BookPDF Available

Global Justice and Development

January 2014

ISBN: 978-1-349-48254-2

Authors:

American University of Paris

Defending a procedural conception of global justice that calls for the establishment of reasonably democratic arrangements within and beyond the state, this book argues for a justice-based understanding of social development and justifies why a democracy-promoting international development practice is a requirement of global justice.

Content uploaded by Julian Culp

Content may be subject to copyright.

Introduction

Julian Culp

DOI: 10.1057/9781137389930.0003

Palgrave Macmillan

Please respect intellectual property rights

This material is copyright and its use is restricted by our standard site license

terms and conditions (see palgraveconnect.com/pc/connect/info/terms_conditions.html).

If you plan to copy, distribute or share in any format, including, for the avoidance

of doubt, posting on websites, you need the express prior permission of Palgrave

Macmillan. To request permission please contact rights@palgrave.com.

Introduction

1 A global village?

Increasingly since the early 1980s, economic globalization – driven by

the active political promotion of market liberalization – with support

from other significant factors such as the Internet has intertwined the

lives of the people around the world. Our economic interdependence

became unmistakable in September 2008 when the bankruptcy of the

Lehman Brothers investment bank induced heavy financial turmoil

around the world, resulting in a global economic slowdown and even

a recession in many regions. The financial crisis that has prevailed

since mid-2007 is a global phenomenon that concerns most of this

world’s inhabitants in some way. This situation, in which all people

on earth share a common fate by virtue of their economic as well as

cultural and political interactions, often leads to the use of the term

‘global village’ (McLuhan, 2002 [1962], p. 31) to capture the sense of

virtual closeness that is the distinctive feature of today’s global social

relations.

If we think of humanity as a village, however, one has to acknowl-

edge – at least prima facie – that from a moral point of view the social

relations in the village are outrageous. If the world were a single village

with 1,000 inhabitants, nearly 500 would be living in economic poverty

and about 200 would suffer from hunger, lack shelter, and have no access

to clean drinking water. And these 200 would be collectively poorer

than the village’s richest person (cf. Beck and Poferl, 2010, pp. 9–10).

The moral reactions that the metaphor of the global village provokes,

when interpreted in light of the current socioeconomic conditions,

stand in stark contrast to the dominant moral sentiments today, which

have largely remained domestic rather than becoming ‘globalized’ as

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

2 Global Justice and Development

well. One can readily notice the contrast by observing how discussions

about domestic social and economic policies take place in comparison

to debates about international development policies. Not long ago

Sloterdijk (2009) proposed in one of Germany’s most influential news-

papers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , to eliminate a coercion based

tax system and to permit instead well-to-do German citizens to donate

as much as they deemed adequate to the finance ministry and their

fellow citizens. He argued that this institutional change in the transfer

of resources throughout society is necessary in order to capture the true

meaning of this societal transfer in question, namely, a generous gift

of the wealthy to the poor. The reactions to Sloterdijk’s proposal, for

instance by Honneth (2009) in Die Zeit , a widely read German news-

paper, have been very harsh. By contrast, while the global distributive

mechanism de facto functions according to Sloterdijk’s agenda, a public

moral outcry of similar magnitude in light of this long lasting status quo

has yet to be heard.

2 Another world is necessary

The individualist interpretation

In light of this mismatch between, on the one hand, the actual global

interconnectedness that encourages us to think of global social relations

as similar to those of a village and, on the other hand, the prevailing

domestic bias in global politics, the proposition that another world is

necessary appears readily intelligible. A world is necessary in which

‘personal identification with the ... world’s hungry, miserable and

dependent’ no longer demonstrates ‘the power of moral imagination’

(Habermas, 1969, pp. 183–4), but rather a self-evident reflection of the

fact that the world has shrunk and that we are all neighbors, so to speak,

within a global village.

1 Already in 1972, the utilitarian moral philoso-

pher Singer (2008 [1972]) argued along these lines in his eminent article

‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. He urged that in the same way in

which people feel morally obliged to save a drowning child from a pond,

persons living in a rich country should feel morally obliged to stop the

suffering that people experience in poor countries. Since donations to

certain international or non-governmental organizations would be an

easy way to reduce human suffering abroad, Singer contended, persons

in wealthy countries should act on this moral obligation and donate

substantial amounts of their income to needy persons in poor countries.

So Singer claimed that another world is necessary – a world in which

our moral commitments are congruent with the virtual closeness that

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 3

globalization has brought about, such that the misery of so many no

longer co-exists with the great fortunes of a few. Being a utilitarian,

however, Singer (2008 [1972], p. 3) added that it would be excusable

not to donate only if the value of a potential donation would be of

‘comparable moral importance’ for the donor of the rich countries as

for the recipient of the poor countries. This demand strikes many non-

utilitarian philosophers (Smart and Williams, 1973, pp. 116–17) as

implausible, because fulfilling such a demand, especially under condi-

tions of widespread noncompliance with this demand, could require

people to live only slightly above the level of sufficiency and could

deprive persons from their capacity of being authors of their own lives.

Libertarians, for instance, would reject Singer’s argument, claiming

that while one may choose voluntarily to donate significant amounts of

one’s holdings so as to prevent human suffering, there is never a duty

to do so. They could agree that another world is possible in the sense

that, if people were willing to sacrifice their holdings to prevent the

suffering of others, then the world would indeed be a different one, a

world in which human misery would no longer co-exist with staggering

abundance. Yet they would resist the claim that people of rich countries

stand under a moral obligation to relieve human suffering in poor coun-

tries. To libertarians, a world in which people donate so much of their

holdings that widespread human misery and radical socioeconomic

inequality ends is a mere possibility, but no moral necessity.

Kantians, on the other hand, acknowledge a so-called ‘duty of

humanity’ and thus indeed could agree with Singer that up to a certain

point people generally stand under a duty to use some of their hold-

ings to promote others’ well-being.

2 The relation between the sacrifice

that the potential duty-bearer accrues and the benefit that the recipient

receives determines the threshold as to when people can legitimately

refrain from assisting others. Therefore, if someone is in dire need and

if it is possible for another person to relieve this person from suffering

at a relatively small personal cost, then this other person has a duty to

do so. Only if the sacrifice of relieving another person from dire need

involves a more substantial cost might the obligation flowing from the

duty of humanity not be applicable. So a Kantian endorsement of a

duty of humanity represents a middle ground between potentially very

demanding utilitarian obligations, on the one hand, and the libertarian

denial of any duty to promote the well-being of others on the other.

However, it is not immediately clear whether a Kantian understanding

of humanitarian obligations would support only the proposition that

another world is possible or the morally more exigent statement that

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

4 Global Justice and Development

another world is necessary. Clearly a Kantian could endorse the former

slogan in the same spirit as the libertarian. That is, he or she could

concede the possibility that most rich people might eventually become

willing to employ large amounts of their holdings to promote others’

well-being. And their doing so would obviously make our world – the

global village – a different one. On the other hand, while the duty of

humanity certainly commands very many of the donations that Singer’s

utilitarian principle also requires – namely, all those that can be realized

at small personal cost – it is not so obvious that Kantians would support

the proposition that another world is necessary solely on the basis of the

duty of humanity. After all, they might say, many people already donate

parts of their income to non-governmental organizations and, besides,

many countries maintain the practice of granting official development

assistance (ODA).

One could object, of course, and argue that fulfilling our obligations

of humanity requires much more than that. But this is a difficult argu-

ment to make because obligations that flow from the duty of humanity

are by their very nature indeterminate and require judgment in their

application. Moreover, even if one could make a compelling argument

that some people have to do more in order to fulfill their humanitarian

obligations, it is not clear that doing more would make our world really

a substantively different one. Doubling the level of ODA, for instance,

may indeed do a lot of good, but it might still leave the global village in

a situation of high socioeconomic inequality, with a significant portion

of its inhabitants living in miserable conditions. So it is far from evident

that, on the basis of humanitarian obligations, one can argue that

another world is necessary.

In the end, then, the statement that another world is necessary may

actually indeed simply show ‘the power of moral imagination’; it may

appeal to morally heroic utilitarians, but it cannot be grounded in either

a more down-to-earth Kantian account of humanitarian obligations or

a libertarian understanding as to what persons owe one another. So it

seems as if the alter- and anti-globalization movements of the World

Social Forum (2012) wisely chose the slogan ‘another world is possible’,

because changing the world is not an imperative that people from

these three dominant moral outlooks (that is, utilitarians, Kantians and

libertarians) could all accept as a categorical one. Rather, these social

movements characterize the project of changing the world as a fasci-

nating ‘vision of the universal’ that is in principle achievable and may

be worthwhile to undertake despite, as Benhabib (2004, p. 16) puts it, its

‘permanent tug of war ... [with] the attachments of the particular’.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 5

The institutionalist interpretation

This way of rejecting the statement that another world is necessary may

have gone too quickly, however. It focused exclusively on the question

of what people, and the world’s richer people in particular, are obligated

to do with their own resources so as to promote the well-being of others.

And the respective utilitarian, libertarian, and Kantian answers have

been, to put it very crudely, ‘a lot’, ‘nothing’, and ‘something’. Thereby

our approach proceeded on the assumption that the actual global distri-

bution of holdings would serve as a suitable baseline for answering this

question. In other words, the answers have been framed solely in indi-

vidualistic terms and have neglected the institutional dimension, or

the global system of entitlements that decrees the holdings that various

people have in the first place. But the statement that another world is

necessary can also mean – more radically – that it is necessary to change

this global system of entitlements.

How are we to understand, if at all, this rather grandiose question

whether the global system of entitlements should be changed? Until

about 1970 skepticism regarding this question may indeed have made

good sense. As long as the social sciences were presenting the world

as an assembly of scattered villages, populated by separate groups that

have come to be known as nations, the very notion of a global system

of entitlements would have seemed misplaced. Without a global insti-

tutional order decreeing what individuals and groups are entitled to,

asking whether the system should be changed would seem to be in vain,

for there would be no system to analyze at the global level in the first

place. In this spirit, or so it seems, even Rawls’s seminal discussion of,

as Caney (2005a, p. 112; 2007, p. 278) and Pogge (2010a, p. 15) put it,

‘institutional’ as opposed to merely ‘interactional moral diagnostics’ in

A Theory of Justice (1971, pp. 54–60, 108–14), which has been described

as epitomizing the left-leaning, social-democratic Zeitgeist , remained

largely concerned with domestic issues.

Yet in light of the intensification of globalization and transnation-

alization processes that occurred in the late 20th century, Rawls’s short

treatment of the so-called ‘Law of Nations ’ (1971, pp. 377–80) in A

Theory of Justice and even his later account in The Law of Peoples (1999a)

increasingly appeared to be proper only for ‘a bygone Westphalian order’

(Buchanan, 2000). Since then, however, the theoretical landscape has

radically changed and many theorists have undertaken wide-ranging

examinations of the global system of entitlements that transcend mere

‘interactional moral diagnostics’ (Barry, 1973, pp. 128–33; Danielson,

1973, pp. 331–40; Scanlon, 1973, pp. 1066–7; Beitz, 1999a [1979]; Pogge,

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

6 Global Justice and Development

1989; Moellendorf, 2002; Tan, 2004). These writers have argued that in

a world that the social sciences increasingly recognize and explain as

globalized and transnationalized, the Rawlsian ‘institutional moral diag-

nostics’ would work very well on the global plane as well.

3 For what, if

anything, could justify attempting, like Rawls, to construct an account

of what sort of social and political institutions would constitute a just

society, while refraining from an attempt to identify just social and

political institutions at the global level?

