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The rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF
Abstract
Mission command is a command philosophy that denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative in all levels of command and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgement. In its first decades of existence, military analysts portrayed the Israeli command system as such and termed it ‘optional control’. The primary objective of this article is to explore the rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF. The first part of the article follows the development of optional control in the IDF’s first decades of existence until the 1970s. The second part of the paper will describe its decline through the analysis of command in recent IDF military campaigns. The last part is analysis; explanation for the decline in mission command is attributed to four major factors: the changes in Israel’s society and thereof in civil‒military relations; the changes in character of military operations; the lack of appropriate military education; and the role and impact of new technologies on the IDF. The combined effect of these factors impedes the ongoing efforts of the IDF to re-establish mission command as its preferred command philosophy.
... Mission command refers to "a command system in which responsibilities and authorities are delegated throughout the command line in order to stimulate initiative and leadership at all levels" (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004, p. 410). It is therefore fundamentally a decentralised system of command (Shamir, 2017;Storr, 2003). The responsibilities and authority to make decisions are delegated throughout the command line (De Vries, 2013;Scholtz, 2012). ...
... Mission command can also be understood as the opposite of Befehlstaktik, which refers to an approach where the commander formulates plans and issues detailed instructions to his or her subordinates, expecting them to follow orders to the letter without any room for lower-level innovation or initiative (Ben-Shalom & Shamir, 2011). In mission command, initiative at all levels of command is both encouraged and facilitated (Shamir, 2017). This assumes that the sub-commander involved in the operation is best informed and has to exploit the opportunities as they evolve on the battlefield (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). ...
... Storr (2003) adds that shared understanding of the overall intent is especially important in joint operations and when working with other nations, which is commonly the case in African peacekeeping operations (Garcia, 2018). All involved in the operation should have a shared understanding of the operational environment, solutions to tactical problems in the field, clarity of the mission, and the outcome of the operation (Ploumis, 2020;Shamir, 2017;Sjøvold & Nissestad, 2020). ...
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as a member state of the United
Nations, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, has
certain continental and regional responsibilities. It is foreseen that the main areas of
influence and operations of the SANDF will be situated in Africa and are referred to
as the African battlespace, which holds challenges for deploying military commanders.
We argue that the elevated levels of complexity and uncertainty in this context make
mission command, as a command approach, especially relevant. The conceptual study
on which this article is based, found that mission command is highly suitable to promote
a command culture that is flexible yet robust, fosters unity of command at all levels, and
simultaneously provides subordinate commanders with the freedom to act decisively
when new opportunities are identified. For mission command to be applied in the African
battlespace, sensemaking is an important cognitive skill that should form an integral part
of the psychological preparation and training of commanders. Recommendations are
made for sensemaking development in the current training of commanders in the SANDF.
... Mission command refers to "a command system in which responsibilities and authorities are delegated throughout the command line in order to stimulate initiative and leadership at all levels" (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004, p. 410). It is therefore fundamentally a decentralised system of command (Shamir, 2017;Storr, 2003). The responsibilities and authority to make decisions are delegated throughout the command line (De Vries, 2013;Scholtz, 2012). ...
... Mission command can also be understood as the opposite of Befehlstaktik, which refers to an approach where the commander formulates plans and issues detailed instructions to his or her subordinates, expecting them to follow orders to the letter without any room for lower-level innovation or initiative (Ben-Shalom & Shamir, 2011). In mission command, initiative at all levels of command is both encouraged and facilitated (Shamir, 2017). This assumes that the sub-commander involved in the operation is best informed and has to exploit the opportunities as they evolve on the battlefield (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004). ...
... Storr (2003) adds that shared understanding of the overall intent is especially important in joint operations and when working with other nations, which is commonly the case in African peacekeeping operations (Garcia, 2018). All involved in the operation should have a shared understanding of the operational environment, solutions to tactical problems in the field, clarity of the mission, and the outcome of the operation (Ploumis, 2020;Shamir, 2017;Sjøvold & Nissestad, 2020). ...
