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Strategic Use of Smart Bombs: A Literature Review
By Georgette I. Escobar
Abstract
Terrorist groups are using sophisticated weaponry to gain extreme tactical advantages.
Specifically, they are manufacturing smart bombs, which are a means of weaponizing
humans. They are inexpensive, extremely effective and accurate, obtain access to
hardened targets, have intelligent guidance and tracking systems and cause mass
casualties and catastrophic damage. Suicide attacks have historically been used as a
military strategy. Proactive prevention measures are necessary. This paper reviews the
research from a multi-disciplinary perspective on the use of suicide bombers. Research
commenced in December 2014 and has continued through April 2015.
Key words: Suicide bombing; Homicide Bombing; Force Multiplier; Narco-Terrorist;
Counter Terrorism, Smart Bomb, Martyr; Deradicalization;
INTRODUCTION
All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players;
they have their exits and their entrances, and one man in his time plays many parts…”
–William Shakespeare1
Suicide terrorism is clearly growing as is the tremendous amounts of research on
this topic. Suicide bombers are one of the most virulent and aggressive forms that
terrorism can take. The transnational terror movement appears to be transforming into a
hydra-headed network. 2Many of the most high profile and deadly terrorist attacks
worldwide have been suicide missions: 9/11 (2001); London (2005); U.S. Embassy in
Kenya & Tanzania (1998); the U.S.S. Cole (2000); Bali (2002 & 2005) and Spain
(2004).3
1
Not only have we seen this dramatic rise in attacks but suicide bombings are
particularly dangerous and are difficult to combat.4 Atran (2004) reports that the “mere
rumor of an impending suicide attack can throw thousands of people into a panic..as it
did in late August 2005, causing hundreds of deaths.”(p. 127).5
METHODOLOGY OF LITERATURE REVIEW
Research Questions
This article reports the findings of a research project on published unclassified
literature pertaining to suicide bombings produced during year 2004 to April 2015 in the
English language. As an exploratory endeavor the project sought to examine a wide range
of issues including the tone of research, the coverage of the subject matter, the
geographical and temporal spread of this coverage, which sources were quoted, what if
any past events were referenced, the imagery used, what words were used as descriptors,
how extensive is terrorist propaganda in peer reviewed esteemed academic journals and
how often was the terrorist mythological opaque fable given credibility in part. The aims
of the research project were to add empirical depth to conceptual accounts of the
importance of academic research on smart bomb discourse and to explore the processes
by which the martyr myth resonates with average individuals and given meaning within
the mainstream media.6
Data Collection Procedures
Thousands of articles, books, news stories, commentaries, journal articles, policy
2
briefs, transcripts of testimony before Congressional Committees and other government
publications have been the subjects of review. Repeated Internet searches for the terms
‘suicide’ and ‘bomb’ were made using multiple search engines including Google Scholar,
the Social Science Network, National Criminal Justice Abstracts and Ebscohost. Google
Scholar revealed 16,300 results for the time period of January 2004 to April 2015.
Ebscohost revealed 209 peer-reviewed results for the same time period. The results from
the National Criminal Justice Abstracts revealed 125 criminological based abstracts. The
majority of these articles had single contributors. However, a few had multiple authors
including one that involved more than ten. Articles from more than thirty-two different
publications were included in the study.
Abstracts were then utilized to determine full text documents to be reviewed. A
narrowing of research was made based on accessibility of the full text document and
attempts to limit the scope to those best addressing the research questions.
Definition of Key Terms
According to Martin (2011) “Terrorism does not have a well-established
definition.”7 This inability to accurately articulate and describe the phenomena makes
formulating answers even more difficult. Semantics have been recognized by many to be
of critical importance not just in operationalizing variables in research but especially
when trying to accurately portray suicidal terrorism acts.8 Currently, we let the terrorist
frame the debate. They do this in a manner helping them recruit others by playing on
sympathetic emotions. Martin (2014) provides the following definition of terrorism
3
“Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of some
principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or
property targets. These groups or agents engage in this behavior intending the purposeful
intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying
political objective.” (p. 8).9
Expert Robert Pape (2003) defines suicide attack in two ways. One is a narrow
definition limited to situations in which the attacker kills himself. The other is a broader
definition that includes any instance when an attacker fully expects to be killed by others
during the attack.10 The first definition is used herein in accord with Hronick (2004)11
Radicalization refers to a social process or pathway which begins with the
development of sympathies towards violent groups, an increasing acceptance of their
propaganda and ideology leading through to active participation in violent terrorist acts
Bhui, Everitt, & Jones, (2014) describe it as “… a form of powerful persuasion that
induces fear and makes political gains by promoting dangerous and infectious ideas. “12
Deradicalization programs often focus on religious principles being retaught and
counseling services being provided as an intervention. As Horgan (2008) points out
deradicalization and demobilization are not the same. One is a change in ideology while
the other represents a change in behavior.13
In defining extremism it is characterized by intolerance toward opposing interests
and divergent opinions that is the underlying excuse used for violent offensive and
reprehensive terrorist behaviors.