Beitz (1999a [1979]) addressed this question in Political Theory and

International Relations and argued that in an age of globalization there

would be no good reason to restrict a theory of institutional justice to the

domestic case only. Moreover, he claimed that domestic and global rela-

tions are sufficiently analogous to justify the global validity of Rawls’s specif-

ically liberal-egalitarian conception of ‘justice as fairness’ . With respect to

the moral adequacy of the global system of entitlements, Beitz claimed

that the global institutional order could qualify as distributively just only

if it maximized the life prospects (in terms of income and wealth) of the

members of the economically least-advantaged group. Consequently,

Beitz’s (1999a [1979], pp. 128–9, 150–3) account supported the more

radical, institutionalist interpretation of the proposition that another

world is necessary: whether or not it is necessary for richer individuals to

donate to the world’s poor, it is necessary to change the global institutional

order so that the global system of entitlements would maximally benefit

the life prospects of those who are economically least well-off.

Utilitarians, such as Murphy (1998), would reject this institutionalist

interpretation of the above proposition, because it relies on a distinction

between a moral theory of institutions and a moral theory of individual

conduct. Utilitarian monism, however, which argues that different

principles for individual and institutional human relations are derived

from the effect that compliance with such principles has with regard

to the promotion of some conception of the good, has received severe

criticism. Rawls, for instance, makes the case that, while under certain

conditions the full pursuit of one’s personal conception of the good is

an appropriate principle for individual conduct, an analogous principle

to maximize the sum of the good of all members of society is not justifi-

able. Given the separateness of persons, that is, the fact that persons lead

lives of their own, the objective of maximizing total social good cannot

serve as a justification for requiring individuals to constantly further the

overall good when doing so causes them to lose their capacity of formu-

lating, revising, and pursuing their personal conception of the good.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 7

On the other hand, libertarians and Kantians would agree that if

the global system of entitlements is unjust, then institutional reform

is necessary, even if that means that individuals have to modify quite

radically their beliefs about what belongs to them. Libertarians and

Kantians, that is, would accept that, in order to fulfill demands of justice,

individuals could be asked to incur significant burdens, although these

two groups would claim that, once a just distribution of holdings is

achieved, individuals may permissibly do nothing at all (the libertarian

view) or only relatively little (the Kantian view) for the well-being of

others. Furthermore, both could also accept that failing to consider first

the moral adequacy of the distributional status quo would eventually

nourish, as Freire calls it, ‘false generosity’ (1970, p. 44; cf. also Barry,

2008 [1982], pp. 206–7), that is, the alleged expression of humanitarian

‘generosity’ even while perpetuating the distributive injustice that makes

this kind of generosity at all possible.

However, before endorsing the statement that another world is neces-

sary in Beitz’s sense, libertarians and Kantians would have to examine

whether it actually is appropriate to view domestic relations as suffi-

ciently analogous to global relations. For otherwise one cannot make

sense of either the claim that ‘institutional moral diagnostics’ can be

employed for assessing the global distribution of holdings or of the claim

that a just global distribution would have to be determined by reference

to an egalitarian distributive principle like the difference principle.

Theorizing global justice

Initially, Beitz’s case for employing the Rawlsian difference principle

globally rested on the claim that because of the fact of globalization, one

now has to ask what particular global distribution of holdings would

be just. At first Beitz meant to argue that since a conception of distribu-

tive justice should determine, following Rawls (1971, p. 4), the ‘appro-

priate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation’,

the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation would permit

employing standards of justice to assess social relations globally. Later,

however, Beitz conceded that it is difficult to make the case empirically

that global social interdependencies are cooperative in nature. In many

circumstances, some people are actually worse off because of global

interdependencies while others benefit.

Nevertheless, he urged that a global analysis of social relations in

terms of egalitarian justice would still make sense, because at this

level economic and political structures possess sufficient pervasive

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

8 Global Justice and Development

impact to subject them to institutional moral diagnostics. As Beitz

argued:

[T]he requirements of justice apply to institutions and practices

(whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social

activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would

not exist if the social activity did not take place. (Beitz, 1999a [1979],

p. 131)

Certainly there is such a global scheme of interdependence with perva-

sive impact, even if there is no genuine global social cooperation. Hence

there is a need for global institutional moral diagnostics. In the case

of a global scheme of interdependence as in the case of a global social

cooperation, then, Beitz argued that in virtue of the existence of a partic-

ular kind of global social practice,

5 it would be adequate to employ the

content of an egalitarian conception of distributive justice and extrapo-

late it to the world as a whole.

6 Beitz’s view may thus be called practice-

dependent Globalism .

Others have argued, however, that even if one endorses the idea that

a certain kind of practice is a presupposition for employing criteria of

justice in assessing social relations, one could still claim that neither

cooperative institutions nor institutions with pervasive impact are

practices of this sort – that is, ones that would permit judging the social

relations of these practices by reference to criteria of justice. Along

these lines some, most prominently Nagel, have argued that only if a

social practice involves a particular kind of coercion can one judge the

social relations of such a practice by employing criteria of justice. In

addition, Nagel has claimed that coercive practices of the proper kind

are found only among citizens within a state. This practice-dependent

Statism , then, follows practice-dependent Globalism by acknowledging

the relevance of social practices for assessing justice as well as the exist-

ence of global institutions that either are of a cooperative kind or that

possess pervasive impact. But by arguing that only the sort of coercive

practices that occurs within states permits judging social relations by

criteria of justice, Statism can reject the claim that the global system of

entitlements is unjust. Questions of global distributive justice become

restricted to the separate analysis of domestic systems of entitlements,

since only here – even in an era of globalization – are the precondi-

tions for making claims of (egalitarian) distributive justice fulfilled. For

Statism, then, the idea that another world is necessary is misguided in

the institutionalist sense.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 9

In response, fervent adherents of the globalist idea may revise their

earlier understanding of the claim that only because of the fact of

globalization can we properly ask whether or not the global system of

entitlements is just. They could argue instead that globalization is rele-

vant because it makes the achievement of certain standards of justice

globally possible, not that it presents a precondition for the validity

of justice-claims in the sense that globalization’s cooperative nature or

pervasive impact would be necessary conditions for questions of justice

to arise. In fact, Beitz (2008b [1983], p. 111) elaborated upon the view

that the mere fact that human beings carry moral personhood matters

for the validity of justice-claims. In this way social practices represent

merely a feasibility condition for principles of justice rather than existence

conditions required to establish their validity. For Beitz, the mere exist-

ence of beings with moral personality, by which he means – following

Rawls (2001, pp. 18–19) – the power to follow moral demands and the

power to formulate, revise, and follow a conception of the good, could

be viewed as sufficient for considering the social relations among these

beings by reference to claims of justice. As Beitz claimed:

Since human beings possess these essential powers regardless of

whether, at present, they belong to a common cooperative scheme,

the argument for constructing [principles of justice] globally need

not depend on any claim about the existence or intensity of interna-

tional social cooperation. (Beitz, 2008b [1983], p. 111)

By shifting from the initial position of practice-dependent Globalism

to this ‘practice-independent’ Globalism, Beitz argued that one could

continue defending the institutionalist interpretation of the state-

ment that another world is necessary. The mere existence of moral

agents could provide sufficient ground for an account of global

distributive justice, and therefore no further argument with respect

to the particular kind of global social institutions is required, except

for the sake of analyzing the practical feasibility of a certain concep-

tion of justice.

Beitz’s different types of justifications for Globalism show that

substantive issues about the possible injustice of the global distributive

order require considerable attention to the issue of how to argue for

or against a ‘conception of global justice’.

7 This explains why method-

ological issues have been gaining prominence in the debate between

globalists and statists over global distributive justice. James (2005) and

Sangiovanni (2007, 2008; cf. also Ronzoni, 2009; Banai, Ronzoni, and

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

10 Global Justice and Development

Schemmel, 2011) in particular advanced such methodological issues by

drawing a helpful distinction (one that we have used already above)

between practice-dependent accounts and practice-independent accounts of

theorizing justice . As their name suggests, the crucial difference between

these two accounts is the specific role that social practices play in a

conception of justice. In the practice-dependent account, social prac-

tices are taken to be constitutive parts of the formulation of principles of

justice. The ‘practice-dependence thesis’ says accordingly, ‘The content,

scope, and justification of a conception of justice depends on the struc-

ture and form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern’

(Sangiovanni, 2008, p. 138). That is to say that the particular shape of

social practices that form and give structure to social relations is taken to

be fundamental for the justification of a particular conception of justice.

Thus Beitz’s initial idea that the existence of a global scheme of coopera-

tion makes it proper to apply Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness to

the world as a whole belongs to a practice-dependent account of theo-

rizing justice.

According to a practice-independent account of theorizing justice, on

the other hand, social practices are merely taken into consideration when

considering the practical implications of principles of justice. Social prac-

tices are to be changed in light of certain principles whose validity is not

contingent upon the practices to which they are intended to apply. These

principles may rely on facts about human nature, but not on the social

practices that they are meant to regulate (cf. Mason, 2004). Beitz’s later

statement that the mere possession of moral personhood by all human

beings could render the usage of principles of global distributive justice

appropriate illustrates a practice-independent account of theorizing

justice. Other practice-independent accounts of theorizing justice includes

libertarian theories of justice like Nozick’s (1974) and the broader category

of natural-rights theories of justice to which they belong.

3 Which world is necessary?

With these preliminary distinctions and clarifications in place, my aim

in the first part of this book can now be formulated succinctly. In the first

part of the book I delineate the weaknesses of the practice-dependent

and practice-independent justifications of Globalism in Chapter 2 and

those of practice-dependent Statism in Chapter 3. The upshot of my

discussion in these two chapters is that neither Globalism nor Statism

represents a satisfactory conception of global distributive justice.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 11

As a continuation of the search for a compelling conception of

global distributive justice, I analyze transnationalist conceptions of

global justice in Chapter 4. Such conceptions also rely on a practice-

dependent justification and promise to avoid the decisive problems of

both Globalism and Statism by amplifying and changing the terms of

the debate. To do so they convincingly argue that one need not restrict

questions of distributive justice to either the global or the domestic

context and that there may be a great plurality of contexts of justice.

I examine one of these transnationalist conceptions of global justice

in greater detail, namely Forst’s, because it illuminatingly urges for a

‘political turn’ (Forst, 2007a, p. 300) in the framing of such questions by

claiming that the ‘ first question of justice ’ (Forst, 2005, p. 33) concerns the

relations of justificatory power under which distributive principles are

decided upon. I conclude that although these transnationalist concep-

tions are correct in defending a conception of global justice in between

Globalism and Statism, they seemingly provide an overly fragmented

conception themselves because they do not provide a sufficiently

holistic framework for integrating the plural requirements of justice in

different contexts.

Therefore I underline in the final chapter of Part I, Chapter 5, the impor-

tance of formulating a conception of fundamental – or basic or minimal –

global justice that addresses the global basic structure. For this reason

I argue for a more modest internationalist conception, which follows

Rawls’s lead in that it perceives the formulation of certain intra- and

international conditions, the fulfillment of which would make the global

basic structure fundamentally just, as the essential task of a conception of

global justice. But I also take up the important insights of Forst’s discourse

theory of justice and therefore argue for a distinctively discourse-theoretic

version thereof. Thereby I overcome the deficiencies in Rawls’s formula-

tion of these intra- and international conditions that I identify in this

chapter by way of an examination of Pogge’s and Buchanan’s critiques of

Rawls’s internationalist conception of global justice.

So my argument will agree with Globalism that another world is

necessary in the institutionalist sense that the current system of enti-

tlements is radically unjust, but I share neither Globalism’s reasons for

making this claim nor Globalism’s particular understanding as to which

other world is necessary. While Globalism argues for the correct conclu-

sion in that it makes sense to ask whether the global distribution of

holdings is unjust, its substantive egalitarian standards of justice, such

as a global-level iteration of the difference principle, are not defensible.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

12 Global Justice and Development

And as I argue more specifically in Chapter 2, only practice-dependent

Globalism provides the right type of argument for the conclusion that

considerations of justice matter globally, since the argument that practice-

independent Globalism puts forward is incompatible with the method of

reflective equilibrium.

