Available via license: CC BY 3.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
Giovanni Giorgini
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek
Poetry
Abstract: This essaycontends that the idea of respect for persons finds its roots
in the cultureand history of Archaic Greece. Isuggest that the idea of respect
retains an aristocratic flavor, even when the historic-political evolutions leading
to the creation of Greek democracy appear to setthe basisfor equalityoftreat-
ment before the law(isonomia). Iinitiallyexamine the notion of aidôs in Homer’s
poems, and suggest that this can be viewed as an embryonic form of self-respect
nurtured (or threatened)byexternal observers. Then, Iproceed to examine how
the idea of respect for persons in Solon betraysadherencetoaform of respect as
honor,i.e., one that is foundedonrecognition of status. Subsequently,Iexamine
some of Theognis’poems and show that equal recognition is premised on pos-
session of outstanding moral excellence. Finally, lack of excellence and capacity
for righteous behavior spark institutional responses such as the inflictionofati-
mia.
1Prelude
Every time the historian of ideas investigatesthe presenceand the meaningof
aconcept in acertain ageand in acertain society,hemust be aware of the meth-
odological requirements of the enterprise. As far as the current investigation is
concerned these entail issues which fall undertwo headings. Afirst cluster of
problems revolves around the differencebetween wordand concept.The concept
−the ‘fact’assumedinthe mind, issuing in adefinition −maybepresent in an
epoch or in asociety withoutthe corresponding word. John Milton, one of the
strongest advocates of religious toleration in the 17th century,never used the
word ‘toleration’in his writings: the wordwas not available to him while the con-
cept obviouslywas.Onthe other hand,the samewordmay acquiredifferent
meanings, and thereforerefer to different concepts, in different ages and societ-
ies: Aristotle’snotion of democracy(the rule of the poor to their sole advantage)
is very different from Schumpeter’s(the institutionalarrangement which enables
the people to make decisions for the common good) although the wordused by
them is the same. IsaiahBerlin’sand Hans Kelsen’sdisparagingjudgments on
‘Soviet democracy’reveal their outragefor the Communist use of the word,
which obviouslydid not correspond to what they thoughttobethe essence of
DOI 10.1515/9783110526288-003, ©2017 Jean-Claude Beacco, Hans-Jürgen Krumm et David
Little, published by De Gruyter.
This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs3.0 License.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
democracy. ‘Esprit de finesse’and context-sensitivity are thereforeall-important
to counter these problems and to arrive at correct results. Secondly, the historian
of ideas must be aware of, and alert to, the fact that the answers he findsdepend
on the questions he poses; he must thereforehaveaclear imageofthe object he
is looking for.Inthe present case, searchingfor the roots of respect in ancient
Greece, we must have aviable definition of ‘respect’as our guiding light.In
so doing,wemust avoid the mistake of projecting our own notion of ‘respect’
onto Greek society and civilization; we should, rather,inquire whether the
Greeks had the notion of ‘respect’and whether therewas awordtoidentify it;
i.e., we have to examine what they meant by ‘respect’,how they defined and
practiced it.Weshould interpret them as they interpreted themselves, aware
that it is culturethat molds the standards of behavior and even the emotions
of people in asociety.¹
2WhatIsRespect and Who Is Worthy of It?
Nowadays,whenwespeak of respect in morality and politics,wetypicallythink
of something we owe to each other simplyqua human beings. From Kant on-
wards,all the elaborate, analytical definitionsofrespect share the basic tenet
that,properlyspeaking,respect is due to every human being because each of
them is an absolutecenter of value. Thiselement of value is all-important in
this perspective because it is intrinsic, is part of the very essence of being
human. This marks adifferencefrom the view of the unity of mankind which
we find in ancient Greece, for instance in sophists likeHippias and Antiphon
and subsequentlyinthe Stoic philosophers. Realizing that “we all breathe out
into the air by the mouth and the nose”and eat with the hands (to quote Hip-
pias) and we are thereforekin by nature, does not mean that we are all valuable
persons; asserting that the “wise man”discovers a “familiarity”(oikeiôsis)with
other human beingsaround the world does not mean that we are morallyequal.²
The identification of acommon, physical human nature mayenable us to see be-
yond the difference between aristocratand commoner,orevenbetween Greek
and ‘barbarian’;but this does not immediatelytranslate into equal respect for
the above-mentioned categories, or for freeman and slave,friend and enemy, ka-
lokagathos and ponêros. The modern notion of ‘respect’entails moral equality,
On the methodological problems highlighted here, Iwish to refertothe Introduction to Gior-
gini 1993. On the differencebetween the emotions of the ancient Greeks and our own see Kon-
stan 2006.
See Hippias DK87B44.Cooper 2012,chapter 4.
42 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
not justphysical resemblance. My first stipulation is thus that in ancient Greek
culture ‘respect’(whateverwewill find this to mean)isnot duetoevery human
being per se but is contingent to merit and status: youdon’tdeserverespect be-
cause youare human but because youmerited it for your actions or for who you
are.³This, in my view,alreadymarks an enormous difference from the current
usageofthe concept and the Weltanschauung that underpins it.
In fact,what distinguishes the twonotionsofrespect is the completelydif-
ferent vision of human nature which lies at their foundation. Forthe modern,
Western liberal view of mankindconceiveshuman beingsasnaturallyequal
qua human beings, irrespective of their gender,status, religion and so on. We
onlyneed to look at two foundational documents of contemporary politics to
find exemplifications. In the very first line of the Preamble to the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights it is stated that “recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”;and article 1reads that
“all human beingsare born free and equal in dignityand rights”.Evenmore in-
teresting is perhaps the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949).
Herearticle 1reads: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar”–human dignity
is inviolable; and it adds: “To respect and protect it shallbethe duty of all State
authority”.There is onlyone “Menschlichkeit”,which is composed of individuals
equal in dignity.Not even the most daring ancient Greek thinker arrivedatsuch
aconclusion (and it is not that they lacked imagination); regardless of the fact
that alreadyinthe 5th century BCE the physicians of the Hippocratic school had
maintained that all human beingsshare acommon nature (physis), uniformlyre-
sponding to the samestimuli and drugs,which is the foundationofthe physi-
cian’sart.But sameness in bodilyfeatures never translatedinto equal dignity
and respect: Greek thinkers werealways convinced that human beingsare
born unequal in dignity and thereforedeserved unequaltreatment.Inaddition,
Greek political thoughtnever elaborated alanguageof‘rights’,legal or natural,
of citizens or human beingsinabstract.Finally, respect alsodependedonthe
relationship one had with ‘the other’:friends and enemies, for instance, de-
served different treatments.One of the basic maxims of ancient Greek ethics
was the injunction to “help friends and harm enemies”.⁴In one of his poems
Even arefined thinkerlikeAristotle believes that a ‘human being’properlyspeakingisnot just
anynew-born human but rather aman whohas realizedhis natural potentialities;inthis line of
reasoning women appear to be defective men and the ‘barbarians’areslave by nature. See Pol. I.
We onlyneed to look at Plato’sRepublic I. Polemarchus givesadefinitionofjusticewhich –he
believes –will be accepted by everybodyfor beingsotraditional, obvious and widespread: jus-
tice,givingeach person their due, means “helpingfriends and harmingenemies”(Rep. I, 332a–
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 43
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
Solon,one of the traditionalSeven Wise Men, asks the Muses to be sweet to his
friends and bitter to his enemies, that is to say “viewed with respect by the for-
mer and with dread by the latter”:hehopes and expects to be an object of re-
spect (aidoion)for his friends and of fear for his personal enemies, literally
the persons who hate him (echthrois).⁵The vital change –we mayconclude –
happened in the imageof‘the other’.
