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Educating monsters with brakes: Teaching soldiers aggression
and aggression control
Ole Boe1 & Alexander Ingdahl2
1Department of Military Leadership and Management, Norwegian Defence University College,
Norway
2Norwegian Army, Norway
Abstract
Problem Statement: During the last years, Norwegian soldiers have been facing an increasing
number of situations in which they had to exert aggression and aggression control. In any type of
war, the psychological aspect of aggression and aggression control is perhaps the most demanding
for a soldier. Purpose of Study: To investigate the education of soldiers in order to cope with
aggression and aggression control. Methods: Respondents from a professional Norwegian Army
battalion were interviewed via email in order to answer whether the soldiers in the battalion were
properly trained in aggression, that is, the ability to kill, and in aggression control, that is, self-
awareness and self-control. Findings and Results: Statements from the respondents revealed that
there were only small deviations between how the theory outlines that aggression and aggression
control should be educated and how it was exercised in the battalion. The battalion was found to
exercise in depth stress management and was found to implement aggression control at an earlier
stage than the theory outlined. Respondents said they had not experienced paralysis in their soldiers
and they had not seen anyone lose their temper, even in situations which in theory could evoke
hatred. All respondents said that they felt that their unit was well educated in aggression and
aggression control before deploying to international operations. Conclusion and recommendations:
A conclusion is therefore that by training on extreme situations the soldiers of the battalion were
properly educated both in aggression and aggression control.
Keywords: Aggression; aggression control; education; soldiers
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Introduction
Both in the animal kingdom and the human world, all species have an inherent reluctance to kill
their own kind (Grossman, 1995). For humans, this can be changed with proper training and
conditioning of soldiers (Murray, 2006). An example of this conditioning is the study conducted
by S.L.A. Marshall in which he points out that there has been a clear improvement in the number
of soldiers who fire aimed shots in combat. The improvement goes from 15-25 % during World
War II up to 50 % in the Korean War (Watson, 1978). A similar survey during the Vietnam War
showed that as many as 90 to 95 percent of soldiers fired their weapons towards the enemy (Boe,
Kjørstad, & Werner Hagen, 2012; Grossman, 1995). These studies show that soldiers who have
undergone aggression training have shown a greater ability and willingness to kill. However, the
number of shots fired by U.S. troops during World War II seems to have compiled from the
battlefields of Europe. Chambers (2003) has found that the firing rate for U.S troops against the
Japanese enemy was a lot higher. Yager (1975) further found that individuals who had previously
shown tendencies to violent behavior and who enlisted as soldiers often became involved in
“unnecessary violence” during war. Military training and education is state-sanctioned, it is the
nation-state´s policy that sends soldiers to participate in a war (O´Sullivan, 2016). Therefore, the
nation-state has an obligation to make sure that the soldiers are fit enough for war. This includes
making sure that they can develop enough aggression to do the job the nation-state wants them to
do, while at the same time show enough aggression control in order to avoid criminal acts and
atrocities.
A question may then arise. Is simple aggression training enough to make soldiers kill? Is that all
it takes in order to be a warrior? The answer is no. If one also includes dehumanization and
conditioning in order to kill, the result may end up as the infamous incident in My Lai in Vietnam.
In this incident, the platoon of U.S. Army officer Lt. Calley and Calley himself were capable of
murdering and slaughtering hundreds of women and children during a bloody rampage on March
16, 1968 in My Lai, Vietnam (Grossman, 1995). As far as we can judge from this incident, Calley
and his men were clearly missing one or several important components of what is means to be a
warrior. With ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, South Sudan, and several
other nations, soldiers may face extremely difficult situations (O´Sullivan, 2016). In some of these
situations they may violate the laws of war, and commit atrocities and crimes. In 2016, the Iraq
Historic Allegations Team started to investigate over 1500 alleged abuses possible committed by
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British soldiers that had fought in the Iraq war (Brown, 2016). Understanding the soldiers’
experiences in these situations and ensuring that they get the correct education and training thus
becomes extremely important. An additional element is that exposure to combat environments may
affect the integration of soldiers back into the society. Learning to control aggression becomes an
important element of functioning in a more normal environment (Brown, 2015).
In recent years, there has been a debate over the development of a warrior culture in some units
in the Norwegian military units. Specifically, the Telemark Battalion of the Norwegian Army
(TMBN) has been in the spotlight both within and outside the Norwegian Armed Forces for
fostering a warrior culture. The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (NAFJOD)
outlines some important components that the warrior should incorporate in order to be a true
warrior (Forsvarsstaben, 2007). Two of these components are discipline and personal responsibility
(ibid, 2007). Grossman (1995) has said about the warrior:
”These men are quite often armed and always vigilant. They would not misuse or misdirect their
aggression any more than a sheepdog would turn on his flock, but in their hearts many of them
yearn for a righteous battle, a wolf upon whom to legitimately and lawfully turn their skills“
(Grossman, 1995, p.184).
The main component here is discipline, and Grossman further states: ”When we add the
ingredient of discipline with the capability of violence, we create a warrior” (Grossman, 2008,
p.233). In the 2014 version of the NAFJOD it is stated: “that war and military operations puts
numerous psychological and physical variables in turn. We must therefore often make decisions
on a faulty information basis, often at the risk of large and irreversible consequences. Herein lies
the war's challenges” (Forsvarsstaben, 2014, p.169, our translation). A specific vision for the
Norwegian Armed Forces is anchored in the NAFJOD (Forsvarsstaben, 2007) and states: "The
military profession is the only profession in which its members can order others and even
themselves be ordered to risk their lives and to take life. [...] The profession places extreme
demands on discipline and on an evolved morality and ethics [...] "(ibid, 2007, p.161, our
translation). Based on these visions outlined in the two versions of the NAFJOD (Forsvarsstaben,
2007) we wanted to examine how the TMBN practices and educates soldiers in the development
of aggression in order to kill, and how it exercises the necessary degree of aggression control
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against carrying out extreme actions. In other words, how do they educate what we refer to as
“monsters with brakes”?
