The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium

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Chapter Four
The Macro Political Uptake of
the G1000 in Belgium
Vincent Jacquet, Jonathan Moskovic, Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps1
After the election of 2010, Belgium attracted the interest of the international media
because the kingdom went on to set the world record for a country without a
government  days. ore precisely, parties were unable to nd an agreement
on a potential reform of the federal architecture of the kingdom. In the context of
the consociational nature of the political decision-making process in Belgium, a
compromise is needed between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking parties in
order to form a government. However, since 2010, divergent opinions concerning
state-reform between northern and southern areas had deprived the country of a
fully functioning federal government for a prolonged period.2
In this context of a crisis of electoral institutions and government-formation,
a group of citizens decided to ‘do something’. After an appeal3 by the writer
David Van Reybrouck and the journalist Paul Hermant, a new team, composed
of leaders of foundations, business-people and academics, implemented a large-
scale deliberative process. The project did not seek to offer a radical alternative
to representative democracy but rather to complement and breathe new life into
it. It aimed to gather ordinary citizens in a setting that was conducive to open and
non-coercive deliberation on possibly contentious social and political issues. The
central idea was to facilitate citiens themselves experiencing the difculty of
building bridges and compromising over highly polarising issues. The deliberation
was structured in three distinct phases: a phase of online public consultation; a
citizen-summit (for a large-scale deliberation); and a citizen-panel (for an in-depth
deliberation).
The G1000 in Belgium cannot be categorised as a form of constitutional
deliberative democracy per se, in that it was never intended as a means to
change the constitution. Its organisers explicitly sought to avoid any political and
institutional ties and their focus was much more on guaranteeing best possible
representativeness and a high quality of deliberation, rather than generating a
strong political outcome (G1000 2012). So, while the G1000 did well in terms of
representativeness and open agenda-setting (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015),
political uptake was very limited in the short term. However, the event put on
1. The authors were members of the Methodology and Research Unit of the G1000. They have been
involved in the designing of the G1000.
2. The country was without a fully functioning government from 26 April 2010 to 5 December 2011.
3. The website http://g1000.org contains full information and the appeal can be read in English at
http://g1000.org/en/manifesto.php.

54 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
the political agenda the issue of democratic innovation, both in the discourse of
political actors and in the practices of citizen-participation.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the potential impact of grassroots
deliberative mechanisms such as the . We rst describe the deliberative
design of the event and analyse its legitimacy by distinguishing the input,
throughput and the output dimensions. We continue with an in-depth assessment
of its political effect by looking at the uptake of its ideas in the media, the maxi-
public and conventional political and social arenas.
The G1000
The G1000 aimed to offer a forum for large-scale deliberation in Belgium. In order
to live up to its aspirations of inclusion and openness, the G1000 consisted of three
phases. The rst was an online public consultation, in which every volunteer was
invited to propose an issue for discussion in the second phase, a citizen-summit,
which consisted of a large, one-day deliberative ‘mini-public’, among 1000
participants randomly selected from inhabitants of the country. The third phase
was a more in-depth citizen-panel, to which thirty-two citizens were invited to
deliberate and agree precise proposals for public policies.
Phase 1: public consultation
The rst phase consisted of a very open process of agendasetting. The organisers
did not determine the agenda of the citizen summit, in contrast to the common
practice in deliberative ventures (Kies and Nanz 2013). Rather, they were
convinced of the importance of starting with an open agenda, which would be
populated entirely by the public itself. They therefore launched a large-scale online
‘idea-box’, in which every citizen, no matter his or her opinion or background,
could post the questions or problems that they believed should be deliberated at
the G1000 citizen-summit. Moreover, they could also rate the ideas and proposals
of others, allowing a more accurate reading of the salience of issues.
This process resulted in a total of over 2000 ideas, dealing with all kinds of
social, political and economic issues. In total, more than 6000 people took part
in this procedure. As most of the proposals appeared several times in the list, the
ideas were subseuently clustered into twentyve themes, based on the number
of times they appeared and their individual rating. This list of twentyve was
placed online in October 2011 for a further round of public voting. In order to
avoid a bias in the results, the twentyve ideas appeared in a random order on the
screen, so that the organisers had no inuence on the nal agenda. Through the
media and via a large public campaign, citizens were invited to vote for their three
preferred themes for the G1000, which turned out to be social security; welfare in
a time of economic crisis; and immigration.4 This large-scale public consultation
. All the results are presented in the nal report of the , which is available on the website at
www.g1000.org (accessed 8 February 2016).

