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China's Interests and Goals in the Arctic: Implications for the United States
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... China's involvement in the Arctic is spurred by resource demands at home and expected future demand for resources. Primarily, China is concerned with an issue deemed the "Malacca dilemma"the possibility that hostile opponents (such as the United States) block essential energy supplies (Wishnick, 2017). Fueling this fear is China's reliance on foreign oil that is imported through the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. ...
... Fueling this fear is China's reliance on foreign oil that is imported through the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. Diversification of energy supply and shipping routes would sufficiently assuage this fear, especially considering China's growing import demand of oil (Ahad et al., 2019;Wishnick, 2017). The possible cessation of foreign imports through Malacca poses a considerable security risk to China. ...
... In recent years, fish stocks in the South China Sea have dropped by up to 75% (CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, 2017) and are speculated to continue to decline due to Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU) and the impacts of climate change (CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, 2017; Varley et al., 2020). In response, China has launched international fishing fleets to meet domestic demand (Urbina, 2020;Wishnick, 2017). China's resource needs in fisheries and energy security has led the nation to seek footholds in other resource-rich areas around the globe. ...
... She further argued that giving the PRC an observer status in the Arctic Council is controversial and its interest and goals in the region and Arctic Council have increased the concerns and questions for the world including the USA. One concern is that the incorporation of the non-arctic great powers would lead towards the militarization of the Arctic Ocean Region (Wishnick, 2017). ...
The Arctic Ocean Region is experiencing a transformation and is remoulding abruptly from an ice-covered region to an economic zone, influenced by the rising Global temperatures. This transformation has unplugged new avenues for maritime activities as well as intensified the Geopolitical dynamics. This study investigates and analyzes the rising tensions prompted by the increasing presence and activities of China in the Arctic region and the potential implications for the USA. Adopting a Qualitative approach, this research analyzes and examines the PRC's involvement and activities in the region along with the Arctic Policies of the PRC and the United States. The study explores the complex interplay of interests and motives of both powers and potential implications and challenges arising from the growing Chinese presence of the USA in the strategically important region.
... 18 In the past, others have pointed to the problem of confining Arctic security discussions to NATO bodies, which necessarily exclude Russia, leaving the region without a forum for discussing key security issues. 19 As Rowe notes, current Arctic dynamics are more anchored in the military dimension, as discussed in the following section. Nevertheless, even if a forum to discuss Arctic security issues with Russia existed, members would likely feel equally reluctant to engage with it at this juncture on hard security issues. ...
This article explores how the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has upended and reshaped Arctic security, institutions, and partnerships. With Arctic governance institutions that include Russia, such as the Arctic Council, on pause and scientific collaboration with Russia interrupted, the military dimension has overshadowed Arctic cooperation-while highlighting the traditional security risks of dependence on fossil fuels and distracting attention from other key Arctic issues such as climate change and the socioeconomic development of indigenous communities. Russia's ambitions for agency as Arctic Council chair have been thwarted, and Moscow's plans for economic development of the Russian Arctic and Northern Sea Route are in doubt. Although some regional cooperation continues through multilateral agreements, the path forward for dialogue on traditional and nontraditional security in the Arctic remains uncertain.
In 2018 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) released its Arctic policy and articulated its position, principles, and goals as a “near-Arctic state.” In the years since, China has become a central focus of the growing academic and professional discourse surrounding the emerging Arctic and has positioned itself as a consequential actor in regional affairs. This article examines the opportunities and limitations for China in the High North by focusing on its four key drivers for Arctic engagement: resource extraction, international shipping, scientific pursuits, and international prestige. This article finds that while China’s involvement in Arctic affairs is growing, there are still significant roadblocks to its ambitions which it will need to overcome in order to reach its goal of being recognized as an Arctic power.
External freedom of manoeuvre (action space) is a meaningful concept, although it is difficult to “measure”—which is often the case with crucial concepts. Scandinavian countries testing the limits of their freedom of manoeuvre will be analysed, learning about it the “hard way” by being subject to great power disciplining. Subsequently, the contours of a theory are sketched, in which freedom of manoeuvre is the missing link between (locational) power polarity and states’ foreign-policy profile. The theory involves a medium “explanatory leap”. A distance from systemic polarity to foreign policies is mostly too long for a systematic pattern to occur. By contrast, constructivist approaches often entail too short a leap, making them almost truistic. A theory of freedom of manoeuvre would be useful for prescriptive purposes. Rather than merely describing and interpreting their discourse, it can offer policy advice to decision-makers. This will seldom be about the positive line of action to be chosen in any given situation, but rather about the outer limits of what they can do. On the other hand, they should not be docile and desist from occasionally challenging the limits of freedom.
