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Neuropsychologists and neurolawyers.
Abstract
Describes the US civil justice system and analyzes the roles played by neuropsychologists (NPs) and neurolawyers (NLs) within this system. Traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) occur in a variety of accidents, which may become the subject of personal injury claims or litigation. Competent clinical NPs can provide convincing evidence of the reality of brain injury deficits. NPs are most likely to become involved in such aspects of personal injury cases as testing and treatment of the TBI claimant, conference with the claimant's lawyer, reporting the patient's status to the lawyer, giving a deposition during discovery, and presenting direct evidence and being cross-examined at the trial. The relationship between NPs and NLs is highlighted.
... La relación entre neurociencia y derecho no es nueva, por lo menos desde el año 1991 una nueva disciplina abre su campo: el neuroderecho. Taylor et al. (1991) publican su artículo "Neuropsychologists and neurolawyers", que en adelante sería el inicio del neuroderecho como área de estudio, además de una nueva denominación de la profesión del abogado como neuroabogado o neurojurista y su relación con la neuropsicología. Los alcances actuales del neuroderecho son diversos y amplios. ...
... específico de la neuroética frente a los temas clásicos de la bioética es que se plantea la propia definición de lo humano, su identidad; tanto es así, que no sólo se habla de la ética de la neurociencia (como regular sus avances, hasta dónde se debe llegar, que implicaciones tienen) sino también de neurociencia de la ética (como construimos los principios morales, como es la conciencia)(Farah, 2007).Todo ello, se ha proyectado también en el Derecho. El término neuroderecho fue acuñado por primera vez por Sherrod Taylor a principios de la década de 1990 para denotar la creciente área de 3 colaboración entre neuropsicólogos y abogados en el sistema de justicia penal(Taylor et al., 1991).En las décadas siguientes, el ámbito del neuroderecho se amplió para abarcar toda el área de intersección entre la neurociencia y el Derecho. Según Ienca (2021), a lo largo de la década de 1990 y principios de la del 2000, el discurso dominante en la opinión pública y la reflexión académica sobre neuroética y neuroderecho se centró principalmente en cuatro temáticas principales: a) La permisibilidad ética de la mejora cognitiva a través de nootrópicos (potenciadores cognitivos) b) Las implicaciones filosófico-legales de la neurociencia del libre albedrío, con especial foco en las nociones de responsabilidad moral y culpabilidad jurídica. ...
El neoconstitucionalismo es una corriente teórica que enfatiza la importancia de la Constitución como fuente fundamental del ordenamiento jurídico; por otro lado, los neuroderechos se refieren al conjunto de derechos relacionados con el cerebro, la mente y la neurociencia. Aunque ambos conceptos tienen implicaciones en el ámbito jurídico y constitucional, el neoconstitucionalismo se centra en la protección de los derechos fundamentales y la interpretación de la Constitución, mientras que los neuroderechos se enfocan en los derechos relacionados con el cerebro y la neurociencia; por ello, esta investigación pretende un acercamiento teórico sobre los nuevos desafíos del Neoconstitucionalismo frente a los Neuroderechos, con el fin de comprender la importancia de estos conceptos dentro del constitucionalismo moderno.
... The origin of the term "neurolaw" is about a decade older than 'neuroethics' as it was first coined by J. Sherrod Taylor et al. in 1991 to denote the growing area of collaboration between neuropsychologists and lawyers in the criminal justice system (Taylor, Harp, & Elliott, 1991). However, this was a very narrow denotation which could hardly encapsulate the bandwidth of modern neurolegal studies. ...
... The origin of the term "neurolaw" is about a decade older than 'neuroethics' as it was first coined by J. Sherrod Taylor et al. in 1991 to denote the growing area of collaboration between neuropsychologists and lawyers in the criminal justice system (Taylor, Harp, & Elliott, 1991). However, this was a very narrow denotation which could hardly encapsulate the bandwidth of modern neurolegal studies. ...
