the East and the West. While clearly interested in offers and benefits from collaboration with both geostrategic realms, Serbia’s authorities have always left space for possible alternatives—a trend that is expected to serve power preservation or to inform external players to what extent Serbia is keen on balancing and juxtaposing great powers in the region. While analyzing the limited case of the Covid-19 pandemic and the never-ending case of Kosovo, additionally actualized by the Russo-Ukrainian war, the present study suggests that Serbia is at the crossroads between growing ambitions and the real limitations of what its smallness can achieve. The paper concludes that Serbian foreign policy contains all the prerogatives of movement without a goal, a search for strategic partnerships, but without a coherent political vision—an approach that generates suspicion of being labelled as distracted and unreliable.
The principle of conditionality has evolved in the European Union from a European foreign policy tool to an instrument of European governance. European conditionality developed as a hard mode of soft governance. This article describes the different forms and cases of using conditionality in European policy so far. Based on this analysis, it elaborates characteristics and patterns of European conditionality policy and tries to distinguish different types of conditionality. This article thus tries to conceptualise the principle, takes a view on the effect and development of the principle in the European Union and finally tries to develop a typology of European conditionality.
The majority of the rules governing the Union’s special relationships with third countries reside in the innermost sphere of the layered global player. They manifest themselves at the conclusion of association agreements, at the establishment of more comprehensive frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, and in the ongoing process of EU enlargement. In these areas, the Member States are to a large extent free to act in an autonomous capacity and exercise their (residual) sovereign prerogatives. In this chapter, after a quick introduction (Sect. 8.1), we first devote attention to the theory and practice of association relationships (Sect. 8.2), highlighting the legal basis and procedure for concluding the agreements, the institutional apparatus, as well as the effects of the rules laid down. Next, we take a look at some comprehensive policy frameworks for entertaining relations with groups of third countries (Sect. 8.3), scrutinising in subsequent order the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Finally, the topic of accession to the EU is brought to the fore (Sect. 8.4), with an analysis of the relevant criteria, a discussion of the applicable procedure, and a number of reflections on the contradictory positions that have been—and still are being—taken with regard to the eligibility for membership.
The Bulgarian case is symptomatic of the susceptibility of the EU enlargement policy under geopolitical pressure. The aim of this text is to add arguments to the statement that the dynamic of Bulgaria’s accession to the
EU has been strongly influenced by external factors – mainly Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the subsequential Kososvo crisis. This crisis brought up the issue of the huge Russian influence over Bulgarian politics and
societies and, as a result, predetermined the perception of Bulgaria as a high security risk for EU. In this situation, Bulgaria was an object of de-securitisation by the EU’s enlargement policy, but at the same time its main instrument, namely, the conditionality policy, was neglected. From this point of view, the Bulgarian case is important because: it illustrates the effects of this discrepancy to date; it is instructive in the context of EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans with huge Russian influence; and also in the context of the acceleration of the EU’s eastern enlargement policy toward Ukraine and Moldova because of the pressure of the ongoing Russian military invasion. The opportunity for accelerating the pre-accession process under the influence of unpredicted external events created prerequisites for politicising the whole process, including the political use of the conditionality and the consequently unfinished preaccession preparation of the newcomers. The research task is fulfilled by a synthesis of primary and secondary sources organised around three main questions – Which external circumstances? Why? and, How? The results of a discourse analysis of interviews with key participants in Bulgaria’s EU integration process are used as a starting point.
