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“I Know Things They Don’t Know!” The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Abstract
In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people’s need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). A further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4), showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people’s desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.
... Conspiracy theories are often described as providing simple explanations for complex issues, and often find broader appeal in times of uncertainty, such as times of war, widespread disease, natural disasters and terrorism (Douglas et al., 2019;van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). This reduction in uncertainty has been referred to as an 'existential' motivation for conspiracy theory adoption (Douglas et al., 2017). As such, conceptual sense can be made of why narcissistic individuals find appeal in the reductive explanations offered by many conspiracy theories. ...
... Low levels of intellectual humility has recently been identified as a predictor of susceptibility to fake news, pseudoscientific beliefs and conspiratorial ideation (Bowes & Tasimi, 2022;Koetke et al., 2021). This strong resistance to information that challenges existing beliefs and accepting conspiratorial information that supports current belief is referred to as the 'epistemic' motivation for conspiracy theory adoption (Douglas et al., 2017). In this study we explore specific factors that may mitigate these mechanisms. ...
... A more recent division of narcissism that has been discussed in the context of conspiracy theory adoption is a need for both uniqueness and superiority among others. These two needs align with the 'social motivation' of Douglas et al. (2017). Conspiracy theories allow the adopter to feel privy to information that others are not and that they are morally righteous relative to the shadowy out-group supported by most conspiracy narratives. ...
Conspiracy theories are alternate viewpoints of provided explanations; sensational stories
revolving around small groups exerting control for nefarious reasons. Several negative social
and personal outcomes have been established for those who endorse them. Prior research
suggests several psychosocial predictors of susceptibility to conspiracy theories, including
narcissistic personality traits (grandiosity, need for uniqueness), cognitive processes (critical
thinking, confirmation bias) and lack of education. Study one utilised an international survey
(N = 323) to investigate the role of education as a protective tool in the relationship between
narcissistic traits and conspiratorial beliefs. Support was found for the hypothesis that higher
levels of narcissistic traits would predict conspiracy theory endorsement. Higher education
and STEM education were associated with lower levels of conspiracy endorsement, however
all significant moderations indicated that for narcissistic individuals, education increased
their likelihood of adopting conspiracy beliefs, contrary to expectation. To investigate this
further, study two analysed a large-scale publicly available dataset (N = 51,404) to assess the
relationship between narcissism, critical thinking and conspiracy beliefs pertaining to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As expected, analysis found narcissism and poor critical thinking as
predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Stronger critical thinking skills were found to moderate the
relationship, reducing the impact of narcissism on endorsement of conspiracy theories. The
relationship between collective narcissism and conspiracy belief was also moderated by
critical thinking, however the effect was more modest. Findings are discussed in the context
of education as a protective factor in conspiratorial belief acquisition, with regard to
cognitively and socially motivated beliefs. The findings improve understanding of both the
role and limitations of education/critical thinking skills as protective factors against
conspiracy theory endorsement.
... Tale combinazione, ovvero l'adesione alle teorie cospirazioniste unita alla sfiducia nelle autorità e alla diffidenza interpersonale, costituisce un circolo vizioso (Goreis e Voracek 2019;Douglas et al. 2017). Non sorprende che la ricerca sull'antagonismo sociale abbia dimostrato che gli atteggiamenti cospirazionisti tendono a correlare con comportamenti quali il disimpegno dal sistema, la disconnessione dalla società, il rifiuto delle norme sociali, la disaffezione, l'ostilità, il senso di impotenza (Lantian et al. 2020, p. 155). ...
... Per ricapitolare, le teorie cospirazioniste risultano attrarre quegli individui che sentono la loro persona minacciata , coloro che hanno un forte bisogno personale di unicità, dacché l'adesione a idee complottiste sembra essere in grado di soddisfare il bisogno sociale di mantenere un'alta autostima (Lantian et al. 2017 Quanto siamo disposti a concedere pur di ottenere conferme sociali e placare il senso di incertezza quando la posta è alta e abbiamo bisogno di certezze a basso prezzo? È il quesito implicito alla base del saggio di Ichino e Raikka (2020), secondo le quali chi cade nella rete cospirazionista non ingaggia, necessariamente, un vero e proprio impegno razionale a credere a singoli aspetti della narrazione complottista. ...
... Le variegate forme di teorie cospirazioniste, dalle fantasticherie politiche alle bizzarrie scientifiche, sono diventate talmente diffuse da rappresentare un allarme sociale al quale si sta facendo fronte con la rimozione dei punti propagatori di disinformazione, bannando pagine web, vietando riunioni e convegni. Le teorie cospirazioniste attraggono le folle, in particolare quegli individui che sentono la loro persona minacciata , coloro che hanno un forte bisogno personale di unicità, dacché l'adesione a idee cospirazioniste sembra essere in grado di soddisfare il bisogno sociale di mantenere un'autostima (Lantian et al. 2017;Green e Douglas 2018). Le teorie cospirazioniste attraggono individui che cercano schemi e ordine nel loro ambiente (van Prooijen et al. 2018). ...
Che cosa comporta abbracciare una teoria cospirazionista? Perché il cospirazionista, indipendentemente dal livello di istruzione e dalla professione, cerca di difenderla e diffonderla addirittura, nonostante palesi contraddizioni talvolta molto fantasiose? Secondo gli autori, l'unico modo per dare una risposta soddisfacente alla comprensione del fenomeno del cospirazionismo-un fenomeno sociale che ha raggiunto una diffusione preoccupante con serie implicazioni a livello psicologico, culturale e politico-è riuscire a comprendere le ragioni del suo fascino. Gli autori illustrano una possibile 'ricetta perfetta' perché si inneschi e si autoalimenti la mentalità cospirazionista. Dalla revisione della letteratura più recente emerge che sentimenti di insicurezza esistenziale e ansia generalizzata possono essere indicati quali il primo ingrediente della ricetta; essi sarebbero anche in grado di distorcere i meccanismi di ragionamento e acquisizione delle informazioni. Peculiari tratti e difese narcisistiche unite a una condizione di isolamento e frustrazione sociale sono i composti del secondo ingrediente. Quest'ultimi tratti danno corpo a quelle ideazioni di stampo paranoideo, che colpiscono tanto l'attenzione dei media. Il terzo ingrediente è il bisogno di integrazione (e riconoscimento sociale), una spinta motivazionale incontenibile, autentico collante delle reti cospirazioniste. Parole chiave Abstract What is involved in embracing a conspiracy theory? Why do the conspiracy theorists, regardless of their education level and profession, try to defend their theory and spread it, despite blatant contradictions that are sometimes highly imaginative? According to the authors, the only way to give a complete answer to understanding the conspiracy phenomenon-a social phenomenon that has become alarming with serious psychological, cultural, and political implications-is to be able to understand the reasons for its appeal. The authors illustrate a possible 'perfect recipe' for the conspiracy mindset to be triggered and self-fulfilling. The review of the most recent literature shows that feelings of existential insecurity and generalized anxiety can be indicated as the first ingredient in the recipe; they would also be capable of distorting the mechanisms of reasoning and information acquisition. Peculiar traits and narcissistic defenses combined with a condition of isolation and social frustration are the compounds of the second ingredient. The latter traits flesh out those paranoid-like ideations that strike so much media attention. The third ingredient is the need for integration (and social recognition), an irrepressible motivational drive, the authentic glue of conspiracy networks.
... For example, conspiracy theories are frequently used to challenge mainstream political sentiments (Sapountzis & Condor, 2013) and expressing dissenting views like this can sometimes be constructive in intra-and intergroup contexts by calling into question problems and triggering reform (Hornsey, 2016). There is also evidence that people may believe in conspiracy theories when they want to appear unique compared to others (Lantian et al., 2017). Therefore, seeing someone share a conspiracy theory may mark them out to perceivers as 'not just one of the crowd', and someone who might hold unique and potentially important and useful information. ...
... mainstream; e.g., Sapountzis & Condor, 2013), or who wish to appear unique (vs. average) compared to others (Lantian et al., 2017), might pursue those goals by sharing conspiracy theories. ...
... Following the results of Experiment 1, we predicted that people would avoid sharing conspiracy theories to create favorable and stable impressions of themselves. However, since the endorsement of conspiracy theories is associated with some traits that might be desirable in some contexts, such as nonconformity and unconventional political beliefs (Lantian et al., 2017;Sapountzis & Condor, 2013), we predicted that people would share conspiracy theories more when they wished to portray themselves as unique, or politically radical. Finally, we explored the potentially moderating role of interindividual differences in the endorsement of conspiracy theories. ...
Conspiracy theories are widely viewed as stigmatized beliefs, and it is often assumed that sharing them will therefore have negative reputational consequences for individuals. In six experiments (two pre-registered), we examined how sharing conspiracy theories can have important consequences for both impression-management and impression-formation. Experiment 1 (N = 354) highlighted people's awareness of an impression-management strategy in sharing conspiracy theories. Participants perceived that others would share conspiracy theories when aiming to create unfavorable impressions, and would avoid sharing them to create favorable impressions. Experiments 2 and 3 (Ns = 137 and 150) examined participants' own impression-management motives for sharing conspiracy theories and demonstrated that these motives depended on their own conspiracy beliefs. Specifically, participants with weaker conspiracy beliefs perceived that they would share conspiracy theories mainly to portray themselves negatively, and as radical, unstable, and unique people, whereas those with stronger conspiracy beliefs perceived that they would share conspiracy theories mainly to appear stable and honest. Experiments 4a, 4b and 5 (Ns = 248, 250 and 417) focused on impression-formation. Participants evaluated fictitious politicians who shared (vs. refuted) conspiracy theories as less predictable and competent, but also as a “rogue” political outsider who is likely to effect change. Moderation analyses indicated that these differences were less pronounced or even reversed among participants with right-wing attitudes (Experiments 4a, Experiment 5) and those with strong conspiracy beliefs (Experiment 5). We discuss the importance of examining conspiracy theories from this communicative perspective.
... We again examined the association of the GCB-5 with delusional ideation, interpersonal trust, and anomie, but we also examined its association with a perceived lack of control, a desire for control, a desire for uniqueness, and the Big Five personality traits (see Goldberg, 1990). Given the results of prior empirical and theoretical work, we expected the GCB-5 would be associated with both a perceived lack of control and a desire for control Kay et al., 2009;Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; but see Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2020), as well as with a desire for uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017;Lantian et al., 2017). We further expected the GCB-5 ...
