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... Essa visão, denominada "pessimismo cultural" [Kulturpessimismus] (Cf. KALBERG, 1987;SEIDMAN, 1983), teve implicações políticas importantes para o desenvolvimento da ideologia nazista e foi descrita por Fritz Stern (1974) como responsável por gerar uma "política do desespero cultural". ...
Este artigo investiga as conexões entre o pessimismo cultural de Max Weber e sua defesa de um Presidente forte na República de Weimar, reformulando a tese de Wolfgang Mommsen, que aponta uma continuidade entre as justificativas de Weber e Carl Schmitt para a concentração de poder no líder político. Ao examinar a genealogia das categorias weberianas e sua influência no desenho institucional da Constituição de Weimar, argumentamos que sua defesa da autoridade carismática refletiu um diagnóstico existencial sobre as possibilidades de atribuição de sentido à vida diante de um processo de burocratização e racionalização percebido como inevitável. Por fim, exploramos a dimensão trágica do pensamento de Weber, especialmente em “A Política como Vocação”, enfatizando suas reflexões sobre as consequências não intencionadas da ação política e a responsabilidade ética dos líderes frente às contingências históricas.
... The sense of technological war (and gruesome victory of technology) was perhaps most dramatically, and prophetically expressed in Georg Kaiser's stage trilogy Die Koralle (1917), Gas 1 (1918), and Gas 2 (1920). See the discussion in (Stern 1965) and the brief reflection on Kaiser's influence on Thea von Harbour and Fritz Lang's Metropolis in (Gittleman 1979). 42 Cf. ...
Martin Buber’s writings on technology are scarce and seemingly subordinated to what he described in I and Thou as the “tyranny of the It”. But a closer look at his writings reveals, in fact, a life-long reflection on the dialogical potentiality of things—whether artworks, buildings, or machines—that echoed broader discourses on technology at the time. Beginning with Julius Goldstein’s Die Technik (1912), which Buber edited for his series Die Gesellschaft, and concluding with Buber’s reception and critique of Heidegger, especially during the 1950s, we can see that Buber critically engaged with the question of technology with respect to labor and community, art and artisanship, and the ethics of thinghood. The essay contextualizes Buber’s repeated call to “humanize technology” in early 20th-century debates on technology and in the post-1945 crisis of humanism. What it argues is that Buber framed technology not only through its aesthetic potential, as Werk, but also as another form of solidarity and care without which community and respect for our environment would not be possible.
... 1849-1914(Beck: München 1995. 8 Fritz Stern, The Politics Of Cultural Despair; A Study In The Rise Of The Germanic Ideology, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961, 1963; George L. Mosse, The crisis of German ideology: intellectual origins of the Third Reich (New York: Schocken Books, 1964 ' Merkur, 5, 1981, pp. 478-487. ...
In the German-speaking world, the memory of the Reformation has often been closely connected to the theory of German historical exceptionalism, the idea that Germany’s historical development took a ‘special path’ (Sonderweg) to modernity. Yet considering how much attention has been paid to the question of a German Sonderweg and the significance of Weimar as a turning point in the story, scholars have paid little attention to the ideology of exceptionalism in the Weimar Republic itself. This article contributes to the historiography of the Sonderweg debate by examining the complex ways in which the poet Hugo Ball (1886-1927) and the philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) traced a narrative of German exceptionalism back to the Reformation era. It argues that these writers appealed to the intellectual and political legacies of the Reformation in an attempt to explain the formative events of their own time: the First World War, and the Russian and German Revolutions. The divergent ideological conclusions they drew reveals much about the conflicted atmosphere of Weimar thought, in which German intellectuals struggled to bridge the gap between crisis and tradition.
... 22 For a qualified defence of the Sonderweg concept, which takes into account the criticism levelled against it, see Kocka (1988). Considered in retrospect, however, the products of the Sonderweg approach-broadly understood-in the field of intellectual history (Krieger, 1957;Stern, 1961;Sontheimer, 1962;Mosse, 1964) come across as particularly unfruitful and repetitive. 23 Peukert's historical account of the Weimar Republic is, by far, superior to the more recent one authored by Nolte (2006). ...