By employing the concept of raison d??tat, the article questions the European Union?s role in the so-called Western Balkan region. While the region continues to be covered by the EU?s enlargement policy, we argue that the policy has been in paralysis. We explore whether the heightened geopolitical tensions in Europe have brought the EU to a turning point at which it would use its enlargement policy decisively to pursue its strategic interests in the region. We start with a theoretical discussion of raison d??tat and its instrumentalization in the context of the European Union as a non-state actor. Then, we use the conceptual benchmarks of the raison d??tat to analyze its empirical implementation through the EU?s relations with Western Balkan countries. We explore the EU?s available enlargement policy tools and the diverging positions within the EU towards enlargement. We pay special attention to the ?New enlargement methodology? devised by the Commission in 2019. We argue that despite the Commission?s efforts to promote the EU?s common interest in the region framed in a geopolitical narrative, the diverging national interests still preclude the EU from aggregating its own and pursuing its raison d??tat towards the region. The ?new methodology? does nothing to overcome this situation. What is more, by insisting on a ?stronger political steer? and by further facilitating the reversal of the accession process, the document pushes the Union further away from a common ground regarding the enlargement.
The nature of the European Union (EU) as a global actor has long been the subject of academic debate. Proponents of understanding the EU as a normative, civilian force agree that its greatest transformative power lies in its enlargement policy, which allows it to shape reforms in countries that wish to become its members through strong conditioning. It is in this context that we will analyse the new methodology of accession negotiations, with the basic premise that it represents a debatable attempt of the EU to preserve its transformative power in relation to candidate countries despite the crisis of the enlargement policy and to further strengthen the already strong mechanisms of conditionality that accompany this process. Two years have passed since the new methodology was adopted, yet there have been no significant changes. Meanwhile, the dramatic change in the geopolitical situation, caused by the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022, has led to a sudden fall of the new Iron Curtain on the continent, creating additional controversies regarding the enlargement policy: Will it apply also to Eastern European countries in the future, and will it become part of a differentiated integration? Also, the question of whether the EU can act strategically towards establishing new relations in Europe is being raised once again.
Illiberalism has recently risen both within the EU and in the European periphery following a global trend of democratic recession, which includes notable cases such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, among others. This has revived interest in the EU’s role and capacity for promoting liberal democratic governance, as the principal international institution with claims to liberal democratic rule transfer. This chapter investigates how consistently the EU has used its principal policy instrument to tackle illiberalism, namely, membership conditionality. It focuses on EU-Turkey relations within the context of the 2015/2016 Syrian refugee crisis as a test case for the EU’s ability and willingness to execute conditionality in times of crisis. Two arguments are made. First, as the EU externalised the crisis to Turkey, consistency of conditionality was compromised by European geostrategic interests that trumped the pursuit of democratic values vis-à-vis Turkey. Second, the strategic EU-Turkey partnership that ensued served to deepen Turkey’s move away from the EU’s democratic norms that lie at the heart of political conditionality. Consequently, unintended illiberal outcomes were fostered by the EU’s transactional policy vis-à-vis Turkey.KeywordsEU conditionalityRefugee crisisIlliberalismStrategic partnershipLiberal governance exportTurkey
This study aimed to develop a scale to determine teacher candidates’ perceptions of the European Union (EU). A descriptive survey method was used in the study, and the study group consisted of 908 teacher candidates attending the Kırşehir Ahi Evran University Faculty of Education in the fall semester of 2021-2022 academic year. The participants were selected using a convenient sampling technique. The Perception Scale of the European Union comprised 20 items and three factors: anxiety, contribution, and culture was employed as the main research tool. The Cronbach's Alpha internal consistency coefficient was calculated for the said scale as .746, which indicated scale reliability. Data were analyzed using percentage, frequency, mean, and standard deviation techniques. Additionally, t-test and ANOVA were performed to identify the differences between samples. The study results showed that the teacher candidates' anxiety levels for the European Union were high, and their perceptions of the “contribution” and “culture” factors were moderate. The analysis of perceptions of the EU and political literacy skills of the participants revealed a significant difference in the “contribution” factor but no significant difference in the “anxiety” and “culture” factors. According to the relationship between teachers’ perceptions of the EU and their cultural literacy skills, there was a significant difference in the “culture” factor but no significant difference appeared in the “anxiety” and “contribution” factors.
Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its application to the European Union in February 2016; however, the progress of her accession process so far was just the outcome of propping-up. Every time Bosnia failed to meet the obligations, the EU eventually lowered its Conditionality to save the country.