... The GCB-5 was not, however, associated with either a need for uniqueness or a desire for control, but the effects were in the correct direction and comparable in size to that seen for the GCB-15 and the CMQ. The size of the GCB-5's association with a need for uniqueness and a desire for control were also not far off from that seen in prior studies (Lantian et al., 2017;Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2020). It is, therefore, unclear whether this is an issue with the GCB-5 not accurately capturing the relationship between conspiracist ideation and a need for uniqueness and a desire for control or a true reflection of the absence of a meaningful relationship between conspiracist ideation and a need for uniqueness and a desire for control. ...
... Butler et al., 1995;Jolley & Douglas, 2014b;Uscinski & Parent, 2014), opposition to vaccine mandates(Craciun & Baban, 2012;Jolley & Douglas, 2014a;Lewandowsky et al., 2013a;Shapiro et al., 2016), and opposition to new environmental regulations(Jolley & Douglas, 2014b;Lewandowsky et al., 2013b). ...
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCB-15) is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracist ideation, but it is also inefficient. At 15 items, the GCB-15 can take upwards of four minutes to complete, limiting its usefulness in situations where administration time and participant attention are limited. Here we introduce the GCB-5—a 5-item, short form of the GCB-15. Across five studies, we demonstrate that the GCB-5 is both a reliable and valid measure of conspiracist ideation. With respect to its reliability, we find consistent evidence that a single latent factor underlies the GCB-5 and accounts for a sizeable proportion of the variation in its items. With respect to its validity, we show that the GCB-5 is associated with both self- and informant-report measures of conspiracist beliefs, as well as with a multitude of theoretically relevant constructs, including anomie, fatalism, and delusional ideation. In the final study, we provide evidence that the GCB-5 is not only a reliable and valid measure but also one that has promise for addressing novel research questions. Specifically, we show that people high in conspiracist ideation—as assessed by the GCB-5—are more accepting of the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of so-called “virtuous violence” (e.g., the death penalty; anti-abortion legislation).
... We again examined the association of the GCB-5 with delusional ideation, interpersonal trust, and anomie, but we also examined its association with a perceived lack of control, a desire for control, a desire for uniqueness, and the Big Five personality traits (see Goldberg, 1990). Given the results of prior empirical and theoretical work, we expected the GCB-5 would be associated with both a perceived lack of control and a desire for control Kay et al., 2009;Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; but see Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2020), as well as with a desire for uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017;Lantian et al., 2017). We further expected the GCB-5 would not be associated with the Big Five personality traits, given that prior research has generally found small to non-existent associations between the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories and "normal" personality traits (Goreis & Voracek, 2019). ...
... The GCB-5 was not, however, associated with either a need for uniqueness or a desire for control, but the effects were in the correct direction and comparable in size to that seen for the GCB-15 and the CMQ. The size of the GCB-5 ′ s associations with a need for uniqueness and a desire for control were also not far off from that seen in prior studies (Lantian et al., 2017;Stojanov & Halberstadt, 2020). It is, therefore, unclear whether this is an issue with the GCB-5 not accurately capturing the relationship between conspiracist ideation and a need for uniqueness and a desire for control or a true reflection of the absence of a meaningful relationship between conspiracist ideation and a need for uniqueness and a desire for control. ...
The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCB-15) is a reliable and valid measure of conspiracist ideation, but it is also inefficient. At 15 items, the GCB-15 can take upwards of four minutes to complete. Here we introduce the GCB-5—a 5-item, short form of the GCB-15. Across five studies, we use self- and informant-report methods to demonstrate that the GCB-5 is a reliable, criterion-valid, and construct-valid measure of conspiracist ideation. In the final study, we further provide evidence that the GCB-5 has promise for addressing novel research questions. Specifically, we show that people high in conspiracist ideation—as assessed by the GCB-5—are more accepting of the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of so-called “virtuous violence” (e.g., anti-abortion legislation).
... Although the orientation towards self-enhancement typical of agentic extraversion might be less predictive of paranoia or needs for dominance, it could be associated with conspiracy beliefs via different psychological processes. One such factor is the need for uniqueness [26,27], which is often associated with the admiration/agentic extraversion aspect of grandiose narcissism. High need for uniqueness likely increases the appeal of conspiracy theories because they promise access to privileged information, making one feel special [26,27]. ...
... One such factor is the need for uniqueness [26,27], which is often associated with the admiration/agentic extraversion aspect of grandiose narcissism. High need for uniqueness likely increases the appeal of conspiracy theories because they promise access to privileged information, making one feel special [26,27]. Indeed, in the study by Kay [12], need for uniqueness emerged as a mediator between grandiose narcissism and conspiracy beliefs, and we argue this is likely due to the agentic extraversion component [cf. ...
Narcissism—a conviction about one’s superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one’s social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation.
... To better understand discordant knowing, consider several examples. In the political domain, discordant knowing can be captured by holding conspiracy theories or alternate facts with certainty, as such theories entail secret information generally considered unknowable or inaccurate by most others (Lantian et al., 2017;Van Prooijen, 2018). Relatedly, religious views held with complete certainty (religious fundamentalism; e.g., Hill & Williamson, 2005;Kirkpatrick et al., 1991) should also qualify as discordant knowing, as long as the individual perceives most others as opposing these views. ...
... For instance, the present work may help explain why conspiracy theories are sometimes linked to fanatical indicators (e.g., aggression; e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999;Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018;van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Simply put, conspiracy theories neatly fall under the framework of discordant knowing-they involve certainty (at least in some cases) about a claim that is generally opposed by the outside world (judged as wrong or unknowable; e.g., Lantian et al., 2017;van Prooijen, 2018). Similarly, the current work may clarify why experiencing identity denial can lead people to join extreme groups and exhibit fanatical attitudes (e.g., Hogg et al., 2007;McGregor et al., 2001;Sityaeva et al., 2020). ...
Examining the epistemic and social-cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing-felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed by most others-underlies fanaticism. Across multifaceted approaches, experimentally manipulating participants' views to fall under this framework (e.g., "I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong") heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1-7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9). Collectively, the present studies suggest that a specific epistemic structure-discordant knowing-underlies fanaticism, and further, highlight the potential of investigating constructs like fanaticism from an epistemic social cognitive perspective. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
... The development of this identity is a reaction to attacks on self-worth that are the result of holding an unpopular opinion; the counter-normative identity generates selfworth by embodying a rare and courageous point of view [32] (Cambon et al., 2006). A similar phenomenon has been observed among conspiracy theorists, who gain self-worth from the belief that "I know things they don't know" [9,33] Counter-normativity is not inherently harmful; sometimes it is the force that expands or overthrows standards of normal behavior that are narrow and harmful [34]. At its best, counter-normativity can be an attitude taken in advance of positive social change, promoted by individuals who are aware of the genuine negative consequences of un-checked social norms. ...
... Conspiracy Theorist Ideation, defined as "the adoption of theories that explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups" [1] is thought to provide self-worth [9,33]. This may compensate for the self-worth lost when a social media system harms the prestige of the ingroup. ...
Social media organizations have an obligation to filter and sometimes exclude content, often based on machine learning algorithms. This has resulted in perceptions of bias in social media. When individuals perceive that a social media system is designed to exclude their point of view, they may experience a loss of self-worth, based on their excluded point of view. As a result, they may resist and avoid the technology that seems biased against them to prevent further loss of self-worth. They might also believe in conspiracies about why social media is marginalizing their point of view and find new self-worth as a conspiracy theorist. Data from 225 individuals who are interested in the risks associated with vaccines indicate that Perceived Bias presents a Social Identity Threat, which, in turn, is associated with Resistance to IT and Conspiracy Theorist Ideation.
... The development of this identity is a reaction to attacks on self-worth that are the result of holding an unpopular opinion; the counter-normative identity generates selfworth by embodying a rare and courageous point of view [32] (Cambon et al., 2006). A similar phenomenon has been observed among conspiracy theorists, who gain self-worth from the belief that "I know things they don't know" [9,33] Counter-normativity is not inherently harmful; sometimes it is the force that expands or overthrows standards of normal behavior that are narrow and harmful [34]. At its best, counter-normativity can be an attitude taken in advance of positive social change, promoted by individuals who are aware of the genuine negative consequences of un-checked social norms. ...
... Conspiracy Theorist Ideation, defined as "the adoption of theories that explain important events as secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups" [1] is thought to provide self-worth [9,33]. This may compensate for the self-worth lost when a social media system harms the prestige of the ingroup. ...
Social media organizations have an obligation to filter and sometimes exclude content, often based on machine learning algorithms. This has resulted in perceptions of bias in social media. When individuals perceive that a social media system is designed to exclude their point of view, they may experience a loss of self-worth, based on their excluded point of view. As a result, they may resist and avoid the technology that seems biased against them to prevent further loss of self-worth. They might also believe in conspiracies about why social media is marginalizing their point of view and find new self-worth as a conspiracy theorist. Data from 225 individuals who are interested in the risks associated with vaccines indicate that Perceived Bias presents a Social Identity Threat, which, in turn, is associated with Resistance to IT and Conspiracy Theorist Ideation.
... As a result, the CTs has been related with underlying psychopathological traits, as schizotypy, which make a person more likely to develop erroneous beliefs (e.g., Georgiou, et al., 2019;Hart & Graether, 2018). Also has been related to people with low educational level (Douglas et al., 2016;Sallam et al., 2021); female gender (Sallam et al., 2021); that have high levels of anxiety or worry (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013); lower monthly income (Sallam et a., 2021); that use social media sources of information (Earnshaw et al., 2020;Wilson & Wiysonge, 2020); that feel they have no power (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999); that need to feel unique compared to others (Lantian et al., 2017); that feel the need to belong (Graeupner & Coman, 2017), or that feel that their group is underestimated (Cichocka et al., 2016), or threatened (Jolley et al., 2018). However, these data are not conclusive, since they are unstable and it is very influenced by cultural impact (Sallam, et al., 2020), and sociodemographic context of the sample (Vicol, 2020). ...
