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Justification, Pluralism and Pragmatism: The Problems and Possibilities of a Peircian Epistemic Justification of Liberalism
Abstract
This article explores the problems and possibilities of offering a compelling Peircian epistemic justification of liberal institutions, primarily via critical engagement with the work of Cheryl Misak, and uses this to make some wider points about the criteria for a successful justification of liberalism in conditions of pluralism. Though the article argues that Misak’s argument fails to take seriously enough the problem that pluralism poses for the justification of liberal politics in modern democratic societies, and that in this sense a version of political liberalism is superior, it nevertheless ends by tentatively suggesting an alternative account of a Peircian epistemological justification that has some potentially promising and attractive features.
In this dissertation, I argue for a pluralist Peircean epistemic approach to democratic
justification to address the challenge of reasonable pluralism. Whereas public reason approaches to democratic justification require citizens privatize their worldviews, an epistemic approach to democracy allows citizens the freedom to express their personal reasons while harnessing the
epistemic power of democracy to identify and solve social problems. I find that of the various epistemic approaches available, Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse’s Peircean Epistemic Defense of Democracy (PED) is the most promising because it is widely inclusive of personal reasons, uses pluralism to further the epistemic goals of democracy, and offers a robust defense of democratic procedures, norms, and institutions. The PED argues that beliefs aim at truth, and in holding a belief properly, one must engage in a process of reason exchange to support the truth
of that belief. Moreover, only in a democracy can one properly engage in this process of reason exchange due to the epistemic requirements of an open society.
The Peircean requirements for proper believing have been criticized for allegedly being oppressive and exclusive in a similar manner to public reason. What I call the ‘faith objection’ claims that the epistemic norms of religious belief and faith are different and even contradictory to the epistemic norms imposed by the PED. I disagree with this objection and argue that thePED is inclusive of religious reasons because religious belief and faith are sufficiently responsive to reasons and evidence. Though this raises a new challenge: if the PED is radically
inclusive, to what extent will reasons that are inaccessible, incommensurable, weak, or false corrupt the epistemic environment of democracy? For the PED to avoid the faith objection, it will need to include reasons that are out of the ordinary, for example, conspiracy theories. But if conspiracy theories or other non-traditional modes of reasoning are rampant in democratic
deliberation, then there may be a decline in the epistemic functioning of democracy, thus
endangering the epistemic justification the PED is built upon. I argue that while the challenge of including non-traditional reasoning is difficult, it also offers the opportunity for new paths towards truth. These non-traditional forms of reasoning may be novel approaches to truth that only some democratic citizens have access. By including conspiracy theories, religion, or other inaccessible and incommensurable reasoning in public deliberation, the PED can be inclusive of all democratic citizens, while offering a robust justification of democracy.
The dispute between impartialists and partialists dominates much modern moral and political philosophy. This book is an attempt to investigate what is at stake between impartialists and their opponents, and to suggest a possible reconciliation. It begins by noting that, in political philosophy, impartiality is normally taken to reflect a belief in the equality of all human beings. However, in a world characterized by plural and competing conceptions of the good, not everyone accepts that all human beings are equal. Belief in equality is part of a comprehensive, and contested, conception of the good. Therefore, if liberal impartiality is to gain support, it must provide an alternative foundation: one which can demonstrate the priority of justice, but which does not depend upon acceptance of a particular conception of the good. I suggest that this foundation is to be found in a form of impartialism that gives centrality to the partial concerns we have for particular others. The fact that we care for particular others can provide a justification for impartialism and can also explain its motivational force.
This book critically evaluates liberalism, the dominant attempt in the tradition of political philosophy to provide a philosophical foundation for democracy, and argues for a conception of deliberative democracy to meet this need. © 2005 by Taylor & Francis Group, a Division of T&F Informa. All rights reserved.
Soulignant la proximite des conceptions libertaire et autonomiste de la vie politique chez Habermas et Rawls, l'A. montre que les deux philosophes negligent de la meme facon la question du fondement moral de la politique. Mesurant la possibilite d'un accord raisonnable concernant l'organisation de la vie politique en fonction de principes liberaux, l'A. montre que cet engagement constitue le centre moral de la pensee liberale et qu'il incarne le principe du respect des personnes. Se referant aux premiers dialogues entre Habermas et Rawls, l'A. interroge la legitimite de l'association politique qui caracterise la democratie et qui permet de depasser les desaccords sur la question de la nature du bien humain
The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person.