The research question
The purpose of this article is to understand how in general terms to develop an aggressive ability,
determination and aggression control in a unit. A second purpose is then to investigate whether the
current practice in the TMBN is correct in relation to relevant theory as regards the preparations
necessary to being able to kill and to exhibit aggression control, and whether it is in accordance
with the foundation for all soldier activity as stated in the NAFJOD (Forsvarsstaben, 2007). Our
research question therefore became:
Are the soldiers of the Mechanized Infantry Company 3 and 4 in the Norwegian Army battalion
TMBN correctly trained in aggression (the ability to kill) and aggression control (self-awareness
and self-control)?
We chose these two mechanized infantry companies because the TMBN chaplain has stated they
are well known to foster and to sustain a warrior culture in their soldiers and officers (P.
Wilhelmsson, personal communication, October 15, 2011). The method we used in this study
means that it is not possible to generalize our findings and apply this throughout the TMBN, but
that we can only relate our findings to the mechanized infantry company 3 and 4 of the battalion.
Findings here refers to the trends and patterns found in these companies, and do not mean that we
have the answers to how this should be trained. Due to the scope of the research question, we chose
not to look into any possible psychological damage as a result of killing. This choice was made
because in order to answer our research question, we need to investigate what has been done before
killing of the enemy and not afterwards. However, we realize that this is an important topic
revolving around the education of professional warriors.
When it comes to the use of punishment and use of force, soldiers and officers can come into
contact with aspects of themselves they are not familiar with. This can occur in situations and
events that put all integrity, professionalism and qualities of the individual on trial, which one can
rarely find and test in everyday and more regular situations. A moment of truth may arise where
the soldier's core is tested in the extreme. In all kinds of war, it is perhaps the psychological aspects
which are the hardest, controlling aggression and reacting on the basis of accepted norms, even in
a perilous situation. Is it then possible to ensure that officers and soldiers do not lose control
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because of fear (and other factors) and give in to violence controlled by impulses? Looking at the
history of the world the answer is a clear no (Moldjord & Holen, 2005). Lust for revenge as a result
of past experiences can also trigger aggression, and at the same time lack of aggression control.
This means that that violence leads to violence. George Quester writes that revenge lust is an
elementary emotional response when someone has insulted or hurt us or someone we care about
(Glad, 1990). The loss of your comrades can daze, paralyze or cause the soldiers to be defeated on
an emotional level. However, in many cases it can also lead to anger, thus enabling the soldier to
kill (Grossman, 1995). Possible outcomes are atrocities committed by soldiers seeking revenge.
Some examples of atrocities committed by military personnel is the My Lai massacre in 1968
(Brownmiller, 1975, 103-105), the Haditha killings in Iraq in 2005 (McGirk, 2006), or the
American prison guards torturing Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in 2004 (Moldjord &
Holen, 2005).
The need for aggression
"Without aggressive enemies and the need to protect our own interests, the justification for a
military defense will not be present" (Moldjord & Holen, 2005, p.115, our translation). Aggression
is clearly a part of our genetic heritage, but the normal person´s aggression quota will not make
him kill an acquaintance, nor will he go to war against other people from other countries without
first being trained and conditioned to conduct extreme actions, i.e. actions like killing (Grossman,
1995). Baron (1977), Berkowitz (1989) Buss (1961), Dollard et al. (1939), and Zillman (1979)
have all defined what aggression is. What their definitions all have in common is that they consider
aggression to be something unilateral from wanting to create damage to another organism. The way
the Norwegian Armed Forces use the term invokes a need for a broader and more nuanced
understanding of the concept. A soldier may be required to kill, which is confirmed by the
definition. "That the use of violence was necessary to prevent the Nazi Germany from continuing
their extinctions of Jews and gypsies is something few consider unethical today" (Moldjord &
Holen, 2005, p.116, our translation). The soldier will also have to be able to use aggression to deter
or protect his or her own territory, without necessarily hurting anyone. This article will therefore
include aggressive behavior intended to set limits and to act as a deterrent, in order to protect one’s
own offspring, territory, tribe or society. Kenneth R. Murray (2006) refers to three ways to develop
and train the necessary degree of aggression; skill, coping with stress and Grossman's (1995, 2008)
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willingness to kill. In order for a soldier to have control of his or her exercising of aggression, in
principle four assumptions that have to be present. These are: self-knowledge and self-control, the
opportunity to let off steam, social support and conversation with someone you have confidence in
(Moldjord & Holen, 2005). The U.S. Army veteran MSG Paul R. Howe (2005) says in his book
that leadership and training for the fight develops an aggressive mindset among their soldiers that
is essential if they are going to be able to kill in their service. Equally important will be to develop
a culture of controlled aggression by channeling fear, anger and anxiety through many hours of
realistic, relevant physical and mental training that is based on values.
Theoretical pespectives
It is well documented that soldiers in a group perform significantly better than they would have
by themselves (Kellett, 1984). According to Watson (1978, p. 113), "the good squad is more than
the sum of its parts". Moreover, it turns out that groups where individuals know each other well
and that have a well-developed sense of cohesion perform significantly better in the war than
groups that have just been created and where individuals to a lesser degree know each other (Dinter,
1985).
To understand how what we call monsters with brakes can be educated in combat units, we must
first account for the soldier's reactions in extreme situations and the factors that influence his
willingness to kill. Then we will look at how relevant theory (Grossman, 1995, 2008; Murray,
2006) claims one should educate and train warriors suitable for controlled violence and the use of
force. In this paper, we define monsters with brakes as soldiers that has the capacity to deliver
violence and to kill, something that is normally otherwise socially undesirable. This is the monster
part of the monsters with brakes. However, the monsters with brakes is at the same time equipped
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with brakes, that is, aggression control. Combining the capacity for violence with aggression
control thus creates the monsters with brakes.