Pandemics are a global threat, with vaccination being the main weapon of control. Fear, an unpleasant emotional state caused by a threatening stimulus perception, is known to be behind inhibitory behaviours; being, with mistrust, the basis of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories (CTs). It would be appropriate to know the fear influence on these theories. In this way, a cross-sectional online survey was applied to 2.987 subjects, in a COVID-19 context, characterized by high levels of uncertainty and mistrust, with the aims of analyse the relationship between some anti-vaccine CTs and vaccination intention (VI), also the influence of fear to vaccination (VF) on TCs and VI in this context. As result, all CTs were positive predictors of VF and negative predictors of VI. The correlations were significant (p <0.001), from moderate to high, for all analysed variables, with a significant and moderate directionality and size of association. Regression analysis indicated a moderate and significant explained variance (r2 = 0.54) of CTs + VF in VI. The analysis also indicates that safety and security CTs were more strongly associated with VF (r2 = 0.347) and VI (r2 = 0.46) than other CTs. Obtained results were more significant than those found by other researchers. Knowing in each case the main anti-vaccine CTs and the associated fear can help to plan programs to increase vaccination levels.
... Endorsing and disseminating conspiracy theories can be instrumental in displaying exclusive knowledge about the world, highlighting one's own unique superiority. Previous research has established a small but reliable link between the need for uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs (Imhoff and Lamberty 2017;Lantian et al. 2017), and we can observe this motive in the current pandemic as well. Conspiracy believers go against the grain and celebrate themselves as fierce resisters (in contrast to the dull masses of sheeple). ...
... This motive according to Heide (2013) is naturally embraced by people in order to find causal explanations that appear logical, coherent and consistent with view around close social network. Social motives according to Douglas et al., (2017), Imhoff and Lamberty (2017); Lantian et al., (2017) can also cause people to accept such theory, this social motive is an ego booster that gives people the impression that they have privilege information which others do not, linking COVID-19 vaccines and Infertility appears to give an intellectual explanation on the motives of westernized vaccines advocates to depopulate certain ethnic groups. Douglas et al., (2017) have been able to give a scientific analysis on why people can belief such conspiracy theory. ...
The effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccination to control transmission, morbidity, and mortality is highly dependent on the population's readiness to embrace the vaccine. This study explores the level of willingness of various demographics in accepting COVID-19 vaccine. A narrative literature review using thematic analytical method was used to determine the level of vaccine acceptance among various socio-demographics. Conspiracy belief was used as the conceptual framework to explore the causes of vaccine hesitancies. It was discovered from the reviewed literatures that vaccine hesitancy was present in all surveyed countries and population. COVID-19 vaccine hesitancies correlated with age, gender, level of education, country of residence, race, ethnic and religion affiliations. The studied revealed that participants who were at least 55 years or older were more receptive to COVID-19 vaccines compared to those between 25 to 54, some studies revealed that those between 16 to 24 years were more receptive than those between 25 to 34 years. The studies showed vaccine hesitancies were higher in female than their male counterparts and also those with no education or low education were more prone to vaccine refusals than college and university graduates. Furthermore, religion affiliation and belief plays a significant role in vaccine hesitancies, those whose religion opposes vaccine acceptance had high refusal rate compared to those whose religion encourages vaccinations, while participants without any religion affiliations showed more willingness to get vaccinated. Ethnicity and racial characteristics were highly significant in all the reviewed literatures, with highest hesitancies among Black race than their Whites counterparts. Majority of Asians and Latinos had over 70% vaccine acceptances, the race and ethnic affiliations were further substantiated when it was observed that people from South America such as Ecuador, Brazil, some Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh had the highest vaccine acceptance compared to countries in Africa and Europe. The primary reason for this vaccine hesitancies was the various conspiracies theories in circulation that labelled the vaccines as either diabolic or unsafe. Targeting populations with high vaccine reluctance rates can help achieve high vaccination coverage. Effective communication should be adopted by using appropriate channels as this will foster trust and increase vaccine uptake.
... Taken together, available evidence suggests a role of three possible unmet psychological needs in people's proneness to believe in conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2019;Stojanov et al., 2021). First, on a social level, when people feel that their need to maintain a positive self-image (Fairfield et al., 2015;Lantian et al., 2017) or a positive image of their ingroup (Cichocka et al., 2016) is threatened, they are more likely to adopt conspiracy beliefs. Second, conspiracy beliefs may arise when existential needs are activated and people need to feel safe and in control, such as when feeling powerless (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999;Zebrowitz et al., 2015); this explanation was further supported by evidence of a reduction in conspiracy beliefs when the individual regained control (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). ...
Unlabelled:
With the progress of the vaccination campaign against the SARS-COV-2, we are ever closer to reaching that part of the population that refuses or is hesitant about vaccination. This study investigated the association between critical thinking motivation factors (i.e., intrinsic value of critical thinking and expectancy of one's critical thinking ability), conspiracy mentality, intolerance of uncertainty and hesitancy toward vaccination. A sample of 390 participants completed an online survey during April 2021. Across participants, results indicate that conspiracy mentality and expectancy about personal ability as a critical thinker positively predict vaccine hesitancy. On the contrary, the intrinsic value attributed to critical thinking, intolerance of uncertainty, and education are negatively associated with hesitancy. While the findings confirm existing evidence, particularly on the detrimental role of conspiracy mentality on vaccine acceptance, they also shed light on the double-faced role exercised by critical thinking. Practical implications and future directions are discussed.
Supplementary information:
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-04165-w.
... First, research has repeatedly demonstrated that stronger conspiracy belief is connected to a higher need for uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017;Lantian et al., 2017), which undermines the influence of the majority (Imhoff & Erb, 2009). In addition, conspiracy belief correlates with distrust against other people Goertzel, 1994;Green & Douglas, 2018). ...
People believing in conspiracy theories question mainstream thoughts and behavior, but it is unknown whether it is also linked to lower adherence to the prosocial norms of the broader society. Furthermore, interventions targeting correlates of the belief in conspiracy theories so far are scarce. In four preregistered, mixed-design experiments ( N total = 1,659, N observations = 8,902), we tested whether believing in conspiracy theories is related to lower prosocial norm adherence and whether deliberation about the reason for the norms mitigates this relationship. Across four studies with the U.S. samples, we found that believing in conspiracy theories correlated negatively with prosocial norm adherence in the control condition, which was less pronounced after deliberation (effect size of interaction: d = 0.16). Whether the norm was related to the law or not did not moderate this effect. Results point toward possible ways of mitigating negative correlates and potentially also consequences of believing in conspiracy theories.
... Deskriptívna analýza položiek škály naznačuje, že slovenskí respondenti sa najviac prikláňajú ku C19-NP súvisiacimi s konšpiráciami, medzi ktorými najvyššie skóre dosiahla položka tvrdiaca, že "Vírus, ktorý spôsobuje COVID-19 bol tajne vyvinutý v laboratóriách ako biologická zbraň". Tento typ konšpirácie sa snaží vysvetliť existenciu vírusu na pozadí obskúrneho a tajného pôsobenia činiteľov (Lantian et al., 2017). Samotné ochorenie COVID-19 je podľa respondentov liečiteľný vhodnou kombináciou vitamínov, čo predstavuje najvyššie skórovanú položku pseudovedeckých presvedčení súvisiacich s liečbou. ...
The aim of the study was to make COVID-19 unfounded beliefs, including conspiracy and pseudoscientific beliefs. The first phase of the research consisted of collecting COVID-19 unfounded beliefs, resulting in 25 items. The resulting set of items was administered in the first collection to 584 respondents. Psychometric analysis of the data, through exploratory factor analysis, indicated the presence of three factors, conspiracy beliefs and pseudo-scientific beliefs related to treatment and measures. The resulting set of 15 items was subsequently administered by 695 respondents. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the good properties of the scale model.
... Given that conspiracy mentality is characterized by distrust of elites 12,22 -and given that trust in the involved parties (for example, local governments) is a key driver of the acceptance of wind farms 19,20 -it seems reasonable to expect that people with a stronger conspiracy mentality might be more opposed to the construction of wind farms in their community. Similarly, wind farms could be rejected because wind energy is largely accepted by societies, and holding views in counterpoint to the mainstream is related to conspiracy mentality 23,24 . ...
Reaching net-zero targets requires massive increases in wind energy production, but efforts to build wind farms can meet stern local opposition. Here, inspired by related work on vaccinations, we examine whether opposition to wind farms is associated with a world view that conspiracies are common (‘conspiracy mentality’). In eight pre-registered studies (collective N = 4,170), we found moderate-to-large relationships between various indices of conspiracy beliefs and wind farm opposition. Indeed, the relationship between wind farm opposition and conspiracy beliefs was many times greater than its relationship with age, gender, education and political orientation. Information provision increased support, even among those high in conspiracy mentality. However, information provision was less effective when it was presented as a debate (that is, including negative arguments) and among participants who endorsed specific conspiracy theories about wind farms. Thus, the data suggest preventive measures are more realistic than informational interventions to curb the potentially negative impact of conspiracy beliefs. Understanding the drivers of opposition to renewable energy infrastructure is increasingly important. Here the authors find an association between wind farm opposition and belief in conspiracy theories and test the effectiveness of information provision in countering it.
... A second point refers to the exploration of the associations between interpersonal conflict seeking and self-esteem. Indeed, we previously found positive associations between need for uniqueness -a variable positively linked to self-esteem (Lantian et al., 2017;Snyder & Fromkin, 1977) -and conflict seeking (see Study 1), while self-efficacy itself has been found to negatively correlate with the tendency to experience conflict (e.g., Kiviruusu et al., 2016). These puzzling results bring to consider further the relationship between conflict seeking and self-esteem. ...
Interpersonal conflicts constitute an essential component of everyday life. The present research aimed to create a measure of the general individual orientation towards conflict, of the individual tendency to seek conflict. We conducted three correlational studies (Ntotal = 652) in order to validate the CONS (CONflict Seeking), to study the associations between this new measure and other antisocial and conflictual positions, and to study associations with potential individual motivations and perception of one’s tendencies to get into conflicts. In addition to good internal consistency, the scale displayed adequate concurrent validity (e.g., coherent correlations with personality traits). Conflict seeking was found to positively correlate with need for chaos, anomia, and conspiracy mentality, and the tendency to actually experience conflict in everyday life. In addition, CONS scores correlated positively with need for uniqueness and dominance motivation. Thus, conflict seeking would be linked to status seeking, potentially referring to a way to promote one's identity as a rebel without a cause.
