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Moral uncertainty
Abstract
What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making under empirical uncertainty, but surprisingly little has been written about the moral uncertainty expressed by this question. Only very recently have philosophers started to systematically address the nature of such uncertainty and its impacts on decision-making. This paper addresses the main problems raised by moral uncertainty and critically examines some proposed solutions.
... The variance between the potential future and the ideal future can be called "risk", and the understanding of such a risk can be called "risk perception". Risk involves a degree of uncertainty in relation to the outcomes or consequences of activities associated with that which people value (e.g., heath, welfare, wealth, assets, the environment) [16]. As a key notion in sustainable development, risk represents uncertainty in the development process. ...
... The variance between the potential future and the ideal future can be called "risk", and the understanding of such a risk can be called "risk perception." Risk involves a degree of uncertainty in relation to the outcomes or consequences of activities associated with that which people value (e.g., heath, welfare, wealth, assets, the environment) [16]. As a key notion in sustainable development, risk represents uncertainty in the development process. ...
... However, if we fail to have a lucid understanding of values and desirables, how can we identify the potential variance? [16]. ...
Today’s challenges to sustainability are explored through a complex combination of interdisciplinary topics that explore various interactions between economic, social, and environmental systems that further contribute to existing uncertainties. Solving complex/dynamic sustainability constraints does not demand exclusively technical and practical methods, as it is equally important to have a profound conceptual understanding of the origins of such challenges. The purpose of this study was to investigate the challenges to the sustainable development process from the perspective of the philosophy of grey systems theory (GST). GST considers inherent defects and shortcomings in human understanding/knowledge and identifies the roots of uncertainty. The study concentrates on the sustainable development process, highlighting the ways in which GST explains the causes and sources of uncertainty in this process. It is emphasized that sustainability cannot be achieved without intentional human intervention, and that international collaboration is vital in solving sustainability problems. Uncertainty and challenges to sustainable development stem from human grey understanding and knowledge. This problem makes it difficult for humans to understand and model dynamicity, to strike a balance between different spheres of science, and to have an objective view of reality due to the dependence of knowledge on thinking paradigms and values. These shortcomings ultimately bring about value conflicts, different understandings of risks, and impediments to international collaboration and agreement. Finally, the study explains that uncertainty arises from incomplete understanding and grey knowledge, and that uncertainty undermines the prediction of outcomes. Furthermore, delays inherent in interactions and the impacts of diverse systems on the world increase uncertainty and complicate decision- and policymaking in improvement projects. In their efforts to implement their decisions and policies, humans also encounter various limitations in terms of their capacities, resources, and facilities. The application of GST-based approaches to the operational area is also discussed.
... One interesting approach to these problems represents moral reasoning under uncertainty the way that decision theory represents rational choice under uncertainty (Hudson 1989;Oddie 1995;Gracely 1996;Smith 2002;Sepielli 2009;MacAskill 2016;Bykvist 2017;MacAskill and Ord forthcoming). This approach models the agent's credence in each moral theory, and in the facts of the case, by using an unconditional probability. ...
A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds descriptive uncertainty about the non-moral facts of a situation into the model by treating choice-worthiness as a random variable. When agents face greater descriptive uncertainty, the choice-worthiness random variable will have a greater spread and a larger standard deviation. MEC, as a decision rule, is sensitive only to the expected value of the random variable and not to its standard deviation. For example, MEC is insensitive to cases where an option with a large degree of descriptive uncertainty may have a higher probability of being below some threshold of impermissibility than does an option with less dispersion, even though the latter has a higher expected choice-worthiness. When applied to the same situation, similar moral theories will have statistically correlated choice-worthiness values. This correlation affects the dispersion of the credence-weighted sum of the random variables but not its expected value. Thus, MEC is insensitive to aspects of the normative situation to which a good decision-rule should be sensitive.
... Well, to answer that we need a third-order moral theory, and an infinite regress appears to arise. 7 4 Smith (2002) and Bykvist andOlson (2009, 2012) argue that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for moral uncertainty, whereas Sepielli (2011) argues that they can rise to the challenge. 5 See Sepielli (2012) for one account. ...
