Media Malaise and Political Cynicism

Abstract

Media malaise is one of the most popular and most controversial concepts in political communication research. At its core is the observation that citizens have become more cynical and distrustful of politicians and the political process as a whole and that political participation is on the decline. This is partly blamed on the news media's presentation of politics as a game or contest in which strategy becomes more important than substantial issues. Media malaise theory claims that such coverage results in widespread political cynicism that turns citizens off. This claim has been fiercely contested, with researchers stressing that media might well mobilize citizens politically or arguing that citizens might well become more cynical but not necessarily less engaged. Evidence is mounting to support both sides of the debate, which emphasizes the need to add further nuance and to spell out the exact conditions and processes behind such effects.

Full text

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
1
Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
Andreas R.T. Schuck
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
University of Amsterdam
Email: a.r.t.schuck@uva.nl
Abstract
Media Malaise is one of the most popular and most controversial concepts in a lot of political
communication research. At its core is the observation that citizens have become more cynical
and distrustful of politicians and the political process as a whole and that political
participation is on the decline. This is partly blamed on the news media’s presentation of
politics as a game or contest in which strategy becomes more important than substantial
issues. Media Malaise theory claims that such coverage results in widespread political
cynicism which turns citizens off. This claim has been fiercely contested, stressing that media
might well mobilize citizens politically, or arguing that citizens might well become more
cynical but not necessarily less engaged. Evidence is mounting to support both sides of the
debate, which stresses the need to add further nuance and spell out the exact conditions and
processes behind such effects.
Cite as:
Schuck, A.R.T. (2017). Media malaise and political cynicism. In: The International
Encyclopedia of Media Effects, (eds.) Patrick Rössler, Cynthia Hoffner, & Liesbet von
Zoonen, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118783764.wbieme0066

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
2
Negative News – Negative Public?
Media malaise is one of the most interesting and most controversial notions in a lot of
political communication research. At its core is the assumption that trust in politics and
government and with it also civic engagement are on the decline - and the media are partly
responsible to this worrying trend. This claim has been fiercely contested and empirical
evidence has mounted to support both sides of the debate. This controversy about the “bad” or
the “good” influence of news media on civic engagement has made media malaise one of the
most productive research lines within the discipline over the years. And the debate is far from
settled, as will be discussed in this chapter. Rather, media malaise research continues to thrive
within the discipline and has expanded over the years and decades from a narrow focus on the
effects of television news coverage on public cynicism to a much broader and more
encompassing focus on different media channels, different program formats, and different
content types on a wide array of democratically relevant attitudes and behaviors. As such it
has picked up each new trend or development in society, such as the popularity of alternative
news and other entertainment formats or the use of social networking sites on the internet, to
ask the same question: are the media to blame for fueling public cynicism and political
disaffection – or just the opposite, do media help to create a more knowledgeable and engaged
citizenry?
Kurt and Gladys Lang (1966) were among the first to prominently put forward the
claim that there likely was a connection between the proliferation of network news and public
feelings of political detachment and disengagement. According to them the news media fueled
political cynicism by over-emphasizing political conflict which would let people turn away
from the political process. This impact was expected to be strongest for the inadvertent
audience, i.e. those citizens without much interest or knowledge about political affairs, who
encountered the news somewhat accidentally while watching television. It took a while until
these claims were picked up again by other political communication research since at the time
they contrasted with the view that news media would only have minimal effects.
Weaver (1972) suggested that television news fostered “detachment (at best) (…) or
cynical rejection (at worse) toward the political institutions of the nation” (p. 74). In 1976,
finally, Michael Robinson coined and popularized the term “videomalaise” (1976). According
to him, tuning into television news instead of reading newspapers was one important factor
fueling political disaffection, political cynicism, frustration, social mistrust, and lack of
political efficacy. In a nutshell, he argued that the public’s exposure to the constant stream of
negative public affairs coverage contributed to less and less civic engagement. Or in his own
words: “the greater the dependency upon television, the greater the person’s (…)
estrangement from government” (Robinson, 1976: 430). Several factors contributed to this
process, according to Robinson: the unusual size of television news audiences, the credibility
attributed to these news channels, the interpretative character of television news, the focus on
negativity, conflict and violence, and the anti-institutional theme of television news programs
(Robinson, 1976: 426-430). These developments together were held responsible for an
increase in political detachment, disaffection, disengagement and a general media-driven
public and political malaise. Thus, the news media were seen as partly responsible by
Robinson for the deficiencies in modern democracies due to their excessive negative reporting
which let people become disengaged. Particularly during election campaigns this process
would become most critical as it could turn voters off because of the prominent focus on
“horse-race” news and negative news about political candidates at the expense of more
substantial issue coverage and analysis. Over the next few decades, empirical evidence

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
3
mounted in support of the view that negative news, particularly television, contributed to a
more cynical and disengaged public (e.g., Patterson, 1993; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).
Since, over time, the research focus shifted away from the original claim that television news
would be particularly harmful and towards the view that negativity in the news more
generally was to be blamed, the term “media malaise” has been - and still is - most commonly
used in the literature to refer to this process.
More specifically, while studies in support of the media malaise hypothesis are often
different in the content and context they focus on individually, they are connected by their
reliance on the same two general claims: (1) news have a significant impact on civic
engagement; and (2) this impact is in a negative direction. There are plenty of examples
lending support to these claims. According to Fallows (1996) the major television networks
had substituted tabloid television for serious political coverage. Other concerns raised were
that television news would produce only an illusion of political participation while actually
fostering passivity. Blumler (1997) talked about a “crisis of civic communication” and
Dahlgren (1995) warned of an impoverished public sphere as a result of the displacement of
public service television by commercial channels, which were often blamed to be responsible
for increasing trends towards more “infotainment” and “tabloidization”. Kaase (2000), for
example, found some indication for media malaise also in a European context. Most
prominently at the time, Patterson (1993) described the press as a ‘miscast’ institution which
was ‘out of order’ in the political system. Finally, Cappella and Jamieson (1997), in what has
become a seminal work ever since, emphasized the role of strategic news frames during
election campaigns, focusing on tactical maneuvering of candidates and the “game” behind
the scenes instead of substantial issues, and its impact on activating political cynicism.
The emergence of the media malaise research paradigm has to be seen in connection
with a more general paradigm shift at the time, away from minimal effects, which also
brought forward other theory development in the discipline along similar lines, stressing a
more negative influence of media on society, such as e.g. the knowledge gap hypothesis or
cultivation theory. Several other prominent publications followed which popularized the idea
that the media, and especially television, would contribute to a decline in social capital and
civic engagement, and reached a broad readership in but also outside of academia (Postman,
1985; Putnam, 1995). These claims resonated well in the public realm also because it seemed
to make intuitive sense to draw a connection between media and television coverage which
seemed to have become an increasingly powerful societal force and the apparent and growing
political disaffection that was growing in society at the time.
Understanding this context and development both in the academic as well as in the
societal debate is important in order to appreciate the provocative potential of the question
mark in Pippa Norris’ chapter “Negative News – Negative Public?” in her seminal book A
Virtuous Circle: Political Communication in Postindustrial Societies (2000) in which she
discusses some of her empirical findings drawing on data from 28 western-style democracies
including surveys and content analyses. In this book Norris directly responds to the claims of
the media malaise hypothesis and formulates and discusses her concept of a “virtuous circle”
(Norris, 2000). In more concrete terms, according to this concept, citizens who consume more
news develop a more positive orientation and trust towards the political system due to deeper
knowledge of political affairs. Citizens who are trusting in politics in return become more
interested and pay more attention to news than others. This results in a reciprocal,
strengthening relationship between media use and trust in politics, i.e. a spiral or “virtuous
circle” in which citizens become more politically engaged over time. In her own words:

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
4
“attention to the news media acts as a virtuous circle: The most politically knowledgeable,
trusting, and participatory are most likely to tune in to public affairs coverage. And those most
attentive to coverage of public affairs become more engaged in civic life“ (p. 317). Regarding
the media malaise perspective she is far from ambiguous, arguing that “claims of media
malaise are methodologically flawed, so that they are at best unproven (…) or at worse false”
(Norris, 2000: 20).
Norris’ findings indeed stood in stark contrast to the original media malaise claims.
Earlier reviews of the original videomalaise thesis had criticized the thin empirical basis of its
claims already before and proposed to adopt a more nuanced view regarding the connection
between media exposure and political cynicism (e.g., Bennett et al., 1999; see also de Vreese,
2005), such as a focus on particular content features. And when Putnam (1995) criticized the
media, and in particular television, to be a negative influence in reducing social capital this
sparked an immediate response, exonerating both television as well as - more recently - the
internet from such criticism. Thus, at the core of the debate, Norris and others agreed with the
first original claim of the original videomalaise thesis cited above, i.e. that the media have a
significant impact on civic engagement, but they firmly disagreed with the second, i.e. that
this impact would be in a negative direction. Somewhat inevitably this also sparked the
formation of what had to appear as two opposing camps, supporting either the political
disaffection (e.g., Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Robinson,
1976) or the mobilization perspective (e.g., Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000).
According to the latter, more positive view, news media rather than turning citizens
off, had the potential to actively engage them in the political process and to promote political
participation (e.g., Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000) or at least had no strong negative effects on
citizens. What has been an important contribution of this line of research was to stress the
need to add more nuance to study which media channels, and which messages, had what kind
of effects on what parts of the audience. As de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) showed, for
example, exposure to news outlets with a high level of political content (such as public
television and broadsheet newspapers) contributed to knowledge gains and increased the
propensity to turn out to vote in an election. Exposure to news outlets with little political
content had either no or slightly positive effects as well, supporting the notion of a virtuous
rather than of a vicious circle or of a media malaise. Other research has confirmed the view
that news coverage can also foster political trust, knowledge and political engagement (e.g.,
Aarts and Semetko, 2003). Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata (2016) showed, in line with
these findings, that there is a positive linkage between news media use and political trust,
however, for some media this relation weakens across time. Furthermore, as Schmitt-Beck
(2015) reports for the 2013 German election, exposure to broadsheet newspapers can
stimulate turnout, however, this mobilizing effect differed between different media and the
quality of information provided and even turned out negative for commercial television under
certain circumstances. These findings are in line with other research showing positive effects
of regularly watching public television news on efficacy and turnout, as well as negative
effects of frequent exposure to commercial television and thus a “virtuous circle” for some
and a “spiral of cynicism” for others - taking place at the same time (Aarts and Semetko,
2003). The simultaneous positive and negative effect of television news is further illustrated
by a recent comparative study in 11 countries showing that public television news can
increase knowledge and interest in public affairs but at the same time discourage
identification with public life because of its repeated focus on the same kind of elites (Curran
et al., 2014). With regard to social media use, Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, and Ljungberg
(2013) showed within a Swedish national election context that political social media use and

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
5
attention to political news in traditional media both jointly increase political engagement over
time among young voters. In a three-country study in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland consistent mobilization effects could be observed for broadsheet newspapers and
weekly news magazines while there was no positive or negative effect on trust in government
(Tworzecki and Semetko, 2012). In line with this more nuanced view put forward by these
studies, Newton (1999) had found earlier that reading broadsheet newspapers was strongly
associated with mobilization, while watching television had weak effects – also in a positive
direction. Furthermore, tabloid papers and general television exposure showed no connection
with political disengagement. One of the important conclusions by Newton back then, and
now widely picked up and established, was that it seemed to be specific media content that
matters – rather than general media or news exposure as such. This added important nuance to
the debate and has been developed further when studies today, such as the ones cited above,
distinguish between different media program or format types and their effects (also see the
discussion below on the different role of different media entertainment programs) as well as
between particular content features in news coverage.
A Spiral of Cynicism?
At the core of the media malaise hypothesis is a concern that negative media coverage fuels
political disaffection and disengagement by eroding trust in politics in government and
creating widespread cynicism. As Cappella (2002: 233) lays out: “Trusting citizens are more
likely to be members of dense social networks, to be engaged in civic activities, to be less
likely to cheat (e.g. on taxes), and to be willing to undertake the mutual obligations that allow
efficient commerce and social exchange.” In concrete terms, political cynicism describes a
(perceived) gap between voters and their political representatives and is said to have increased
on the aggregate level over the past decades (e.g., Jackson, 2011; Patterson, 1993; Rhee,
1997). Such cynicism is seen as problematic as it alienates people from politics, resulting in
lower levels of political participation and engagement (Patterson, 2002). Political cynicism
shares some conceptual grounds with regard to the trust one has into the well-functioning of
politics. Ultimately, to trust an object is to believe that the object will act as it should and, in
the political realm, to feel closeness to or estrangement from some aspect of one’s
government (Citrin and Muste, 1999: 479). As Miller and Listhaug (1990) put it: “Trust ...
reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in
accordance with normative expectations held by the public. Citizen expectations of how
government should operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, honest,
efficient, and responsive to society’s needs” (p. 358). Political cynicism, then, is defined by a
lack of trust and, more specifically, “(…) implies that the self-interest of political actors is
their primary goal and that the common interest is secondary at best or played out only for its
political advantage” (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997: 142). Thus, whereas trust is at the root of
every relationship and an important basis for social capital, cynicism is characterized by “the
absence of a belief in the reliability of authorities, or no or limited faith in their sincerity”
(Brants, 2013: 16). In relational terms trust is based on experience or the expectation that the
exchange with a trustee would yield benefits for the trustor. It consists of two dimensions:
reliability, i.e. the perceived integrity of a person, and competence, i.e. the perceived ability of
a person. In politics that direct personal experience is almost always absent so that citizens
have to rely on their expectations. These are heavily influenced by factors such as reputation,
perceived honesty, motivations, reliability and credibility of the trustee and these can be
significantly shaped by the media (see Brants, 2013 and Tsfati and Cappella, 2003 for a
discussion).