The soldier’s anatomy and adding brakes to the soldier
"Think of a warrior as a finely calibrated machine. His job is to decide in a fraction of a second
exactly how much force to use. If he should use a little too much, he gets into trouble, and if he
uses too little, he can die” (Grossman, 2008, p. 18).
To overcome the barrier to kill, one must first be conditioned through realistic and proper
training in order to be a predator or a monster able to develop enough aggression to kill if this is
necessary. If the conditioning is done correctly, this will increase the ability and willingness to kill
and give a greater mastery of aggression. This will add brakes to or control of the warrior. To train
soldiers to become warriors the educator or instructor must understand how a soldier reacts to the
demands of war. This means understanding how a soldier thinks, how he reacts in different
situations and how to counteract it, if it is not conducive to the required controlled aggression.
Which factors influence the soldier's willingness to kill?
A study from 1973 conducted on veterans of the Vietnam War, World War II and the Korean
War investigated the phenomenon further. In the latter investigation, it was revealed that it was the
order from the authorities to open fire that was the deciding factor for the soldiers to shoot (Krauss,
Kaplan & Krauss, 1973). In a previous study by Boe and Johannesen (2015), four factors that
influence the soldier´s willingness to kill were investigated. The four factors were the role of the
group, the role of the leader, the emotional distance to the enemy, and the degree of aggressive
predisposition of the individual soldier. Using interviews with professional soldiers that had
previously killed in battle, it was found that the role of the group was very important in order to
increase the willingness to kill. The aggressive predisposition of the individual soldier was also
found to be an important factor in order to increase the willingness to kill. However, in this study,
neither the role of the leader nor the emotional distance to the enemy contributed to the soldier´s
willingness to kill.
" Any natural or learned resistance to killing, any sense of sanctity of human life, any human
emotions, any remorse or compassion at the moment of truth, can all be overcome and
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overwhelmed with training" (Grossman, 2008: p. 77). According to Kenneth R. Murray, there are
three aspects that determines whether a soldier or officer will succeed in a combat situation. These
are the individual skill level, the ability to cope with stress, and the willingness to perform extreme
acts (Murray, 2006). Regarding the willingness to perform extreme actions, Murray points to
Grossman's factors that affect the willingness to kill. Grossman describes these factors in his book
On Killing as physical distance, emotional distance, obedience, group absolution, target
attractiveness and the soldier and killer's predisposition. In the next sections, we will discuss briefly
the physical and emotional distances and conditioning and their relatedness to the willingness to
kill.
Physical distance
Grossman (1995) states that resistance to killing decreases the longer physical distance the
soldier or officer has to his or her target. There will clearly be a greater reluctance to kill another
person by physically tearing his throat in a combat situation, than standing miles away and pulling
a string on an artillery cannon. The resistance will naturally increase with sensory elements at short
distances like the smell of the combat field, the sight of combat, sounds like listening to the enemy
screaming in pain and so on. From what Grossman refers to as "Sexual Range" and even "Mid-
Range", that is short distances, you know as well that it is you who kill, you see your victim and
you cannot transfer this responsibility to your group or team.
Emotional distance
Grossman (1995) divides emotional distance into four factors; cultural, moral, social and
mechanical distance. We decided not to discuss social distance in this study, since social distance
does not seem to have a relevance for Norwegian soldiers. This was based on the findings that
Norway is one of the most egalitarian societies in the world (United Nations Development
Programme, 2010).
Cultural distance
In the factor cultural distance the enemy is regarded as a subordinate race or not human in all.
By dehumanizing the enemy a cultural distance is created that will make it easier emotionally to
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kill. This can be substantiated by the use of simple but strong examples like the Nazi Germany
extermination of the Jews, dehumanizing the Jews by referring to them as "Untermensch" (sub-
humans), and war crimes through grotesque treatment of prisoners at the Guantanamo base.
Documented condescending words have also been seen elsewhere in the history of warfare.
Referring to the enemy as japs, gooks, skinnies, Krauts, and so on are examples (Grossman, 1995).
This can make it easier to create the distance that is required to kill.
Moral distance
Moral distance discusses the belief in our own case, ideology and legalization of this,
justification of war, and what one is fighting for. A distinctive hate arises against those who attack
one's own country or values. Everything the enemy is doing is against your own faith and thus is a
legitimate opponent to be defeated or killed. Terrorism and Jihad are two examples that can create
a moral distance in that you think that the terrorists are morally wrong and that you are morally
right. There exists a relationship between cultural distance and the willingness to kill as is evident
in a well-known research report from World War II. Between 38 and 48 percent of the surveyed
U.S. soldiers replied that they would like to kill a Japanese soldier, while only between 5 and 9
percent said the same when the question concerned a German soldier (Stouffer, Lumsdaine,
Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, 1949).
Mechanical distance
Mechanical distance is according to Grossman due to current technological aids. Various screens
and machines make killing a mechanical execution, killing becomes like in a computer game. The
enemy resembles not so much a human being but rather a uniform or shade. An example here
would be a Norwegian CV90 infantry fighting vehicle shooter who shoots at a silhouette at 2,500
meters. The scope and levers give the shooter a mechanical distance and less proximity to the
killing (Grossman, 1995).
Conditioning of soldiers
During high stress, a soldier will use the more primitive parts of the brain. Activity in these parts
will increase when we are scared or angry. Patterns of thought and action may soon become
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ineffective because humans have a tendency to fall back to primitive reactions in crisis or
emergency situations. Reactions like these are often referred to as Fight, Flight, Posture or Submit
(Grossman, 1995). To train soldiers to perform appropriate and desirable actions under extreme
stress in war, techniques such as classical and operant conditioning are used. Operant conditioning
is a modern continuation of classical conditioning and the term conditioning will be used in this
study. Conditioning is conducted in order to give the soldier the stimuli he may meet in an extreme
situation such that the desired response or reaction may be shaped in response to the stimuli. By
showing the correct response to the stimulus, this will reinforce the belief in the decided action and
the nerve connections will become faster by repeating it until automation of an action (drill) is
obtained. Simply put, it is all about stimulus - response, stimulus - response, stimulus - response
(Boe, Kjørstad & Werner Hagen, 2012). Thus, conditioning of soldiers should include realistic
training where stress-inducing situations are common. These situations should include the practice
and training of skills and abilities to handle extreme situations, and situations that evoke the
different responses in a soldier. This will prepare the soldier for what he will face in a conflict and
give him experience. In order to instill a proper combat mindset through correct conditioning, these
situations need to include mental, tactical, physical, and technical aspects (Yanilov & Boe,
forthcoming).
