No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Morality and the Market in Blood
... In any case, even though the impression might be that Titmuss's idea of freedom refers to a more "profound", important, and value-related conception of freedom -the freedom to give, almost meant as a sort of positive freedom, if not a "privilege" (Lomasky 1983;Stewart 1984) -I agree with those who have claimed that Titmuss's work has nothing to do with the problem of freedom (Archard 2002: 90-91;Scott, Seglow 2007: 108-109). ...
Can taxation and the redistribution of wealth through the welfare state be conceived as a modern system of circulation of the gift? But once such a gift is institutionalized, regulated and sanctioned through legal mechanisms, does it not risk being perverted or corrupted, and/or not leaving room for genuinely altruistic motives? What is more: if the market's utilitarian logic can corrupt or 'crowd out' altruistic feelings or motivations , what makes us think that the welfare state cannot also be a source of corruption? To explain the standard answers to the abovementioned questions as well as their implications I will first reexamine two opposing positions assumed here as paradigmatic examples of other similar positions: on the one hand, Titmuss's work and the never-ending debate about it; on the other, Godbout's position, in-so-far as it shows how Titmuss's arguments can easily be turned upside down. I will then introduce and reinterpret Einaudi's "critical point" theory as a more complex and richer anthropological explanation of the problems and answers considered herein.
Through the analysis of these paradigmatic positions I will develop two interrelated arguments. 1) The way these problems are posed as well as the standard answers to them are: a) subject to fallacies: the dichotomy fallacy and the fallacy of composition; b) too reductive and simplistic: we should at least try to clarify what kind of ‘gift’ or ‘corruption’ we are thinking about, and who or what the ‘giver’, the ‘corrupter’, the ‘receiver’ and/or the ‘corrupted’ party are. 2) The answers to these problems cannot be found by merely following a theoretical approach, nor can they be merely based on empirical evidence; instead, they need to take into account the forever troublesome, ambiguous and unpredictable matter of human freedom.
... Even though the impression might be that Titmuss's idea of freedom refers to a more "profound", important, and value-related conception of freedom -the freedom to give, almost meant as a sort of positive freedom, if not a "privilege" (Lomasky 1983;Stewart 1984) -I agree with those who have claimed that Titmuss's work has nothing to do with the problem of freedom (Archard 2002: 90-91;Scott, Seglow 2007: 108-109). ...
Can taxation and the redistribution of wealth through the welfare state be conceived as a modern system of circulation of the gift? But once such a gift is institutionalized, regulated and sanctioned through legal mechanisms, does it not risk being perverted or corrupted, and/or not leaving room for genuinely altruistic motives? In this paper I will develop two interrelated arguments. 1) The way these problems are posed as well as the standard answers to them are: a) subject to fallacies: the dichotomy fallacy and the fallacy of composition; b) too reductive and simplistic: we should at least try to clarify what kind of 'gift' or 'corruption' we are thinking about, and who or what the 'giver', the 'corrupter', the 'receiver' and/or the 'corrupted' party are. 2) The answers to these problems cannot be found by merely following a theoretical approach, nor can they be merely based on empirical evidence; instead, they need to take into account the forever troublesome, ambiguous and unpredictable matter of human freedom. To explain the standard answers to the abovementioned questions as well as their implications I will first reexamine two opposing positions assumed here as paradigmatic examples of other similar positions: on the one hand, Titmuss' work and the never-ending debate about it; on the other, Godbout's position, in-so-far as it shows how Titmuss' arguments can easily be turned upside down. I will then introduce and reinterpret Einaudi's "critical point" theory as a more complex and richer anthropological explanation of the problems and answers considered herein.
... Anche se si può avere l'impressione che l'idea di libertà di Titmuss rinvii a una concezione più "profonda", importante e valoriale della libertàla libertà di donare, intesa quasi come una sorta di libertà positiva se non un "privilegio" (Lomasky 1983;Stewart 1984), sono d'accordo con chi ha sostenuto che il lavoro di Titmuss non abbia nulla a che fare con il problema della libertà (Archard 2002: 90-91;Scott, Seglow 2007: 108-109). ...
... Following Richard M Titmuss's pioneering work, the pros and cons of paying blood donors have been subject to an occasionally heated debate. [1][2][3][4][5][6] The parallel issue of transplantation organs from living donors, in particular kidneys, has been the subject of controversies, and so have practices of paying sperm and oocyte donors. [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15] In addition, there are ongoing debates regarding the commodification and commercialisation of stem cells; cell lines developed from tumour cells; tissues stored in biobanks, and information extracted from sequencing human DNA. ...
Whereas previous discussions on ownership of biological material have been much informed by the natural rights tradition, insufficient attention has been paid to the strand in liberal political theory represented by Felix Cohen, Tony Honoré, and others, which treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights. In accordance with that tradition, we propose that the primary normative issue is what combination of rights a person should have to a particular item of biological material. Whether that bundle qualifies to be called "property" or "ownership" is a secondary, terminological issue. We suggest five principles of bodily rights and show how they can be applied to the construction of ethically appropriate bundles of rights to biological material.
Challenging the dominant account of medical law as normatively and conceptually subordinate to medical or bioethics, this book provides an innovative account of medical law as a rhetorical practice. The aspiration to provide a firm grounding for medical law in ethical principle has not yet been realized. Rather, legal doctrine is marked, if anything, by increasingly evident contradiction and indeterminacy that are symptomatic of the inherently contingent nature of legal argumentation. Against the idea of a timeless, placeless ethics as the master discipline for medical law, this book demonstrates how judicial and academic reasoning seek to manage this contingency, through the deployment of rhetorical strategies, persuasive to concrete audiences within specific historical, cultural and political contexts. Informed by social and legal theory, cultural history and literary criticism, John Harrington’s careful reading of key judicial decisions, legislative proposals and academic interventions offers an original, and significant, understanding of medical law.
This study underscores the importance of ethical values in politics by using the indices of the United Nations' Global Compact to assess the profile of Shell Petroleum Development Company in the observance of the principles of the Compact between the United Nations and business concerns. The study explores prospects of improving the relations between multinational oil corporations and their host communities especially in developing nations. The paper concludes that Shell's profile with respect to the tenets of the United Nations Global Compact for businesses is opportunistic and devoid of promise. The study takes the view that implementing the Global Compact initiatives would be challenging, and advises the United Nations to ensure safeguards to prevent companies from relegating the Global Compact to essentially public relations gimmicks and propaganda.