... A carta que publicou em 1862 no Courier an der Werer ("The Bremen Letter"), o ensaio "Whithin Philo-Semitism" de 1887 e o apocalíptico "The Testament of an Anti-Semite" de 1891, não se limitaram a introduzir um termo novo na opinião pública, mas a fazer nascer um movimento político-social contra os judeus (ZIMMERMANN, 1987 É por isso que os historiadores dão conta de um crescente radicalismo de Wagner contra os judeus, provavelmente acicatado pelos textos de Wilhelm Marr e pela influência da sua segunda mulher (a filha do compositor Franz Liszt) 1 : "Wagner deixou de desejar a assimilação dos judeus pela sociedade alemã e passou a pretender a sua exclusão" (EVANS, 2005;MOSSE, 1999;STERN, 1974;FRØLAND, 2020). ...
___________________________________________________________________________________ Resumo: Este artigo começa por defender que a história é um esforço contínuo de fazer avançar o conhecimento presente através de perguntas ao passado para depois colocar em perspectiva a função do tempo. São utilizadas perspectivas comparadas com alguns filmes de ficção científica não tanto para estabelecer inexistentes pontos de contacto com a realidade, mas apenas como recurso narrativo para reposicionar a história na sua centralidade: o conhecimento histórico é importante não porque o passado pode ser mudado, ou porque se repete, mas pela importância determinante que pode ter para interpretar o presente. Os historiadores sabem que a história não se repete, mas podem olhar para filmes como o Interstellar como desafios para renovar o seu ofício de reinterpretação do conhecimento histórico sabendo que o passado em si continuará a ser o que foi: uma descoberta sem tempo concreto. Não se pode mudar a ascensão do nazismo nem se pode evitar a derrocada da União Soviética e a transformação das dinâmicas do mundo contemporâneo, mas podemos, e devemos, questionar o tempo em que as coisas aconteceram e, acima de tudo, como aconteceram. É esse o objectivo deste artigo, sugerir que a imobilização do que aconteceu no seu tempo concreto representa um desafio para a sua revisitação e reinterpretação e assim fazer avançar o conhecimento histórico presente. Palavras-chave: História. Ficção Científica. Tempo. Nazismo. União Soviética. ___________________________________________________________________________________ Introdução As perguntas parecem estúpidas o suficiente para serem ignoradas, mas continuamos a ouvi-las assobiar sobre as novas cabeças como o martelo de Thor: podemos mudar o passado? O passado pode repetir-se? Não levem a mal, mas perguntem ao Cooper (Mattew McConaughey). Depois de mergulhar no buraco negro Gargântua, a estrela do filme Interstellar tornou-se no primeiro ser humano habilitado a responder a essa pergunta, na medida que conseguiu compreender que o tempo pode ser interpretado em diferentes dimensões físicas, e susceptíveis de algum tipo de interacção. Pode então o passado ser mudado? É cedo para (não) responder à pergunta, mas quando o realizador Christopher Nolan começa por colocar Cooper por detrás da estante (dentro da estante) do quarto da filha, o que está a fazer é sufocar o espectador com a dor com que o condena a ser
... 22 For a qualified defence of the Sonderweg concept, which takes into account the criticism levelled against it, see Kocka (1988). Considered in retrospect, however, the products of the Sonderweg approach-broadly understood-in the field of intellectual history (Krieger, 1957;Stern, 1961;Sontheimer, 1962;Mosse, 1964) come across as particularly unfruitful and repetitive. 23 Peukert's historical account of the Weimar Republic is, by far, superior to the more recent one authored by Nolte (2006). ...
... For example : Julius Langbehn (1851-1907, in order to emphasize that he was not corrupted by 'Jewish, academic science' , demanded the possibility of renouncing his doctoral degree. As the Head of the University opposed his decision, he sent him a torn diploma and did not invoke his historical education ever again 11 . Not all researchers who shared the Völkisch views in whole or in part were that radical. ...
... This approach was especially damaging to antipositivist argument& since most of these thinkers had arisen in a German-speaking context and could therefore be associated with the narrative of German exceptionalism, according to which Nazism was a product of irrationalist trends in the German philosophical tradition (e.g. Stern 1961;Mosse 1964); see also Steinmetz 1997a).42 ...