8 This is because the practice-independent account

of theorizing justice, that is, the genus of which practice-independent

Globalism is a species, does not ascribe any justificatory relevance to the

consequences that can be foreseen as following from compliance with a

particular conception of justice. It assesses only the intuitive appeal of

certain principles of justice and does not rely on information as to how

these principles operate in practice.

While practice-dependent Globalism avoids this problem, it neverthe-

less fails to provide a convincing account of global distributive justice,

because it neglects the fact that in the absence of global background

institutions securing political justice, certain arguments for particular,

individualistically conceived, egalitarian distributive criteria of justice

lose their justificatory force. For without democratic institutions that

are capable of fostering deliberations with respect to the kind of distrib-

utive equality that public institutions should promote, individualisti-

cally conceived egalitarian distributive principles are prone to formulate

one-sided requirements, not reciprocally acceptable ones. This would

not be a serious problem for practice-dependent Globalism if it could

argue convincingly that reasonably democratic political institutions

that would secure, for instance, Rawls’s equal basic liberties principle,

or some similar principle, could eventually emerge on the global level.

Yet an argument to that effect is very weak, because – following Kant

(1970 [1795]) – given that a world state is undesirable, it is difficult

to see how global socio-political institutions could evolve that would

afford an equal political status to all individuals. Thereby practice-

dependent Globalism’s defense of distributive equality among individ-

uals cannot be defended. Since the socio-political institutions respon-

sible for securing political justice globally have to be arranged differently

from how similar institutions are structured domestically, some of the

validity conditions of egalitarian principles of distributive justice are not

fulfilled at the global level.

In Chapter 2 I will reject Statism’s denial that another world is neces-

sary in the institutional sense. I will argue that the reasons that the two

most dominant versions of Statism put forward for restricting the validity

of egalitarian distributive justice-claims to relations among fellow citizens

and limiting the demands of distributive justice beyond the state to some

sufficientarian threshold are deeply problematic, both normatively and

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 13

empirically. Following Caney (2008) I refer to the two dominant forms

of Statism as ‘Strong Statism’ and ‘Weak Statism’. While Nagel defends a

strong version of Statism and holds that any requirements of justice are

valid only within the state, Blake argues for a weak version of Statism

that accepts the validity of some sufficientarian threshold requirement

of justice beyond the state, but that considers strongly egalitarian duties

of distributive justice to be valid only within the state.

In this chapter I differentiate further between two conceptions of

Strong Statism – a democratic sovereignty conception and a political

authority conception – and reject both of them. The democratic sover-

eignty conception argues that egalitarian duties of distributive justice

are valid only under circumstances in which individuals effectively co-

authorize coercive institutions that they impose upon themselves, whereas

the political authority conception holds that such distributive duties are

valid when coercive institutions are imposed in the name of those whom

they coerce. I criticize the democratic sovereignty conception on norma-

tive grounds, because this conception involves a conflation between the

practices that realize justice and the practices that make justice-realizing

practices necessary (cf. Forst, 2011, p. 14). After all, the institutions of

the democratic state should be understood as a response to the political

injustice that exists when some have coercive political power to decide

over others that is not democratically justified. So the democratic exercise

of power should not be thought of as a necessary condition for making

justice-claims. By contrast, the political authority conception is philosoph-

ically sounder as an account of the conditions under which questions of

justice arise, but it fails to establish empirically Strong Statism’s thesis that

egalitarian distributive duties of justice hold only within the state. There

are many instances on the inter-, supra-, and transnational levels where

some claim to be authorized to impose coercive institutions upon others.

So the political authority conception actually goes beyond Statism in that

it provides (albeit unintentionally) a justification for claims of egalitarian

distributive justice beyond the state.

The philosophical problem of Weak Statism’s justification of a suffi-

cientarian threshold beyond the state is that it views all cases of abso-

lute deprivation as calling for rectification as a matter of justice. This

is because Weak Statism presents the implications that flow from a

general duty to show equal respect to all human beings in terms of

justice only. Hence it does not separate requirements owed because of

general considerations of what all human beings owe to each other as a

matter of humanity from other requirements that arise specifically from

considerations of justice. Moreover, Weak Statism’s explanation of why

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

14 Global Justice and Development

egalitarian duties of distributive justice hold only within the state is not

persuasive on empirical grounds.

This justification begins with the observation that the domestic legal

system includes private law that could coercively direct all belongings

to a small fraction of the population, thereby inhibiting effective polit-

ical influence for the rest of society. Weak Statism then argues that one

could hypothetically consent to such coercion only on the condition

that there is a reliable, public concern for an egalitarian distribution of

holdings among fellow citizens. For otherwise the minimal requirement

of possessing effective political influence over the general shape of the

legal system would not be fulfilled.

Since international legal coercion does not encompass this kind of

coercion by private law that could engender a morally problematic

distribution of holdings, Weak Statism argues that it does not give rise

to an international concern for relative deprivation among individuals.

This view must be rejected, because it relies on the implausible view of

explanatory or methodological nationalism (Pogge, 2002, pp. 139–44),

according to which the global distribution of holdings could be explained

solely by reference to domestic factors. It fails thereby to recognize that

coercion by international law also has significant consequences for the

global distribution of holdings and can also prevent actors from being

able to participate meaningfully in determining the shape of the inter-

national legal order.

In Chapter 4 I then engage with several accounts of Transnationalism,

which recognizes a plurality of contexts of justice within and beyond the

state. Forst’s conception, for example, holds the view that the ‘grounds

of justice’

9 are located wherever power is exercised, and identifies a

complex system of power relations that often manifest a multiplicity

of various, interwoven, and mutually reinforcing forms of domina-

tion, that is, unjust exercises of power. Transnationalism moves beyond

the Statism-Globalism dichotomy by proposing a conception of global

justice that identifies ‘contexts of justice’

10 not only domestically or at

the global level, but also in inter-, supra-, and transnational contexts

beyond the state. It subscribes to a pluralist practice-dependent justifica-

tion of a conception of global justice, one which holds that, apart from

distinct principles of justice for the domestic and the global case, proper

principles must also be justified for further inter-, supra-, and transna-

tional contexts. Transnationalism even considers formulating specific

principles for a genuinely transnational context that only involves non-

state agents such as transnational corporations.

In Chapter 4 I analyze more carefully the discourse-theoretic version

of Transnationalism in particular because I employ a discourse-theoretic

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 15

approach myself in Chapter 5 in order to defend a ‘disourse-theoretic’

or ‘democratic’ version of Internationalism. A discourse theory of

justice holds that the formulation of principles of distributive justice

must primarily concentrate on the socio-political conditions that would

secure a fundamentally just structure of justification within which

further distributive principles of justice would then be determined by

way of collective deliberation. While I agree with the discourse-theoretic

insight that this is the proper way of addressing issues of distributive

justice, I am reluctant to accept the kind of practice-dependent pluralism

that Transnationalism defends. For while, indeed, asking solely whether

some principles of justice are valid either domestically or globally is a

false categorization, I argue in Chapter 4 that a conception of global

justice would be overly fragmented if it were to consider the proper prin-

ciples of justice for an unspecified number of separate contexts. This

is because of the importance of the idea of devising a conception of

justice for the basic structure of a social order, which means focusing

on a limited set of conditions the fulfillment of which would render the

social order just.

To convey the relevance of this idea, one must recall why Rawls, in

the domestic case, singles out the basic structure as the proper subject

of justice.

11 Among other reasons, this is chiefly because focusing on

the basic structure of society is a way of addressing society’s background

justice , without having to pay attention to all the potential moral prob-

lems at stake in single transactions among members of society. After all,

attempting to construe principles with which individuals would have to

comply so as to maintain a just social order is too difficult a task, since

the cumulative effects of these transactions among individuals could

lead to unjust outcomes, even if the individual transactions appear

morally unproblematic when considered in isolation.

This fact, in turn, provides an argument for focusing, analogously, on

the social background justice of the global social order and for asking

what conditions, if fulfilled, would make it just, rather than attempting

to justify distinct principles of justice for various separate contexts of

justice. Hence it is problematic if a conception of global justice, such as

Transnationalism, permits a seemingly endless number of contexts of

justice within and beyond the state. In this case the conception lacks

a unifying account of global background justice, which would have to

consist of a limited set of conditions that must be fulfilled globally, what-

ever the more specific moral principles in other, narrow social contexts

might be.

In Chapter 5 I develop and defend a democratic or discourse-theo-

retic, internationalist conception of global justice and formulate a set of

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

16 Global Justice and Development

intra- and international conditions that the global basic structure would

have to satisfy. I proceed by relying on two foundations: an exposition

of central ideas of a discourse theory of justice and a critical discussion of

Rawls’s Internationalism as articulated in The Law of Peoples (1999a). So

in Chapter 5 I first reconstruct Rawls’s Internationalism and then go on

to assess the criticisms of the inter- and intranational conditions of his

conception of global justice that Pogge and Buchanan have put forward.

Pogge argues that Rawls’s Internationalism fails to account for the struc-

tural aspects of social, political, legal, and economic life beyond states and

also neglects how the global institutional order is causally responsible for

the economic hardships that many members of various states experience.

I question whether the first objection by Pogge is sound, given that Rawls

clearly formulates a conception of international justice that is meant to

regulate the basic structure of global society. On the other hand, I am in

full agreement with Pogge’s second argument, since Rawls – despite his

recognition of the importance of concentrating on the basic structure of

global society – fails to acknowledge that global political and economic

institutions can contribute to or commit serious distributive injustices

that cause individuals and even entire societies to suffer.

Buchanan criticizes Rawls for counting so-called ‘decent hierarchical

societies’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 69) as reasonable and thereby formulating a

very limited set of human rights that all ‘states’

12 would have to fulfill

internally. I concur in this chapter with Buchanan’s analysis that Rawls’s

criteria of reasonability are based on too permissive an account of the

‘burdens of judgment’ (Rawls, 2005 [1993], pp. 54–8) and, moreover, are

incompatible with the fundamental principle of equal moral respect. For

Rawls thinks that decent hierarchical societies embody reasonable prin-

ciples of social organization, despite the fact that the justifications that

its members give for its justifiability seem to be the result of an unjust

socio-political reality and deny some members of society an equal socio-

political status. This is the case, for instance, when members of decent

societies state that some people’s (reasonable) religious beliefs, which

diverge from those that members of the state religion hold, justify their

exclusion from certain political offices. This is why a sounder version

of Internationalism has to formulate intranational conditions of global

justice very different from those that Rawls defends.

Finally I offer in Chapter 5 a formulation of the distinct inter- and

intranational conditions that the discourse theory of Internationalism

requires the global basic structure to satisfy. These conditions demand

that representatives of states ought to have sufficient justificatory power

in international processes of opinion and will formation that affect

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 17

the lives of their members. Representatives of states must be able to

construct discursively the internationally valid, substantive principles

of justice upon which the specific shape and contours of a just interna-

tional order are to be erected. Domestically, structures of justification

must enable members of states ‘to demand and provide justifications

and to challenge false legitimations’ (Forst, 2011, p. 9) of the particular

shape of their domestic social and political orders.

As long as this domestic requirement remains unmet, international

practices of justification lack the normative quality necessary to reason-

ably presume the moral acceptability of the agreements reached in

international processes of opinion and will formation. For without

the effective political opportunity to question the opinions expressed

and decisions taken by the representatives of states, the concerns of

members of states are not sufficiently taken into account when states’

international priorities are determined.

In a nutshell, then, discourse-theoretic or democratic Internationalism

consists of a two-pronged approach that requires the establishment of

fundamentally just structures of justification on the inter- and intra-

national levels. These structures in turn must enable fair justificatory

discourses to construct the principles that ought to determine the funda-

mental shape of socio-political orders within and beyond the state.