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
6
The way in which political cynicism has been operationalized in previous research has
clearly been impacted by Cappella and Jamieson’s (1997) influential work on the spiral of
cynicism. They define cynicism as “mistrust generalized from particular leaders or political
groups to the political process as a whole – a process perceived to corrupt the persons who
participate in it and that draws corrupt persons as participants” (p.166). Their set of question
items measuring cynicism by focusing on specific election campaigns and individual
politicians has been criticized by other research as being too narrow (see e.g., Jackson, 2010;
Pedersen, 2012). As Shehata (2014) stresses, we still know only little about if campaign
coverage not only affects actor- or campaign-level cynicism but also more stable institutional-
level trust. Indeed, while some studies connect cynicism with negativity and disapproval of
political actors, many other theoretical definitions of cynicism go beyond the more specific
actor- or campaign-level. Miller (1974), for example, argues that cynicism “refers to the
degree of negative affect towards the government and is a statement of the belief that the
government is not functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations
(p.952). Nevertheless, the operationalization by Cappella and Jamieson still represents the
standard way to measure cynicism and has been applied by most other empirical research in
the field and sometimes been adjusted to refer to a particular campaign specifically (see e.g.,
Elenbaas and de Vreese, 2008; Schuck, Boomgaarden, and de Vreese, 2013; Shehata, 2014;
de Vreese, 2004, 2005; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002). Interestingly, some studies have found
effects of news on issue-specific cynicism but not or hardly on more generic political
cynicism (Jackson, 2010). This strong reliance on the original operationalization of political
cynicism has the benefit of high comparability of findings across time and contexts but the
flipside of that is the difficulty to revise this original measurement in line with more recent
theoretical insights into the exact nature of cynicism vis-à-vis other related concepts (such as
trust etc.) without losing out on the aforementioned benefits.
Strategic news – cynical public?
The question if –and how– the media contribute to political cynicism and/or the (de-)
mobilization of citizens has been subject to a lot of political communication research.
Valentino, Beckmann, and Buhr (2001) provide one prominent example of research that has
focused on cynicism as a result of media coverage, i.e. the impact of election news coverage
on levels of political cynicism among citizens. In studies like this, the increase in public
cynicism is often linked to strategy framing in the news, i.e. coverage focusing on the
strategic motivations behind politicians’ actions (see e.g., de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; de
Vreese, 2005). Because election campaigns become increasingly professionalized and make
more use of advanced political marketing strategies (e.g., Norris, 2000) journalists pay more
attention to what is going on ‘behind the campaign’ (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). Strategic
news reporting is often contrasted with substantive issue or policy news (see Cappella and
Jamieson, 1996; Jackson, 2010; Rhee, 1997) and is generally conceptualized as news that
focuses on winning and losing, is driven by ‘war and games’ language, focuses on the style of
presentation and perceptions of politicians, their tactics and performances, or how candidates
or parties are doing in the polls (see e.g., Aalberg, Strömbäck, and de Vreese, 2012).
According to Cappella and Jamieson (1997) strategy framing consists of several conceptual
dimensions, which have been widely employed - in slight alteration - in many content analytic
studies (see e.g., Jackson, 2011; Pedersen, 2012; Schuck et al., 2013; Strömbäck and
Dimitrova, 2006; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; de Vreese, 2004, 2005), measuring the
prominence of strategy coverage mostly in campaign contexts: “(1) winning and losing as the
central concern; (2) the language of wars, games, and competition; (3) a story with

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
7
performers, critics, and audience (voters); (4) centrality of performance, style, and perception
of the candidate; and (5) heavy weighting of polls and the candidates standing in them”
(p.33).
Ever since Robinson’s (1976) ‘‘video malaise’’ thesis, numerous studies demonstrated
the news media’s increasingly strong emphasis on strategic elements such as strategic
motivations or the style of presentation of political leaders as opposed to actual content or
substance and showed how this mode of coverage negatively affects citizens’ political
attitudes and behavior (e.g., Fallows, 1996; Patterson, 1993, 2002). The reason why such sort
of framing affects audiences is supposed to be that it makes politicians’ self-interest more
salient in citizens’ minds at the expense of more substantial issue positions and thus it
distracts readers from what an issue is about and works against an informed citizenry.
According to Cappella and Jamieson (1997), strategic news dominates American news
coverage not only during election campaigns, but also on policy issues more generally. Some
scholars refer to strategic coverage as dominating political news coverage since the 1970s and
others have documented the strong presence of such coverage also outside of election contexts
and in important policy debates and also outside the US context and in comparative
perspective (see e.g., Jackson, 2011; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2006). The strong prominence
of strategy framing in the news is not so surprising if we consider that journalists themselves
have been shown to be rather cynical about politicians, yet less so than the general public, and
convinced that most politicians are driven by “media salacity”, i.e. the drive to get media
attention (Brants et al., 2010). Schuck et al. (2013) showed in a comparative study in 27
countries in the context of the 2009 European parliamentary election campaign that strategy
framing was the most prominent type of news frame overall and across countries, i.e. even
more prominent than conflict framing. Interestingly, there was significant cross-country
variation in the prominence of strategy framing but this variation could not be explained
statistically considering a standard set of medium, time and context factors.
Studies focusing on the role of political cynicism as a result of strategy news have
referred to the above-mentioned ‘‘spiral of cynicism’’ according to which news media report
largely strategically about politics — that is, emphasizing the political performance of and
battle among politicians, as well as the tactics they use in pursuing political victory at the
expense of actual content or substance — which fuels public distrust in and cynicism about
politics and politicians among the public (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). This is in line with
research on the effects of news framing more generally, which has demonstrated the
dependency of how citizens make sense of political issues on how an issue is presented in the
news. Several experimental studies, mostly carried out in U.S. political contexts, have shown
that participants exposed to political coverage framed in terms of strategy are significantly
more inclined to implement strategic considerations in interpreting and evaluating political
behavior, issues, and campaigns (e.g., Valentino, Beckmann, and Buhr, 2001). However,
these effects do not seem to persist over time and without repeated exposure (de Vreese,
2004).
Regarding the effects of strategy news, studies have shown that it has the potential to
produce more negative reactions than other frames and to depress substantive information
retention (Valentino, Buhr, and Beckmann, 2001). Shehata (2014) showed that while strategy
coverage increased cynicism and depressed interest, substantial issue coverage had mobilizing
effects. Other studies suggested to also move beyond cynicism as a result of strategic news
coverage (e.g., Shehata, 2014) and to consider effects on related concepts such as political
efficacy or trust, which indeed had been cited by Robinson’s original videomalaise hypothesis