The so-called Dayton Peace Agreement “frozen” the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia between 1992-1995, by guaranteeing equality and the power-sharing system among the three ethnic groups, namely the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. In the course of post-war reconstruction, however, such mechanism has hampered any attempt to reform toward a functional state.
The EU made remarks on the Dayton mechanism, questioning sustainability and structural flaws in it. And the EU listed as the high priority, above all, the police reform aiming to consolidate police organisations scattered across the state at various levels and to unify the chain of command into one state authority. The electoral reform of the Presidency and the House of Peoples was listed as well. Although it is not on the list, amendment to the Constitution, adopted as the Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement, is indispensable to complete those required reforms. The EU Conditionality was anticipated to become an ice-breaker of the deadlock in the Dayton mechanism, whereas such an idea turned out to be too optimistic.
In this paper, we will examine the difficulties in transforming the Dayton mechanism with EU Conditionality, while focusing on the failure of the police reform and the electoral reform that has yet to be resolved. The first chapter gives a brief outline of the national structure in Bosnia and the problematic Dayton Constitution, and appraises the progress of the constitutional reforms including the electoral one. The second chapter overviews several matters in addition to the police reform as examples of lowering of Conditionality. Finally, we will apply the affairs discussed in previous two chapters to the conditions for success of the political conditionality in the EU Copenhagen Criteria, which Frank Schimmelfennig （2008） elaborated, to testify the Conditionality malfunction in the Bosnia’s accession process. Consequently, we will find the stalemate of ethno-politics in Bosnia, and at the same time, the EU’s incoherent attitude toward it.
This paper reports on the 1st case study performed in the 1st cycle of a design research aiming at designing a learning environment based on philosophical theories of concept formation (i.e. categorization). Here, we will present the 1st version of our learning environment which supports primary school students in constructing the biological concepts of fish, amphibian, reptile, bird, mammal, and enhancing their categorization skills. Philosophers have provided theories that suggest different mechanisms of categorization. Family resemblance-inspired theories suggest that we classify, e.g., individual birds under the concept bird by intuitively relying on examples of birds and/or on lists of their shared features. Moreover, classical theory suggests that we classify, e.g., individual birds under the concept bird by articulating bird-definitions. Considering the above theories, we developed a three-part, collaborative learning environment within the theoretical framework of constructivism. Our learning environment consists of 7 teaching-learning activities that aim at helping students to actively engage with the vertebrate animals classification while using different types of reasoning. More specifically, students are expected to collaborate in small groups in order to classify vertebrate animals into their classes, by (a) observing different examples of each vertebrate class, (b) making lists of the features the members of each class share (‘shared features list’), (c) deducing some ‘key features’ of each class from the corresponding ‘shared features list’, and (d) using these ‘key features’ to articulate definition-like reasoning strands about vertebrates. The learning environment will be thoroughly discussed in the paper, along with some preliminary results of its implementation. Analyzing the pre/post responses of the 19 conveniently selected fifth-graders who took part in this case study, showed an improvement in their reasoning about the target biological concepts.
Conditionality requirements have been applied for decades in the Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFF), and, over the years, these mechanisms have been extended and developed. In December 2020, the European Union legislature adopted the ‘Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’ which includes the new rule of law mechanism. According to the regulation 2020/2092, the MFF for the period 2021–2027, as well as the Recovery and Resilience Facility and React-EU, should guarantee the link between the rule of law and the disbursement of EU funds. Above all, the new regulation will have an important impact on EU Cohesion Policy from 2021 to 2027. This article will conceptualise both existing and new conditionality instruments as included in the EU Cohesion Policy, and compare them with previous MFFs in order to assess the new conditionality regulations in the context of the debate on the development of the EU budget.
