The baby and the bathwater: Trophy hunting, conservation and rural livelihoods

Abstract

Trophy hunting is the subject of intense debate and polarized positions, with controversy and deep
concern over some hunting practices and their ethical basis and impacts. The controversy has sparked moves at various levels to end or restrict trophy hunting, including through bans on the carriage or import of hunting trophies. In March 2016, for example, a group of members of the European Parliament called (unsuccessfully) for the signing of a Written Declaration calling for examination of the possibility of restricting all imports of
hunting trophies into the European Union. Although there is a pressing need for the reform of hunting governance and practice in many countries, calls for blanket restrictions on trophy hunting assume that it is uniformly detrimental to conservation; such calls are frequently made based on poor information and inaccurate assumptions. Here we explain how trophy hunting, if well managed, can play a positive role in supporting conservation as well as local community rights and livelihoods, and we provide examples from various parts of the world. We highlight the likely impact of blanket bans on trophy hunting and argue for a more nuanced approach to much needed reform.

Full text

An internat ional journal of fore stry and forest ind ustries Vol. 68 2017/1
249
ISSN 0041-6436
SUSTAINABLE
WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT

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Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
There is substantial evidence that the controversial practice of trophy
hunting can produce positive outcomes for wildlife conservation and
local people. T
rophy hunting is the subject of
intense debate and polarized posi-
tions, with controversy and deep
concern over some hunting practices
and their ethical basis and impacts. The
controversy has sparked moves at various
levels to end or restrict trophy hunting,
including through bans on the carriage
or import of hunting trophies. In March
2016, for example, a group of members
of the European Parliament called (unsuc-
cessfully) for the signing of a Written
Declaration calling for examination of
the possibility of restricting all imports of
hunting trophies into the European Union.
The baby and the bathwater:
trophy hunting, conservation and rural livelihoods
R. Cooney, C. Freese, H. Dublin, D. Roe, D. Mallon, M. Knight, R. Emslie, M. Pani,
V. Booth, S. Mahoney and C. Buyanaa
Rosie Co oney is Chair of t he Internationa l Union
for Conservation of Natu re (IUCN) Com mission
on Environmental, Ec onomic and Social Policy
(CEESP)/Species Surv ival Commission (SSC)
Sustainable Use a nd Livelihoods Special ist
Group and Visiting Fel low at the University of
New South Wales, Australia.
Curtis Frees e, Marco Pa ni and Verno n Booth
are independent consu ltants and members of
the IUCN CE ESP/SSC Sustainable Use and
Livelihoods Spe cialist Group.
Holly Dublin is Chair of the I UCN SSC African
Elephant Specia list Group, Senior Advisor at
the IUCN Ea st and Southern Af rica Regional
Ofce, and a member of the IUCN CEESP/SSC
Sustainable Use a nd Livelihoods Special ist
Group.
Dilys Roe is Pr incipal Researcher a nd Team
Leader ( Biodiversity) at the Internationa l
Institute for Envi ronment and Development and
a member of the IUC N CEESP/SSC Sustainable
Use and Livelihoods Sp ecialist Group.
David Mallon is Co- chair of the IUCN SSC
Antelope Spec ialist Group and a membe r of
the IUCN CE ESP/SSC Sustainable Use and
Livelihoods Spe cialist Group.
Michael Kn ight is Co-chai r of the IUCN SSC
Africa n Rhino Speci alist Group and a membe r
of the IUCN CE ESP/SSC Sustainable Use and
Livelihoods Spe cialist Group.
Richard Emslie is Scientic Ofcer with the
IUCN SSC Afr ican Rhino Sp ecialist Group.
Shane Mahoney is Chief Executive Ofcer at
Conservation Visions a nd Deputy Chai r for North
Amer ica of the IUC N CEESP/SSC Sustainable
Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group.
Chimeddorj Buyana a is Conservation Dir ector
at the W W F Mong ol i a Pr o g r a m m e Of  c e.
© JOACHIM HUBER [CC BY-SA 2.0 (H TTP://CREATIVE COMMONS.ORG/LICENSES /BY-SA/2.0)], VIA WI KIMEDIA COM MONS
Above: Elephants bathe in the
Chobe River, Botswana