Different cultures play a role in terrorism including cultures of violence and
4
cultures of martyrdom. As noted by Jasper, Culture “provides our criteria for rational
action. …Culture not only bounds rationality but defines it. It provides the context and
criteria for recognizing and judging rationality, which cannot exist in a pure form outside
social context”14
Current Research Limitations
While common ground and general points of consensus emerged it would be
irresponsible to draw generalized conclusions as to the findings. Much of the research
used small sample sizes that cannot be broadly generalized. Further, much research
tended to focus on specific geographic regions. The underlying methodology of the
studies varied in quality and type. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence was utilized
in the formulation of theories and assumptions.
A majority of studies aggregate the role of terrorist to encompass everything from
leader to bomb maker to smart bomb components implicitly tracing the pathway into
terrorist involvement as being one and the same. 15
Some prominent researchers exclaim astonishment at the quality of the
problematic studies published in esteemed journals.16
Gill (2012) adds a poignant thought “Thus, while recent studies of suicide
bombings draw on empirical data, their interpretation of this data warrant closer
examination.” (p. 240). He explains how it is conceivable that the inherent drama in the
act of suicide bombings may account for why some analyses remain rooted in dramatic
explanations.17 The more contemporary approach is to view the behavior and motivation
as emerging from an incremental process of mobilization. According to Deflem &
5
McDonough (2015) after analysis of existing research they opined that scholars need to
understand the social realities involved with surveillance and counterterrorism as
involving a subjective dimension, related to legitimacy, especially the lack thereof, that
coexists with objective conditions.18
Multi-disciplinary Approach
Independent bands of academics find that much can be learned from other fields
such as public health and infectious pathogens including viruses; political science
including reliance on polling as well as electioneering; criminology such as patterns of
serial killers or street gangs, military strategies for example Japan’s Kamikaze pilots of
World War II; sociological as in planning a wedding with its attendant traditions, rituals,
and ceremony19 and similar aspects of theology; ultimately their own particular frame of
reference-the world of entertainment and production of movies.
Much of the research recognizes that traditionally reliable forms of evidence such
as prior recorded statements or memorialized acts and behaviors reported by friends and
families are completely fabricated in the case of suicide bombers for purposes of
theatrics. The act of suicide bombs exploding is only part of the first act. The actions of
the organization thereafter proffering its prerecorded propaganda and its media spin
feeding into the publicity and media campaigns continue the unfolding drama. Most
people agree that the events are all used as forms of signaling and communications.20
A day in the life of many terrorists mirrors most of the roles or positions involved
with a successful movie studio. Producing live drama filmed in the public streets much
6
like the recreations of the old west shootouts taking place regularly in Tombstone,
Arizona only combined with that Alice in Wonderland fell-down-a-rabbit-hole effect.
Literature Review Findings
This growing phenomenon described as an ominous threat has produced a number
of studies emphasizing the urgent need in identifying what works for fighting terrorism. 21
Because of the breadth of possible means of prevention and/or interventions, initially the
most comprehensive approach possible was taken with consideration given to any
research studies that considered preventing, detecting, managing or other wide
responding to suicide bombing events. Over the course of many months of intensive
research clarity and consensus started to emerge on a great number of points.
Contrary to the conclusions of Lum et al. (2006)22 and Freese (2014)23 a full
reading of the literature reveals a vast wealth of rich data.
Hronick (2004) addresses the state of the research consisting of thirty-four
projects reviewed post-conference.24 Ayers (2008) acknowledges how difficult research
and analysis on this contemporary subject matter may be.25
Trends in academia shifting from one focused on the individual smart bomb’s
personality and signs of psychopathology have transitioned to much more sophisticated
analysis to include profiling of organizational roles and functions. 26
Existing publications have addressed specific questions such as the motivation of
both individual and groups engaged in the act of suicide bombings, psychological and
physical profiling, usages of technology, emergency response and mitigations,
7
communication and propaganda, the role of religious ideology, deradicalization
programs, the myths of martyrdom, and terrorist recruitment and targeting. 27.