According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by (Jeffrey) conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence calls for. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In the first essay I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. The second variation replaces descriptive claims with moral claims as the objects of credence. I consider three standard arguments for probabilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—in order to examine whether such arguments can also be used to establish probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. In the second essay, I argue that by and large they can, with some caveats. First, I don’t examine whether these arguments can be given sound non-cognitivist readings, and any conclusions therefore only hold conditional on cognitivism. Second, decision-theoretic representation theorems are found to be less convincing in the moral case, because there they implausibly commit us to thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are always possible. Third and finally, certain considerations may lead one to think that imprecise probabilism provides a more plausible model of moral epistemology. The third variation considers whether, in addition to (Jeffrey) conditionalization, agents may also change their minds by becoming aware of propositions they had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned any probability. More specifically, I argue that if we wish to make room for reflective equilibrium in a probabilistic moral epistemology, we must allow for awareness growth. In the third essay, I sketch the outline of such a Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium. Given that (i) this account gives a central place to awareness growth, and that (ii) the rationality constraints on belief change by awareness growth are much weaker than those on belief change by (Jeffrey) conditionalization, it follows that the rationality constraints on the credences of agents who are seeking reflective equilibrium are correspondingly weaker.
Conscientious objection is a critical topic that has been sparsely discussed from a global health perspective, despite its special relevance to our inherently diverse field. In this Analysis paper, we argue that blanket prohibitions of a specific type of non-discriminatory conscientious objection are unjustified in the global health context. We begin both by introducing a nuanced account of conscience that is grounded in moral psychology and by providing an overview of discriminatory and non-discriminatory forms of objection. Next, we point to the frequently neglected but ubiquitous presence of moral uncertainty, which entails a need for epistemic humility—that is, an attitude that acknowledges the possibility one might be wrong. We build two arguments on moral uncertainty. First, if epistemic humility is necessary when dealing with values in theory (as appears to be the consensus in bioethics), then it will be even more necessary when these values are applied in the real world. Second, the emergence of global health from its colonial past requires special awareness of, and resistance to, moral imperialism. Absolutist attitudes towards disagreement are thus incompatible with global health’s dual aims of reducing inequity and emerging from colonialism. Indeed, the possibility of global bioethics (which balances respect for plurality with the goal of collective moral progress) hinges on appropriately acknowledging moral uncertainty when faced with inevitable disagreement. This is incompatible with blanket prohibitions of conscientious objection. As a brief final note, we distinguish conscientious objection from the problem of equitable access to care. We note that conflating the two may actually lead to a less equitable picture on the whole. We conclude by recommending that international consensus documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, be amended to include nuanced guidelines regarding conscientious objection that can then be used as a template by regional and national policymaking bodies.
Recently, several philosophers have argued that, when faced with moral uncertainty, we ought to choose the option with the maximal expected choiceworthiness (MEC). This view has been challenged on the grounds that it is implausibly demanding. In response, those who endorse MEC have argued that we should take into account the all-things-considered choiceworthiness of our options. I argue that this gives rise to another problem: acts that we consider to be supererogatory are rendered impermissible, and acts that we consider to be suberogatory are rendered obligatory, under MEC. I suggest a way to reformulate MEC to solve this problem.
Many philosophers think that descriptive uncertainty is relevant to what we subjectively ought to do. This leads to a further question: is what we subjectively ought to do sensitive to our moral uncertainty as well? Includers say yes—what we subjectively ought to do is sensitive to both descriptive uncertainty and moral uncertainty. Excluders say no—only descriptive uncertainty matters to what we subjectively ought to do (i.e., moral uncertainty is irrelevant). Excluders argue that common motivations for the subjective ought only give us reason to think that descriptive uncertainty matters. This paper focuses on one motivation: accessibility. Excluders argue that accessibility does not motivate the Includers’ view because moral truths are always accessible – unlike descriptive facts which are not always accessible. My goal is to defend the Includers’ view by arguing that moral truths are not always accessible in the relevant sense.
Background:
Discrete choice models (DCMs) for moral choice analysis will likely lead to erroneous model outcomes and misguided policy recommendations, as only some characteristics of moral decision-making are considered. Machine learning (ML) is recently gaining interest in the field of discrete choice modelling. This paper explores the potential of combining DCMs and ML to study moral decision-making more accurately and better inform policy decisions in healthcare.
