Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship in St. Basil’s Debate with Eunomius

Abstract

When St. Basil the Great entered the controversy with Eunomius, the political and theological context was not very friendly for the defenders of the Nicene definition of faith, to say the least. After Constantine’s death, the ideological consensus reached and maintained with such difficulties during his lifetime began to unravel rapidly. A significant and growing number of Eastern bishops were searching for an alternative expression of faith to that adopted in Nicaea. Of course, these bishops were careful to reject Arius’s patronage and ideas as extremist, but they also showed an even more resolute aversion toward the Nicene Creed, in which they claimed to detect a subtle form of modalism. Behind the text of the “318 Fathers,” their contention went, loomed the specter of Marcellus of Ancyra, reportedly holding, through an original interpretation of homoousion, that between the Father and the Son, the identity is not only generical but also numerical. “A new Sabellius” in the Nicene Creed, this was the rhetorical strategy by which many Easterners were seeking to discredit the definition of 325 and its ever fewer defenders. Yet, instead of making genuine efforts to bring more theological clarity to the controversial homoousion, as Athanasius was to do, these bishops were in fact eager to replace the Nicene Creed altogether with confessions of faith that were at best ambiguous in form and, in fact, more often subordinationist in their theological orientation.

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Philosophical Arguments
and Christian Worship in
St. Basil’s Debate
with Eunomius
Gheorghe Ovidiu Sferlea
Preliminaries
When St. Basil the Great entered the controversy with Eunomius, the
political and theological context was not very friendly for the defenders of
the Nicene definition of faith, to say the least. After Constantine’s death, the
ideological consensus reached and maintained with such difficulties during
his lifetime began to unravel rapidly. A significant and growing number of
Eastern bishops were searching for an alternative expression of faith to that
adopted in Nicaea. Of course, these bishops were careful to reject Arius’s
patronage and ideas as extremist, but they also showed an even more reso-
lute aversion toward the Nicene Creed, in which they claimed to detect a
subtle form of modalism. Behind the text of the “318 Fathers,” their conten-
tion went, loomed the specter of Marcellus of Ancyra, reportedly holding,
through an original interpretation of homoousion, that between the Father
and the Son, the identity is not only generical but also numerical. “A new
Sabellius” in the Nicene Creed, this was the rhetorical strategy by which many
Easterners were seeking to discredit the definition of 325 and its ever fewer
defenders. Yet, instead of making genuine efforts to bring more theological
clarity to the controversial homoousion, as Athanasius was to do, these bishops
were in fact eager to replace the Nicene Creed altogether with confessions of
faith that were at best ambiguous in form and, in fact, more often subordina-
tionist in their theological orientation. From 341 to 360, various anti- Nicene
groups— homoians, heteroousians, and homoiousians— were fighting each

94 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
other to gain theological preeminence and imperials favors, while St. Athana-
sius, left virtually alone in the East to defend the Nicene legacy, found himself
often in exile and lacking a public tribune. It was during such times, largely
dominated by opponents, that the three Cappadocians made their appear-
ance and became theologically active. Among them, Basil acted as a mentor.
Basil’s most important theological opus from the beginning of the 360s
is his treaty Against Eunomius.1 A radical Arian,2 just like his master, Aetius,
Eunomius must have been perceived as a serious threat in his time, since
Didymus the Blind, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Gregory of
Nyssa, and Theodoret of Cyrus all felt the need to pen refutations directed
against him.3 And judging from the available evidence, the fact is that Euno-
mius appears to have been a much more sophisticated thinker than Arius
was. His intellectual strength resided in the way in which he managed to
back his (anti- )Trinitarian convictions by a theological epistemology and a
theory of language that served particularly well his radical subordinationism.
Basil countered Eunomius by articulating a distinctive philosophical stance
that especially emphasized the limits of human reason and language. These
arguments will be dealt with in more detail later. But Basil also raised against
his opponent serious concerns that were not philosophical yet pertained to
the very nature of Christian piety and faith as a whole. In the eyes of Basil
and many of his contemporaries, Eunomius’s “technology” threatened to
change the devotional tradition of the Church. At stake was therefore not
only how to oppose and reject logical errors about God but also how to
preserve the kind of worship that would secure a transforming and salvific
relationship with Him. This part of his refutation deserves as much attention
as the philosophical one, as I would like to emphasize in the final part of the
present chapter.