Counterterrorism efforts include practices such as hardening of targets,
intelligence gathering and law enforcement infiltration, drone strikes and targeted
assassinations, the use of the criminal justice system, the rules of war and acts of military
force along with building the contextual democracy, community engagement and
psychological programs.28
There are many dedicated researchers to this field and even if only the act of one
man many have creatively used a variety of methodologies that have provided
comprehensive critical data.
EVOLUTION OF SMART BOMBS
Many scholars’ fear that suicide bombers will continue to rapidly evolve into
people being utilized as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD’s refer to nuclear,
biological, chemical or radiological weapons. 29 Self-propelled WMD’s are effective.
According to Clint (2009) pedestrian suicide bombers already pose a biological threat
through infectious diseases to the United States.30
Terrorist organizations use smart bombs because they work!31 Terrorists are able
to assert power and control over foreign governments and their military activities
irregardless of it’s resources, power or prestige. Troops are withdrawn, prisoners are
forced to be exchanged, acts of commission as well as omission are loudly demanded.
8
There has always been great efforts made to appease these barbaric creatures which only
encourages them more. Transnational crime syndicates market martyrdom. Smart bombs
are used as a form of strategic signaling that communicates determination to the target
audience according to Hafez (2014); Hoffman (2010) and McCormick (2003). 32
Ozgur, Smith & Mus (2007) analyzed uncompleted suicide attacks by
interviewing the perpetrators. It was revealed that most voluntarily came forward initially
upon being recruited but compulsion and coercion were a repetitive theme. According to
the research an example was made of one recruit who refused and was brutally murdered.
33Others report acts such as having been handcuffed to the steering wheel or not being
aware until the final moments that they are engaged in an act designed to result in their
death. Hafez (2006) sees the mythology of martyrdom as a challenging communication
problem.34 Berko & Erez (2005) report that becoming a suicide bomber is a social
process. 35Their findings challenge the prevailing beliefs about voluntariness of
perpetrators to be invariably willing participants. Rather, their research makes clear that
there is a continuing need for reinforcement “if not actual cajoling and coaxing of
candidates” (p. 605). This type of strategic attack requires access to organizations whose
objective is nonsecular but who uses publicity and propaganda to motivate recruits.
Religion is a farce used to justify recruiting and deployment of human smart bombs.36
Ritual & Ceremony
Following Hafez (2006) a calibrated analysis synthesizing that of a rational actor,
cultural framing and structural approaches are relied upon to produce a comprehensive
9
valid and ultimately convincing explanation of suicidal terrorism. Hafez continues stating
“The religious framings of Hamas and other Islamic organizations go beyond mere
manipulation of a person’s mind, rather it combines symbolic narratives that tend to
resonate with various people of differing credibilities combined with ritual and ceremony
to foster a culture of martyrdom that venerates self-sacrifice.” 37This false reliance on a
religious façade is a cornerstone of continuing to be able to conduct suicide missions so
successfully. 38
Are You a Target?
Recruiters are incorporating not only the medically infected but also unwitting
pregnant fiancées, women and young children globally.39 Much research indicates that
they obtain local residents who are fluent not with just local languages but regional
dialects as well. Someone who will blend in easier and are already familiar with the
targeted site and/or population. Some one who will be guaranteed momentary access such
as trying to aid what appears to be a lost child. Recruitment efforts by many terrorist
groups are not only in the English language such as the highly circulated Inspire
Magazine they are openly targeting American citizens for use in indigenous plots already
planned on native U.S. soil.40.
Orehek et al (2006) cites Schuster et al (2001) for the notion that individuals become
more religious in response to threats of terrorism.41 Fear helps strengthen people’s faith.
Orehek (2006) also discovered a trend referenced as the ‘rally effect’ emerging wherein
individuals feeling threatened cling to their leadership. The evidence is clear that terrorist
10
organizations use suicide bombs to create greater solidarity which is capitalized on and
enables supporters to remain standing firmly by leaders even when mistakes are seen in
decision making. 42
However, membership in a militant group is a prerequisite to becoming a suicide
bomber. 43 Recruitment into terror organizations is often largely based on familial and
friendship ties and for others it gradually occurs over a course of time. 44
Aman (2007) provides good detailed information about the different stages
including a planning phase (target selection, tactics, mental preparations, training,
acquisition of explosive materials) that leads to the preparation phase (movements &
whereabouts, reconnaissance and tactical training along with behavioral modifications)
which results in an attack in progress (bombers actual are present, the scene is
approached, engagement teams are operational, the use of deadly force is unleashed
leaving evacuation teams and post-blast considerations). The earlier the intervention the
higher the probability of success.45
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DECISION MAKING
Many times smart bomb’s are used as “spoiler alerts” used to derail any peace process.