4 Another world is possible

Even while recognizing the distinction between the individualist and

the institutionalist understandings of the statement that another world

is necessary, and while happily acknowledging an alternative that goes

beyond the problematic conceptions of both Globalism and Statism,

a member of one of the social movements of the World Social Forum

(2012) may nevertheless insist that the ‘another world is possible’ slogan

continues to embody an important point. Specifically, he or she might

argue, the dominant conceptions and international practices of develop-

ment, such as ideas contained in the Washington Consensus of the late

20th century and the policies of the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund in particular, have assumed that economic growth is the

ultimate end of global development.

And this assumption, he or she would continue, is a dogma that must

be challenged because it is the root cause of the political injustice of

lack of representation at various levels of policy-making, as well as of

the distributive injustice of rampant socioeconomic global inequality

that allows around a billion people to go hungry in a world of plenty.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

18 Global Justice and Development

Focusing narrowly on economic growth fails to appreciate that such

growth is only a means and not an end of global development, because

what ultimately matters is what people can actually do and experience –

for instance, that people can actually nourish themselves. Furthermore,

exactly what particular ends individuals and collectivities should pursue

is not something that can simply be stipulated by some development

experts, but a matter to be deliberated upon carefully and inclusively

under suitable circumstances. The slogan ‘another world is possible,’

then, expresses the liberating idea that humanity need not follow any

overly narrow conception of development defined as economic growth,

but can become the author of its own destiny and can set its develop-

ment trajectories according to what it deems fit.

My argument in Part II is in full agreement with this latter under-

standing of the slogan. As I will show in Chapter 6, it is indeed the case

that most conceptions of development, which all flesh out in different

ways the concept of human or social progress, treat economic growth

as the point of development. But simply demonstrating that most theo-

ries of development rely on an indefensible assumption and positing

that some other objectives – like enabling people to be well-nourished,

or improving people’s access to decision-making procedures – should

take center stage is not enough. Without a more thorough conception

of development that specifies priorities, we will still not know what steps

should be taken to promote a more desirable international development

practice. It will also be unclear as to who – for instance, individuals,

states, or international institutions – has to fulfill which particular tasks.

Moreover, simply stating that one views certain ends of development

as more plausible than economic growth fails to address the worries of

the cynic who views any such efforts not motivated by self-interest as

useless anyway. Hence it is necessary to show how a certain form of

development could evolve that would prove sufficiently stable in the

long run and transform into a morally unobjectionable social process.

Finally, merely stating that other ends are more attractive than the

development conception based on economic growth also does not offer a

response to the objections of statists who deny that they have any obliga-

tions toward members of other states beyond the activities in which they

are engaged already. Hence it is not enough, though it is very important,

simply to object that most development conceptions that have emerged

since around 1950 fixate narrowly on economic growth.

For this reason I applaud in Chapter 6 the human development

approach pioneered by Sen, as it effectively undermines the conceptions

of development espoused by modernization theory, dependency theory,

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Introduction 19

and the Washington Consensus – all of which share the assumption that

economic growth is the ultimate purpose of development. Sen’s work

illuminates that neither the mere possession of goods nor the amount

of utility that a certain bundle of goods may yield constitutes a suitable

criterion for assessing development. But while his favored capabilities

metric, namely the effective freedoms to do certain things or to expe-

rience certain states of beings that one has reason to value, certainly

advances the debate about how to understand development, his concep-

tion of development as freedom falls short of answering the additional

questions mentioned above that a complete conception of development

must also address.

Nussbaum’s version of the human development approach is therefore

even more appealing, since it suggests a distinctively justice-based concep-

tion of development that specifies priorities. And since she argues for a

conception of basic justice that is certainly not demonstrably unachiev-

able, she also addresses the potential objection that any efforts to realize

development or justice would be useless anyway. Therefore I accent

in Chapter 6 Nussbaum’s crucial insight that a sufficiently elaborated

theory of justice can substantiate a conception of development.

I suggest, however, that a discourse theory of justice is more suitable

for this role than the purely outcome-oriented conception of justice that

Nussbaum offers. The reason is that such a discourse-theoretic justice-

based conception can better fulfill the abstract idea that human or social

progress requires a process of liberation through which people come to

have their dignity recognized – as well as to recognize the equal dignity

of others. It seems more truly aligned with justice-based human develop-

ment if people occupy positions in a social process that permit them to

define collectively the goals of development, rather than if they simply

enjoy being the beneficiaries of desirable outcomes.

Finally, in the final chapter of this book I make the case that discourse-

theoretic Internationalism also provides a compelling normative basis

for a moral rationale for certain forms of international development

practice, one that is superior to the primarily distribution-oriented moral

rationales that can be formulated from either Statism or Globalism. In

carrying out this argument, I engage with certain critiques of interna-

tional development practice that have been put forward by post-devel-

opment theorists, who claim that this practice is not only ethnocentric

but also relies on inadequate interpretations of the contexts of the

people whom its policies address.

I defend that discourse-theoretic Internationalism is better equipped

to address these charges than alternative moral rationales for the

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

20 Global Justice and Development

international development practice that rely solely on humanity-based

or exclusively distributive justice-based moral foundations. In this way

I can show in this chapter that discourse-theoretic Internationalism

provokes sound, considered moral judgments when assessing its rele-

vance for an influential area of global political practice. This fact further

strengthens the case for discourse-theoretic Internationalism as the most

compelling conception of global justice.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Global Justice and Development

Julian Culp

ISBN: 9781137389930

DOI: 10.1057/9781137389930

Palgrave Macmillan

Please respect intellectual property rights

This material is copyright and its use is restricted by our standard site license

terms and conditions (see palgraveconnect.com/pc/connect/info/terms_conditions.html).

If you plan to copy, distribute or share in any format, including, for the avoidance

of doubt, posting on websites, you need the express prior permission of Palgrave

Macmillan. To request permission please contact rights@palgrave.com.

193

Bibliography

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2002. ‘The Colonial

Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.’ American

Economic Review , 91 (5), 1369–401.

Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. ‘Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and

Why?’ Journal of Economic Growth , 5 (1), 33–63.

Alkire, Sabina. 2005. Valuing Freedoms . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Altman, Andrew and Christopher Wellman. 2009. A Liberal Theory of International

Justice . New York: Oxford University Press.

Ambos, Kai. 1998. ‘Straflosigkeit von Menschenrechtsverletzungen und

Völkerstrafrecht’ [Impunity of Human Rights Violations and International

Criminal Law] . Deutsche Richterzeitung , 76, 251–4.

Amin, Samir. 1976. Unequal Development . New York: Monthly Review.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. ‘What’s the Point of Equality?’ Ethics , 109 (2),

287–337.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. ‘Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice.’

In Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns (eds), Measuring Justice . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 81–100.

Arndt, Heinz. 1981. ‘Economic Development: A Semantic History.’ Economic

Development and Cultural Change , 29 (3), 457–66.

Arneson, Richard. 2005. ‘Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice?’ Journal of Ethics ,

9 (1–2), 127–50.

Arneson, Richard. 2006. ‘Justice after Rawls.’ In John Dryzek, Bonnie Honig,

and Anne Phillips (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Theory . Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 111–26.

Banai, Ayelet, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel. 2011. ‘Global Social

Justice.’ In Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel (eds), Social

Justice, Global Dynamics . London: Routledge, 46–60.

Barry, Brian. 1973. The Liberal Theory of Justice . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Barry, Brian. 1989. Theories of Justice . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Barry, Brian. 2008 [1982]. ‘Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective.’ In Thomas

Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf (eds), Global Justice . St. Paul: Paragon House,

179–209. Orig. 1982. In J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds), Nomos

24: Ethics, Economics and the Law . New York: New York University Press, 219–52.

Bauer, Peter and Basil Yamey. 1957. The Economics of Under-Developed Countries .

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 2004. Was ist Globalisierung? [ What is Globalization? ]. Munich: C.H.

Beck.

Beck, Ulrich. 2008. Die Neuvermessung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen [ The

New Measurement of Inequality among Humans ]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Beck, Ulrich and Angelika Poferl (eds). 2010. Grosse Armut, grosser Reichtum [ Great

Wealth, Great Poverty ]. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Beitz, Charles. 1986. ‘Review of Amartya Sen’s Resources, Values, and Development. ’

Economics and Philosophy , 2(2), 282–91.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

194 Bibliography

Beitz, Charles. 1994. ‘Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System.’ In Chris

Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in Europe . London: Routledge, 123–36.

Beitz, Charles. 1999a [1979]. Political Theory and International Relations . 2nd edn .

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beitz, Charles. 1999b. ‘Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism.’ International Affairs ,

75 (3), 515–29.

Beitz, Charles. 2000. ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples.’ Ethics , 110 (4), 669–96.

Beitz, Charles. 2001. ‘Does Global Inequality Matter?’ Metaphilosophy , 32 (1–2),

95–112.

Beitz, Charles. 2008a [1975]. ‘Justice and International Relations.’ In Thomas

Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf (eds), Global Justice . St. Paul: Paragon House,

21–48. Orig. 1975. Philosophy and Public Affairs , 4 (4), 360–89.

Beitz, Charles. 2008b [1983]. ‘Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment.’ In

Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton (eds), Global Ethics . St. Paul: Paragon House,

107–17. Orig. 1983. Journal of Philosophy , 80 (10), 591–600.

Beitz, Charles. 2009. The Idea of Human Rights . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of Others . Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Berthélemy, Jean-Claude and Ariane Tichit. 2004. ‘Bilateral Donors’ Aid

Allocation Decisions: A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis.’ International Review

of Economics and Finance , 13 (3), 253–74.

Birdsall, Nancy, Stijn Claessens, and Ishac Diwan. 2003. ‘Policy Selectivity

Forgone: Debt and Donor Behavior in Africa.’ World Bank Economic Review , 17

(3), 409–35.

Birnbacher, Dieter. 2007 [2003]. Analytische Einführung in die Ethik [ An Analytical

Introduction to Ethics ]. 2nd edn . Berlin: de Gruyter.

Blake, Michael. 2001. ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 30 (3), 257–96.

Boone, Peter. 1996. ‘Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid.’ European

Economic Review , 40 (2), 289–329.

Boucher, David. 2006. ‘Uniting What Right Permits with What Interest Prescribes.’

In Rex Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples : A Realistic Utopia?

Malden: Blackwell, 19–37.

Boxill, Bernard. 1987. ‘Global Equality of Opportunity and National Integrity.’

Social Philosophy and Policy , 5 (1), 143–68.

Brennan, Geoffrey and Philip Pettit. 2005. ‘The Feasibility Issue.’ In Frank Jackson

and Michael Smith (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy . New

York: Oxford University Press, 258–79.

Brock, Gillian. 2005. ‘The Difference Principle, Equality of Opportunity, and

Cosmopolitan Justice.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy , 2 (3), 333–51.

Brock, Gillian. 2009. Global Justice . New York: Oxford University Press.

Brown, Chris. 1992. International Relations Theory . New York: Columbia University

Press.

Buchanan, Allen. 1990. ‘Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice.’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 19 (3), 227–52.

Buchanan, Allen. 2000. ‘The Law of Peoples: Rules for a Bygone Westphalian

Order.’ Ethics , 110 (4), 697–721.

Buchanan, Allen. 2004. Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination . New York:

Oxford University Press.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 195

Buchanan, Allen. 2010a. ‘The Egalitarianism of Human Rights.’ Ethics , 129 (4),

679–710.

Buchanan, Allen. 2010b. ‘The Legitimacy of International Law.’ In Samantha

Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law . Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 79–96.

Buchanan, Allen. 2011. ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of

International Legitimacy.’ Politics, Philosophy and Economics , 10 (5), 5–19.

Buchanan, Allen and David Golove. 2002. ‘The Philosophy of International Law.’

In Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and

Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 868–934.

Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth.’ The American

Economic Review , 90 (4), 847–68.

Caney, Simon. 2001a. ‘Review Article: International Distributive Justice.’ Political

Studies , 48 (5), 974–97.

