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EL FÉNIX QUE NUNCA ARDIÓ. EL RETORNO DE LA NUEVA ULTRADERECHA, 1991-2014
Número 1, Abril 2017, pp. 39-60
Tiempo Devorado. Revista de Historia Actual
ISSN 2385-5442
Anti-Semitism in the late Soviet Union:
The rise and fall of Pamyat movement
by SERGEY SUKHANKIN
Researcher at ICPS, Kiev, and PhD student at UAB
My cause will be continued by children
and grandchildren. They will avenge me. May
the God save you from the ire of my
grandchildren. When my pupils will raise, you
will shudder. I have nurtured so many men that
you have never dream of. It is no longer about
myself. The seeds have been sawn.
Dmitry Vasliyev
ABSTRACT
This article aims to discuss the rise and fate of the Pamyat movement, which became one of the
first nationalist groupings in the late USSR. The main idea implied in this analysis is primarily
concerned with the task to illuminate the phenomenon of this “People's National-patriotic
Orthodox Christian movement”, which would deflect from the mainstream of Russian nationalist
movements and organizations that appeared after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Namely, it
would be particularly valuable to outline ideological evolution of the movement that would
transcend onto the path of idealistic monarchism intertwined with aggressive anti-Semitic and
xenophobic posture promulgated by the organization. Initiated as a historical association, this
movement would later take a shape that could not have been predicted by its creators.
Subsequently, another goal embedded in this study is to show both role and legacy of Pamyat for
development and maturing of far-right ideology in the post-1991 Russia. In the end, the article
explains the main reasons of failure suffered by the movement: both objective and subjective. The
study is based on chronological principle and employs a broad range of secondary data in the
language of original. From methodological point of view, the article should be seen as an example
of “interdisciplinary” study.
Key words: Pamyat, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, post-Soviet Russia, nationalism.
RESUMEN
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
Este artículo tiene por objeto discutir el ascenso y destino del movimiento Pamyat, que se convirtió
en uno de los primeros grupos nacionalistas en los últimos tiempos de la Unión Soviética. La idea
principal en este análisis se refiere principalmente a la tarea de iluminar el fenómeno de este
"Movimiento Cristiano Ortodoxo Nacional-Patriota Popular", que se desviaría de la corriente
principal de los movimientos y organizaciones nacionalistas rusos que aparecieron después del
colapso de la URSS en 1991. En particular, resulta particularmente valioso esbozar la evolución
ideológica del movimiento que trascendería el camino del monarquismo idealista entrelazado con
la postura agresiva antisemita y xenófoba promulgada por la organización. Surgido como una
sociedad histórica, este movimiento tomará más adelante una forma que no podría haber sido
predicha por sus creadores. Posteriormente, otro objetivo incluido en este estudio sería el de
mostrar el papel y el legado de Pamyat para el desarrollo y la maduración de la ideología de
extrema derecha en la Rusia posterior a 1991. Para concluir, el artículo explica las principales
razones del fracaso sufrido por el movimiento, tanto objetivo como subjetivo. El estudio se basa en
un principio cronológico y emplea una amplia gama de datos secundarios en el idioma original.
Desde el punto de vista metodológico, el artículo debe ser visto como un ejemplo de estudio
interdisciplinario.
Palabras clave: Pamyat, antisemitismo, xenofobia, Rusia post-soviética, nacionalismo.
RESUM
Aquest article té per objecte discutir l'ascens i destinació del moviment Pamyat, que es va convertir
en un dels primers grups nacionalistes en els últims temps de la Unió Soviètica. La idea principal en
aquesta anàlisi es refereix principalment a la tasca d 'il-nar el fenomen d'aquest "Moviment Cristià
Ortodox Nacional-Patriota Popular", que es desviaria del corrent principal dels moviments i
organitzacions nacionalistes russos que van aparèixer després del col·lapse de l'URSS el 1991. en
particular, resulta particularment valuós esbossar l'evolució ideològica del moviment que
transcendiria el camí del monarquisme idealista entrellaçat amb la postura agressiva antisemita i
xenòfoba promulgada per l'organització. Sorgit com una societat històrica, aquest moviment
prendrà més endavant una manera que no podria haver estat predita pels seus creadors.
Posteriorment, un altre objectiu inclòs en aquest estudi seria el de mostrar el paper i el llegat de
Pamyat per al desenvolupament i la maduració de la ideologia d'extrema dreta en la Rússia
posterior a 1991. Per concloure, l'article explica les principals raons del fracàs sofert pel moviment,
tant objectiu com subjectiu. L'estudi es basa en un principi cronològic i empra una àmplia gamma
de dades secundàries en l'idioma original. Des del punt de vista metodològic, l'article ha de ser vist
com un exemple d'estudi interdisciplinari.
Paraules clau: Pamyat, antisemitisme, xenofòbia, Rússia post-soviètica, nacionalisme
Introduction
History of anti-Semitism in Russia is a phenomenon that can be traced back to the pre-
1917 Russia1. It would therefore be absolutely inaccurate to suggest that the advent of
1 For more information see: Edward Flannery (1965).
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
so-called “tumultuous 90s” (likhije devianostyje)2 accompanied by on the one hand per-
vasive impoverishment of wide masses of Russians, skyrocketing level of criminality,
drag abuse, alcoholism, corruption and on the other hand mushrooming of oligarchy
(being primarily assembled of ethnic Jews) was the only factor that proliferated emer-
gence and rapid elevation of far-right parties and movements3. Undoubtedly, the
advent of the aforementioned social diseases, the lack of clear strategy and vanishing
popularity of Communism created a void that many Russians could not reconcile with.