This chapter offers an analysis of the Western Balkans' thorny path towards joining the European Union (EU). The aim is to identify the key hurdles in the European enlargement in the Western Balkans as well as to suggest ways to deal with these hurdles. The chapter begins with a historical overview and proceeds to a discussion of the most persistent hurdles that still derail the EU enlargement process. After offering recommendations on how to overcome these roadblocks, the chapter provides an outlook. Looking ahead, there is still hope that the European dream of the Western Balkans will eventually turn into reality. The final outcome will be determined to a significant degree by the commitment of the candidate countries, the EU as a whole, but also the future position of the 27 member states. Although the new enlargement methodology can be seen as a step forward, individual member states can still hijack the enlargement process. This might prove to be the Achilles' heel of the entire EU enlargement project.
The rule of law is incorporated in the EU Founding Treaties and case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU and was included as a key requirement already in 1993 Copenhagen accession criteria. The EU enlargement is not only territorial increase, but also transposition of EU acquis to third countries. Since 1993, the monitoring mechanism of the rule of law reform in the EU accession countries was enhanced, including two specific negotiation chapters, Chapter 23 – judiciary and fundamental rights and Chapter 24 – justice, freedom and security. Over the last two decades, the EU was struggling to develop an adequate mechanism in this area, from mechanism for coordination and verification, to action plans for Chapter 23, to more specific tools like perception and experience surveys of the judiciary and functional reviews. Due to the challenges to measure progress and track record in the rule of law, in February 2020 the European Commission presented the new approach to EU Enlargement that aims to push reforms forward. The intention is to make the accession negotiations more credible, predictable and dynamic and criteria for assessing reforms in the accession countries will be based on the clearer criteria and more concise EU requirements. The article examines how EU enlargement policies influenced the rule of law reforms in Western Balkan countries over the years and what could be expected from the new approach. The research hypothesis is based on the correlation between Enlargement strategy towards the Western Balkans and its impact on rule of law in countries of the mentioned region. The methodological approach applied in the assessment is based on analysis of Enlargement strategy and other EU and national documents, as well as results of the work of judicial institutions in order to provide insight into the bottlenecks of the state rule of law in Western Balkan countries and enable identification of recommendations for improvement. The authors concluded that the new methodology would improve the measurability of the achieved results in the rule of law area, however, the approach might slow down the accession process of Serbia and Montenegro as a frontrunners in the process.
This paper analyses the Europeanization of the foreign policies of the Western Balkans states, using the examples of the Montenegrin and Albanian alignment with the EU sanctions against Russia. Using the Process-tracing method we discover that the role-playing mechanism in the case of Montenegro and socialization in Albania’s case are behind the alignment in sanctions. Despite the EU’s potential leverage, the external incentive model (EIM) is almost completely absent. This is rather unexpected given EIM’s prevalence in other policy areas. This suggests that the EU might be treating the foreign policy area differently to other enlargement chapters, reflecting the special position of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an intergovernmental policy with no adaptational pressure at the EU level
The first attempts of the European Commission and Parliament to invoke Art. 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union against the Polish and Hungarian governments demonstrate the EU’s political willingness to claim its own authority in defending core European values (Art. 2 TEU) in case of state disobedience. However, despite these attempts to integrate the Rule of Law concept into the overall EU’s supervisory machinery, the Commission’s and the Parliament’s submissions indicate a lack of coherency in implementing the principle as a relevant tool to address multiple challenges arising within the EU Member States legal systems. The parallel developments in the CJEUs case-law (LM/ML, Torubarov) support this statement. Regardless of the Council’s yes/ no decisions in the Polish and Hungarian cases, these lines of reasoning are capable of giving rise to further questions in application of the European Arrest Warrant Framework decision or the Asylum Procedures Directive, in particular the EU Member States which remain within the scope of the EU’s attention in view of systemic Human Rights violations (Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia). Moreover, the series of the CJEU’s judgements on the Polish judicial reform are capable of paving the way to the de facto intervention into traditional areas of the EU Member States competence – the organisation of the national judicial systems, in light of the development of a EU-specific principle of effective judicial review.