The Core of Eunomius’s Position
The main thesis of the Neo- Arians is well known: the Son is of a different
substance (heteroousion) than God the Father. To establish this crucial point,
Eunomius starts from a postulate pertaining to the theory of language that
he uses to elaborate a metaphysics of his own of the supreme principle; he
then applies the consequences of this synthesis to the interpretation of rel-
evant scriptural texts.4 According to Eunomius, human words and concepts,
or at least some of them, are able to express what things are in themselves.
There is an intimate correspondence between some names and the realities
they indicate to such degree that the former rigorously convey the substance
of latter. This is especially true in the case of agennetos. In Eunomius’s esti-
mate, agennetos contains a wholly adequate and clear idea of what God is in
himself. God is the only one who does not depend on another in order to
be. There is no contingency in God; his being is not derived from anything
whatsoever other than himself. This is precisely to say that he is “unbegotten
substance” (ousia agennetos).5 Hence there are two further corollaries: First,
God cannot communicate his own substance (e.g., to a Son), for the idea

Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship 95
of “two unbegotten” beings would be contradictory. Indeed, to posit two
unbegotten (i.e., absolute) substances would imply division or mutual limita-
tion. Second, the proper name of the Son must then be gennetos (the fact of
being begotten). Accordingly, to say that he is of the same substance with
(homoousion) the Father would mean that one part of God is unbegotten
and the other begotten, which is again absurd.6
The hermeneutical consequence of God’s absolute singularity is, accord-
ing to Eunomius, that names do not have the same meaning when applied to
God and to other realities. Difference of meaning between names is analogous
to the difference of ontological status between the realities they indicate. This
is, briefly stated, the so- called theory of homonymy.7 To give an example, the
name of “creator,” when applied to a human being, supposes the existence
of a matter out of which he or she creates, a meaning that would be absurd
in God’s case, since he creates things out of nothing. In the same way, the
attribute “goodness” has an absolute meaning when predicated about the
Unbegotten God, while one should take it in a derivative sense when applied
to the Son, since his goodness can only be of an incomparably lesser degree.
It is easy to see how the theory of homonymy provides Eunomius with an
effective instrument for neutralizing the force of those scriptural texts that
speak about the Son in the same terms as about the Father. Even if the names
are identical, Eunomius contends, their meaning is different. On the other
hand, other divine names, whether found in Scripture or discovered by natu-
ral reason, tell something about God only insofar as they concord with his
essential predicate. Here is the second principle of Eunomius’s hermeneutics:
since God’s substance is simple, all other predicates applied to God are in the
end reducible to the meaning of a single one: agennetos.8
Some of the Basil’s Main Arguments
When one considers Eunomius’s argument, it is easy to see that its strength
and coherence are provided by the initial postulate— that is, human reason has
access to the substance of the highest reality. Humans are able to know what
God is in himself, and names faithfully reveal that very substance. St. Basil
perfectly understands that this is a crucial point for Eunomius’s system. He
then mobilizes all resources of his philosophical acumen to confront it head
on. Against Eunomius’s contention, he shows that human reason does not
have access to the substance of things. Consequently, names are unable to
reveal for us this substance.
To hold that human mind is able to pierce the very secret of God’s sub-
stance is, in Basil’s eyes, a very extravagant, indeed naive claim. In fact, it
appears that our mind does not have access to the substance of anything
whatsoever. The source of our knowledge of reality is, according to Basil,
perhaps influenced by Epicureans, our perceptions.9 Our mind processes
these perceptions, analyzes them, and classifies them into general categories.
