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China's Interests and Goals in the Arctic: Implications for the United States
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... China's involvement in the Arctic is spurred by resource demands at home and expected future demand for resources. Primarily, China is concerned with an issue deemed the "Malacca dilemma"the possibility that hostile opponents (such as the United States) block essential energy supplies (Wishnick, 2017). Fueling this fear is China's reliance on foreign oil that is imported through the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. ...
... Fueling this fear is China's reliance on foreign oil that is imported through the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. Diversification of energy supply and shipping routes would sufficiently assuage this fear, especially considering China's growing import demand of oil (Ahad et al., 2019;Wishnick, 2017). The possible cessation of foreign imports through Malacca poses a considerable security risk to China. ...
... In recent years, fish stocks in the South China Sea have dropped by up to 75% (CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, 2017) and are speculated to continue to decline due to Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU) and the impacts of climate change (CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, 2017; Varley et al., 2020). In response, China has launched international fishing fleets to meet domestic demand (Urbina, 2020;Wishnick, 2017). China's resource needs in fisheries and energy security has led the nation to seek footholds in other resource-rich areas around the globe. ...
... 52 Meanwhile, the PLAN has expanded its global reach to join in various maritime security missions, including operations at the entrances to the Arctic. 53 China's ability to maintain a faraway base in Djibouti is viewed as a proving ground for important lessons on extended deployments and resupply. 54 But this is, of course, not the primary or most visible use of China's peacetime maritime capability. ...
For the first time since World War II the most likely friction points between a rising, potentially revisionist power and a declining, largely status-quo power are located at sea. This special issue accordingly seeks to set an appropriate agenda for security studies research. It presents six interconnected articles exploring different dimensions of maritime competition, largely between China and the United States. Between them, the articles employ three important approaches to security studies: quantitative analysis, pairing classic international relations theory with qualitative evidence, and operational-level research. Together, they consider different geographies—competition and conflict in the Western Pacific versus in the greater Middle East; different issue areas such contending legal claims and control over sea lines of communication; and, finally, different uses of naval power—including blockades, naval diplomacy, fleet engagements, and nuclear escalation. Combined, the issue encourages applying the many classic approaches of security studies to this high-stakes relationship while considering maritime conflict as distinct from other forms, such as land and nuclear, that have traditionally occupied the field.
China in the Arctic: Arctic Silk Road
Due to global climate change, melting of pack ice and fast ice has been accelerated in the Arctic. It is estimated that the region will be free of ice during the summers in the future. As this change will create new economic and commercial opportunities in the region, some non-Arctic countries but observer members of the Arctic Council have revealed their Arctic policy papers in order to benefit from these potential opportunities. Although People’s Republic of China (China) is not an Arctic country, she is keenly engaging in the region and does not only concentrates its investments and scientific researches in the Arctic but also strengthens its bilateral relations with many Arctic countries. China revealed its Arctic policy paper, which is called Arctic Silk Road in 2018. The aim of this article is to explore and explain the reasons of China’s Arctic engagement and expectations from the region and discuss whether these expectations can be achieved. The paper firstly outlines geographic and legislative features of the Arctic. Then, it touches the Spitsbergen Treaty and administration of Svalbard Archipelago. The following section delineates constituents of the China’s Arctic policy and discusses what China wants from the Arctic and why. Subsequently, the reactions of Arctic countries to Arctic Silk Road are overviewed. In the light of the complicated legislative, administrative and geopolitics features of the region and reactions of Arctic countries, the final section discusses if the Chinese ambitions are realistic and achievable. Certainly, economic and commercial interests are the main elements, which attract China to the region. However, in an international political economy context, the main assertion of the article is that Arctic Silk Road is a new manifestation of China’s active foreign policy employed in the last two decades and its desire for being a leader, a rule designer country in the world. Furthermore, the Arctic region is now being a competition arena among the USA, China and Russia. Hence, the future of the region and position of China in the Arctic will be essentially determined by outcomes of this competition.