Methods:
An interdisciplinary literature search across four databases - PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Arxiv - was conducted to gather papers. Based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guideline, studies were screened for eligibility on inclusion criteria and extracted attributes from eligible papers. Of the 6285 articles, we included 277 studies.
Results:
DCMs have shortcomings in studying moral decision-making. Whilst the DCMs' mathematical elegance and behavioural appeal hold clear interpretations, the models do not account for the 'moral' cost and benefit in an individual's utility calculation. The literature showed that ML obtains higher predictive power, model flexibility, and ability to handle large and unstructured datasets. Combining the strengths of ML methods with DCMs has the potential for studying moral decision-making.
Conclusions:
By providing a research agenda, this paper highlights that ML has clear potential to i) find and deepen the utility specification of DCMs, and ii) enrich the insights extracted from DCMs by considering the intrapersonal determinants of moral decision-making.
We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI etc), animals, and patients with 'locked in' syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or intimate partners? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimise the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choiceworthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the 'risk asymmetry argument', which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favouring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this paper argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help to resolve disputes about the status of human-AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue), however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically-grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being sceptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take, though this in turn creates tension in our moral views that requires additional resolution.
Uncertainty is increasingly recognized as a crucial phenomenon throughout medical practice. Research on uncertainty so far has been scattered across disciplines, leading to a lack of consensus about what uncertainty represents and minimal integration of knowledge obtained within isolated disciplines. Currently, a comprehensive view of uncertainty which does justice to normatively or interactionally challenging healthcare settings is lacking. This impedes research teasing apart when and how uncertainty manifests, how all stakeholders experience and value it, and how it affects medical communication and decision-making. In this paper, we argue that we need a more integrated understanding of uncertainty. We illustrate our argument using the context of adolescent transgender care, in which uncertainty occurs in myriad ways. We first sketch how theories of uncertainty have emerged from isolated disciplines, leading to a lack of conceptual integration. Subsequently, we emphasize why it is problematic that no comprehensive approach to uncertainty has yet been developed, using examples from adolescent transgender care. Finally, we advocate an integrated approach of uncertainty to further advance empirical research and to ultimately benefit clinical practice.
Even if we know all relevant descriptive facts about an act, we can still be uncertain about its moral acceptability. Most literature on how to act under such normative uncertainty operates on moral realism, the metaethical view that there are objective moral facts. Lay people largely report anti-realist intuitions, which poses the question of how these intuitions affect their interpretation and handling of normative uncertainty. Results from two quasi-experimental studies (total N = 365) revealed that most people did not interpret normative uncertainty as referring to objective moral facts but rather as uncertainty regarding one’s own view, uncertainty regarding the culturally accepted view or as the result of ambivalence. Especially the anti-realist majority of participants interpreted normative uncertainty different to how it is described in the literature on choice under normative uncertainty. Metaethical views were also associated with lay peoples’ choice of uncertainty reduction strategies and with assumptions about the intended aim of such strategies. The current findings suggest that empirical investigations of normative uncertainty might benefit from considering folk metaethical pluralism, as the lay public largely disagrees with the metaethical assumptions underlying the current discourse on choice under normative uncertainty.
The higher-order evidence debate concerns how higher-order evidence affects the rationality of our first-order beliefs. This Element has two parts. The first part (Sections 1 and 2) provides a critical overview of the literature, aiming to explain why the higher-order evidence debate is interesting and important. The second part (Sections 3 to 6) defends calibrationism, the view that we should respond to higher-order evidence by aligning our credences to our reliability degree. The author first discusses the traditional version of calibrationism and explains its main difficulties, before proposing a new version of calibrationism called 'Evidence-Discounting Calibrationism.' The Element argues that this new version is independently plausible and that it can avoid the difficulties faced by the traditional version.