Method
The method in this study was based on the social tradition that the objects of study are
communicative and interpretative people (Johannessen, Tuft, & Kristoffersen, 2005). Our starting
point in the present study was the existing theories about factors that may affect the willingness to
kill. Based upon this, we have interviewed a small sample of respondents and discussed the extent
to which their opinions and beliefs concur with what we present in the theory chapter in this article.
Because we sent out pre-structured questionnaires by email, we will refer to our informants as
respondents for the rest of this study. We have therefore used a deductive approach based upon
theory, and then we made an empirical comparison using a qualitative approach (ibid, 2006).
According to Jacobsen (2005), one will through the qualitative approach discover how people
themselves construct reality, and how they reveal all the variations and nuances found in different
interpretations. We chose to use a qualitative approach to highlight the research question we wanted
to investigate. We further chose to interview commanders at different levels in the TMBN,
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commanders who have been both criticized and praised for the way they conducted the education
of their soldiers.
We have looked at whether Grossman's (1995, 2008) and Murray´s (2006) relevant but also
somewhat controversial theories coincide with how Norway's most professional conventional unit
educates its soldiers. Empirical data was gathered through the opinions and interpretations of these
opinions, and not by numbers or statistics. By focusing on theory, and then continuing by
undertaking an empirical investigation, we ended up with a deductive approach (Johannesen,
2006). The questions that were asked in the emailed interview, were based on how the theory
describes the way to train sufficient aggression and aggression control in the soldiers of the TMBNs
mechanized infantry companies 3 and 4.
Choosing the best method for the research question
This study deals to a large degree with the individual military commander's interpretation and
perception of how he trains or how he has trained his soldiers. The difficult nature of this theme
requires a high level of understanding and reflection, both in the authors and in the respondents, to
give it the depth the research question requires. The theme has not been researched much, and there
is a lack of empirical documentation to be found on this subject. In addition, there are few units in
the Norwegian Armed Forces where commanders have as much relevant expertise in this area as
do the commanders of the TMBN. The selected method favors a qualitative approach where details,
nuances and the uniqueness of each subject matter expert respondent becomes emphasized.
However, by using this method, the study will have a weakness in that the number of respondents
will be limited, because of time available and limited resources (Jacobsen 2005). Face-to-face
interviews simply take a lot of time. The answers given by the commanders cannot be said to be
representative of the entire TMBN battalion, as we have limited ourselves to ask only the
commanders of the TMBNs mechanized infantry companies 3 and 4. On the other hand, it is in
these two companies in the battalion that we find commanders with the most relevant experiences
and expertise in training their soldiers to exhibit aggression and aggression control. We also think
that a quantitative approach would be too superficial when studying this complex theme. In
addition, if we included the enlisted soldiers of the battalion in a quantitative study, they would
perhaps not possess the same skills and understanding regarding education as a commander does.
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This might result in irrelevant answers to our questions, and thus as a consequence we might not
be able to answer our research question thoroughly enough.
Participants
The respondents and research objects
The TMBN is the only Norwegian conventional military unit with a hundred percent enlisted or
professional military personnel. Because of the unit's uniqueness and responsiveness, they have
also sent more combat troops to international operations in recent times than other units in Norway
have. In return for this, the battalion has gained relevant and unique experience regarding how to
educate soldiers. Unit and platoon commanders in the battalion are therefore a natural and good
choice as interview and research objects. According to Jacobsen (2005), such a population will
provide the best possible information one may get.
We chose to extract answers that were given by several respondents, as this would give strong
indications of patterns and trends in the units’ education in general. With a qualitative approach
and a limited number of just five respondents, this may be seen as a weakness in our research
approach. On the other hand, the answers the respondents provided were quite similar, and the fact
that the respondents had been commanders at different times and that they did not know who the
other respondents were, gave our research approach some more validity and credibility.
Materials
The pre-structured questionnaire
The pre-structured questionnaire used in this study consisted of questions in a fixed order with
some elements of open-ended questions. By using a pre-structured interview, it can be argued that
we are drawing on a quantitative method. But, as long as the respondents answers with their own
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words and there is opportunity for openness, our method will still be described as a qualitative
method (Jacobsen, 2005).
Procedure
The interviews and collecting the empirical data
The TMBN is the only conventional military force in the Norwegian Armed Forces with a
hundred percent enlisted or professional military personnel. Because of the battalion's uniqueness
and responsiveness, they have also posted the most combat troops to international operations in
recent times. In return, the battalion has gained relevant and unique experience regarding how to
educate soldiers. The unit and platoon commanders are therefore a natural and good choice as
interview and research objects, this sample will thus provide the best possible information
(Jacobsen, 2005).
To get a sense of coherence in the discussion chapter of this study, we have chosen to emphasize
responses enhanced by several respondents, as this will give strong indications of patterns and
trends regarding education in general. With a qualitative approach and given a limited number of
only five respondents, this may indicate a weakness in the breadth of the discussion chapter. On
the other hand, the answers from the respondents tended to be quite similar. Both that the
respondents have been commanders at different times and the fact that they do not know who the
other respondents are, adds to the validity and credibility of the results. We do not intend to criticize
the individual respondent for errors or deficiencies in training and we also omit certain details
which are not considered to be relevant to highlight the issue and to answer our research question.