Keywords: China, Arctic, Arctic Silk Road, Belt and Road Initiative, Svalbard.
Rapporten viser, at den nuværende udvikling i Arktis, der er præget af stormagtsrivalisering mellem Rusland, Kina og USA, sætter Kongeriget i en svær situation. Som en lille stat har Kongeriget draget fordel af perioden med sikkerhedspolitisk lavspænding i Arktis. Den sikkerhedspolitiske lavspænding er nu under pres. Det er i Kongerigets interesse at forsøge at værne om de arktiske fora og samarbejdsrelationer, der har gjort lavspændingen muligt. Kongeriget må imidlertid også forholde sig til de nye sikkerhedspolitiske dynamikker i Arktis. Dette skaber behov for ændrede tilgange både i forhold til stormagterne og deres interesser i Arktis og i forhold til samarbejdet i Rigsfællesskabet.
Kongeriget må arbejde på at imødegå bekymrende russisk og kinesisk adfærd i Arktis. Endnu mere presserende for Kongeriget er imidlertid at håndtere de nylige amerikanske reaktioner på russisk og kinesisk adfærd i Arktis og ikke mindst de nye amerikanske krav og forventninger til dansk opgaveløsning i regionen, som følger med. Her bør Kongeriget handle hurtigt og proaktivt søge at holde kontrol med den amerikanske politik i forhold til Grønland og Færøerne. Det er i den forbindelse centralt, at Rigsfællesskabet formår at opretholde en fælles linje overfor stormagterne.
The article deals with the process of formation of China’s Arctic policy and mechanisms for its implementation. Till the end of the 1990s, Beijing was not interested in the Arctic region because of its geographical remoteness from China, as well as because of the lack of the necessary scientific and technological basis. The economic reforms of 1972 and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 gave an impetus to the development of China’s policy in the Arctic. Since then, China has intensified its activities aimed at expanding the state’s presence in the region. Special attention is given to China’s policy document in the region ― a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy”. It is noted that this document was aimed at legitimizing China’s activities in the region.
Despite the fact that the Arctic is not a priority region for Beijing, China is a prominent actor there. China’s attention to the Arctic is determined by economic factors, namely, by the possible development of the region’s resources, as well as its transport capacities, which can be used in the framework of the One Belt One Road Initiative.
The article analyses China’s cooperation with the «Arctic five» countries and the position of the Arctic States towards intensifying Beijing’s activities in the region. China is promoting cooperation with Norway, Denmark and Iceland. despite the existing contradictions, it is noted that the Arctic states are interested, as Chinese investments play an important role in the development of the region. China has consistently stated the need for greater involvement of interested non-regional states in the multilateral management of the region, while respecting the sovereignty of the Arctic countries.
The article is devoted to the cooperation of Russia and China in the Arctic, in particular, the identification of the potential and prospects of the Russian-Chinese partnership in the Arctic region. Three main stages of bilateral cooperation are considered: China’s desire to join the Arctic Council as a permanent observer; access to the North Sea, providing access to navigation; access to natural resources, oil and gas. Based on the results of the systemic and comparative analysis, it was concluded that Russia and the PRC in the Arctic have more common approaches than disagreements, and Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic can become mutually beneficial.
This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.
In recent years, up to 40% of the central Arctic Ocean has been ice-free in summer. This open water makes access possible for ordinary vessels, including fishing boats. The five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States) have agreed to develop an international agreement to prohibit unregulated fishing in international waters of the central Arctic Ocean. Non-Arctic countries, including China, and regional organizations such as the European Union will be invited to join the ensuing negotiations. Participation would strengthen China's interest in Arctic affairs in a cooperative fashion, in contrast to a perception that China is interested solely in extracting Arctic resources and is thus a competitor with Arctic states. China's scientific capacity, including the icebreaker Xuelong (Snow Dragon), provides it with an opportunity to practice marine and polar science diplomacy and to contribute further to Arctic cooperation and collaborative understanding. The precautionary approach of managing resources before extraction begins may make cooperative actions easier, as no one yet has a stake in the resource, and could provide a model for other regions that are developing international mechanisms for governance of international waters.