... At the heart of many conspiracy theories are several presumptions that are potentially self-enhancing: that those who believe these theories have access to secret knowledge that the mainstream is not sophisticated enough to access (the 'do your research' argument); that those who believe conspiracy theories are flexible free-thinkers, compared to the blinkered or sheep-like minority (the 'wake up' argument); and that those who believe conspiracy theories are on a critical mission and represent a brave minority working to revolutionize how society operates (the 'speaking truth to power' argument) 91 . Although there is no empirical evidence for these self-enhancing benefits, research has shown that conspiracy beliefs increase when one's personal image is threatened 92 and are somewhat higher among those who have a strong need for uniqueness 93,94 . Finally, there is emerging evidence that conspiracy beliefs satisfy a desire for entertainment. ...
Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions. Conspiracy theories have the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. In this Review, Hornsey et al. synthesize the literature on factors that shape conspiracy beliefs at the individual, intergroup and national level.
... Such conditions give rise to conspiracy theories (Leman and Cinnirella, 2013). Conspiracy theories are also driven by a high need for uniqueness as believers think they know something others do not (Lantian et al., 2017); it is no wonder then that anyone trying to correct conspiracy theories is dismissed. Believing conspiracy theories allows a sense of power because they have access to "secret" knowledge . ...
In this article, we show that voluntarily inserting devices inside the body is contested and seek to understand why. This article discusses insertables as a source of contestation. To describe and understand the social acceptability, reactions toward, and rhetoric surrounding insertable devices, we examine (i) the technical capabilities of insertable devices (the technical context), (ii) human reactions toward insertables (the social context), and (iii) the regulatory environment. The paper offers explanations to the misperceptions about insertables.
... Those who identify resist the stigmatisation of 'conspiracy theorist' (Harambam & Aupers, 2017), fearing social exclusion (Lantian et al., 2018). Nevertheless, they seek a sense of community by differentiating from an out-group (Lantian et al., 2017), try to convert others to their point of view, engage in disputed political actions, and believe that the CT may lead to future change (Franks et al., 2017). ...
Conspiracy theories (CTs) and CT belief stem from uncertain, hard to explain, crisis situations, especially when strongly held social and political identities are threatened making people feel anxious, insecure, or out of control. Connected to alarming developments in world politics, CTs are no longer manifestations of extremists and paranoids. As salience increases, scholars continue to examine their antecedents and consequences. This chapter highlights the interdisciplinary roots of the study of CTs and CT belief. It sets the stage with important definitions and measurement challenges, then reviews scholarship on psychological, social, political, and situational factors behind CTs and CT belief. Consequences are vast, allowing for only brief discussion of the spread, persistence, and prevalence related to negative health, social, political, and environmental effects. As it is unlikely that broad weaponisation of CTs or their blaze online will cease in the near future, the chapter concludes by discussing directions for future research.
... Research has also uncovered several predictors of this general tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Prior cross-sectional work has found that greater conspiracist ideation is predicted by higher levels of need for uniqueness [16], higher dispositional levels of anxiety [17], and a more intuitive thinking style [18]-to name a few. Greater narcissism has also been linked to higher levels conspiracist ideation [19]. ...
A primary focus of research on conspiracy theories has been understanding the psychological characteristics that predict people’s level of conspiracist ideation. However, the dynamics of conspiracist ideation—i.e., how such tendencies change over time—are not well understood. To help fill this gap in the literature, we used data from two longitudinal studies (Study 1 N = 107; Study 2 N = 1,037) conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that greater belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories at baseline predicts both greater endorsement of a novel real-world conspiracy theory involving voter fraud in the 2020 American Presidential election (Study 1) and increases in generic conspiracist ideation over a period of several months (Studies 1 and 2). Thus, engaging with real-world conspiracy theories appears to act as a gateway, leading to more general increases in conspiracist ideation. Beyond enhancing our knowledge of conspiracist ideation, this work highlights the importance of fighting the spread of conspiracy theories.
... Conspiracy theories are commonly defined as beliefs that explain prominent political and societal events (e.g., the assassination of prominent politicians, terrorist attacks) through malevolent plots by hidden and often powerful agents (Bale, 2007;Keeley, 2019). Specifically, people endorse conspiracies as an attempt to reduce epistemic uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013), strengthen in-group belonging , restore control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015) and fulfil a need for uniqueness (Lantian et al., 2017) to name a few. While there has been some recent empirical evidence for the theoretical link between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes (Erisen et al., 2021;Silva et al., 2017;van Prooijen et al., 2022), much less is known as to why these two constructs appear so intimately related. ...
In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero‐sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre‐registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well‐established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero‐sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.
... The third set of motives analyzed by Douglas et al. (2017) are social, referring to people's desire to maintain a positive image of the self or group. There is growing evidence that individuals' motivation to maintain positive esteem (e.g., narcissism; Cichocka et al. 2016), and distinctiveness from others (e.g., need for uniqueness; Lantian et al. 2017) predict conspiracy belief. Moreover, people's motive to maintain positivity toward their social groups predicts belief that they are being conspired against. ...
Conspiracy theories are abundant in social and political discourse, with serious consequences for individuals, groups, and societies. However, psychological scientists have started paying close attention to them only in the past 20 years. We review the spectacular progress that has since been made and some of the limitations of research so far, and we consider the prospects for further progress. To this end, we take a step back to analyze the defining features that make conspiracy theories different in kind from other beliefs and different in degree from each other. We consider how these features determine the adoption, consequences, and transmission of belief in conspiracy theories, even though their role as causal or moderating variables has seldom been examined. We therefore advocate for a research agenda in the study of conspiracy theories that starts—as is routine in fields such as virology and toxicology—with a robust descriptive analysis of the ontology of the entity at its center.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 74 is January 2023. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... Furthermore, adopting and disseminating conspiracy beliefs by people high in collective narcissism may be another approach to draw attention to the group as the one knowing the truth behind major world events or political reality (see Lantian et al., 2017). ...
The rise of illiberalism may have been fuelled in part by group-based psychological needs for recognition and dominance. The group-based need for recognition can be captured by collective narcissism: a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on external validation. Collective narcissism has consistently been associated with outgroup prejudice and hostility, especially towards groups that are perceived to have insulted or threatened the ingroup. The group-based need for dominance can be captured by social dominance orientation: an ideological attitude characterised by a strong preference for maintaining or enhancing hierarchies in intergroup relations and establishing dominance. While the two needs differ in their psychological antecedents and consequences, the craving for recognition of the ingroup can slide into a demand for dominance. Both collective narcissism and social dominance orientation have been associated with support for illiberal leaders, political movements, and policies. Opposition to democracy, civil liberties, science, and environmental protection can all be used to signal the country’s dominance and independence from others. Thus, the needs for recognition and dominance can form a toxic blend, creating a psychological basis for the present popularity of illiberalism.
... The experience of social exclusion may itself increase superstitious [22] or conspiracist ideation [23]. The social costs incurred by exclusion may be partly compensated by the psychological benefit of fulfilling a heightened need for uniqueness (knowing more than the majority of other people) among CT believers compared to non-believers [24][25][26][27]. ...
Research on conspiracy theories tends to frame conspiracy believers as isolated individuals falling prey to irrational beliefs caused by a variety of pathological traits and cognitive shortcomings. But evidence is accumulating that conspiracy theory believers are also linked together in social movements capable of effectively coordinated collective action. We propose that conspiracy theory beliefs evolve over time, as part of a process of increasing disengagement from mainstream groups, and concomitant engagement in a community of like-minded individuals, capable of coordinated collective action. This approach allows portaying extreme conspiracism as attractive not despite its apparent irrationality, but precisely because of it. As such, conspiracy theories could not only be conceived as “beliefs”, but also as “social signals” advertising a subversive “counter-elite” posture.
... The experience of social exclusion may itself increase superstitious [22] or conspiracist ideation [23]. The social costs incurred by exclusion may be partly compensated by the psychological benefit of fulfilling a heightened need for uniqueness (knowing more than the majority of other people) among CT believers compared to non-believers [24][25][26][27]. ...
Research on conspiracy theories tends to frame conspiracy believers as isolated individuals falling prey to irrational beliefs caused by a variety of pathological traits and cognitive shortcomings. But evidence is accumulating that conspiracy theory believers are also linked together in social movements capable of effectively coordinated collective action. We propose that conspiracy theory beliefs evolve over time, as part of a process of increasing disengagement from mainstream groups, and concomitant engagement in a community of like-minded individuals, capable of coordinated collective action. This approach allows portraying extreme conspiracism as attractive not despite its apparent irrationality, but precisely because of it. As such, conspiracy theories could not only be conceived as “beliefs”, but also as “social signals” advertising a subversive “counter-elite” posture.
... Research has also uncovered several predictors of this general tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Prior cross-sectional work has found that greater conspiracist ideation is predicted by higher levels of need for uniqueness (Lantian et al., 2017), higher dispositional levels of anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013), and a more intuitive thinking style (Stahl & van Prooijen, 2018)-to name a few. Greater narcissism has also been linked to higher levels conspiracist ideation (Cichoka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016). ...
A primary focus of research on conspiracy theories has been understanding the psychological characteristics that predict people’s level of conspiracist ideation. However, the dynamics of conspiracist ideation—i.e., how such tendencies change over time—are not well understood. To help fill this gap in the literature, we used data from longitudinal studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that greater belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories at baseline predicts both greater endorsement of a novel real-world conspiracy theory involving voter fraud in the 2020 American Presidential election (Study 1) and increases in generic conspiracist beliefs over a period of several months (Studies 1 and 2). Thus, engaging with real-world conspiracy theories appears to act as a gateway, leading to more general increases in conspiracist ideation. Beyond enhancing our knowledge of conspiracist ideation, this work highlights the importance of fighting the spread of conspiracy theories.
... In general, these motivations appear to go beyond the typical pleasures of participation, such as camaraderie and recognition. Like many conspiracy theorists, Bakers map coherent patterns onto the chaos of current events, produce damning critiques of their ideological opponents, and, by "aiding" President Trump through research, may see themselves as players on the world stage (Lantian et al., 2017;Moulding et al., 2016). ...