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 55
and the voting tool for the top twentyve guaranteed that the agenda of the 
was open.5
Phase 2: citizen-summit
Following the public-consultation phase, the second part of the project consisted
of a large-scale citizen-deliberation, the G1000 citizen-summit. Through a mixture
of random selection and targeted recruitment (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015),
1000 citizens were invited to participate in a one-day deliberative event in Brussels,
in order to reect on and discuss their positions about the three issues that had
been chosen during the public-consultation phase. Participants were randomly
seated by roundtables of ten and experienced volunteers facilitated the discussion
at each of the tables.
The  event in russels was anked by two side projects Home and
G’Offs. The former was a software application that served as a forum for online
discussion while the latter provided local events for citizens to gather and discuss
the same issues as in citizen-summit itself. The participant pool of the G’Homes
and G’Offs was based entirely on self-selection. However, the chance to take part
in local initiatives or even at home did lower the threshold for participation and
allow a much larger group than those gathered in Brussels to discuss the same
issues. To this end, there was a live stream of the event in Brussels, which was
available online.
Phase 3: citizen-panel
The third phase of the G1000 project, also known as the G32, aimed at elaborating
the ideas that came out the discussions at the citizen-summit. After all, the citizen-
summit was a large event designed to facilitate the pooling and sharing of ideas.
Given the fact that each round was relatively short and focused on exploring the
diversity around the tables, the ideas and proposals made were, at that stage, still
quite basic.
For three weekends, thirty-two participants gathered to work out policy
proposals. These thirty-two citizens were randomly selected from a pool of 491
participants in the G1000, G’Offs and G’Home who agreed to be considered
as potential  participants, which meant the signicant timecommitment of
participating in each of the three weekends. The stratied random selection of
the thirty-two from the pool of the 491 participants was done with controls for
diversity in terms of gender (sixteen women and sixteen men); language (eighteen
Dutch-speaking, twelve French-speaking and two German-speaking); region
(from each of the ten Belgian provinces and Brussels) and age (seven participants
under thirty nine between thirty and fortyve nine between fortyve and sixty
and seven over sixty).
5. There was also an ex post IP check to prevent massive voting by a single individual or group.

56 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
The G32 took the format of a citizen-panel, which is used in policy processes
throughout the world, such as in citizens’ juries in the USA (Crosby and Nethercut
2005) or ‘planning cells’ in Germany (Garbe 1986). Such a deliberative design
is much more intensive, since participants endeavour to propose specic policies
and actions. A citizen-panel is also more open than a citizen-summit, since the
participants have a much greater say in the process itself. In fact, citizens have
the authority to decide what they wish to work on the choice of the specic
questions they want to tackle); how they want to work (the choice of the experts
and stakeholders they wish to question); and, above all, on what they decide and
then bring to the public debate.
Input, throughput and output legitimacy
In this chapter, mobilising the typology presented in Suiter and Reuchamps 2016,
Chapter One of this volume, we analyse the legitimacy of the G1000 in three steps:
the input, the throughput and the output, with a focus on the macro-uptake of its
recommendations in the assessment of the output legitimacy.
Input legitimacy
The selection of participants is always a key question for the organisers of
deliberative mini-publics. From an epistemic point of view, random selection is the
best-suited selection technique (Caluwaerts and Ugarriza 2012). The organisers of
G1000 wanted a large-scale deliberation with ordinary citizens and thus opted for
random selection. The aim was to give to every inhabitant of the country the same
probability to be selected for the G1000.