Caney, Simon. 2001b. ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities.’

Metaphilosophy , 32 (1–2), 113–34.

Caney, Simon. 2002. ‘Survey Article: Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples.’

Journal of Political Philosophy , 10 (1), 95–123.

Caney, Simon. 2005a. Justice Beyond Borders . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caney, Simon. 2005b. ‘Global Interdependence and Distributive Justice.’ Review

of International Studies , 31 (2), 389–99.

Caney, Simon. 2006. ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Institutional Design: An

Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Global Governance.’ Social Theory and

Practice , 32, 725–56.

Caney, Simon. 2007. ‘Global Poverty and Human Rights: The Case for Positive

Duties.’ In Thomas Pogge (ed.), Who Owes What to the Very Poor? New York:

Oxford University Press, 275–303.

Caney, Simon. 2008. ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State.’ Political Studies ,

56 (3), 487–518.

Caney, Simon. 2010. ‘Cosmopolitanism.’ In Duncan Bell (ed.), Ethics and World

Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 146–63.

Caney, Simon. 2011. ‘Humanity, Associations and Global Justice: A Defence of

Humanity-Centred Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism.’ The Monist , 94 (4), 506–34.

Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependency and Development in Latin

America. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Carens, Joseph. 2008 [1987]. ‘Aliens and Citizens: Open Borders.’ In Thomas

Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf (eds), Global Justice . St. Paul: Paragon House,

211–33. Orig. 1987. Review of Politics , 49 (2), 251–73.

Center for Global Prosperity. 2013. 2013 Index of Global Philanthropy and

Remittances. http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/2013IndexofGlobalPhila

nthropyandRemittances.pdf. Accessed November 12, 2013.

Chambers, Robert. 1997. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the Last First. London:

Intermediate Technology Publications.

Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder. London: Anthem Press.

Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. Bad Samaritans . London: Random House Business Books.

Chwaszcza, Christine. 1996. ‘Politische Ethik II: Ethik der Internationalen

Beziehungen’ [Political Ethics II: Ethics of International Relations]. In Julian

Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Angewandte Ethik [ Applied Ethics ]. Stuttgart: Alfred Krüner,

154–98.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

196 Bibliography

Clark, G., and L. B. Sohn. 1958. World Peace Through World Law . 2nd edn.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Cogneau, Denis and Jean Naudet. 2007. ‘Who Deserves Aid? Equality of

Opportunity, International Aid, and Poverty Reduction.’ World Development ,

35 (1), 104–20.

Cohen, G. A. 1997. ‘Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 26 (1), 3–30.

Cohen, G. A. 2003. ‘Facts and Principles.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 31 (3),

211–45.

Cohen, G. A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press.

Cohen, Joshua. 2001. ‘Taking People as They Are?’ Philosophy and Public Affairs ,

30 (4), 363–86.

Cohen, Joshua and Charles Sabel. 2006. ‘Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 34 (2), 147–75.

Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Collier, Paul and David Dollar. 2001. ‘Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How

Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals.’

World Development , 29 (11), 1787–802.

Collier, Paul and David Dollar. 2002. ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction.’

European Economic Review , 46 (8), 1475–500.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War.’ Oxford

Economic Papers , 56 (4), 563–95.

Cooper, W. E. 1977. ‘The Perfectly Just Society.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research , 38 (1), 46–55.

Crocker, David. 2008. Ethics of Global Development . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Culp, Julian. 2011. ‘Warum für eine Theorie der Gerchtigkeit zählt, ob sie in

der Praxis taugt [Why It Matters for a Theory of Justice Whether It Is of Use

in Practice]. In Christoph Amman, Barbara Bleisch, and Anna Goppel (eds),

Müssen Ethiker moralisch sein? [ Do Ethicists Need to be Moral? ]. Frankfurt/M.:

Campus, 302–12.

Culp, Julian. 2013. ‘The Problem of Undemocratic Side Effects of Democracy

Promotion.’ In Sarah Tangen (ed.), African Perspectives on Social Justice . Kampala:

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 26–42.

Culp, Julian and Nicole Hassoun. 2011. ‘Bridging the Gap: Global Justice in Global

Health Research.’ In Dane Scott (ed.), Debating Science: Deliberation, Values and

the Common Good . Amherst: Prometheus, 69–79.

Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. 1974. ‘Cocoyoc Declaration.’ Development

Dialogue , 2, 88–96.

Dag Hammarskjold Foundation. 1975. ‘What Now? Another Development.’

Development Dialogue, 1–2, 1–129.

Daniels, Norman. 2011. ‘The Method of Reflective Equilibrium.’ In Edward Zalta

(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Ethics . http://plato.stanford.edu/ (home page).

Accessed November 14, 2012.

Danielson, Peter. 1973. ‘Theories, Intuitions and the Problem of World-Wide

Distributive Justice.’ Philosophy of the Social Sciences , 3 (4), 331–40.

DeBres, Helena. 2012. ‘The Many, Not the Few: Pluralism about Global Distributive

Justice.’ The Journal of Political Philosophy , 20 (3), 314–40.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 197

Deitelhoff, Nicole and Jens Steffek (eds). 2009. Was bleibt vom Staat? [ What

Remains of the State? ]. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

DeMartino, George. 2000. Global Economy, Global Justice . London: Routledge.

Demsetz, Harold. 1967. ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights.’ American Economic

Review , 57 (2), 347–59.

De Soto, Hernando. 1989. The Other Path . New York: Harper and Row.

Dower, Nigel. 2000. ‘Human Development – Friend or Foe to Environmental

Ethics?’ Environmental Values , 9 (1), 39–54.

Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Sovereign Virtue . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Easterly, William. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man’s Burden. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Easterly, William. 2008. ‘Can the West Save Africa?’ http://www.nber.org/papers/

w14363.pdf. Accessed June 12, 2011.

Ellerman, David. 2005. Helping People Help Themselves . Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press.

Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Escobar, Arturo. 2012. Encountering Development . 2nd edn . Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Estlund, David. 1998. ‘Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of

Rawls.’ The Journal of Political Philosophy , 6 (1), 99–112.

Estlund, David. 2011. ‘What Good Is It?’ Analyse & Kritik , 33 (2), 395–416.

Farrelly, Colin. 2007. ‘Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation.’ Political Studies , 55

(4), 844–64.

Feinberg, Joel. 1973. ‘Duty and Obligation in the Non-Ideal World.’ Journal of

Philosophy, 70 (9), 263–75.

Fischer, Karin, Gerald Hödl, and Wiebke Sievers. 2008. Klassiker der

Entwicklungstheorie [ Classics of Development Theory ]. Vienna: Mandelbaum.

Flory, James and Philip Kitcher. 2004. ‘Global Health and the Scientific Research

Agenda.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 32 (1), 36–65.

Forst, Rainer. 2001. ‘Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice.’

Metaphilosophy , 32 (1–2), 160–79.

Forst, Rainer. 2002. Contexts of Justice . Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of

California Press.

Forst, Rainer. 2005. ‘Justice, Morality and Power in the Global Context.’ In

Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice . Dordrecht:

Springer, 27–37.

Forst, Rainer. 2007a. ‘First Things First: Redistribution, Recognition and

Justification.’ European Journal of Political Theory 6 (3), 291–304.

Forst, Rainer. 2007b. ‘Radical Justice: On Iris Young’s Critique of the Distributive

Paradigm.’ Constellations , 14 (2), 260–65.

Forst, Rainer. 2007c. Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung [ The Right to Justification ].

Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Forst, Rainer. 2010. ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to

Justification. A Reflexive Approach.’ Ethics , 120 (4), 711–40.

Forst, Rainer. 2011. Transnational Justice and Democracy. Normative Orders

Working Papers 4.

Forst, Rainer. 2012. The Right to Justification . New York: Columbia University Press.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

198 Bibliography

Forst, Rainer. 2014. Justification and Critique . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Frankel, Jeffrey and David Roemer. 1999. ‘Does Trade Cause Growth?’ American

Economic Review , 89 (3), 379–99.

Frank, André. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America . New York:

Monthly Review.

Frank, André. 1975. Capitalist Underdevelopment . Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Frank, André. 1978. World Accumulation, 1492–1789 . New York: Monthly Review

Press.

Frankfurt, Harry. 1987. ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal.’ Ethics , 98 (1), 21–43.

Fraser, Nancy. 2007. ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World.’ In David Held

and Ayse Kaya (eds), Global Inequalities . Cambridge: Polity, 252–72.

Fraser, Nancy. 2008. Scales of Justice . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Freeman, Samuel. 2006. ‘Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples.’ In Rex

Martin and David Reidy (eds), The Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Malden:

Blackwell, 243–59.

Freeman, Samuel. 2007. ‘The Law of Peoples , Social Cooperation, Human Rights

and Distributive Justice.’ In Samuel Freeman, Essays in Rawlsian Political

Philosophy . New York: Oxford University Press, 259–95.

Freire, Paulo. 1970. Pedagogy of the Oppressed . New York: Continuum.

French, Peter. 1984. Corporate and Collective Responsibility . New York: Columbia

University Press.

Fromm, Erich. 1976. To Have or To Be? New York: Harper and Row.

Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gosepath, Stefan. 1992. Aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse [ Enlightened Self-Interest ].

Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Gosepath, Stefan. 2001. ‘The Global Scope of Justice.’ Metaphilosophy , 32 (1–2),

135–59.

Gosepath, Stefan. 2004. Gleiche Gerechtigkeit [ Equal Justice ]. Frankfurt/M.:

Suhrkamp.

Gosepath, Stefan. 2009. ‘Poverty and Responsibility.’ In Elke Mack, Michael

Schramm, Stephan Klasen, and Thomas Pogge (eds), Absolute Poverty and Global

Justice . Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 113–21.

Gosepath, Stefan. 2011. ‘Zur Verteidigung der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit’ [In

Defense of Distributive Justice]. In Regina Kreide, Claudia Landwehr, and Katrin

Toens (eds), Demokratie und Gerechtigkeit in Verteilungskonflikten [ Democracy and

Justice in Distributional Conflicts ]. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 35–50.

Goulet, Denis. 1995. Development Ethics . New York: The Apex Press.

Grant, Ruth and Robert Keohane. 2005. ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in

World Politics.’ American Political Science Review , 99 (1), 29–43.

Greig, Alastair, David Hulme, and Mark Turner. 2007. Challenging Global Inequality.

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grimm, Dieter. 2009. Souveränität [ Sovereignty ]. Berlin: Berlin University Press.

Grimm, Dieter. 2010. ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospect in

a Changed World.’ In Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of

Constitutionalism , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–22.

Günther, Klaus and Stefan Kadelbach (eds). 2011. Recht ohne Staat? [ Law without a

State? ] Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 199

Gupta, Akhil. 2009. ‘Nationale Armut, Globale Armut und Neoliberalismus’

[National Poverty, Global Poverty and Neoliberalism]. In Hubertus Büschel and

Daniel Speich (eds), Entwicklungswelten [ Worlds of Development ]. Frankfurt/M.:

Campus, 113–42.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1969. ‘Einleitung einer Podiumsdiskussion.’ In Jürgen

Habermas, Protestbewegung und Hochschulreform [ Protest Movement and the Reform

of Higher Education ]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 178–84.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action .

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. The Theory of Communicative Action , Vol. 1: Reason and

the Rationalization of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1993. ‘On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral

Employments of Practical Reason.’ In Jürgen Habermas, Justification and

Application . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1–18.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. ‘Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of

Communicative Rationality.’ In Maeve Cooke (ed.), On the Pragmatics of

Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 306–42.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1999. The Inclusion of the Other . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. The Postnational Constellation . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. The Divided West . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2008a. ‘A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World

Society?’ In Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Between Naturalism and Religion . Cambridge:

Polity Press, 312–53.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2008b. ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and

the Legitimation Problems of World Society.’ Constellations , 15 (4), 444–55.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2010. ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia

of Human Rights.’ Metaphilosophy , 41 (4), 464–80.

