Thesis

In Search of Economic Rationality : Puzzles Related to Saving, Voting, and the Opportunity Costs of Time

January 2017

Thesis for: Doctoral

Authors:

Sven Resnjanskij

Ifo Institute

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.

Chapter

Why Become Politically Informed?

January 2015

Richard Jankowski

Downs (1957) shows that it is not in the rational, self-interest of citizens to vote, or be politically informed, nor participate in the political process, more generally. Much scholarly attention has been given to the first dilemma, and substantially less to the second. The focus of this chapter is on the second dilemma of democracy, that is, that it is not in the self-interest of citizens to ... [Show full abstract] become informed about politics. This neglect of the second enigma is somewhat puzzling, because it is the more serious problem in a democracy. We can increase turnout by reducing the costs of physically voting. But, if individuals remain ignorant of candidates and issues, elections just produce random outcomes.

Article

The influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the US

August 2011 · Applied Economics

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the 'rational voter model' so as to include the potential effects of the number of statewide legislative referendums. This study tests the hypothesis that greater numbers of such referendums increase voter turnout because they elevate the Expected Gross Benefits (EGB) of voting by 'empowering voters' while not significantly increasing ... [Show full abstract] the Expected Gross Costs (EGC) of voting. Using state-level data for the 2006 general election in the US, as well as the 2004 US Presidential election, and after allowing for a variety of economic and demographic factors, this study finds compelling evidence that the number of statewide legislative referendums does significantly increase voter turnout.

Article

Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation

May 1995 · Journal of Public Economics

In recent elections, voters supported initiatives to limit the number of terms that their representatives may serve, yet at the same time, overwhelmingly re-elected their incumbents. We provide a theoretical explanation for this and other puzzles associated with voting on term limitations. The pattern of voting on term limits can be explained by the desire to redistribute power from one party to ... [Show full abstract] another, from one branch of government to another, and from districts with long-term incumbents to districts whose representatives have served only for a short time span. We test these hypotheses by looking at voting patters on California Proposition 140 and the vote on the 22nd Amendment with generally positive results.

Article

International capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle

September 1997

Kimberley Scharf

This paper examines the role of international tax evasion for the choice of an optimal foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region. Since a foreign tax credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income, it can be employed to discourage evasion activity. The existence of international tax evasion possibilities could thus help rationalize a choice of tax credit in excess ... [Show full abstract] of a deduction-equivalent credit level. Our analysis shows that, in general the optimal credit will be one that results in a mixed tax system and, under certain conditions, the presence of international tax evasion can indeed result in a higher optimal foreign tax credit for a capital exporting country.

In Search of Economic Rationality : Puzzles Related to Saving, Voting, and the Opportunity Costs of Time

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Why Become Politically Informed?

The influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the US

Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation

International capital tax evasion and the foreign tax credit puzzle