Neurotechnologies are emerging technologies that establish a connection pathway to the human brain through which human neuronal activity can be recorded and/or altered. These technologies open novel opportunities for exploring, influencing, or intercommunicating with the human brain. Medical neurotechnologies offer the potential to help people with neurological or psychiatric conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, dementia, stroke, and major depressive disorder. Non-medical neurotechnology systems provide new tools and methods to monitor and modulate brain activity in healthy subjects and to interact with digital devices. Intervening effectively and safely in the human brain through neurotechnology is a scientific frontier that must be reached for the good of humanity. At the same time, however, it raises major ethical and legal challenges. Neuroethics and neurolaw are the two main areas of scholarship that address, respectively, the ethical and legal issues raised by our ever-improving ability to intervene in the brain through neurotechnology.
In the past decade, philosophical-legal studies in the fields of neuroethics and neurolaw have given increasing prominence to a normative analysis of the ethical- legal challenges in the mind and brain sciences in terms of rights, freedoms, entitlements, and associated obligations. This way of analyzing the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience has come to be known as “neurorights”. Neurorights can be defined as the ethical, legal, social, or natural principles of freedom or entitlement related to a person’s cerebral and mental domain; that is, the fundamental normative rules for the protection and preservation of the human brain and mind. In their most popular version, neurorights have been defined as an emerging category of human rights designed to protect the brain-mind sphere of the person.
Reflections on neurorights have received ample coverage in the mainstream media and have become a mainstream topic in the public neuroethics discourse. Further, they are rapidly becoming an emerging regulatory tool of international politics. Yet, several meta-ethical, normative-ethical, legal-philosophical and practical challenges need to be solved to ensure that neurorights can be used as effective instruments of global neurotechnology governance and be adequately imported into international human rights law. To overcome these challenges, this report attempts to provide a comprehensive normative-ethical, historical and conceptual analysis of neurorights. In particular, the objective of this report is fivefold as it attempts to (i) provide an overview of current and likely future biomedical neurotechnologies; (ii) reconstruct a history of neurorights and situate these rights in the broader history of ideas; (iii) summarize ongoing policy initiatives related to neurorights in the present international policy landscape; (iv) proactively address some unresolved ethical-legal challenges; and (v) identify priority areas for further academic reflection and policy work in this domain.
The findings of this report suggest that neurorights reflect fundamental human interests that are deeply rooted in the history of ideas. These rights introduce normative specifications related to the protection of the person’s cerebral and mental domain that are not merely repetitive of existing human rights frameworks, but add a new, fundamental level of normative protection. This corroborates the view that human beings generally enjoy a set of rights against certain kinds of interferences in their brains and minds, including those interferences involved in the misuse of neurotechnologies. In addition to protecting against the misuse of neurotechnology, the neurorights spectrum also contains moral and legal provisions aimed at ensuring that neuroscientific and neurotechnological progress is used to empower people and improve human well-being (positive rights). To a large extent, the findings of this report also corroborate the normatively stronger thesis that the fundamental rights and freedoms relating to the human brain and mind should be seen as the fundamental substrate of all other rights and freedoms.
This overview indicates that there is not yet complete consensus regarding the conceptual-normative boundaries and terminology of neurorights. Divergences exist in relation to how these rights are interpreted, named, and conceptually articulated. Nonetheless, some degree of convergence is emerging around three main families of neurorights. First and foremost, the need for specific provisions on the protection of private brain-related information seems to share a high degree of acceptance and recognition. The right to mental privacy appears to be the candidate best equipped conceptually to take on this role. Second, the right to mental integrity appears to have the highest degree of legal entrenchment. While there are some variations in the interpretation of this right, there is full theoretical consensus about the need to protect the person from psychological harm and mental interference. Third, a variety of neurorights candidates have been proposed to preserve and promote the freedom of the human mind and thereby prevent external manipulation. These include evolutionary interpretations of the right to freedom of thought, the right to cognitive liberty, and the right to personal identity.
On the other side of the coin, positive rights such as promoting justice and equality— e.g., through ensuring egalitarian access to neurotechnology for biomedical use and promoting patient welfare on the basis of the ethical principle of beneficence—have so far occupied a secondary role in the neurorights debate.