Every scientific or intellectual movement rests on central premises and assumptions that shape its philosophy. The purpose of this study is to review a brief account of the main philosophical bases of grey systems theory (GST) and the paradigm governing its principles. So, the recent studies on the philosophical foundations of GST have been reviewed and tried to pay attention to some key ambiguities in the previous studies and give more and clearer explanations in this paper. Also, this paper tries to fill the gap among the previous studies and to provide a purposeful connection between them by expressing two key concepts: complete information and imbalance knowledge. Primarily, the study addresses the theoretical foundations of uncertainty and the concept of greyness. Next, it focuses on the notion of “complete information” and challenges to it. Then, it reviews such processes as perception, cognition, and understanding, as well as their dynamic nature. It explains how knowledge is produced through understanding and interpreting information/data and the dynamics governing the whole process. Also, the study describes any dataset, no matter how large it may be, will remain incomplete, imperfect, and grey, so humans only rely on incomplete datasets to interpret the world. As such, information and knowledge are always grey and uncertain because they are basically contingent on subjective understandings and interpretations and imperfect inputs and data. Finally, as a key development, this study also demonstrates that human grey knowledge remains imbalanced across different disciplines and spheres. In the end, a brief overview of the philosophical paradigm of GST is also provided. GST is depicted as an anti-realistic, anti-positivistic, and non-deterministic approach, which is inherently pluralistic and ideographic. According to GST principles, dynamicity and change are essential parts of human narratives of the world and systems, and human knowledge is constantly reproduced through collecting new information. As a result, knowledge, theories, narratives, and scientific laws dynamically change. Given this premise, one could argue that GST is considerably compatible with the postulates of post-modern thinking.
If non-human animals have high moral status, then we commit a grave moral error by eating them. Eating animals is thus morally risky, while many agree that it is morally permissible to not eat animals. According to some philosophers, then, non-animal ethicists should err on the side of caution and refrain from eating animals. I argue that this precautionary argument assumes a false dichotomy of dietary options: a diet that includes farm-raised animals or a diet that does not include animals of any kind. There is a third dietary option, namely, a diet of plants and non-traditional animal protein, and there is evidence that such a diet results in the least amount of harm to animals. It follows therefore that moral uncertainty does not support the adoption of a vegetarian diet.
Modern times have been declared as the age of uncertainty. In business and management, as well as other disciplines, the study of uncertainty becomes relevant as it is the inherent state of nature, pervading organizational life in a permanent form. Numerous ways of observing reality are linked to the notion of uncertainty, including the perception of the times we live in, which have been conceptualized in different ways, including VUCA, exponential, liquid, chaotic, turbulent, seismic and explosive times, just to cite a few. These time-constraint conditions have paved the way for different ways of using or interpreting the notion of uncertainty, which is an intrinsically unobservable concept. Through a bricolage process, a wide selection of characterizations and notions related to uncertainty were identified, somehow assembling a theoretical montage through which meaning is constructed. The objective is to reduce the anxiety that results from not knowing what we are dealing with when considering uncertainty.
This paper explores the role of moral uncertainty in explaining the morally disruptive character of new technologies. We argue that existing accounts of technomoral change do not fully explain its disruptiveness. This explanatory gap can be bridged by examining the epistemic dimensions of technomoral change, focusing on moral uncertainty and inquiry. To develop this account, we examine three historical cases: the introduction of the early pregnancy test, the contraception pill, and brain death. The resulting account highlights what we call “differential disruption” and provides a resource for fields such as technology assessment, ethics of technology, and responsible innovation.
This article is about the role of factual uncertainty for moral decision-making as it concerns the ethics of machine decision-making (i.e., decisions by AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles, autonomous robots, or decision support systems). The view that is defended here is that factual uncertainties require a normative evaluation and that ethics of machine decision faces a triple-edged problem, which concerns what a machine ought to do, given its technical constraints, what decisional uncertainty is acceptable, and what trade-offs are acceptable to decrease the decisional uncertainty.
Background
Most writing about uncertainty in healthcare has addressed empirical uncertainty – that is, resulting from insufficient or conflicting facts.
Objective
To consider moral uncertainty by exploring how different theories apply to a single clinical case.
Method
In this philosophical reflection, I briefly acknowledge empirical uncertainty before introducing and exploring the topic of moral uncertainty – defined as the question of what to do when we do not know what (morally) to do—using a case study of my own mother’s deterioration and death from Covid-19.
Results
I identify and apply a number of philosophical theories relevant to managing moral uncertainty, including utilitarianism, deontology, practical rationality and feminist philosophy.
Conclusion
Different moral theories lead to different conclusions about the best course of action in situations of moral uncertainty.
Practice implications
Detailed analysis and close reading of a single case can provide insights into how to act in morally complex situations, but learning is in the form of enriched understanding, not formulaic rules.