During this tumultuous period two major (though of course unequal in size and
proportion) ideological postures appeared. The first one promoted by Boris Yeltsin
called for greater liberalization trying to present even more radical agenda than the one
that had been put forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in 19854. The second approach preached
for greater conservatism (in it various forms and shapes). One of them was inseparable
from somewhat romanticised vision of the pre-1917 Russia – an image that would not
be full without mentioning raging anti-Semitism as one of the most distinctive
characteristic of Romanovs Russia. In effect, the disgraceful “pale of settlement”5 (1791
- 1917) that practically outlawed the Jews from the rest of Russia would be
supplemented by even more shameful “pogroms” that claimed lives of many Jews and
made as many as 2.5 million of them to abandon the Russian Empire for good6. The
most tragic and embarrassing aspect of these horrible events was that this ideology
was wholeheartedly supported and promoted from above: many representatives of
Russian nobility not only turned out to be ardent supporters and members of such anti-
Semitic organizations as the Union of Russian People (URP), the Black Hundreds,
Russian Monarchist Party, Society of Active Struggle Against Revolution, White Two-
headed Eagle and a number of less remarkable movements, yet also expressed their
great proudness of this fact. On the other hand, the role of the Russian Orthodox
Church in growing anti-Semitism in the pre-1917 Russia should not be disregarded as
well. It is a well-known fact that certain members of the Russian Orthodox Church were
implicated (to some extent or another) in anti-Jewish activities and even instigations for
“pogroms”.
In the meantime, the advent of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and creation of the USSR with
romantic ideas on international labour solidarity and rejection of all types of
nationalism coupled with a prominent role played by the Jews in the course of creation
of the Soviet state seemed to have solved the question of anti-Semitism7. Indeed, first
years of the Soviet sway became a glimpse of hope for the Soviet Jews. Soviet
2 Ольга Слободчикова. "Лихие" или "разные": почему в России снова спорят о 90-х? Available
at: http://www.bbc.com/russian/society/2015/09/150924_90s_argument_russia
3 Sergey Sukhankin (2015)
4 Sergey Sukhankin (2017)
5 For more information see: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-pale-of-settlement
6 For more information see: Ronnie S. Landau (1992)
7 Леммлейн Ашер. Ленин Владимир. Электронная еврейская энциклопедия. Available at:
http://www.eleven.co.il/article/12414.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
nationality policies did not oppose to creation of national regions and republics within
the Soviet architecture8. Moreover, with an explicit support of the USSR President
Mikhail Kalinin a Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan in the Far East was created9
which was a revolutionary gesture. This trend was however set aside after the so-called
“Stalin`s revolution” (1934) and later further aggravated by the debacle in political
relations between the USSR and the former Allies leading toward the cold war. The last
year of the Soviet dictator`s life was associated with the infamous Doctors Plot10 that
was explicitly levelled against the Jews.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 introduced a visible division within the Soviet
intellectual milieu with two main camps coming on the forefront: so-called “liberals”
(with a visible role of the Jews) and “conservatives” strongly attached to traditionalism
and a visible tilt toward nationalist ideology. Part of this camp was known for blaming
the Jews for many misfortunes that befall Russia in the course of its post-1917 historical
development. This period also witnessed re-emergence and popularisation of various
“conspiracy theories” that maintained the idea of clandestine “Judeo-Massonic
organizations” (zydo-massony) that were connected with the West and plotting against
Russia11. One of such groups was “Pamyat” (from Russian: “Memory”) that was one of
the first ones to explicitly manifest its distinct anti-Jewish posture. Thus, analysis of
emergence, maturing and the fate of Pamyat as well as its impact on Russian anti-
Semitic and far-right nationalist traditions constitute the main objective of this research
paper.
The work also aims to illuminate the following topics:
1. Pre-conditions for re-emergence of anti-Semitism in the USSR in the period of
“developed Socialism”;
2. The role and place of Pamyat in Russian far-right nationalist traditions;
3. The legacy Pamyat and its impact on post-1991 anti-Semitism in Russia.
While working on this research, the author has employed a broad range of primary
sources including video materials, interviews, memoirs of the leaders of Pamyat
movement and Dmitry Vasilyev in particular. Second group of sources - secondary
8 В.И. Ленин. К вопросу о национальностях или об «автономизации». Available at: http://librar-
y.maoism.ru/Lenin/Lenin-autonomisation.htm.
9 Chimen Abramsky (1978) The Biro-Bidzhan Project, 1927–1959’, in Lionel Kochan (ed.), The Jews in
Soviet Russia since 1917. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp.64–77.
10 Борис Соколов. "Дело врачей": начало и конец (04.04.2003). Available at:
http :// graniru . org / Society / Health / m .28183. html; Смиловицкий Л. Л. «Дело врачей» в
Белоруссии: политика властей и отношение населения (январь-апрель 1953) // Репрессивная
политика Советской власти в Беларуси: Сборник научных работ. — Мемориал, 2007. — Вып.
2. — С. 276.
11 http :// elitehistory . info / index . files / uriki / OtechestvoIPO . htm
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S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
literature sources - have also been employed. In this regard, it should be noted that the
absolute majority of both primary and secondary literature sources are in the language
of origin (Russian). In the final analysis, it ought to be highlighted that the topic has not
been extensively studied, which should be seen is an additional value of this research.
Jewish question in the period of “developed Socialism”12.