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
4
Although there is a pressing need for the
reform of hunting governance and practice
in many countries, calls for blanket restric-
tions on trophy hunting assume that it is
uniformly detrimental to conservation;
such calls are frequently made based on
poor information and inaccurate assump-
tions. Here we explain how trophy hunting,
if well managed, can play a positive role
in supporting conservation as well as local
community rights and livelihoods, and we
provide examples from various parts of the
world. We highlight the likely impact of
blanket bans on trophy hunting and argue
for a more nuanced approach to much-
needed reform.
WHAT IS TROPHY HUNTING?
Here we dene trophy hunting as hunting
carried out on a recreational basis (i.e. not
“subsistence” hunting carried out as part
of basic livelihood strategies) targeting
animals with specic desired characteris-
tics (such as large size or antlers). Trophy
hunting generally involves the payment
of a fee by a foreign or local hunter for
an (often guided) experience for one or
more individuals in hunting a particular
species with desired characteristics. The
hunter generally retains the antlers, horn,
tusks, head, teeth or other body parts of
the animal as a memento or “trophy”,
and the local community or the hunter
usually uses the meat for food. Trophy
hunting takes place in most countries of
Europe, the United States of America,
Canada, Mexico, several countries in
East, Central and South Asia, around
half the 54 countries in Africa (Booth and
Chardonnet, 2015), several countries in
Central and South America, and Australia
and New Zealand.
We note, however, that the term “trophy
hunting” can be misleading. Hunting takes
many forms, and hunters have diverse
motivations. Gaining trophies may be a
minor or incidental motivation for some
hunters, who may also be motivated by,
for example, the prospect of obtaining
food; managing a population in order to
conserve other species of plants or animals
or to enable forest regeneration; being in
nature; continuing a culturally important
or traditional set of practices; and inter-
acting with family and friends. In many
contexts, trophy hunting overlaps substan-
tially with hunting for food. Many deer
hunters, for example, may hunt animals
with larger antlers if encountered, but will
hunt others (for meat) should the desired
animal not be found.
A wide variety of species is subject to
trophy hunting, from common to threat-
ened. Most are native, but some (e.g. deer
in Australia and New Zealand) are intro-
duced. The hunting of introduced species
constitutes a small proportion of hunting
and raises different conservation issues
to those associated with the hunting of
native species; it is not discussed further
in this article.
Although there is a tendency for the
media and decision-makers to conate
“canned” hunting (hunting of usually
captive-bred animals in enclosures from
which they are unable to escape, or of
recently released animals unfamiliar with
the area) with legitimate trophy hunting,
canned hunting is a limited practice (pri-
marily involving lions in South Africa)
and is condemned by major professional
hunting organizations. It raises different
issues to those associated with the hunt-
ing of free-ranging animals and is not
discussed further in this article.
Trophy hunting is also frequently (and
incorrectly) conflated with poaching
for the organized international illegal
wildlife trade that is devastating many
species, including the African elephant
(Loxodonta africana) and African rhinos
(black – Diceros bicornis – and white –
Ceratotherium simum). Trophy hunting
typically takes place as a legal, regulated
activity under programmes implemented by
government wildlife agencies, protected-
area managers, indigenous or local
community bodies, private landowners or
conservation or development organizations,
whereas poaching for the illegal wildlife
trade is – by denition – illegal and un-
managed. Poaching for the illegal wildlife
trade is generally far more damaging in
both scale and demographic impact, with
breeding females and calves often killed.
In Africa, for example, 1 342 African rhi-
nos (including both species) were reported
poached in 2015 – almost 20 times more
than the 69 that were hunted legally that
year (Emslie et al., 2016). All revenue from
poaching for the illegal wildlife trade ows
to criminals; on the other hand, revenues
from legal hunting are used in a number of
cases to fund law enforcement or provide
community benets that counter the incen-
tives to engage in illegal wildlife trade (see,
for example, case studies 1, 2 and 4 later
in this article).
In some contexts, all decisions on hunt-
ing quotas, species and areas are made by
government wildlife agencies (for example
in the United States of America – case
study 3). In many trophy-hunting gover-
nance systems, however, local landowners
and community organizations participate
alongside governments in deciding these
questions and sometimes are the key
decision-makers, at least for some species
(e.g. in Namibian communal conservan-
cies – see case study 5).
This is not to say that no illegal practices
take place – as, to a certain extent, they
do in most sectors. Widespread anecdotal
reports indicate that regulatory weak-
nesses and illegal activities exist in the
trophy-hunting sector in some countries,
sometimes at a very serious scale and
sometimes involving ofcial corruption.
Such activities include hunting in excess
of quotas or in the wrong areas, the tak-
ing of non-permitted species, and “pseudo
hunting” (case study 1).
The prices paid for trophy hunts vary
enormously, from the equivalent of hun-
dreds to hundreds of thousands of United
States dollars; at a global scale, such hunts
involve a substantial revenue ow from
developed to developing countries (e.g.
Booth, 2009; Saayman, van der Merwe
and Rossouw, 2011). In developing coun-
tries, landowners and land managers often
negotiate with hunting operators (or “con-
cessionaires”) to decide who will get the