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
8
as well as other points of concern (see also Cappella and Jamieson, 1996, 1997). In line with
some of the other original claims, and corroborating findings of other studies, research has
shown that exposure to strategic news can also decrease trust in the media (Hopmann,
Shehata, and Strömbäck, 2015) as well as levels of internal efficacy (Pedersen, 2012). This is
important because efficacy is often connected to political participation.
However, despite the clear evidence that strategic news does have the potential to
affect audiences, Valentino, Beckmann and Buhr (2001) show that these effects are not the
same for everyone. Those with higher political involvement and sophistication showed to be
largely unaffected whereas those with lower involvement and sophistication showed to be
demobilized (see also Jackson, 2010; de Vreese, 2005). This can also be seen to be in line
with some of the original claims of Kurt and Gladys Lang (1966) who also suspected the
inadvertent part of the audience to be most negatively affected. Furthermore, in cross-national
perspective, the effects of strategy news on cynicism can also depend on the respective
country context. As Schuck, Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2013) have shown in a
comparative study including 27 countries, the effects of strategy news might be more
pronounced in countries in which the quality of government is high and baseline cynicism is
low.
In line with these findings regarding the effect of strategy news on cynicism, Rhee
(1997) found that strategy news bolster participants’ strategic interpretations of an election
campaign. But what are the consequences of this? The link between strategic news and public
cynicism is assumed to have important implications for modern democracy since other
research suggests that higher levels of cynicism can - in turn - alienate people from politics,
reduce learning, erode civic engagement and can result in lower levels of participation in the
political process or confidence in government (see e.g., Cappella and Jamieson, 1997;
Patterson, 1993, 2002; Valentino, Buhr, and Beckmann, 2001; Valentino, Beckmann, and
Buhr, 2001). In light of such findings, Patterson (1993) concluded that “election news, rather
than serving to bring candidates and voters together, drives a wedge between them” (p. 52).
However, the view that cynicism fuels political disengagement has been challenged by
other research which suggests that citizens might well become more cynical by the way media
frame politics but this cynicism could also be seen as an indication of a kind of critical
citizenship which does not inevitably let people turn away from politics (Elenbaas and de
Vreese, 2008; de Vreese and Semetko, 2002; de Vreese, 2004, 2005). Indeed, other research
also stressed that strategic framing can also increase audience interest and provide useful
information to citizens (e.g., Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 2008). Fu, Mou, Miller and Jalette
(2011) support the notion that political involvement is positively associated with political
cynicism. In line with this evidence, other research has shown that cynicism can, for example,
contribute to public support for referendums. Thus, citizens who are cynical and lost
confidence in traditional party politics do not necessarily become politically disengaged but
can remain committed to democratic practices. They might even be especially supportive of
alternative democratic means such as referendums (see Schuck and de Vreese, 2015). This
provides indirect support for the perspective that cynicism does not have to be detrimental to
political participation as such. Citizens who feel cynical about traditional party politics may
embrace alternative means of political participation and engagement, as is the case in a
referendum vote, because for them it represents an opportunity to have an unfiltered and more
direct say with a concrete outcome, i.e. bypassing those standard political practices and
processes they are cynical of. If - and to what extent - such participation which is driven by
cynical attitudes is rather resembling a sort of protest vote that is not based on the actual issue

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
9
at stake and susceptible to considerations which are not rooted in political deliberation and
informed decision-making, such as “punishing” the incumbent government, is yet another
question.
The way in which strategy frames have been conceptualized and operationalized in
previous research differ significantly and different studies sometimes use terms such as
strategy frame, game frame or horse-race frame interchangeably while others stress that there
are conceptual differences (for a good overview see Aalberg et al., 2012). Horse-race news,
for example, i.e. news coverage focusing on public opinion polls, can also be seen as
stimulating attention and condensing relevant information which is useful to voters (Irwin and
Van Holsteyn, 2008). However, while horse-race framing is often - yet, not always -
distinguished empirically from strategy framing, game framing often is not. Schuck et al.
(2013) showed that in the context of the 2009 European parliamentary elections strategy
framing was far more prominent than horse-race framing. Furthermore, one indicator often
used to measure strategy framing in many content analytic studies, i.e. ‘the use of war
language’, is conceptually more closely related to game framing. As suggested by Aalberg et
al. (2012), while game and strategy framing might well be closely related and could be seen
as two dimensions of a larger strategic game frame, their conceptual distinction is still
important as both these dimensions can be expected to cause different effects. Strategy
framing with its focus on a politicians’ or parties’ representational style and motivations is
more likely to spark cynical responses while game and horse-race framing could also be
expected to spark interest and attention, even though there are different views on this issue
(see Valentino et al., 2001a, 2001b) and horse-race framing has also been shown to turn
voters off and to decrease participation (Lengauer and Höller, 2012).
While most of the original research regarding the presence and effects of strategic
news has been conducted in the US, more and more research from outside the US has been
reported on. For example, political alienation and a lack of public involvement both are
problems particularly well known to the European Union (EU). Ever since the first European
parliamentary elections were held in 1979 turnout rates have been steadily declining. We
know from studies of national election campaigns in, for example, Britain, Germany and the
Netherlands, or of the 2009 European election campaign in all EU member states, that
strategic news reporting is common in election news coverage also outside of the U.S. (e.g.,
Schuck et al., 2013). Furthermore, in a European context, research has shown how
strategically framed news coverage can foster cynicism towards the EU which in turn can
affect vote choice in EU integration referenda among certain segments of the electorate (de
Vreese and Elenbaas, 2008). Jackson (2011) showed that strategy news in British media
coverage about the EU was about equally prominent as substantial issue coverage and did
affect issue-specific cynicism. In a Danish referendum context strategy news was prominent
in the media and did increase cynicism but without consequences for turnout, which remained
high (de Vreese and Semetko, 2002).
The Role of Negativity and Conflict
There are different types of negativity in the news (for an overview see e.g., Lengauer, Esser,
and Berganza, 2011). While Robinson (1976) in his original study focused primarily on
negativity, conflict and violence as detrimental factors behind the “videomalaise” subsequent
research primarily focused on strategic news in election coverage as the driving force
fostering public cynicism. However, also Cappella and Jamieson (1996) stress the role of
“conflict-oriented frames” in activating public cynicism, even though they focus on the effects
of strategy news in their empirical studies. Regarding the tonality of news, research has