Soviet official propaganda argued that in the USSR anti-Semitism (as well as all other
forms of inter-ethnic hatred) were inconceivable. This however did not correspond to
the actual state of affairs. In the early 1950s Jewish community was permeated with
strong rumours about the upcoming deportation to Siberia. In 1952 Ministry of State
Security (MGB) prohibited Jewish songs at restaurants and public places, whereas in
1963 the Soviet public (at least those who were permitted to know) were appalled with
horrible killing of an entire Jewish family (including children) in the city of Sverdlovsk
(currently Yekaterinburg)13. On the other hand, some elements within Soviet
intellectual elite made attempts to theoretically condemn “Jewish nationalism”14.
The most dramatic change of the course occurred in the year 1967 when so-called Six
Day War broke out. As it turned out this event would usher in a new lap of anti-Semitic
campaign in the USSR15. Initially, this abrupt turn of events was met with a fair share of
surprise: not only was Israel composed of “quarter of our former people”16, yet also
many prominent Israeli politicians such as Golda Meir and others had had ties with the
USSR. The outbreak of hostilities between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria and
Jordan (supported by virtually all Arab countries) on the other led to a drastic change of
position of the Soviet political leadership, leading to the debacle in Soviet-Israeli
political relations and worsening position of the Jews within the Soviet society as well.
The first group of consequences (“political”) lead to a campaign against Zionism that
reportedly had come into alliance with “American Imperialism”. The second – was
primarily concerned with a blatant attack against Soviet Jews on a routine basis. The
Jewish “national awakening” (particularly visible after 1967) went hand in glove with
growing drive for immigration from the USSR17. On the other hand, being excluded from
many venues of public life the Soviet Jews would take part in so-called “dissident
movement” on an increasingly wider scale.
12 Речь Брежнева по случаю 60-летия Октябрьской революции 1977 год. Available at:
https :// ok . ru / video /17709533788
13 Следствие вели... с Леонидом Каневским. Дело о погроме (документальный сериал). Avail-
able at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_raJ6oazkw
14 Трофим Кичко. Іудаїзм без прикрас. Изд-во АН УССР, Київ, 1963.
15 Антисемитизм в 70 - 80е годы. Советский Союз. Эдектронная Еврейска Энциклопедия. For
more information see: http://www.eleven.co.il/article/15402#0401
16 Владимир Высоцкий. Из авторской песни «Лекция о международном положении...» (1979).
For more information see: http://enc-dic.com/winged/A-tam--na-chetvert-bvshi-nash-narod-2501/
17 Б.Морозов. Еврейская эмиграция в свете новых документов. Тель-Авив, 1998
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
The abrupt collapse of political relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv witnessed yet
another discouraging transformation of Soviet policies pertaining to the Jews: “anti-
Zionism” was rapidly evolving into an ill-concealed anti-Semitism. The Soviet Jews were
suddenly ceased to be accepted to various prestigious positions such as Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
In the meantime, mass culture and mass media started to be extensively used as a
speaking tube of anti-Semitism. In addition to the avalanche of anti-Jewish literature
(such as anecdotes), the image of the Jews was being distorted with the help of the
television. For instance, in 1977 a documentary move titled “Buyers of soles” (Skupshiki
dush) was aired. It was meant to show that the “anti-Soviet Zionist agents have
permeated the USSR”. Another documentary “Secret and obvious” (Tajnoje i javnoje)
was initiated with a sound of a pistol shot and a commentary stating that “In a such a
manner Jewish woman Kaplan was trying to assassinate Vladimir Il`ych Lenin”. The
same move commenting on the German tanks entering the Soviet city claimed that
“Hitler was brought to power with the help of the Jewish financial capital”. In the year
1986 an openly anti-Semitic novel written by Vasily Belov, Всё впереди (Everything's Ahead
) was published. Appearance of the novel was met by no less anti-Semitic comments
put forth by a famous Soviet writer Viktor Astafyev who accused the Jews for numerous
wrongdoings against Russia18. Incidentally, one of the most significant changes was
physical elimination of the Emperor Nicolas II and his entire family, which Astafyev said
had been carried out by “a clear-cut Zionist Yurovsky”19.
An effort of the aforementioned groups was supported by the Soviet intellectual elites
who tried to theoretically justify rampant anti-Semitism: the famous formula “Zionism –
the weapon of Imperialism” would be changed by the new one “Imperialism – the
weapon of Zionism”20. For instance, according to L. Korneev21 it was “Jewish financial
capital that had by the middle of the nineteenth century taken under its effective
control powers… in the Russian Empire, Germany, France, England, the USA, Italy and
Austro-Hungarian Empire”. Aside from this, the Soviet official ideology started
searching for a link between Zionism and Judaism (religion)22.
However, the outbreak of mass-scale anti-Semitic frenzy did not seem to be possible a
time for two main reasons. First, Leonid Brezhnev (the General Secretary of the USSR)
18 К. Азадовский. Переписка из двух углов Империи (2003). Available at:
http://magazines.russ.ru/voplit/2003/5/azadov.html
19 For more information see: Плотников И. О команде убийц царской семьи и её национальном
составе // Урал. — 2003. — № 9. Available at: http :// magazines . russ . ru / ural /2003/9/ plotnik . html
20 А. Романенко «Классовая сущность сионизма». Л., Лениздат, 1986
21 Л. Корнеев «Враги мира и прогресса», М., изд-во «Правда», 1978
22 For instance, see: В. Бегун «Сионизм и иудаизм», Минск, «Знание», 1972; В. Бегун «Ползучая
контрреволюция», Минск, «Беларусь», 1974.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
held negative opinion of anti-Semitism (which may also have been related to the
supposition about his wife Jewish origin). For instance, Brezhnev was even said to have
openly expressed an idea about granting more autonomy to the Jews concerning the
“Jewish language”, education and national traditions23. Secondly, historical experience
has shown that major outbreaks of ethnic nationalism in Russia have been primarily
related to the worsening economic conditions and internal instability which was not the
case for major part of Brezhnev`s tenure. The (in)famous formula boiling down to the
following concept - “they pretend to pay, we pretend to work” (oni delajut vid, chto
nam platiat, mi delajem vid, chto rabotajem)24 – was quite effective being able to mask
growing economic difficulties, mushrooming criminality, stagnating economy and social
discontent that started to take shape in the final year of Brezhnev`s epoch.