Almost all participants in the debate about the ethics of accidents with self-driving cars have so far assumed moral universalism. However, universalism may be philosophically more controversial than is commonly thought, and may lead to undesirable results in terms of non-moral consequences and feasibility. There thus seems to be a need to also start considering what I refer to as the “relativistic car” — a car that is programmed under the assumption that what is morally right, wrong, good, bad, etc. is determined by the moral beliefs of one’s society or culture. My investigation of this idea involves six steps. First, I explain why and how the moral universalism/relativism debate is relevant to the issue of self-driving cars. Second, I argue that there are good reasons to consider accident algorithms that assume relativism. Third, I outline how a relativistic car would be programmed to behave. Fourth, I address what advantages such a car would have, both in terms of its non-moral consequences and feasibility. Fifth, I address the relativistic car’s disadvantages. Finally, I qualify and conclude my considerations.
Decision theory is the study of how people make rational choices, where rationality is defined as taking effective means to one’s goals and conforming to the rules of logic and axioms of probability theory (Resnik in Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1987; Peterson Introduction to Decision Theory, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2017). As noted in Chap. 1, this type of rationality, known as instrumental rationality, is different from reasonableness because reasonableness is founded on moral and social values. A decision could be rational in the decision theorist’s sense but not reasonable. For example, it might be rational to jump off a tall building to commit suicide (if that is one’s goal) but not reasonable to do this.
A critical survey of recent work in epistemology on higher-order evidence. It discusses the nature of higher-order evidence, some puzzles it raises, responses to those puzzles, and problems facing them. It concludes by indicating connections between debates concerning higher-order evidence in epistemology and parallel debates in ethics and aesthetics.
Nihilists believe that nothing matters. This article discusses a pragmatic argument against nihilism proposed by Guy Kahane: If nothing matters it does not matter whether you believe that nothing matters, but if you falsely believe that nothing matters when some things actually do, then the consequences will be bad for you because you will fail to pay attention to things you should be paying attention to. If some things really do matter, then believing that some things matter will lead to a better outcome, because you will be paying attention to things you should be paying attention to. Therefore, it is rational to believe that some things matter even if the probability that this hypothesis is true is close to zero. I argue that this pragmatic argument against nihilism is unconvincing because it is vulnerable to the many‐gods objection to traditional versions of Pascal's wager.
Sometimes it’s not certain which of several mutually exclusive moral views is correct. Like almost everyone, I think that there’s some sense in which what one should do depends on which of these theories is correct, plus the way the world is non-morally. But I also think there’s an important sense in which what one should do depends upon the probabilities of each of these views being correct. Call this second claim “moral uncertaintism”. In this paper, I want to address an argument against moral uncertaintism offered in the pages of this journal by Brian Weatherson, and seconded elsewhere by Brian Hedden, the crucial premises of which are: (1) that acting on moral uncertaintist norms necessarily involves motivation by reasons or rightness as such, and (2) that such motivation is bad. I will argue that (1) and (2) are false, and that at any rate, the quality of an agent’s motivation is not pertinent to the truth or falsity of moral uncertaintism in the way that Weatherson’s and Hedden’s arguments require.
Many moral theses nowadays go under heading of internalism, so it is important to distinguish them from one another. After supplying a brief catalogue of moral internalisms, I restrict my attention to one such theory, which I call 'motivational judgment internalism'. This view claims that there is a necessary connection between sincerely holding a moral judgment and being motivated to act on the judgment. I believe that this view is false. I also believe that we cannot show it to be false in any simple, straightforward way. In what follows I marshall arguments designed to place the burden of proof on this form of internalism. Though we must be able to account for the widepread pull that moral judgments exert on agents, externalism can do this better than internalism.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
We are often uncertain how to behave morally in complex situations. In this controversial study, Ted Lockhart contends that moral philosophy has failed to address how we make such moral decisions. Adapting decision theory to the task of decision-making under moral uncertainly, he proposes that we should not always act how we feel we ought to act, and that sometimes we should act against what we feel to be morally right. Lockhart also discusses abortion extensively and proposes new ways to deal with the ethical and moral issues which surround it.
Every choice we make is set against a background of massive ignorance about our past, our future, our circumstances, and ourselves. Philosophers are divided on the moral significance of such ignorance. Some say that it has a direct impact on how we ought to behave - the question of what our moral obligations are; others deny this, claiming that it only affects how we ought to be judged in light of the behaviour in which we choose to engage - the question of what responsibility we bear for our choices. Michael Zimmerman claims that our ignorance has an important bearing on both questions, and offers an account of moral obligation and moral responsibility that is sharply at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in ethics.