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Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
hunting right or concession on their land,
and on what terms. Terms may include
(and, in some countries, must include, if
on state land) obligations to carry out anti-
poaching and community development
activities. The operator, in turn, secures
contracts with foreign clients and runs the
hunting trips. The fees paid by hunters
generally include three things:
1.
the operator’s costs (where applicable);
2.
payments to the local entity (e.g. com-
munity, private or state landowner or
land manager) with which the opera-
tor has the contract; and
3.
official government payments of
various types (e.g. permits and fees),
which typically help nance wild-
life management and conservation
activities.
In developing countries, generally 50–90
percent of the net revenues (excluding
operator costs) are allocated to local
entities, with the remainder going to gov-
ernment authorities. The local community
benet can be as high as 100 percent and
as low as nearly zero. Meat from hunts is
often donated or sold to local community
members and can be highly valued locally
(Naidoo et al., 2016). In most countries
in Europe and North America, a share of
hunters’ fees usually goes to governmental
wildlife authorities to help nance wildlife
management and conservation activities.
WHAT IMPACTS DOES
TROPHY HUNTING HAVE ON
CONSERVATION?
Trophy hunting takes place in a wide
range of governance, management and
ecological contexts and, accordingly, its
impacts on conservation vary enormously,
from negative through neutral to positive.
Good evidence on the impacts is lacking or
scarce in many contexts, making it impos-
sible to fully evaluate the overall effect of
trophy hunting.
Negative conservation impacts of poorly
managed trophy hunting may include over-
harvesting; articial selection for rare or
exaggerated features (e.g. abnormal colour
morphs); genetic or phenotypic impacts
(such as reduced horn size); the intro-
duction of species or subspecies beyond
their natural ranges (including into other
countries); and predator removal.
It is clear, however, that, given effective
governance and management, trophy hunt-
ing can and does have positive impacts
(as shown in the six case studies in this
article). Habitat loss, fragmentation and
degradation, driven primarily by the
expansion of human economic activities,
is the most important threat to terrestrial
wildlife populations (Mace et al., 2005),
along with other threats such as poaching
for bushmeat and illegal wildlife trade and
competition with livestock. Demands for
food, income and land for development
are rising in many biodiversity-rich parts
of the world, exacerbating threats to wild-
life and increasing the urgency of nding
viable conservation incentives.
Well-managed trophy hunting can be a
positive driver of conservation because
it increases the value of wildlife and the
habitats it depends on, providing crucial
benefits that can motivate and enable
sustainable management approaches.
Trophy-hunting programmes can have
the following positive impacts:
•
Generate incentives for landowners
(e.g. government, private individu-
als and communities) to conserve
or restore wildlife on their land.
Benets to landowners from hunting
can make wildlife an attractive land-
use option, encouraging landowners
to maintain or restore wildlife habitat
and populations, remove livestock,
invest in monitoring and management,
and carry out anti-poaching activi-
ties. Policies enabling landowners
to benet from sustainable wildlife
use have led to the total or partial
conversion of large areas of land
from livestock and cropping back
to wildlife in, for example, Mexico,
Namibia, Pakistan, South Africa,
the United States of America and
Zimbabwe (case studies 1 and 3–6).
This benet applies to state protected
areas as well as to private lands. In
sub-Saharan Africa, lands set aside
for wildlife in hunting concessions
cover as much land (or more) as
national parks (Lindsey, Roulet and
Romañach, 2007) and are often part
of national protected-area systems
(usually in IUCN categories IV and
VI).1 Given the intense and escalat-
ing pressures on land in developing
countries, particularly to produce
food, the future of these lands and the
wildlife that inhabit them would be
highly uncertain without the benets
owing from wildlife management.
•
Generate revenue for wildlife man-
agement and conservation, including
anti-poaching activities, for gov-
ernmental, private and communal
landholders (see case studies 1–6).
In most regions, government agencies
depend at least in part on revenues
from hunting to manage wildlife and
protected areas. State wildlife agen-
cies in the United States of America,
for example, are funded primarily by
hunters (both trophy and broader recre-
ational hunting) through various direct
and indirect mechanisms, including
the sale of trophy-hunting permits
(Heffelfinger, Geist and Wishart,
2013; Mahoney, 2013). The extent of
the world’s gazetted protected areas,
many of which are in IUCN catego-
ries IV and VI and include hunting
areas, could decline signicantly if
hunting areas were to become inop-
erable. Private landowners in South
Africa and Zimbabwe and com-
munal landowners in Namibia also
use trophy-hunting revenues to pay
guards and rangers, buy equipment,
and otherwise manage and protect
1 The aim of IUCN Protected Area Category IV
areas (“habitat/species management areas”) is
to protect particular species or habitats, and
management reflects this priority. The aim
of IUCN Protected Area Category VI areas
(“protected areas with sustainable use of natu-
ral resources”) is to conserve ecosystems and
habitats together with associated cultural values
and traditional natural resource management
systems (IUCN, 2 017).

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
6
wildlife (case studies 1 and 5). Reve-
nues from trophy-hunting operations in
Mongolia, Pakistan and Tajikistan are
used to pay local guards to stop poach-
ing and to improve habitat for game
animals (case studies 2 and 6). Trophy-
hunting operators and the patrols they
directly organize, nance and deploy
can reduce poaching (Lindsey, Roulet
and Romañach, 2007).
•
Increase tolerance of wild-
life and thereby reduce illegal
wildlife killings and human–wildlife
conicts. Retaliatory killings and
local poaching are common when
wildlife imposes serious costs on local
people – such as the loss of crops and
livestock and human injury or death
– and there are no legal means for
pe ople to benet from it. This is a pa r-
ticularly important factor in Africa,
where elephants and other species
destroy crops and where large cats
kill humans and livestock.
The incentives and revenues from trophy-
hunting programmes are not just important
for the conservation of hunted species:
site protection exercises a “biodiversity
umbrella” effect and may help conserve
non-hunted species, too. Populations of
African rhinos and the African wild dog
(Lycaon pictus) in the Savé and Bubye
conservancies in Zimbabwe are not hunted,
but proceeds from trophy hunting sup-
port their conservation (case study 4). In
the Pamirs in Tajikistan, trophy-hunting
concessions for argali (Ovis ammon) and
ibex (Capra ibex) (wild sheep and goats)
are showing higher densities of the threat-
ened snow leopard (Panthera uncia) than
nearby areas without trophy hunting, likely
due to higher prey densities and reduced
poaching (Kachel, 2014). High densities
of snow leopard have also been recorded
in a markhor (Capra falconeri) conser-
vancy (Rosen, 2014). In the United States
of America, the threatened grizzly bear
(Ursus arctos) population in the Yellow-
stone National Park region has beneted
from the retirement of areas of land
from livestock grazing and thus reduced
bear–livestock conicts, paid for partly by
revenues from trophy hunting for bighorn
sheep (Ovis canadensis) (K. Hurley, per-
sonal communication, 25 February 2016).
Concern is frequently expressed that
trophy hunting is driving declines of
iconic African large mammals such as
the elephant, rhino and lion (Panthera
leo). Although there is evidence in a small
number of cases – particularly concerning
the lion – that unsustainable trophy hunting
has contributed to declines (e.g. Loveridge
et al., 2007; Packer et al., 2011), it is not
considered a primary threat to any of
these species and is typically a negligible
or minor threat to African wildlife popula-
tions (Lindsey, 2015). The primary causes
of current and past population declines
© JÖRG HEMPEL [CC BY-SA 3.0 DE (HTTP://CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG/LIC ENSES/BY-SA/3.0/DE/DEED.EN)], VIA WIKIM EDIA COMMONS
Hunting for food and trophies
overlaps for species such as
red deer (Cervus elaphus)