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as a member state of the United Nations, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, has certain continental and regional responsibilities. It is foreseen that the main areas of influence and operations of the SANDF will be situated in Africa and are referred to as the African battlespace, which holds challenges for deploying military commanders. We argue that the elevated levels of complexity and uncertainty in this context make mission command, as a command approach, especially relevant. The conceptual study on which this article is based, found that mission command is highly suitable to promote a command culture that is flexible yet robust, fosters unity of command at all levels, and simultaneously provides subordinate commanders with the freedom to act decisively when new opportunities are identified. For mission command to be applied in the African battlespace, sensemaking is an important cognitive skill that should form an integral part of the psychological preparation and training of commanders. Recommendations are made for sensemaking development in the current training of commanders in the SANDF.
How does the Israel Defence Forces cultivate the image of a ‘hero’ within its combat ranks? By analysing a series of online educational videos on combat heritage, this article will demonstrate how the IDF’s current heroic imagination is grounded in a subversion of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ paradigm. Within this paradigm, junior ranking soldiers are seen as increasing the chaos inherent in asymmetrical conflicts. By contrast, this article will argue that a focus on the learned elements of professionalism and training are seen as creating the conditions wherein every man (or woman) can become a ‘hero’.
This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah. Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel's own traumatic experience of Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
Despite its achievements in the 1948 Palestine War, the military performance of the Israeli army was less impressive than is usually assumed. Attacks by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) on the regular Arab armies (Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi, and Egyptian) ended in most cases in Israel's defeat. Israeli victories, which allowed the extension of the territories under its control, were gained in the fighting against the unorganized Palestinians and the semi-military Arab Liberation Army. The only significant military achievement in the war was the victory of Yigal Allon's forces over the Egyptians in southern Palestine. This success was gained at the conclusion of a debate between Allon and another IDF senior commander over the best way to conduct of offensive operations, a debate that provides a key to understanding the reason for Allon's remarkable achievement compared to the lesser performance of other IDF commanders. However, Allon's brilliant military leadership was the result of intuition and not of professional military education, a factor that had a negative effect on some of his decisions.
Efraim InbarWashington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999, xiv, 276 pages, US$32.00 (ISBN 0-8018-6217-5)The name of Yitzhak Rabin evokes a wide variety of perceptions and emotions. For most Israelis he was a military hero, under whose command the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) defeated and destroyed the armed forces of three neighbouring Arab countries in less than six days during the 1967 war. For many Palestinians and human rights organizations, he was primarily the defence minister who developed and executed a policy of brutal repression in the occupied territories during the intefada of the late 1980s. For many Israelis and much of the international community, he was above all a peacemaker, who as prime minister in the 1990s concluded agreements with Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and initiated negotiations with Syria. For the ultra-Orthodox segment of Israeli society, he was a traitor who surrendered to the Palestinians large tracts of the biblical land of Israel. It was, of course, this last perception that led to his death in 1995 at the hands of an Israeli extremist.Rabin was first and foremost a devotee of realpolitik, who firmly believed in the central importance of military power in the preservation and pursuit of national interests. At one level, as Efraim Inbar says, 'Rabin was essentially a military man whose expertise was the management of violence.' This was evident in the major contributions he made to the training, doctrine, tactics, and command of the IDF. But his was certainly not a blind faith in the use or usefulness of force. He displayed a strong aversion to risk taking and a deep sensitivity to casualties. More often than not, he advocated the limited use of military power as a calibrated instrument of policy, even when the Israeli public and his colleagues were calling for far more robust action. And, as was evident in the last years of his life, he saw military power as a diplomatic tool in the pursuit of peace and not solely as an instrument of coercion.According to Inbar, 'Rabin seemed to have a good grasp of the intricacies of nuclear strategy,' but was profoundly sceptical about the usefulness of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, he seemed convinced that Israel's conventional military capabilities were sufficient to deter or defend against any military threat likely to arise in its turbulent neighbourhood. On the other hand, he believed that any overt move by Israel to deploy nuclear weapons would only encourage Israel's Arab neighbours to make a concerted effort to do the same. And given the idiosyncratic politics of the Middle East, he very much doubted that it would be possible to establish with the Arab states a stable balance of nuclear deterrence, along the lines of that which prevailed between the superpowers during the cold war. …
The myth of the Israeli paratroopers at the beginning of the 1950s, and their heroic deeds in the reprisal raids, embodied the new Zionist ethos for which the current Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, claims much of the credit. The book thus provides historical insight into some of the most intractable developments of the current Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israel's assault on Gaza in early 2009, Operation Cast Lead, achieved significant tactical successes and managed to redeem the Israel Defence Forces' poor performance during the 2006 Lebanon War. Sergio Catignani examines Israel's military and public information campaign and why Cast Lead failed to accomplish the government's two main goals of stopping rocket attacks on Israel and the influx of weapons for resupplying Hamas.