Communication research is increasingly concerned with the relationship between epistemological fragmentation and polarization. Even so, explanations for why partisans take up fringe beliefs are limited. This article examines the right-wing conspiracy QAnon, which posits that the anonymous poster “Q” is a Trump administration insider who encourages followers (“Bakers”) to research hidden truths behind current events. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork on the 8chan imageboard, we position baking as a collective, knowledge-making activity built on the affordances of social media designed to construct specific facts and theories that maintain QAnon’s cohesion over time. Bakers demonstrate populist expertise, the rejection of legacy media accounts of current events in favor of the “alternative facts” constructed through their systematic research programs. We emphasize the politically ambivalent nature of participatory culture and argue that baking casts doubt on critical thinking or media literacy as solutions to “post-truth” dilemmas like hyperpartisan media and disinformation.
... Conspiracy theories are defined as the belief that powerful forces, such as Big Pharma, influential individuals, or institutions, are conspiring against the public with malign intent . Believing in conspiracy theories is linked to certain personality variables (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999;Imhoff & Bruder, 2014;Lantian et al., 2017), but situational factors also make it more likely for conspiracy theories to evolve, which include individual or collective threat (Heiss et al., 2021;Newheiser et al., 2011;Van Prooijen, 2020) and societal crises (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). These situations give rise to feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence (Van Harreveld et al., 2014). ...
Conspiracy theories often involve topics of uncertainty and ambivalence. One of those topics during the Covid-19 pandemic was the vaccination based on the new method using messenger RNA. In a preregistered study with N = 382 participants, we tested an intervention addressing the uncertainty concerning this new vaccination at a time when conspiracy theories about the vaccination method were not yet widely spread. Participants either only read short facts about the new vaccination (no explanation condition), or read these facts in addition to an explanation about the function of messenger RNA vaccines (relevant explanation condition), or they read the facts after the explanation of an alternative issue (irrelevant explanation condition). Results showed that individuals reading the relevant explanations addressing uncertainties surrounding the new vaccination method were less likely to agree with a Covid-19 vaccination conspiracy theory and were more willing to get a Covid-19 vaccination compared to the other conditions. An exploratory analysis showed that agreement with the Covid-19 vaccination conspiracy theory mediated the effect of explanation type on vaccination intentions. Potential implications and limitations are discussed.
... Studies exploring the link between paranoia and conspiracy thinking have tended to calculate associations between paranoia and measures of general conspiracy mindset. These measures pose broad statements such as 'The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or wellknown public figures, and keeps this a secret' and 'I think that the official version of events given by authorities very often hides the truth' [4,19,20]. Because these approaches often involve aggregating responses across multiple items [12] or measuring conspiracy thinking using one item alone [2], they cannot speak to the relationship between paranoia and different features of conspiracy thinking. ...
Paranoia and conspiracy thinking are known to be distinct but correlated constructs, but it is unknown whether certain types of conspiracy thinking are more common in paranoia than others. In a large ( n = 1000), pre-registered online study we tested if endorsement of items on a new Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire varied according to whether harm was described as being (a) intentional and (b) self-referential. Our predictions were supported: paranoia was positively associated with endorsement of items on this questionnaire overall and more paranoid individuals were more likely to endorse items describing intentional and self-referential harm. Belief in any item on the Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire was associated with belief in others and items describing incidental harm and harm to others were found to be more believable overall. Individuals who endorsed conspiracy theory items on the questionnaire were more likely to state that people similar to them would as well, although this effect was not reduced in paranoia, counter to our expectations.
This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptaulize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical.
There are many conspiracy theories about the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Belief in these conspiracy theories may lead people to underestimate the risk of COVID-19 and adopt behaviors that increase their risk of infection. Consequently, they may not support national infection prevention policies. In study 1, we administered a survey in January 2021 and analyzed the data using structural equation modeling (SEM). The results revealed the validity of the following hypothesized model: “Conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 → disregard for infection risk → individual behavior that increases infection risk and disapproval of national infection prevention policies.” In study 2, a longitudinal survey was disseminated to the respondents of study 1 in January 2022. The results were similar to those obtained with SEM in study 1. Analysis of the longitudinal data based on simultaneous effects and cross-lagged models revealed the following causal relationship: “Conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 → underestimation of infection risk → infection prevention”. These results suggest that conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 may have a disruptive effect on governments’ infectious disease control policies.
Affiliation with certain groups allows to simultaneously satisfy two competing needs: the need to be moderately different from others and the need to belong. We propose that the feminist movement, that has been turning towards individualistic goals based on individual empowerment, may be one of such groups for women. In three studies we examined the relationship between self-uniqueness and women's support for collective action and structural measures (i.e. sex quotas) promoted by the feminist movement. A first correlational study indicated that self-uniqueness need is positively associated with willingness to participate in collective action for gender justice generally, but not with support for sex quotas. Consistently, two experimental studies (Studies 2-3) found that priming self-uniqueness increases collective action intentions, but not quota support. Study 3 also showed that the effect of self-uniqueness on collective action intentions for gender justice may be mediated by greater perceptions of personal discrimination for being a woman and fusion with the feminist movement. These results suggest that appeals to self-uniqueness may attract women to the feminist movement but do not guarantee support for concrete collective measures against gender inequality.
"Reboot," especially NoFap, promotes abstinence from masturbation and/or pornography to treat "pornography addiction," an unrecognized diagnosis. While the intention of Reboot/NoFap is to decrease distress, qualitative studies have consistently suggested that "Reboots" paradoxically cause more distress. The distress appears to occur in response to (1) the abstinence goal, which recasts common sexual behaviors as personal "failures," and (2) problematic and inaccurate Reboot/NoFap forum messaging regarding sexuality and addiction. This preregistered survey asked men about their experience with perceived "relapse" and NoFap forums. Participants reported that their most recent relapse was followed by feeling shameful, worthless, sad, a desire to commit suicide, and other negative emotions. A novel predictor of identifying as a pornography addict in this lower religiosity sample was higher narcissism. Participants reported that NoFap forums contained posts that were misogynist (73.7% of participants), bullying (49.1%), anti-LGBT (42.9%), antisemitic (32.0%), instructing followers to harm or kill themselves (23.5%), or threats to hurt someone else (21.1%). More engagement in NoFap online forums was associated with worse symptoms of erectile dysfunction, depression, anxiety, and more sex negativity. Results support and expand previously documented harms and problems with Reboot/NoFap claims of treating pornography addiction from qualitative research.
Proceedings of the 5th Leipzig-Evora Scientific Meeting in Psychology.
Conspiracy theories arise during important societal and political events, with negative consequences. Yet, conspiracy theories remain to be investigated in the context of sporting tournaments, in spite of the importance of such events in contemporary societies. During the 2018 FIFA World Cup, conspiracy theories alleging that the newly introduced video Assistant Referee (VAR) was used with malevolent motives gained popularity online. In this paper, we used a Twitter content analysis to explore VAR conspiracy theories during the World Cup (N = 2,768 tweets). Conspiracy tweets peaked after eliminations of some teams and were strongly associated with labels referring to self-categorization at the group-level, supporting the notion that conspiracy beliefs are triggered by contexts threatening one’s social identity. Conspiracy tweets were also correlated with tweets expressing skepticism or defiance against the VAR, suggesting that conspiracy beliefs might be related to sport fans’ other identity management strategies. Finally, we drew an intergroup typology of VAR conspiracy beliefs’ recurrent figures, highlighting that higher ordered categorization helped conspiracy narratives and content to adapt throughout the tournament. We discuss the identity management strategy status of sport fans’ conspiracy beliefs.
This article theorises and conceptualises the ambivalent role of religions and conspiracy theories in modern democracies. Based on a concise comparison of both phenomena, it elaborates the similar risks and functions of religions and conspiracy theories for the political community without neglecting the fact that, under secular conditions, the spread of conspiracy narratives might outweigh those of religious messages in the long run. That observation seems particularly relevant for contemporary governance and political science, as a tendency towards social anomie in the sense of Durkheim can be deduced from democratic theory, which significantly increases democracy’s need for compensatory moral and cognitive authorities.
Conspiracy theories – which posit that secret groups cooperate to pursue malevolent goals – are a prominent feature in social and political discourse. Psychological research on conspiracy theories has boomed in the past 20 years, generating insights to the correlates and consequences of conspiracy beliefs. However, the literature suffers some limitations; the current editorial identifies five that constrain this relatively young field of research and recommends that future research (1) consider different forms of conspiracy beliefs and their distinct correlates and effects, (2) rely more on experiments to allow for conclusions about causality, (3) conduct more research that is high in external validity, (4) dedicate more attention to the cognitive processes underlying conspiracy beliefs, and (5) study methods for potential interventions. The current Virtual Special Issue highlights cutting-edge research that addresses some of these limitations. In particular, they highlight the importance of experimental methods in advancing this growing research field.
The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology provides a comprehensive review of the psychology of political behaviour from an international perspective. Its coverage spans from foundational approaches to political psychology, including the evolutionary, personality and developmental roots of political attitudes, to contemporary challenges to governance, including populism, hate speech, conspiracy beliefs, inequality, climate change and cyberterrorism. Each chapter features cutting-edge research from internationally renowned scholars who offer their unique insights into how people think, feel and act in different political contexts. By taking a distinctively international approach, this handbook highlights the nuances of political behaviour across cultures and geographical regions, as well as the truisms of political psychology that transcend context. Academics, graduate students and practitioners alike, as well as those generally interested in politics and human behaviour, will benefit from this definitive overview of how people shape – and are shaped by – their political environment in a rapidly changing twenty-first century.
In 2020, the US Department of Defense elicited research that "would look at audience vulnerability to suasory discourses, as delivered by a variety of authentic and inauthentic actors and at methods to improve audience resilience to malign and deceptive information attacks" (DoD 2020, 48). This chapter argues that malign and deceptive information fosters pathological belief systems. Why are pathological beliefs still a modern problem after centuries of the Enlightenment project? Enlightenment thinkers, such as French Revolutionary leader Nicolas de Condorcet, predicted that progress would lead to reason's triumph, benefitting all humanity. Condorcet claimed that human beings would perfect their reasoning abilities and abandon their prejudices (Condorcet 1795). But the Enlightenment project fell short for two reasons: (1) it contained significant blind spots; and (2) It didn't go far enough. Condorcet's most significant blind spot was his belief that human progress was a natural law. He wrote, "that no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the controul of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us." He added that human progress was not only inevitable, but also irreversible; "The course of this progress may doubtless be more or less rapid, but it can never be retrograde" (11-12).