Habermas, Jürgen. 2012. The Crisis of the European Union . Cambridge: Polity

Press.

Hart, H.L.A. 1961. The Concept of Law . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hassoun, Nicole. 2012. Globalization and Global Justice . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Heath, Joseph. 2006. ‘On the Scope of Egalitarian Justice.’ Les ateliers de l’éthique ,

1 (1), 21–41.

Heath, Joseph. 2007. ‘Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence.’ In Daniel

Weinstock (ed.), Global Justice, Global Institutions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Supplementary Volume 31 . Lethbridge: University of Calgary Press, 193–226.

Held, David and Anthony McGrew (eds). 2008. Globalization/Anti-Globalization .

2nd edn. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. 1999.

Global Transformations . Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Henrich, Dieter. 1994. ‘The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant’s Doctrine of the

Fact of Reason.’ In Richard Velkley (ed.), The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s

Philosophy . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 55–88.

Higgins, Benjamin. 1959. Economic Development . London: Constable.

Hinsch, Wilfried. 2001. ‘Global Distributive Justice.’ Metaphilosophy , 32 (1–2),

58–78.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

200 Bibliography

Hinsch, Wilfried. 2011. ‘Ideal Justice and Rational Dissent: A Critique of Amartya

Sen’s Idea of Justice.’ Analyse & Kritik , 33 (2), 371–86.

Hirschman, Albert. 1965. ‘Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-

Vanishing Act.’ Economic Development and Cultural Change , 13 (4), 385–93.

Hollis, Aidan and Thomas Pogge. 2008. ‘The Health Impact Fund.’ http://health-

impactfund.org/ (home page). Accessed December 12, 2013.

Honneth, Axel. 2009. ‘Fataler Tiefsinn aus Karlsruhe’ [Non-Sense from Karlsruhe].

Die Zeit , 40, September 24, 60–61.

Hopper, Paul. 2012. Understanding Development . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Horn, Christoph. 1996. ‘Philosophische Argumente für einen Weltstaat‘ [Philosophical

Arguments for a World State]. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 21, 229–51.

Howse, Robert and Ruti Teitel. ‘Global Justice, Poverty, and the International

Economic Order.’ 2010. In Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The

Philosophy of International Law . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 437–49.

Hulme, David and Sakiko Fukudu-Parr. 2009. International Norm Dynamics and

‘The End of Poverty’: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals. Brooks

World Poverty Institute Working Paper, 96.

Hume, David. 1978 [1739]. Treatise of Human Nature . L. A. Selby-Bigge and rev. P.

H. Nidditch (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurka, Thomas. 1997. ‘The Justification of National Partiality.’ In Robert McKim

and Jeff McMahan (eds), The Morality of Nationalism . Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 139–57.

Hurrell, Andrew. 2007. On Global Order . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Illich, Ivan. 1970. Celebration of Awareness . New York: Penguin Books.

Inkeles, Alex. 1966. ‘The Modernization of Man.’ In Myron Weiner (ed.),

Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth . New York: Basic Books, 151–66.

International Criminal Court. 2002. ‘Rome Statute.’ http://www.un.org/law/icc/

index.html (home page). Accessed July 12, 2013.

International Labour Organisation. 1976. Employment, Growth and Basic Needs.

Geneva: International Labour Organisation.

International Law Commission. 1950. ‘Report of the International Law

Commission Covering Its Second Session, June 5, – July 29, 1950. Document

A/1316.’ http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/390?OpenDocument. Accessed

June 11, 2013.

James, Aaron. 2005. ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls and the

Status Quo.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 33 (3), 281–316.

Jamieson, Dale. 2005. ‘Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance, and Intervention in

the Developing World.’ Journal of Ethics , 9 (1–2), 151–70.

Jones, Charles. 1999. Global Justice . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Julius, A. J. 2006. ‘Nagel’s Atlas.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 34 (2), 176–92.

Kabou, Axelle. 1993. Weder arm noch ohnmächtig [ Neither Poor Nor Powerless ].

Basel: Lenos.

Kant, Immanuel. 1970 [1795]. ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.’ In Hans

Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

93–130.

Kant, Immanuel. 1996a [1793]. ‘On the Common Saying: “This May Be True in

Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice”.’ In Mary Gregor (ed.), Immanuel

Kant. Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 273–309.

Kant, Immanuel. 1996b [1797]. The Metaphysics of Morals . In Mary Gregor (ed.).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 201

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders . Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert. 2002. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World .

London: Routledge.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (eds). 1972. Transnational Relations and World

Politics . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 2001 [1977]. Power and Interdependence . 3rd edn .

New York: Longman.

Keohane, Robert, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. 2009. ‘Democracy-

Enhancing Multilateralism.’ International Organization , 63 (Winter), 1–31.

Kersting, Wolfgang. 2002. Kritik der Gleichheit [ Critique of Equality ]. Weilerswist:

Velbrück.

Kersting, Wolfgang. 2008 [1993]. Rawls zur Einführung [ An Introduction to Rawls ].

2nd edn. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.

Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart. 2005. ‘The Emergence of

Global Administrative Law.’ Law and Contemporary Problems , 68 (3–4), 15–61.

Klabbers, Jan, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. 2009. The Constitutionalization of

International Law . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kleingeld, Pauline and Eric Brown. 2006. ‘Cosmopolitanism.’ In Edward Zalta

(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . http://plato.stanford.edu/ (home

page). Accessed November 13, 2011.

Kleinlein, Thomas. 2010. Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht [ Constitutionalization

Within International Law ]. Heidelberg: Springer.

Korsgaard, Christine. 1986. ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason.’ Journal of

Philosophy , 83 (1), 5–25.

Kreide, Regina and Andreas Niederberger (eds). 2008. Transnationale Verrechtlichung

[ Transnational Juridification ]. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.

Krisch, Nico and Benedict Kingsbury. 2006. ‘Introduction: Global Administrative

Law and Global Market Regulation in the International Legal Order.’ European

Journal of International Law , 17 (1), 1–14.

Krisch, Nico. 2010. Beyond Constitutionalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Krueger, Anne. 1990. ‘Government Failures in Development.’ Journal of Economic

Perspectives , 4 (3), 9–23.

Krugman, Paul. 1995. ‘Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets.’ Foreign Affairs , 74

(4), 28–44.

Kuper, Andrew. 2000. ‘Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a

Cosmopolitan Law of Persons.’ Political Theory , 28 (5), 640–74.

Kukathas, Chandran. 2006. ‘The Mirage of Global Justice.’ Social Philosophy and

Policy , 23 (1), 1–28.

Landes, David. 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations . New York: W. W. Norton.

Larmore, Charles. 2002. ‘Public Reason.’ In Samuel Freeman (ed.), Cambridge

Companion to Rawls . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 368–93.

Lepenies, Philipp. 2009. ‘Lernen vom Besserwisser’ [Learning from the Wiseacre].

In Hubertus Büschel and Daniel Speich (eds), Entwicklungswelten [ Worlds of

Development ]. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 33–59.

Lin, Justin Yifu. 2011. ‘New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking

Development.’ World Bank Research Observer , 26 (2), 193–222.

Lister, Andrew. 2011. ‘Justice as Fairness and as Reciprocity.’ Analyse & Kritik , 33

(1), 193–212.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

202 Bibliography

Llavador, Humberto and John Roemer. 2001. ‘An Equal-Opportunity Approach

to the Allocation of International Aid.’ Journal of Development Economics , 64

(1), 147–71.

Mason, Andrew. 2004. ‘Just Constraints.’ British Journal of Political Science , 34 (2),

251–68.

McDonnell, Ida, Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, and Liam Wegimont. 2003.

Public Opinion Research, Global Education and Development Co-Operation Reform.

OECD Development Centre Working Paper 222.

McGillivray, Mark. 1989. ‘The Allocation of Aid Among Developing Countries:

A Multi-Donor Analysis Using a Per Capita Aid Index.’ World Development , 17

(4), 561–68.

McGillivray, Mark. 2004. ‘Descriptive and Prescriptive Analyses of Aid Allocation:

Approaches, Issues, and Consequences.’ International Review of Economics and

Finance , 13 (3), 275–92.

McKinlay, Robert and Richard Little. 1977. ‘A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral

Aid Allocation.’ World Politics , 30 (1), 58–86.

McLuhan, Marshall. 2002 [1962]. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic

Man . Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

McNamara, Robert. 1973. Address to the Board of Governors . Washington, D.C.:

World Bank.

Meckled-Garcia, Saladin. 2008. ‘On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice:

Constructivism and International Agency.’ The Journal of Political Philosophy ,

16 (3), 245–71.

Milanovic, Branko. 2005. Worlds Apart . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, David. 1999. ‘Justice and Global Inequality.’ In Andrew Hurrell and

Ngaire Woods (eds), Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics . Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 187–210.

Miller, David. 2005. ‘Against Global Egalitarianism.’ Journal of Ethics , 9 (1–2),

55–79.

Miller, David. 2007. National Responsibility and Global Justice . Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Miller, Richard. 1998. ‘Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern.’ Philosophy

and Public Affairs , 27 (3), 202–24.

Miller, Richard. 2010. Globalizing Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mills, Charles. 2005. ‘Ideal Theory as Ideology.’ Hypatia , 20 (3), 165–84.

Minouio, Camelia and Sanjay Reddy. 2009. Development Aid and Economic Growth:

A Positive Long-Run Relation . IMF Working Paper WP/09/118.

Moellendorf, Darrel. 2002. Cosmopolitan Justice . Boulder: Westview Press.

Moellendorf, Darrel. 2006. ‘Equality of Opportunity Globalized?’ Canadian Journal

of Law and Jurisprudence , 19 (2), 301–18.

Moellendorf, Darrel. 2009. Global Inequality Matters . Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Mosler, Hermann. 1962. ‘Die Erweiterung des Kreises der Völkerrechtssubjekte’

[The Expansion of the Circle of Subjects of International Law]. ZaöRV , 22, 1–48.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Mosley, Paul, John Hudson, and Sara Horrell. 1987. ‘Aid, the Public Sector

and the Market in Less Developed Countries.’ Economic Journal , 97 (387),

616–41.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 203

Moyo, Dambisa. 2010. Dead Aid . London: Penguin Press.

Murphy, Liam. 1998. ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice.’ Philosophy and

Public Affairs , 27 (4), 251–91.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions . London:

Duckworth.

Nagel, Thomas. 2005. ‘The Problem of Global Justice.’ Philosophy and Public

Affairs , 33 (2), 113–47.

Nagel, Thomas. 2008 [1977]. ‘Poverty and Food: Why Charity Is Not Enough.’ In

Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf (eds), Global Justice . St. Paul: Paragon

House, 49–59.

Nielsen, Kai. 1988. ‘World Government, Security, and Global Justice.’ In Steven

Luper-Foy (ed.), Problems of International Justice . Boulder: Westview Press,

263–82.

Niggli, Peter. 2008. Der Streit um die Entwicklungshilfe [ The Conflict about Development

Aid ]. Zurich: Rotpunktverlag.

Noël, Alain. 2006. ‘The New Global Politics of Poverty.’ Global Social Policy , 6 (3),

304–33.

Norberg-Hodge, Helena. 1992. Ancient Futures . Delhi: Oxford University Press.

North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance .

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia . New York: Basic Books.

Nurkse, Ragnar. 1953. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries .

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nuscheler, Franz. 2006. Entwicklungspolitik [ Development Politics ]. Bonn:

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Nussbaum, Martha. 1992. ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of

Aristotelian Essentialism.’ Political Theory , 20 (2), 202–46.

Nussbaum, Martha. 2000. Women and Human Development . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha. 2003. ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and

Social Justice.’ Feminist Economics , 9 (2–3), 33–59.

Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Nussbaum, Martha. 2011a. Creating Capabilities . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha. 2011b. ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism.’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 39 (1), 3–45.

O’Neill, Onora. 1987. ‘Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics.’ In J.

D. G. Evans (ed.), Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 55–69.

O’Neill, Onora. 1991. ‘Transnational Justice.’ In David Held (ed.), Political Theory

Today . Cambridge: Polity Press, 276–304.

O’Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue . Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

O’Neill, Onora. 2000. Bounds of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O’Neill, Onora. 2004. ‘Global Justice: Whose Obligations?’ In Deen Chatterjee

(ed.), The Ethics of Assistance . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

242–59.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011a. Official

Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage . http://www.oecd.org/docume

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

204 Bibliography

nt/4/0,3746,en_2649_34447_46181892_1_1_1_1,00.html. Accessed December

12, 2011.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011b. DAC List of

ODA Recipients . http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/40/43540882.pdf. Accessed

December 12, 2011.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. Development

Co-operation Report 2012 . http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/

oecd/development/development-co-operation-report-2012_dcr-2012-en.

Accessed November 11, 2013.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2013a.

What do we Know about Multilateral Aid? http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-

architecture/13_03_18%20Policy%20Briefing%20on%20Multilateral%20Aid.

pdf. Accessed November 11, 2013.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2013b. OECD

StatExtracts . http://stats.oecd.org/. Accessed November 10, 2013.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 1995. Kolonialismus [ Colonialism ]. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons . Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. 2009. ‘Global Justice: Problems of a Cosmopolitan

Account.’ In Lukas H. Meyer (ed.), Legitimacy, Justice and Public International

Law . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 207–31.

Peters, Anne. 2011. ‘Das Subjektive Internationale Recht’ [The Subjective

International Law]. In Peter Häberle (ed.), Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der

Gegenwart [ Yearbook of Contemporary Public Law ]. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,

411–56.

Philips, Michael. 1985. ‘Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal

Theory.’ Noûs , 19 (4), 551–70.

Pinzani, Alessandro. 2005. ‘It’s the Power, Stupid! On the Unmentioned

Precondition of Social Justice.’ In Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge (eds),

Real World Justice . Dordrecht: Springer, 171–97.

Pogge, Thomas. 1989. Realizing Rawls . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pogge, Thomas. 1992. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.’ Ethics , 103 (1),

48–75.

Pogge, Thomas 1994. ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs ,

23 (3), 195–224.

Pogge, Thomas. 2000. ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen

and Murphy.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 29 (2), 137–69.

Pogge, Thomas. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pogge, Thomas. 2004a. ‘The Incoherence of Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice.’

Fordham Law Review , 72 (5), 1739–59.

Pogge, Thomas. 2004b. ‘“Assisting” the Global Poor.’ In Deen Chatterjee (ed.),

The Ethics of Assistance . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 260–88.

Pogge, Thomas. 2005a. ‘Recognized and Violated by International Law: The

Human Rights of the Global Poor.’ Leiden Journal of International Law , 18 (4),

717–45.

Pogge, Thomas. 2005b. ‘Severe Poverty as Violation of Negative Duties.’ Ethics

and International Affairs , 19 (1), 55–83.

Pogge, Thomas. 2005c. ‘Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program.’

Metaphilosophy , 36 (1–2), 182–209.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 205

Pogge, Thomas. 2006. ‘Do Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?’ In Rex

Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Malden:

Blackwell, 206–25.

Pogge, Thomas. 2007a. ‘Why Global Inequality Matters.’ In David Held and Ayse

Kaya (eds), Global Inequality . Cambridge: Polity Press, 132–47.

Pogge, Thomas. 2007b. ‘Severe Poverty as Human Rights Violation.’ In Thomas

Pogge (ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right . Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 11–53.

Pogge, Thomas. 2010a. Politics as Usual . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pogge, Thomas. 2010b. ‘A Critique of the Capability Approach.’ In Harry

Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns (eds), Measuring Justice . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 17–60.

Pogge, Thomas and Andreas Follesdal. 2005. ‘Introduction.’ In Thomas Pogge

and Andreas Follesdal (eds), Real World Justice . Dordrecht: Springer, 1–19.

Prebisch, Raúl. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal

Problems . New York: United Nations.

Preston, Peter. 1996. Development Theory . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Rahnema, Majid. 1991. ‘Global Poverty: A Pauperizing Myth.’ Interculture , 24 (2),

4–51.

Rahnema, Majid. 2010. ‘Poverty.’ In Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development

Dictionary . 2nd edn. London: Zed Books, 158–76.

Rajan, Raghuram and Arvind Subramanian. 2005. Aid and Growth: What Does

the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? International Monetary Fund Working

Paper 05/127.

Rapley, John. 2007. Understanding Development . 2nd edn . Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Rawls, John. 1999a. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Rawls, John. 1999b. A Theory of Justice . Revised edn . Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Rawls, John. 1999c. Collected Papers . Samuel Freeman (ed.). Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press.

Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness . Erin Kelly (ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press.

Rawls, John. 2005 [1993]. Political Liberalism . Expanded Edition . New York:

Columbia University Press.

Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reidy, David. 2004. ‘Rawls on International Justice: A Defense.’ Political Theory ,

32 (3), 291–319.

Richards, David. 1982. ‘International Distributive Justice.’ In J. Roland Pennock

and John W. Chapman (eds), Nomos 24: Ethics, Economics, and the Law . New

York: New York University Press, 275–99.

Risse, Mathias. 2005a. ‘What We Owe to the Global Poor.’ Journal of Ethics , 9

(1–2), 81–117.

Risse, Mathias. 2005b. ‘How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?’ Philosophy

and Public Affairs , 33 (4), 349–76.

Risse, Mathias. 2006. ‘Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?’

Ethics and International Affairs , 19 (1), 9–18.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

206 Bibliography

Risse, Mathias. 2012. On Global Justice . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Robbins, Lionel. 1952 [1932]. Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic

Science . 2nd edn. London: Macmillan.

Robeyns, Ingrid. 2005. ‘The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey.’ Journal of

Human Development , 6 (1), 93–117.

Robeyns. Ingrid. 2008. ‘Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice.’ Social Theory and

Practice , 34 (3), 341–62.

Robeyns, Ingrid. 2009. ‘Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach.’ In

Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in

Honor of Amartya Sen . New York: Oxford University Press, 397–413.

Robeyns, Ingrid. 2011. ‘The Capability Approach.’ In Edward Zalta (ed.), The

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . http://plato.stanford.edu/ (home page).

Accessed March 11, 2012.

Rodan-Rosenstein, Paul. 1943. ‘Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and

South-Eastern Europe.’ Economic Journal , 53, 202–11.

Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes . Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. ‘Institutions

Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic

Development.’ Journal of Economic Growth , 9, 131–65.

Ronzoni, Miriam. 2008. ‘What Makes a Basic Structure Just?’ Res Publica , 14 (3),

203–18.

Ronzoni, Miriam. 2009. ‘The Global Order – A Case of Background Injustice?’

Philosophy and Public Affairs , 37 (3), 229–56.

Ronzoni, Miriam and Laura Valentini. 2008. ‘On the Meta-Ethical Status of

Constructivism.’ Politics, Philosophy and Economics , 7 (4), 403–22.

Rostow, Walt. 1960. Stages in Economic Development . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Ruggie, John. 2004. ‘Reconstituting the Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and

Practices.’ European Journal of International Relations , 10 (4), 499–53.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2002. Tropical Underdevelopment . NBER Working Paper W81119.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005a. ‘Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve

the Millennium Development Goals.’ http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/

reports/fullreport.htm (home page). Accessed December 12, 2012.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005b. The End of Poverty. London: Penguin Press.

Sachs, Wolfgang (ed.). 2010. The Development Dictionary. 2nd edn . London: Zed

Books.

Samuelson, Paul. 1983 [1947]. Foundations of Economic Analysis . 5th edn .

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Sangiovanni, Andrea. 2007. ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State.’ Philosophy

and Public Affairs , 35 (1), 3–39.

Sangiovanni, Andrea. 2008. ‘The Priority of Politics over Morality.’ The Journal of

Political Philosophy , 16 (2), 137–64.

Sarooshi, Dan. 2005. International Organizations and Their Exercises of Sovereign

Power . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 2007. A Sociology of Globalization . New York: W. W. Norton.

Satz, Debra. 1999. ‘Equality of What among Whom?’ In Ian Shapiro and Lea

Brilmeyer (eds), Nomos 41 : Global Justice . New York: New York University Press,

67–85.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 207

Satz, Debra. 2005. ‘International Economic Justice.’ In Hugh LaFollette

(ed.), Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press,

620–42.

Scanlon, Thomas. 1973. ‘Rawls’s Theory of Justice.’ University of Pennsylvania Law

Review , 121 (5), 1020–69.

Scanlon, Thomas. 1982. ‘Contractarianism and Utilitarianism.’ In Amartya Sen

and Bernard Williams (eds). Utilitarianism and Beyond . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 103–28.

Scanlon, Thomas. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press.

Schaber, Peter. 2007. ‘Globale Hilfspflichten’ [Global Duties of Assistance]. In

Barbara Bleisch and Peter Schaber, Weltarmut und Ethik [ World Poverty and

Ethics ]. Paderborn: Mentis, 139–52.

Schefczyk, Michael. 2007. ‘Rawls und die Verantwortung von Nationen’ [Rawls

and the Responsibility of Nations]. In Paolo von Becchi et al., Nationen und

Gerechtigkeit [ Nations and Justice ]. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 7–32.

Schemmel, Christian. 2007. ‘On the Usefulness of Luck Egalitarian Arguments for

Global Justice.’ Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric , 1, 55–67.

Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal (ed.). 1948. Der Prozess gegen

die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof [ The Process

against the Main Perpetrators of the War Crimes in the International Military

Tribunal ]. Vol. 12. Nuremberg.

Sen, Amartya. 1977. ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of

Economic Theory.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 6 (4), 317–344.

Sen, Amartya. 1981. Poverty and Famines . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1984. ‘Goods and People.’ In Amartya Sen, Resources, Values and

Development . Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 509–32.

Sen, Amartya. 1989. ‘Human Development as Capability Expansion.’ In Saiko

Fukuda-Parr and A. K. Shiva Kumar (eds), Readings on Human Development:

Concepts, Measures, and Policies for a Development Paradigm . New York: Oxford

University Press, 3–16.

Sen, Amartya. 1991. Inequality Reexamined . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1997 [1980]. ‘Equality of What?’ In Amartya Sen, Choice, Welfare

and Measurement . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press: 353–72.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom . New York: Oxford University

Press.

Sen, Amartya. 2006. ‘What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?’ Journal of

Philosophy , 103 (5), 215–38.

Sen, Amartya. 2008. ‘The Concept of Development.’ In Thomas Pogge and Keith

Horton (eds), Global Ethics . St. Paul: Paragon House: 157–80.

Sen, Amartya, 2009. The Idea of Justice . London: Allen and Unwin.

Shiva, Vandana. 1988. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development . London:

Zed Books.

Shue, Henry. 1988. ‘Mediating Duties.’ Ethics , 98 (4), 687–704.

Simmons, John. 2010. ‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs ,

38 (1), 5–36.

Sinding, Steven. 2007. ‘Overview and Perspective.’ In Warren Robinson and John

Ross (eds), The Global Family Planning Revolution . Washington, D.C.: World

Bank, 1–13.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

208 Bibliography

Singer, Hans. 1950. ‘The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing

Countries.’ American Economic Review , 40 (2), 473–85.

Singer, Peter. 2008 [1972]. ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality.’ In Thomas Pogge

and Keith Horton (eds), Global Ethics . St. Paul: Paragon Press, 1–14. Orig. 1972.

‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 1 (3), 229–43.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2004. A New World Order . Princeton: Princeton University

Press.

Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams. 1973. Utilitarianism and Beyond . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Sloterdijk, Peter. 2009. ‘Die Revolution der gebenden Hand’ [The Revolution of

the Giving Hand]. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , June 13, 2009, 29–31.