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
10
investigated the impact of the (positive or negative) tonality of political news on audiences.
Druckman and Parkin (2005), for example, documented the impact of the tone of news
coverage on voters. Ceron and Memoli (2015) document effects of pro- or antigovernment
media slant on trust in government. Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof and Oegema (2006) show how
negative news can also cause a so-called sleeper effect, i.e. they do not only have short-term
behavioral effects (e.g., on vote choice) but over time can also negatively affect underlying
attitudes such as trust in politicians and thus indirectly affect and depress turnout in the long
run. Another important feature of news coverage cited by Robinson (1976) is what he
describes as an excessive focus on political conflict (see also Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).
Research has focused on the role of negative campaign advertising and the behavioral
consequences of conflict in the news, often yielding contradictory evidence for either
mobilizing or demobilizing effects. Early findings suggested that negative campaign ads with
their excessive focus on attacks between political opponents would be demobilizing for
citizens. This view has been challenged soon afterwards (e.g., Finkel and Geer, 1998) and
more recent accounts (e.g., Brooks and Geer, 2007) suggest a slight but consistent mobilizing
influence of negative attack ads. This might mainly be due to these attacks being more
attention grabbing and arousing and thus carrying the potential to increase attention, interest
and the perceived relevance of what is at stake (see e.g., Finkel and Geer, 1998). However, a
lot of these contradictions and inconsistencies in previous research seem to be attributable to
different conceptualizations of negativity (see e.g., Sigelman and Kugler, 2003). While there
is empirical support for the idea that negativity in campaigns mobilize citizens, previous
research has stressed the importance to take a more nuanced look at what type of negativity
causes what types of – mobilizing or demobilizing – effects, why, and for whom (see e.g.,
Brooks and Geer, 2007; Mutz and Reeves, 2005). Other research has shown that the
individual perception of negativity also matters (see also Sigelman and Kugler, 2003) and
depends on pre-existing attitudes and that positive news coverage, supporting a referendum
proposal, can be perceived as negative by opponents and mobilize them to turn out and vote
against it (Schuck and de Vreese, 2009).
Conflict framing is another prominent feature in news coverage prominently present
both in election coverage (e.g., Neuman et al., 1992; Schuck et al., 2013) as well as in regular
political coverage (e.g., de Vreese, 2005). Previous research has established a link between
conflict framing in news reporting and citizens’ level of engagement (e.g., Patterson, 1993,
2002). The news report elections with a special emphasis on conflict between political parties
and actors. Also outside electoral contexts discussing politics in terms of conflict has become
a standard practice and has for example been shown to depress policy support (Vliegenthart et
al., 2008). Along with the findings of these studies, there is a debate on the normative
implications of the consequences the way news media frame politics and on the quality and
function of election coverage more generally. A lot of this research has focused on the
presumed negative consequences of the way journalists frame elections merely as conflict-
laden contests between actors (e.g., Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Robinson, 1976). However,
disagreement, conflict, and differences of opinion between political actors are natural part of
democratic decision-making. They should not be judged as inherently negative from a
normative viewpoint because conflict also shows that there is something at stake and
something to choose from (de Vreese, 2005). Previous research has identified conflict as a
prominent news value as it attracts audience interest and thus makes it more likely for a story
to be covered in an increasingly competitive media market (Neuman, Just, and Crigler, 1992).
Not surprisingly, previous content analytic studies report conflict frames to be a prominent
standard ingredient of political news coverage (Schuck et al., 2013). Focusing on

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
11
disagreement or actual conflict between political actors does not, per se, have to be negative
as it can contribute to meet professional standards of balanced reporting (e.g., Neuman et al.,
1992) and serve to alert citizens that there is something at stake and inform about viable
alternatives on contested issues. Thus, conflict in the news can both have negative effects on,
for example, policy support, but also be engaging as it serves to highlight the differences
between political actors and thereby adds relevance and importance to an issue. Another
reason for why conflict can mobilize is provided by, for example, Sigelman and Kugler (2003,
p.146) who state that it may take: “a loud barrage of brutal attacks to break through the
public’s wall of inattention, for anything less than that is likely to pass through largely
unnoticed”.
Assuming that conflict news is important for citizen engagement recent research also
investigated the factors that explain variation in the degree to which election news coverage
focuses on conflict. Interestingly, it turns out that we are better able to explain variation in the
degree of conflict in news coverage than other typical content features of election coverage
(such as strategy framing, horse-race coverage or meta coverage). A comparative study
around the 2009 European parliamentary elections in 27 countries has shown that conflict
framing in election news is, for example, more prominent in certain media outlets (i.e.
broadsheets and public broadcasting) and political systems (i.e. with proportional
representation) and also depends on other factors such as public opinion or the co-occurrence
of simultaneous elections (Schuck et al., 2013). As such, conflict is an inherent feature of
politics and democracy, i.e. different ideas and suggested solutions to problems compete for
public approval and precede compromise and consensus. Previous research has shown that the
presence of conflict may contribute to citizens’ political participation (see e.g., Schuck,
Vliegenthart, and de Vreese, 2016).
However, this is one side of the issue - but there also is another. Kleinnijenhuis et al.
(2006: 93) showed that exposure to conflict oriented news, that is news “in which a politician
of a certain party is criticized or supported by another actor or in which a politician of a
certain party criticizes or supports another actor” can also lead to public distrust which in turn
has the potential to depress turnout. Conflicts can take very different shapes and be sparking
different reactions which is why it is important to consider different types of conflict, such as
conflict about substantial issues and conflict about personality. It can be more or less negative
or confrontational and it can either be one-sided or two-sided. Each of these distinctions bears
relevance regarding the possible effects of exposure to political conflict on subsequent citizen
engagement and attitudes. While conflict as such can be engaging and increase levels of
interest, some types of more extreme conflict, such as incivility, with its inherent focus on
negative affect between actors might not only be engaging but can also damage citizens’ trust
in politics (Mutz and Reeves, 2005). Incivility is different from disagreement or conflict in
that it tries to discredit the other viewpoint on a personal level and with more aggressive tone
(see Brooks and Geer, 2007). Such negative personal attacks might be particularly engaging,
as they should attract most attention, but they should also be most damaging in terms of
resulting cynicism or mistrust in politicians (see Mutz and Reeves, 2005). Given that more
severe types of conflict are characterized by “the development of repulsion, the dissolution of
perceived homophily (similarity) and the increased perception of incompatible differences,
the loss of credibility and the development of disrespect” (McCroskey and Wheeless, 1976:
247) it is reasonable to assume that such type of conflict, such as incivility, can contribute to
cynical perceptions about politics. Indeed, other research has shown that incivility (as
compared to disagreement and conflict) in the news can increase cynicism because it
decreased the perceived likelihood that politicians will find a solution to the problem the

