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An Initiative of the Center for Law and Social Responsibility’s
Human Rights and Immigration Law Project
Sanctuary City Initiative:1 Summary of Arguments in Favor
The aim of this summary is to inform and support local communities, cities, counties and states as
they consider how best to protect all of the residents within their communities, regardless of immigration
status.
I. Overview
The term “sanctuary” is often used to refer to a constellation of protective measures that local
governments may undertake. The term “sanctuary city” is not defined by statute, nor does it have any
technical or legal significance,2 rather the term is commonly used to define localities that have limited their
involvement with federal immigration enforcement, in a variety of possible ways.3 While reasons may vary,
localities typically justify these policies by asserting: 1) a primary objective of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of all residents within their communities, regardless of immigration status, 2) concern that
without these policies, residents may be less willing to interact with local government officials, potentially
undermining law enforcement’s ability to access crime victims and witnesses, endangering public health,
and undermining the goals inherent in having an educated populace, and 3) they have the right to set their
own priorities and make their own decisions about allocation of resources, without federal interference.
1 This summary was written by Professor Dina Francesca Haynes, Director of the Human Rights and Immigration Law Project,
with the help of Raquel Muscioni and Michael Fulton. It draws, in part, from a White Paper, authored by law professors
specializing in immigration, criminal law, and constitutional law: Annie Lai, Christopher Lasch, Ingrid Eagly, Juliet Stumpf, Linus
Chan, Elizabeth McCormick, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Virgil Wiebe. Excellent further resources on this issue include:
National Immigrant Justice Center, National Immigration Law Center, National Day Laborer organization, and Asian Americans
Advancing Justice.
2 Recently, several media outlets have explored what might constitute a “sanctuary city.” These reports have issued in reaction
to triggering events, such as political threats or a high -profile crime. Michael Pearson, What’s a ‘sanctuary city,’ and why should
you care?, CNN (July 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/06/us/san-francisco-killing-sanctuary-cities/. Similarly, the
Washington Post ran a “fact-checker” piece after Donald Trump during the campaign threatened to withdraw funding for
“sanctuary cities.” Michael Ye Hee Lee, What exactly are ‘sanctuary cities’ in immigration policy?, THE WASHINGT ON POST (Sep. 7,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/07/what-exactly-are-sanctuary-cities-in-
immigration-policy/.
3 This variety and disparity makes it challenging to count and identify sanctuary jurisdictions:, : “[t]he difficulty in estimating the
precise number of jurisdictions stems, at least in part, from conflicting interpretations as to what constitutes a sanctuary
policy.” Michael Garcia, “Sanctuary Cities”: Legal Issues, CONGR. RES. SERVICE (July 15, 2009),
https://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0106-crs.pdf. However imprecise the definition, the Trump administration
has pledged to undertake the effort of identifying such jurisdictions. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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II. Benefits of supporting immigrants and adopting sanctuary policies
There are many economic, legal and moral reasons that affect a community’s decision to support
and show respect for immigrants and mixed status families, by limiting their cooperation with the federal
authorities or otherwise adopting legislation, ordinances, or policies to become a “sanctuary,”
“welcoming,” or “human rights” city. Many, even possibly most, immigrants live in “mixed status”
families, meaning that within one family, some may be citizens or lawful permanent residents, while
others have DACA, are out of status, or never had status.4 Policies that affect any one member of the
family have an impact on the entire family and all of its members, and these impacts ripple out into the
larger community.
A. Economic
a. Social Security: “Earnings by unauthorized immigrants result in a net positive effect on
financial status generally, and that this effect contributed roughly $12 billion to the cash
flow of the program” for the year 2010 alone,5 because undocumented people pay into
this system, but cannot benefit from it.
b. Taxes: Undocumented persons are estimated to contribute $11.64 billion in state and
local taxes each year.6
• Billions of dollars in tax revenues are estimated to have been generated from
President Obama’s deferred action programs.