Thus things have form, color, weight, odor, taste, and so on. We therefore
come into contact not with the substance of things but with their distinctive

96 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
qualities or properties.10 What things are beyond these properties, what things
are in themselves, we never know.11 We can only find out how things are in
relation to us. In other words, we come to know things through the way in
which they manifest themselves to us, through their action or “energy” (ener-
geia).12 From these considerations, it follows that since our mind does not
have contact with the substance of things, but only with their manifestations,
neither can names express this substance for us.13 Indeed, for Basil, names are
not a sort of emanation of the substance of things but creations of our mind
after reflecting on them.14 It is this part of the human subjectivity and fal-
libility inherent to every representation or name that Eunomius conveniently
chose to overlook when he claimed to have identified the essential name of
God in agennetos.15 But how could a name enjoy suprahuman status or truth
value when all names and concepts are the result of human conceptualization
(epinoia)? Yet, in denying the legitimacy of an absolute usage of names, Basil
did not want to suggest that they lack any cognitive value. Even if they do not
convey to us the substance of things, names express nonetheless real aspects
of them, as they manifest themselves to us.
Formulated in this way, Basil’s critique strikes to the core of Eunomius’s
epistemological construction and operates a complete reversal of his system.
The consequences of this critique for theology are tremendous. If the human
mind cannot attain even the substance of created realities, what could it pos-
sibly say about the Creator’s substance? How could it be claimed that a philo-
sophical concept is able to achieve in God’s case what it cannot do in the case
of created realities? For Basil, the object of our natural intuition is not God’s
substance but his activities. Through natural reason, we understand that God
exists— that he is great, powerful and wise— but never does his substance fall
under our comprehensive ability.16
If it is true that no name can describe God as he is in himself, but only as
he has manifested and revealed himself through his works or Scripture, Basil
still has to explain the status of the name agennetos. Eunomius considered it
as the essential divine attribute, but following Basil’s argument, on this cru-
cial point his opponent proved to be wrong. In what sense then is it never-
theless legitimate to use this name? According to Basil, names applied to God
fall into two categories.17 There are certain names that express something
that is present in God, something positive about him. Thus, for instance, we
say that God is good, wise, rightful, and so on. But there are also names that
express something that is absent from God, something that he is not. These
names are called privative: indestructible, invisible, immaterial, and so on. It
is to this second group that agennetos properly belongs. Far from conveying
God’s substance, these names point to a property of creation that is absent
from its Creator’s being. To Basil, being “unbegotten” simply means not
having a cause, just as being “endless” (ateleutetos) involves the absence of
the temporal limitation characteristic for creatures.18 All similar names then
point to aspects of God considered negatively in relation to creation; these
aspects are real, but none of them reveal his substance, which remains for-
ever inaccessible. To quote Basil, “God is unbegotten, but unbegottenness is

Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship 97
not his substance.”19 A lucid theologian should resist the temptation to reify
any of these names in order to transform them into ousia— that is, to jump
from the semantics of names indicating properties to the ontology of divine
substance.20
Up to this point, St. Basil has established that Eunomius’s main principle
was in fact a logical fallacy, and he has also managed to relativize the use of
“unbegotten” by showing that it was a simple privative name among many
other similar ones. But his reflection goes beyond a mere destructive cri-
tique of Eunomius’s system. Through the contemplation of God’s works,
we discover that he exists. We can never find out what he is in his very sub-
stance. But could it possibly be that we know who he is? St. Basil makes the
observation that, as revealed in the Scriptures, God is Father. On the one
hand, this name encapsulates the meaning of “unbegotten,” having in addi-
tion the scriptural sanction.21 On the other hand, it tells us more about what
or rather about who God is than a privative name, whatever the latter might
be. Father is a relational name, for Son is implied in its immediate meaning.
Consequently, if Father is something pertaining intimately to what it means
to be God, and this is indeed the suggestion of the Scriptures, then Son must
also be something pertaining intimately to what it means to be God. If God
is Father, it means that he never was something else, for there is no change
in God, and thus he always was also Son. Eternally Father means eternally
Son.22 A version of this argument can be found already in Origen. Athanasius
refined it against his Arian opponents,23 and Basil uses it here in a similar way.