7
Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
of the large mammals subject to trophy
hunting – such as the African elephant,
African buffalo, white rhino, black rhino,
zebra (Equus zebra and E. quagga), arga li,
ibex, bighorn sheep and various deer and
bear species – are habitat loss and degrada-
tion, competition with livestock, illegal or
uncontrolled poaching for meat and trade
in animal products (e.g. ivory and horn),
and retribution killings in human–wildlife
conicts (Schipper et al., 2008; Ripple
et al., 2015). For lions, the most important
causes of population declines are indis-
criminate killing in defence of human life
and livestock, habitat loss, and prey-base
depletion (usually from poaching) (Bauer
et al., 2015). For many of these species, as
noted in the case studies, well-managed
trophy hunting can promote population
recovery and protection and help in main-
taining habitats.
TROPHY HUNTING AND INDIGENOUS
AND LOCAL COMMUNITY RIGHTS
AND LIVELIHOODS
The contributions of trophy hunting to the
livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local
communities vary enormously by context
and region. In many cases, trophy hunting
takes place without meaningful community
participation in decision-making around
wildlife management, without adequate
respect for community rights and consent,
and with insufcient or poorly functioning
benet-sharing mechanisms, with most
value captured by hunting operators or
government agencies. In a significant
number of trophy-hunting programmes,
however, it is clear that indigenous peoples
and local communities have freely chosen
to use trophy hunting as a way of generat-
ing incentives and revenues for conserving
and managing their wildlife and improving
their livelihoods (case studies 2, 3, 5 and
6). In many other cases, communities have
less decision-making power over trophy
hunting but nevertheless gain a share of
hunting revenues (see Lindsey et al., 2 013).
Communities can benefit from trophy
hunting through hunting-concession pay-
ments or other hunter investments, which
typically provide improved community
services such as water infrastructure;
schools and health clinics; jobs as guides,
game guards, wildlife managers and other
hunting-related employment; and greater
access to game meat. Typically, indigenous
and local communities in and around hunt-
ing areas are very poor, with few sources
of income and sometimes no other legal
source of meat.
TROPHY HUNTING IN ACTION:
CASE STUDIES OF POSITIVE IMPACTS
In the intense ongoing debate over trophy
hunting, broad statements are often made
suggesting that all trophy hunting threatens
conservation or is driving declines in spe-
cies. For this reason, and because many
of these examples are not widely known,
we set out here a number of case studies
where trophy hunting is generating positive
benets for conservation and community
rights and livelihoods. Although examples
of poor approaches to trophy hunting also
exist and deserve similar scrutiny, these
typically involve illegal or non-transparent
behaviour, making veriable information
difcult to obtain.
Case study 1. Rhinos in Namibia and
South Africa
The history of rhino hunting in Namibia
and South Africa demonstrates clearly its
sustainability in terms of population num-
bers. Since trophy-hunting programmes
were introduced for white rhino in South
Africa, numbers have increased from
around 1 800 individuals in 1968 to just
over 18 400 today (Emslie et al., 2016;
Figure 1), with many more individuals also
reintroduced to other countries in the spe-
cies’ natural range. Since the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
© CHARL ESJSHARP (OWN WORK, FROM SH ARP PHOTOGRA PHY, SHARPPHOTOGRA PHY) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (HTTP://CREAT IVECOMMONS.ORG/LIC ENSES/BY-SA/4.0)], VIA WIKIM EDIA COMMONS
Lions: trophy hunting is not
conside red a primary threat
to their conservation and can
generate benets

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
8
approved limited hunting quotas for black
rhino in late 2004, the number of indi-
viduals in Namibia and South Africa has
increased by 67 percent, from about 2 300
in 2004 to about 3 900 today (Figure 1).
As of the end of 2015, Namibia and South
Africa hosted 90 percent of Africa’s total
black and white rhino population.
Hunting has played an integral role in
the recovery of the white rhino by provid-
ing incentives for private and communal
landowners to maintain the species on their
lands; generating income for conservation
and protection; and helping manage and
promote the recovery of populations.
In South Africa, the limited trophy hunt-
ing of rhinos, combined with live sales and
tourism, has provided an economic incen-
tive to encourage more than 300 private
landowners to build their collective herd
to about 6 140 white rhinos and 630 black
rhinos on 49 private or communal land-
holdings, representing around 1.7 million
hectares of conservation land – equiva-
lent to almost another Kruger National
Park (Balfour, Knight and Jones, 2016;
Emslie et al., 2016). The contribution of
trophy hunting to increasing the range and
numbers of these iconic species, therefore,
is signicant (and increasing).
Many private reserves rely heavily on
trophy hunting and the sale of white rhinos
(to other reserves) to cover operating
costs. For example, one self-funded South
African reserve manages an increasing
population of 195 white rhinos and many
other species.2 An analysis of eight years
of data showed that only about 18 percent
of that reserve’s total operating costs was
generated from tourism, with trophy hunt-
ing generating the bulk (63 percent) of
income needed to fund operations. The
reserve allocates all the proceeds from
rhino hunting to rhino protection and
conservation management. The reserve
manager has noted that a recent ban on
lion-trophy imports by the United States of
America has already caused the cancella-
tion of some hunts, with a negative impact
on income for conservation (M. Knight,
R. Emslie and K. Adcock, personal com-
munication, 18 March 2016).
Increasing security costs and risks due
to escalating poaching and declining
economic incentives have resulted in a
worrying trend, in which some private
landowners and managers are no longer
keeping rhinos; if this trend continues,
it could threaten the expansion of the
species’ ranges and numbers. Import
restrictions that threaten the viability of
hunting would likely further reduce incen-
tives and exacerbate the trend.
Hunting may also directly contribute to
population growth by removing males that
might (for example) kill or compete with
calves and females. The hunting of small
numbers of specic individual “surplus”
male black rhinos is approved in South
Africa only if criteria set out in the coun-
try’s black rhino biodiversity management
plan are met to ensure that hunting furthers
demographic and genetic conservation.
Generating revenue for conservation is
a bonus rather than the main driver of
this hunting.
In recent years, “pseudo hunters” have
used legal trophy hunting to access rhino
horn for illegal sale in Southeast Asia,
driving a spike in the number of individu-
als hunted to a high of 173 in 2011. The
introduction of control measures in South
Africa in 2012, however, has brought the
number of white rhinos hunted back down
to previous levels (Emslie et al., 2016).
Case study 2. Argali in Mongolia
Trophy hunting became legal in Mongolia
in 1967, with argali, particularly the Altai
argali (Ovis ammon ammon), the coun-
try’s most highly valued trophy animal.
An inadequate management framework,
2 The identity of this reserve is k nown to the IUC N
SSC African Rhino Specialist Group (a highly
credible and trusted authority), but we do not
reveal it here for rhino security reasons.
1
Estimated number
of white rhi nos
in South Africa
(left) and black
rhinos in South
Africa an d Namibia
(right) before
and after trophy
hunting started ()
in 196 8 and 20 05,
respectively
Year Year
1978 19891993 1994 19992008 2004 2009 2014196 31948
2 900
3 400
3 900
2 400
1 900
1 400
900
Sou rce: Redrawn from Emslie et al. (2 016).
20 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
18 000
10 000
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
0