Next,wemay ask what is ‘respect’in ancient Greek cultureand who is wor-
thyofrespect (and who is not)? When we lookfor the Greek words which most
closelyapproximate the meaning of ‘respect’,the likeliest candidates are aidôs
and timê. Aidôs,which is usually translated as ‘respect’or ‘shame’,identifies
modesty and propriety in one’sattitude and due respect for gods and men. It
goes together with sôphrosynê,self-restraint or sound-mindedness, and it brings
just measure.⁶The latter makes man recognize the consequences of his actions
and thus represents the opposite of hybris,the arrogant refusal to remain within
one’s(human) limits. Aidôs brings restraint and is asocial virtue because it iden-
tifies the fear of disgracewhich comes from improper behavior.With reference
to Homer,James Redfield remarked: “Aidôs is the most pervasive ethical emotion
in Homeric society;itisbasicallyaresponsiveness to social situations and to the
judgmentsofothers”.⁷Also, “the feeling of aidôs,entailing concentration on the
self and one’sown status, is prompted by and focuses on consideration of the
status of the other”(Cairns 1993, p. 3); thus, “aidôs is inextricablytied to the re-
spect one can expectfor oneself”(Atwill 1998, p. 211). We experience aidôs when
we feel that acertain conduct or circumstancecould deprive us of our reputation
(doxa). We mayconclude that we act according to aidôs when we behave accord-
ing to the standards of our society in our interactions with men and gods: we
tribute them the respect they deserveaccordingtotheir status; and from other
men we expectthe same. Twoexamples are illuminating. In the Iliad 24 Apollo
upbraidsAchillesfor his behavior towardsHector after his defeat: he acted with
acruel heart, “like alion”,without pity or aidôs (44): aidôs distinguishes a
336a). We usuallyfail to recognize how revolutionary is Socrates’ethics,which commands that
the just person never harm anyone.
Solon fr.13, vv.5–6.
See Plato, Laws VI, 771e–772a: the just measureofaidôs in religious festivals is exemplified by
the sober modesty aperson shows when lookingatthe naked bodies of youngmen and girls.
Redfield 1994,p.115.Redfield adds that aidôs is “avulnerability to the expressed ideal norm
of the society”(p.116). He can thus conclude that “aidôs is in general an emotion provokedby
the perception of one’splaceinthe social structureand of the obligations which accompany
that place”;therefore “it is generallyfelt towards persons in the exerciseoftheir social roles
or when they areperceivedashavingasocial relation to oneself”(p.118).
44 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
human beingfrom an animal.⁸In his wrath Achilles did not paythe customary,
due respect to the bodyofhis adversary,who had always acted honorably. In
Herodotus, on the other hand,wefind the amusing and tellingstory of Gyges
and Candaules. Asked by his king Candaules to see the queen naked in order
to admire her beauty,Gyges replies “together with the dress awoman also
sheds her aidôs”–which is not her modesty or decencybut rather the respect
due to her as awoman (and aqueen).⁹Candaules, “doomed to misfortune”in
Herodotus’revealing comment (Hdt. I, 8, 2),acts against the social norms
which uphold the respectability of awoman while Gygesentreats his lordnot
to commit him to something lawless (anomon: Hdt. I, 8, 4).¹⁰
The other importantwordinthis semantic context is timê,honor,value, rev-
erence. Timê identifies both the value of aperson and his rank. Especiallyin
the plural, timai,itmay also indicate the ‘honors’,namelythe positions,offices,
that aman occupies in his city. Timê can be institutionalized in aregime (timok-
ratia)and the sameistrue for its opposite, atimia. Plato, who usesthe word tim-
okratia for the first time, described it literallyasthe regime in which the ruling
class is drivenbyloveofhonor.Itrepresentsthe first degeneration of the perfect
city (kallipolis): although its ruling classisnot drivenbyloveofknowledge any-
more, its object of desire is represented by moral, immaterial thingssuch as
honor and glory.AlreadyinAristotle however, timokratia designates more gen-
erallyaregime whereoffices are distributed accordingtovalue, namelyproperty.
And here we can make the first significant observation for our investigation.
When we explore the ideas and values of ancient Greek civilization, we realize
that we are dealing with an aristocratic society;namelyahierarchical society
whose values are molded by the nobles. Nietzsche alreadyobserved (with satis-
faction) that the Greek aristocrats described themselvesas“the good”(agathoi),
“the best”(aristoi), “the fortunate”(ghennaioi), “the prosperous”(esthloi); they
accordinglydescribed ‘the other’,the common people, as “the bad”(kakoi), “the
miserable”(deiloi), “the poor”(ponêroi).¹¹ Differenceofstatus entaileddifferent
Il. 24,39–55.Cf. Heller 1984,p.222. See also Od. 9, 265ff., where Polyphemus (a Cyclops who
does not know justiceorlaw –oute dikas oute themistas)isreproached by Odysseus for not fol-
lowingthe traditional laws of hospitality set by Zeus:Odysseus’party actedassuppliants but
Polyphemus did not heed their pledge and acted against the aidôs duetoxenioi (271).
Hdt. I, 8. See Plato’sversion in Rep. II; cf. Cicero, Off. III, 38 –39.
Indeed, Herodotusdisplays the entirearray of words appropriatetothe social conventions of
the case and takesfor grantedthat his readers know the complex associations between exposure
and aidôs: Candaules did not show any aidôs,restraint,inhis behavior and actedagainst the
social conventions,thus deprivingthe queen of her aidôs,respectability:feeling “shamed”
(aischyntheisa,aischynê), she recurs to nemesis,revenge: Hdt. I, 8–11.
F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (1887/2008), First Dissertation,chapters 2and 5.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 45
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
moral, social and economic characterization. Atypicalattitude of aristocrats all
over the world consists in considering themselves, the nobles, as equals, on the
same footing: agood contemporary example is English aristocracy,wherethe no-
bles are known as “the Peers”of England –they are “the Equals”par excel-
lence.¹² In the ancient world this is very well exemplified by the Spartan regime,
ruled by asmall group of aristocratic families who considered themselves
“peers”(homoioi), sharing the ideal of enjoying an exactlyequal lifestyle (iso-
diaitoi).¹³ Moreover,Greek aristocrats claimed to be such not onlyathome but
everywhere; they wanted to be respected and their timê to be recognizedevery-
wherefor fear of being enslavedafter an unsuccessful war.Aristotle mentions
this fact,alreadywith some skepticism, in his treatment of slavery,because
the Athenian democratic revolution had alreadychanged the perception of aris-
tocracy dramatically. The notion at stake here is thatofeugeneia,nobility,being
“well-born”,which goes together with being free(eleutheria): Aristotle observes
that the Greeks maintain that such notions exist “absolutely”(haplôs)intheir
case and “non-absolutely”in the caseofthe barbarians,which is tantamount
to identifying good with free and noble, and bad with slave and ignoble.¹⁴
The root of respect in Greek ethics and politics lies exactlyinthe aristocratic
recognition of the equal value of the fellow-aristocrat.Itisvery interesting to
note how the vicissitudes of aristocracy broughtabout an evolution and enlarge-
ment of this notion.Itispossibletoobserve at least twoimportant turning-points
in the history of ancientGreek aristocracy (and therefore of respect). The first oc-
curred in the 7th –6th century BCE when the rule of the most ancient nobility –the
Eupatrids –was challenged by aristocrats of morerecent date and by common-
ers of distinction (because of their wealth). The old aristocracy proved unable to
find asolution to social turmoiland most Greek cities assigned to asingle person
the task of pacifyingthe conflict and giving new laws (aisymnêtês, diallaktês,
nomothetês); in other cases, aman of the aristocracy himself grabbed sole
power,thus incurring the hatred of his peers (tyrannos). Theother,slower and
less dramatic turning-point occurred with the establishment of democratic re-
gimes, first in Athens (508 BCE) and then in other Greek cities. The ideological
foundation of democracy was the equality of all citizens before the law(isono-
This is valid for aristocracy consideredasastand or aclass,inan“Us and Them”opposi-
tion. There areobviously differencesofrank inside aristocracy,and therehavealwaysbeen. On
the other hand, it is as Peers that the baronsatRunnymede obtained the Magna Charta from
kingJohn, granting to every Freeman “the lawful judgment of his Peers”(1215).
See Thucydides I, 65 and Cartledge 2009,pp. 9 –10.
Aristotle, Pol. 1, 6. 1255a33–36.