• In California alone, the economic benefits of tax revenue from residents with
DACA are estimated at $904 million.7
c. Housing Market: The presence of immigrants in the US is estimated to have contributed
a total of “$3.7 trillion in housing wealth.”8
• Immigrant families contributed an estimated $10,000 to the value of the typical
homes in Arizona and New Mexico (states hit hardest by the recession of 2008).9
d. Medicare: Undocumented immigrants contributed approximately $35.1 billion dollars to
the Medicare Trust Fund alone between 2000 and 2009.10
4 Hansi Lo Wang, Alyson Hurt, Camila Domanoske, NPR, Mar. 8, 2017, (citing Pew Research Center asserting that 2/3 of
undocumented people have been in the US for 10 years or longer, and Migration Policy Institute for the statistics that 1/3 of
undocumented persons above the age of 15 have US citizen children, while 14% have a US citizen or green card holder spouse),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/08/517561046/how-americas-idea-of-illegal-immigration-doesnt-always-
match-reality
5 Stephen Goss et al, Actuarial Note, Effects of Unauthorized Immigration on the Actuarial Status of the Social Security Trust
Funds (April 2013), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_notes/note151.pdf, (emphasis added). For example, in 2013 “[t]he
Congressional Budget Office estimated federal costs of over $20 billion in four years for H.R. 22 78, the Strengthen and Fortify
Enforcement Act, which would enhance state and local immigration law enforcement roles.” Legislative Threats to Undermine
Community Safety Policies: The Costs of Entangling Local Policing and Immigration Law, National Immigrant Justice Center and
National Immigration Law Center (Oct. 2015),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NILC_NIJC_CommunitySafetyFactSheet_201510. pdf
[hereinafter Legislative Threats].
6 Niall McCarthy, How Much Tax Do America’s Undocumented Immigrants Actually Pay?
Fᴏʀʙᴇs (Oct. 6, 2016).
7 See Topline Fiscal Impact of Executive Action Numbers for 31 States, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/248189539/topline-fiscal-impact-of-executive-action-numbers-for-31-states.
8 McCarthy, supra note 6.
9 See e.g., The Economic Benefits of Fixing Our Broken Immigration System, The White House, President Obama (July 10, 2013,
1:20PM) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/07/10/economic-benefits-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system.
10 Esther Yu Hsi Lee, No, Undocumented Immigrants Aren’t A Burden On The Health Care System, THINK PROGRESS (June 24,
2015),
https://thinkprogress.org/no-undocumented-immigrants-arent-a-burden-on-the-health-care-system-39560e0bcaf7#.n
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B. Social and Moral
a. Education: Immigrant students who feel safe at school, increasing the likelihood that they
will attend regularly, matriculate through secondary school, and graduate with a high
school diploma or certificate of completion and become productive members of society –
ultimately fulfilling Plyler’s legacy.11
When parents or students are detained at school, waiting for school
buses, or while dropping off or picking up their children from school,
communities report an immediate reduction in school attendance.12
The holding in Plyler v. Doe,13 followed up with a letter from the
Department of Education,14 requires that employees of public school systems not
reveal (or ask) the status of their students.
The rationale, set forth in Plyler, is that all of society benefits when all of
its children are educated, and all of society suffers when some of its children are
not.
b. Public Health: Healthy Communities: Widespread fear of seeking medical attention is
widely understood as a public health concern for the entire community. Accordingly,
some cities have promulgated further guidance on this particular issue.
C. Law Enforcement: Noncitizens and individuals in mixed status families are deterred from interacting
with police if they know that law enforcement may inquire about immigration status.
• Reduced reporting of crime negatively impacts communities, requiring local police to
work harder to solve and deter crime and keep residents safe.
• A hostile immigration policy deprives individuals of the right to equal protection in access
to police services on the basis of national origin and generally cities believe that abiding by
the Constitution is their priority.15
• Holding non-citizens on ICE detainers results in law suits against police, costing local
cities.16 The federal government’s efforts have serious economic consequences for local
communities—including settlements for unlawful detainers, loss of revenue and tax
711b9rty.