Practically, the participants were selected using Random Digit Dialling. As
other authors have noticed, the use of random selection does not prevent the
effect of self-selection (Smith 2009; Fung 2007). In order to mitigate this, the
organisers also used quotas on gender, province and language in order to have
a more appropriate representation of the Belgian population. In addition, and
perhaps even more importantly, 10 per cent of the seats were reserved for a
targeted recruitment of groups of people less likely to take up the opportunity
to participate. For example, homeless people can be very difcult to attract with
phone calls, and the G1000 therefore contacted local associations to help them to
include this segment of the population. The idea behind all these efforts was to
create the most inclusive process possible. As Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2015)
contend, the s uality of representation reuires a ualied assessment.
The use of random selection, quotas and some targeted recruitment brought
a very diverse group of participants, which was a feature highly praised by the
international observers:
one of the most impressive features of the G1000 was the diversity of
participants in terms of gender, age, political preferences as well as social,
professional and cultural background. We were also impressed by the inclusion

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 57
of diverse faith communities and the fair representation of Belgium’s different
language communities (G1000 2012: 102).
The selection of the issues to be discussed in the G1000 was also driven by
the aim to give voice to citiens. articularly in the rst phase, everyone had the
opportunity to propose issues: this openness of the agenda was possible because of
the autonomy of the G1000. Contrary to the Irish and Icelandic cases, the G1000
was not mandated by public authorities and was not embedded in formal political
processes. This high level of openness is positive in terms of input but it can also be
an obstacle to implementation of the outcomes, thus weakening output legitimacy;
we explore this issue in greater detail later in the chapter.
Throughput legitimacy
The G1000 focused strongly on the quality of the deliberative process. This process
was organised and managed by volunteers with professional skills as facilitators;
their task was to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, equal consideration of all
opinions represented at the table. Each roundtable began with an introduction of all
participants in order to create a setting conducive to respectful exchange. Experts
were also invited to feed the discussion with substantive information at the plenary
discussion. Their role was to provide a minimum context of common knowledge
on the issues at stake but not to impose a specic framing. uring the , two
academics spoke on each of the three themes of the day. Nevertheless, according
to the international observers, the presentations from the experts were not quite
diverse enough. From what we have understood, we nd that the keynotes were
slightly biased; the experts who introduced the three themes approached the
matter from a somewhat “left-wing” oriented perspective’ (G1000 2012: 103).
This is a key element because good deliberation needs to build on a plurality of
points of view (Ryfe 2005). Yet the same observers pointed out that the impact
of the experts on the discussions was not very substantial in the end and that the
outcomes of the votes after the deliberation were not merely reections of the
experts’ presentations. For the third phase, the G32, the process was more open
in terms of experts. Indeed the participants were invited to choose themselves
whom they wanted to invite. This meant that they met not only academics but also
members of lobbies and think-tanks as well as businessmen and representatives
from a range of associations.
To be sure, time-constraints hindered the full development of deliberation
over these three complex issues. Thus, in comparison to mini-publics that take
place over several weekends, the throughput legitimacy assessment is lower for
the . t is also always difcult to grasp the uality of the deliberation. The
Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is often used in this regard (Steiner et al. 2004).
The coding using DQI of a random selection of tables at the G1000 did show an
equal quality of deliberation across them (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014b),
due to the fact that each table was following the same script. Another measure is
also possible: the Perceived Discourse Quality Index (PDQI). This index, built

58 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
from the answers given by the participants to a post facto questionnaire, was quite
high, with participants giving a positive evaluation of the quality of deliberation
(Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014b). The perceived quality of deliberation was
even higher during the three weekends of the G32, as participants had more time
to ponder the issues at stake.
Finally, we have to look at the balance between aggregation and deliberation
during the G1000 in order to evaluate a third dimension of throughput legitimacy.
During the G1000, each table had to send all its ideas to a central desk, which then
clustered them. But, as pointed out elsewhere, clustering is never a wholly neutral
activity:
after all, the experts at the central desk were asked to do a rst clustering of
the inputs from the tables in order to see which ideas were introduced and to
facilitate the voting round. As such, some genuinely innovative and original
ideas, which only appeared once or twice, did not make it to the nal vote, and
the post-test questionnaire indicated that some of the participants felt like their
opinions were not taken seriously, because their ideas were not put to the vote
(Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015: 161).