A marked difference between Basil and Eunomius becomes striking at this
point. Eunomius’s God was a hypertranscendent monad unable to commu-
nicate its being to another. Starting from an exegesis of St. John’s Prologue,
Basil shows instead that God the Father eternally communicates himself to
the Son. And this is precisely, according to Basil, the meaning of many other
crucial scriptural passages, such as Philippians 2:6– 7, John 14:9, John 17:10–
11, or Hebrews 1:3. In this last text, the Son is literally named “the very
stamp of his substance.”24
Between the Father and the Son, there is full community of being, so that
one and the same “formula of being” (logos tou einai / logos tes ousias) is found
in both. It is the opposite of Eunomius’s principle of homonymy. When the
Son is called in the Scriptures “light,” “life,” “truth,” “power,” or “God,” he
is called such in exactly the same sense as the Father. Their common names
refer to what they have in common— that is, to the same “formula of being.”
What distinguishes them are the hypostatic properties (idiomata) of each
one. If one can speak about an order in their case (e.g., the Son comes after
the Father), this should not be taken as indicating ontological subordination
but a mere relation of causality. It is true that, on the basis of our most ordi-
nary experience, we name the cause before its effect, the effect is sometimes
inferior to its cause, and the cause loses a part of itself in the process. But
in God’s case, causality does not entail temporality or materiality, for God
is beyond time and matter. The Father communicates his being to the Son
without this supposing a temporal gap (diastema)25 and without his being

98 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
becoming thus divided or diminished, as Arius had supposed26 and Eunomius
continued to contend.27 “But we say that the Father is ranked prior to the
Son in terms of the relation that causes have with what comes from them,
not in terms of a difference of nature or a pre- eminence based on time.”28 At
the end of his argument, Basil is thus able to qualify the relation between the
Father and the Son using the key term of Nicaea: homoousion.
Eunomius and the Christian Worship
Brothers, we must think about Jesus Christ as we think about God, as
about the judge of the living and the dead. And we must not give little
thought to our salvation. For when we think little about him, we also
hope to receive but little.29
Despite the fact that Basil often argues against his opponent on a philo-
sophical ground, an important element in his refutation is represented by
the appeal to traditional liturgical and devotional practices that he regarded
as in frontal opposition to Eunomius’s theology. Indeed, should one give
them credit, as Basil obviously feared, Eunomius’s technicalities were bound
to correct or render unintelligible well- established liturgical and devotional
practices, some of which go back to Christ himself. Basil charged his oppo-
nent with interpreting the whole Christian teaching in a way that was contra-
dictory with the traditional forms of worshiping and invoking God. But if the
truth and salvific power of these forms were beyond any possible doubt, so
Basil’s argument implies, then it is Eunomius’s theology that must necessarily
be wrong. One crucial example of this was, of course, baptism.
According to Eunomius, Christ, the Son of God, was a supremely eminent
being, unique in its kind, but in the end a creature. To the extent that he
was called “God,” he was so only by homonymy. Basil, however, saw here
a major inconsistency with the theology and practice of the baptism under-
stood as the salvific act through which every Christian enters into a new life,
the beginning of his or her personal redemption from corruption and death.
Basil presumed that only the true God can achieve this on our behalf— that is,
only the true God can give access through baptism to the true God’s life.30 Is
it not sheer monstrosity then to be baptized in the name of a creature? And
of course, the same conclusion follows in the case of the Spirit. If the Spirit is
not the true God, but on the contrary needing to be saved and “divinized”
by another, then it would seem that the whole tradition of baptism must be
changed accordingly.
