No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Reflectiveness and rational thinking: Response to Duemler and Mayer (1988).
Abstract
D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer (see record 1989-14366-001) claimed to have found evidence against my theory of rational thinking (J. Baron, 1985), which they interpreted as saying that more reflective thinking is always better. They claimed to show that the most reflective subjects do worse in a task that requires generation of unusual hypotheses. The theory itself, however, implies that people can be too reflective. Their data do not test even this implication adequately because their measure of reflectiveness is very likely invalid.
We introduce the Berlin Numeracy Test, a new psychometrically sound instrument that quickly assesses statistical numeracy and risk literacy. We present 21 studies (n=5336) showing robust psychometric discriminability across 15 countries (e.g., Germany, Pakistan, Japan, USA) and diverse samples (e.g., medical professionals, general populations, Mechanical Turk web panels). Analyses demonstrate desirable patterns of convergent validity (e.g., numeracy, general cognitive abilities), discriminant validity (e.g., personality, motivation), and criterion validity (e.g., numerical and non-numerical questions about risk). The Berlin Numeracy Test was found to be the strongest predictor of comprehension of everyday risks (e.g., evaluating claims about products and treatments; interpreting forecasts), doubling the predictive power of other numeracy instruments and accounting for unique variance beyond other cognitive tests (e.g., cognitive reflection, working memory, intelligence). The Berlin Numeracy Test typically takes about three minutes to complete and is available in multiple languages and formats, including a computer adaptive test that automatically scores and reports data to researchers (www.riskliteracy.org). The online forum also provides interactive content for public outreach and education, and offers a recommendation system for test format selection. Discussion centers on construct validity of numeracy for risk literacy, underlying cognitive mechanisms, and applications in adaptive decision support.
J. Baron (see record
1990-27432-001) makes two assertions concerning our research on reflectiveness in scientific reasoning (D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer; see record
1989-14366-001): (a) His theory, particularly as stated in Baron (1988), predicts our findings, and (b) we have misnamed the independent variable in our study as reflectiveness. In this essay, we briefly respond to each assertion and call for three improvements in theories of scientific reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer (see record
1989-14366-001) claimed to have found evidence against my theory of rational thinking (J. Baron, 1985), which they interpreted as saying that more reflective thinking is always better. They claimed to show that the most reflective subjects do worse in a task that requires generation of unusual hypotheses. The theory itself, however, implies that people
can be too reflective. Their data do not test even this implication adequately because their measure of reflectiveness is very likely invalid. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
We investigated the role of individual differences in cognitive reflection in decision making. We measured the performance of 157 participants in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005) and a number of decision-making tasks. We examined the relation of cognitive reflection with performance in tasks that assess correspondence (as distinct from coherence), such as predicting the ratings of chess players. We found significant correlations between cognitive reflection and all the estimation measures in correspondence tasks. Our results suggest that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that includes more characteristics than originally proposed by Frederick (2005). We proposed that cognitive reflection is related to the concept of actively open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985, 2008). We concluded that cognitive reflection is a thinking disposition that interacts with knowledge, domain-specific heuristics and characteristics of the environment and that it may play an essential role in the adaptation of the decision maker to different environments and situations.
Individual differences in cognitive abilities and skills can predict normatively superior and logically consistent judgments and decisions. The current experiment investigates the processes that mediate individual differences in risky choices. We assessed working memory span, numeracy, and cognitive impulsivity and conducted a protocol analysis to trace variations in conscious deliberative processes. People higher in cognitive abilities made more choices consistent with expected values; however, expected-value choices rarely resulted from expected-value calculations. Instead, the cognitive ability and choice relationship was mediated by the number of simple considerations made during decision making --- e.g., transforming probabilities and considering the relative size of gains. Results imply that, even in simple lotteries, superior risky decisions associated with cognitive abilities and controlled cognition can reflect metacognitive dynamics and elaborative heuristic search processes, rather than normative calculations. Modes of cognitive control (e.g., dual process dynamics) and implications for process models of risky decision-making (e.g., priority heuristic) are discussed.
In 5 studies, undergraduate subjects were given descriptions and outcomes of decisions made by others under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions concerned either medical matters or monetary gambles. Subjects rated the quality of thinking of the decisions, the competence of the decision maker, or their willingness to let the decision maker decide on their behalf. Subjects understood that they had all relevant information available to the decision maker. Subjects rated the thinking as better, rated the decision maker as more competent, or indicated greater willingness to yield the decision when the outcome was favorable than when it was unfavorable. In monetary gambles, subjects rated the thinking as better when the outcome of the option not chosen turned out poorly than when it turned out well. Although subjects who were asked felt that they should not consider outcomes in making these evaluations, they did so. This effect of outcome knowledge on evaluation may be explained partly in terms of its effect on the salience of arguments for each side of the choice. Implications for the theory of rationality and for practical situations are discussed.
We tested a prediction of Baron's (1985) rationality theory: that reflectiveness is directly related to creative problem-solving performance. In two experiments, subjects solved a series of four induction problems involving conventional rules, followed by an induction problem involving an unconventional rule. Subjects who had been extremely reflective or extremely impulsive on successfully solving conventional problems performed more poorly on solving the unconventional problem than did subjects who had been moderately reflective or moderately impulsive on conventional problems. This
U-shaped relationship between degree of reflectiveness/impulsiveness on conventional problems and problem-solving performance on an unconventional problem conflicts with predictions of rationality theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Cognitive style and its improvement: A normative approach Advances in the psychology of human intelligence
- J Baron
- P Badgio
- I W Gaskins
- J. Baron
- P. Badgio
- I. W. Gaskins
Thinking and deciding
- J Baron
- J. Baron
Everyday reasoning and the roots of intelligence
- D N Perkins
- M Faraday
- B Bushey
- D. N. Perkins
- M. Faraday
- B. Bushey
Rationality and intelligence
- J Baron
- J. Baron