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Introduction
EU policy towards its Southern Neighbour-
hood aims to ensure the security of Member
States and is underpinned by an assumption of a
shared interest in democracy, security, and pros-
perity through economic liberalisation. It sees the
main way of achieving these aims as promoting
Western-style liberal democracy as a political sys-
tem capable of providing peace and stability. Evi-
dence from public opinion survey research shows
this ambition is supported by citizens of Arab
countries, where public opinion polls for over a
decade report strong support for democracy.
However, these citizens do not share the EU’s
procedural conception of democracy, a concep-
tion in which civil and political rights are decou-
pled from – and prioritised over – social and eco-
nomic rights. The Arab Transformations survey
carried out in 2014 in six Arab states (Morocco,
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq) suggests few
people demanded this brand of democracy. Fur-
thermore, most people thought the EU has not
done a good job of supporting transitions to
democracy, nor did they have much appetite for
EU involvement in the domestic politics of their
countries.
The EU soon portrayed the 2010-2011 Arab
Uprisings as a popular demand for liberal democ-
racy. However, while the Uprisings were indeed
intensely political, clearly demanding a change of
regime (nizaam), they were not demands for a
liberal and free-market version of democracy.
Protesters were more concerned about social
justice, economic inclusion, and fighting corrup-
tion, and relatively less concerned with those civil
and political rights which regional regimes had for
decades told people they already had, covering
autocracy with a thin veil of ‘façade democracy’.
The EU revised its policies in response to the Up-
SUMMARY
•EU policy towards the Southern Neighbour-
hood aims to achieve security through de-
velopment and democracy.
•However, it assumes shared understandings
of democracy, security and prosperity, and
Western-style market democracy as the
main tool to achieve this.
•Data show Arab citizens strongly support for
democracy but equally that most reject the
EU brand of formal liberal democracy, de-
manding social and economic rights.
•MENA citizens also do not think the EU has
facilitated transitions to democracy, and they
reject EU involvement.
KEYWORDS
Democracy, European Neighbourhood Policy,
Arab Uprisings, Political Rights, Economic and
Social Rights, Security
Policy Brief prepared by Andrea Teti and Pamela Abbott
1
6
5
The Arab Transformations
Policy Brief 1
What do ‘the People’ Want? The Demand for
Democracy in Six Middle Eastern States
new approaches. Unfortunately, while this may
pay electoral dividends domestically, it does not
address the basic causes of instability in the
Middle East. European leaders find themselves
in a bind: either support long-term solutions
which will stabilise the region and risk domestic
unpopularity, or score easier political points at
home while leaving an already unstable Middle
East to fester.
Stability, security and prosperity in the Euro-
Mediterranean region can be achieved by sup-
porting both an economic growth which guar-
antees the equitable inclusion of all citizens, and
a political process which actually represents citi-
zens and their interests. There is a potentially
strong demand across the Arab world for such
an equitable and inclusive economic and politi-
cal order. The opportunity to harness such a
demand is one which political leaderships on
both side of the Mediterranean forgo at their
peril.
risings, claiming it recognised the error of previ-
ous support for autocratic regimes, and recog-
nising at least nominally the importance of ‘inclu-
sive growth’ and encouraging a ‘deep democra-
cy’. However, closer analysis shows that the EU
model of democracy remained substantively
unchanged, and that it did not respond to popu-
lar demands for social justice and economic
rights. The model of democracy set out by the
new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) fo-
cuses on formal aspects of democracy com-
bined with economic liberalisation, with later re-
forms shifting away from even this in favour of
conventional conceptions of security and stability
of which it had supposedly recognised the fail-
ings.
Democracy without inclusive economic
growth will no more prevent conflict in the region
in the future than it did in the past, nor is cooper-
ation with autocracies on democracy and human
rights any more likely to support democratisation
than it did in the run-up to the Arab Uprisings.
What the People Want
The Arab Transformations public opinion sur-
vey was carried out in six MENA countries
(Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia)
in 2014. It shows MENA citizens are deeply un-
happy with the performance of their govern-
ments and lack trust in them. However, they do
not think that the Arab Uprisings were primarily
motivated by a demand for more political rights,
nor do they think that lack of political rights are
among the two most important challenges facing
their countries in 2014. Survey data suggest they
are generally more concerned about corruption,
social justice and the economic situation.
FIGURE1: TWO MOST IMPORTANT DRIVERS OF THE UPRIS-
INGS (%)
Only a very small minority of citizens in 2014
thought authoritarianism was one of the two
main challenges facing their country. It varied
from a low of just two per cent in Egypt and Jor-
dan to 17 per cent in Libya. By contrast, the
economic situation was nominated by three
quarters of citizens across the six countries sur-
veyed, varying from around 90 per cent in Egypt
and Jordan to just over three-quarters in Moroc-
co and Tunisia, a half in Iraq and 28 per cent in
Libya. In Iraq and Libya – countries scarred by
deep divisions and conflict – there was much
concern about security. What is clear is that,
whatever their political preferences, citizens re-
ject the democratic façade which ‘adaptable au-
tocrats’ have sought before and since the Upris-
ings in which political rights and social justice are
merely rhetorical fig-leaves: citizens want both a
substantive political inclusion – i.e., government
responsive to people’s needs, listening to citi-
zens’ voices – and a fairer, more stable and more
dignified economic outlook. They want respon-
sive governments that they can trust and which
prioritise meeting citizens’ needs rather than lin-
ing their own pockets and abusing the rule of
law.