Introducing neurorights into the human rights framework may require adding new protocols to existing instruments or even stipulating new entirely devoted to neuroethics and neurolaw. In either case, some fundamental problems such as rights inflation and to provide an adequate normative justification for multilateral instruments ethical, meta-ethical, and legal issues must be addressed in order to overcome neurorights. These include introducing justificatory tests for the introduction of neurorights, clarifying the relationship between moral and legal neurorights and harmonizing neurorights with existing normative instruments.
The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo
Convention) offers an ideal platform and normative substrate for the protection and
promotion of neurorights. Given its focus on prohibiting the misuse of innovations in
biomedicine, protecting the dignity and identity of all human beings, and guaranteeing
respect for their integrity and fundamental freedoms, the Convention is well placed for
either enshrining neurorights through ad hoc protocols or for serving as a basis for
future instruments.
Understanding, treating, and augmenting the human brain and mind is one of the great
scientific challenges of our age. Achieving these goals in a way that preserves justice,
safeguards fundamental rights and human dignity is the corresponding task of ethics
and law. Neurorights will likely be a useful tool to accomplish this task.
... Neurolaw is a relatively new and highlyinterdisciplinary field while the Decade of the Brain 17 was first introduced to the health care and legal communities. The term neurolaw, among legal scholars, was first coined by Taylor et al. 18 More effectively, He raised the issue of it, with his prominent scientific paper entitled "Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers." 18 Taylor's works during his career in academia 19 are of considerable significance in the research area of neurolaw, chiefly legal practice. ...
... The term neurolaw, among legal scholars, was first coined by Taylor et al. 18 More effectively, He raised the issue of it, with his prominent scientific paper entitled "Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers." 18 Taylor's works during his career in academia 19 are of considerable significance in the research area of neurolaw, chiefly legal practice. Neuroscience and the law have interacted over a long history. ...
Neurolaw, as an interdisciplinary field which links the brain to law, facilitates the pathway to better understanding of human behavior in order to regulate it accurately through incorporating neuroscience achievements in legal studies. Since 1990's, this emerging field, by study on human nervous system as a new dimension of legal phenomena, leads to a more precise explanation for human behavior to revise legal rules and decision-makings. This paper strives to bring about significantly a brief introduction to neurolaw so as to take effective steps toward exploring and expanding the scope of law and more thorough understanding of legal issues in the field at hand.
... El término Neurolaw se utilizó por primera vez en la publicación "Neuropsychologists and neurolawyers", en la cual se interrelacionaba la neuropsicología, neurohabilitación y el derecho civil en casos de personas con antecedentes de traumatismo craneoencefálico, y su relación con implicaciones jurídicas en los juzgados 4 . El neuroderecho ha tenido un crecimiento exponencial en los últimos años en diferentes países 5 , teniendo un gran número de publicaciones científicas relacionadas con las neurociencias y el derecho las cuales han aumentado en la última década El neuroderecho se ha originado como disciplina anexa al ámbito legal debido al impacto que han tenido las neurociencias en los últimos años, siendo a su vez una disciplina con grandes oportunidades, pero aún desconocida para el área del derecho. ...
Resumen Las neurociencias están en medio de un resurgimiento del interés en la dimensión biológica de los estados mentales y la conducta humana, aún más con su introducción en el ámbito ce la criminología biosocial y el sistema penal. La introducción de nuevas disciplinas en el ámbito penal representa un reto al momento de validarlas como una herramienta útil para el proceso, dado que cada vertiente tendrá puntos a favor y en contra de ellas, por lo cuál es fundamental analizar de forma crítica la utilidad, viabilidad y grado de certeza que ofrezcan dichas disciplinas. Al margen de las neurociencias forenses, resulta predominante analizarlas de forma integral, biológica, psicológica, ética y legal, con la finalidad de que las aportaciones que esta rama ofrezca al estado de derecho sean objetivas y aptas para el sistema penal de cada circunstancia temporal y social en que se implementen. Abstract Neurosciences are in the midst of a resurgence of interest in the biological dimension of human mental states and behavior, even more so with the introduction of biosocial criminology and the penal system into the field. The introduction of new disciplines in the criminal field represents a challenge when validating them as a useful tool for the process, given that each aspect will have points for and against them, which is why it is essential to critically analyze the usefulness, viability and degree of certainty offered by these disciplines. Apart from forensic neurosciences, it is predominant to analyze them in an integral, biological,
... In contrast, for a legal assessment, the purpose is not just to describe how the patient functions, but also to decide whether the MHI was the cause of any impairment. Legal issues are described elsewhere in this issue (Taylor, Harp, & Elliott, 1991). Here I want to stress that the neuropsychologist must remember what every student of statistics learns-that it is impossible to prove the null hypothesis. ...
