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"Les entreprises où les hommes s'exposent à une perte, dans la vue d'un profit". Condorcet et l'héritage de d'Alembert
Abstract
[fre] Les entreprises ou les hommes s'exposent a une perte, dans la vue d'un profit Au meme titre que Voltaire pour ce qui concerne la justice et les lettres et que Turgot en matiere d'economie et de politique, d'Alembert est traditionnellement considere comme le mentor de Condorcet dans les sciences et les mathematiques. Pour autant, l'influence du coediteur de l'Encyclopedie sur les idees economiques de Condorcet doit-elle etre jugee marginale ? Justement pas : en partant d'une conception « mixte » des mathematiques qu'il partage avec d'Alembert et d'une interrogation sur les doutes probabilistes de ce dernier, Condorcet est amene a developper une theorie du choix en univers incertain qui depasse le domaine classique des jeux de hasard ou des assurances pour s'etendre a celui de l'entreprise economique en tant que telle, qu'elle soit de culture, de commerce ou d'industrie. Ce faisant, il soumet le facteur risque a une formalisation probabi-liste sans precedent lorsqu'il envisage le profit percu par l'entrepreneur. [eng] Enterprises where men are exposed to loss with a view to profit: Condorcet and the d'Alembert's legacy Like Voltaire in the fields of justice and letters, and Turgot in economics and politics, d'Alembert is traditionally considered as the mentor of Condorcet in sciences and mathematics. Accordingly, should the influence of the Encyclopedia's coeditor on the economic ideas of Condorcet be judged marginal ? Precisely not : while adopting d'Alembert's mixed approach of mathematics and questionning the probabilistic doubts of the latter, Condorcet is lead to develop a theory of choice under uncertainty which goes beyond the standard scope of games of chance or insurances and embraces the economic enterprise as such, whether agricultural, commercial or manufacturai. By the way, his study of the entrepreneur's profit affords a probabilistic formalization of risk without precedent.
... faut un risque quasi-nul de faillite et un risque raisonnablement faible de résultat négatif, par exemple), ses successeurs, comme par exemple ou les textes déjà cités, n'en considèrent en général qu'un seul. 6 Voir Rieucau [1998]. Condorcet [1784], p. 492 propose de « savoir comment dans la pratique les hommes qui passent pour sages, & dont les projets ont réussi, ont résolu le même problème ; par exemple, quelle a été la probabilité de ne pas perdre que les assureurs ont su se procurer dans les différens bureaux d'assurances qui ont pu continuer le commerce avec avantage. ...
... Le texte dans lequel Condorcet expose avec le plus de détail cette théorie des seuils est un article de l'Encyclopédie méthodique qui suscitera des développements chez Laplace et Lacroix sur les assurances maritimes. Bien que cet article soit maintenant connu grâce aux travaux de Pierre Crépel [1988] et Jean-Nicolas Rieucau [1998], il n'est peut-être pas inutile d'en rappeler le contenu avant d'introduire aux écrits ultérieurs. Au milieu des années 1780, Condorcet déploie une activité assez intense pour promouvoir les assurances : il organise un prix de l'Académie des sciences ([1783] ([s. ...
La rapidité fulgurante avec laquelle le concept de Value-at-Risk (VaR dans la suite) et son usage se sont diffusés durant les années 90 peut étonner. Les histoires traditionnelles, qui s'en tiennent à la théorie financière ou aux pratiques prudentielles du secteur ne peuvent pas rendre compte de ce phénomène, même si Holton [2002] par exemple, donne une image excellente pour ce champ. La thèse que nous défendons consiste à expliquer cette diffusion rapide par le fait que le formalisme de la VaR s'appuie sur le « principe de Condorcet », lui-même connu dans les sciences sociales, les sciences de gestion, et les sciences de l'ingénieur depuis plus de deux siècles. Du point de vue théorique, les seules inflexions remarquables du dernier siècle sont d'une part d'avoir fait admettre des seuils de probabilité conventionnels, et d'autre part d'avoir remplacé ce principe, qui est une règle de gestion, par une expression qui permet d'exprimer la comparaison. Ces transformations touchent par nature à la diffusion des pratiques plus qu'à la production de connaissances nouvelles. C'est pourquoi cette enquête conduit aussi à s'interroger sur la relation entre théories et pratiques dans la finance. Toutes considérations qui auraient dû ravir Condorcet, nous reviendrons sur ce point en conclusion. La VaR résume l'exposition d'un portefeuille au risque de marché ; la littérature insiste sur la distinction entre métrique et mesure : la première est une fonction quand la second correspond à des valeurs particulières (évaluation d'un portefeuille par la fonction). Bien que différentes métriques existent, on considère en général les VaR pour un seuil de confiance donné pour une période donnée. On parle par exemple de VaR en euro quotidienne à 90 %. Si un portefeuille est caractérisé par une VaR en euro quotidienne à 90 % d'un million, alors cela signifie qu'il existe une probabilité de 10 % que la perte quotidienne sur ce portefeuille soit supérieure à un million. Comme telle, la VaR rappelle immanquablement les intervalles de confiance de la statistique mathématique. Il semble donc que la VaR soit une application financière directe des travaux de Neyman et Pearson. En fait, les théories statistiques de la dispersion ont une histoire bien plus ancienne, qui prend d'ailleurs racine dans les sciences de la société. Dans la suite, notre plan d'exposition identifie des champs théoriques, avec leurs problématiques, leurs auteurs propres, en situant leur époque. C'est donc aussi une histoire institutionnelle des disciplines qui nous conduit à rappeler les travaux d'arithmétique politique liés au développement des mathématiques mixtes, à la fin du XVIII e s. (1.), avant de commenter la naissance de l'actuariat et de la théorie mathématique du risque (2.), puis la transformation de l'économie politique en science économique (3.) et le détachement de la finance (4.), laquelle finit par se distinguer non plus seulement comme discipline académique, mais aussi comme communauté de pratique (5.).