46 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
mia),¹⁵notwithstanding the permanence of differences in status and wealth. Iam
inclined to think that the notion of isonomia too originatedinanaristocratic con-
text.¹⁶Itsfirst occurrence, the adjective isonomikos,isinaconvivial song com-
posed around the year 511 BCE to celebrate the “tyrant-slayers”,Harmodius
and Aristogeiton who had killed Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant Hippias,
and were celebrated in songssung by aristocrats in their banquets.¹⁷It is this
idea of equalityamong peers that Cleisthenesappropriated in an operation
well caught by Herodotus: Cleisthenes, “findinghimself in aweak position (es-
somenos), associated the people to his aristocratic faction”.The expression “ton
demon prosetairizetai”renders perfectlythis idea since the hetaireiai werearis-
tocratic clubs;itwas so peculiar, however,that when Aristotle, evidentlyusing
Herodotus as asource, recounts the story,hechanges the verb and explains:
“Cleistheneshaving been worsted by the comradeships enlisted the people on
his side”(AP 20). Democracy appropriated the aristocratic vision of equality
among peers and gave rise to anew ideologyofequality (isotês)which envi-
sioned all citizensasequal in dignity and alsoasequallynoble,inaway.¹⁸In
this new vision, respect was due to each citizenfor his being an Athenian citizen
and not for belongingtoanoble family. The foundation of respect changed dra-
matically, for it now layinpublic recognition and not in privatepossession.¹⁹
Foranoverview of the issues connected to this concept and acomparison with eunomia see
Lombardini 2013.
This idea is debated. Foraclassic statement of the twooppositepositions see Ehrenberg
1958;Vlastos 1953. Forarecent sensible evaluation see Ober 1996.
On this event see Thucydides’insistenceinsettingthe recordstraight: I, 20 and VI, 56 –59;
cf. Meyer 2008.
Iamreferringtothe oft-repeateddiscourse of the collective ‘nobility’of the Athenian people
that we find in our literary sourcesofthe 5th and 4th century BCE. The Athenian demos claims
collective nobility because of its “autochthony”–the fact that they have livedfor centuries
on the same land. They thus claim commonold ancestry,just like the nobles do individually.
See for instanceThucydides I, 2, wherethis is stated as afact,and II, 36 whereitisafeature
of Pericles’eulogy of Athens.Itisinteresting to note that isotimia,equality of consideration
and respect,isnot certainlyattested in Greek beforethe 3rd century BCE.
This change is very well caught by Josh Ober, TheAthenian Revolution,who remarks that the
distinction between citizen dignity and personal honour shows the pragmatic consequences of
democracy at Athens;for citizen dignity was protected by the ongoingand collective actions of
the demos whereas honour was an affair of individuals or of families:Ober 1996,p.87. Ober con-
cludes that the eliteindividual’smost precious possession was his honour;the most precious
possession of the ordinary Athenian was the dignity he enjoyed as acitizen. On Cleisthenes’re-
forms,their consequences and legacy see the classic Leveque and Vidal-Naquet 1996;also the
importantcontribution of Raaflaub, Ober and Wallace2007.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 47
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
We mayadd that it is onlyinthe context of Athenian democracythat ability
and competence in acertain field acquire dignityand prestige:the arts, technai,
are conceivedasself-contained and completeforms of knowledge.²⁰Thisnew
status of the technitês,the person who has knowledge of an art,marks an enor-
mous changeinthe notion of respect.Against the old aristocratic view thatlin-
eageguaranteed the judgment,discernment(gnômê)ofthe well-born person,
we now find that art(technê)and virtue (aretê)can be taught and acquired: it
is exactlyonthis terrain that the confrontation between Socrates and Protagoras
will takeplace.²¹ Against Socrates’view of politics basedonthe analogywith the
arts (onlythe specialist,who possesses political science, is entitled to rule) Pro-
tagoras maintains the political equalityofmankind, basedonthe common pos-
session of the twofundamental political virtues: respect (aidôs)and justice
(dikê), which epitomize political science and the art of politics. This political
equalitymakes democracy not onlythe best but also the most natural form of
government for mankind.
Forthe scope of this essayitisworthwhile focusing on the first turning-point
in the history of Greek aristocracy and the correspondingnotion of respect.The
figure thatimmediatelystands out for his undisputed significanceisthe Atheni-
an poet and statesman Solon.
3Solon
Solon (c. 648 –c. 560) livedinatime of great social turmoil.²² Athens was
plagued by aconflict of factions and faced an economic problem of the utmost
gravity which had become also apolitical issue: manyAthenian citizens, share-
croppers and small landowners, who had not been able to repaytheir debts,
had become atimoi (which meant ‘disenfranchised’at this stage) and had
been reduced to slavery and even sold abroad. In one of his poems, Solon re-
marks that manyofthese people weresold out of Attika dikaios,namely “legal-
The arts are many: mantikê, iatrikê, nautikê, mousikê and so on. In the 5th century BCE these
arts become the subject of special treatises.
See the ‘Great Speech’in Plato, Prot. 320c–328d.
The Athenians kept the list of archons fromthe year 594/3BCE, when Solon was elected:
asignofthe turning-point his reforms represented (Plato, Hipp.Ma. 285e). See Develin 1989.
On Solon see the valuable recent work by Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010.Onthe significanceofSolon’s
political action see Ober 1989;Balot 2006,pp. 41–47.Interesting observations can be found in
Owens 2010.
48 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
ly”or “rightly”,according to the laws of the land.²³ The old aristocrats, the Eu-
patrids(“the descendants of good fathers”), proved to be unable to find asolu-
tion within their circle and through the ordinary institutions of the polis. Plu-
tarch informs us that Solonwas thus elected archon with the task of pacifying
the conflict between the factions (diallaktes)and of giving new laws to the
city (nomothetês).²⁴The fact thathewas accepted both by the rich and by the
poor testifies to his being not too involved in the factional strife as well as to
his personal qualities: his reputation recommended him as umpire in the con-
flict.Solon enacted anumber of very significant measures:his first reform,
called seisachtheia or the “shaking-off of burdens”,consisted in the cancellation
of all existing debts and the legal abolition of slavery caused by debts for the fu-
ture; it alsoincluded an amnesty for the rehabilitation of the atimoi.²⁵We must
here remark that behind Solon’sprovision there is an innovative imageofthe
citizen and his timê: no man can use his bodyasapawn for an economic trans-
action;and nobodycan be deprivedofhis timê and made atimos for economic
reasons.Inthis context,the curious provision (actuallyalaw) cited by Aristotle
and Plutarch to make atimos the citizenwho did not take side during acivil strife
(stasis)makes more sense; behind it there is ahighconsideration of politics:
those who don’tfeel attachment to anysidehavenointerest in politics and
the common good, and therefore don’tdeserve to have political rights; they do
not belong to the polis.²⁶
Although Ibelieveweshould credit Solon with anew and revolutionary an-
thropologicalview,there is no idea of equal dignity or respect in his works. So-
lon’spolicy was informed by an ideal of moderation of Delphic ascendancy,in-
spired by the Delphic motto “nothing to excess”(mêden agan). The notion of
dikê,justice, features prominentlyinhis thought and in his poems. It is dikê
that commands self restraint to all parties in the city and fairness in the alloca-
tion of officesand economic resources.Itistobenoted that for Solonfairness
meant thatunequal people receive different treatment,but in aharmonious po-
litical arrangement. In one of his poems, Solon attributes to himself the merit of
Solon fr.36. See Valdes-Guia 2007.
Plutarch, Life of Solon 14,2.
Plutarch, Life of Solon 19.