Along with growing sub-cultures and underground groups that were unhappy with
Communist ideology and widening socio-economic polarity within the Soviet society,
first openly anti-Semitic organizations started to appear. Among of the first ones to
emerge on the scene was national-patriotic front Pamyat.
From national-patriotic societies to emergence of the Pamyat.
Interestingly enough, yet a formation that would give raise to Pamyat did not have an
explicit nationalist background. Rather, it would be more appropriate to argue that the
origins of the movement were tightly intertwined with such notions as “patriotism” and
promotion of Russian national culture and traditions. For this purpose, in the year 1965,
all-Russian Society for Securing of Historical and Cultural Sites was created. This was
followed by an intensive campaign on popularisation of reading and exponential
growth in number of various societies of so-called “booklovers” of which perhaps the
most well-known was named named “Souz”.
Nonetheless, very soon the head of the State Committee of the USSR on printing and
book sales Boris Stukalin (who was considered to be a proponent of ideas close to
“Russian nationalism”) would turn his attention to the phenomenon, which resulted in
creation of all-Union Voluntary Society of Booklovers (1974). As it would be clear later
this was an extremely important milestone in emergence of Russian nationalist
movement. In the second half of 1970s under the auspices of the all-Russian Society for
Securing of Historical and Cultural Sites a historical association “Vityaz” (Russian
equivalent for the notion “knight”) was established - Society for the Protection of
Historical and Cultural Monuments. The association came up with two major tasks that
ought to be classified as immediate and somewhat more far-reaching. Fist, the
association set the goal of preparation for the upcoming celebration of the anniversary
of the Battle of Kulikovo (September 8, 1380) - an event that has a profound meaning
for Russian statehood and occupies a prominent role in historical memory of the
Russians25. The second objective was related to fostering of "informal historical, cultural
and educational organizations" as well as pulling together activists-bibliophiles and
23 http :// jhist . org / russ / russ 001-20. htm
24 https://rg.ru/2015/10/08/rodina-brejnev.html
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
amateur historians. The association included prominent figures such as I. Glazunov (a
famous painter), S. Malyshev (historian), and A. Lebedev (Colonel of the MVD). At this
stage, however, no recorded proofs of far-right ideology or explicit anti-Semitic
sentiments were traced.
In the year 1980 (some accounts claim 1982) “Vityaz” was renamed into “Pamyat”
(from Russian: “memory”). Initially, under the leadership of Gennady Frygin (who was
closely realted to the Ministry of aviation of the USSR) activities conducted by the
society did not significantly diverge from its historical “predecessor”. However, it was
the year 1985 that would have a decisive meaning for the movement: Frygin was
replaced by Dmitry Vasilyev - a person who would later openly admit his sympathy
toward far-right and anti-Jewish ideology in the meantime claiming his adherence to
the Russian Monarchist tradition26. As it would turn out later Pamyat would give a start
to a number of notorious neo-Nazi and far-right radical groups and organizations.
Incidentally, creator of the notorious Russian National Unity movement (RNU)
Alexander Barkashov also came out of Pamyat27.
Unfortunately, this and many other disturbing signals did not receive proper attention
from the side of Mikhail Gorbachev, who was elected as General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. The Soviet
leader clearly undermined the role and power of nationalist sentiments concealed
under the glacial of official propaganda incessantly claiming that the “national
question” in the USSR had long been gotten rid of.
In the second half of 1980s the USSR resembled a powder keg especially in its so-called
“national margins”: economic stagnation, deficit, raising criminality and vanishing sense
of injustice, dragging war in Afghanistan, horrible Chernobyl tragedy and emerging
parallel societies were supplemented by rapidly raising ethnic nationalism that
threatened to burst out in several parts of the Soviet state28. Furthermore, general
inability to find a proper equilibrium between political and economic reforms created
an extremely dangerous situation that threatened internal stability and cultivated
development of various sorts of radicalism.
Moreover, disenchantment with ebbing Communist ideology put forth a new dilemma:
what was going to replace this no-longer-appealing model? Under these circumstance,
part of the Russian society started to turn to the model that was once dismantled by
25 In spite the fact that the victory over the Tatars did not bring immediate collapse of the Tatar
yoke (which formally was gotten rid of only in 1480 as a result of so-called the Great Stand on the
Ugra river) this is known as the beginning of the end of the Tatar domination over the Russian prin-
cipalities, and simultaneously marked the beginning of the ear of domination of Moscow.