This chapter scrutinizes ‘civilian power’ European Union as a mature tightly coupled security community that lacks a fully ‘communitized’ foreign policy. Brussels’ efforts to export its Kantian, win–win geopolitical vision to the Eastern neighborhood—which include the Eastern enlargement, the European Neighborhood Policy, and the Eastern Partnership—have resulted in conflict with Moscow. Institutionally and intellectually unprepared, lacking effective instruments and experience, the EU was unable to face the Russian neoclassical geopolitical offensive. Even more importantly, domestically the populist wave as well as a number of overlapping serious economic and political crises have led to a ‘dynamic of disintegration’ and to an ‘existential crisis.’ Brexit might trigger deeper integration, the dominance of the Franco-German axis, or the geopolitical irrelevance of the EU.
The aim of this paper is the description of Albanians public opinion with regard to European Union and the process of European integration. This is done through an unpublished research conducted by the authors at the region of Korça, in south-east Albania. The latter may serve as a pilot survey, as it may indicate the main trends of general opinion of Albanians concerning European Union. Besides, it may be developed further on the future in other regions of Albania, in order to present a more comprehensive overview of public opinion. Methodologically, the pilot survey was based on a questionnaire design, conducted of 14 questions and filled by a sample of 100 people, aged 18-60 years. Additionally, the theoretical background of the survey is that of political science, and concretely of the relation between public opinion and policy making. Consequently, we will try to investigate the way that Albanians perceive different internal, regional and international developments, and also the impact that public opinion has to the process of policy making in Albania. Finally, we will try to describe the actual dynamics of the European path of Albania, which means the politics adopted by Albanian government within the last two decades, and also the perspective of the future relations between Albania and the E.U.
Keywords: European integration, public opinion, democracy, State of Law, challenges to European Union and integration
European Union’s (EU) enlargement policy is, for at least half a decade, facing a reality that, with quite some benevolence, could be defined as an orientation crisis, accompanied with a substantial lack of clarity and precision. The fact that, during the second half of 2019, both North Macedonia (NM) and Albania (AL) have not achieved the status of candidate countries was only a symptom – unfortunately not devoid of still unforeseeable internal political and eco- nomic consequences – of undeniable and profound discord between the EU member states over the future of the Union’s enlargement policy. When it comes to the two countries of the Western Balkans – Serbia (SR) and Montenegro (MN) – that are already in the process of membership negotiation, their relatively poor progress in 2019 – with either no further chapters provision- ally closed (MN) or with only one chapter opened (SR) – only confirms the initial assessment about the fundamental crisis of this important EU policy. On the basis of scarce and mostly underdeveloped elements of the new enlargement methodology presented by the Commission in February 2020, this paper – using content analysis and scrutiny of negotiation-related polices of candidate countries – seeks to go beyond questions of conditionality and benchmarks, in order to examine some major consequences that this potentially new enlargement strategy could have. In spite of the fact that the focus of the analysis is put on some major changes the reorien- tation of this policy would entail, the author also examines (and, to some extent, predicts) what are the potential benefits and/or threats the new methodology could bring to both candidates and the EU itself. Without any pretention to provide final answers and apodictic conclusions, this paper proposes some elements of fine-tuning, in order to better define a potential change that encompasses the following three controversial elements: the wish for an encouragement, the reality of the fatigue and the threat of a dead end.
This chapter examines three Central and Eastern European EU members (Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia) that agreed to shut down their nuclear reactors not fulfilling the EU safety requirements during the accession process. Since this request was part of the membership requirements, conditionality seems to be able to explain their willingness to do such difficult step impacting their energy policies and energy security. However, while Bulgaria phased-out its reactors in Kozloduy already during the pre-accession process—in line with conditionality expectations—Lithuania and Slovakia did so only after they became full EU members in 2004. The puzzle this chapter is trying to shed light on is why these two countries fulfilled these (demanding and unpopular) obligations if the EU conditionality was not in place anymore. The chapter analyses factors that could have contributed to the post-accession compliance of Lithuania and Slovakia and thus contributes to the general discussion about the activities of Central and Eastern European countries in the EU.