This claim of Eunomius is clearly opposed to what has been handed down
about the saving baptism: Go, baptize in the name of the Father; and of the Son,
and of the Holy Spirit [Matt. 28:19]. Baptism is the seal of faith, and faith is an
assent to divinity. For one must first believe, then be sealed with baptism. Our
baptism accords with exactly what the Lord handed down: it is in the name of

Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship 99
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. In this formula, no creature
or servant is ranked together with the Father and the Son, as if the divinity
becomes complete in a Trinity. Everything external to them is a fellow- servant,
even if generally some are valued more than others on account of their superior
dignity.31
It is difficult to decide whether the future bishop of Caesarea had knowl-
edge of actual Eunomian attempts at changing the baptismal formula when
writing his refutation or he just proved to be visionary. It appears neverthe-
less that the Eunomians did in fact try at some point to qualify the original
wording of Matthew 28:19 in order to put it in line with their theological
convictions. At least, this is the testimony that can be found in Epiphanius of
Salamis, for instance, who reports that Eunomius “baptized persons already
baptized— not only people who came to him from the Orthodox and the
sects, but even from the Arians. He, however, baptized them in the name of
God the Uncreated, and in the name of the Created Son, and in the name of
the Sanctifying Spirit created by the Created Son.”32 Even if one decides that
this text is not to be taken at face value,33 other reports also attest that the
Eunomians felt quite uncomfortable with the Trinitarian symbolism of tradi-
tional baptismal rite of their time and so attempted to rule it out. According
to Theodoret of Cyrus, for instance, Eunomius “overturned the custom of
holy baptism established by the Lord and delivered by the apostles, and he
laid down opposite laws. He said not to use three dippings of the one being
baptised nor to invoke the Trinity, but to baptize once into the death of
Christ.”34 Converging testimonies about the Eunomian innovations on these
points are provided by Philostorgius, Socrates, and Sozomen, who all report
that Eunomians used to perform the baptism “into the death of Christ,” in
reference to Romans 6:3.35 While it is possible to reconstruct a theological
justification for these variations in the baptismal rite,36 the motivation behind
them was quite obviously antitrinitarian. And here we come again to the
crux of the matter. Basil charged Eunomius that, by arguing against the true
divinity of the Son and of the Spirit, he was attacking in fact the Trinitarian
identity of God as attested in the Scriptures and embedded in cultic forms
bequeathed by the Church tradition, thereby doing away with the distinctive
feature of the Christian religion:
As I see it, while there is much that distinguishes Christianity from Greek error
and Jewish ignorance, I think there is no doctrine in the gospel of our salvation
more important than faith in the Father and the Son. For even schismatics,
whatever their error might be, agree that God is the Founder and the Creator.
Now in which group should we put Eunomius? He declares that “Father” is a
pseudonym and that “Son” only goes so far as a mere designation. He thinks
that it makes no difference whether one confesses “Father” or “founder,” and
whether one says “Son” or “something made.” So in what party should we
count him? Among the Greeks or the Jews? For whoever denies the power
of piety and the distinctive character (so to speak) of our worship will not
affiliate himself with Christians. For we have not put our faith in the Creator

100 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
and something made. Rather, we have been sealed in the Father and the Son
through the grace received in baptism. Hence when he dares to deny these
terms, he simultaneously takes exception to the whole power of the gospels,
proclaiming a Father who has not begotten and a Son who was not begotten.37
Christians are named so because from the very beginning they worshipped
Christ as God.38 Eunomius instead “introduces on the pretext of Christianity
the denial of the divinity of the Only- Begotten,” disturbing “what is pure
and simple in the teaching of the divine Spirit and misleading the innocent
through the use of plausible arguments.”39 In Basil’s estimate, Eunomius
was at odds with the previous tradition: “If we were persuaded by you, we
would have to judge the tradition that has prevailed in every time past due
to so many saints as of less worth than your impious fabrication.”40 Surpris-
ingly enough, Eunomius does not seem to have viewed things otherwise
when emphatically urging the present and future audience of his Apology
not to judge the doctrinal matters in hand by taking as authoritative the
testimony of precedent generations of Christians.41 Indeed, Eunomius did
not think that the past should enjoy as much normative value as Basil would
have liked, and in any event, belief in Trinity was, in his eyes, an illegitimate
development of the pristine faith. Eunomius quite probably was of the opin-
ion that the original exclusive monotheism, which he took to be the truth of
the Scriptures, had been slowly obscured by unreflecting popular beliefs and
forms of piety close to the pagan religion. Consequently, technical precision
was now required in order to restore the truth in doctrine and to correct the
Trinitarian direction in which Christian faith and worship were increasingly
engaged in his time.42 On the contrary, Basil regarded the continuity of the
Christian cultic devotion for Christ and for the Holy Spirit as an indisputable
fact, wholly consistent with the teaching of the Scriptures.43 For him, this
fact had to be taken very seriously. And Basil also believed that his opponent
refused to admit the consequences that this devotion naturally entailed as far
as articulating a properly Christian doctrine of God was concerned. Obvi-
ously, Church devotional practice functions here as a canon for doctrinal
Orthodoxy. Theological clarification must do justice to the cultic traditional
worship of Christ and of the Holy Spirit as reflected in baptism, for instance.