... First, we have seen this problem before in the extremist politics of the twentieth century among the young people who became anarchists, Bolsheviks, fascists, or members of the Bader-Meinhof gang (ibid., 11). As Frits Stern (1974) and Ernest Gellner (1983) have lucidly demonstrated, modernization and the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Ferdinand Tönnies) represent an intensely alienating process that has been confronted by countless individuals in different societies. "It is now the turn of young Muslims to experience this. ...
This paper addresses the issue of how Europe’s ethnic and cultural mix is changing drastically by the large numbers of culturally diverse, especially Muslim immigrants, as well as problems that Western European governments face today as they try to deal with unintended consequences of their liberal policies of multiculturalism. In light of this discussion, radical Islamism and identity politics are seen as long-term challenges for all liberal democracies. We argue that extremist voices among the right-wing populist parties in many Western European countries opposed to immigration and increasingly mobilized around the issue of Muslim minorities, may spur resentment and political activism among Muslim immigrant communities, which can turn very violent. We conclude that for the time being, the best realistic scenario is that Islamic radicalism in Europe will continue on a lower level of intensity, but it will not disappear and it may aggravate existing tensions in the future.
... First, we have seen this problem before in the extremist politics of the twentieth century among the young people who became anarchists, Bolsheviks, fascists, or members of the Bader-Meinhof gang. As Frits Stern (1974), Ernest Gellner (1983 and others have shown, modernization and the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft constitute an intensely alienating process that has been confronted by countless individuals in different societies. It is now the turn of young Muslims to experience this. ...
... Fritz Stern demonstrated that this debate was not purely philosophical (Stern 1974). Stern coined one of the most fitting expressions for the prevailing mood among many of the West's 19 th century philosophers: cultural despair. ...
This contribution challenges the notion that political behaviour can be sufficiently explained with a rational choice approach. Drawing on recent findings from the area of social psychology and anthropology, the author argues that political behaviour is very often an emotional and collective phenomenon. Political participation cannot be understood as a simple mechanism to satisfy the material interests of individuals via voting fort he party that promises the highest benefits, but hast to be seen as an activity that reinforces notions of identity and group belonging. Cultural ideas and group values have a strong impact on our political behavior and influence our decision on whether we are willing to participate in the first place. This essay argues that in order to achieve political participation, possible participants need to identify sufficiently with the body politic in order to be emotionally incentivized to engage in the political process.
This article asks if the phenomenon of the Conservative Revolution had exponents in rural western Norway in early 20 th century. It sheds light on Thorleif Schirmer (1877–1941), a teacher and writer. Schirmer elaborated his ideology with radical and conservative rhetoric, influenced by German literature and politics. He presented a cyclical understanding of culture. To secure its existence, nations should revolutionize its mythical origins. Antisemitism fuelled his theories. The positive reception of Schirmer’s writings, indicates conceptual resemblance between the Scandinavian folk and the German Volk .
This article argues that historicising the evolution of nineteenth century nationalisms in South-Eastern Europe allows us to undermine not only binary understandings of nationalism, but also the essentialist reification of a single ideal type as a dominant or exclusive manifestation of nationalism. It draws attention to the competing nationalisms that can be encountered in the area during this period, varying across the spatial and temporal axes, as well as in their espousal by certain groups within the same ‘nation’. The article challenges notions of a temporal lag, constitutive of binary interpretations that identify a fundamental difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’.
The Routledge International Handbook of Charisma provides an unprecedented multidimensional and multidisciplinary comparative analysis of the phenomenon of charisma – first defined by Max Weber as the irrational bond between deified leader and submissive follower. It includes broad overviews of foundational theories and experiences of charisma and of associated key issues and themes. Contributors include 45 influential international scholars who approach the topic from different disciplinary perspectives and utilize examples from an array of historical and cultural settings. The Handbook presents up-to-date, concise, thought-provoking, innovative, and informative perspectives on charisma as it has been expressed in the past and as it continues to be manifested in the contemporary world by leaders ranging from shamans to presidents. It is designed to be essential reading for all students, researchers, and general readers interested in achieving a comprehensive understanding of the power and potential of charismatic authority in all its varieties, subtleties, dynamics, and current and potential directions.