Introduction
As a multilateral negotiation system which aims to align national economic policies that may have negative external effects (Heise 2008), European economic governance (EEG) has trickled down to the EU candidate countries and become an integral part of the EU accession process. Economic and financial dialogue between candidate countries and EU institutions and Member States
is becoming more complex compared to the earlier accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, and the scope of obligations a candidate country should fulfil prior to accession has been continuously expanding. Legal, administrative
and economic conditionality related to the conduct of economic policies, as external pressures on central banks in the Western Balkan (WB) region, have strengthened the importance of central banks within national economic coordination structures.
In the Western Balkan region, two countries have formally started accession negotiations: Montenegro opened accession negotiations in June 2012, whereas Serbia formally started accession negotiations in January 2014. Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia have the status of candidate countries.
In this Chapter, Serbia is chosen as a positive example of the link between the economic conditionality imposed by the European integration process and the competences and capacities of the central bank. This is visible both at the level
of national economic policy coordination and in structured dialogue within the relevant subcommittees established to monitor the stabilisation and association process and accession negotiations. The main hypothesis is that accession process requirements have reinforced the functional independence of the National
Bank of Serbia (NBS) and its role in the coordination of macroeconomic policies.
The conditionality set out in the accession process is harmonised with that of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A comparison of Serbia with Montenegro and North Macedonia has led to the conclusion that the ‘light’ requirements of the EEG stipulated for WB economies and determinants of the legal independence of central banks
within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) have strengthened the de jure independence of central banks. In line with the main hypothesis, this strengthened independence is expected to positively correlate with the attempt to anchor inflation expectations.
In order to explain the impact of Europeanisation by the imposed conditionality, it is necessary to briefly present the main characteristics of the new approach to accession negotiations and the main channels and instruments through which requirements for adhesion to the EU influence the role of central banks in candidate countries. Evaluating the EU as the most influential
source of external pressure, the Chapter examines how accession negotiations have strengthened the functional independence of the National Bank of Serbia in pursuing monetary and macroprudential policies, maintaining financial stability and contributing to economic reforms.
Comparing the values of the legal (de jure) independence of the NBS
based on the Cuikerman index (CWN) (Cukierman et al. 1992) and modified Cuikerman index (Jacome & Vasquez 2005), with the values constructed for peer countries, as well as the independence indexes of central banks during the accession of new EU Member States, the result shows that the NBS ranks among the most independent central banks in the region in terms of the determinants of legal independence. Obviously, legal independence should
be treated with a dose of reserve, as it may be jeopardised through indirect influence. In the absence of clear protocols on measuring the impact of informal factors, the final section of this Chapter attempts to measure the transparency of inflation targeting (IT) as the most objective measure of the de facto independence of Serbia’s monetary authority. The result, based on methodology developed by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), and Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), confirms the hypothesis that growing independence and transparency of the NBS has contributed to the greater anchoring of inflation expectations.
European Union uses conditionality as the main tool, which reaches measurable results and a regret mechanism for each country offering advancement in the EU integration process. The aim of this paper is to analyze the conditionality of EU towards potential country for integration, Kosovo. The main question of the paper is how EU manages Conditionality Europeanization in Kosovo and how EU uses conditionality in the case of Kosovo. In order to analyze conditionality, I used discourse analysis of a Dialogue Meeting of the Stabilization and Association Process. I conclude that EU uses two types of conditionality towards Kosovo, whereas is ready to accept also good arguments and reasons from the representatives of Kosovo.
Separation of institutions, functions and personnel – Checks and balances – Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia – Short tradition of separation of powers in Central Europe – Fragile interwar systems of separation of powers – Communist principle of centralisation of power – Technocratic challenge to separation of powers during the EU accession – One-sided checks on the elected branches and empowering technocratic elitist institutions – Populist challenge to separation of powers in the 2010s – Re-politicising of the public sphere, removing most checks on the elected branches, and curtailing and packing the unelected institutions – Technocratic and populist challenges to separation of powers interrelated more than we thought
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