They are also used for purposes of recruitment and are strategic military type strategies46.
Ayers (2008) using four rationalist models found that smart bombs are used for 1)
strategic signaling through government 2) bombing for votes 3) bombing for recruits and
4) to gain a tactical advantage. 47
11
Financing
These elements combine criminal street gangs, drug mules, terrorists, and
insurgencies that become highly profitable new networks48.
The coverage on the war on drugs has changed since 9/11 consistent with the
Government’s Narco-terrorism initiative49. According to Michael Braun with the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) the nexus between drugs and terror is growing at light
speed. Braun (2008) reported that up to sixty percent of terror organizations are
connected with the illegal narcotics trade. “There are many similarities between a
terrorist organization and a global drug cartel” (Braun p.2) The Taliban and the FARC
are two examples representing the face of twenty first century transnational terrorists
“meaner and uglier than law enforcement or militaries have ever faced.” (Id.) In his
article Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply researcher Joel
Hernandez links Mexican drug cartels with terrorist organizations such as
Hezbollah and the Taliban50. There is much research about the Taliban and problems
with cultivation of opium poppies in Afghanistan.
There have been multiple incidents involving the recruitment of Mexican criminal
organizations to cooperate raising concerns about terrorists leveraging other Mexican
contacts for activities in the U.S51. The border wall needs to be constructed and we
must continue relying on immigration and customs officials to be on the front line in
preventing these plots. The National Counterterrorism Center reports that the drug trade
12
remains a significant source of revenue for the Taliban and al-Qaida with eroding the
stability in West and North Africa.
However, surpassing the drug monopolies is an even more lucrative industry.
Human trafficking has become one of the largest and most profitable crimes to date52.
Transnational terror groups run the modern day Atlantic Slave Trade. Women sex slaves
and domestic servants are high value targets as are young children whom are not only
used in the slave trade but are forced to become combatants and human shields. 53
Terror organizations continue to broaden their networks and have invaded our public
educational institutes, places of worship and providers of medical and social services in
our communities. As ISIL, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda and many others make clear
they are nihilist organizations who thrive on using smart bombs in order to gain the best
offensive strategic position before making demands on other countries for which they
expect and often get compliance. Important new contributions analyzing new and
growing threats includes not only closer scrutiny of terrorist recruitment efforts over the
use of the internet as well as the frequency of narcoterrorism. 54
Group Dynamics
Orehek et al (2006) finds that there is a need to study closure as an important variable
suggesting that this variable engenders support for one’s group and its leadership rather
than undermining it.55 In a recent review Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti & DeGrada (2006)
found support for the notion that heightened need for closure leads to a “syndrome of
group centrism including pressures toward uniformity, rejection of opinion deviates, in-
13
group favoritism, out-group derogation and the endorsement of autocratic leadership.” (p.
280). 56
False Narrative & Propaganda
It is important to not let the terrorist frame the debate. The terrorist false narrative is a
cornerstone of suicide bombings, which is one of religious, faith and sacrifice that create
cognitive dissonance. When researchers focus their studies on terrorist propaganda such
as videos made by the suicide bombers sometimes years before their death, suicide notes,
statements of family and friends, diaries or notes left behind and perhaps even witness
statements they give credence and credibility into a flimsy mythological fanciful story
created for the purposes of deceiving others.57
Behaviors of terrorist organizations emphasize the importance they give to
demonstrating with propaganda the willingness and voluntariness of suicide attackers.
This is viewed as extremely important and terror organizations make extensive efforts to
establish by as much documentation as possible that their version of reality is accurate..
We are shown excited and happy individuals about to kill themselves. Often footage
reveals a number of family, friends, or terrorist peers lively demonstrating their
encouragement. There is evidence that in many cases this is a farce and coercion if not
outright force is used against these victim/perpetrators. The exception would be for
example the children of Iran58 who are videotaped exploding themselves as they run over
mine fields because they have been brainwashed into believing that they have a special
key to heaven with them. This is why our educational institutions are at risk and why
recruiters target young children. For example in Palestine, children are socialized into a
14
culture of hate and death by Hamas directing violence and prejudice towards the people
of Israel and those of different religious faiths59.
However, William McGuire recognizes people can resist persuasion. He analogizes to
inoculations against disease. He also theorized about cultural truisms and how people are
vulnerable because the individual has never had practice defending a belief. Presenting
refuted counterarguments motivate people to develop refuted counterarguments to defend
their beliefs. This is referenced as belief perseverance. The bottom line is that we must
take affirmative action to inoculate Americans especially our children from terrorist
coercion.