Describes the natural history of minor head injury (MHI) and discusses factors important in the development of persistent postconcussion syndrome. Problems involved in neuropsychological assessment after MHI are outlined, including confusion between (1) group and individual results, (2) quantity and quality, and (3) average and normal scores. A representative sample of tests measuring information processing ability, attention and concentration, and memory are highlighted. Advice about principles of case management and systems that help patients to regain their preinjury level of function is provided. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... As Matarazzo (1990) has noted, it is imperative that psychologists address these neuropsychological assessment issues in their research, their clinical practice, and their professional opinions in the courtroom. It is in the area of personal injury-in this instance, MTBIthat these issues are addressed, in the interests of balanced assessment-that is, to neither miss defensive and malingered responding nor overlook genuine MTBI sequelae (Taylor, Harp, & Elliott, 1991). ...
A balanced approach to the detection of malingering and defensiveness in the neuropsychological assessment of mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI) is suggested, while genuine neurobehavioral and psychopathological sequelae are documented. The absence of neuroradio-loglcal evidence and heavy reliance on patient report and neuropsychological test data make malingering and defensiveness issues that are critical in forensic contexts and for the credibility of neuropsychology. Deficiencies in interview data collection and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the MMPI (Minnesota Muttiphasic Personality Inventory) are reviewed. The potential independence of malingering and defensiveness and of MMPI and neuropsychological data are noted. The equivocal research on malingering is reviewed, with particular emphasis on assessment of memory deficits as one of the most common complaints in MTBI. Arguably, malingering is more similar to than different from other diagnoses, but it has not been so treated in clinical practice. The need for developing sophisticated malingering probes is acknowledged, but the quest for a single malingering test is criticized and preference given to approaches that rely on evaluating data patterns indicating malingering.
While the prominence of neuroscience and neurotechnologies has generated intensive debates about the normative analysis of the ethical-legal challenges in public opinion and academia, these debates are relatively scarce among law and religion experts. To overcome the shortfall, this contribution describes the impact of the main neuroscientific applications on the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Considering how neurosciences techniques can alter the mind, decode thoughts, and enhance cognitive functions, particularly individual thought and conscience, I suggest revising the traditional dichotomy of forum internum and forum externum of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and rethinking the protection of the forum internum , which is at risk in the Age of Neuroscience.
Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators.
This research aims to detect the methodologies scholars use to conclude what is a human right or a natural right. For most of them, the mere citation of an article of the constitution or law does not provide enough justification for rights, and they usually resort to other supra-positive elements which are summarized in the “Natural Law Formula”. Commonly, they will appeal to human dignity, some psychological or natural inclinations, the values of society, some important goods, goals and means, and to certain principles coined in different places of the legal system. This Article discuss how authors deal with these starting points in their analysis, which precisely are the main elements of the mentioned formula. After showing how the formula works in the human rights field, we consider new possible applications of the versatile formula. It can be used deducing legal conclusions from general principles, ends, values and other elements, and inferring general standards from specific cases, as well. While scholars tend to use the deductive methodology that goes from the general to the particular, courts use the inductive methodology that goes from the case law to the general rules and standards. Finally, the Article introduces new applications of the formula in different sciences and arts related to the human being, like anthropology, ethics, and economics. Thus, this study shows how the formula can be used to develop interdisciplinary studies.