Smith, Kimberly, Talita Fordelone and Felix Zimmermann. 2010. Beyond the DAC:

The welcome role of other providers in development co‐operation. http://www.oecd.

org/investment/stats/45361474.pdf. Accessed November 11, 2013.

Spittler, Gerd. 1991. ‘Armut, Mangel und einfache Bedürfnisse’ [Poverty,

Deprivation and Simple Needs]. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie , 116, 65–89.

Stemplowska, Zofia. 2008. ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?’ Social Theory and

Practice , 34 (3), 319–40.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents . New York: W. W. Norton.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 2006. Making Globalization Work . New York: W. W. Norton.

Streeten, Paul. 1981. First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing

Countries : Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Streeten, Paul. 1984. ‘Basic Needs: Some Unsettled Questions.’ World Development ,

12 (9), 973–8.

Streeten, Paul and Shahid Burki. 1978. ‘Basic Needs: Some Issues.’ World

Development , 6 (3), 411–21.

Swift, Adam. 2008. ‘The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances.’ Social

Theory and Practice , 34 (3), 363–87.

Tan, Kok-Chor. 1998. ‘Liberal Toleration in Rawls’s Law of Peoples.’ Ethics , 108

(2), 276–95.

Tan, Kok-Chor. 2004. Justice Without Borders . Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Tasioulas, John. 2005. ‘Global Justice Without End?’ Metaphilosophy , 36 (1–2),

3–29.

Teubner, Gunther (ed.). 1997. Global Law Without a State . Dartmouth: Aldershot.

Teubner, Gunther. 2003a. ‘Global Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszen-

trierten Verfassungstheorie’ [Global Civil Constitutions: Alternatives to a State-

Centered Constitutional Theory]. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht

und Völkerrecht [ Heidelberg Journal of International Law ] 63, 1–28.

Teubner, Gunther. 2003b. ‘Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and

the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria .’ European Journal of Social Theory , 5 (2),

199–217.

Teubner, Gunther. 2010. ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism

beyond the Nation State.’ In Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The

Twilight of Constitutionalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 327–41.

Thompson, Janna. 1992. Justice and World Order. London: Routledge.

Truman, Harry. 1949. ‘Inaugural Address.’ http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.

Accessed December 10, 2011.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Bibliography 209

Tugendhat, Ernst. 1993. Vorlesungen über Ethik [ Lectures on Ethics ]. Frankfurt/M.:

Suhrkamp.

Unger, Peter. 1996. Living High and Letting Die . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

United Nations. 1945. ‘Charter of the United Nations.’ http://www.un.org/en/

documents/charter/index.shtml. Accessed July 12, 2012.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 1999. Trade and

Development Report 1999. http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdr1999_en.pdf. Accessed

July 11, 2012.

United Nations Development Programme. 2010. Human Development Report . New

York: Oxford University Press.

Valentini, Laura. 2009. ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory.’ Journal of

Political Philosophy, 17 (3), 332–55.

Valentini, Laura. 2011. Justice in a Globalized World . Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Weber, Max. 2001 [1920]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London:

Routledge.

Wenar, Leif. 2001. ‘Contractualism and Global Economic Justice.’ Metaphilosophy ,

32 (1–2), 79–94.

Wenar, Leif. 2003. ‘What We Owe to Distant Others.’ Politics, Philosophy and

Economics , 2 (3), 283–304.

Wenar, Leif. 2004. ‘The Unity of Rawls’s Work.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy , 1 (3),

265–75.

Wenar, Leif. 2006. ‘Why Rawls Is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian.’ In Rex Martin

and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? Malden:

Blackwell, 95–113.

Wenar, Leif. 2007. ‘The Basic Structure as Object: Institutions and Humanitarian

Concern.’ In Daniel Weinstock (ed.), Global Justice, Global Institutions. Canadian

Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 31 . Lethbridge. University of Calgary

Press, 253–78.

White, Howard and Mark McGillivray. 1992. Descriptive Measures of the Allocation

of Development Aid . Institute of Social Studies Working Paper Series 125.

White, Howard, and Mark McGillivray. 1995. ‘How Well Is Aid Allocated?

Descriptive Measures of Aid Allocation: a Survey of Methodology and Results.’

Development and Change , 26 (1), 163–83.

Wight, Martin. 1991. International Theory . Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Williams, Andrew. 1998. ‘Incentives, Inequality and Publicity.’ Philosophy and

Public Affairs , 27 (3), 225–47.

Williams, Huw-Lloyd. 2012. On Rawls, Development and Global Justice . Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Williamson, John. 1990. ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform.’ In

John Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?

Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 7–20.

Wohl, Isaac. 2009. ‘The Antigua–United States Online Gambling Dispute.’ Journal

of International Commerce and Economics , 2, 127–48.

World Bank. 1990. World Development Report 1990. Washington, D.C.: Oxford

University Press.

World Bank. 1998. Assessing Aid . Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 2006. World Development Report 2006 . Washington, D.C.: Oxford

University Press.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

210 Bibliography

World Bank. 2008. World Development Report 2008 . Washington, D.C.: Oxford

University Press.

World Social Forum. 2012. ‘Another World Is Possible.’ http://www.forumsocial-

mundial.org.br/ (home page). Accessed November 12, 2012.

Young, Iris. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference . Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Young, Iris. 2007. Global Challenges . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Young, Iris. 2011. Responsibility for Justice . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ypi, Lea, Robert Goodin, and Christian Barry. 2009. ‘Associative Duties, Global

Justice, and the Colonies.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs , 37 (2), 103–35.

Zürn, Michael. 1998. Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates [ Governing Beyond the

Nation-State ]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Zürn, Michael. 2011. ‘Vier Modelle einer globalen Ordnung in kosmopolitischer

Absicht’ [Four Models of Global Order with a Cosmopolitan Intent]. Politische

Vierteljahresschrift , 52 (1), 78–118.

10.1057/9781137389930 - Global Justice and Development, Julian Culp

Kommunitarismus

Chapter

Jun 2023

Global justice must be seen to be done—A defense of integrated pluralism

Article

Mar 2024

Julian Culp

Over the past two decades the academic literature on global distributive justice has generated a proliferation of positions regarding the question of how to conceive a globally just distribution of goods. One important development within this global justice debate is the emergence and increasing influence of several Pluralist theorists of global justice—including, perhaps most prominently, Fraser, R. Miller, and Risse. This article argues that Pluralists have not yet sufficiently engaged with the difficulty of how their conceptions of global justice could satisfy the publicity condition. This condition requires that the demands of justice must be publicly known to be recognized and fulfilled. This article explains why meeting this condition is especially difficult for the Pluralists. Then, it outlines an Integrated Pluralist position which, by placing special emphasis on global background justice, can meet the publicity condition. This position “integrates” concerns of justice emerging from a plurality of sites of justice. Thereby it follows “Integrationist” approaches to global justice—like those of Caney and Walton—which claim that the contents of justice of a given site of justice must not be determined in isolation from contents of other sites of justice.

Morally philosophizing the indefensible or politically theorizing the disagreeable?

Article

Sep 2024

Julian Culp

THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY OF INTERNATIONALISM

Article

May 2024

Julian Culp

This essay revisits the metanormative version of the motivational critique of contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitan justice. I distinguish two ways of understanding this critique as leveling the charge of infeasibility against cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan motivation can be understood to be infeasible because it is impossible or because it is not reasonably likely to be achieved if tried. The possibilistic understanding is not persuasive, given that examples show that cosmopolitan motivation is possible. The conditional probabilistic understanding is more compelling, by contrast, because under certain social conditions it may not be reasonably likely that cosmopolitan motivation is achieved if tried. I argue, however, that whether cosmopolitan motivation is infeasible in the conditional probabilistic sense depends on malleable social conditions, given that, according to a plastic account of the human moral mind developed by Allen Buchanan, social conditions can undermine or favor the formation of cosmopolitan motivation. I illustrate this plastic account by showing how it can explain recent anticosmopolitan orientations as “tribalistic” reflexes to global crises, like the COVID-19 pandemic, which involved competition for survival resources and (existential) threats. I conclude that cosmopolitan motivation is not infeasible under all social conditions and that cosmopolitanism therefore requires bringing about and maintaining those social conditions under which cosmopolitan motivation is feasible.

Mining the past: The case for historical narratives in global justice theorizing

Article

Nov 2023

Huw L. Williams

Debates on global justice, it is claimed, can be enriched in important ways by more explicitly historicizing our approach and using historical narratives, stories and debates to expand our conceptual vocabulary and theoretical purview. The claim is illustrated through a specific analysis of Paul Robeson’s relationship with the Welsh Miners. It is argued such a historical turn, grounded in a wider interdisciplinary engagement with subjects such as cultural studies may see at least three key benefits accrue in terms of our understanding of the field. Firstly, it can uncover philosophical and theoretical ideas and alternatives so far unconsidered; secondly, it can generate a shift in the empirical frame that accounts for and seeks to identify means for “real world” political change; lastly, it should encourage us to question the in/out dichotomy at the heart of the western debate, which projects global injustice as being “out there.”

Poverty

Chapter

Jun 2021

Julian Culp

Poverty is generally perceived as a moral problem that needs to be resolved. Philosophical discussions of poverty concern the conceptualization of poverty, its particular nature as a moral problem, and the reasons for ascribing moral responsibility to alleviate poverty. Some philosophers are critical of exclusively income‐based understandings of poverty and suggest instead that poverty consists of a lack of particular opportunities such as being able to be well nourished. Yet even if philosophers agree on how to conceive poverty, they may nevertheless disagree whether the moral problem that poverty constitutes is a distributive injustice or simply a humanitarian concern. In addition, philosophers also offer various justifications of the moral responsibility to alleviate poverty. While some highlight the mere capacity to alleviate poverty, others emphasize the contribution to or the benefit from poverty. These philosophical inquiries are closely related to, and need to be informed by, social‐scientific research on poverty – especially research regarding the causes of poverty, the effects of poverty, and the solutions to poverty.

Demokratie

Chapter

Jun 2023

Julian Culp

Thomas Pogge

Chapter

Jun 2023

Julian Culp

The case against alternative currencies

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2021

Louis Larue

Local Currencies, Local Exchange Trading Systems, and Time Banks are all part of a new social movement that aims to restrict money's purchasing power within a certain geographic area, or within a certain community. According to their proponents, these restrictions may contribute to building sustainable local economies, supporting local businesses and creating “warmer” social relations. This article inquires whether the overall enthusiasm that surrounds alternative currencies is justified. It argues that the potential benefits of these currencies are not sufficient to justify the restrictions they impose on money's purchasing power. Turning these currencies into effective channels of change, by increasing their scope and their strength, could severely hinder the pursuit of social justice, in a way that is probably not even necessary for achieving their objectives. The paper concludes that large-scale limitations of money's purchasing power are, therefore, undesirable.

Educação cidadã, consciência democrática e globalização

Article

Jun 2020

Julian Culp

O artigo começa com análises críticas de duas concepções amplamente empregadas de educação para a cidadania. Primeiro critica uma concepção exclusivamente doméstica de educação para a cidadania democrática como inadequada para preparar futuros cidadãos para as suas vidas em ambientes políticos e econômicos globalizados. Depois argumenta que a concepção da educação para a cidadania como formação da consciência global é funcionalista, enviesada pelo status quo e insuficientemente democrática. Com base nessas análises, o artigo passa a articular uma concepção de educação para a cidadania como conscientização democrática transnacional. Esta concepção sustenta que a educação para a cidadania deve contribuir para a formação da consciência democrática doméstica assim como transnacional. Pois, a menos que a educação para a cidadania contribua para a construção dessa consciência, como o artigo defende, não apenas os processos de tomada de decisão inter e transnacionais, mas também os domésticos, permanecerão democraticamente deficientes.