Proactive prevention measures are necessitated. Prevention should address
interventions at the family and local community level. 60
PRACTICAL PREVENTIONS
A first line of defense is to learn how to counter the messaging and minimize people’s
receptivity (that of ordinary everyday people) to recruiting organizations. 61 Hafez (2006)
correctly reminds us that religion is employed as a mere facade, an ideological cover for
worldly rational choices.62
Moghaddam & Breckenridge (2011) focus on intergroup dynamics that follow
tragedies wherein ‘opportunity bubbles’ can lead to constructive outcomes.63 They stress
that leadership must pay close attention to opportunities to engage the public as capable
partners in the national crisis response. During these occasions, it is important for the
public’s role to be clearly explained and accompanied by ample means to readily acquire
additional information about the crisis, future threats and the government’s response.1
15
Under the theory of broken windows policing64, it is the minor infractions that aid
the officer’s in spoiling terrorist surprises such as taking minor crimes seriously such as
traffic violations, loitering, littering, jaywalking, and parking tickets may help stop an
attack once the bomber is deployed. But Garrett (2002) warns that these types of
situations pose the greatest risk to law enforcement officers especially traffic stops,
residence visits, policing rallies and marches; confrontations/standoffs, incident responses
and revenge and retaliation. 65
Horgan (2008) outlines the complexity of understanding what involvement in
terrorism entails emphasizing that it is all about the process. 66The consensus of many
researchers highlights that future efforts need to focus critically about what can be
developed at any level to facilitate or promote disengagement.
Often emotional issues lead to disengagement including developing negative
sentiments as a result of experiencing negativity associated with sustained membership.
To illustrate, dismantling the fantasy or illusion that serves to lure the recruit in the first
place and a growing sense of disillusionment with the quality of operational tactics may
result in externally identifiable acts of disengagement.
Horgan (2008) addresses the current trend to pursue deradicalization programs
worldwide including those in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Columbia, Ireland and Malaysia
stating “It is clear that there is significant promise in thinking about the development of
some kind of disengagement initiatives. “(p. 3). Jacobson (2010) shares lessons learned
from those that drop out. 67
Smith (2015) recognizes the importance of narratives and story telling through
16
community engagement in order to circumvent recruitment of individuals by terror
organizations.68 Hafez (2014) also supports this finding concluding that we are in a new
phase of raising public awareness on the seriousness of terrorist ideology.69 He supports
grass root efforts as do many. Responses are needed from collaborating citizens as
reliance on the government to stop this from happening is misplaced.
1 Within three weeks after the attacks on 9/11 the rate of US volunteerism
increased more than six standard deviations above average throughout the nation. Within
only three months over 1.5 billion dollars was raised for victims and their families.
(Moghaddem & Breckenridge 2011)
CONCLUSION
While much has been learned about menaces to the public’s health and safety
from terrorist organizations, the threat of another catastrophic peril persists post
September 11, 2001. Our very own democratic lifestyle is being tested. People are
seriously shaken. The damage persists and continues to cause harm despite the passage of
time.
Time cannot heal this wound, terror has not dissipated to date we cannot
extinguish the chronic condition created. It continues on searing new dates in the minds
of people, it spreads rapidly adding new historic landmarks such as London and Madrid.
As we approach the fifteenth anniversary of Al Qaida’s successful attack on September
11, 2001 the amount of research continues to expand.
17
Unfortunately, many researchers conclude that the answers still elude us.
Problems with methodology abound. But there are answers. Many experts from nearly
every field have found means of countering terrorism. We must prioritize mental health
and hinder preventable conditions like Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
We need to inoculate society from stressful events. We must make efforts to
mitigate the damages inflicted by terrorists to the public’s psyche. We must not
perpetuate their propaganda. The old saying that sticks and stones can break my bones
but words will never hurt me has been empirically contradicted. Words hurt and they hurt
badly.
We must be more cautious and careful in ensuring we accurately articulate the
problem. We must not let terrorists define the debate. Everyone must collaborate,
communities need to come together and discredit the myths used to play on people’s
sympathies.
18
Acknowledgments: The author thanks Professor Wen Chi-Chen from Western
New Mexico University and former state representative Daniel Patterson for helpful
conversations on this topic. All errors and viewpoints are my own.