El presente Informe fue preparado por encargo de la UNESCO (Oficina para América Latina y el Caribe). En primer lugar destaca el notable desarrollo neurocientífico que ha tenido lugar en los últimos años en varios países latinoamericanos, tanto en actividades clínicas como de investigación. Al abordar la perspectiva de derechos humanos en relación con las neurotecnologías, el informe identifica cuatro derechos que están llamados a jugar un rol central en la materia: la privacidad mental, la integridad mental, la identidad personal y la libertad cognitiva. El documento presenta a continuación las diversas propuestas de regulación de la materia por parte de distintos organismos internacionales y regionales latinoamericanos, así como a nivel de los órganos legislativos de países de la región, enfatizando el liderazgo de la UNESCO, que puede ser una fuerza motriz en materia de neurotecnología dentro del sistema de las Naciones Unidas, gracias a su mandato único y su experiencia en bioética y ética de la ciencia y la tecnología.
Publicado en Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Penales vol 4 num 13. Resumen; En el presente artículo se explica qué es el trastorno de la personalidad antisocial y se esbozan las raíces neurobiológicas y factores de riesgo ambientales vinculados al desarrollo de este trastorno de la personalidad. Posteriormente, se relaciona el concepto de neuroderecho para el análisis de la responsabilidad penal, la imputabilidad aminorada y los planteamientos de política criminal. Además, se explica el arduo camino que queda por delante, no solo para prevenir la comisión de delitos, sino, además, para promover la salud mental dentro y fuera del sistema penitenciario. De cara al final del texto, se plantea sumariamente el problema del libre albedrío y la responsabilidad penal desde la ciencia. Finalmente se presentan las conclusiones del trabajo con un llamado especial hacia la promoción de la salud mental en los países latinoamericanos.
Borbón Rodríguez, D. A. (2021). Trastorno de la personalidad antisocial desde el neuroderecho: responsabilidad penal, libre albedrío y retos de política criminal. Revista Mexicana De Ciencias Penales, 4 (13), 187-218. Recuperado a partir de https://revistaciencias.inacipe.gob.mx/index.php/02/article/view/416
The present study reviews the contribution of neuroimaging tests in the American criminal process, whose contribution varies greatly depending on the stage of the process in which they are used: while the neurocognitive data have practically no relevance in the phase of competency to stand trial or for culpability, in the sentencing phase they are becoming a powerful weapon for mitigation, especially in those cases in which is discussed the death penalty. However, as we will conclude, it would be in this guilt phase, as the basis for the incomplete defense of diminished capacity when mental disorders are discussed, especially when they affect the sphere of personality, where these tests could have a greater judicial impact, in contrast with its more mediatic uses and, at the same time, unfortunate, like the one carried out by the famous lie detection technique.
Talking about neuroscience and law today no longer seems futuristic or bizarre. On the contrary it is the representation of a new sector of research, concisely referred to as neurolaw, that flourishes around the integration between two fields each characterized by a high complexity and stratification of elements, theories, links with other scientific fields. Neurolaw was born as a “branch” of bioethical and bio-juridical reflection but now it has become an autonomous sector based on an extensive spectrum of transversal and integrated knowledge. It is a work in progress whose thematic area goes from the traditional phases of the trial and of ‘law in action’ to the frontiers still to be explored of artificial intelligence. This paper tries to make a critical summary of the implications and problems that modern neuroscientific acquisitions pose to the legal dimension, starting from the fundamental theme of responsibility to the controversial perspectives opened by modern techniques of neuroenhancement and brain computer interfaces.