Public and scientific interest in why people believe in conspiracy theories (CT) surged in the past years. To come up with a theoretical explanation, researchers investigated relationships of CT belief with psychological factors such as political attitudes, emotions, or personality. However, recent studies have put the robustness of these relationships into question. In the present study, a prediction‐based analysis approach and machine learning models are deployed to detect and remedy poor replicability of CT belief associations. The analysis of a representative dataset with 2025 UK citizens supports the assumption that the current simplicity of the field's analysis routine, exhibiting high sample‐specificity and neglecting complex associations of psychological factors with CT belief, may obscure important relationships. The results further point towards key components of conspiratorial mindsets like general distrust and low socio‐political control. Important implications for building a coherent theory of CT belief are derived.
Conspiracy believers often claim to be critical thinkers doing their “own research” instead of relying on others’ testimony. In two preregistered behavioral studies conducted in the UK and Pakistan (Nparticipants = 864, Ntrials = 5408) we test if conspiracy believers have a general tendency to discount social information (in favor of their own opinions and intuitions). We found that conspiracy mentality is not associated with social information use in text-based (Study 1) and image-based (Study 2) advice-taking tasks. Yet, we found discrepancies between self-reported and actual social information use. Conspiracy believers were more likely to report relying less on social information than actually relying less on social information in the behavioral tasks. Our results suggest that the skepticism of conspiracy believers towards epistemic authorities is unlikely to be the manifestation of a generalized distrustful mindset. Conspiracy believers may be more permeable to social influence than they sometimes claim.
Research suggests that a number of cognitive processes—including pattern perception, intentionality bias, proportionality bias, and confirmation bias—may underlie belief in a conspiracy theory. However, there are reasons to believe that conspiracy theory beliefs also depend in part on a failure to understand the probability of actual events allegedly supporting those conspiracy theories as well as a failure to entertain disconfirming evidence that may contradict those beliefs. Study 1 examines the relationships between general beliefs in conspiracy theories, belief in a novel conspiracy theory, conjunctive error propensity, and the propensity to consider disconfirming evidence. Study 2 investigates the roles of confronting both the propensity to make conjunctive errors and the failure to consider disconfirming evidence in changing conspiracy theory beliefs as well as attitudes associated with those beliefs. The results of both studies suggest that corrections to one's propensity to make conjunctive errors and mindful consideration of disconfirming evidence may serve as viable methods of self‐persuasion pertaining to conspiracy theory beliefs. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
We examined how individuals that may be labelled “conspiracy theorists” respond to discrimination against “conspiracy theorists”. In line with the Rejection-Identification Model (Branscombe et al., 1999), we hypothesised that perceived group-based discrimination against conspiracy theorists would strengthen identification with the “conspiracy theorist” ingroup. We propose that this relationship might be mediated by meta-conspiracy beliefs, that is, the belief that the discrimination of conspiracy theorists is itself a conspiracy. Three studies (Ns = 97, 364, 747) among participants who had been labelled as “conspiracy theorist” in the past (Studies 1-2) or who had been labelled as such at the beginning of the experiment (Study 3) revealed robust positive relationships between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists, meta conspiracy beliefs, and identification. Furthermore, in Studies 2-3, identification was strongly associated with positive intergroup differentiation and pride to be a conspiracy theorist. However, there was no evidence that a manipulation of discrimination with bogus public opinion polls affected “conspiracy theorist” identification or meta-conspiracy beliefs. A Bayesian internal meta-analysis of the studies returned moderate (for group identification) to strong (for meta-conspiracy beliefs) support for the null hypothesis. In contrast, in Study 3, a manipulation of discrimination by powerholders enhanced both identification and meta-conspiracy beliefs. This suggests that the source of discrimination moderates the causal relationship between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists and group identification.
The Covid-19 pandemic not only led to chaos and uncertainty, it also brought about many conspiracy theories. In the last two decades, with considerable amount of research, social psychologists have begun to unravel the personality traits underlying conspiracy theories. One such trait is narcissism where the need to distinguish oneself from others might be satisfied by holding beliefs that are different from the general population. In this research, we focus, for the first time in the literature, on both collective and grandiose narcissism’s predictive effects on Covid-19 conspiracy theories and the possible moderation of need for uniqueness (feeling oneself to be special and different from others) and belonging (feeling oneself to be part of a larger and worthy whole). In a Turkish sample ( N = 309), we found that both collective and grandiose narcissism were significant predictors of Covid-19 conspiracy. In addition, when the need to feel special was high, grandiose narcissists, but not collective narcissists, tended to believe in Covid-19 conspiracies. Finally, we found that generic conspiracy beliefs were also important predictors of Covid-19 conspiracy theories. Our research illuminates the link between narcissism and Covid-19 conspiracy theories. Future research should look for other possible moderating factors between collective narcissism and conspiracy beliefs in the context of Covid-19.
Conspiracy theories are a folk narrative genre that tends to arise whenever crises occur; thus, inevitably, these kinds of theories appeared on the pandemic of COVID-19 as well. Their spread used to be done through magazines with relevant subject matter and through the word of mouth. The internet has changed this treaty because, by giving space in the dissemination of any information, it seems to have enhanced the widest spread of this narrative genre too. So, in this chapter, the impact of the internet on the genre will be highlighted through a long-term digital folklore research on the Greek internet. Through the case study of conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of digital folklore, this chapter intents to highlight the impact of the internet on the genre, its spread, and its function, as well as the way the internet users' uptake the genre.
We examine conspiracy beliefs in the context of misplaced certainty—certainty that is unsubstantiated by one’s own or others’ skepticism. A conspiracy theory held with misplaced certainty may entail, for instance, “knowing” or feeling certain that secret actors are plotting against society yet acknowledging that this claim lacks evidence or is opposed by most other people. Recent work on misplaced certainty suggests that such certainty predicts and results in antisocial outcomes, including fanatical behavior in terms of determined ignorance, aggression, and adherence to extreme groups. As such, introducing the concept of misplaced certainty to theory and research on conspiracy theories may help identify when and why conspiracy theories lead to deleterious behavioral outcomes. (113 words)
Many people believe conspiracy theories, even though such beliefs are harmful to themselves and their social environment. What is the appeal of conspiracy theories? In this contribution I propose that conspiracy theories have psychological benefits by imbuing perceiver’s worldview with meaning and purpose in a rewarding manner. Conspiracy theories enable an alternative reality in which perceivers (a) can defend a fragile ego by perceiving themselves and their groups as important, (b) can rationalize any of their beliefs and actions as legitimate, and (c) are entertained through the opportunity to uncover a mystery in an exciting tale. These are short-term benefits, however, suggesting that conspiracy theories provide people with a form of instant gratification.
We examined how individuals who may be labelled ‘conspiracy theorists’ respond to discrimination against ‘conspiracy theorists’. In line with the Rejection-Identification Model (Branscombe et al., 1999), we hypothesized that perceived group-based discrimination against conspiracy theorists would strengthen identification with the ‘conspiracy theorist’ ingroup. We propose that this relationship might be mediated by meta-conspiracy beliefs, that is, the belief that the discrimination of conspiracy theorists is itself a conspiracy. Three studies (Ns = 97, 364, 747) among participants who had been labelled as ‘conspiracy theorist’ in the past (Studies 1 and 2) or who had been labelled as such at the beginning of the experiment (Study 3) revealed robust positive relationships between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists, meta conspiracy beliefs, and identification. Furthermore, in Studies 2 and 3, identification was strongly associated with positive intergroup differentiation and pride to be a conspiracy theorist. However, there was no evidence that a manipulation of discrimination with bogus public opinion polls affected ‘conspiracy theorist’ identification or meta-conspiracy beliefs. A Bayesian internal meta-analysis of the studies returned moderate (for group identification) to strong (for meta-conspiracy beliefs) support for the null hypothesis. In contrast, in Study 3, a manipulation of discrimination by powerholders enhanced both identification and meta-conspiracy beliefs. This suggests that the source of discrimination moderates the causal relationship between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists and group identification.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, conspiracy theories about the virus spread rapidly, and whilst governments across the globe put in place different restrictions and guidelines to contain the pandemic, these were not universally adhered to. This research examined the association between pandemic related risk perceptions, belief in conspiracy theories, and compliance with COVID-19 public guidelines amongst a UK sample (n = 368). Participants rated their level of concern for a series of potential risks during the pandemic (to the economy, personal health, freedom, media integrity and health risk to others). Participants also rated their level of belief in different conspiracy theories and self-reported their behaviour during the first UK lockdown. Mediational analyses showed that stronger belief in conspiracy theories was associated with perceptions of lower risk to health and higher risk to the economy and freedom, which in turn were associated with lower compliance with COVID-19 related governmental guidelines. Perception of information transparency risks did not mediate the association between belief in conspiracy theories and compliant behaviours. These results highlight the key role that risk perception may play in translating belief in conspiracy theories into low compliance with governmental COVID-19 related guidelines. Our findings suggest new patterns with respect to the relationship between conspiracy theory adherence and salience of different risk perceptions amidst the pandemic, which could have implications for the development of public health messaging and communication interventions.
Manipulation checks do not allow ruling out or accepting alternative explanations
of causal effects (Sigall & Mills, 1998). In order to gauge the influence of this argument on current research practices, we surveyed the views of researchers on manipulation checks. Results confirmed that a manipulation check still stands as a totem of experimental rigor. Except in rare circumstances, such as when pilot testing, manipulation checks do not provide information relevant to construct validity. While it seems cost free to include seemingly informative manipulation checks, we claim it is actually costly because it wrongly enhances subjective confidence in the validity of research findings. We conclude that manipulation checks may hinder efforts to adopt a cumulative culture and practice of hypothesis testing.