9
Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
however, led to largely unmanaged,
open-access hunting. Argali populations
decli ned signi cantly, possibly with addi-
tional pressure arising from competition
with a rapidly growing domestic goat
population (Page, 2015; Wingard and
Za hler, 2006).
WWF Mongolia initiated a community-
based wildlife management project in the
Uvs administrative region in northwest
Mongolia in 2007. The objective was to
replace uncontrolled open-access use with
community wildlife management by seven
local groups, with revenues to be gener-
ated by trophy hunting, mainly of the Altai
argali. The 12.7 million-hectare Gulzat
Local Protected Area was established
and an initial ban on hunting was put in
place to enable population restoration.
With protection from local herders, the
population grew from about 200 in the
years immediately preceding the ban to
more than 1 500 in 2014 (Figure 2). This
growth continued as managed hunting
was initiated. Twelve Altai argali were
harvested in the four years following
the lifting of the ban, generating around
US$123 400 in income at the local level
(C. Buyanaa, personal communication,
2 March 2016).
Hunting is managed by the Gulzat
Initiative, a non-governmental organization
formed entirely of local community mem-
bers, with guidance from experts in wildlife
management, including certain hunting
companies. Trilateral contracts between
hunting companies, the Gulzat Initiative
and the district governor enhance trans-
parency and accountability (C. Buyanaa,
personal communication, 28 January 2016).
Recent legal developments in Mon-
golia have established a sound basis for
community-based wildlife management,
informed by experiences from communal
conservancies in Namibia (see case study 5).
Case study 3. Bighorn sheep in
North America
Euro-American settlement and the cor-
responding surge in livestock numbers and
uncontrolled hunting led to a rapid decline
in bighorn sheep in North America, from
roughly 1 million individuals in 1800 to
fewer than 25 000 in 1950. Since then,
based primarily on more than US$100 mil-
lion contributed by trophy-hunting groups
through fees and donations, hundreds of
thousands of hectares have been set aside
for bighorn sheep and other wildlife, and
the bighorn population has more than
tripled from its historic low to roughly
80 000 today (Hurley, Brewer and
Thor nton, 2 015).
Restoration of the bighorn sheep popu-
lation in Canada and the United States
of America was brought about largely
by hunters working with provincial and
state wildlife agencies to support research,
habitat acquisition and management. In the
American state of Wyoming, for example,
auctions of bighorn sheep hunting tags
yield approximately US$350 000 annually,
of which 70 percent goes to conserving
bighorn sheep and 10 percent goes to the
conservation of other wildlife. These funds
were used to cover approximately one-
third of the more than US$2 million paid to
producers of domestic sheep to voluntarily
remove sheep from 187 590 hectares of
public grazing lands (with the other two-
thirds of the cost met from fees paid by
other hunt ing, sh ing and wildl ife groups;
K. Hurley, personal communication,
23 February 2016).
Indigenous-managed trophy hunting has
also driven recoveries of bighorn sheep
in Mexico. In 1975, 20 individuals were
reintroduced to Tiburon Island in the Sea
of Cortez, an island owned and managed
by Seri Indians. The original cause of the
extinction of the species on the island is
unknown, but the population grew quickly
after reintroduction to around 500, prob-
ably the island’s carrying capacity. In 1995,
a coalition of institutions initiated a pro-
gramme to fund bighorn sheep research
and conservation while providing needed
income for the Seri through the interna-
tional auctioning of exclusive hunting
permits on the island.
Initially, perm its oft en garnered 6-gure
bids (in US dollars). From 1998 to 2007,
the Seri Indians earned US$3.2 million
from bighorn sheep hunting permits and
the sale of young animals for transloca-
tion – funds that were reinvested in Seri
2
Population counts fo r Altai arg ali in the
Gulzat Lo cal Protected Area , Mongoli a
1 800
1 600
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
Year
Not e: Population gures are the numbers of an imals observed in an nual transect and poi nt surveys, with a
low likeliho od of animals being counted more tha n once; gures therefore represent minimu m estimates.
Sou rce: Chimeddorj Buyanaa, WWF Mongolia, unpublished data.
2003 2004 20 05 2007 2008 2009 2010 20 1220 11 2014
No. of individuals