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
12
conflict is about (Schuck and Otto, 2016). Thus, overall, whereas the claim that different
types of conflict matter differently for citizen engagement and attitudes towards politics
appears plausible, the question which types of conflict exactly have what kind of effects, and
why, and how they relate to another, still needs more attention by future research.
The Role of Political Entertainment
In 1985 Neil Postman warned about “amusing ourselves to death” in what has been a critical
and fierce accusation of television news as a sort of entertainment programming in which
politics had ceased to be about substantive issues and more about presentational style. Over
the last years, sparked by ever new alternative news and entertainment formats, there has been
a proliferation of studies, specifically studying the effects of these different formats, again
asking the question that was already at the core of traditional media malaise research and that
has been cited here before: are the media to blame for fueling public cynicism and political
disaffection – or just the opposite, do media help to create a more knowledgeable and engaged
citizenry?
Repeating this same question here again helps to understand the unusual breadth of
media malaise research and how it picks up current (and likely future) trends and
developments in the media without becoming outdated simply because its core concern is
right at the heart of a lot of political communication research more generally. The general
potential of political entertainment programs to affect politically relevant outcomes by now
seems undisputed. Late-night comedy shows, for example, have been shown to affect salience
of caricatured character traits of politicians and candidate perceptions, political issue
perceptions as well as political attitudes and behaviors. However, much in line with other
areas of media malaise research, studies are still ambiguous about the either positive or
negative direction of these effects on audiences. Some emphasize the positive effects on issue
knowledge and attention for political topics among those least interested in politics and
conclude that these formats can contribute to political learning. Others are more critical with
regard to the type of knowledge acquired and warn of the negative impact of political humor
on, for example, political cynicism (Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). In this perspective, the
inherent negativity of a lot of political humor and entertainment programs may “(…) breed or
reinforce a certain cynicism about government and politics” (p.332) leading to potential
negative democratic effects. As a result of these conflicting results a debate has emerged
discussing the normative implications of political entertainment programs for society and
democracy. However, as previous research has shown, and again much in line with other
areas of media malaise research (see above), it is not unlikely for political entertainment
programs to have effects that are normatively positive or negative at the same time
(Baumgartner and Morris, 2006). Shah (1998), importantly, adds nuance to this discussion by
stressing the need to consider the actual content of media coverage and, for example,
distinguish between different media formats and genres. Guggenheim, Kwak and Campbell
(2011) find negative effects of satirical news programs on systemic cynicism and of comedy
talk shows, cable opinion news and satirical news on trust in politicians. However, here again
other research stresses the need to take a nuanced look. As Hoffman and Thomson (2009)
showed late-night TV can also have a positive effect on civic participation among younger
viewers, partly because of increased levels of political efficacy. Moy and Scheufele (2000),
for example, find positive effects of political entertainment on social trust while watching TV
news undermined trust, however, in their study political entertainment refers to situation

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
13
comedies focused on friendship specifically. As this example illustrates, it is indeed
important, also with regard to political entertainment programs, to consider the particular
content and format of the program in question in order to make sense of the findings.
Future developments
Current research is well on its way to add further nuance to the study of the effects of news
coverage on cynicism and (dis-)engagement. Adding this nuance to the rather broad question
which is underlying a lot of media malaise research should also guide future research, as it
bears the promise to come to terms with and to better understand seemingly conflicting
evidence from past research. There has been a lot of progress in this regard by recent research.
We see more cross-national comparative studies encompassing an increasingly wide array of
countries and regions looking at the prominence of strategy framing in different election
campaigns. Studies have begun to disentangle both the multi-dimensionality of political
cynicism (e.g. regarding the political system, politicians, processes, the media) as well as the
operationalization of strategy (or game or horse-race or conflict) framing with more
theoretical scrutiny and the ambition to discriminate related concepts from each other which is
both a needed and a promising contribution to the field. This can also improve the theoretical
and conceptual match between the kind of news content we study and the effects we observe.
Importantly, there is increasing interest in the conditionality of the effects of strategy
framing but also conflict news or other types of negativity on cynicism, engagement and other
relevant variables. Indeed, there still is a lot to gain from looking not only at (more)
individual-level factors which condition these effects but also by looking at relevant
contextual (e.g., country-specific) factors which influence if and to what extent the same
content can have different effects in different contexts. This will be an exciting challenge for
future cross-national and/or comparative research.
Furthermore, we still know only little about the underlying mediating processes which
account for the positive and/or negative effects of different types of news coverage (e.g.,
negativity, conflict, strategy, horse-race) on different types of relevant attitudes and behaviors,
such as cynicism and engagement or participation. Why does such news affect audiences?
There are several theoretical considerations in the literature with the potential to shed more
light on the exact mechanisms behind these effects but we still need to invest more efforts to
spell these out and put them to test empirically. The same is true with regard to studying the
duration of these (positive and negative) effects and the conditions under which these are
amplified or cancel each other.
Does media coverage contribute to widespread cynicism and political disaffection or
does it foster learning and civic engagement? There is no easy or clear-cut answer to this
question. Both processes can take place at the same time, depending on specific program
types, the exact contents of the information, individual characteristics of the audience member
who processes that information and the context in which it is received in. Changes in the
media landscape and in media use behavior also need to be considered, including changes in
the way news are received online and processed, e.g. the different uses of political
information on social networking sites. Currently there still is only scarce evidence on how
social media use contributes to cynicism and/or engagement but first evidence suggests that
especially younger citizens become more engaged by frequent social media use (Holt et al.,
2013) or at least not more cynical. Studying online communication and its effects on cynicism

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
14
and engagement poses natural challenges for researchers given the variety of different
information formats and content characteristics and the subtle differences even within broader
categories (such as social networking sites) as well as the constant development of new forms
of (social) media formats and content. This again stresses the need to take a more nuanced
look at the respective information formats and content before arriving at broader
generalizations. It also means researchers need to consider different user characteristics (such
as user background characteristics and motives to use social media) when aiming to explain
conditional effects of (social) media use on cynicism and/or engagement. Finally, both the
antecedents as well as the consequences of cynicism, as central concept in this field of
research, need to be further investigated both theoretically as well as empirically. Overall, the
question if, how and under what conditions different types of news content contribute to either
cynicism and disaffection or knowledge and engagement, or both simultaneously, remains of
central importance in our field and still offers a lot of exciting research opportunities.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
15
SEE ALSO: Cultivation: Idea, Topical Fields and Methodology; Cultivation Theory: Effects
and Underlying Processes; Knowledge Gap: History and Development (incl. Types of
Knowledge); Framing as Multi-Level Process (incl. Definitions); Framing: Media Frames;
Framing: Audience Frames; News Values: Audience Effects (Exposure and Cognitions);
Differential Susceptibility to Media Effects Model (Valkenburg & Peter); Content Effects:
Political Communication; Content Effects: Political Campaign Communication; Content
Effects: Entertainment; Audience Effects: Journalists/Journalism; Media Representation:
Politics; Civic Engagement Through Media; Entertainment Effects: Political Outcomes;
Involvement with Media Content; Attention/Awareness