Adding to the growing literature on the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, the present paper argues that a small part in motivating the endorsement of such seemingly irrational beliefs is the desire to stick out from the crowd, the need for uniqueness. Across three studies, we establish a modest but robust association between the self-attributed need for uniqueness and a general conspirational mindset (conspiracy mentality) as well as the endorsement of specific conspiracy beliefs. Following up on previous findings that people high in need for uniqueness resist majority and yield to minority influence, Study 3 experimentally shows that a fictitious conspiracy theory received more support by people high in conspiracy mentality when this theory was said to be supported by only a minority (vs. majority) of survey respondents. Together these findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs can be adopted as a means to attain a sense of uniqueness.
Keywords: conspiracy
Belief in conspiracy theories about societal events is widespread and has important consequences for political, health and environmental behaviour. Little is known, however, about how conspiracy theorising affects people’s everyday working lives. In the present research, we predicted that belief in conspiracy theories about the workplace would be associated with increased turnover intentions. We further hypothesised that belief in these organizational conspiracy theories would predict decreased organizational commitment, and job satisfaction. Finally, we hypothesised that these factors would mediate the relationship between organizational conspiracy theories and turnover intentions. In three studies (one correlational and two experiments, Ns = 209, 119, 202), we found support for these hypotheses. The current studies therefore demonstrate the potentially adverse consequences of conspiracy theorising for the workplace. We argue that managers and employees should be careful not to dismiss conspiracy theorising as harmless rumour or gossip.
We designed, in French and in English, a single-item scale to measure people’s general tendency to believe
in conspiracy theories. The validity and reliability of this scale was assessed in 3 studies (total N = 555).
In Study 1 ( N = 152), positive correlations between the single-item scale and 3 other conspiracy belief
scales on a French student sample suggested good concurrent validity. In Study 2 ( N = 292), we replicated
these results on a larger and more heterogeneous Internet American sample. Moreover, the scale showed
good predictive validity—responses predicted participants’ willingness to receive a bi-monthly newsletter
about alleged conspiracy theories. Finally, in Study 3 ( N = 111), we observed good test-retest reliability
and demonstrated both convergent and discriminant validity of the single-item scale. Overall these results
suggest that the single-item conspiracy belief scale has good validity and reliability and may be used to
measure conspiracy belief in favor of lengthier existing scales. In addition, the validation of the single-
item scale led us to develop and start validating French versions of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale,
the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, and a 10-item version (instead of the 15-item original version)
of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory.
This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online version will vary from the pagination of the print book. Self-Categorization Theory Abstract The focus of this chapter is self-categorization theory (SCT). SCT is a theory of the nature of the self that recognizes that perceivers are both individuals and group member, explains how and when people will define themselves as individual and group entities and its implications, and examines the impact of this variability in self-perception ('I' to 'we') for understandings of mind and behaviour. As a result, it has generated a range of distinctive subtheories, hypotheses and findings across a range of significant areas in social psychology. This chapter outlines central steps in the theory's development, its unique contribution and the impact of its ideas with specific details provided in the areas of social influence (more recently, leadership and power) and individuality (e.g. personal self, personal self-perception, personal self-beliefs). In the final section, the way SCT can be applied to better understand and solve a range of social issues is highlighted. A specific example is provided of how core SCT ideas are being implemented in secondary schools with the aim of improving school outcomes (e.g. learning, bullying, wellbeing). It is our view that through an understanding of SCT (and related work) it is possible to appreciate the important and distinctive contribution of social psychology to other areas of psychology and cognate fields.
Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? This study breaks from much previous research and attempts to explain conspiratorial beliefs with traditional theories of opinion formation. Specifically, we focus on the reception of informational cues given a set of predispositions (political and conspiratorial). We begin with observational survey data to show that there exists a unique predisposition that drives individuals to one degree or another to believe in conspiracy theories. This predisposition appears orthogonal to partisanship and predicts political behaviors including voter participation. Then a national survey experiment is used to test the effect of an informational cue on belief in a conspiracy theory while accounting for both conspiratorial predispositions and partisanship. Our results provide an explanation for individual-level heterogeneity in the holding of conspiratorial beliefs and also indicate the conditions under which information can drive conspiratorial beliefs.
This paper describes version 0.8-2 of R package meta which has been published in February 2007.
Most R commands presented in the paper are still working today with the current version of meta.
The command
summary(m1, byvar = Fleiss93$year < 1980, bylab = "year<1980")
has been replaced by
summary(update(m1, byvar = year < 1980, bylab = "year<1980")).
Furthermore, the R function plot.meta() has been replaced by forest.meta().
Across three studies, we examined the role of self-evaluation in predicting conspiracy beliefs. Previous research linked the endorsement of conspiracy theories to low self-esteem. We propose that conspiracy theories should rather be appealing to individuals with exaggerated feelings of self-love, such as narcissists, due to their paranoid tendencies. In Study 1 general conspiracist beliefs were predicted by high individual narcissism but low self-esteem. Study 2 demonstrated that these effects were differentially mediated by paranoid thoughts, and independent of the effects of collective narcissism. Individual narcissism predicted generalized conspiracist beliefs, regardless of the conspiracy theories implicating in-group or out-group members, while collective narcissism predicted belief in out-group but not in-group conspiracies. Study 3 replicated the effects of individual narcissism and self-esteem on the endorsement of various specific conspiracy theories and demonstrated that the negative effect of self-esteem was largely accounted for by the general negativity towards humans associated with low self-esteem.
We seem to live in an incredibly credulous age. Despite the unparalleled proliferation of information (or perhaps because of it), many people appear to believe in all sorts of myths or false narratives that exaggerate, idealize, or misconstrue reality. These beliefs extend to almost all aspects of modern life, from pseudoscience (Swami, Stieger, Pietschnig et al., 2012b) to pseudohistory (Allchin, 2004), as well as they way societies are governed and the motives of those who govern. In addition, many millions of people worldwide appear to subscribe to unfounded “conspiracy theories,” while denying “official” or mainstream accounts of many important phenomena. Whether it was about Salem witches, slaveholders, Jews, Bolsheviks, or black militants, conspiracy theories have always found deep roots in society (Fenster, 1999; Goldberg, 2001; Knight, 2001). In contemporary societies, however, conspiracy theorists have found fertile ground in intelligence failures, such as in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Barkun, 2003; Prange, 1986) and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. In terms of the latter, for example, many Americans remain skeptical of the findings of the Warren Commission Report, which identified Lee Harvey Oswald as having acted alone in assassinating John F. Kennedy (Posner, 1993). Indeed, by the early 1990s, polls suggested that over 70% of Americans believed that some form of conspiracy was responsible for the president’s death (Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995; Southwell and Twist, 2004).
We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.
Although public endorsement of conspiracy theories is growing, the potentially negative societal consequences of widespread conspiracy ideation remain unclear. While past studies have mainly examined the personality correlates of conspiracy ideation, this study examines the conspiracy-effect; the extent to which exposure to an actual conspiracy theory influences pro-social and environmental decision-making. Participants (N = 316) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions; (a) a brief conspiracy video about global warming, (b) an inspirational pro-climate video or (c) a control group. Results indicate that those participants who were exposed to the conspiracy video were significantly less likely to think that there is widespread scientific agreement on human-caused climate change, less likely to sign a petition to help reduce global warming and less likely to donate or volunteer for a charity in the next six months. These results strongly point to the socio-cognitive potency of conspiracies and highlight that exposure to popular conspiracy theories can have negative and undesirable societal consequences.
Threats to control have been found to increase belief in conspiracy theories. We argue, however, that previous research observing this effect was limited in two ways. First, previous research did not exclude the possibility that affirming control might reduce conspiracy beliefs. Second, because of artificial lab procedures, previous findings provide little information about the external validity of the control threat–conspiracy belief relationship. In Study 1, we address the first limitation and find that affirming control indeed reduces belief in conspiracy theories as compared with a neutral baseline condition. In Study 2, we address the second limitation of the literature. In a large-scale US sample, we find that a societal threat to control, that citizens actually experienced, predicts belief in a range of common conspiracy theories. Taken together, these findings increase insight in the fundamental relationship between the human need for control and the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Uncertainty surrounds the public understanding of climate change and provides fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Typically, such conspiracy theories assert that climate scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science to suit their own purposes. Climate change conspiracy theories resemble other conspiracy theories in some respects, but in others they appear to be quite different. For example, climate change conspiracy theories appear to be motivated by the desire to deny or minimize an unwelcome and threatening conclusion. They also appear to be more contentious than other types of conspiracy theories. Perhaps to an unparalleled extent, people on both sides of the issue champion climate change conspiracy theories. Finally, more than other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change appear to be more politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum. Some empirical evidence suggests that climate change conspiracy theories may be harmful, steering people away from environmentally friendly initiatives. They therefore present a significant challenge for governments and environmental organizations that are attempting to convince people to take action against global warming.
Conspiracist beliefs are widespread and potentially hazardous. A growing body of research suggests that cognitive biases may play a role in endorsement of conspiracy theories. The current research examines the novel hypothesis that individuals who are biased towards inferring intentional explanations for ambiguous actions are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, which portray events as the exclusive product of intentional agency. Study 1 replicated a previously observed relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual differences in anthropomorphisation. Studies 2 and 3 report a relationship between conspiracism and inferences of intentionality for imagined ambiguous events. Additionally, Study 3 again found conspiracist ideation to be predicted by individual differences in anthropomorphism. Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship was not mediated by the intentionality bias. The findings are discussed in terms of a domain-general intentionality bias making conspiracy theories appear particularly plausible. Alternative explanations are suggested for the association between conspiracism and anthropomorphism.
The current research proposes that high need for uniqueness (NFU) brings individuals positive life outcomes by helping them be connected with, rather than isolated from, others in societies where social relationships are mobile and generally open to outsiders. In societies characterized by a high mobility of relationships (relational mobility) that may result in market-like competitive circumstances (e.g., America), NFU may increase chances of social success by leading individuals to develop their unique selling points. In contrast, high NFU may bring worse results in closed societies (e.g., Japan) because of the associated risk of being ostracized. This hypothesis was examined and confirmed by three studies that employed cross-national as well as cross-regional comparisons within a single nation. A pilot study first confirmed that for societies higher in relational mobility, a high NFU person was viewed more favorably as a friend. Studies 1 and 2 found that NFU was more positively associated with life satisfaction, relationship satisfaction (Study 2), as well as income (Study 2) in societies higher in relational mobility.