Aristotle, AP 9, 5. Aristotle comments that Solon’stargetwerethose citizens who, “through
slackness,were content to let things slide (to automaton)”:things do not happen ‘automatically’
in politics,active participation of the citizens is required. Cf. Plutarch, Life of Solon 20; De sera
numinis vindicta 4. As Plutarchremarks, Solon probablywanted to ensurethat no citizen be in-
sensible or indifferent to the commongood (to koinon). On the significanceofthis lawsee Ka-
lyvas2014.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 49
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
giving to the dêmos exactlythe honor and esteem, the recognition (timê)itde-
served, neither more nor less:
Igavethe common folk such recognition (timês)asissufficient for them, neither adding
nor takingaway. And as for those whohad powerand were envied for their wealth,
Isaw to it that they tooshould suffer no indignity.²⁷
Solon praises himself for restraining the dêmos while at the same time keeping
at bay “the greater and stronger”.And in another poem, fr.4(the so-called “Eu-
nomia”), Solon blames “the leaders of the people”for being unjust.Aristotle
comments that Solon thus showed how the massesshould be treated, without
giving them too much freedom or oppressingthem.²⁸We mayadd that Solon
had aclear view of the unequalstatus of Athenian citizens, which asked for a
proportional recognition. An anecdotecited by Plutarch is very telling. Soon
after his election, Solon was hailed both by the rich and the poor,for previously
he had stated something to the effect that “equality (to ison)breeds no war”;the
rich expected this equalitytobebasedon“worth and excellence”(axia kai
aretê), the poor on “measure and count”.²⁹
In his political measuresSolon revealed himself to be closer to the aristocrat-
ic visionof‘equality’.Infact,inorder to pacify the civilstrife, Solonenacted a
constitutional reform which shows his moderation as well as his aristocratic be-
lief in the unequaldignityofcitizens. Itsmost interesting feature for our purpos-
es is the division of the citizenry in four classes based on their different timê;this
was identified by the wealth of the citizenscalculated accordingtothe number
of bushels (medimnai)ofwheat that their properties could produce yearly. It is
immediatelyevident thatbehind this reform therealso layanideological as-
sumption: timê is not amatter of blood and ancestry but rather of capacity
and wealth; the formerpairobviouslycould not be acquired whereas the latter
could. The rigid criterion of birth ceases to be the discriminating factor for polit-
ical participation; instead it is the law(nomos)that establishes the timocratic ar-
rangement of society,based on different timê. We should note, however,that
Solon was convincedthat wealth had to be acquired without exploiting other
people and withoutgreed and not to an excess: excess breeds hybris and de-
stroysvirtue. Wealthshould not thereforebeimmediatelyidentifiedwith status:
Solon fr.5.
Aristotle, AP 12. Incidentally, the fact that Aristotle quotes so manySolonian poems in his
little work on the Athenian constitution shows that he attributed ahighhistorical value to
them. This was noted by Linforth 1919,p.182.
Plutarch, Life of Solon 14,2.
50 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
“Manybad men are rich and many good men poor; but we will not take their
wealth in exchangefor virtue since this is always secure, while wealth belongs
now to one man, now to another”(fr.15). Interestingly enough,this poem
made its wayalso into the Theognidea,surelyonaccount of its gnomic value.
Solon’sreforms destroyed the Eupatrids’monopolyonAthenian politics and
consequentlytheir claim to the sole possession of gnômê,political judgment.
This fact brought to asudden end the old aristocracy’sview that political capaci-
ty was inherited and opened the door to the new ideal of civiceducation: its
highestinstantiation (and idealization) was the Athenian citizen depicted by
PericlesinThucydides’Funeral Oration.³⁰We maysafelystate thatSolon’sre-
forms werenot democratic, but they pavedthe waytodemocracy and to its
novel vision of citizen equality, isonomia (which entailed equal access to public
speech, isêgoria,and the possibility to speak up one’smind, parrhêsia). Solon
called his view of the perfect political arrangement eunomia,“good order”,be-
cause in it the ‘good’and the ‘bad’,namelythe aristocrats and the commoners,
livedharmoniouslytogether: we should notice, however,that thereare no good
or bad citizens according to the democratic ideologyofisonomia,but only
equals, isoi. It is the samesentiment that informs another poem:
Iwrote laws for the good and the bad alike, providingstraightforward justice(dikê)for each
person.³¹
Here, it is the importance of the laws, which guarantee justice to all citizens re-
gardless of their differences,thatisexalted. Again, in another poem Solon prides
himself to have denied isomoiria –an equal share of the fatherland –to the no-
bles and the commoners.Inhis words,
[I]t givesmenopleasuretoact with the violenceoftyrannyortosharethe country’srich
land equallybetween the good and the bad.³²
Isomoiria,redistribution of land on an equal basis, was adrastic demagogic
measure which receivedvery strongpopularsupport but alsohad unforeseeable
destabilizing consequences. It was stronglyassociated with the extraordinary ac-
tion of atyrant.Solon thought that the principle of property should be defended,
Thucydides II, 35–46.
Solon fr.36, vv.18–20.
Solon fr.34=Aristotle, AP 12, 3. On this fragmentsee Rosivach1992. Solon, however,was
consideredthe father of the Athenian democratic constitution alreadyinthe late 5th century
BCE; also the moderatepolitical ideal of the patrios politeia vaguelyrefers to an imagined ‘Solo-
nian democracy’.
The Notion of Respect in AncientGreek Poetry 51
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
not because it favored the noble but because it furnished an ethical and social
foundation for community life. Once shattered, property was open to the prevail-
ing faction of the moment.Itisinthis context thatwemay examine Solon’suse
of the word aidôs. Forherejects the mockery and accusations of thosecitizens
who thought he had been unwise not to try to exploit the situation to become
sole ruler of Athens:
If Ispared my country,and did not defile and disfigure my fame by undertakingtyranny
and brutal violence, Ifeel no shame (aideumai); for in this wayIthink Ishall excelover
all men.³³
Solon is convinced that tyrannyand violence never bring glory;and the honor
that is attachedtopower comes onlyfrom positions acquired honorablyand
not basely, and exercised for the common good and not for one’sown profit.
The lureofabsolutepower must have been very strong in most Athenian citizens
since Solon feels compelled to ironicallygivevoice to one of them:
Solon is not deep-thinkingnor sage,for godoffered him agreat good and he declined it.
[…]Now had Ithe power, Iwould have been onlytoo glad to be flayedfor awineskin and
my posterity wiped out,ifonlyImight first have abundant wealth and be the tyrant of Ath-
ens for just one day.³⁴
It appears evident that in his poems Solon retainedthe aristocratic language
which associated moralgoodness to political status, thus disclosing his aristo-
cratic leanings. In his vision of good order,harmonyexists because the laws fair-
ly regulate the relation between rich and poor,aristocrats and commoners.These
are conceivedbySolon as people of unequal value and therefore deserving the
appropriate proportional honor and respect.However,weshould not blame
Solon for not anticipating the future and not being ademocrat.This is afutile
exercise, for statesmen necessarilyhavetotakeinto account the situation at
hand: they think of the present circumstances and of the foreseeable consequen-
ces of their actions in the near future. The distant future is in the hands of
chance because the resultofhuman actions consists in their encounter with
the singular,specific circumstances of the case. On the contrary,weshould ob-
serveagain Solon’sinnovative political vision, which emphasized the dignity
that every citizen had simplyasacitizen and the prerogativesthat citizenstatus
gave to everyone.
Solon fr.32.
Solon fr.33.
52 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
4Theognisand the Theognidea
The Theognidea,the collection of poems that has come down to us under the
name of Theognis,contains material from different authors and from aperiod
of time comprised between the late7
th and the early5
th century BCE.³⁵T.J. Figueira
neatlysummarizes the question thus: “Theognis was the poetic persona as-
sumed by anumber of Megarian poets active from the late seventh or early
sixth century down to the early470s”.³⁶Theognis himself was acitizen of Mega-
ra,onthe isthmus between Attica and the Peloponnese;³⁷his floruit according to
Suda is in the 59th Olympiad, namely 544–541. The background of his political
and poetical activity was the harsh civil strife, stasis,inMegarawhich paved
the waytothe tyrannyofTheagenes.³⁸The poemswerecomposed to be sung
at aristocratic parties, the symposia,wheredrinking and flute-playing wereac-
companied by the readingofsuch poetry.The purpose of this kind of composi-
tions was thus moraland political –to assert certain values and infuse them into
the young.The gnomic appearance of manyofhis poems made them suitable to
be included in collection of epigrams for the instructionofthe young,although
this was not their original purpose; as Douglas Cairns correctlyremarked in his
analysis of aidôs in Theognis: “Certainly, all the passages which we shallconsid-
er emerge in aclearerlight when seen against that background; several of the
passages in which our terms occur deal directlywith behaviour at the symposi-
um.”³⁹Indeed, in the materials that compose the Theognidea we still find ‘snap-
shots’of manyancient banquets. These collections of epigrams wereamong the
primary means of transmission of the elite values from one generation to the
Foranintroduction to Theognis and his context see Figueiraand Nagy 1985.