But only a resolute statement of their divinity can achieve that. In other
words, only a nonsubordinationist Trinitarian theology as that advocated by
Basil meets the truth of the Christian faith and safeguards continuity with the
tradition.44
Modern historians warn sometimes against a simplistic view on the dialec-
tic between lex orandi and lex credendi during the Arian controversy. They
also tend to relativize somewhat the effectiveness of the argument analyzed
here in settling the doctrinal issues in hand. In particular, it is pointed out
that such arguments must have been inconclusive, since appeal to liturgical
practice was made by all sides. With respect to this, I think one could make
the following comment. It is indeed true that “liturgical practice can be read
in different ways as easily as scriptural texts.”45 Yet, I believe, one cannot

Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship 101
do this with equal plausibility. Basil’s Trinitarian theology was able to make
sense of the baptismal formula and rite as they were performed in his time,
to illuminate their meaning. His heteroousian opponents instead searched
for ways to change them, because these opponents were not equally willing
to elaborate in turn a Trinitarian theology. Indeed, one can fairly say that
all their efforts were rather aimed at deconstructing such a concept. If it was
Basil and not the Eunomians who triumphed in the end, the explanation for
this lies most probably neither in a superior rhetorical strategy nor in specific
political circumstances but should be considered above all as theological. It
is that Basil’s teaching appeared to his contemporaries as more faithful to the
liturgical tradition and more consistent with their own spiritual and devo-
tional experience than Eunomius’s.
Concluding Remarks
The debate between Basil and Eunomius raised questions and offered answers
on topics of major significance for the Christian tradition, such as the proper
way of interpreting the Scriptures, the source of theological knowledge,
and the relation between natural reason and Revelation. Many of Basil’s
insights became classic for later thinkers. Yet I believe one should not over-
look another, equally important aspect of his theological legacy. As argued
in the final part of the present text, the case made by Basil against Eunomius
emphasizes in a powerful manner that there is an organic link between theo-
logical discourse and cultic devotion. Basil suggests that this link can never
be dismissed or taken à la légère without a price and thus offers an element
to meditate on for every Christian theologian. Indeed, writing theology does
not require the mere intellectual ability to express propositional truths about
God’s nature; it also requires one to stand with awe in front of His mystery
and to be sensitive to His salvific presence in Church forms of worship.
Notes
1. On Basil’s Against Eunomius, see M. V. Anastos, “Basil’s Kata Eunomiou:
A Critical Analysis,” in Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic,
ed. P. J. Fedwick (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Biblical Studies, 1981),
69– 134; P. Rousseau, “Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium: The Main Preoc-
cupations,” in The Idea of Salvation: Papers from the Conference on the Idea of
Salvation, Sacred and Secular, Held at St. Paul’s College, University of Sydney,
22– 25 August, ed. D. Dockrill et al. (Auckland, NZ: Prudentia, 1988), 77– 94;
B. Sesboüe, introduction to Basile de Césarée, Contre Eunome, suivi d’Eunome,
Apologie (Sources chrétiennes [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1982; hereafter SC]
299, 15– 95); and A. Radde- Gallwitz and M. DelCogliano, introduction to
St. Basil of Caesarea (St. Basil the Great), Against Eunomius, trans. Radde-
Gallwitz and DelCogliano (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
Press, 2011), 3– 75.