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
16
References
Aalberg, T., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C.H. (2012). The framing of politics as
strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism,
13(2), 162-178.
Aarts, K., & Semetko, H.A. (2003). The divided electorate: Media use and political
involvement. Journal of Politics, 65(3), 759-784.
Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J.S. (2006). The Daily Show Effect: Candidate
evaluations, efficacy, and American Youth. American Politics Research, 34, 341-367.
Bennett, S.E., Rhine, S., Flickinger,R.S., & Bennett, L.L.M. (1999). "Video Malaise"
Revisited Public Trust in the Media and Government. The International Journal of
Press/Politics, 4(4), 8-23.
Blumler, J.G. (1997). Origins of the Crisis of Communication for Citizenship.
Political Communication, 14(4), 395-404.
Brants, K. (2013). Trust, Cynicism, and Responsiveness. In: Rethinking Journalism:
Trust and Participation in a Transformed Media Landscape, pp. 15-27, ed. C. Peters and M.
Broersma, Routledge: London and New York.
Brants, K., de Vreese, C.H., Möller, J., & van Praag, P. (2010). The real spiral of
cynicism? Symbiosis and mistrust between politicians and journalists. International Journal
of Press/Politics, 15(1), 25-40.
Brooks, D. J., & Geer, J.G. (2007). Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the
electorate. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 1-16.
Cappella, J., & Jamieson, K. (1996). News frames, political cynicism, and media cynicism.
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 546, 71-84.
Cappella, J. & Jamieson, K. (1997) Spiral of cynicism. The press and the public good.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Cappella, J. (2002). Cynicism and Social Trust in the New Media Environment.
Journal of Communication, 52, 229-241.
Citrin, J., & Muste, C. (1999). Trust in Government. In J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver, &
L.S. Wrightsman, Measures of Political Attitudes, San Diego, CA.
Elenbaas, M., & De Vreese, C.H. (2008). The effects of strategic news coverage on
political cynicism and vote choice among young voters. Journal of Communication, 58(3),
550-567.
Ceron, A., & Memoli, V. (2015). Trust in government and media slant: A cross-
sectional analysis of media effects in Twenty-Seven European countries. The International
Journal of Press/Politics, 20(3), 339-359.
Curran, J., Coen, S., Soroka, S., Aalberg, T., Hayashi, K., Hichy, Z., Iyengar, S.,
Jones, Pl., & Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Reconsidering ‘virtuous circle’ and ‘media malaise’
theories of the media: An 11-nation study. Journalism, 15(7), 815-833.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
17
Dahlgren, P. (1995). Television and the public sphere: Citizenship, democracy and the
media (Vol. 10). Sage.
de Vreese, C.H., & Boomgaarden, H. (2006). News, political knowledge and
participation: The differential effects of news media exposure on political knowledge and
participation. Acta Politica, 41, 317-341.
de Vreese, C.H. (2005). The spiral of cynicism reconsidered. European Journal of
Communication 20(3), 283-301.
de Vreese, C. H. (2004). The Effects of Strategic News on Political Cynicism, Issue
Evaluations and Policy Support: A Two-Wave Experiment. Mass Communication and Society
7(2), 191–215.
de Vreese, C. H. & Semetko, H. (2002). Cynical and Engaged: Strategic Campaign
Coverage, Public Opinion and Mobilization in a Referendum. Communication Research
29(6), 615–41.
Druckman, J. N., & Parkin, M. (2005). The impact of media bias: How editorial slant
affects voters. Journal of Politics, 67(4), 1030-1049.
Fallows, J. (1996). Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American
Democracy. New York: Pantheon Books.
Finkel, S.E., & Geer, J.G. (1998). A spot check: Casting doubt on the demobilizing
effect of attack advertising. American Journal of Political Science, 42(2), 573-95.
Fu, H., Mou, Y., Miller, M.J., & Jalette, G. (2011). Reconsidering political cynicism
and political involvement: A test of antecedents. American Communication Journal, 13(2),
44-61.
Guggenheim, L., Kwak, N., & Campbell, S.W. (2011). Nontraditional News
Negativity: The Relationship of Entertaining Political News Use to Political Cynicism and
Mistrust. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 23(3), 287-314.
Hoffman, L.H., & Thomson, T.L. (2009). The effect of television viewing on
adolescents’ civic participation: Political efficacy as a mediating mechanism. Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 53(1), 3-21.
Holt, K., Shehata, A., Strömbäck, J., & Ljungberg, E. (2013). Age and the effects of
news media attention and social media use on political interest and participation: Do social
media function as leveller? European Journal of Communication, 28(1), 19-34.
Hopmann, D., Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2015). Contagious media effects: How
media use and exposure to game-framed news influences media trust. Mass Communication
and Society, 18, 776-798.
Irwin, G. A., & Van Holsteyn, J. J. (2008). What are they waiting for? Strategic
information for late deciding voters. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 20(4),
483-493.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
18
Jackson, D. (2010). Strategic media, cynical public? Examining the contingent effects
of strategic news frames on political cynicism in the United Kingdom. International Journal
of Press/Politics, 16(1), 75-101.
Jackson, D. (2011). Strategic news frames and public policy debates: Press and
television news coverage of the euro in the UK. Communications, 36, 169-193.
Kaase, M. (2000). Germany. In: Democracy and the media: a comparative
perspective, ed. R. Gunther and A. Mughan. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kleinnijenhuis, J., van Hof, A.M.J., & Oegema, D. (2006). Negative news and the
sleeper effect of distrust. International Journal of Press/Politics, 11(2), 86-104.
Lang, K., & Lang, G. E. (1966). The mass media and voting. Reader in Public
Opinion and Communication, 2, 455-472.
Lengauer, G., & Höller, I. (2012). Turning Voters on? Effects of News Frame
Exposure on Voter Mobilization in the 2008 Austrian Elections. Mass Communication &
Journalism, 2, 137.
Lengauer, G., Esser, F., & Berganza, R. (2011). Negativity in political news: A review
of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism, 13(2), 1-24.
McCroskey, J., & Wheeless, L. (1976). An introduction to human communication.
Boston, M.A.: Allyn and Bacon.
Miller, A.H. (1974). Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970. American Political
Science Review, 68(3), 951-972.
Miller, A.H., & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political Parties and Confidence in Government:
A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. British Journal of Political Science,
20(3), 357-386.
Moy, P., & Scheufele, D.A. (2000).Media Effects on Political and Social Trust.
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 77(4), 744–759.