The Demand for Democracy
As in previous research, most citizens agreed
that ‘democracy as a system may have its prob-
lems but is better than other systems’. This
ranged from a low of 62 per cent in Egypt to a
high of 90 per cent in Jordan. However, the pro-
portion of respondents strongly agreeing is much
lower, varying from a high of 39 per cent in Jor-
dan to a low of 18 per cent in Tunisia and Iraq.
This suggests that there may be only qualified
support for the idea that democracy is better
than other systems of government.
FIGURE 2: DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST SYSTEM DESPITE ITS
FAULTS, %
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014
Nor is there any evidence that Islam is seen
as a major barrier to democratisation. A majority
agree that democracy is compatible with Islam –
or rather disagree that it is incompatible with Is-
lam – ranging from 71 per cent of Moroccans
and Iraqis to 59 per cent of Egyptians.
FIGURE 3: DISAGREE THAT DEMOCRACY IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH ISLAM (%)
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014
However, they do not necessarily want the
type of liberal democracy promoted by the EU.
Taking the kind of minimalist procedural definition
espoused in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP), a clear majority of citizens do see open
multiparty elections as at least somewhat suit-
able for their country. However, support falls
dramatically when we consider only those who
see procedural democracy as the only suitable
system – that is, that their countries should be-
come democracies. Here, support varies: 51 per
cent in Iraq, around 38 per cent in Egypt and
Tunisia, around a quarter in Jordan and Moroc-
co, and 17 per cent in Libya.
Furthermore, while Islam is not seen as a bar-
rier to democracy, there is strong support for
religious law (shari’a), with less than 10 per cent
wanting no law to be based on shari’a. This rais-
es questions about the extent to which there is
support for human rights and gender equality in
the way in which they are generally understood
in Western liberal democracy.
What Kind of Democracy do
People Want?
What do citizens in the six countries surveyed
think about when they say that democracy is the
best system despite its faults? Asked to nomi-
nate the two most important characteristics of
democracy, it is clear that civil and political rights
are not seen universally as the most important in
the same way as EU policy or indeed current
scholarly consensus do. Although the most fre-
quently mentioned is indeed the right to vote, it
is only in Iraq and Libya that more than 50 per
cent nominate it, and even then it is only just
over a half, falling to only around 20 per cent in
Egypt and Jordan. Freedom of speech and polit-
ical equality are much less frequently mentioned.
Even fewer are those who nominate two such
political characteristics as the most important,
varying from a high of a quarter in Iraq, Libya and
Tunisia, to just six per cent in Egypt. The propor-
tion of those choosing voting in elections as one
of the two is even lower, varying from a quarter in
Libya to around a fifth in Iraq and Tunisia, a tenth
in Morocco, and around five per cent in Jordan
and Egypt. MENA citizens appear unsurprisingly
sceptical of voting in the region’s ‘façade
democracies’.
FIGURE 4: POLITICAL RIGHTS AS ESSENTIAL CHARACTER-
ISTIC OF DEMOCRACY (%)
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014
Even among those who do prioritise political
rights, there is a much broader understanding of
democracy than just focusing on political rights.
For them, social justice and economic inclusion
are also crucial: providing for citizens’ welfare
through inclusive development, basic services,
and full employment are all seen as important by
most citizens, varying from nearly two-thirds in
Morocco to half in Libya. In Iraq and Jordan
over 40 per cent of citizens think that a democ-
racy fights corruption, as do a noticeable minor-
ity in all other countries.
FIGURE 5: NON-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS NOMINATED
AS ONE OF TWO MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF
DEMOCRACY (%)
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014
Indeed, in three countries more respondents
nominate at least one welfare variable as being
one of the two most important characteristics of
democracy than nominate a political variable.
FIGURE 6: POLITICAL AND WELFARE RIGHTS AS ESSEN-
TIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY (%)
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014.
Conclusions and Recommenda-
tions
Survey data show that while the Arab Upris-
ings may not have been motivated by a pursuit
of (liberal) democracy, there is certainly wide-
spread support for democracy and a strong
demand for social justice and economic inclu-
sion as part of democracy.
The EU rightly recognised the limits of its pre-
Uprisings Neighbourhood Policy, and in the ear-
ly aftermath of the 2010-2011 Uprisings it be-
gan to move towards re-assessing both the
goals and the instruments of this policy. Howev-
er, partly due to conflict in Iraq and Syria and the
ensuing refugee crisis – aggravated in European
public opinion by the problem of ‘Islamist’ ter-
rorism – the EU has backtracked from these
2
3
4
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
47.8
40.3
20.9
64.1
29.9
55.7
24.4
25.9
34.5
28.3
43.3
32.6
61.3
57.1
63.8
47.8
50.5
41.1
25.3
19.4
34.1
9.1
22.9
7.7
20.2
16.5
27
14.9
25.1
14
Political Freedom Against Authoritarianism Corruption
Basic Services Economic situation
Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
77.7
80.3
74.6
89.8
81.7
61.3
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
65.4
70.6
68.5
65.7
70.7
58.6
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
30.2
22
21.3
32.4
25.2
11.5
26.3
19.7
29.5
19.5
27.2
8.7
43.1
29.9
54.2
20.2
52
16
Elections Freedom of Speech
Political Equality
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
10.6
11.3
8.4
19.7
10.5
23
19.7
32.9
32.5
42
43.7
23
32.3
36.4
25.9
34.4
30.3
36.1
31.7
43.7
24
29.2
19.8
28.7
Inclusive Growth
Univeral Provision of Basic Services
Elimination of Corruption
Full Employment
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
60.8
73.8
50.1
69.5
52.4
59.5
74.8
57
78
61.3
78.7
30
43.1
29.9
54.2
20.2
52
16
Elections Political Right
Welfare Right