About the Author: Georgette I. Escobar is currently a senior at Western New
Mexico University majoring in psychology with a minor in political science and a
concentration in criminology. In 1994 she received her Juris Doctorate degree from
Empire College School of Law. She resides in Las Vegas, Nevada 89005; E-mail:
azgovpolicy@gmail.com
19
20
1 Shakespeare, William (n.d) [web] last accessed on April 4, 2015 at
http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/all-the-world-s-a-stage
2 Atran, S. (Spring 2006) The Moral Logic & Growth of Suicide Terrorism The Washington
Quarterly 29(2): 127-147; Olsen, M. (25 July 2012) Hearing Before the House Committee on
Homeland Security Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape
3 N. Ayers (2008) Ghost Martyr’s in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist Models
to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(9): 856-882 notes the now
daily occurrences of suicide bombers in Iraq and expresses frustration about research difficulties of
this contemporary phenomenon.
4 Grimland, M., Apter, A., & Kerchof, J.F.M. (2006) The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A
Review of Psychological & Nonpsychological Factors Crisis: The Journal of Crisis Intervention &
Suicide Prevention 27(3): 107-118; Hafez, M.M. (2006) Rationality, Culture & Structure in the
Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis & Illustrative Case Study Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 165-185
5 See O’Connell, E. & Bernard, C. (May 2006) A New IO Strategy: Prevention & Disengagement
Strategic Insights 5 describe a similar experience
6 Champion, D. J. (2006). Research Methods for Criminal Justice and Criminology (Third Edition
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.pressrel/pr071808.html
7 See also Hronick, M.S. (2004) Analyzing Terror: Researchers Study the Perpetrators and the
Effects of Suicide Terrorism National Institute of Justice Journal 254
8 Khan, M.M., Goldney, R. & Hassan, R. (2010) Homicide Bombers: Life as a Weapon Asian
Journal of Social Science 38 pp. 481-484
9 Martin, G. (2014). Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies (Third Edition ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
10 Pape, R. (August 2003) The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism American Political Science
Review 97(3)
11 Hronick, M.S. (2004) Analyzing Terror: Researchers Study the Perpetrators and the Effects of
Suicide Terrorism National Institute of Justice Journal 254
12 Bhui, K., Everitt, B., & Jones, E. (2014) Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity & Limited
Social Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance Against Violent Radicalization? PLoS One
9(9), e105918
13 Hafez, M.M. (2006) Rationality, Culture & Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A
Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis & Illustrative Case Study Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 2
(March-April 2006), pp. 165-185
14 As cited in Hafez (2006) see endnote 13 above
15 Gill, P. (2012) Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative & Casual Qualities of Group
Based Behaviors Aggression & Violent Behavior 17:565-574
16 Lum, Kennedy & Shirley (2006) Are Counter Terrorism Strategies Effective? Results of the
Campbell Systematic Review on Counterterrorism Research Journal of Experimental Criminology
2; Horgan, J. (2014). The Psychology of Terrorism. New York, NY: Routledge.; Silke (2004)
Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements & Failures: New York: Taylor & Francis; Victoroff
(2005) The Mind of the Terrorist Journal of Conflict Resolution 49: pp. 3-42 and Gill, P. (2008)
Suicide Bomber Pathways among Islamic Militants Policing 2(4): 412-422
17 Gill, P. (2012) Assessing Contemporary Trends and Future Prospects in the Study of the
Suicide Bomber Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 5(3): 239-252 ; Gill, P. (2012)
Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative & Casual Qaulities of Group Based
Behaviors Aggression & Violent Behavior 17: 565-574
18 Deflem, M. & McDonough, S. ( 15 Jan 2015) The Fear of Counterterrorism: Surveillance and
Civil Liberties since 9/11 Society 52: 70-79
19 Members of al-Qaeda used the real life actions of the sole hijacker with a fiancé Ziad Jarrah
as coded language to openly plan attack using terms like ‘engaged’, ‘wife’, ‘fiancé’, ‘married’,
‘bachelor’, ‘groom’, ‘bride’ and so on. For information about his upcoming wedding see
“Prelude to 9/11: A Hijacker’s Love, Lies (27 Jan 2003) Los Angeles Daily Times last accessed
on April 19, 2015 at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/27/world/fg-love27
20 Hoffman, B. and McCormick, G.H. (July 2004) Terrorism, Signaling & Suicide Attack Studies
and Conflict in Terrorism 27(4): 243-281; Aman, M. (2007) Preventing Terrorist Suicide Attacks
[web] http://www.jbpub.com
21 Hafez, M.M. (2006) Rationality, Culture & Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A
Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis & Illustrative Case Study Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 2
(March-April 2006), pp. 165-185; White, G, Mazerole, L., Porter, M & Chalk, P. ( June 2014)
Modeling the Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Interventions Trends & Issues in Crime &
Criminal Justice 475 Australian Institute of Criminology
22 Lum, Kennedy & Shirley (2006) Are Counterterrorism Strategies Effective? Results of the
Campbell Systematic Review on Counterterrorism Research Journal of Experimental
Criminology 2
23 Freese, R. (2014) Evidence Based Counterterrorism or Flying Blind? How to Understand
and Achieve What Works Perspectives on Terrorism 8(1)
24 Hronick, M.S. (2004) Analyzing Terror: Researchers Study the Perpetrators and the Effects of
Suicide Terrorism National Institute of Justice Journal 254
25 Ayers, N. (2008) Ghost Martyr’s in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist
Models to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(9): 856-882
26 Horgan, J. (2008) Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity &
Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation Perspectives on Terrorism 2(4) [web] last
accessed on April 4, 2015 at http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/32/
html; Gill, P. (2012) Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative & Casual Qualities of
Group Based Behaviors Aggression & Violent Behavior 17:565-574
27 Moghadam, A. (Winter 2008/09). Motives for Martyrdom: Spread of al-Qaida, Salifa Jihad and
Spread of Suicide Attacks. International Security, 33(3), 46-78.; Martin, G. (2014). Essentials of
Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies (Third Edition ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.; Horgan, J. (2014). The Psychology of Terrorism. New York, NY: Routledge.; Gill, P.