This is a risk that lots of deliberative mini-publics face because every discussion
needs to be summarised to some extent. The crucial issue, therefore, is to make
this step more transparent. During the third phase, the thirty-two citizens were
invited to write the proposals themselves. An each stage, people were invited to
propose sentences for the proposals and also to critique and amend their wording.
In this situation, there was little opportunity for the organisers to manipulate the
process because participants could change the proposed text. Also, at the end of the
process, votes were held on every proposal. All in all, the throughput legitimacy of
the G1000 was quite good, especially if one takes into account all three phases and
not only the second phase, the citizen-summit.
Output legitimacy
What were the outputs of the mini-public? This is probably one of the most critical
questions for any deliberative endeavour. Just a few days after the G1000, Edouard
Delruelle, a Belgian philosopher, explained that the G1000 had no future because
it was not about politics per se.6 According to him, politics is about class conict
and is a struggle between organised groups. The question then becomes: has the
 had any inuence on politics or policies in elgium
When looking at the possible uptake of mini-publics, we must clearly
distinguish between two kinds of impact: on the public-policy content of different
authorities and on agenda-setting with respect to the public debate. According to
Goodin and Dryzek,
6. ‘Le G 1000, maladie infantile de la démocratie postmoderne?’, RTBF, 15 June 2011. All news
reports referred to in the following footnotes are available through the websites listed after the
References at the end of the chapter.

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 59
when it comes to the macro-political impact of micro-political innovations,
mini-publics of the sort here in view rarely determine public policy (though
more than direct impact on the content of public policy will turn out to be an
issue, we shall be arguing). Generally they can have real political impact only
by working on and through the broader public sphere, ordinary institutions of
representative democracy, and administrative policy making (2006: 220–1).
It should not come as a surprise that, from its very conception, the G1000 was
to be a citizen-led initiative, with no ties to formal decision-making institutions.
The desire to stay independent from traditional political authorities reduced
the likelihood that the conclusions of its deliberation would be translated into
concrete public policies. There was no obligation for members of the government
to take the report into account; no proposal for referendums; and no place for
deliberation between participants and politicians. The presence of the presidents
of the different parliaments of elgium during the nal session of the 
seems to be the only – weak – link with the formal process of political decision-
making (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015). Analysing causality in the content of
public policy is always difcult but we can argue that the weight of the s
proposal was, in practice, negligible in the content of public policies in Belgium.
Does this imply that the G1000 was an island of deliberation largely isolated
from the real politics that inuence citiens in their everyday lives Several
elements show that the  has inuenced public debate in elgium on one
central topic democratic renewal. That is the major justication provided by the
initiators of the project (G1000 2012). The G1000 has given a clear example, which
gained huge media attention. It embodied the demand for deliberative democracy.
This role of agenda-setting is observable in different places and can be analysed
using the classical distinction between the systemic and governmental agenda
(Cobb and Elder 1983). The systemic agenda describes all the issues commonly
perceived as important by members of the political community. Hereafter, we
will show that the G1000 has received lots of attention from plenty of actors in
Belgium, much more than previous deliberative mini-publics, in terms of media
uptake, maxi-public uptake and social uptake. The governmental agenda consists
of what is taken into account by public authorities at the international, national,
regional or local levels, which we will refer to as conventional political uptake.
The next sections analyse each of these uptakes. Thus, following the systemic
approach to deliberative democracy (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012), the aim
of the remainder of this chapter is to analyse the interaction between the G1000
(its input and throughput) with the entire political system, by looking at the
relationship with the media, public opinion, political parties and MPs and with
other experiments in deliberative democracy.
The media uptake
In order to grasp the character of media coverage of the G1000, we have analysed
all the articles published in Dutch- and French-speaking newspapers in Belgium

60 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
that covered the G1000, over the period from June 2011 (when the initiative was
launched to ecember . This section is divided into three parts rst, the
period before the citizen-summit of the G1000 period, that is, from 10 June to 10
November 2011; second, the period between 11 November 2011 and 9 November
2012, which corresponds to the second and the third phase of the G1000; third, the
post-G1000 period.