11 Sonali Kohli, ICE agents won’t be going onto Los Angeles public school campuses, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/local/education/lausd/la-me-edu-ice-agents-school-campuses-20160209-story.html; Durnham School
Board Passes Resolution to Oppose Student Immigration Raids, WRAL (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.wral.com/durham-school-
board-passes-resolution-to-oppose-student-immigration-raids/15353656/.
12 Melinda D. Anderson, How Fears of Deportation Harms Kids’ Education, Tʜᴇ Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ (Jan . 26, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-educational-and-emotional-toll-of-deportation/426987/.
13 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982).
14 Letter from the U.S. Department of Education & the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Dear Colleague Letter:
School Enrollment Procedures (May 8, 2014), http://images.politico.com/global/2014/05/08/plyler_dcl_-_05-05-14.html
(discussing undocumented immigrants shall not be denied education); see also Reporting Requirements: Who Has a Duty to
Report Undocumented Immigrants? Fact Sheet, http://scjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/reporting-requirements-
factsheet-2012.pdf (“School employees, like teachers and principals, have no duty to report undocumented students or their
parents.”).
15 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of East
Haven 8–10 (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-enters-settlement-agreement-reform-east-
haven-conn-police-department (describing police department’s practice of patrolling locations where Latinos congregated
and following vehicles with a Latino driver in an attempt to enforce immigration laws).
16 See e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 2014 WL 1414305 (U.S. D.C. D. Ore. 2014); Cruz v. Multnomah County, 381
P.3d 856 (2016); Onadia v. City of New York, 44 N.Y.S.3d 882 (2017); Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas, 2017 WL 169102 (2017)
(discussing claims made by individuals seeking relief for municipalities’ violation of the Fourth Amendment for detaining the
individuals after their criminal sentence).
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dollars, the cost of enforcement, and costs of litigation.17
• Law enforcement that abides by sanctuary policies generally see a reduction in claims of
racial profiling and lawsuits on that basis.18
III. General Impact of Anti-Immigrant Policies and Practices
Some sub-federal units have been determined to adopt anti-immigrant policies, including but not
limited to 287(g) cooperation in which local law enforcement are deputized for use as “force multipliers”
for the federal government. Although these jurisdictions often cite immigrant driven crime as their
primary justification, there is no evidence to support this belief.19 Anti-immigrant policies and practices
have yielded negative consequences within many communities.
A. Economics
o Localities have experienced significant economic losses after enacting anti-immigrant
ordinances, such as Hazelton, Pennsylvania; Farmers Branch, Texas; and Escondido,
California.20
• Immigration detention and removal programs are costly to administer, have a
tremendous social and economic cost, and those costs are felt most keenly at the local
level.21
• Federal detention programs are expensive.22 As a consequence, the federal government
has attempted to shift costs by co-opting local and state level authorities to assist it with
achieving its deportation goals.
B. Social and Moral
a. Education
• The fear of deportation can cause undocumented parents to keep their children
home from school, resulting in years of lost education.23 As articulated in Plyler v
Doe, education failures in one part of the community negatively affect the entire
17 See, e.g., Legislative Threats, supra note 4 (discussing Harris County, Texas spent over $45 million to detain immigrants for
ICE during 2012 and 2013 and that Colorado spent $13 million per year to enforce federal immigration laws).
18 Wayne A. Cornelius, et al., Giving sanctuary to undocumented immigrants doesn’t threaten public safety—it increases it, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:00PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanctuary-cities-trump-20170202-story.html
(discussing evidence that “Secure Communities” encouraged racial profiling).
19 Mona Chalabi, Fact-checking Trump: how often do immigrants in the US commit crimes? The Guardian, Mar. 3, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/03/immigration-crime-donald-trump-fact-check, reviewing and endorsing
empirical evidence that first immigrants commit considerably less crime than citizens.