This important book explores the relationship between the Third Reich and animals -- as symbols, as myths, and as living creatures. From a review in Choice: "Rarely does a book contribute to two fields so significantly as this one. Sax, an independent scholar and consultant to various human rights organizations, has written the first book to explore thoroughly the Nazi cult of animals. In a way, this book reads like a mystery novel, as it uncovers some of the chief paradoxes of Nazi ideology. The Nazis promoted vegetarianism and passed the most progressive anti-cruelty laws the world has ever known. Yet they also developed a mystical technocracy that reduced morality to the crudest version of a biological struggle for survival...This book is a must for all collections in German history and in animal rights. It is a deep and profound reflection on the complex and perplexing ways that animals can shape human culture and politics." (S.H. Webb, Choice). This second, expanded edition includes a new essay on "Nazi Totemism."
Em 1910, quatro anos depois de publicar O Jovem Törless, Musil terminou, enfim, sua difícil segunda obra (as novelas Uniões). É um período de incertezas, primeiro porque Musil duvida que suas novelas teriam o sucesso do primeiro romance, segundo, porque se preocupa com sua carreira de escritor. Nesse momento de crise ainda sorrateira, ele começa a anotar ideias sobre as relações da moral com a arte. É um assunto antigo que acompanha a reflexão estética desde Platão e Aristóteles, mas ele recebe na reflexão de Musil um novo horizonte que conecta a moral e a estética com o conhecimento científico.
This article explores the reception of the work of James Gillray and Thomas Rowlandson in Germany in the long nineteenth century, within the contexts of evolving art historical studies and nationalist cultural policies during the period. The German-language art historical writings of fin-de-siècle critics (two from Germany – Richard Muther and Hans Wolfgang Singer – and two from the Low Countries – Charles Polydore de Mont and Jan Veth) demonstrate how these authors used historical examples of British graphic satire to promote modern liberal agendas of protest and internationalism in opposition to the narrow nationalism of the Prussian-led Kaiserreich (the German Empire, 1871–1918).
This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunk-ing he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche's positive vision.
Rarely has any society had to undergo the stress which Germany experienced from 1918 through 1924. Sudden, unexpected defeat; a peace treaty particularly humiliating because it fell on a people particularly sensitive to national prestige; occupation of the western areas of the country by foreign troops; the loss of some territory, particularly that in the East lost to a people considered distinctly inferior; and inflation. The student of the period should not be surprised to find internal developments of a disruptive nature. New political parties and creeds — many of which were extreme — assassinations of political figures, violent oratory, messianism rampant among all sectors of the population — this was the fare of existence within Germany in those years.
The prodigious expansion of Germany’s economy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century following national unification established her as one of the world’s foremost industrial nations. The process of rapidly accelerating if uneven industrialisation formed the backdrop to the emergence of social issues as a vital matter of concern in national life in that period. Governmental and wider public awareness of the impact of industrialisation on the social fabric of the Reich originated in embryonic form at least during the limited depression of the 1870s when the triumphant confidence of the Gründerzeit was badly shaken. The broad consensus in German society that the free market economy and its self-regulating mechanisms would take care of all problems was thus demonstrated in striking fashion to be untenable and that, in reality, there was a crucial role for the state to play in the general field of social welfare reform alongside the traditional agencies such as the churches and private charitable and philanthrophic organisations.
“1750”, the French enlightenment, was a retrospective casualty of the catastrophes set in chain by 1914. German Kulturpessimismus, heightened by the war and enflamed by the abuse of liberal ideals at the Treaty table at Versailles, has since been disseminated through, amongst other things, the intellectual normalisation of Heidegger’s metapolitical, radically antimodern “history of Being”, and more recently Carl Schmitt’s work. The paper recalls that the French enlightenment, a divided period of intellectual ferment, was characterised as much by scepticism as rationalism, Deism as atheism, anticolonialism as Eurocentrism, the recovery of Roman (as against Greek) antiquity, and the philosophical use of literature to break with old modes of intellectual production, and create new public spheres.