John Locke
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.1 (2004) 9-22
There is a direct connection between deliberative democracy and the pragmatist theory of truth. The deliberative democrat thinks that correct political decisions can only be reached by free and open deliberation. And the pragmatist, at least the kind of pragmatist who follows the founder of the doctrine, C. S. Peirce, thinks that correctness or truth in any kind of discourse is that which would be the upshot of unlimited deliberation and inquiry. Indeed, pragmatists have always wanted to bring moral and political judgments under our cognitive scope—under the scope of correctness, truth, falsity, knowledge, error, and reason. Peirce was the least explicit in conducting this task (but see Misak 2004), whereas James and Dewey were very explicit. The tradition has been continued by contemporary pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas. Moral and political judgments aim at getting things right and the best way of achieving or approximating that aim is to engage in reasoning, debate, and the consideration of different perspectives and evidence.
It is unsurprising that so many pragmatists are moral cognitivists, as Peirce's theory of truth, on which true beliefs are those that would be undefeated by deliberation and inquiry, seems tailor-made for cognitivism. It leaves the prospects for cognitivism intact, as it does not require a causal connection between our beliefs and physical objects. Moral and political judgments cannot be candidates for truth and falsity on a theory of truth that, for instance, has it that judgments are true if and only if they correspond to the mind-independent or physical world.
The Peircean account of truth is entirely general—that is, it is applicable in principle to any discourse or domain of inquiry. A true belief, Peirce maintained, is one that is "unassailable by doubt" (Collected Papers, 5.416). It is a belief that would forever stand up to deliberation or inquiry; not lead to disappointment; be "indefeasible" or not defeated, were deliberation to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go (CP 5.569, 6.485). Truth is a stable property—a belief is either true (indefeasible) or not. And truth is not a matter for some particular community—if a belief is indefeasible, it would stand up to whatever could be thrown at it, by any community of inquirers.
In Truth, Politics, Morality, I presented a sustained defense of this pragmatist cognitivism. The starting point of that argument was that we take ourselves in morals and politics to aim at the right answer—i.e., at the truth, rather than at what my own standards point to (what is justified by my lights) or at what community standards point to (what is justified by our lights). We try to get things right, we distinguish between thinking that we are right and being right, we criticize the beliefs and actions of others, we think that we can improve our judgments, and we take ourselves to be able to learn by listening to others, by putting ourselves in another's shoes, by examining the arguments of the other side, by broadening our horizons, and so forth. We think that "rational" persuasion, not brow-beating or force, is the appropriate way to get people to agree with us. Indeed, we want others to agree with us, not to merely mouth what we say or fall in line with it.
That is, our practices—what we find when we examine morals and politics—point to cognitivism. The pragmatist is of course committed to keeping philosophical theories true to practice. As Peirce writes: "We must not begin by talking of pure ideas,—vagabond thoughts that tramp the public roads without any human habitation,—but must begin with men and their conversation" (CP 8.112). This commitment to respecting practice is not itself without arguments in its support: for instance, a theory of x must take seriously what x is like, or it runs the risk of not being a theory of x, but a theory of something else instead.
Nonetheless, two related difficulties press upon cognitivism and its thought that the practice of moral and political deliberation suggests...
The paper examines the current discussion in liberalism around the issue of the “neutrality” of the state. It scrutinizes the “political liberalism” defended by John Rawls and Charles Larmore and shows that the consequence of their approach is to evacuate the dimension of “the political” from the idea of a well-ordered society. By presenting the exclusions existing in their model of liberal society as the product of free agreement resulting from rational procedures, “political liberals” offer us a picture in which antagonism, violence and power have only disappeared because they have been made invisible. The consequence is to leave liberalism unable to conceptualize power and antagonism. The paper concludes that there cannot be such a thing as a “neutral justification of the neutrality of the state” (Larmore 1987) and that a pluralist perfectionist perspective like the one proposed by Joseph Raz offers a more adequate way to envisage the specificity of modern pluralist democracy.
As Misak herself states, this is a variation of a Peircian understanding of truth which has some significant advantages over Peirce's own. See also (ibid
- Misak
Misak (ibid.: 1). As Misak herself states, this is a variation of a Peircian understanding of truth
which has some significant advantages over Peirce's own. See also (ibid.: 49-50).
- J Rawls
RAWLS J., (1996), Political Liberalism, Chichester, Columbia University Press, 1996, 36-37.
Justification, Pluralism and Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-2 | 2013
Westbrook goes as far as to say that Misak's book is the strongest argument "yet offered for claiming a democratic political valence for pragmatism
- Westbrook See
promising account of such a justification. See, for example, Westbrook (2005:
44-51), and Talisse (2005: 103-121). Westbrook goes as far as to say that Misak's book is the
strongest argument "yet offered for claiming a democratic political valence for pragmatism,"
Westbrook (2005: 51).
Though it is probably even more accurate, though cumbersome, to say that he sought a justification that was neutral between all reasonable conceptions of the good for a conception of Justification
Though it is probably even more accurate, though cumbersome, to say that he sought a
justification that was neutral between all reasonable conceptions of the good for a conception of
Justification, Pluralism and Pragmatism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-2 | 2013