2. There is a significant theological continuity between Arius and Eunomius, in
spite of their differences. See, for instance, K. Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea:

102 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Academic, 2011), 77– 79. In this sense, it is therefore justified to con-
sider Eunomius a radical Arian or a “Neo- Arian”; see T. Kopecek, A History of
Neo- Arianism (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979).
3. On Eunomius’s life and theology, see E. Cavalcanti, Studi Eunomiani (Rome:
Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1976); Kopecek, History
of Neo- Arianism, esp. 299– 359 and 441– 543; M. Wiles, “Eunomius: Hair-
splitting Dialectician or Defender of the Accessibility of Salvation?” in The
Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. R. D. Williams
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 157– 72; R. P. Vaggione,
Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000); and J. Behr, The Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 2: The
Nicene Faith (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), 267– 82.
4. For Eunomius’s theory of language, see R. Mortley, From Word to Silence: The
Way of Negation, Christian and Greek, vol. 2 (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986), 128– 59;
K.- H. Uthemann, “Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius von Cyzicus,”
Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 104 (1993): 143– 75; and M. DelCogliano,
Basil of Caesarea’s Anti- Eunomian Theory of Names: Christian Theology and
Late- Antique Philosophy in the Fourth- Century Trinitarian Controversy (Brill:
Leiden, 2010). See also L. Karfiková, “Der Ursprung der Sprache nach Euno-
mius und Gregor vor dem Hintergrund der antiken Sprachtheorien (CE II
387– 444; 543– 53),” in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II. An English
Version with Supporting Studies, Proceedings of the 10th International Collo-
quium on Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15– 18, 2004), ed. L. Karfiková
et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 279– 306.
5. Eunomius, Apologia 7 (SC 305, 246).
6. Ibid. 9 (SC 305, 250– 52) and 14 (SC 305, 260– 62).
7. Ibid. 16– 19 (SC 305, 266– 72).
8. Ibid. 19 (SC 305, 272). On this point, see now A. Radde- Gallwitz, Basil of Cae-
sarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
9. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.6 (SC 299, 186– 88).
10. Ibid. 1.13 (SC 299, 216– 18).
11. Ibid. 1.12 (SC 299, 212– 16).
12. Ibid. 1.14 (SC 299, 220– 22).
13. Ibid. (SC 299, 224).
14. Ibid. 2.4 (SC 305, 18– 22).
15. Ibid. 1.6 (SC 299, 186– 88).
16. See St. Basil the Great, Epistle 234: “For instance, we say that we know the
greatness of God, and His power, and His wisdom, and His providence whereby
He cares for us, and the justice of His judgment, not His very substance . . .
We say that from His activities we know our God, but His substance itself we
do not profess to approach. For His activities descend to us, but His substance
remains inaccessible.” Basil of Cesarea, Letters, vol. 3, trans. Roy J. Deferrari
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 371– 73.
17. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.10 (SC 299, 204).
18. Ibid. 1.15– 16 (SC 299, 226– 28).
19. Ibid. 1.11 (SC 299, 208).
20. Ibid. 2.28 (SC 305, 120).
21. Ibid. 1.5 (SC 299, 174– 76).

Philosophical Arguments and Christian Worship 103
22. Ibid. 1.17 (SC 299, 230– 32) and 2.12 (SC 305, 44– 46). See also D. Robert-
son, “Relatives in Basil of Caesarea,” Studia Patristica 37 (2001): 277– 87.
23. See R. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, revised ed. (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans, 2001), 137– 39.
24. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.18– 20 (SC 299, 234– 44).
25. Ibid. 1.20 (SC 299, 244– 46) and 2.12– 13 (SC 305, 44– 46).
26. In his letter to the Alexandrian synod of 321, for instance. The text is given by
St. Athanasius of Alexandria, De Synodis 16.5: “εἰ δὲ τὸ «ἐξ αὐτοῦ» καὶ τὸ «ἐκ
γαστρὸς» καὶ τὸ «ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἥκω» ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ ὁμοουσίου
καὶ ὡς προβολὴ ὑπό τινων νοεῖται, σύνθετος ἔσται ὁ πατὴρ καὶ διαιρετὸς καὶ
τρεπτὸς καὶ σῶμα κατ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀκόλουθα σώματι
πάσχων ὁ ἀσώματος θεός.”