The names of our respondents will be kept anonymous in this study, due to the sensitive subject of
educating soldiers to show aggression and aggression control, and due to operational security for
our respondents. The respondents will therefore be referred to by numbers (i.e. Respondent 1 and
so on).
When we decided to collect empirical data, we essentially had three choices; observation, group
interviews and open physical individual interview, or pre-structured interviews by using a
questionnaire via email. Observation as a method of collecting data was ruled out as it was deemed
too time-consuming. A lot of time would have to be invested in order to observe the exercises
needed to highlight the issue. Group interview was also deselected because we wanted the
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individual respondents’ answers with their perceptions of a situation. Group interviews can cause
the opinions to be colored by the other participants (Jacobsen, 2005), which is unfavorable for the
validity of respondents’ answers and our discussion. Because of the theme's complex scope, we
chose a pre-structured interview by email, so the focus would be directed steadily towards the areas
of concern that would be relevant. By filling out the pre-structured questionnaire via email the time
spent in data collection, time and travel costs was reduced. In addition, the amount of data will be
easier to process. However, we clearly understood that we would lose the opportunity to see how
respondents act or react to questions, and to a lesser extent be able to follow up a question in the
moment. Using email will reduce the scope of the data collection to some extent, but to answer the
research question, we decided that there was no need to interpret reactions, or to create proximity
or familiarity. Our research question could then be answered by interpretations and perceptions, by
giving respondents the opportunity to think and to express themselves in writing, and this led to a
greater reflection in the individual respondent than a physical interview would have done. The pre-
structured questionnaire in this paper consisted of questions in a fixed order with elements of open
questions. By using a partially closed interview, it can be argued that we draw on a quantitative
method. Nevertheless, as long as the respondents answers in their own words and there is
opportunity for openness, it will still be described as a qualitative method (Jacobsen, 2005).
The questions used in the pre-structured interview
The questions used in the pre-structured interview can be found in Table 1 below. The questions
were designed by the authors based upon existing theoretical perspectives that we considered to be
important in order to answer our research question. First, the purpose of the interview was
explained to the respondents. They were told that the purpose of the study was primarily intended
to understand how aggressive ability, determination and aggression control can be developed in a
unit in general (theoretical approach). They were then told that a second purpose was to investigate
whether the TMBN practiced correctly in their preparations to kill and to exhibit aggression control
in relation to relevant theory and this was in accordance with the NAFJOD´s paragraph 0615
(Forsvarsstaben, 2007). After this, they were then explained the exact content of paragraph 0615:
The military profession is the only one that its members can order others and even themselves be
ordered to risk their life and to kill. [...] The profession places extreme demands on discipline and
on an evolved morality and ethic [...]" (Forsvarsstaben, 2007, 161, our translation). The
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respondents were then requested to answer questions based on their subjective understanding of
how they had been conducting their education for their soldiers in order to condition them to
become warriors. We also explained to the respondents that in the study we already had taken a
theoretical approach to how this can be achieved. We finally explained to the respondents that the
interviews therefore aimed at their views and not at regulations or theory. Before some of the
questions, a statement was given to the respondents. This was done in order to clarify things before
the nest question. Regarding the first questions related to skills, no statements were deemed
necessary as an officer know through his education what a skill is (table 1).
Table 1. Questions regarding skills that the respondents were requested to answer in the interview.
Skills
How do you practice on realistic scenarios?
Why do you practice on realistic scenarios?
Are human targets used that pose different threats or do you use cardboard characters?
Do you practice on shooting women and children?
If no, can you imagine why the theory says that this may be a good way to train?
How do you practice decision training?
Example; shoot, no shoot exercises
The following table (table 2) gives an overview over the questions that we asked that were related
to coping with stress. In specific stressful events, the heart rate may rise sharply from 60 BPM to
over 200 BPM in less than a second. This usually happens when there is a high level of fear present
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in the person, with minimal time to react or when the consequences of and failure are great (Murray,
2006).
Table 2. Questions regarding coping with stress that the respondents were requested to answer in
the interview.
Coping with stress
How do you practice on coping with stress?
Why do you practice on coping with stress?
Do the soldiers practice on controlling their heart rate in stressful situations?
If yes, how?
In two-way exercises, is a laser system (SAAB)1 or paint balls (SIMUNITION®)2 used most
frequently?
Considering the training effect and not the technical effect, are there some benefits to using either
or?
Having a positive inner dialogue in extreme situations is a coping strategy, is this implemented?
If yes, how?
1SAAB laser system is a system used in tactical training scenarios. The helmet has laser detectors
and reflectors and a west with small loudspeakers, a radio antenna and built in GPS is used. The
system is used in force against force training.
2Simunition® is marking cartridges made of paint. This means non-lethal training ammunition
designed for force against force training (Murray 2006, 304-305).
The respondents were then asked to read the following information: Swank and Marchand
(1946, p. 244) refers to a study where 2 percent of combat soldiers will not experience resistance
to killing, is very aggressive in battle, feel immune to danger and will not feel any kind of remorse
or empathy, and according to Grossman (1995) can be described as sociopathic. The remaining 98
percent have an inherent resistance to killing their own species, this can be only be overcome with
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training, conditioning and influence from the unit. Then they were asked to answer the questions
related to unit culture that can be found below in table 3.
Table 3. Questions regarding unit culture that the respondents were requested to answer in the
interview.
Unit culture
When you recruit new soldiers, do you to a large degree look for people with an innate
temperament?
Why, why not?
Does the enemy become less human through practice and dialogue in the TMBN?
Does it happen that you use nicknames on the enemy (degrading names)?
Positive and negative consequences of doing so?
Is it accepted?
Is this systematized in training or does it happens as a result of unit culture and profession?
Can you mention some positive and negative consequences of making the enemy less human?
Statement: "The Taliban gets their will to kill among others things through their faith in their own
religion."
How did you increase or how do you increase your will to kill in your unit?