20 Philip E. Wolgin & Angela Maria Kelley,Your State Can’t Afford It, The Fiscal Impact of States’ Anti-Immigrant Legislation,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, (July 5, 2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2011/07/05/9952/your-state-cant-afford-it.
21 Goss et al., supra note 4.
22 Judith A. Greene, The Cost of Responding to Immigration Detainers in California Justice Strategy (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/Justice%20Strategies%20LA%20CA%20Detainer%20Cost%20R
eport.pdf.
23 For example, in 2011, Alabama enacted the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act. The Monday
after the Act went into effect, 2,200 of the state’s 34,000 Hispanic students – or 6.5% – were absent from school. Paul Easton,
School Attrition Through Enforcement: Title VI Disparate Impact and Verification of Student Immigration Status, 51 B.C. L. Rᴇᴠ.
313, 316, 321 (2013) (citing Jaclyn Zubrzycki, Immigration Statute has Alabama Schools in Legal Balancing Act, EDUC. WEEK, at
16, (2011), WLNR 21906125). In the first week of its implementation, Alabama school personnel observed a “sudden exodus”
of Hispanic students from public schools. Specifically, this includes the absence or withdrawal of 200 Hispanic students in
Montgomery County; 200 in Huntsville; 107 in Albertville; and approximately 20 students in Shelby Mark Guarino, Hispanics
Leave School in Face of Alabama’s Tough Immigration Law, Cʜʀɪs. Sᴄɪ. Mᴏɴɪᴛᴏʀ (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/1001/Hispanics-leave-school-in-face-of-Alabama-s-tough-immigration-law.
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country.24
• An unexpected side effect can be the loss of income within the community, as
parents remained home with children who were afraid to attend school.25
b. Public Health: When the immigrant community is fearful of interacting with
government officials, medical providers see an immediate drop off in health care
appointments across the Latino population, as mixed status families are fearful for their
undocumented relatives and refrain from all but emergency interaction.
• Even perceived discrimination by health care providers is associated with several
negative health outcomes in minority patients, regardless of immigration status—
including delays in seeking treatment, a lower rate of following doctors’
treatment instructions, and lower rates of patients returning for follow up
appointment.26
• Putting off preventative care increases the burden on emergency care facilities
and increases hospitalizations. A recent study found that if. the number of
preventable hospitalizations among Latinos (both citizen and non-citizen) were
brought down to the rates of non-Latino Whites, the United States could save
approximately $900 million in hospitalization costs.27
IV. Legal and Constitutional Concerns with Anti-Immigrant Policies and Practices
A. Legal Concerns
a. Threat of Withdrawal of Funds
• President Donald Trump has stated he would seek to pull all federal funding
from “sanctuary” cities.28 The Executive Order (EO) relies on Title 8, Section
1373 of the United States Code (“Section 1373”), which provides that local
governments may not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official from
“sending to, or receiving from, [federal immigration officials] information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status . . . of any individual.”
• Several lawsuits have been filed in response to the executive order: San Francisco
v. Trump,29 City of Chelsea, City of Lawrence v. Donald J. Trump (jointly),30 and
County of Santa Clara v. Trump31
b. The lawsuits argue that Executive Order No. 13768 is unconstitutional
i. It is unconstitutional on its face
1. It exceeds Executive authority in using spending power threats, a power
held by the Legislative branch under Art. I,32 and
24 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982).
25 Jay Reeves, Alabama Hispanics Halt to Protest Tough, New Immigration Law, NBC Nᴇᴡꜱ,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44879612/ns/us_news-life/t/alabama-hispanics-halt-work-protest-tough-new-immigration-
law/#.WDC9-zY0now (last updated Oct. 12, 2011).
26 Williams DR & Mohammed SA, Discrimination and Racial Disparities in Health: Evidence and Needed Research. J. BEHAV. MED.
Feb; 32(1):20-47 (2009).
27 Thomas R. Frieden, MD, MPH, CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report, CDC (2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf.
28 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
29 See generally Complaint, City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, No. 00485 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 1, 2017).