Recent years have seen an exponential growth in political, economic and
scientific ties between Iceland and China. While there is a rising consensus
amongst the Icelandic political and entrepreneurial elite that engagement
with China can strengthen Iceland’s strategic position, less is known about
how the general Icelandic public views this engagement. This paper presents
the results of a phased, mixed-methods research project designed to gauge
the Icelandic public’s opinion on the deepening Sino-Icelandic relationship.
Results indicate that while the Icelandic public views political and scientific
engagement with China either positively or neutrally, factors specific to both
China and Iceland - including a pronounced lack of trust in the Icelandic
political establishment and a suspicion of Chinese motives in Iceland and
the Arctic – cause any economic engagement with China that is deeper than
conventional beyond trade to be viewed with a mixture of caution and fear.
These findings contribute to an on-going debate amongst Icelandic foreign
a!airs and economic practitioners as well as international relations scholars
interested in the changing nature of Arctic relationships.
The impact of climate change in the Arctic Ocean such as ice melting and ice retreat facilitates natural resources extraction. Arctic fossil fuel becomes the drivers of geopolitical changes in the Arctic Ocean. Climate change facilitates natural resource extractions and increases competition between states and can result in tensions, even military ones. This article investigates through a political and legal analysis the role of China as an emerging regulatory sea power in the Arctic Ocean given its assertive “energy hungry country behaviour” in the Arctic Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council (AC) are taken into consideration under climate change effects, to assess how global legal frameworks and institutions can deal with China’s strategy in the Arctic Ocean. China’s is moving away from its role as “humble power” to one of “informal imperialistic” resulting in substantial impact on the Arctic and Antartic dynamism. Due to ice-melting, an easy access to natural resources, China’s Arctic strategy in the Arctic Ocean has reinforced its military martitime strategy and has profoundly changed its maritime military doctrine shifting from regional to global in the context of UNCLOS. In particular, it is wondered, what China understands about the public order dimension of UNCLOS. The article concludes that despite China’ assertive behaviour towards the Arctic environmental ocean and its rise as global sea power, for the time being, China cannot be considered as a variable for Arctic security as there are no sufficient legal and policy objective elements to adduct that it constitutes a threat to Artic ocean security.
Interest in the Arctic has increased considerably in recent years, in both academic and policy circles. The role of China has figured prominently in many debates currently surrounding the Arctic. Relating to claims that a “China threat” might materialise in the region, concerns are being raised that China is employing “lawfare” to pursue its objectives in the Arctic. In an attempt to re-examine such assertions, this paper addresses the question “To what extent does China’s strategy in the Arctic constitute a case of lawfare?” In defining lawfare as “the misuse of the law to achieve a military objective and to undermine the legal framework”, the findings of this paper belie the perception that China’s activities in the Arctic qualify as lawfare. Rather, China’s actions have been in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; its main objectives in the Arctic seem to be economic and commercial instead of military in nature; and reform advocacy is not unique to China and might even strengthen rather than undermine the Arctic’s current legal and governance framework.
This article discusses the type of partnership Russia pursues towards China in the Arctic. Through evidence, the author finds that while Russia may be aiming for an overall strategic partnership, Arctic developments on the whole conclude on a pragmatic approach. Russia needs assistance to develop the Arctic and an eastward diversification is opportune. Russia’s energy development in the Arctic indicates an emerging strategic co-operation with China, but policies towards Beijing concerning the Arctic Council and the Northern Sea Route prove to be more pragmatic. The general bilateral relationship gives incentives for expanding co-operation to the Arctic, but Russia’s sovereignty and security concerns limit the opportunities.