Before the G1000 (10 June to 10 November 2011)
The G1000 was covered in all the major newspapers in the country on 10 June
2011.7 The articles all mentioned the citizens’ initiative, rooted in the perception
that the inability of politicians to form a federal government for almost a year was
not because of communal tensions but rather because Belgium’s current form of
democracy was unsuited to the twentyrst century. The next day,  une ,
the presentation by the G1000 group of its Manifesto also received extensive
media coverage.8 In the following days, various articles mentioned the importance
of launching such an initiative and the popular support for it.9 In the weeks and
months that followed, however, media interest decreased.
From the beginning of October and, to a greater extent, in November, the
G1000 became the centre of media attention once again, with a multiplicity
of articles focused on the upcoming event.10 In the midst of this, some articles
focused on the nancial problems of the ,11 which was a crowd-funded
initiative (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2012).
The political context explains the large number of articles dealing with the
G1000. When the G1000 was launched in June 2011, the country had been waiting
for the formation of a federal government for almost one year (Deschouwer and
Reuchamps 2013). This political situation opened a window of opportunity for
the G1000, which positioned itself explicitly as a citizen-led alternative to the
complete political stalemate in Parliament. Moreover, despite the emergence of
7. ‘La journée’, La Libre, 10 June 2011; ‘1 jaar politieke crisis: “Huidige democratie is als een koets
op de E40” ’, De Morgen, 10 June 2011; ‘Un G1000 pour sortir de la crise’, Le Soir, 10 June 2011;
‘David Van Reybrouck lanceert politiek burgerinitiatief’, De Standaard, 10 June 2011.
8. ‘Belges, exprimez-vous!’, La Libre, 11 June 2011; ‘Le G1000 veut réunir mille citoyens le
11/11/11’, Le Soir, 11 June 2011; ‘Democratie 2.0’, De Standaard, 11 June 2011; ‘Droom’, De
Standaard, 11 June 2011; ‘Burgerinitiatief rond David Van Reybrouck moet Belgische politiek
hervomen’, De Standaard, 11 June 2011; ‘Manifest van de G1000’, De Morgen, 11 June 2011.
9. ‘Meer dan 2500 handtekeningen voor politiek burgerinitiatief’, De Standaard, 13 June 2011;
‘Zinnige burgerinspraak’, De Standaard, 18 June 2011; ‘Les grandes espérances du G 1000’, La
Dernière Heure, 23 June 2011.
10. ‘Le G1000 est bien sur les rails’, La Libre, 4 October 2011; ‘Dernière ligne droite avec le sommet
citoyen du G1000’, Le Vif, 7 October 2011; ‘Des Belges lancent le ‘sommet citoyen’ du G1000’,
Le Soir, 4 November 2011; ‘G1000 buigt zich over sociale zekerheid, welvaart en immigratie’,
De Standaard, 8 November 2011.
.  oekt nog . euro nanciering voor werking, De Standaard, 8 November 2011;
n petit decit de  euros, La Libre, 9 November; ‘Les gros sous du G1000’, Le Soir, 9
November 2011.

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 61
several protest movements (for example, SHAME; the Belgian Fries Revolution;
Camping 16) during the government-formation process, the G1000 was one of
the main initiatives that formulated clear demands and a clear alternative. These
features triggered media interest.
During the G1000 (11 November 2011 to 10 November 2012)
The second phase should be divided into two distinct periods: coverage of the
second phase of the G1000, the citizen-summit of 11 November 2011; and
coverage of the third phase – the citizen-panel – which did not receive as much
media attention. The extensive media-coverage that preceded the citizen-summit
continued after the event itself, with an overall positive slant: it was a ‘re-
enchantment of Belgian democracy’12 according to Le Soir and described as a
successful rst citiensummit13 by La Libre. However, some did not hesitate to
criticise ‘the quality of sandwiches, coffee and the amount of toilets’ and the low
turnout for the event.14 This topic raised different reactions. Indeed, there was a
large difference in the number of participants according to various news sources:
according to Le Vif, ‘850 participants’15 attended the event, while the Gazet van
Antwerpen reported that there were ‘more than 1200 participants’.16 According to
the organisers of the G1000 there were 704 participants. These discrepancies are
because some journalists included the volunteers that attended the event whereas
others did not.