T.J. Figueira 1995,p.42. Here Figueira also remarkshow “Theognidean poetry was particu-
larlyfavoredbylate5
th-and early4
th-century Athenian opponentsofimperial democracy”,which
mayexplain the selection for preservation of poems most evocative of social tensions and civil
war.
Not in Sicily, as wrongly reportedbySuda II, 692.13 Adler and confirmed by Plato, Laws
I, 630a.
Forthe ancient sourcesonMegara see Aristotle, Pol.4,15.1300a17; 5, 3.1302b30;5,5.1304b35;
add “5, 5. 1305a24. Plutarch, Quaestiones Graecae 18;onthe tyrant Theagenes see Thucydides
I, 126.
Cairns 1993, p. 168. E. Irwin, Solon and Early Greek Poetry (2005) remarks: “when performed
in the aristocratic symposium martial exhortation poetry represents atype of heroic self-fashion-
ing,anattempt to claim for its singers astatus within awider community equivalent to that of
epic heroes”(p.62).Irwin also correctlystresses the ‘international’circulation of these poems.
The Notion of Respect in AncientGreek Poetry 53
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
other.⁴⁰ Honor featured prominentlyinthem, sometimes in avery clear and basic
way: for instance, “Honor the gods, respect your parents”are typicalprecepts in
collections of dicta down to the Romantimes (Morgan 2007).
Theognis’poems werecomposed at atime when aristocratic privileges were
challenged by the new rich who claimed more participation in power;this re-
quest caused social turmoil and civil strifeand the tone of his poems reflectspar-
tisan affiliation as well as nostalgia for ‘the old ways’.Theognis’verses transmit
this sense of epoch-change, the disappearance of the old aristocratic order and
system of values superseded by a ‘materialistic’culturewhich places wealth at
the topofvalues.We can still subscribe to Werner Jaeger’sjudgment: “Their [Pin-
dar’sand Theognis’]poetry did not commence arenaissance of the aristocracy in
political and social life; still, it eternalized the aristocratic ideal at the moment
when it was most gravelyendangered by new forces […]”(Jaeger 1939 –1945:
I, p. 186). Theognis declares,for instance, “Iwill order my homeland, ashining
city,neither turning it over to the populace (dêmos)nor giving it to unjust men”
(I, 947–948). To the poets’aristocratic eyethese nouveaux riches could not ap-
pear but to be interlopers and, as aconsequence, one of Theognis’constant mes-
sages to his audience is that wealth and kalokagathia do not go together any-
more. By this wordTheognis means both moral quality and political status, in
the typical aristocratic coupling of beauty and virtue. He remarks that virtue
and beauty are possessed by few human beings. These people will not be
harmed by anyone either in honor (aidous)orinright (I, 933 –938). We can con-
cur with Ernest Harrison’sobservation that the poet “Tyrtaeus makes respect the
rewardofvalour: Theognis makes it the homagepaid to him who combines ex-
cellencewith beauty”(Harrison 1902, p. 103).
Theognis dedicates his poems to ayoung aristocrat,Cyrnus, so that he can
learn from them the sound aristocratic values in an ageofchange; for social and
political changebringsabout upheaval in moral values. The ideals and values of
the old aristocracy mean nothing to the new powerful people who now rule the
city.This fact is alsoreflected in language, for the old aristoi are not “the best”
anymoreand the bewilderedpoet has to face this ‘revolution’in the use of
words:
Cyrnus,this city is still acity,but the people aredifferent,people whoformerlyknew nei-
ther justicenor laws,but wore tatteredgoatskins about their sides and livedoutside this
Plato, Laws VII, 811a, alreadytestifies to the existenceofsuch collections.The fact that The-
ognis himself felt the need to placea‘seal’on his poems shows that verses fromdifferent sour-
ceswere freelyquoted and put together in these compilations.This is confirmed by the presence
of other poets’verses in the Theognidea,includingMimnermus,Solon and Tyrteus.
54 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
city likedeer.And now they are good (agathoi), Polypaides,while those who wereprosper-
ous (esthloi)beforeare now miserable (deiloi). Who can endure the sight of this?They de-
ceiveone another and mock one another,knowingneither the distinctive marks of the bad
nor of the good. (I, 53 –60;cf. I, 1109–14)
Theognis displays in afew lines the moral vocabulary of the old aristocracy and
its impasse before the new power arrangement.Before, being well-born meant
also being deservedlywealthy,⁴¹morallygood and politicallysuited to rule: dis-
cernment (gnômê)inpolitics was believed to be aprerogative of the noble.In-
deed, as Theognis states, “discernment (gnômê)and respect (aidôs)are appropri-
ate to good men”.⁴²Politicalchangehas shattered this simple equation: now
“the good”are not powerful anymore. To remark the ferocity of the new power-
ful, Theognis complains that the new citizens are “men who formerlyknew nei-
ther dikas nor nomous”(I, 54;cf. I, 1135 –50). Thesentenceeasilyreminded his
listeners and readers of Homer’scharacterization of Polyphemus and the Cy-
clops, who have no understandingorrespect of dikai or themistes (Od. IX, 215).
The disappearance of an entire world of values is lamented also in another line:
Order (kosmos)disappeared and no longer is thereanequal distribution (isos dasmos)⁴³in
the common interest (I, 677–678).
Bewilderment is the poet’sresponse to such spectacle:
Manyindeed have worthless brains but enjoy good fortune, and for them apparent failure
turns into success.And there arethose wholabour wiselybut suffer bad luck, and their
efforts accomplish nothing.⁴⁴
The onlysolution to this state of thingsseems to be pointing to God and fateas
being responsible of man’scondition: God dispensesgood and bad fortune as he
wishesand human beingsmust enduretheir lot.⁴⁵ But here again lies adifficul-
ty;for the aristocrats claimedtohaveacertain vicinity to God, to be in aprefer-
ential relationship; and this obviouslydoes not applyanymore. The Gods have
See I, 525 –526: “ it seems appropriatethat the good have riches and it is proper to abad man
to suffer poverty”.
I, 635. At I, 895 –896,wereadthat the most precious possession for aman is discernment
whereas lack of discernment (agnômosynê)isthe most bitter.AtI,1171–72,Theognis states
that gnôme is the best thingthe gods give to mortal men, because “discernment has the ends
of everything”.
On the political overtones of this expression see Cerri 1969.
I, 161–164;cf. 865 –866”:God givessplendid prosperity to manyworthless men.
See for instanceI,441–446;591–592; 1162A–F.
The Notion of Respect in AncientGreek Poetry 55
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
abandoned them, to the point thatthe poet wonders who will trust the Gods see-
ing that the unjust man flourishes and the just is “worn out and consumed by
grievous poverty”(I, 752). Theognis hints to an additional problem: since mate-
rial fortune depends on the will of the Godsand is changeable, appraisal of a
person should go beyond it.But this is not the custom of the day. Lionel Pearson
commented that “Theognis says that aretê is not worth winning at the price of
injustice, and thatdistinctionand success deservenorespect if they are the re-
sult of chance”(Pearson 1962, p. 77). Aretê in the old ethics has the connotation
of distinction and success; it will later be identified with true human excellence.
Aretê is a telos,anend, and thereforethe Socratic question whether it can be
taught makes no sense until it becomes ameans. Onlythe means can be taught.
Aretêbecomes aquality of mind and character,amode of behavior.What,then,
deserves respect?Theognis’answer is: justice, dikaiosynê (I, 147), which contains
the sum of all virtue.