This essay is intended to offer a kind of user’s guide to theories of fascism. The aim of the guide is neither to provide an exhaustive analysis—or even list—of those theories, nor to synthesize them into a new or more comprehensive theory. Instead, what is proposed is a map of sorts that will signal some of the landmarks and fault lines distinguishing various theories and provide orientation for those interested in what the humanities have to offer to a theory of fascism. As with most maps, the mode of presentation is essentially synchronic, and though reference might be made to some historic shift, no real attempt will be made to offer a history of theories of fascism. Moreover, the use of a generic term throughout this article—”fascism”—reflects not an assertion of some common value running through various specific historical regimes, but rather the abstract remove at which theories of fascism have tended to operate within the humanities. Where it might be the task of the historian to insist on distinction and detail, the theorists dealt with in this presentation tend, instead, to operate at the level of generality—providing paradigms for the orientation of more detailed study. Finally, no pretense will be made to cover in exhaustive fashion the literature generated within the humanities pertaining to the study of fascism. The objective, instead, is to indicate the major points of division between competing trends in fascism theory.
Der Nazismus und die Technikdiskurse der Nazis sind beide Teil der modernen Geschichte. Doch sollte der Nazismus nicht als ein Nebenprodukt der Moderne verstanden werden. Im Gegenteil, auch wenn wir heute besser verstehen, in welchem Ausmaß der Nazismus spezifisch moderne Züge annahm, bleibt er ein untrennbarer Teil der deutschen Geschichte. Wenn Historiker schreiben, daß der Nazismus vor dem Hintergrund der »Revolte gegen die Moderne« zu verstehen sei, haben und hatten sie einen breitgefaßten Begriff von Moderne. Unter Moderne ist nicht ausschließlich und nicht hauptsächlich der wissenschaftliche und technische Fortschritt der letzten zwei Jahrhunderte zu verstehen. Sicherlich schließt sie diesen mit ein, doch ist sie viel mehr. Sie umfaßt darüber hinaus: die Bildung von Nationen und Staaten, einen gewissen Begriff von der Würde und dem Wert der Menschen, unabhängig von dessen sozialem und ethnischem Status, wirtschaftliche Märkte, die durch ein stabiles rechtsstaatliches System reguliert werden, sowie konzeptionelle Ideen von individueller Freiheit, sozialer Gleichheit und liberaler Demokratie.
This article aims to relate the figure of Naphta in Der Zauberberg to the political situation in Germany during the turbulent early years of the Weimar Republic. Naphta embodies Thomas Mann’s perception of a twin threat from the ideological extremes of both radical right and revolutionary left to the newly established republican regime.]
Aryan philology exercised tremendous influence on the Nazi movement and the Third Reich. Its search for a non-Jewish or specifically Aryan Jesus was closely connected to the quest for the origins of the German people and creation of a new Germanic or Nordic Christianity. It prompted major efforts in Germany to decanonize and exclude the Old Testament from Christian history in general and German culture and life in particular. The struggle against the Jewish Bible and all Jewish influence reached its height after the Nazi Revolution of 1933, which signaled the triumph of Aryan philology in Germany. This crisis led to the replacement of the European humanist tradition with racism and the myths of Blood, Volk, and Soil in the German mind during the Third Reich.
By the time of the semicentennial, America differed from Europe in ways unimaginable given its European roots. Moreover, precisely its uniqueness made it immensely appealing. This chapter relates how Europeans witnessed and evaluated not only America’s rise to a major global power but, more importantly, the spread of its popularity throughout the world. Consumerism, over and above the industrialization already known in Europe, distilled America’s singular charm and extended the lead of the unbound Prometheus as the modern trendsetter.