30 See generally Complaint, City of Chelsea, City of Lawrence v. Donald J. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 8, 2017).
31 See generally Complaint, City of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 5:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017).
32 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952)
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2. It is overbroad, vague and ambiguous.33
ii. It violates principles of federalism
1. In threatening to withhold all funds, it overreaches, violating the 10th
amendment by commandeering local authorities, and forces them to
reallocate their budgets and resources while guessing about how to do
that. 34
2. It is unconstitutionally coercive in threatening federal funds in a manner
inconsistent with the tests and parameters set out by the Supreme
Court.35
3. It asks localities to honor detainers in such a way that violates the 4th
amendment.36
4. It attempts to alter the conditions so drastically that it “puts a gun to the
head” of localities, in violation of Supreme Court guidance.37
iii. Jurisdictions have also responded by instituting “don’t ask” policies, in which
employees are restricted from inquiring into immigration status. If the
information is not obtained, the entity cannot be deemed to have violated §
1373.
c. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
• A major consideration for undocumented immigrants and people in mixed status
families is whether their undocumented status will be revealed when they seek
health care. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(commonly known as “HIPAA”), all information provided by a patient for the
purposes of obtaining health care is protected.38
• Federal anti-sanctuary measures, including §1373 do not repeal or override the
privacy protections of federal statutes, including HIPAA.39
B. Additional Constitutional Concerns
a. A number of federal courts have held that detainer-based detention by local law
enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment.
b. Tenth Amendment:
• The federal government may create laws directly regulating immigration, but it
cannot carry out that regulatory program by conscripting state and local
government officials, especially where doing so overrides validly enacted local
policy designed to protect the public health, safety or welfare of local residents.40
• The federal government currently does not compensate state and local officials
for resources they expend to detain individuals solely for immigration
enforcement purposes. Requiring state and local officials to become “force
multipliers” and comply with such federal requests would improperly compel
33 NFIB v Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
34 NFIB v Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
35 S. Dakota v Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
36 Morales v Chadbourne 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015)
37 NFIB v Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
38 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 45 CFR §§ 160, 164 (2016).
However, HIPPA § 164.512(j) permits disclosures of protected health information to law enforcement in limited situations, in
order to avert a serious threat to health or safety.
39 Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and A Poor Substitute
for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165 (2016)
40 See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (describing “broad authority to enact legislation for the public good”
retained by states); see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247, 96 S. Ct. 1440, 1445, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1976) (“The promotion
of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power”).
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states to “absorb the financial burden” of implementing a federal program.41
c. Fourteenth Amendment:
• Congress may not use its spending power coercively, impose new conditions
without notice, nor induce state and local government action that is itself
unconstitutional.42 Any attempt by federal officials to induce them to violate the
Constitution would be an “illegitimate exercise of the Congress’ . . . power”).43
• With regard to K-12 public schools, attempts to collect information about
undocumented students can serve to discourage enrollment and therefore violate
the equal protection mandates of Plyler v. Doe and Title VI.
V. Conclusion
The foregoing establishes that any threatened risks that might be associated with
becoming a “sanctuary city,” or of declaring one’s locality a “safe space” are outweighed by the
social, economic and moral benefits that emanate from such a self-designation. Immigrant-
inclusive policies are on strong federal constitutional footing and, within the federalist scheme,
plainly a power that the states and their political subdivisions may exercise without interference of
the federal immigration authorities.
Immigrant-inclusive policies recognize and appreciate each resident who lives in the
jurisdiction and calls that place home. This vision of the city or state as inclusive of each person
into the civic community stabilizes families, encourages healthy economic activity, and promotes
strong democratic public institutions. When an individual calls the community home, and
commits to contribute the best he or she can to the best interests of that community, the city or
state reciprocates by extending its protection, and in turn benefits from the residents’
commitment to the community.
March 10, 2017-v.4
41 Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 644 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997)).
42 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (describing four federalism-based limits on the use of Congress’ conditional
spending power).
43 Id. at 210–11.