The samefeeling of bewilderment prompts the poet to lament that “Hope is
the onlygood godyet left among mankind; the rest have forsaken us and gone to
Olympus.”Honesty,self-restraint,piety,justice have all left the earth (I, 1135 –
50). It follows that in such asituation of upheaval and unrest it is difficult to dis-
cern what is good and what is bad, who the trustworthypeople are and who
should not be consorted with. HenceTheognis advice to his protégé:
Be sensible and do not,atthe cost of shameful or unjust acts,seize for yourself prestige,
success or wealth. Know that this is so and do not seek the companyofbase men, but al-
ways clingtothe good. […]For fromthe noble youwill learn noble things,but if youmingle
with the base, youwill lose even the sense youhave. Knowingthis, consort with the good,
and one dayyou will saythat Igivegood advicetomyfriends.(I, 29 –38;cf. 69 –72;465 –
466)
Theognis foresees thatsocial changeand political turmoilwillcorrupt the city
and will pave the wayto“acorrector of our evil insolence”(hybrios: I, 39 –
40), himself an “insolent(hybristên)man, aleader of grievous strife”(I, 1081–
82): atyrant.⁴⁶ The man thatelsewhereisdescribed as “the tyrant who devours
the people (dêmophagontyrannon)”(I, 1180 –82); such aman can be put down
without causing anyrevengefrom the gods and will go below ground not
mourned by the poet (I, 1203 –06). In such changingcircumstances,the art of
deception will provetobeoffundamental importance: Cyrnus must keep an ap-
parentlycheerful attitude and be friendlytoeverybodywhile in fact trusting no-
Social unrest and civil strife arethe typical background for the appearance of atyrant on the
political scene. On this theme see Giorgini 1993.
56 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
body. Forthe new elite has no idea of truth or of honor and respect and therefore
cannot be trusted. Indeed, the poet admonishes, “Yo umay wander around the
entire world and you’ll find people to fit barelyinone boat who have respect
(aidôs)ontheir tongues and on their eyes”(I, 83 –86).
The new value, the new driving forceinsocial relations is wealth:⁴⁷ “Wealth
mixes stock”because aristocratic men or women prefer to marry someone rich
rather than good; or sometimes are forced to do so by necessity (anagkê:
I, 195). Indeed, We alth is “the fairest and most desirable of all the gods”,because
with it “aman becomes good even if he is bad”(I, 1117–18) –where ‘good’and
‘bad’do not have moral connotations but rather are indicative of status. This sit-
uation bringsabout acompletereversal of values. Theognis lamentsthat:
Now whatthe noble consider vicesare deemed virtues by the base, who rule with devious⁴⁸
laws; for all sense of respect (aidôs)died, and shamelessness and pride (hybris), having
overcome justice, prevail in all the land (I, 289–292).
We maycomparethese verses with I, 647–648, wherethe poet reiterates that “all
sense of respect died among men, while shamelessness roams the earth”.
The reversal of values accompanies the reversal of fortune of people: the citi-
zens who once werewealthyare now impoverished and unable to accomplish
anything in line with theirintrinsic excellenceand distinction (aretê). Forpover-
ty casts meninasituation of powerlessness and perplexity,acondition sum-
marized by the word amêchaniê.⁴⁹ In asad genealogy “poverty is the mother
of perplexity”(I, 384–385); which, in turn,confuses aman’smind and prompts
him to commit base actions. Apoor man cannot shine morallynor excel politi-
cally: “Forineffect aman overwhelmed by poverty is powerless to sayoraccom-
plish anything and his tongue is bound fast”(I, 177–178). In addition, when
someone findshimself in such acondition of powerlessness and perplexity he
will discover that he has few true friends and comrades: everybodyprefers to
stayawayfrom people saddledwith poverty,powerlessness and perplexity.⁵⁰
In this context Solon’sadmonition is repeated:
I, 699 –700. The conclusion of the poem is trenchant: “Forall people wealth has the greatest
power”(I, 718).
Ektrapelos: an unusual adjective,literally “turningawayfromthe common way”.
See for instanceI,619 –620: “ Often Itoss about amid perplexities, distressed at heart,for we
have not surmounted the crest of the wave of poverty”.
I, 645–646;cf. 1075 –78.Perplexity and poverty are coupled also at I, 1114.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 57
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
Manybad men arerich, and manygood men poor;but we will not taketheir wealthinex-
change for virtue, sincethis is always securewhile wealthbelongs now to one man, now to
another (I, 315–318).
Discernment (gnômê: I, 319), on the contrary, like virtue, is always secure. And
onlythe good men, the noble, possess it and thereforeknow how to observe
due measure (metron)inevery matter (I, 614). This statement goes together
with the admonition to “Be not over-eager (mêden agan)inany matter; due
measure (kairos)isbestinall human works”(I, 401).
In this universe of values it is evident that respect is due onlytopeers, to
those one can call friends and comrades (hetairoi: I, 399 –400). Theognis ad-
monishesthus Cyrnus and his audience in general:
Respect (aideisthai)your friends and shun oaths that bringruin to men carefully, avoiding
the wrath of the Immortals.
And he adds:
Youwill not leave your sons abetter treasure, Cyrnus,than the respect (aidous)which ac-
companies the good men (agathois: I, 409–410).
In this context of aristocratic values, whererespect is duetoanoble bothfor his
rank and for his moralvalue, Theognis laments that he has not been appropri-
atelyhonored by his lover and protégéCyrnus. With beautiful imagery Theognis
complains that although by celebrating Cyrnus he gave him wingstofly over
human affairs and go down in history,hereceivedinexchange “scant respect”
(aidous: I, 253). Indeed, Cyrnus tried to deceive the poet as if he were “alittle
child”.Theognis concludes thus his complaint at Cyrnus:
Boy,you paid back abad exchange for kindness.Nothanks from youfor favours.You’ve
never givenmepleasure. And though I’ve often been kind to you, Inever wonyour respect
(aidous).⁵¹
We should, however,note that these complaints rather refertothe convivial
setting of the poems and to privatelovematters. Asubject on which Theognis
feels readytogivecounsel, be it the proper behavior with aboy-lover or the
right measure in wine consuming. We thus read thatadrunken person loses con-
trol over his mind and his tongueand has no shameinhis actions(I, 475 –476).
Or,revealing atypicalconvivial attitude, the statement to the extent that “What
I, 1263 –66.See Hubbard2003.
58 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
worth is to me wealth and respect (aidôs)? Gaiety and good cheer together sur-
pass all things”(I, 1066 –68).
5The Institutionalization of Respect:
timê andatimia
Political institutions and social norms embodythe ideology, namely the set of
consistent beliefs, of apolitical entity.They reflect the values upon which a
community is built.Wecan thereforeshedmorelight on our object of study
by examining the institutionalization of respect in ancientGreece. As we have
seen, timê identifiedthe personal honor of acitizen and the consequent respect
it commanded, as well as an office or position that aperson occupied. The same
wordhad thus both personal and institutional connotations: the personal pres-
tigeofaperson was increased when he was elected general or judge in acourt,
for instance. It is interesting to note that the same mix of publicand private, of
moral condemnation and political exclusion, applied to its opposite, the notion
of atimia. In its original sense, atimia meant outlawry,loss of the protection of
the law; therefore, aperson who committed very serious crimes, such as high
treason or attemptingtobecome tyrant of acity,would lose legal protection:
he could be killed or his property plundered or takenbyanyone. This was tan-
tamount to being cast out of the community:the atimos person would find him-
self defenseless, banned in away similar to the pharmakos. In the caseofAth-
ens, this measure would have made it almost impossible for aperson to live
within Athenian territory and it can be considered equivalent to expulsion
from Attica; this measure could accordingly be imposed also on aliens (MacDo-
well 1978,pp. 73 –74).
Atimia “deprivedanAthenian of the protection of the courts. Consequently,
his enemies could harm him to anydegree with impunity”(Sealy1994,p.12).
This harsh punishment was the consequenceofthe loss of honor of aperson in-
curred by committingaterrible crime: this reflected an aristocratic mentality,
wherehonor is the most valuable possession of anoble person. It is therefore
very interesting that in duecourse the notion of atimia became more lenient:
it entailed milder penalties,although acitizen could incur such penalty by com-
mitting lesser crimes against the community.For instance, “acitizen who owed a
financial debt to the state and did not payitbythe ninth prytanyofthe year be-
came atimos. By the time of Dêmosthenes manyofthe atimoi werepublic debt-
ors”(Sealy1994,p.13). This fact reflects the idea that acitizen who did not dis-
charge his duties towards the community,ofwhatever kind, lost the right to have
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 59
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
access to certain public spaces and ceremonies. One very good testimonyisagain
that of Dêmosthenes. In his oration Against Philip 3,Dêmosthenes cites an old
event and reminds his Athenian audience that “atimia in the past was asevere
penalty,amounting to death without retribution, in contrast to atimia as his au-
dience knows it,which concerns exclusion from participation in the Athenian
koina”.⁵²The more the polis lost its aristocratic connotations the more crimes
against the community wereconsidered punishable; and the punishment con-
sisted in exclusion from public life. It wasthe political, rather than the moral,
aspect that was emphasized by this development,asitsuits ademocratic ideol-
ogywhich stresses the importance of political equality.