Nationalism was the most pervasive doctrine in the society and politics of Imperial Germany. The national idea coloured every major facet of social experience, not least in the empire’s ideological powerhouse, the Prussian state. The extent of its suffusion by the turn of the century was exemplified by Georg Schiele, writing in the Preussische Jahrbucher:
The word national is today on all people’s lips. One speaks of national duties and rights, national education and fulfilment. The word unifies and divides political parties. It has become an article of faith, a dogma, as in the past century were the words freedom and equality. This word represents the measure of good and evil; the justification of war and revolution. It is as if it were one of the Ten Commandments.1
There was little in the outward childhood of Paul Joseph Goebbels to suggest the huge influence he would subsequently exert on twentieth-century history. He was born on 29 October 1897 in the small manufacturing town of Rheydt, which lies some 25 kilometres west of Düsseldorf, and 35 kilometres east of the Dutch frontier. Rheydt adjoins the larger town of Mönchen-Gladbach, and both are close to the industrial area of the Ruhr, which lies on the eastern side of the River Rhine. In the late nineteenth century, fuelled by the rapid expansion of German industry, Rheydt’s population was increasing rapidly, and a new town hall, completed in 1896, symbolized local pride and economic achievement. Goebbels’ father, Friedrich, or ‘Fritz’, was a clerk in a small firm; his mother Katherina, was, according to Goebbels’ early biographers, ‘a simple woman of little education’.2 Both parents were devout Roman Catholics, and models of respectability. Goebbels had two older brothers, Konrad and Hans, and two younger sisters, Elisabeth and Maria. When Joseph was still an infant, his parents were able to move to their own terraced house close to the centre of Rheydt, within walking distance of its railway station and the red-brick Church of St Mary. The most remarkable thing most can find to say of Goebbels’ childhood is to repeat anecdotes about his disability, and how resentment about this fed into his adult development.
Eines der ungelösten Probleme der vergleichenden sozialen Gerechtigkeitsforschung besteht darin, inwieweit Vorstellungen über die Verteilungsgerechtigkeit durch die Sozialstruktur und die politische Organisation einer Gesellschaft geprägt sind. So kommt Max Haller (1989) auf der Grundlage eines Vergleichs von neun Ländern zu dem Schluß, daß in Gesellschaften mit einer ausgeprägten Klassenstruktur und einem wohlfahrtstaatlichen Versorgungssystem die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung vom Staat umverteilende Maßnahmen zur Verringerung sozialer Ungleichheit erwartet. In Gesellschaften mit geringen Mobilitätsbarrieren und schwach entwickelten wohlfahrtstaatlichen Regelsystemen hingegen glaubt die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, daß eine ungleiche Güterverteilung sofern sie das Ergebnis ökonomischer Marktprozesse ist gerecht ist und daß Umverteilung durch den Staat nicht wünschenswert ist. Versucht man beide Standpunkte in der Terminologie der Gerechtigkeitsforschung auszudrücken, so stehen sich hier zwei Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen gegenüber. Die eine Vorstellung ist die eines egalitären Etatismus. Soziale Gerechtigkeit verwirklicht sich aus dieser Sicht durch umverteilende Maßnahmen des Staates, die sich am Prinzip der Verteilungsgleichheit orientieren. Die andere Gerechtigkeitsvorstellung ist die eines Verteilungsindividualismus.
Will man eine Definition von “sozialer Gerechtigkeitsforschung” geben, liegt die Schwierigkeit darin, daß Gerechtigkeit sowohl eine normative als auch eine deskriptive Vorstellung ist. Sie fällt in eine Klasse von Begriffen, in der sich z.B. auch die Begriffe “das Gute” oder “das Schöne” finden. Eine “Güteforschung” die Erforschung des Guten also oder eine “Schönheitsforschung” (die es als Ästhetik ja tatsächlich gibt) stehen wie die soziale Gerechtigkeitsforschung immer vor einer doppelten Frage, nämlich einmal: Wie soll die Welt beschaffen sein (damit sie gut, schön oder gerecht ist)? Und: Wie ist sie tatsächlich bzw. wie nehmen wir sie wahr? Für die soziale Gerechtigkeitsforschung, die sich überwiegend mit distributiver Gerechtigkeit beschäftigt, lauten die entsprechenden Fragen: Wie soll die Gesellschaft eingerichtet werden, damit die Verteilung von Gütern und Lasten gerecht ist? Und: Welche Zustände und welche institutionellen Verteilungsmechanismen halten die Menschen tatsächlich für gerecht?