As the G1000 entered its third phase, thirty-two people were selected to further
develop the results of the second phase but this sparked relatively little media
interest.17 Before this, there was a brief resurgence of G1000 media coverage
on three separate occasions: the media covered problems of fundraising18 and
deliberations over where the G32 would take place and highlighted the dissolution
of the G1000 and its formal integration into an existing Foundation.19 However,
these three topics of media interest were not directly related to the deliberation
itself. Aside from these elements, the G32 was largely neglected by the media.
This contrasts sharply with the enthusiasm of the media for the second phase of
the G1000. There are two possible explanations for this. First, media interest in
the G1000 might have derived from the absence of a federal government for such
12. ‘Le G1000 “réenchante” la démocratie belge’, Le Soir, 12 November 2011.
13. ‘Un premier sommet citoyen réussi’, La Libre, 12 November 2011.
14. ‘De G1000-democratie kampt met thuisblijvers’, De Standaard, 12 November 2011.
15. ‘G1000: Environ 850 participants présents à Tour & Taxis’, Le Vif, 11 November 2011.
16. ‘Meer dan 1.200 deelnemers voor G1000’, Gazet van Antwerpen, 11 November 2011.
17. ‘Slotweekend voor G1000’, De Standaard, 10 November 2012; ‘G1000 : le bout du tunnel’, Le
Soir, 14 November 2012; ‘G1000: l’apothéose’, La Libre, 9 November 2012.
18. ‘Burgerinitiatief G1000 op zoek naar 75.000 euro’, De Morgen, 6 March 2012; ‘Le G1000
poursuivra l’effort’, La Libre, 8 March 2012; ‘Le G1000 en rade’, Le Soir, 8 March 2012.
19. ‘G1000 ruilt Burgertop in voor Stichting voor Toekomstige Generaties’, Knack, 19 Augustus
2012; ‘G1000-vzw opgeheven’, De Tijd, 19 August 2012; ‘Le G1000 dissous pour mieux se
fondre dans une Fondation’, Le Soir, 20 August 2012.

62 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
a prolonged period. On 6 December 2011, Elio Di Rupo was sworn in as prime
minister and elgium nally had a federal government, which could have led to a
gradual shift in media coverage. A second possible explanation is that the G1000
was a more interesting topic for the media to cover while it brought together a large
number of people for one single day – the citizen-summit – than when it convened
a small group of people for three weekends – the citizen-panel. This analysis is in
line with Parkinson’s (2006) evaluation of using media in deliberative democracy.
After the G1000 (11 November 2012 to 31 December 2013)
The last period starts with the presentation of the nal report of the . n the
days following the G32, the media covered the content of the report and, more
specically, the willingness of participants to address some key political issues,
such as automatic wage-indexation and the thorny issue of economic policy in
Belgium.20 After this, though a few articles still referred to the experience of
the G1000,21 overall, we note that with the exception of the week following the
presentation of the report, the G1000 quickly disappeared from the Belgian media.
What can be concluded from this analysis of the media coverage of the G1000?
It is possible to distinguish variation in the coverage according to the different
G1000 phases. The ‘before’ phase was characterised by extensive media coverage.
The ‘between’ phase started with strong exposure of the citizen-summit of 11
November 2011 but there was relatively little coverage of the G32 citizen-panel.
The ‘after’ phase saw little coverage in the days succeeding the event and interest
then evaporated due to the constant ow of new information on other topics. ne
crucial factor, the political crisis, seems to help explain the coverage of the G1000.
As the G1000 was initiated in a context of high political tension it was seen as
a possible alternative to traditional parliamentary politics. There was, therefore,
a window of opportunity for the G1000 to capture media attention. Afterwards,
media coverage reverted to its usual focus on formal politics.
The maxi-public uptake
Besides looking at how media reacted to the G1000, it is equally important to
determine how much public support the G1000 garnered. After all, if the G1000
wants its resultsproposals to be signicant at a macropolitical level, there has to
be support for the G1000 in the wider public sphere. As Goodin and Dryzek argue
20. ‘G1000 legt politici conclusies voor’, Het Belang van Limburg, 11 November 2012; ‘G1000 ziet
geen heil in indexsprong’, De Standaard, 11 November 2012; ‘La fusée citoyenne belge est bel et
bien sur orbite’, La Libre, 12 November 2012; ‘Le G1000 contre un saut d’index’, La Libre, 12
November 2012; ‘G1000 of de kracht van burgerdemocratie’, De Morgen, 12 November 2012.