26 For more information see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6-TragXNMA
27 Умер воевода "Памяти" Дмитрий Васильев (18.07.2003). For more information see:
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/397235
28 For more information see: “Hello, do you hear us?” (1990, documentary). Available at:
http://www.mycentury.tv/red-square/item/365-hello-do-you-hear-us.html.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
Communism: romanticised portrayal of the pre-1917 Russia. Regretfully, romantic
nostalgia over the “Russia that we lost”29 was inseparable from ugliest and most
unpleasant traditions that also existed in the Imperial Russia – ethnic nationalism,
xenophobia and anti-Semitism. These were key distinctive features of “Pamayat” that
by 1986 found itself in the forefront of emerging Russian nationalist movement.
Pamyat in zenith: the final days of the USSR (1987 – 1991)
First attempt by Pamyat to clearly pronounce itself as an emerging force came about in
May 1987, when its members rallied on what is now Manege Square. The event must
have had significant magnitude: Boris Yeltsin (at a time First Secretary of the CPSU
Moscow City Committee) had a meeting with the assemblers. However, in spite of
seeming success this did not lead toward transformation of Pamyat into the main
player among nascent nationalist movement.
On the contrary, it appeared that Pamyat started to experience problems somewhat
resembling those faced by Ukrainian nationalists – the lack of unity and internal
coherence30. Within this same year, the organization demonstrated first signs of
looming subdivision leading toward defragmentation of the movement on several
smaller fractions (bearing however the same names). Among most known were:
National-patriotic front “Pamayat” (headed by D. Vasilyev), Universal anti-Zionist, anti-
Semitic front “Pamyat” (Igor Shcheglov) and other less significant groups and fractions.
Perhaps, the only element that bound these newly emerged formations was based on a
firm (and rather aggressive) anti- Judeo-Masonic posture31.
According to some estimations (probably, the word rumours would be more
appropriate in this regard) it was the Committee for State Security (KGB) that stood
behind emergence of Pamyat32. It has been frequently argued that ideas emanating
from Pamyat were endeared by some top-Soviet political functionaries. However, the
course of events showed that the Soviet political leadership clearly felt ill at ease with
emerging Russian nationalist movement which threatened to get out of control.
Starting from this point on official Soviet mass media started to criticise Pamyat
(Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia, Moskovskaya Pravda) and some of its members were
purged from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For instance, in her article
29 Станислав Говорухин. Россия, которую мы потеряли (1992, documentary). Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEOqssnAAMs.
30 Alla Hurska. Far-right Movements and Ideology in Contemporary Ukraine: Formidable Image vs.
Weak Essence. CIDOB, Barcelona, February 2016.
31 Общество "Память": откуда взялась националистическая организация в СССР. Русская
Семерка (
20/11/16). Available at: http :// russian 7. ru / post / obshhestvo - pamyat - otkuda - vzyalas - naci /.
32 This version however has neither solid confirmation nor can it be utterly dismissed
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
published in Komsomolskaya Pravda Soviet journalist E. Losoto openly accused Pamyat
of its ideological connection to Fascist ideology33.
By this time however in the range of debris of initial Pamyat, it was Vasilyev`s fraction
that should be seen as the main “legal successor”: it not only managed to attract the
largest number of supporters, yet also wittingly declared itself a political organization,
which immediately granted it a totally new meaning. This was however a mixed
blessing. On the one hand, many representatives of European intellectual elites felt
threatened and perplexed with emerging sentiments of this kind in the USSR that was
at this point seeking western financial support. On the other hand, activities of Pamyat
magnified attention from the side of European far-rights such as Jean-Marie Le Pen,
which created an international resonance.
Another remarkable event was related to the event that occurred on January 18, 1990
and its immediate aftermath. On this day, a group of people committed beating of
Anatoly Kurchatkin who was a member of famous pro-Perestroika organization of
Russian writers “Aprel`”. It was assumed that the deed was committed by members of
Pamyat, yet there were not enough concrete evidences to argue the case in court. In
January 23, Kurchatkin presented a passionate speech during airing of “Vzgliad”
television programme whose popularity was enormous at a time34. Namely, he claimed
that “…we are dealing with such a type of national conscious that could be defined as
“dark nationalism”… we are avoiding the word “fascism”… We need to call things by
their proper names: this movement is political, it is a “fascist” movement”35. It was a
curious event indeed: even to the prior to the collapse of the USSR the term “fascism”
was started to be used in respect to some movement in the Soviet state.
On the other front, it seems to be curious and in some sense even instrumental to trace
evolution of ideology pursued by Pamyat from its emergence toward the last days of
the Soviet Union and its ideology. What is perplexing was a steep latitude of oscillation
from “national-Bolshevik” (initially characterized by overwhelming support for Stalinist
ideology) posture that could be traced in the interim of the emergence of the
movement until 1989 that would later be abruptly replaced by “Orthodox-monarchist”
sentiments and practical condemnation of Communist ideology and methods exercised
by the Bolsheviks. Namely, it would not be superfluous to recall that the most “mature”
version of ideological postulates endeared by Pamyat boiled down to the urgent
necessity of restoration of Monarchical rule in Russia whereby explicitly portraying
deep and profound disappointment with Communism. However, taking into
consideration limitations and shortcoming of Russian historical experience, leaders of
the movement claimed that the best model should be seen as so-called “elected
33 Лосото Е. В беспамятстве. Куда ведут руководители так называемого объединения
«Память» // Комсомольская правда. 1987. № 123. 22 мая. С. 4.
34 История телевизионной программы "Взгляд (02.10.2012). For more information see: https :// ri-
a . ru / spravka /20121002/763558698. html.