In fact,itwas around 510/07that this changetook place in Athens. Interest-
ingly enough,this changewas not legallyenacted but rather came about by
practice around the time of Cleisthenes’reforms. Atimia took up the meaning
of “disenfranchisement”,loss of civic rights or,more generally, exclusion from
the privileges of Athenian publiclife (Hansen 1976). Therefore, an atimos “was
not allowed to enter templesorthe Agora. He could not holdany publicoffice,
nor be amember of the Boule or ajuror.Hecould not speak in the Ekklesia or in
alaw-court […]”(Mac Dowell 1978,p.74). We mayadd thatthere existed a, so to
speak,automatic atimia and an atimia by sentence: the first applied to people
guilty of certain offenses, not necessarilycrimes, such as prostitution. In this
case, the original meaning of timê is still reflected: by such behavior, these peo-
ple lost their honor and respectability and therefore forfeited theircivic rights.
As Deborah Kamencorrectlyremarked: “The very word atimos,meaning both
‘deprivedofcivic offices’(a + timai)and ‘deprivedofhonor’(a + timê), encapsu-
lates boththe degraded political status and the degraded social status of such
individuals”.⁵³It is my impression thatinthe course of time, with increasingly
democratic institutions and afully-fledgeddemocratic ideologyestablished in
Athens, the emphasis shifted from the personal/moral to the public/political
realm: what commanded more condemnation wasthe offense against the com-
munity;itdishonored the citizenand deprivedhim of his civic privileges. The
fact that atimia was context-sensitive seems confirmed alsobyits different impli-
cationsinsuch diverse political entities as Sparta and Athens. Plutarch, Agesi-
laus 30,informs us thatatSparta soldiers who fled the battlefield were labeled
runaways and they weredishonored. In oligarchic Sparta, wherehonor com-
Dêmosthenes IX,44–47.See Evelyn van’tWout 2011.
Kamen 2013,chapter7;p.78. Kamen also maintainsthat prostitutes and people whosquan-
deredtheir money werefound guilty of acrime by analogy and therefore punished: for instance,
someone who sold his own bodywould be readytosell his city.Cf. Aeschynes, ContraTim.
I, 28–30.
60 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
mands equal respect from the peers, this is astate of infamyrather than real out-
lawry.Tothis testimonywemay add that of Xenophon, who maintains that cer-
tain Spartans made atimoi for being cowards preferred actual death to the utter
dishonor,entailing social death, deriving from such a “atimos and reproachful
life”.⁵⁴ An Athenian atimos,bycontrast,incurred civil death, the loss of all
civic prerogatives. This seems to be the sense of the Decree of Eukrates of 346
BCE, which made people who attempted to or actuallysubverted the democratic
regime atimoi. Isubscribe to David Teegarden’sopinion: “To prescribe that an
offender ‘is to be atimos’,is, Isuggest,aquasi-magical speech act comparable
to self-imprecation, intended to protect the interests of the community”(Teegar-
den 2014,p.146). These are formulaic protections, entrenchment clauses, rather
than actual penalties.Their purpose is coercingcompliance, putting on an aura
of untouchability,rather than punishingoffenders; for it is not clear what gov-
ernment will punishthose who overturn the government.
Another very interesting notion to examine in this connection is that of hyb-
ris,awordnotoriouslydifficult to translate. Thisisdue to the fact thatitencap-
sulates both adisposition of presumption, an attitude of wanton insolence,and
the ensuingactionstowards actual people (or the gods). In the second respect,
this madeitdifficult for the legislator to pin down the exact actions determined
by wanton insolence although it was important,because hybris entaileddishon-
or (atimia)for the offended.⁵⁵ This fact was recognized by the Athenian penal
code, which included alaw against hybris. In fact,accordingtothe Athenian
laws it was possibletobring alaw-suit for hybris and also for atimia. Since
the precise borders of these crimes were blurred and undefined, the suitor had
to appeal to the conventional knowledge and wisdom of the jurors, namelyto
ashared perception of what these terms entailed for the ordinary citizens. To re-
strain wanton suits penalties were fixed for bringinganunsuccessfulsuit.We
must alsonote thatoften these law-suits had the purpose of outmaneuvering
apolitical opponent, of excludinghim from the public arena. Athenian democ-
racy wasavery agonistic political society.AsLene Rubinstein has remarked:
“Athenian legal actions, public as well as private, can be characterized as
‘zero-sum games’in which the prize for which the two opponents competed
was recognition of status or honor (timê): in this game the successful litigant
could add to his own prestige the prestige lost by his unsuccessful opponent
[…]”(Rubinstein 2000,p.29). Therefore, in most atimia cases the real purpose
Xenophon, Resp. Lac. IX, 6, 4 –5.
See Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 2.1378b 29 –30: “Dishonour is part of hybris,for the one whodishon-
ours slights”.For acomprehensive discussionofthe subject see Fisher 1992; for adetailed crit-
ical discussion see Cairns 1996.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 61
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
of the prosecution was to discredit apolitical rival and to silence him: “citizens
are defined by their parrhêsia,the right to speak publicly, and non-citizens, in-
cludingthe disenfranchised, are branded by their legal silence”(Wohl 2010,
p. 51).
Avery interesting case is the famous orator Dêmosthenes who, in his Against
Meidias,trying to persuade the jurors that Meidias’behaviorwas insolent,wish-
es to distinguish between the actual damagecaused by apunch and the dishon-
or thatitbringsabout when it is done with “wanton insolence”(hybris). He re-
counts the story of Euaion, who at adinner party killed Boiotos who had
punched him, and comments: “It was not the blow that made him angry,but
the dishonor (atimia); nor being hit is such aserious matter to freemen (eleu-
therois), though it is serious,but rather being hit with hybris”.⁵⁶ Dêmosthenes
goes on to arguethat,put in much worse circumstances by Meidias, who
punched him at the Dionysian festivals of 348 in front of Greek citizens and for-
eigners,herestrained himself and now asks for satisfaction through the lawand
by the court.His point is clear:
Ithink that youshould set up aprecedent for all to follow,that no one whowantonlyas-
saults and outrages another should be punished by the victim himself in hot blood, but
must be broughtinto your court, because it is youwho confirm and uphold the protection
granted by the laws to those whoare injured.⁵⁷
Dêmosthenes argues that acourt and the laws of the city redress the hybristic act
of injusticewhich dishonored him. The protection of acitizen’shonor is now a
political and legal matter and aperson cannot take justice into one’sown hands.
It can be argued, however,that Dêmosthenes did not act merelyinthe name of
the public interest but alsoinorder to getrid of Meidias’spresenceinthe public
arena.
Finally, thereisone more area we need to explore concerning the public per-
ception of honor,dishonor and respectful behavior. Thisconsists in what we
could call the ritualistic aspect of timê,namelyspecific, deliberate behavior
that causesdishonor.Wealreadynoted how Homer stigmatizedAchilles’inhu-
man behavior towards Hector and his corpse. It is especiallyintragedy that
we find examples of acts of inhumanconduct,like maiming abody, performed
with the intent to dishonor it.For instance, this is the case of maschalismos,se-
vering parts of acorpse in order to dishonor the person: cutting off hands, feet,
the nose or the genitals. This is the fate that Agamemnon meets on his return
Dêmosthenes 21,71–72.
Dêmosthenes 21,76.