27. Eunomius, Apologia 9 (SC 305, 250– 52) and 26 (SC 305, 290).
28. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.20 (SC 299, 246), in Basil of Caesarea,
Against Eunomius, trans. DelCogliano and Radde- Gallwitz (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 121.
29. Second Letter of Clement to the Corinthians 1, trans. B. D. Ehrman, in The Apos-
tolic Fathers, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 164.
30. A similar idea was put forth by Athanasius. See K. Anatolios, Athanasius: The
Coherence of His Thought (London: Routledge, 1998), 125– 33. See also Wil-
liams, Arius, 239– 43.
31. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 3.5 (SC 305, 164), trans. DelCogliano
and Radde- Gallwitz, 192. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 1 (Gre-
gorii Nysseni Opera [Leiden: Brill] I, 288– 91); and Apollinaris of Laodicea,
He Kata Meros Pistis 8– 9, in Apollinaris von Laodicea und Seine Schule, ed.
H. Lietzmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 1904), 170.
32. Epiphanius of Salamis, Panarion 54, 32– 34, in Panarion, trans. Frank Williams
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 579– 80.
33. Rowan Williams, for instance, suggests that one should not. See R. Williams,
“Baptism and the Arian Controversy,” in Arianism after Arius: Essays on the
Development of the Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts, ed. M. Barnes and
D. H. Williams (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1993), 172– 73. Maurice Wiles, too,
expressed skepticism about this point. See M. Wiles, “Triple and Single Immer-
sion: Baptism in the Arian Controversy,” Studia Patristica 30 (1997): 340– 41.
34. Theodoret of Cyrus, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 4.3, Patrologia
Graeca, ed. Jacques Paul Migne (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1857– 66) 83,
420B– C. This text is translated and discussed by E. Ferguson, Baptism in the
Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 716.
35. Philostorgius, Historia Ecclesiastica 10.4; Socrates of Constantinople, Historia
Ecclesiastica 5.24, 6; Sozomen, Historia Ecclesiastica 6.26, 2– 6.
36. See, for instance, T. Kopecek, “Neo- Arian Religion: The Evidence of the
Apostolic Constitutions,” in Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassess-
ments, ed. R. C. Gregg (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation,
1985), 167– 68; cf. Williams, “Baptism and the Arian Controversy,” 174– 75.
In a more simple way, however, Philostorgius (HE 10.4) tells us that baptism
should be performed through a single immersion because the Lord “suffered
for us only once, not twice or thrice.”
37. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 2.22 (SC 305, 88– 90), trans. DelCo-
gliano and Radde- Gallwitz, 163.

104 The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians
38. This was also noticed by their pagan contemporaries. See, for instance, L. W.
Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2003), 605– 9.
39. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.1 (SC 299, 142), trans. DelCogliano
and Radde- Gallwitz, 81.
40. Ibid. 1.3 (SC 299, 156– 58), trans. DelCogliano and Radde- Gallwitz, 87.
41. Eunomius, Apologia 2 (SC 305, 238). See also 27 (SC 305, 292– 94).
42. Ibid. 25, 1– 6 (SC 305, 284). Cf. P. Amidon, introduction to Philostorgius,
Church History (Leiden: Brill, 2007), xviii– xx.
43. St. Basil the Great, Against Eunomius 1.3 (SC 299, 156– 58); Against Euno-
mius 2.2 (SC 305, 12– 16); Against Eunomius 3.1 (SC 305, 144– 46); etc. For a
contemporary case, see, for instance, Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ; and R. Bauck-
ham, Jesus and the God of the Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the
New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdmans, 2008), esp. 127– 81.
44. For this view on the evolution of doctrinal clarifications during the first five
centuries, see Bauckham, Jesus and the God of the Israel, 150– 51.
45. Wiles, “Triple and Single Immersion,” 337. Cf. Williams, “Baptism and the
Arian Controversy,” 175– 77.