35 For more information see: Рекемчук А. Е. Мамонты. М.: Издательство "МИК", 2006.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
monarchy”. The most distinctive feature of this theory was that the locus of decision-
making power was to have been vested in the hands of the “Russian people”: the
Monarch was supposed to be elected by the Zemsky Sobor (Russian quasi-parliament
that was active within 1549 - 1684). Despite this ideological transformation, Pamyat did
not abdicate form its xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric. On the contrary, this return
to adoration of Monarchy seemed to have amplified ethnic hatred toward the Jews and
their negative role for most decisive stages of Russian historical development.
The collapse of the USSR and the fate of Pamyat.
The Belavezha Accords (December 8, 1991) signed by Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and
Stanislav Shushkevich dealt the final blow to the USSR (established in 1922)36. The
collapse itself did not produce the same impact as its immediate aftermath: the entire
post-Soviet space was being torn apart by a wave of violence stemming from centuries-
old inter-ethnic hatred. All of a sudden Central Asia, the Caucasus and Transnistria
came to be marked by newly emerging tinderboxes. Russia itself did not escape a
splash of ethnic nationalism intertwining with separatist sentiments. Mounting tensions
reached its zenith with the outbreak of the bloody and highly unpopular among Russian
population first Chechen campaign/war (1994 - 1996)37.
These tumultuous events did in many ways stipulated skyrocketing popularity of ultra-
nationalist sentiments among ordinary Russians: this had to do with both anti-
Caucasian and anti-Jewish feelings38. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that
within 1994 – 1999 the overall number of far-right and nationalist groups counted
dozens of them39. Furthermore, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)
and the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR) started to bid for
leading positions in the Russian State Duma (the lower house of the Russian
Parliament). This circumstance enticed many European scholars to start serious
discussion about immanent fascist peril that Russia was facing at a time40.
36 Союзный парламент попрощался со страной сдержанно и печально // «Независимая
газета», 28 декабря 1991, № 170. Availabe: http://yeltsin.ru/press/newspaper/detail7372/.
37 For more information see: Sergey Sukhankin. The 'Caucasus Knot': The New Lap of Violence. In-
ternational Catalan Institute for Peace, Working Paper No. 2014/5, Barcelona.
38 This could be explained with the fact that Boris Berezovsky (one of the most well-known Russian
oligarchs and a politician of Jewish origin) was severely criticised for his stance on the Chechen con-
flict and even accused of financing terrorist formations. For more information see: Мартагов:
террористов финансировал Березовский (16.05.2012). Available at: https :// golosislama .-
com / news . php ? id =8595.
39 Владимир Прибыловский. НАЦИОНАЛ-ПАТРИОТИЧЕСКИЕ ПАРТИИ, ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ И ГРУППЫ
В 1994-1999 гг. КРАТКОЕ ОПИСАНИЕ (по состоянию на июнь 1999). Available at: http :// www . an-
ticompromat . org / nazi - p / naz 99. html
40 Andreas Umland: Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics: Three Approaches to the Emergence of
the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 1990-1993
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
Meanwhile, the year 1991 became probably the most successful period for Pamyat,
which was reflected in both the number of its members and growing geographical
network of its presence to the ability to carry out propaganda campaigns. First, it needs
to be mentioned that within 1991 – 1994 the overall number of member may have
reached 400 persons, whereas branches of the movement were created in 52 subjects
of the Russian Federation. Secondly, by the beginning of 1991 the movement was able
to obtain its own newspaper (Pamyat) and a radio station (“Motherland, memory and
you”). Also, Pamyat started to disseminate propagandist leaflets and audio recordings.
On September 29, 1991 the leader of Pamyat for the first time appeared in a radio
program. In this juncture, it would be worthwhile to present parts of this speech of
Vasilyev primarily due to the fact that it fully showed ideological transformation of the
movement: “Dear compatriots, brothers and sisters! The long-suffering Orthodox
people! I am speaking to you at this arduous period for the Russian land. Many
tempests and hurricanes have dashed upon the holy land, yet never has she witnessed
such a difficult period is we are currently going through. The Russian people have
forgotten bequests of their predecessors: wholeheartedly keep Russian land… they
have succumbed to the diabolic temptations betraying the creed of their predecessors,
sawing malice among their brothers, sisters, betraying their mothers and fathers,
vilifying ancient wisdom of grandparents. They have ceased to sign Russian songs and
speak Russian language… The kikes have captured Russian freedom! They are taunting
and torturing without any shadow or compassion! And where are our people?!... I am
wondering if Russian land has ceased to bring knights the Super-warriors?! Where are
you, Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alesha Popovych?! 41... Are you going to
serve to damned kike and tolerate his sneering for the eternity!? Has not the time
come to start minting swards to relive the Russian lands from these abominable freaks!
… May the God, the Tsar and the nation guide us!”42.
In spite of seemingly appealing rhetoric based on patriotism and anti-Semitic
sentiments43 Pamyat failed to become the flagman of Russian nationalist movement.
Partly, it was stipulated by a growing number of internal frictions that later led to
further fragmentation of the movement. On the other hand, the majority of Russians
(even though being of negative stance on the Jews and their role in Russian historical
traditions and post-1991 transformations) were not proponents of unbridled anti-
Semitism.