This concluding chapter attempts to adjudicate debates and resolve apparent contradictions among the preceding arguments to arrive at a complete, synthetic explanation of China-Russia cooperation. In making the case that this collection is a substantial advance in scholarship on China-Russia relations, it also identifies important limitations, and maps out a path forward for subsequent scholarship to build on the progress made in this volume to further refine our causal understanding of the vital China-Russia relationship.
This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.
In recent years, up to 40% of the central Arctic Ocean has been ice-free in summer. This open water makes access possible for ordinary vessels, including fishing boats. The five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States) have agreed to develop an international agreement to prohibit unregulated fishing in international waters of the central Arctic Ocean. Non-Arctic countries, including China, and regional organizations such as the European Union will be invited to join the ensuing negotiations. Participation would strengthen China's interest in Arctic affairs in a cooperative fashion, in contrast to a perception that China is interested solely in extracting Arctic resources and is thus a competitor with Arctic states. China's scientific capacity, including the icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon), provides it with an opportunity to practice marine and polar science diplomacy and to contribute further to Arctic cooperation and collaborative understanding. The precautionary approach of managing resources before extraction begins may make cooperative actions easier, as no one yet has a stake in the resource, and could provide a model for other regions that are developing international mechanisms for governance of international waters.
Recent years have seen an exponential growth in political, economic and
scientific ties between Iceland and China. While there is a rising consensus
amongst the Icelandic political and entrepreneurial elite that engagement
with China can strengthen Iceland’s strategic position, less is known about
how the general Icelandic public views this engagement. This paper presents
the results of a phased, mixed-methods research project designed to gauge
the Icelandic public’s opinion on the deepening Sino-Icelandic relationship.
Results indicate that while the Icelandic public views political and scientific
engagement with China either positively or neutrally, factors specific to both
China and Iceland - including a pronounced lack of trust in the Icelandic
political establishment and a suspicion of Chinese motives in Iceland and
the Arctic – cause any economic engagement with China that is deeper than
conventional beyond trade to be viewed with a mixture of caution and fear.
These findings contribute to an on-going debate amongst Icelandic foreign
a!airs and economic practitioners as well as international relations scholars
interested in the changing nature of Arctic relationships.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into consideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its maritime military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article concludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise as global sea power, for the time being, China cannot be considered as a variable for Arctic security as there are no sufficient legal and policy objective elements to adduct that it constitutes a threat to Artic ocean security.
Interest in the Arctic has increased considerably in recent years, in both academic and policy circles. The role of China has figured prominently in many debates currently surrounding the Arctic. Relating to claims that a “China threat” might materialise in the region, concerns are being raised that China is employing “lawfare” to pursue its objectives in the Arctic. In an attempt to re-examine such assertions, this paper addresses the question “To what extent does China’s strategy in the Arctic constitute a case of lawfare?” In defining lawfare as “the misuse of the law to achieve a military objective and to undermine the legal framework”, the findings of this paper belie the perception that China’s activities in the Arctic qualify as lawfare. Rather, China’s actions have been in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; its main objectives in the Arctic seem to be economic and commercial instead of military in nature; and reform advocacy is not unique to China and might even strengthen rather than undermine the Arctic’s current legal and governance framework.
This article discusses the type of partnership Russia pursues towards China in the Arctic. Through evidence, the author finds that while Russia may be aiming for an overall strategic partnership, Arctic developments on the whole conclude on a pragmatic approach. Russia needs assistance to develop the Arctic and an eastward diversification is opportune. Russia’s energy development in the Arctic indicates an emerging strategic co-operation with China, but policies towards Beijing concerning the Arctic Council and the Northern Sea Route prove to be more pragmatic. The general bilateral relationship gives incentives for expanding co-operation to the Arctic, but Russia’s sovereignty and security concerns limit the opportunities.