The African sun had just risen above the hills surrounding the sprawling city and sent its already dazzling rays streaming into the dusty alleyway. Corporal Hernandez felt the sun on his face and knew that today would, again, be sweltering. He was a squad leader in 2d Platoon, Lima Company and had, along with his men, spent a sleepless night on the perimeter. For the past week his platoon had provided security to the International Relief Organization (IRO) workers who manned one of three food distribution points in the American Sector of Tugala -- the war-tom capital of Orange -- a Central African nation wracked by civil unrest and famine. The situation in Orange had transfixed the world for nearly two years. Bloody tribal fighting had led first to the utter collapse of the government and economy, and ultimately, to widespread famine. International efforts to quell the violence and support the teetering government had failed, and the country had plunged into chaos. The United States had finally been compelled to intervene. A forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) was ordered to assist the efforts of the ineffective Regional Multi-National Force (RMNF) and the host of international humanitarian assistance organizations that struggled to alleviate the suffering. The MEU's arrival had stabilized the situation and allowed the precious relief supplies to finally reach the people who needed them most. The Food Distribution Point (FDP) manned by 2d Platoon serviced over 5,000 people daily. The Marines had, at first, been shocked at the extent of the suffering, by the constant stream of malnourished men and women, and by the distended bellies and drawn faces of the children. The flow of food and medical supplies had, however, had a dramatic impact. The grim daily death tolls had slowly begun to decrease and the city had begun to recover some sense of normalcy. Within a month the lives of the Marines had assumed a sort of dull routine.
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvardâs Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of Americaâs injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
This study is an analysis of the decisiveness of Israeli small-unit leadership on the Golan Heights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. What allowed the Israeli brigades on the Golan Heights to defeat an Arab coalition that launched a surprise attack with a force that vastly outnumbered the Israelis in men, tanks and artillery? The one advantage the Israelis had was the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This study begins with a brief review of the strategic and operational situation in the Middle East in 1973. This includes background information on the Israeli and Arab forces facing each other on the Golan Heights and their plans for the defense and attack respectfully prior to the start of hostilities. The majority of the thesis discussion is concerned with the actual battle on the Golan Heights. It highlights the contributions that small-unit leadership made during the battle that allowed the vastly outnumbered IDF to destroy a massive Soviet-style Arab army. This portion of the study also looks at the experiences of those Israeli leaders involved in the fighting. The study then looks at leadership from the Israeli perspective. I define what leadership is and why it is important at the small-unit level. I take a close look at how the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) picks and trains its leaders and what role the Israeli Military Culture plays in that process. The conclusion of the thesis is that the IDF was able to fight and win even though surprised and vastly outnumbered due to the quality of leadership at the small-unit level. This lesson may prove to be important still today as the armies of the Western societies continue to get smaller even though they still face the threat of fighting the massive Soviet-style armies of the "Axis of Evil" for decades to come.
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