In this book, three views about the nature of moral obligation are distinguished: the Objective, Subjective, and Prospective Views. Some philosophers have attempted to reconcile the three views in question, but these attempts are shown to fail. The question thus arises: Which of the three views ought to be accepted and which rejected? It is argued that, in light of the ignorance that besets us, the Objective and Subjective Views should be rejected and the Prospective View accepted. The argument is based on close consideration of a kind of case provided by Frank Jackson, one in which an agent has deficient evidence regarding the outcomes of his options. Many objections to this argument are entertained and rebutted, by means of which the Prospective View is itself elaborated and defended. Among those who accept the Prospective View, the primary motivation for doing so has often been that of finding a useful guide to action, but it is argued that the Prospective View can be of only strictly limited help in providing such a guide. Finally, some implications that the Prospective View has regarding the nature of moral rights are addressed. It is argued that the possession of moral rights is precarious, being dependent on the evidence possessed by others. Once again, several objections are entertained and rebutted. The distinction between rights and desert is stressed, and the relevance of risk to rights is explored.
Several philosophers have tried to develop a framework for decision-making in the face of fundamental moral uncertainty. Critics argue that the project is misguided, as it assumes that there's a kind of "subjective" rightness that depends on which moral views might be true (rather than which ones are true). This chapter replies to some such criticisms presented by Elizabeth Harman. Harman argues that "moral uncertaintists" seem committed to counterintuitive views about what's right and what we're culpable for, and that the only way of modifying the uncertaintist position to escape these commitments renders it uninteresting. However, uncertaintism can avoid these counterintuitive implications by focusing on epistemic probabilities of moral claims rather than subjective ones, and by positing different "orders" of subjective rightness. Further, the version of uncertaintism Harman calls "uninteresting" is not; it specifies what would count as one's best try at doing what she has objective reason to do.
Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman (2003) and Michael Ridge (2003, 2007) responded independently. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming) has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for (Schroeder 2008) to account for normative certitude. We shall argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications.
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought. Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us. Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought. Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the 'motivation question' of how a normative belief motivates an action.
Repeatedly and successfully, the celebrated Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick has reached out to a broad audience beyond the confines of his discipline, addressing ethical and social problems that matter to every thoughtful person. Here Nozick continues his search for the connections between philosophy and "ordinary" experience. In the lively and accessible style that his readers have come to expect, he offers a bold theory of rationality, the one characteristic deemed to fix humanity's "specialness." What are principles for? asks Nozick. We could act simply on whim, or maximize our self-interest and recommend that others do the same. As Nozick explores rationality of decision and rationality of belief, he shows how principles actually function in our day-to-day thinking and in our efforts to live peacefully and productively with one another. In Nozick's view, misconceptions of rationality have resulted in many intractable philosophical problems. For example, the Kantian attempt to make principled behavior the sole ultimate standard of conduct extends rationality beyond its bounds. In this provocative volume, Nozick reformulates current decision theory to include the symbolic meaning of actions in areas from controlling impulses to fighting society's war against drugs. The author proposes a new rule of rational decision, "maximizing decision-value, " which is a weighted sum of causal, evidential, and symbolic utility. In a particularly fascinating section of the book he traces the implications of this rule for the famous Prisoner's Dilemma and for Newcomb's Problem. Rationality of belief, according to Nozick, involves two aspects: support by reasons that make the belief credible, andgeneration by a process that reliably produces true beliefs. A new evolutionary account explains how some factual connections are instilled in us as seemingly self-evident, thus reversing the direction of Kant's "Copernican Revolution." Proposing a theory of rational belief that inc
Some philosophers have recently argued that decision-makers ought to take normative uncertainty into account in their decisionmaking. These philosophers argue that, just as it is plausible that we should maximize expected value under empirical uncertainty, it is plausible that we should maximize expected choice-worthiness under normative uncertainty. However, such an approach faces two serious problems: how to deal with merely ordinal theories, which do not give sense to the idea of magnitudes of choice-worthiness; and how, even when theories do give sense to magnitudes of choice-worthiness, to compare magnitudes of choice-worthiness across different theories. Some critics have suggested that these problems are fatal to the project of developing a normative account of decision-making under normative uncertainty. The primary purpose of this article is to show that this is not the case. To this end, I develop an analogy between decision-making under normative uncertainty and the problem of social choice, and then argue that the Borda Rule provides the best way of making decisions in the face of merely ordinal theories and intertheoretic incomparability.