(2012) Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative & Casual Qualities of Group Based
Behaviors Aggression & Violent Behavior 17:565-574
28 Lum, Kennedy & Shirley (2006) Are Counter Terrorism Strategies Effective? Results of the
Campbell Systematic Review on Counterterrorism Research Journal of Experimental Criminology
2; Horgan, J. (2014). The Psychology of Terrorism. New York, NY: Routledge; Martin, G. (2011).
Terrorism and Homeland Security. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
29 Winkates, J. (2006) Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom for Organizational Objectives Journal of
Third World Studies 23(1):87-115; Eshkol, Z & Katz, K. (2005) Injuries from biologic material of
suicide bombers. Injury 36(2):271-274; Howard, R.D. and Sawyer, R.L. (2006) Terrorism &
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment Readings & Interpretations
Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill Contemporary Learning Series
30 In Family Affair: A Brief Analysis of the Potential Direction of the Suicide Terrorist Profile
(April 2008) Joseph Koury and Allen Kurdyla describe the constant evolution of persons
turned into smart bombs in order to not raise suspicion at security check points and hit
hardened targets explaining that the involvement of an entire family team is possible.
Terrorists go to extremes to break away from preconceived notions of profiling using the
most innocent appearing bombers. They are also using people with contagious illnesses like
HIV/AIDS because the biological materials such as the skeletal system become shrapnel that
becomes embedded in the bodies of victims.
31 Leary, K. (n.d.) Engaging Extremists: Diplomacy through Deradicalization Harvard Kennedy
School Review 113-117; Martin, G. (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.
32 Hafez, M. (2014) A Case Study: The Mythology of Martyrdom in Iraq eJournal USA [web] last
accessed on April 10, 2015 at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/05/20080522172922srenod0.3611566.ht
ml#axzz3Wuy1rb8M ;
McCormick, G.H. (2003) Terrorist Decision Making Annual Review Political Science 6: 473-
507; Hoffman, A.M. (2010) Voice & Silence: Why Groups Take Credit for Acts of Terror Journal
of Peace Research 47(5): 615-626
33 Ozgur, Smith & Mus (2007) Suicide Attacks as a Devastating Terrorist Modus-Operandi: An
Updated Evaluation of Turkish Cases IOS Press
34 See note 21 above
35 Berko, A., & Erez, E. (2005). "Ordinary people" and "death work": Palestinian suicide bombers
as victimizers and victims. Violence Vict, 20(6), 603-623.
36 Koury & Kurdyla (2008) Family Affair: A Brief Analysis of the Potential Direction of the Suicide
Terrorist Profile IALEIA Journal 18(1): 1-17; Berko, A., & Erez, E. (2005). "Ordinary people" and
"death work": Palestinian suicide bombers as victimizers and victims. Violence Vict, 20(6), 603-
623.
37 See note 21 above
38 Moghadam, A. (Winter 2008/09). Motives for Martyrdom: Spread of al-Qaida, Salifa Jihad and
Spread of Suicide Attacks. International Security, 33(3), 46-78.