The coaching of clients by attorneys on how to "beat" psychological tests in the context of personal injury or disability litigation poses a serious concern for the practice of psychological assessment. This article reviews the empirical literature with respect to the effects of coaching on psychological tests, discusses current ethical and legal standards relevant to coaching on psychological tests, and offers suggestions on how the field of assessment psychology might deal with this challenge. This review has important implications for all clinicians conducting psychological and neuropsychological assessments in forensic settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes the US civil justice system and analyzes the roles played by neuropsychologists (NPs) and neurolawyers (NLs) within this system. Traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) occur in a variety of accidents, which may become the subject of personal injury claims or litigation. Competent clinical NPs can provide convincing evidence of the reality of brain injury deficits. NPs are most likely to become involved in such aspects of personal injury cases as testing and treatment of the TBI claimant, conference with the claimant's lawyer, reporting the patient's status to the lawyer, giving a deposition during discovery, and presenting direct evidence and being cross-examined at the trial. The relationship between NPs and NLs is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Over the last 20years, the Courts and the legal community have increasingly relied on neuropsychologists to provide opinions,
guidance, and expertise in the area of brain–behavior relationships. The purpose of this article is to review issues neuropsychologists
commonly face when asked to evaluate cases with suspected mild traumatic brain injuries (TBI) in the civil or criminal legal
context. In particular, we will discuss: (a) the neuropsychologist’s role in TBI forensic cases, (b) the attorney’s role in
forensic TBI cases, (c) a neuropsychological framework to approach forensic mild TBI cases, (d) establishing working relationships
with attorneys, (e) the Daubert and Frye standards, (f) symptom validity, (g) ethical issues, and (h) recommendations to improve
the ecological validity of our tests and encourage test developers to provide alternate forms of tests.
Traumatic brain injuries and spinal cord injuries occur in a variety of accidents which may become the subject of civil litigation. A new field of medical jurisprudence, called neurolaw, is emerging to join health-care professionals and attorneys in a common quest to employ legal remedies to enhance the quality of life for individuals with neurological injury and their families. Presented here is a review of the underpinnings of this developing area of inquiry. © 1995 Informa UK Ltd All rights reserved: reproduction in whole or part not permitted.
This article reviews the field of medical jurisprudence known as neurolaw which deals with the medicolegal ramifications of brain and spinal cord injuries. Placing emphasis upon how clinicians may work effectively with trial lawyers, it provides practical guidance to neurorehabilitation professionals who testify in personal injury cases.
Increasingly, psychological assessment is conducted with clients and patients involved in child custody and personal injury litigation. Clinical neuropsychologists are being asked sophisticated questions by attorneys regarding the validity of practitioners’ most highly respected tests. Research reviewed here bears on the validity of test-buttressed clinical opinions, including research related to the following psychometric properties of individual test scores: standard errors of measurement, test–retest stability and subtest-to-subtest intercorrelations. The highest and the lowest subtest scores used as indices, respectively, of an individual’s premorbid level of cognitive functioning and the degree of current impairment from that presumed earlier level is not justified when used in isolation from the life history and current medical findings. Although many practitioners use information from the wider research, courtroom experience suggests that a number do not; contrariwise, the attempt of Faust and Ziskin (1988a) to undermine the courtroom testimony of every psychologist who serves as an expert witness is also criticized.
The involvement of psychologists and psychiatrists within the legal arena continues to grow rapidly but remains highly controversial.
Extensive research on clinical judgement provides a scientific basis for clarifying the growing disputes about the values
of such professional activities. Studies show that professionals often fail to reach reliable or valid conclusions and that
the accuracy of their judgements does not necessarily surpass that of laypersons, thus raising substantial doubt that psychologists
or psychiatrists meet legal standards for expertise. Factors that underlie the research findings and implications for courtroom
testimony are discussed.
Faust and Ziskin present their criticisms of clinical psychology and of computer-based clinical work as objective and scientific analyses. However, in content and function the criticisms fit more closely into the adversarial process of a cross-examination in a court of law. Viewed from this perspectives, the content of such criticisms are part of a priori conclusions about all clinical endeavors, and are not valid, clearly targeted, and empirically meaningful evaluations of clinical procedures.
Discusses the judicial definition of the expert witness, what testimony is admissible, where and about what psychologists testify, the structure of expert testimony, dealing with attorneys, and becoming an expert witness. It was not until 1962 that clinical psychologists were identified as experts qualified to testify as to mental disease or mental defect. Training to become an expert witness is currently limited to courses in a few graduate schools and continuing education workshops. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
overview some of the main topic areas that the neuropsychologist will need to address in the forensic evaluation of a patient, as well as preparation for testimony / case studies will be presented demonstrating the role of neuropsychological evaluation in forensic cases
issue of professional competency / selection of tests / deposition vs court testimony
liability and disability / trauma / malpractice / competency/incompetency / criminal jurisprudence / malingering (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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