Statement: It is known that if other own soldiers or officers are killed in war, the soldier will be
inclined to perform extreme acts beyond the ordinary. On several occasions, soldiers have
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committed murders and executions as a result of revenge. The events at the Battle for Haditha is
an example.
How are the soldiers affected by their hatred, are they more prone to aggressive actions beyond
what is provided by the rules of engagement (ROE) and other constraints?
If the unit´s own soldiers would have been killed in battle, would the soldiers have been able to
exhibit aggression control?
Table 4 shows the questions we asked the respondents that were related to social support and to
the opportunity to let of steam.
Table 4. Questions regarding social support and the opportunity to let off steam that the respondents
were requested to answer in the interview.
Social support and the opportunity to let off steam
What kind of social support exist in the unit?
Do the soldiers have an opportunity to let off steam after an extreme incident?
How?
Finally, the respondents were thanked for taking the time to answer the interview. They were also
told that we hoped the interview gave them an opportunity to reflect on the importance of
aggression training and aggression control in a unit. Finally, they were informed that all responses
would be anonymous and answers deleted by censorship, and that we would inform them when
this was done. As can be seen from table 1-4, our questions were related to skills training, coping
with stress, unit culture, and to social support and to the opportunity to let of steam.
Results
When analyzing the answers given by our respondents we decided to aggregate the answers.
This means that we wanted to look at the bigger picture instead of analyzing each respondent´s
individual answer to a question. The purpose of using this analyzing method was that it would be
easier to see trends or what the majority of respondents thought in relation to the questions. We
also wanted to look at the big picture when it came to answers given by our respondents within a
specific category. This means that we decided to aggregate the answers for each category, that is,
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20
skills training, coping with stress, unit culture, and social support and to the opportunity to let of
steam.
Conditioning of soldiers - skills
In this section we will argue that the TMBN does practice skills in accordance with how the
theory outlines that it should be done, but that they implement aggression control earlier. Basic
soldier proficiency is achieved through a basic education and various other specialization courses.
The increasing degree of complexity allows the soldiers to obtain a collection of experiences while
decision making training is improved. According to our five respondents, a variety of means to
achieve realism in training is used. Using personnel with fake wounds, blood, and injuries; close
combat where the soldiers fight each other; and close combat training scenarios in light as well as
in low light and/or dark conditions or confined areas are used. In addition, the two companies use
all available means of power from the bayonet at close quarters to the unit´s long-range weapons.
Because of lack of time and materials at their disposal, the companies had no significant focus on
using human-like target, but used regular cardboard targets. Most of our respondents state that they
had not educated their soldiers to shoot at women or children. They further argue that this form of
exercise is not necessarily good decision making training in itself, but should be viewed as an
attention exercise. The respondents realize why it may be advantageous to condition soldiers to kill
a child or a woman who poses a threat, but that this should be practiced in other ways. Here they
draw up scenarios that also include practicing aggression control and motivation. Military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT), with both armed and unarmed actors (a third party), are used
to practice distinction of and assessment of a target, including legitimacy, threat and actual
identification. Furthermore, the companies practice escalation of power and the employment of
violence through training on the mandate of the given assignment and the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) for a specific mission. The idea behind this is that this will raise the awareness of the soldiers
of how much power they can use in a specific situation. To achieve realism and decision making
training most respondents are of the opinion that scenario-based training will provide the best
outcome.
The theory suggests that self-awareness and self-control (as in aggression control) comes after
and as a consequence of coping with skills and stress. The TMBN adds aggression control at an
earlier time in their educational program than the theory suggest. The theory says nothing about
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the prerequisites of the personnel in order to undergo this type of conditioning. From the responses
given by our respondents, we see a clear tendency for the soldiers in the two companies to be
conditioned faster than the theory accounts for, because the soldiers have been selected based upon
values, potential, aptitude and an aggression test at the start of the education. There are small
deviations in the companies from how the theory outlines conducting the best possible skill
training. However, looking at the big picture, perfecting skills so the skills become automated,
decision making training, and increasing complexity are the same as outlined by theory.
Conditioning of soldiers - coping with stress
We found that the TMBN practices coping with stress somewhat differently than Murray (2006)
and Grossman (1995, 2008) outline as the correct way. The respondents all claim that they practice
in more depth on the mental aspects of stress control. As previously mentioned, the soldiers are
selected in accordance with certain criteria. This will be reflected in how motivated the personnel
are for training and how quickly the training will be allowed to progress. In addition to the fact that
fear, anxiety, stress and reactions are conditioned through realistic and complex scenarios, time is
set aside to deal with the mental aspects around stress control. This correlates well with Limbert´s
(2004) study showing that a majority of the British military personnel deployed in conjunction with
the Falklands War in the 1980s used positive thinking as their primary coping strategy. Respondent
2 described this type of training like this: "The company commander often gathers the unit [...] and
presents various situations that the individual must visualize [...] You are commanding the vehicle
and both your legs are blown away, you have to use your hands to accelerate…, your partner is
shot in the stomach and in the intestines and blood flows out, you order covering fire and pull him
into cover"[...]" (our translation).
In his book Brødre i blodet (Brothers in blood, our translation) former TMBN soldier Emil
Johansen writes that visualization was frequently used in his unit, Mechanized Infantry Company
4:"[...] I've imagined myself so far into it that I'm willing to bite his throat if necessary. I'll never
lose. Being hurt is not the same as giving up" (Johansen, 2011, p.109). Our respondents said that
the soldiers were educated in topics such as stress and combat reactions and techniques to
counteract these reactions, as well as to make the soldier familiar with normal reactions and to
provide a better basis for coping with this. Not much was mentioned during this education of the
theories of Murray (2006) and of Grossman (1995; 2008), only a paragraph. The respondents said
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they were familiar with, and have used, breathing techniques to dampen the sense of stress in the
classroom and on exercises, but they had not used or implemented positive inner dialogue as a
separate area of focus in education. Furthermore, our respondents said that pulse control was not
exercised nor practiced as a separate field, but was practiced as part of a whole, through
conditioning and coping with stress. Murray (2006) argues that control of the pulse will be a focus
for future warriors, but that there is too little research on this subject as of today. By comparing the
theoretical foundations and empirical evidence from our respondents, we draw a logical inference,
namely that positive inner dialogue will come naturally because the soldier has faith in his own
abilities, is familiar with how he reacts in stressful situations, and has the support of his unit.