Surveyed 348 residents of southwestern New Jersey and found that most believed that several of a list of 10 conspiracy theories were at least probably true. Ss who believed in 1 conspiracy were more likely also to believe in others. Belief in conspiracies was correlated with anomia, lack of interpersonal trust, and insecurity about employment. Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories than were Whites. Younger Ss were slightly more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, but there were few significant correlations with gender, educational level, or occupational category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In the present research, we examined people's tendency to endorse or question belief in conspiracy theories. In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that the perceived morality of authorities influences conspiracy beliefs, particularly when people experience uncertainty. Study 1 revealed that information about the morality of oil companies influenced beliefs that these companies were involved in planning the war in Iraq, but only when uncertainty was made salient. Similar findings were obtained in Study 2, which focused on a bogus newspaper article about a fatal car accident of a political leader in an African country. It is concluded that uncertainty leads people to make inferences about the plausibility or implausibility of conspiracy theories by attending to morality information. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Ambivalence is a presumably unpleasant experience, and coming to terms with it is an intricate part of human existence. It is argued that ambivalent attitude holders cope with their ambivalence through compensatory perceptions of order. We first show that ambivalence leads to an increase in (visual) perceptions of order (Study 1). In Study 2 we conceptually replicate this finding by showing that ambivalence also increases belief in conspiracy theories, a cognitive form of order perception. Furthermore, this effect is mediated by the negative emotions that are elicited by ambivalence. In Study 3 we show that increased need for order is driving these effects: Affirmations of order cancel out the effect of ambivalence on perceptions of order. Theoretical as well as societal implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).
The current studies investigated the potential impact of anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs, and exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, on vaccination intentions. In Study 1, British parents completed a questionnaire measuring beliefs in anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and the likelihood that they would have a fictitious child vaccinated. Results revealed a significant negative relationship between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intentions. This effect was mediated by the perceived dangers of vaccines, and feelings of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust in authorities. In Study 2, participants were exposed to information that either supported or refuted anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, or a control condition. Results revealed that participants who had been exposed to material supporting anti-vaccine conspiracy theories showed less intention to vaccinate than those in the anti-conspiracy condition or controls. This effect was mediated by the same variables as in Study 1. These findings point to the potentially detrimental consequences of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories, and highlight their potential role in shaping health-related behaviors.
People who believe in the paranormal have been found to be particularly susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. The present research examines whether the same is true of people who endorse conspiracy theories. Two studies examined the association between conspiracist ideation and the number of conjunction violations made in a variety of contexts (neutral, paranormal and conspiracy). Study 1 found that participants who endorsed a range of popular conspiracy theories more strongly also made more conjunction errors than participants with weaker conspiracism, regardless of the contextual framing of the conjunction. Study 2, using an independent sample and a generic measure of conspiracist ideation, replicated the finding that conspiracy belief is associated with domain-general susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. The findings are discussed in relation to the association between conspiracism and other anomalous beliefs, the representativeness heuristic and the tendency to infer underlying causal relationships connecting ostensibly unrelated events. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The current studies explored the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories. In Study 1, participants were exposed to a range of conspiracy theories concerning government involvement in significant events such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to engage in politics, relative to participants who were given information refuting conspiracy theories. This effect was mediated by feelings of political powerlessness. In Study 2, participants were exposed to conspiracy theories concerning the issue of climate change. Results revealed that exposure to information supporting the conspiracy theories reduced participants' intentions to reduce their carbon footprint, relative to participants who were given refuting information, or those in a control condition. This effect was mediated by powerlessness with respect to climate change, uncertainty, and disillusionment. Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories also influenced political intentions, an effect mediated by political powerlessness. The current findings suggest that conspiracy theories may have potentially significant social consequences, and highlight the need for further research on the social psychology of conspiracism.
The relationship between the self and the collective is discussed from the perspective of self-categorization theory. Self-categorization theory makes a basic distinction between personal and social identity as different levels of self-categorization. It shows how the emergent properties of group processes can be explained in terms of a shift in self perception from personal to social identity. It also elucidates how self-categorization varies with the social context. It argues that self-categorizing is inherently variable, fluid, and context dependent, as sedf-categories are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference. This notion has major implications for accepted ways of thinking about the self: The variability of self-categorizing provides the perceiver with behavioral and cognitive flexibility and ensures that cognition is always shaped by the social context in which it takes place.
Five experiments demonstrate that exposure to novel visual stimulus arrays of geometric shapes affects consumers' real choices among products. The authors first demonstrate that exposure to variety arrays (arrays of differing shapes) increases variety seeking (Study 1). They then show that exposure to uniqueness arrays (e.g., one circle among six squares) increases choice of unique over common objects (Studies 2 and 3) and interacts with chronic need for uniqueness (Study 3). In the final two studies, the authors show that variety and uniqueness arrays activate distinct constructs; specifically, they find no effect of exposure to uniqueness arrays on variety seeking (Study 4a) and no effect of exposure to variety arrays on uniqueness seeking (Study 4b). Taken together, these studies build on the existing literature about nonconscious effects on consumer behavior and choice behavior in particular by showing that consumers' real choices are affected by subtle exposure to novel stimuli that do not have any previous associations.
The relation between authoritarianism and social dominance orientation was analyzed, with authoritarianism measured using a three-dimensional scale. The implicit multidimensional structure (authoritarian submission, conventionalism, authoritarian aggression) of Altemeyer’s (1981,1988) conceptualization of authoritarianism is inconsistent with its one-dimensional methodological operationalization. The dimensionality of authoritarianism was investigated using confirmatory factor analysis in a sample of 713 university students. As hypothesized, the three-factor model fit the data significantly better than the one-factor model. Regression analyses revealed that only authoritarian aggression was related to social dominance orientation. That is, only intolerance of deviance was related to high social dominance, whereas submissiveness was not.
Dans cette thèse, nous défendons l'idée que la motivation à se distinguer d'autrui (et plus précisément, le besoin d'unicité) pourrait favoriser l'adoption et l'augmentation des croyances aux théories du complot. Cette relation s'expliquerait par le fait que les individus ayant un fort besoin d'unicité auraient davantage tendance à être attirés par ce qui rare ou inaccessible, et nous argumentons que c'est justement ce qui caractérise les récits conspirationnistes (e.g., impression de détenir des informations secrètes). Nous présenterons 12 études ayant pour but de tester empiriquement cette hypothèse.Parmi les principaux résultats, nous avons montré que les individus disposant d'un niveau de croyances aux théories du complot supérieur à la moyenne pensent avoir un niveau de croyances à ces théories supérieur à celui attribué aux autres (Etudes 4, 5 et 6), ce qui correspond à un prérequis nécessaire à la formulation de notre hypothèse. Nous avons ensuite mis en évidence que plus les personnes possèdent un fort besoin d'unicité, plus elles croient aux théories du complot (Etude 8). Conformément à notre hypothèse, nous avons également démontré que les personnes qui croient aux théories du complot ont plus tendance à penser détenir des informations rares et secrètes à propos de divers complots (Etude 9). Une méta-analyse conduite sur deux études testant le rôle causal du besoin d'unicité sur les croyances aux théories du complot (Etudes 11 et 12) suggère enfin qu'une hausse situationnelle du besoin d'unicité favoriserait la formation des croyances aux théories du complot.Dans l'ensemble, il semblerait donc que le besoin d'unicité intervienne dans l'adoption des croyances aux théories du complot, même si cet effet semble de taille relativement modeste. En conclusion, cette thèse fait partie des rares travaux soulignant le rôle des explications motivationnelles dans l'adhésion aux théories du complot.
“Even paranoids have enemies.” So (reportedly) said the fourth Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, to Henry Kissinger during the 1973 Sinai talks. The point is, of course, that while paranoia is typically considered to describe a pathological disjunction between persecutory belief and reality, this is not necessarily so. There are numerous historical and contemporary examples of situations in which one group of people really are out to get others (for example, the McCarthyist persecution of supposed communist sympathizers in the 1950s, and numerous pogroms). Indeed, this is a point repeatedly made about conspiracy by laypeople, often in defense of their belief in conspiracy, and scholars, often in defense of their thesis concerning conspiracy belief (see Coady, 2006). Under some circumstances, there really has been a conspiracy going on behind the conspiracy theory. Our aim in this chapter is not to discuss whether or not paranoia or conspiracy belief is legitimate or rational (there are clearly cases where it may be), but rather to investigate why some people endorse conspiracy theories more than others. Specifically, we shall do this through consideration of several important individual difference variables that have been implicated as the foundation of a range of social and political attitudes and behaviors – social dominance orientation (SDO) (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996) – that together comprise a particularly powerful explanatory package (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; McFarland and Adelson, 1996). At the same time, we shall attempt to illustrate the role that paranoia might play in the process.
An examination of anti-Semitic themes in the thinking of the contemporary far left cannot proceed without controversy, for the very concept of “anti-Semitism” is itself a matter of intense debate. At the root of this debate lie the relations between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, and whether, either in practice or in theory, the articulation of an anti-Zionist position collapses into an anti-Semitic one, or whether anti-Zionism is separate from anti-Semitism. The present strategy is not to offer firm definitions of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, in order to separate or link the two concepts by definition, but to see whether anti-Semitic themes emerge in the way that the anti-Zionist position is articulated in sections of the far left in Britain.
As the end of the Millennium approaches, conspiracy theories are increasing in number and popularity. In this short essay, I offer an analysis of conspiracy theories inspired by Hume's discussion of miracles. My first conclusion is that whereas Hume can argue that miracles are, by definition, explanations we are not warranted in believing, there is nothing analytic that will allow us to distinguish good from bad conspiracy theories. There is no a priori method for distinguishing warranted conspiracy theories (say, those explaining Watergate) from those which are unwarranted (say, theories about extraterrestrials abducting humans). Nonetheless, there is a cluster of characteristics often shared by unwarranted conspiracy theories. An analysis of the alleged explanatory virtues of unwarranted conspiracies suggests some reasons for their current popularity, while at the same time providing grounds for their rejection. Finally, I discuss how conspiracy theories embody an anachronistic world-view that places the contemporary zeitgeist in a clearer light.
IntroductionIndividual studiesThe summary effectHeterogeneity of effect sizesSummary points