Another heavy blow to Pamyat was dealt in 1992 when one of the main ideologists of
the front A.R. Shtilmark defected from the movement creating a group entitled “Black
Hundred” (following the patterns of the pre-1917 ultra nationalist tradition). Most
41 Heroes of the Russian national folklore
42 Игорь Молотов. Черная дюжина. Общество смелых. Available at:
https://lib.rus.ec/b/610490/read
43 Алла Гербер. Антисемитизм в России генетический? (07.07.2011). Available at: http://ie-
shua.org/v-rossii-geneticheskij-antisemitizm.htm
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
likely, the internal conflict was caused by a bitter dispute between two fractions led by
Shtilmark and Vasilyev over the candidature of President Yeltsin and his vision of the
new Russia. Growing process of weakening of the remnants of Pamyat are also related
to its behaviour during the events in the fall of 1993: the constitutional crisis a political
stand-off between the Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament that ended up with
military clash and shooting of the parliament. Although, even though it has been
suggested on numerus occasions that the leadership of the movement had tacitly
supported Yeltsin, officially Pamyat opted to stay neutral. On the other hand, members
of Pamyat on more frequent occasions criticized President Yeltsin for his “Jewish
entourage” claiming that his wife was Jewish thereby negatively affecting President`s
understanding of internal conditions and the overhaul of challenges faced by the
country. And still, the second all-Russian congress of the National Patriotic Front
Pamyat supported Yeltsin`s policies related to the Chechen question simultaneously
severely criticizing Russian mass media. In terms of ideology the year 1994 clearly
manifested final crystallization of ideological posture of Pamyat that was expressed in
the following formula: We are neither Nazis nor extremists, we are devoted followers
of Monarchism. Our ideal is – Rus` as an Orthodox Monarchy”44. In effect this meant a
complete breakup with the residues of national-socialist ideology as the one that bears
traits of social-democracy, which was deemed to be detrimental for Russia due to its
implication with the Jews.
Another drawback that significantly abridged general ability of Pamyat to increase its
weight had to do with practical rejection of participation in political activities. By the
same token, elections in the Federation Council (1993) were neglected. Only in the year
1995 Pamyat was proclaimed by Russian Ministry of Justice as an inter-regional
organization. Nonetheless, valuable time had been wasted and the organization was
not able to assemble required support for entering the Duma (the lower chamber of
the Russian Parliament).
Having suffered a defeat leaders of Pamyat opted for creating ad-hock alliances with
weak fractions and movements (such as Russian Conservative`s Union and
“Rus`Dezhavnaja” movement). The ultimate purpose boiled to a somewhat naïve idea
to create a greater nationalist movement that was to have acquired a name “The
Movement of Russian National Renaissance” preaching for monarchism and positioning
itself close to the famous formula proposed by Sergey Uvarov in 183345. Pamyat
however contended that the old formula (“Joint spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and
Nationality”) was to be replaced by “God, Tsar and the Nation”. This did not have
necessarily to do with a string inclination toward monarchism, yet it was largely
44 Ю.Г.Коргунюк, С.Е.Заславский (1996): Российская многопартийность: становление,
функционирование, развитие. М.: Центр прикладных политических исследований ИНДЕМ.
Vi.: http://partinform.chat.ru/rm_6.htm
45 Алексей Миллер. Триада графа Уварова (11.04.2007). For more information see:
http://polit.ru/article/2007/04/11/uvarov/.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
explained with the fact that Russia first needed to (re)establish necessary foundations,
whereas the restoration of monarchy could ensue only within 10-15 years.
Nonetheless, the life span of this new organization turned out to be very brief: without
any visible achievements, it went to oblivion after several months of unsuccessful
activities. Interestingly enough, yet Pamyat and its leadership continued to see Russian
President Yeltsin as a person capable restore monarchy in Russia – in many ways, this
argument did play a pivotal role in the decision of the movement to support the
incumbent president in 1996 during probably one of the most intense presidential
campaigns of contemporary Russia.
Taking into consideration the fact that political activism bore no traits of remarkable
achievements within this period, it would therefore be appropriate to concentrate
attention on two most salient aspects: ideological evolution and first attempts to
identify some sort of an economic program.
Speaking about the latter one could find it to be a patchwork of ideas where some
classical concepts are interrelated with naïve utopia. For instance, such postulates as
non-tax economy and virtual absence of the private property on the land somehow
interrelated with autarchy, state crediting and introduction of the full states control
over external trade relations.
In the year 1998 as a response to severe economic hardships caused by the outbreak of
acute financial crisis Vasilyev came up with the manifest “Time to live like Russians!”46
which included the following prescriptions:
1. Acquisition of the entire mass of dollar liquidity from the Russian population for the
purpose of transferring it to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
government of the US as a rebate for Russia`s debts;
2. Prohibition of all “Zionist financial Banks” acting on the Russian territory;
3. Imposition of a ban on independent fixation of interests rates by private Banks;
unilateral converting of the Russian rouble with increasing of its value at least ten times
in comparison with the US dollar;
4. Severe penalty for using foreign currency on internal market of the Russian
Federation;
5. Immediate modernization of Russian manufacture;
6. Reconsideration of privatisation.
46 Дмитирий Дмитриевич Васильев. Я русский и делаю русское дело. Газета «Русские идут»,
2008, pp. 202 – 222
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
This unambiguously suggest that in terms of economic policy Pamyat envisaged the US
dollar and transnational capital to be the main weapons levelled against Russia by
“International Zionist-Imperialism”. However, taking into account key postulates of
“economic strategy” forged by Vasilyev, it would be impossible to overlook visible anti-
globalist tilt and somewhat naïve belief in the ability to solve economic problems with
hedging the country form external competition. Undoubtedly, such posture was more
commensurate with pre-1991 patterns rather than pre-1917.