In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.
1. What is the Moral Problem? 2. The Expressivist Challenge. 3. The Externalist Challenge. 4. The Humean Theory of Motivation. 5. An Anti-Humean Theory of Normative Reasons. 6. How to Solve the Moral Problem.
In his 'Wide or Narrow Scope?', John Broome questions my contention in 'Why Be Rational?' that certain rational requirements are narrow scope. The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational require-ments govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow-and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not vi-olating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there was an important difference? Perhaps, I conjecture, because there is an im-portant difference between narrow-and wide-scope process requirements, and we have implicitly taken process requirements as our topic. I clarify and try to defend my argument that some process requirements are narrow scope, so that if there were reasons to conform to rational requirements, there would be implausible bootstrap-ping. I then reformulate Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements as an argument against narrow-scope process requirements, and sug-gest a reply.
Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to (sic), then she is motivated to (sic). The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of cleve intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgement in a good moral agent or they attribute a kind of fetishism to good moral agents. I argue that there are alternative models of moral motivation available to Externalists, in particular a model according to which a good moral agent is one who is effectively regulated by a second order desire to desire to do what is right.
I defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort of motivation, what Michael Smith calls “moral fetishism”.
One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.
In “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism,” Jacob Ross argues that a rational decision maker is permitted, for the purposes of practical reasoning, to assume that nihilism is false. I argue that Ross’s argument fails because the principle he relies on conflicts with more plausible principles of rationality and leads to preference cycles. I then show how the infectiousness of nihilism, and of incomparability more generally, poses a serious problem for the larger project of attempting to incorporate moral uncertainty into expected value maximization style reasoning.
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).
Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength
of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate
both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of
reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount
Smith’s challenge, and (b) any brand of non-cognitivism that has even a chance of solving the Frege–Geach Problem and some
related problems involving probabilistic consistency can also thereby solve Smith’s problem. Because only versions of non-cognitivism
that can solve the Frege–Geach Problem are otherwise plausible, all otherwise plausible versions of noncognitivism can meet
Smith’s challenge.
A major focus of ethical argumentation is (and should be) determining the relative merits of proposed ethical systems. Nevertheless, even the demonstration that a given ethical system was the one most likely to be correct would not establish that an agent should act in accord with that system. Consider, for example, a situation in which the ethical system most likely to be valid is modestly supportive of a certain action, whereas a less plausible system strongly condemns the same action. Should the agent perform the action, arguing that the most plausible system supports doing so, or avoid the action, being conservative about the strong condemnation of it from a less plausible system? I argue that, in general, different ethical frameworks see the ethical world in fundamentally different ways, rendering the comparison of degrees of support and opposition of actions between systems intrinsically invalid. One should indeed choose to act in accord with the most defensible system. I believe that this important topic needs more attention than it has gotten to date.
Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief,
and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs.
James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block
this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non‐cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates
both non‐cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar
versions of non‐cognitivism will succeed.
Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The upshot is that that form of cognitivism can explain both features of evaluative judgements, and that non-cognitivism can explain neither.
Non-cognitivism and the dimensions of evaluative judgement
- Lenman Jimmy
Subjectivization in ethics
- Hudson J. L.
Medicine and moral reasoning
- G. Oddie
Environmental ethics and consequentialism
- K. Bykvist
Oxford studies in metaethics
- E. Harman
Oxford studies in metaethics 11
- B. Hedden
Normative uncertainty Ph.D. thesis in
- W Macaskill
On acting rationally against one's best judgement
- Arpaly
Krister An introduction to moral uncertainty
- William Macaskill
- Toby Ord
- Bykvist
Andrew 2010 Along an imperfectly lighted path’: Practical rationality and normative uncertainty
- Sepielli
- Zimmerman
- Zimmerman
Along an imperfectly lighted path’: Practical rationality and normative uncertainty
- Sepielli Andrew
Oxford studies in metaethics: 4
- A. Sepielli