Mutz, D. & Reeves, B. (2005). The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility
on Political Trust. American Political Science Review, 99(1), 1-15.
Neuman, W. R., Just, M.R., & Crigler, A.N. (1992). Common knowledge. News and
the construction of political meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Newton, K. (1999). Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise? British
Journal of Political Science, 27, 577-599.
Norris, P. (2000). A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial
societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Patterson, T. (1993). Out of Order. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Patterson, T. (2002). The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of
Uncertainty. New York: Alfred Knopf.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
19
Pedersen, R.T. (2012). The game frame and political efficacy: Beyond the spiral of
cynicism. European Journal of Communication, 27(3), 225-240.
Postman, N. (1985). Entertaining Ourselves to Death. New York: Viking.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social
capital in America. PS: Political Science and Politics, 28, 664-683.
Rhee, J. (1997). Strategy and Issue Frames in Election Campaign Coverage: A Social
Cognitive Account of Framing Effects. Journal of Communication, 47(3), 26–48.
Robinson, M. (1976). Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise:
The Case of “The Selling of the President”. American Political Science Review 70(3), 409–
32. Schmitt-Beck, R. (2015). Struggling up the hill: Short-term effects of parties’
contacting, political news and everyday talks on turnout. Party Politics, 22(2), 227-240.
Schuck, A. & de Vreese, C.H. (2009). Reversed mobilization in referendum
campaigns: How positive news framing can mobilize the skeptics. The International Journal
of Press/Politics 14(1), 40-66.
Schuck, A., & de Vreese, C.H. (2015). Public Support for Referendums in Europe: A
cross-national comparison in 21 countries. Electoral Studies, 38, 149-158.
Schuck, A., & Otto, L. (2016). Disagreement is not conflict is not incivility? The
effect of different types of political conflict in the news on political cynicism and
participation. Paper accepted for presentation at the Annual Meetings of the International
Communication Association (ICA), Fukuoka, Japan.
Schuck, A.R.T., Vliegenthart, R., Boomgaarden, H., Elenbaas, M., Azrout, R., van
Spanje, J., & de Vreese, C.H. (2013). Explaining campaign news coverage: How medium,
time and context explain variation in the media framing of the 2009 European Parliamentary
elections. Journal of Political Marketing, 12(1), 8-28.
Schuck, A.R.T., Vliegenthart, R., & de Vreese, C.H. (2016). Who’s afraid of conflict?
The mobilizing effect of conflict framing in campaign news. British Journal of Political
Science. 46(1), 177-194.
Schuck, A.R.T., Boomgaarden, H., & de Vreese, C.H. (2013). Cynics all around? The
impact of election news on political cynicism in comparative perspective. Journal of
Communication, 63(2), 287-311.
Shah, D.V. (1998). Civic engagement, interpersonal trust, and television use: an
individual-level assessment of social capital. Political Psychology, 19(3), 469–496.
Shehata, A. (2014). Game Frames, Issue Frames, and Mobilization: Disentangling the
Effects of Frame Exposure and Motivated News Attention on Political Cynicism and
Engagement. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 26(2), 157-177.
Sigelman, L., & Kugler, M. (2003). Why is research on the effects of negative
campaigning so inconclusive? Understanding citizens’ perceptions of negativity. The Journal
of Politics, 65, 142-160.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
20
Strömbäck, J., & Dimitrova, D.V. (2006). Political and Media Systems Matter A
Comparison of Election News Coverage in Sweden and the United States. The International
Journal of Press/Politics, 11(4), 131-147.
Strömbäck, J., Djerf-Pierre, M., & Shehata, A. (2016). A question if time? A
longitudinal analysis of the relationship between news media consumption and political trust.
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(1), 88-110.
Tsfati, Y., & Cappella, J. (2003). Do People Watch what they Do Not Trust?
Exploring the Association between News Media Skepticism and Exposure. Communication
Research, 30(5), 504-529.
Tworzecki, H., & Semetko, H. (2012). Media use and political engagement in three
new democracies: Malaise versus Mobilization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 17(4), 407-432.
Valentino, N., Beckmann, M. & Buhr, T. (2001). A spiral of cynicism for some: The
contingent effects of campaign news frames on participation and confidence in government.
Political Communication, 18, 347-367.
Valentino, N., A. Buhr, & Beckmann, M. (2001). When the frame is the game:
Revisiting the impact of “strategic” campaign coverage on citizens’ information retention.
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 78, 93–112.
Vliegenthart, R., Schuck, A., Boomgaarden, H. & de Vreese, C.H. (2008). News
coverage and support for European integration, 1990-2006. International Journal of Public
Opinion Research, 20 (4), 415-439.
Weaver, P.H. (1972). Is television news biased? The Public Interest, 26, 57-74.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
21
Further Reading
Avery, J.M. (2009). Videomalaise or Virtuous Circle? The Influence of the News
Media on Political Trust. International Journal of Press/Politics, 14(4), 410-433.
Hanson, G., Haridakis, P.M., Cunningham, A.W., Sharma, R., & Ponder, D. (2010).
The 2008 Presidential Campaign: Political Cynicism in the Age of Facebook, MySpace, and
YouTube. Mass Communication and Society, 13(5), 584-607.
Schuck, A.R.T., Boomgaarden, H., & de Vreese, C.H. (2013). Cynics all around? The
impact of election news on political cynicism in comparative perspective. Journal of
Communication, 63(2), 287-311.
Strömbäck, J., & Shehata, A. (2010). Media Malaise or a virtuous circle? Exploring
the causal relationships between news media exposure, political news attention and political
interest. European Journal of Political Research, 49, 575-597.
de Vreese, C.H. (2007). A Spiral of Euroscepticism: The Media’s Fault? Acta Politica,
42, 271-286.

Media Malaise and Political Cynicism
22
Brief Biography
Andreas R. T. Schuck is an Associate Professor for Political Communication at the
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) at the University of Amsterdam,
the Netherlands. His research focuses on media effects on political opinions, attitudes, and
behavior. He is currently working on a research project about the (de-)mobilizing role of
emotions in political communication. His work has been published in international peer-
reviewed journals such as Journal of Communication, Political Communication,
Communication Research, European Union Politics, British Journal of Political Science,
European Journal of Political Research, Electoral Studies, International Journal of
Press/Politics, International Journal of Public Opinion Research.