Therefore, it is not necessary to allow extra time for this component in the education of the soldier
of the TMBN.
Murray (2006) is quite clear when it comes to using bilateral exercises (meaning two forces or
soldiers acting as opponents in a scenario) and how this should be trained. If SIMUNITION® is
not used the soldier will not experience any fear of being hit, and this will lead to that the learning
process from the exercise will be of less value for the individual soldier. Stated differently, if you
are not shot upon, you will not practice upon the correct responses to being shot upon. On the one
hand, our respondents mostly agree that the feeling of fear and shooting another human being
generate positive effects in aggression, reduces the resistance to killing, and increases realism. On
the other hand, they are critical to the SIMUNITION® system if the scenario requires longer
distances as this will lead to reduced accuracy. Furthermore, the weapons systems must be equal
to the unit’s weapons, otherwise this will contradict the theory of conditioning and automatization
of skills. They are also critical of Murray's (2006) contention that warriors should not be
conditioned to be "killed" in training, as this can lead to excessive and misplaced faith in their own
ability. The fact that a soldier should not give up or never accept losing, should rather be learned
through attitudes and values, according to our respondents. At this point, it should be mentioned
that Murray is one of the founders of SIMUNITION®. Because of this, he argues only for and not
against using the SIMUNITION® system. He highlights few or none of the drawbacks of the
system. Therefore, his arguments thus lack objectivity and validity.
Murray (2006) and Grossman's (1995, 2008) theories are missing important elements of how to
cope with stress, as the mental aspect is partly not accounted for. Their views on bilateral exercises
are also somewhat weakened because they do not mention the drawbacks of the system, which is
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pointed out by our respondents. None of the respondents have experienced or seen paralysis in
combat because of stress or conflict reactions. This may indicate that the mechanized infantry
company 3 and 4 in the TMBN has a more holistic perspective on how to cope with stress, and that
it works. A potential pitfall in our discussion might be that the prerequisites personnel in the
mechanized infantry company 3 and 4 in the TMBN has to have in order to be conditioned, is better
than the theory accounts for. As one of our respondents stated: "The key to success with this
(something we've done 100 percent) is selection. Without warriors who are disciplined, reflective
and ethically aware, this approach would have been dangerous" (Respondent 3, our translation).
Still, it can be concluded that the conditioning of warriors are fairly similar to the theories except
that the TMBN implements and exercises aggression control at an earlier stage.
Grossman's (1995, 2008) factors of willingness to kill are being practiced through conditioning
(practicing skills and coping with stress), with the exception of emotional distance. Our
respondents believe that the willingness to kill does generally not need to be practiced and that this
theory does not apply to the TMBN because the current conflicts have changed and attitudes have
evolved. We conclude, however, that much of the theory is still applicable because several of the
respondents spoke unconsciously about how the willingness to kill was practiced through
conditioning. They stated that their soldiers trained realistically at different distances with all the
unit´s weapons, something that covers physical distance.
Obedience is given in that all the soldiers are selected and will generally possess good values,
potential, and for officers, subject matter expertise. The group will also be affected by the two
preceding elements, that is, skills and stress, and will reinforce its identification through legitimacy
of actions and coping of skills and stress. Aggressive predisposition is the psychological
precondition every individual brings with him into a combat situation, and this is furthered by
conditioning the warrior. Emotional distance is the only factor that is not a pure result of
conditioning. The TMBN practices and develops the willingness to kill through conditioning and
through unit culture. But what about emotional distance?
Conditioning of soldiers - unit culture and emotional distance
Emotional distance will help reduce the resistance to killing, it will increase the willingness to
carry out acts of aggression, but is it appropriate for combat units in today's conflicts? Most
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respondents agree with the theory, which says that emotional distance and dehumanization will
reduce the resistance to killing, but it will not do it in a sensible way. They argue that
dehumanization and making the enemy inferior was something that happened in Vietnam and in
older previous wars in order to overcome resistance to killing, but that this did not take place with
their soldiers while they were in Afghanistan. "I consider it a sign of disease and an indicator of a
poor unit culture if one is forced to resort to dehumanization" (Respondent 3, our translation).
Respondent 2 said that this happened when he was in Kosovo because the situation felt hopeless
and the job felt pointless. By degrading, for instance during the war in Afghanistan last years, the
Afghanis (i.e. putting civilians and enemies in the same box) there is a greater chance that resistance
to killing civilians becomes less and that excessive use of force may occur. This will help in
aggressiveness but reduce the degree of aggression control.
Also pointed out by our respondents was that the moral distance (why one fights) is very
different, the Taliban are fighting their own fight, partly because of religion and ideology, while
the Norwegian soldiers are professionally motivated.
To accomplish the mission because it is their job and trust that the Norwegian government uses
the unit for something that will have a positive effect is important. By having a professional
approach to the killing through conditioning, teaching and conversation, that normalizes the killing
or being injured, the moral balance becomes better in the unit.
"There is to a low degree focus on the willingness to kill, it is more about normalizing it. [...]
Through visualization, discussion and thousands of "kills" on the shooting range and exercises this
is normalized" (Respondent 3, our translation). "Common taboos in the civilian world, like killing
and cultivating controlled aggression, was natural conversation topics for us" (Johansen, 2011,
p.37). It will therefore be important to have a professional unit culture that manages to
communicate this message or to deal with negative or unwanted sub-cultures. The officers will be
the main control mechanism for this.