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
10
community projects, the management of
the bighorn sheep population, and the
maintenance of the island in an undis-
turbed state. The funding of the island’s
conservation through trophy hunting
continues, with the Seri recently selling
permits for US$80 000–90 000 each. The
island has also been an important source
population for the re-establishment of
bighorn sheep populations in the Sonoran
Desert and elsewhere on the mainland.
Many ranchers in the Sonoran Desert have
greatly reduced or eliminated livestock to
focus on wildlife because of the substantial
revenues that can be generated from trophy
hunting for bighorn sheep and mule deer
(Odocoileus hemionus) (Valdez et al.,
2006; Wilder et al., 2014; Hurley, Brewer
and Thornton, 2015).
Case study 4. Private wildlife lands in
Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, the devolution of wildlife
use rights to landholders in 1975 resulted
in a transition in the wildlife sector from
game ranching as the hobby of a few dozen
ranchers to, by 2000, some 1 000 land-
owners conserving 2.7 million hectares
of wildlife land, with trophy hunting a
primary driver of this change (Child, 2009;
PHOTO CREDI T: JWANAMAKER (OWN WORK) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (HTTP: //CREATIVECOMMO NS.ORG/LICENSES/BY-SA/3.0)], VIA WIK IMEDIA COMMONS
A bighorn sh eep,
New Mexico, United
States of America
Year
No. of individuals
Not e: The privately owned Bubye Valley Conservancy is on land previously used for farming and depends
on trophy hunting to fund wildlife conservation. Samanyanga is an area in the east of the conservancy on
the banks of the Bubye River.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200 4 20092008200720062005 2 0 112 010 2012
0
50
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
100
Original lion monitoring data
History
1999 13 lions introduced into Samanyanga
(+ 4 young mal es break in )
2001 Lion monitoring ceases
2009 Conservation research initiated:
WildCRU te am from Ox ford
Oxford WildCRU Predator Sur vey data
3
The lion po pulation i n the privately
owned Bubye Val ley Conser vancy,
Zimbabwe, 1999–2012

11
Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
Lindsey, Romañach and Davies-Mostert,
2009). The number of landholders involved
and the area of wildlife land conserved
have since declined signicantly under
the land reform programme; neverthe-
less, despite the challenging economic
conditions in the country today, private
conservancies continue to play a crucial
role in conservation. The two conservan-
cies described below both rely on trophy
hunting as the primary source of revenue
and would be unviable without it. Both
have made efforts to attract nature-based
tourism that does not include hunting
(often referred to as photographic tourism),
but this does not contribute signicant
revenue (Zimbabwe’s political instability
has had far more impact on photographic
tourism than on hunting tourism).
The Savé Valley Conservancy (SVC),
covering 344 000 hectares, was created
in the 1990s by livestock ranchers who
agreed that wildlife management could
be a better use of the land than livestock.
Cattle-ranching operations had eliminated
all elephants, rhinos, buffaloes and lions
(among other species) in the area. Today,
SVC has around 1 500 African elephants,
121 black and 42 white rhinos, 280 lions
and several packs of African wild dog.
Hunting on the Sango Ranch, SVC’s largest
property, yields around US$600 000 annu-
ally and employs 120 permanent workers,
who represent more than 1 000 family
members (Lindsey et al., 2008; W. Pabst
and D. Goosen, personal communication,
9 February 2016; Sango Wildlife, undated).
The 323 000-hectare Bubye Valley
Conservancy (BVC), also a converted
cattle ranch, now has roughly 500 lions
(Figure 3), 700 African elephants,
5 000 African buffaloes, 82 white rhinos
and, at 211, the third-largest black rhino
population in Africa. Trophy fees in 2015
generated US$1.38 million. BVC employs
about 400 people and invests US$200 000
annually in community development proj
-
ects (BVC, undated; B. Leathem, personal
communication, 17 January 2016).
Note that the revenues generated by
trophy hunting protect and benet many
non-hunted species in these ranches, such
as the black rhino, white rhino and African
wild dog.
Case study 5. Communal
conservancies in Namibia
In the early 1990s, many residents of
Namibian communal lands viewed wildlife
species as detrimental to their livelihoods
because they destroyed crops and water
installations and killed or injured livestock
and people. In 2015, 82 communal conser-
vancies managed 1.6 million hectares for
conservation, lands that are also home to
around 190 000 people, including indig-
enous and tribal communities (NACSO,
2015).
Trophy hunting has underpinned
Namibia’s success in community-based
natural resource management. Recent
analysis indicates that if revenues from tro-
phy hunting were lost, most conservancies
would be unable to cover their operating
costs; they would become unviable, and
wildlife populations and local benets
would both decline dramatically (Naidoo
et al., 2016; Figure 4).
Overall, conservancies generate around
half their benets (e.g. cash income for
individuals or communities; meat; and
social benets like schools and health
clinics) from photographic tourism and
half from hunting. Much of the revenue
is reinvested into the management and
protection of wildlife. Around half the
conservancies gain their benets solely
from hunting, with most of the rest deriv-
ing parts of their incomes from hunting
alongside tourism. Only 12 percent of
conservancies specialize in tourism
(Naidoo et al., 2016). Revenues from
trophy hunting for 29 wildlife species in
conservancies totalled NAD36.4 million
(about US$2.7 million) in 2015 (NACSO,
2015). Communities directly receive
payments of about US$20 000 for each
elephant hunted, plus about 3 000 kg of
meat (Chris Weaver, personal communica-
tion, 18 January 2016).
© FAO/ M. BOU LTON
White rhino: und er threat from
poaching, but trophy hunting can
be benecial for conservation.
This rhino is in the Thanda Private
Game Reserve, South Africa