“Political” part of the program was formulated by the end of 1990s, it included the
following aspects47:
1. The October Revolution was in fact a “Zionist occupation” that distorted the entire
course of Russian history;
2. Internationalism – is a theory of eradication of national distinctive features of other
nations. Russians were a nation upon which a war was declared;
3. Genocide of the Russians was continued through forceful populator of Russian lands
by representatives of Asia and the Caucasus. As a result, Russian national traditions are
being devalued, history and culture eliminated, violence is cultivated, prostitution,
alcoholism and drug abuse are becoming a commonplace.
Careful analysis of both economic and political programs of Pamyat movement in the
late 1990s (when it had reached its zenith of popularity) may lead one to believe that
on frequent occasions common sense gave the way to sentiments. It is rather difficult
(if possible at all) to deduce a kernel of rationalism in frequently contradictory
postulates presented by leaders of the movement. Rather, it would be more
appropriate to classify these not as a full-fledge political/economic program, yet as a
reaction to gruesome and in many respects genuinely disappointing transformations
experienced by the Russian Federation. The widespread poverty, humiliating results of
the Chechen conflict (that was predominantly construed as a defeat of the federal
centre), mushrooming criminality and deepening polarity within Russian society – these
frustrating events should be seen as the main source of disgruntlement of Pamyat
leadership that could not keep up with both the pace and rapidity of changes
experienced by Russia.
“New Russia” and the end of Pamyat: the final accord.
On July 16, 2003 (which coincided with the death of Nicolas II) the leader of Pamyat
Dmitry Vasilyev perished. As it turned out, the death of such a charismatic leader would
incur irreparable damage to the movement leading toward its further disintegration.
47 Ibid, pp. 192 – 194.
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
The new leadership appeared to be incapable of containing these processes. Nikolay
Skorodumov who was elected in 2004 as the new head of the organization could not
forestall brewing conflicts among members of Pamyat. As a result of yet another
serious dispute a number of members walked out of the movement in 2005, whereby
dealing yet another blow to the organization and its reputation.
Among most noticeable events that Pamyat took part in after the death of its former
leader Vasilyev was the year 2006, when members of the movement took part in
traditional “Russian March” that brought together various nationalist forces. This
however did not lead toward resurrection of the movement. On the contrary, further
course of development would show that in many ways this event was one of the last
ones conducted by Pamyat.
In June 2009, the head of the Moscow-based branch of Pamyat Georgy Borovikov
decided to create his own organization (according to other version he was purged from
the organization for propagating ideas close to National-Socialism) that would be
entitled the Russia Fascist Order. Later it would be re-named into Russian Liberation
Front and under this name the organizing will be undertaking its activities. In spite of
regular rallies held by members of Pamyat, this movement has lost vestiges of
popularity mostly concentrating on activities in on-line social groups (for instance, such
as vkontakte.ru which is the largest social network in Russia48).
In lieu of conclusion.
Indeed, as it has been stated before Pamyat was not destined to become the flagman
of the nascent Russian nationalist movement. In effect, it activities and achievements
have been dwarfed by other ultra-nationalist groups and movements. In the range of
factors that in the end did not allow Pamyat to achieve heights that would be taken by
movements of similar ideology were political passivity, naïve anti-globalism and general
failure to produce intellectual legacy in the form of coherent theoretical reflections.
Nonetheless, Pamyat and its role in Russian nationalist movement should not be
brushed aside completely.
In this juncture, it would be worthwhile to quote Oleg Platonov in his assessment of
Pamyat and its historical meaning: “After the death of Brezhnev Russian movement
entered a new phase. The type of Russian patriot was changed dramatically. Being used
to concealment of his patriotic feelings during the Soviet period he is no longer afraid of
expressing them. For the first time in many decades Russians started to unite: first for
the purpose of protection of their holy places and later against their common enemies.
Having started from tiny springs, Russian movement gradually turns into a full-size
river. Certainly, if Andropov had lived longer he would have tried to crash Russian
48 For more information, see: Национально-патриотический фронт "ПАМЯТЬ"
Официальное представительство НПФ "Память" в социальных сетях.
https://vk.com/npf_pamyat
40
S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
movement. However, his successor Chernenko continued policies of Brezhnev aimed at
appeasement of opposing forces, whereby giving the patriots time to organize
themselves. These three years from Andropov to Gorbachev allowed Russian
movement to acquire new quality, which found its reflection in creation of Pamyat
movement”49.
On the other hand, it should not be disregarded it was Pamyat that appeared as one of
very few (if not the first one) organizations in the late Soviet Union that stood in the
beginning of restoration of radical, ultra-nationalist, openly xenophobic tradition
whereby ushering in a new page of anti-Semitism in Russia.
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Sukhankin S. (2017), The collapse of the USSR and its implications for contemporary Russia
(public lecture). IBEI, Barcelona, 10.01.2017
Umland A. Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics: Three Approaches to the Emergence of
the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 1990-1993 (Dr. Phil. in History, Free University of
Berlin, 1997).
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S.SUKHANKIN – ANTISEMITISM IN THE LATE SOVIET UNION
Video materials:
Дмитрий Васильев, Пикет у Альфа банка. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6-TragXNMA
Речь Брежнева по случаю 60-летия Октябрьской революции 1977 год. Available at:
https :// ok . ru / video /17709533788
Следствие вели... с Леонидом Каневским. Дело о погроме (документальный сериал).
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_raJ6oazkw
Станислав Говорухин. Россия, которую мы потеряли (1992, documentary). Available at:
https :// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = vEOqssnAAMs
“Hello, do you hear us?” (1990, documentary). Available at: http://www.mycentury.tv/red-
square/item/365-hello-do-you-hear-us.html