By comparing the theory with our empirical data in light of today's conflicts, it is confirmed that
this element will help reduce resistance to killing. This will be a contributing factor for groups who
want to kill as many as possible, but not for international forces who rely on aggression control in
their personnel. The TMBN reduces resistance to killing through conditioning and professional
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attitudes, which will also provide a greater degree of aggression control. The unit does not do this
through emotional distance.
Conditioning of soldiers - unit culture and social support
We have shown how physical aggression control (self-awareness and self-control) is the result
of proper conditioning. The last two factors that contribute to aggression control, social support
and the opportunity to let off steam, are dependent on trust within the unit and a good unit culture.
Social support was defined by our respondents as support if the warrior should have a need to
talk or relieve thoughts and feelings. It is also defined as support from the closest commander if
something should occur during a mission. Loyalty and trust towards the commanding officers are
important. The primary group is most important at first. This group has direct knowledge of or a
good understanding of the situation the person is in. This consists of the pair mate, the team and
the squad. Then the secondary group will consist of a priest and a psychologist to get professional
support in areas in which the primary group cannot give support.
Conditioning of soldiers - unit culture and the opportunity to let off steam
Regarding the possibility to let off steam, our respondents answer that this is done through a
technical and emotional debriefing after an incident or mission. The aim is that everyone should
get a unified picture of what has happened and the opportunity to speak out about their thoughts
and feelings, and in this way vent. Moreover, two respondents mentioned that the best way for
them to let off steam caused by an extreme event, was going on a mission again. Not to take
revenge, but to get the feeling of mastering a situation and then move on.
The theory states that a soldier may be inclined to exhibit abnormal aggressive behavior and hate
if he experiences losing a close colleague or leader – he may feel meaninglessness, may not trust
those closest to him and so may need to let off steam (Grossman, 1995). War history has shown
that has happened several times (Caputo, 1977).
Most respondents have lost a soldier during a mission and seen aggressive tendencies among
their soldiers. No one has lost his temper. The theory and empirical data can conclude that this may
be due to soldiers' self-awareness and self-control that has been created through conditioning, the
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social support provided through trust and confidence, and the opportunity to vent through
conversations and the focus on solving the assigned missions.
Conclusions
In order to answer our research problem, we first provided an understanding of how soldiers
react in extreme situations. Furthermore, we then provided a theoretical description of how
aggression and aggression control should be educated according to theory. This has been done by
using Murray (2006) and Grossman's (1995, 2008) three factors for developing aggression; skills,
coping with stress and the willingness to kill. Through the theoretical part of the study, it has been
possible to make logical conclusions where it appears that aggression control and willingness to
kill are a result of conditioning, that is, skills and coping with stress and unit culture. The theoretical
foundation has been the basis for derivation of questions for the interviews, and been the subject
of discussion.
Through our selected method and approach, it has been possible to go in depth into the material.
By selecting respondents who have subject matter expertise and higher officer education, the
collection of empirical data provided a good basis for discussion and conclusions. The fact that
respondents answer open question relatively similarly (without having conferred with each other)
has strengthened the credibility of the empirical data. The deductive approach enables a verification
or a falsification of our research question. Our research question was: Are the soldiers of
Mechanized Infantry Company 3 and 4 in the Norwegian Army battalion TMBN correctly trained
in aggression (the ability to kill) and aggression control (self-awareness and self-control)? These
two mechanized infantry companies were chosen because they foster and sustain a warrior culture
in their soldiers and officers.
The theory does not refer to the conditions that must be present in order to start the warrior
education. By referring to empirical data obtained through interviews, we conclude that the two
companies in TMBN educate their soldiers faster than the theory takes into account. This is mainly
due to the selection process in the TMBN and good conditions for the conditioning process. There
are small deviations between how the theory outlines that aggression and aggression control should
be trained and how it is conducted in the two companies. The TMBN practices in more depth on
how to cope with stress, and implements aggression control at an earlier stage than the theory
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outlines. Also confirmed was that emotional and moral distance will reduce the resistance to kill,
but that it is not appropriate for Norwegian military forces, as this reduces the level of aggression
control.
Respondents said they had not experienced paralysis in action in their soldiers, they had not seen
anyone lose their temper even in situations which in theory could evoke hatred. All respondents
said that they felt that the soldiers were well trained in aggression and aggression control when
they deployed to international operations. Based on the respondents’ answers, we found that the
effect of training on extreme situations had been possible to verify, and had been found to have a
positive effect on aggression and on aggression control. We therefore conclude that the soldiers of
Mechanized Infantry Company 3 and 4 in the Norwegian Army battalion TMBN have been
educated correctly in aggression (the ability to kill) and in aggression control (self-awareness and
self-control).
However, more research on this topic is needed, as the number of respondents was quite low in
the present study. The low number of respondents in the study thus makes it impossible to
generalize to other Norwegian Army units, or even to other units in the TMBN. On the other hand,
the number of Norwegian soldiers or officers that have killed in the line of duty are few, and ever
fewer of them are interested in talking about it. This severely limits our ability to generalize our
results to a larger population of Norwegian soldiers and officers. What we can state from our results
is that the TMBN largely satisfies paragraph 0615 in the NAFJOD: "The military profession is the
only profession in which its members can order others and even themselves be ordered to risk and
to take life. [...] The profession places extreme demands on discipline and on an evolved morality
and ethics [...] "(Forsvarsstaben, 2007, p.161, our translation). This statement is supposed to govern
all of the Norwegian Army units as well. Further research should therefore look into other units to
investigate whether these units, who are not professional in the same sense as the TMBN units,
satisfy the same requirements. An interesting question would then be if it will be possible to achieve
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the same results regarding aggression and aggression control in soldiers with a year of regular
conscript military service.
Acknowledgements
This research work was supported by the Norwegian Military Academy. The views expressed in
this article are those of the authors and do not represent any official position by the Norwegian
Army. The authors wish to thank senior lecturer Merete Ruud at the Norwegian Military Academy
for valuable help with the language of this work.
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