39 Williams, J.T. (2006) Suicide Bombers: Are you a target? What can you do? Journal Health Prot
Management 22(2): 43-50; Koury & Kurdyla (2008) Family Affair: A Brief Analysis of the
Potential Direction of the Suicide Terrorist Profile IALEIA Journal 18(1): 1-17; Gill, P. (2008)
Suicide Bomber Pathways among Islamic Militants Policing 2(4): 412-422
40 Michael Steinbach Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation
(26 Feb 2015) Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Washington, D.C. [web] last accessed on April
12, 2015 at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/isil-in-america-domestic-terror-and-radicalization
41 Orehek, E. (2010) Need for Closure and the Social Response to Terrorism Basic & Applied
Sociology 32(4): 279-290
42 Moghaddam, F & Breckenridge, J. (2011) The Post Tragedy Opportunity Bubble and the
Prospect of Citizen Engagement. Homeland Security Affairs 7
43 Gill, P. (2012) Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative & Casual Qualities of Group
Based Behaviors Aggression & Violent Behavior 17:565-574
44 Ayers, N. (2008) Ghost Martyr’s in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist
Models to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(9): 856-882
45 Priem, R., Hunter, D., & Polisar, J. (Sept 2007) Terrorists & Suicide Tactics: Preparing for the
Challenge Police Chief 74(9): 32-36
46 Atran, S. (Spring 2006) The Moral Logic & Growth of Suicide Terrorism The Washington
Quarterly 29(2): 127-147
47 See note 3 above
48 Chertoff, M. (Summer 2008) Preventing Terrorism Harvard International Review pp. 14-17;
Decker, S.H. & Pyrooz, D.C. (2015) “I’m down for a jihad”: How 100 years of Gang Research
Can Inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism Perspectives on Terrorism
9(1); Braun (18 July 2008) Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terror Groups: A Growing
Nexus? Washington Institute for MidEast Policy [web] last accessed at www.dea.gov/pubs
49 Denham, B.E. (Fall 2012) NYTimes War on Drugs Sources Change After 9/11 Newspaper
Research Journal 33(4)
50 Dronzina, T. & el Houdaigul, R. (2012) Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends &
Ways of Tackling It [web] IOS Press last accessed on March 12, 2015 at
http://www.iospress.nl/book/contemporary-suicide-terrorism-origins-trends-and-ways-of-tackling-
it/
51 Olsen, M. (25 July 2012) Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security
Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape
52 Winterdyk, J., Perrin, B. & Reichel, P. (2012) Human Trafficking: Exploring the International
Nature, Concerns & Complexities Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press
53 See Polaris Project Web Site located at http://www.polarisproject.org/ for detailed information
about modern day slavery and how to identify it and take action
54 Howard, R.D. and Sawyer, R.L. (2006) Terrorism & Counterterrorism: Understanding the New
Security Environment Readings & Interpretations Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill Contemporary
Learning Series
55 See note 41 above
56 Kruglanski, Pierro, Manetti & DeGrada (2006) Need for Closure and the Social Response to
Terrorism Basic and Applied Social Psychology 32(4): 279-290
57 Hronick, M.S. (2004) Analyzing Terror: Researchers Study the Perpetrators and the Effects of
Suicide Terrorism National Institute of Justice Journal 254; Berko, A., & Erez, E. (2005).
"Ordinary people" and "death work": Palestinian suicide bombers as victimizers and victims.
Violence Vict, 20(6), 603-623; Hafez, M. (2014) A Case Study: The Mythology of Martyrdom in
Iraq eJournal USA [web] last accessed on April 10, 2015 at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/05/20080522172922srenod0.3611566.ht
ml#axzz3Wuy1rb8M
58 see YouTube video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjIBrs4_b98
59 See for example YouTube video posted at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mue96rYTY7M
60 Zarate, J. (2013) Winning the War on Terror: Marking Success and Confronting Challenges
Report in War Haugen, D. (Ed) Detroit: Greenhaven Press
61 Atran, S. (Spring 2006) The Moral Logic & Growth of Suicide Terrorism The Washington
Quarterly 29(2): 127-147
62 See Note 4 above
63 Moghaddam, F and Breckenridge, J. (2011) The Post-Tragedy Opportunity Bubble and the
Prospect of Citizen Engagement Homeland Security Affairs 7
64 Wilson & Kelly (1982) criminological theory described at
http://andragogytheory.com/2015/03/11/criminology-broken-window-theory-explain/
65 Garrett, R. (July 2002) Terrorism on the Homefront: Being On Guard for Homegrown
Terrorist Threats Helps Keep Officers Safe Law Enforcement Technology 29(7): 22-26
66 Horgan, J. (2008) Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity &
Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation Perspectives on Terrorism 2(4)
67 Priem, R., Hunter, D., & Polisar, J. (Sept 2007) Terrorists & Suicide Tactics: Preparing for the
Challenge Police Chief 74(9): 32-36
68 Smith, A. (February 2015) Telling Stories: Preventing Violent Extremism through
Community Engagement The Police Chief 74(9): 32-36
69 See Note 32 above