... These applications, in line with those of the Bernoullis, first regard the traditional fields of insurance, life annuities, tontines or the problem of the "absent", for example, (Crépel 1988(Crépel , 1989 but also the activity of any entrepreneur who -as Richard Cantillon already insisted in his Essai sur la nature du commerce en général -always acts in an uncertain world. Generalising his analysis of the behaviour of both a merchant and his insurer facing uncertainty and risk in maritime trade, Condorcet conceived of any economic activity as an uncertain and risky undertaking -"undertakings in which men expose themselves to losses in view of a profit" (1994a: 396) -and used probability to describe the entrepreneur's decisions to invest (Rieucau 1998). A parallel is made with the traditional analysis of "fair" games of chance, in which a fair stake is equal to the mathematical expectation of gain: Condorcet explains that, as additional constraints and calculations arise in economic activity, the analogy between a gambler and an entrepreneur is somewhat misleading. ...
Important aspects of the evolution of political economy in France regard the various attempts at the quantification of economic variables and the formalisation of economic discourse. This chapter first deals with attempts at quantification, in which, for economic and political reasons, what is called today demography played a central role in the progress of techniques – with Pierre-Simon Laplace in particular, who used the recently developed probability theory. Then, it is shown how formalisation and probability theory is used by M.-J.-A.-N. Caritat de Condorcet to transform the old political arithmetic into a “social mathematic”, especially in the field of social choices. Finally, the chapter deals with some significant attempts in the use of algebra in economic reasoning – as distinct from the use of probability theory –, stressing the particular state of the development of mathematics at that time. While the physiocrats insisted on the importance of “calculations”, the hostility of F. Quesnay towards algebra is dealt with, as well as the ambiguous attempt of P.S. Dupont de Nemours and the isolated development by another of Quesnay’s disciple, C.R. de Butré. Finally, the uses of formalisation by A.-N. Isnard, N.-F. Canard and C.-F. de Bicquilley are restated and discussed.
... He thus conceived of any economic activity as an uncertain and risky undertaking -"undertakings in which men expose themselves to losses in view of a profit" (Condorcet 1994, 396). Himself a mathematician, he thought that the development of the calculus of probabilities could help individuals in their choices, and he started to use probability theory to describe the entrepreneurs' decisions to invest (Rieucau 1998, Faccarello 2016b. Self-interest was thus supposed to find in this new branch of mathematics a powerful tool for decision support and calculation. ...
In this chapter, we focus on the French economists that, all along the eighteenth century, formed what we call “philosophie économique”. In Section 2, this current of thought is precisely defined: a review of the troops shows how its members (Boisguilbert, Quesnay, Turgot, Condorcet and Say) refer to a new view on the nature and role of self-interest, and why, in their opinion, self-interest is supposed to reach positive results, both at the individual and collective levels. Section 3 deals with how, in this approach, the Legislator is supposed to act in this new environment, trying to use self-interest as a means of government, and how it is supposed to make decisions. Section 4 concludes, stressing the fact that, parallel to the recognition of the positive role of self-interest, more and more critical voices arose to stress at the same time the limits of this approach and the essential role played by other important elements—religion, morals, altruism—neglected by “philosophie économique”.
... He thus conceived of any economic activity as an uncertain and risky undertaking-"undertakings in which men expose themselves to losses in view of a profit" (Condorcet 1994, p. 396). Himself a mathematician, he thought that the development of the calculus of probabilities could help individuals in their choices, and he started to use probability theory to describe the entrepreneurs' decisions to invest (Rieucau 1998;Faccarello 2016b). Self-interest was thus supposed to find in this new branch of mathematics a powerful tool for decision support and calculation. ...