In Philosophy in a new key Susanne Langer (1942, p. 1) stresses the point that the questions posed by any interlocutor constrain and circumscribe the range of acceptable or palatable answers. Those who pose certain questions characteristically take for granted many assumptions that are open to dispute, or presuppose the truth of claims that may be false or problematic. Before I directly confront the substance of the paper by Vonèche, I would like to commend him for his refusal to be suborned by the question-begging queries and assertions posed to him by the Editors of this volume.
This chapter proposes to tackle the relationship between history and ecology (ecological history) from the angle of ideology and mentality. What interests me is the composition — the component parts — of sensitivity towards the environment. The current ecological movement, with us now for some decades, is the most recent manifestation. I am not, therefore, going to write a history of the protection of nature, I am going to seek to understand the evolution of ecological sensitivity. Respect for equilibrium in the natural environment is a concern which is the result of a long evolution. This is understandable, providing one restores nature to a place in a social context where it has both a symbolical and economical meaning.
Of Jewish origin, Jakob Wassermann (1873-1934) has been labeled a nationalist and reactionary author, even a precursor of fascism. The opposite is the case. Nicole Plöger (2007) argues convincingly for Wassermann’s modernism by examining the literary style of his early novels. This article seeks to complement her approach by concentrating on two key aspects of Wassermann’s thought: First, there is his critical attitude to modern industrial and urban life, exemplified in his “Volksromane.” Second, Wassermann conceived of the “Orientale,” a charismatic leader figure of Jewish origin-heavily influenced by Nietzsche’s “Übermensch”-who would overcome anti-Semitism, and eventually, reconcile the German and Jewish cultures. These two elements of his early work, which may appear reactionary from the modern viewpoint, are in fact decisive evidence that Wassermann was at the height of his time.
This comparative and cross-disciplinary study examines the origins and consequences of pre-1930 beliefs that advertising harms society. These surprisingly well-developed beliefs stimulated enduring regulatory restraint upon advertising and formed the foundations of present critical thought. They have important implications for current macromarketing.
The year is 1968, and the American psychologist Gardner Murphy is looking back 4 decades and wistfully recalling a Camelot-like time in the brain and mind sciences. It was a time filled with excitement about (in Murphy’s words) a “new and vital way of viewing organisms, a view ‘from above.’ ”In the United States, Karl Lashley’s work on laboratory mice had contributed to a “renaissance of belief in the wholeness of central nervous system function.” In England, Henry Head’s post-World War I studies of brain-damaged soldiers had raised interest in the dynamic reorganizing capacities of the human brain following localized damage. In the lab, Sir Charles Scott Sherrington’s work on the “integrative” nature of reflex nervous action was overturning the 19th-century view of the organism as a bundle of sensory-motor reflex arcs and pointing the way toward a hierarchical, biologically purposeful alternative.
Quine’s classic interpretation succinctly characterized Carnap’s Aufbau as an attempt “to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data ….” Consequently, “Russell” was characterized as the most important influence on the Aufbau. Those times have passed. Formulating a comprehensive and balanced interpretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be a difficult task and one that must take into account several disjointed sources.
My thesis is that the core of the Aufbau rested on a problem that had haunted German philosophy since the end of the nineteenth century. In terms fashionable at the time, this problem may be expressed as the polarity between Leben and Geist that characterized German philosophy during the years of the Weimar Republic. At that time, many philosophers, including Cassirer, Rickert and Vaihinger, were engaged in overcoming this polarity. As I will show, Carnap’s Aufbau joined the ranks of these projects. This suggests that Lebensphilosophie and Rickert’s System der Philosophie (1921) (henceforth System) exerted a strong influence on Carnap’s projects, an influence that is particularly conspicuous in his unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit (1922). Carnap himself asserted that this manuscript could be considered “the germ of the constitution theory” of the Aufbau. Reading Chaos also reveals another strong but neglected influence on the Aufbau, namely a specific version of neutral monism put forward by the philosopher and psychologist Theodor Ziehen before World War I. Ziehen’s work contributed much to the invention of the constitutional method of quasi-analysis.
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