62 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
from the Trojan War: killed by his wife Clytemnestraand her lover and then
maimed. This event is recounted by Aeschylus, Coeph. 439 –443, as well as by
Sophocles El. 444–446.Both Aeschylus and Sophocles indicate that maschalis-
mos made Agamemnon further dishonored (atimos)indeath (Iles Johnston 1999,
pp. 156–159). Again, in Aeschylus, Eum. 810,wefind that the Furies describe
themselvesasatimai,dishounored, and “mourning over dishonor”(atimopen-
theis), and thereforeseeking revenge. Since one of the manyintents of the Ore-
steia trilogyistoshow how the ancientcustom of revengeisinterrupted by the
Gods and replaced by lawand human courts,the messageAeschylus wants to
conveyisthatthe old idea of personal honor requiringtaking justiceinone’s
own hand is here superseded; afixed lawvalid for everyone (not onlythe citi-
zens but also the gods) and apublic court will from now on judge and make le-
gallybinding decisions. ForAeschylus the institution of the tribunal of the Are-
opagus marks the beginning of anew erainAthens, in which nomos basileus
reigns over mortals and immortals. And with it respect is due to every Athenian
citizen simply quacitizen.
Bibliography
Aristotle (1984): The Athenian Constitution,ed. by P. J. Rhodes: London, Penguin.
Aristotle (2013): Politics,transl. by C. Lord, Chicago: ChicagoUniversity Press.
Aristotle (1992): The Art of Rhetoric,ed. by.H.Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin.
Atwill,J.M. (1998): Rhetoric Reclaimed.Aristotle and the Liberal ArtsTradition,Ithaca: Cornell
UniversityPress.
Balot, R. (2006): Greek Political Thought,Oxford: Blackwell.
Cairns, D.L. (1993): Aidôs. The Psychologyand Ethics of Honour and Shame in AncientGreek
Literature,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cairns, D.L. (1996): “Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big”,Journal of Hellenic Studies 116,
pp. 1 –32.
Cartledge, P. (2009): AncientGreek Political ThoughtinPractice,Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Cerri, G. (1969): “Isos dasmos come equivalente di isonomia nella sillogeteognidea”,
Quaderni Urbinati di CulturaClassica 8, pp.97–104.
Cooper,J.M. (2012): PursuitsofWisdom: Six Ways of Life in AncientPhilosophy,Princeton:
PrincetonUniversity Press.
Demosthenes (2002): AgainstMeidias,ed. by D.M. MacDowell, Bristol: Bristol Classical
Press.
Develin, R. (1989): Athenian Officials 684 –321 BC,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Ehrenberg,V.(1958): “Isonomia”.InA.F.von Pauly and G. Wissowa, Realencyclopaedie der
classischen Altertumswissenschaft,Stuttgart:Metzler,Suppl. VII, cc.293 –301.
The Notion of Respect in AncientGreek Poetry 63
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
Figueira, T.J. (1995): “Khremata: Acquisition and Possession in Archaic Greece”.InK.D.Irani
and M. Silver (Eds.): Social Justiceinthe AncientWorld,Westport, CT:Greenwood,
pp. 41–60.
Figueira, T.J. and Nagy,G.(1985): “TheognisofMegara”.Poetry and the Polis,Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins UniversityPress.
Fisher, N.R.E. (1992): Hybris. AStudyinthe Values of Honour and Shame in AncientGreece,
Warminster: Aris&Phillips.
Giorgini, G. (1993): La città eiltiranno,Milan: Giuffrè.
Hansen, M.H. (1976): Apagoge,Endeixis and Ephegesis againstKakourgoi, Atimoi and
Pheugontes,Odense: Odense UniversityPress.
Harrison, E. (1902): Studies in Theognis. Together with aText of the Poems,Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Heller,E.(1984): “Man Ashamed”.InIn the Age of Prose. Literaryand PhilosophicalEssays,
Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Herodotus (2008): The Histories,transl. by R. Waterfield, Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.
Hubbard, T.K. (Ed.) (2003): Homosexuality in Greece and Rome,Berkeley: Universityof
California Press.
Iles Johnston, S. (1999): Restless Dead. Encounters betweenthe Living and the Dead in
AncientGreece,Berkeley/Los Angeles:University of California Press.
Irwin,E.(2005): Solon and EarlyGreek Poetry: The Politics of Exhortation,Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Jaeger,W.(1939 –1945): Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture,Oxford: Blackwell.
Kalyvas, A. (2014): “SolonianCitizenship: Democracy,Conflict, Participation”.In
P.M. Kitromilides (Ed.), Athenian Legacies: European Debates on Citizenship,Florence:
Olschki,pp. 19 –36.
Kamen, D. (2013): Status in Classical Athens,Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Konstan, D. (2006): The Emotions of the AncientGreeks,Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.
Leveque, P. and Vidal-Naquet, P. (1996): Cleisthenes the Athenian. An Essayonthe
Representation of Spaceand Time in Greek Political Thoughtfromthe Endofthe Sixth
Centurytothe Death of Plato,Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.
Linforth, I.M. (1919): Solon the Athenian,Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lombardini, J(2013): “Isonomia and the Public SphereinDemocratic Athens”,History of
Political Thought 34, pp. 393–420.
MacDowell, D.M. (1978): The LawinClassical Athens,Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.
Meyer,E.A. (2008): “Thucydides on Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Tyranny,and History”,
Classical Quarterly 58, pp. 13 –34.
Morgan, T. (2007): Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire,Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Nietzsche, F. (1887/2008): On the GenealogyofMorals,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Noussia-Fantuzzi, M. (2010): Solon the Athenian, the Poetic Fragments,Leiden: Brill.
Ober,J.(1989): Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens,Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Ober,J.(1996): The Athenian Revolution,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Owens, R. (2010):Solon of Athens: Poet, Philosopher,Soldier,Statesman,Brighton: Sussex
Academic Press.
Pearson, L. (1962): Popular Ethics in AncientGreece,Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress.
Plato(1982): Hippias Major,transl. by P. Woodruff,Indianapolis:Hackett.
64 Giovanni Giorgini
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
Plato(2012): The Republic,ed. by C. Rowe, London: Penguin.
Plutarch (1914): Lives,ed. by B. Perrin, vol. 1, Harvard, Harvard University Press.
Plutarch (1927): Moralia,ed. by F. Cole Babbitt, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Raaflaub,K.A., Ober,J.and Wallace, R. (2007): Origins of Democracy in AncientGreece,
Berkeley-Los Angeles/London: UniversityofCalifornia Press.
Redfield, J. (1994): Natureand Cultureinthe Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector,Durham:Duke
UniversityPress.
Rosivach,V.J. (1992): “Redistribution of Land in Solon, Fragment34West”,Journal of Hellenic
Studies 112, pp. 153–157.
Rubinstein, L. (2000): Litigation and Cooperation. Supporting Speakers in the Courtsof
Classical Athens,Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Sealy,R(1994): The Justice of the Greeks,Ann Arbor,MI: University of Michigan Press.
Solon (1999): Greek Elegiac Poetry,ed. by D.E. Gerber,Harvard, HarvardUniversityPress.
Suidae Lexicon (1928–1938), ed. by A. Adler,Leipzig: Teubner.
Teegarden, D.A. (2014): Death to Tyrants,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thucydides (2009): The Peloponnesian War,ed. by P. J. Rhodes, Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press.
Tyrtaeus (1999): Greek Elegiac Poetry,ed. by D.E. Gerber,Harvard, HarvardUniversity Press.
Valdes-Guia,M.(2007): “Peuretcontraintedes dépendents ratifiées par des pratiques
judiciaires et religieuses: les paysans atimoi de l’Attique archaique”.
In A. Serghidou (Ed.): Fear of Slaves, Fear of Enslavementinthe AncientMediterranean,
Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, pp. 99–114.
Van’tWout, E. (2011): “From Oath-Swearing to Entrenchment Clause: The Introduction of
Atimia-Terminology in Legal Inscriptions”.InA.Lardinois, J. Blok and M.G.M. vander
Poel (Eds.): Sacred Words: Orality,Literacy and Religion,Leiden: Brill, pp. 143 –160.
Vlastos,G.(1953): “Isonomia”,American Journal of Philology 74,pp. 337 –366.
Wohl,V.(2010): Law’sCosmos. JuridicalDiscourse in Athenian Forensic Oratory,Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
The Notion of Respect in Ancient Greek Poetry 65
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 4/12/17 7:23 PM