... He thus conceived of any economic activity as an uncertain and risky undertaking-"undertakings in which men expose themselves to losses in view of a profit" (Condorcet 1994, p. 396). Himself a mathematician, he thought that the development of the calculus of probabilities could help individuals in their choices, and he started to use probability theory to describe the entrepreneurs' decisions to invest (Rieucau 1998;Faccarello 2016b). Self-interest was thus supposed to find in this new branch of mathematics a powerful tool for decision support and calculation. ...
In this chapter, we focus on the French economists that, all along the eighteenth century, formed what we call “philosophie économique”. In Sect. 2, this current of thought is precisely defined: a review of the troops shows how its members (Boisguilbert, Quesnay, Turgot, Condorcet and Say) refer to a new view on the nature and role of self-interest, and why, in their opinion, self-interest is supposed to reach positive results, both at the individual and collective levels. Section 3 deals with how, in this approach, the Legislator is supposed to act in this new environment, trying to use self-interest as a means of government, and how it is supposed to make decisions. Section 4 concludes, stressing the fact that, parallel to the recognition of the positive role of self-interest, more and more critical voices arose to stress at the same time the limits of this approach and the essential role played by other important elements—religion, morals, altruism—neglected by “philosophie économique”.
... But he went further, especially in the questions related to the problem of the absent or marine insurance (Crépel 1988(Crépel , 1989. In particular, generalising his analysis of the behaviour of both a merchant and his insurer facing uncertainty and risk in maritime trade, he conceived of any economic activity as an uncertain and risky undertaking -"undertakings in which men expose themselves to losses in view of a profit" (Condorcet 1994a: 396) -and used probability theory to describe the entrepreneurs' decisions to invest (Rieucau 1998). A parallel is made with the traditional analysis of "fair" games of chance, in which a fair stake is equal to the mathematical expectation of gain: but Condorcet explains that, in economic activity, additional constraints and calculations arise because the analogy between a gambler and an entrepreneur is somewhat misleading. ...
John Rawls proposed two criteria for the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. The universal gain principle requires inequalities to be beneficial for all, and the difference principle requires them to be beneficial for the least advantaged. These principles are commonly believed to have originated in Rawls’s work, but they were both clearly expressed in the writings of Nicolas de Condorcet. Contrary to Rawls, Condorcet did not imbed them in the framework of a social contract, but instead sought their foundations in natural rights. Whereas Rawls recommends us to find out what social arrangements rational reasoners would choose in a hypothetical pre-social situation, Condorcet proposes that we ask the underprivileged in our society whether or not they consider themselves to benefit from the prevailing social and economic inequalities. Thus, Condorcet’s original version of the difference principle puts social inequalities to a different test than its latter-day, hypothetical version.
El objetivo de este artículo es comprender la tendencia dominante de la historia de la macroeconomía. Se trata entonces de identificar las dos vías que ha seguido la investigación de los fundamentos microeconómicos de la macroeconomía: de una parte la relación entre empleo, salario e inflación (vía señalada por Friedman) y, de otra parte, la existencia de rigideces o de una restricción monetaria (vía señalada por Clower). Palabras clave: Modelo IS-LM, Curva de Phillips, Restricción de Clower, equilibrios a precios fijos, rigideces nominales. Clasificación JEl: B20, E12, E13, E20, E30 Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the dominant tendency in the history of macroeconomics. It attempts to identify the two routes that research on the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics has followed. On the one hand, the relation between employment, wages and inflation (the route indicated by Friedman); on the other hand, the existence of rigidities or a monetary restriction (the route indicated by Clower). Keywords: IS-LM model, Phillips. curve, constraint à la Clower, fixed prices equilibrium, nominal rigidities. JEL Classification: B20, E12, E13, E20, E30 Résumé : L'objectif de cet article est de comprendre la tendance dominante de l'histoire récente de la macroéconomie. Il s'agit alors d'identifier les deux voies qu.a suivies la recherche des fondements microéconomiques de la macroéconomie: d'une part la relation entre emploi, salaire et inflation (à la suite de Friedman) et, d'autre part, l'existence de rigidités ou d'une contrainte monétaire (à la suite de Clower). Mots Clef: Modèle IS-LM, courbe de Phillips, contrainte de Clower, équilibres à prix fixes, rigidities nominales. Classification JEL: B20, E12, E13, E20, E30
In his Dissertation sur la liberte (1754b), Condillac propounds a theory of choice that is intrinsically probabilistic. Reflecting on the cases which we would qualify as 'paradoxes in expected utility' he puts these down to common faults, explicable by 'delusions' and 'dominant desires'. This article concerns the revelation of this original procedure of a philosopher who had little interest in mathematics who constructed a clearly probabilistic procedure of choice. By a Bayesian revision of our probabilistic belief and our 'delusions', we sometimes 'prefer that which we desire less' and this way of thinking explain our endogenous changes of preferences.
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