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
12
Wildlife populations have shown dra-
matic increases in Namibia since the
beginning of the communal conservancy
programme. On communal lands in the
northeast, the population of the sable
antelope (Hippotragus niger) increased
from 724 in 1994 to 1 474 in 2011, and
the impala (Aepyceros melampus) popula-
tion grew from 439 to 9 374 over the same
period. In the conservancy region in the
northwest, the population of the threatened
Hartmann’s mountain zebra (Equus zebra
hartmannae) increased from fewer than 1
000 individuals in the early 1980s to an
estimated 27 000 in 2011, and the number
of black rhinos more than tripled, mak-
ing it the largest free-roaming population
in Africa (conservancies are unfenced).
The growth of communal conservancies
and protection offered by national parks
has led to an increase in the population
of elephants from around 7 500 in 1995
to more than 20 000 today. The Kunene
Conservancy’s lion population grew from
roughly 25 in 1995 to 150 today, and
Namibia now has a large free-roaming
lion population outside national parks
(NACSO, 2015; C. Weaver, personal com-
munication, 18 January 2016).
Case study 6. Markhor and urial in
Pakistan
In Pakistan in the mid-1980s, local
Pathan tribal leaders were concerned
that uncontrolled illegal hunting for
food had greatly reduced populations
of both the Suleiman (straight-horned)
markhor (Capra falconeri megaceros)
(<100 individuals) and the Afghan urial
(Ovis orientalis) (around 200 individu-
als). After unsuccessfully petitioning the
government to protect these two species,
the Pathan leaders developed the Torghar
Conservation Project based on a simple
concept: that community members would
give up hunting in exchange for being
hired as game guards to prevent poaching,
and the project would be nanced by rev-
enues derived from a limited trophy hunt
of markhor and urial by foreign hunters.
The project covers about 100 000 hect-
ares inhabited by 4 000 people. Between
1986 and 2012, hunting of the two species
generated US$486 400 for the provincial
government and US$2.71 million for the
local community, the latter covering the
salaries of more than 80 game guards,
funding various community projects,
including schools and healthcare facilities,
and supporting actions to reduce graz-
ing competition with livestock. Illegal
hunting declined dramatically: by 2012,
the markhor population had grown to an
estimated 3 500 individuals, while a 2005
survey of urial estimated the population
at 2 541 (Woodford, Frisina and Awun,
2004; Frisina and Tareen, 2009; Mallon,
2013).
Similar examples exist elsewhere in
Pakistan and in Tajikistan (and see also
the article on page 17 of this edition). Such
developments have contributed to a recent
improvement in the conservation status of
markhor in the IUCN Red List, where it
is no longer listed as Threatened. Outside
protected areas, stable and increasing
populations are found only in areas where
there is sustainable hunting (Michel and
Rosen Michel, 2015).
HOW WOULD TROPHY HUNTING
BANS AFFECT CONSERVATION
AND INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES?
Outright bans on trophy hunting, as
well as import or transport restrictions
on high-value species, especially in the
European Union and the United States
of America, could end trophy hunting
by making programmes economically
unviable (see Figure 4). The case stud-
ies presented here make it clear that, in
the absence of effective and sustainable
4
Revenue generated by tr ophy hunting
underpins the success of the Nami bian
communal conservancy programme. The
maps illustrate the economic viability of
communi ty conservancie s in Namibi a
under (a) the status quo; and ( b) a
simulated trophy-hunting ban
Sou rce: Reproduced from Naidoo et al. (2016 ).
Unprofitable Unprofitable
Break-even Break-even
Profitable Profitable

13
Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
alternatives, removing the incentives and
revenue provided by trophy hunting would
likely cause serious population declines
for a number of threatened or iconic
species, potentially stopping and revers-
ing the recovery of (for example) some
populations of African elephant, black and
white rhino, Hartmann’s mountain zebra
and lion in Africa, markhor, argali and
urial in Asia, and bighorn sheep in North
America. Populations of threatened species
not subject to trophy hunting – such as the
snow leopard and African wild dog – could
also be negatively affected.
For some indigenous and local com-
munities, making trophy hunting illegal
or unviable would mean the loss of cash
income from hunting concessions on their
land, less access to meat, and lost employ-
ment options. The indigenous Khwe San
and Mbukushu (around 5 000 people) in
Bwatwata National Park, who are among
Namibia’s poorest people, have earned
around NAD2.4 million (US$155 000)
per year from trophy hunting in recent
years (R. Diggle, personal communica-
tion, 18 March 2016); stopping trophy
hunting would be an enormous setback
for them because of both a loss of income
and reduced access to meat (and living in
a national park means they cannot graze
livestock or grow commercial crops). If
trophy hunting became unviable, thou-
sands of rural Zimbabwean households that
directly benet from CAMPFI RE
3
would
collectively lose about US$1.7 million per
year (already reduced from US$2.2 million
by import bans on elephant trophies in
the United States of America) (C. Jonga,
personal communication, 27 August 2015).
These are substantial amounts of money
in countries where the average income of
rural residents is a few dollars or less per
day. Even more fundamentally, perhaps,
unilateral trophy restrictions by import-
ing countries would reduce the power of
already-marginalized rural communities
to make decisions on the management of
3
The CAMPFIRE [Communal Areas Manage-
ment Progra mme For Indigenous Resources] is
Zimbabwe’s community-based natu ral resource
management programme, one of the rst such
program mes globally (Mutandwa and Gad zirayi,
2007).
© JORGE LÁSCAR FROM AUSTR ALIA (ELEPH ANT SWIMM ING. UPLOADED BY PDTIL LMAN) [CC BY 2.0 (HT TP://CREATIVEC OMMONS.ORG/LICENSES/ BY/2.0)], VIA WIK IMEDIA COMMONS
Photo tourism:
rarely a full
substitute for trophy
hunting in Africa

Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
14
their lands and wildlife in ways that respect
their right to self-determination and that
best meet their livelihood aspirations.
CAN ALTERNATIVE LAND USES
REPLACE TROPHY HUNTING?
Trophy hunting is not the only means of
increasing the economic value of wild-
life and generating local benets. It is
often assumed that photographic tourism
could replace trophy hunting: this is cer-
tainly a valuable option in many places
and has generated enormous benets for
conservation and local people, but it is
viable in only a small proportion of the
wildlife areas now managed for trophy
hunting. In contrast to trophy hunting,
photographic tourism requires political
stability, proximity to good transport
links, minimal disease risks, high-density
wildlife populations to guarantee viewing,
scenic landscapes, high capital investment,
infrastructure (hotels, food and water sup-
plies, and waste management), and local
skills and capacity. Photographic tourism
and trophy hunting are frequently highly
complementary land uses when separated
by time or space. Where photographic
tourism is feasible in areas also used for
trophy hunting, it is typically already being
pursued (e.g. case studies 4 and 5). Like
trophy hunting, photographic tourism – if
not carefully implemented – can have seri-
ous environmental impacts and return few
benets to local communities, with most
value captured offshore or by in-country
elites (Sandbrook and Adams, 2012).
To be effective, alternatives to trophy
hunting need to provide tangible and effec-
tive conservation incentives. They need
to make wildlife valuable to people over
the long term, and they should empower
local communities to exercise rights and
responsibilities over wildlife conserva-
tion and management. Various forms of
payment schemes for ecosystem services
(PES schemes) have considerable potential
for mobilizing investments or voluntary
contributions from governments, philan-
thropic sources and the private sector and
motivating the conservation of species and
habitats. An example – albeit limited by
the difculty of obtaining stable funding
– is the land-leasing scheme carried out
by Cottar’s Safari Service with Maasai
communities in Olderkesi, Kenya (IUCN
SULi et al., 2015). REDD+4 can provide
incentives and revenue ows to local com-
munities in some areas, although with
many caveats. PES schemes are difcult
options and risk donor dependency. A
crucial challenge is ensuring that revenue
ows are sustainable over the long term
and not contingent on highly changeable
donor priorities.
REFORMING TROPHY-HUNTING
PR ACT ICES
Despite the positive examples outlined
here, we are fully aware that, in many
countries, trophy-hunting governance and
management have many (typically undocu-
mented) weaknesses and failures, and
action by decision-makers to support effec-
tive reform should be strongly supported.
Import restrictions are often attractive
interventions for remote decision-makers
because they are easy to implement and
can be carried out at low cost to decision-
making bodies, which do not bear formal
accountability for the impacts of their deci-
sions in affected countries. Conservation
success, however, is rarely achieved by
single decisions in distant capitals; rather,
it typically requires long-term, sustained
multistakeholder engagement – in-country
and on the ground.
As an alternative to unilateral, blanket
restrictions or bans that would curtail
trophy-hunting programmes, decision-
makers could consider whether specic
trophy-hunting programmes meet require-
ments for best practice (IUCN SSC, 2012;
Brainerd, 2007). Where there are gover-
nance and management problems, it would
be most effective to engage with relevant
countries in addressing, for example,
transparency in funding ows, commu-
nity benets, the allocation of concessions
and quota setting; the rights and respon-
sibilities of indigenous peoples and local
communities; and the monitoring of popu-
lations and hunts. Hunting stakeholders
– importing countries, donors, national
regulators and managers, community
organizations, researchers, conservation
organizations, and the hunting industry
and hunter associations – have important
roles to play in improving standards.
In certain cases, conditional, time-
limited and targeted moratoria aimed
at addressing identied problems could
help improve trophy-hunting practices.
Bans, however, are unlikely to improve
conservation outcomes unless there is a
clear expectation that improved standards
will lead to the lifting of such bans and
the country has the capacity and political
will to address the problem. It is crucial,
at least in developing countries, therefore,
that moratoria are accompanied by funding
and technical support for on-the-ground
management improvements and by a plan
to review the status of the initial problem
after a specied period.
CONCLUSION
Trophy hunting is increasingly under
intense scrutiny and facing high-prole
and often-effective campaigns calling for
broad-scale bans. There are valid concerns
about the legality, sustainability and ethics
of some hunting practices, but calls for
bans or import restrictions risk “throw-
ing the baby out with the bathwater”,
undermining programmes that are having
substantive and important positive effects
on species recovery and protection, habitat
retention and management, and commu-
nity rights and livelihoods.
In some contexts, there may be valid and
feasible alternatives to trophy hunting that
can deliver the above-mentioned benets,
but identifying, funding and implementing
these requires genuine consultation and
engagement with affected governments,
the private sector and communities. Such
4
REDD+ is the term given to the efforts of coun-
tries to reduce emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation and foster conserva-
tion, sustainable management of forests, and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks (www.
forestcarbonpartnership.org/what-redd).

15
Unasylva 249, Vol. 68, 2017/1
alternatives should not be subject to the
vagaries of donor funding and, crucially,
they must deliver equal or greater incen-
tives for conservation over the long term.
If they do not, they could hasten rather
than reverse the decline of iconic wildlife,
remove the economic incentives for the
retention of vast areas of wildlife habitat,
and alienate and undermine already-
marginalized communities who live with
wildlife and who will largely determine
its future. u
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