21. ‘La démocratie change terriblement’, Le Soir, 12 December 2012; ‘G1000-bedenker Didier
Caluwaerts trekt met onderzoeksbeurzen naar VS’, Knack, 5 April 2013; ‘Participatie is geen
modegril’, De Morgen, 13 October 2013.

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 63
(2006), only with large-scale public support can the proposals of any deliberative
event reach the decision-making sphere; and only with a strong endorsement of
the results in the wider public sphere can the mini-public legitimately claim to be
heard. This is why we conducted a survey among the general public in Belgium
in order to determine whether the process and results of the G1000 produced
wider endorsement among the Belgian population. This survey was sent out to
1000 randomly selected citizens from both sides of the linguistic divide, by a
commercial polling rm bureau, which has a panel of over , individuals.
Despite the fact that the pool is inevitably biased, the ex post controls showed that
socio-demographic characteristics of our sample largely concurred with the socio-
demographic distribution of the Belgian population.
Awareness of the G1000
In many European countries, participatory and deliberative events are usually very
particular experiences, in the margin of the major political process and known
only to a few people. Due to massive media coverage, the context of the Belgian
political crisis and also the popularity of some of its organisers, however, the
G1000 is known to more people than other similar initiatives. Table 4.1 shows that
more than 52 per cent of respondents had heard of the G1000. We can also see that
Table 4.1: Awareness of the G1000
Have you heard of
G1000?
Not at all Quite a lot A great deal
Total 47.7 39.8 10.1 2.4
Region (p=0.000)
Flanders 38.0 45.9 12.6 3.5
Wallonia 65.0 30.9 31.4 0.6
Brussels 52.3 31.4 15.1 1.2
Gender (p=0.010)
Male 42.2 43.1 11.7 3.0
Female 52.4 37.3 8.5 1.9
Education (p=0.005)
Low 53.4 38.8 6.8 1.1
Middle 49.5 42.5 9.2 2.5
High 40.0 42.5 14.0 3.5
Age (p=0.909)
>= 34 47.9 39.1 10.5 2.5
34–54 46.3 41.0 09.6 3.0
55+ 48.8 39.5 10.1 1.6

64 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
there were big differences between the north and the south of the country, with
many more people in Flanders having heard of it. The more extensive Flemish
media coverage, linked to the presence of famous Flemish personalities in the
organisational team, are the most credible factors accounting for this difference.
The second interesting element shown in Table 4.1 is that there is a positive link
between levels of education, although it seems smaller than one would expect.
Unlike other cases of deliberation, the G1000 was not known only to the better
educated, who are often already convinced of the merits of democratic innovations
(Gourgues and Sainty 2011). This suggests that the organisers succeeded in putting
their initiative on the societal agenda and opening the door to a wider public debate
on democratic innovation.
Support for the process of the G1000
Before turning to the popular evaluation of the results of the G1000, we will
examine to what extent the respondents were in favour of the process by which it
was conducted. In other words, do respondents support the way in which citizens
were consulted in the  And do they think the  has had any signicant
impact on the functioning of politics in Belgium?
The results in Table 4.2 show that respondents had mixed feelings regarding
the procedures applied by the G1000. On the one hand, a large majority wants to
see a repeat of the G1000. After all, about 60 per cent of respondents agree that
citizens should be involved in political discussions on important policy issues in
the future while about 40 per cent of respondents declare themselves willing to
partake in such a mini-public in the future. This suggests that the G1000 process
Table 4.2: Support for the process of the G1000
Completely
disagree
Disagree Neither agree
nor disagree
Agree Completely
agree
G1000 contributed to
renewal of democracy in
Belgium
7.2% 16.6% 60.1% 15.4% 0.7%
Recommendations
formulated by citizens at
G1000 should be turned
into law.
3.3% 6.3% 59.7% 28.0% 2.7%
In future, citizens should
be gathered again to
discuss political issues, as
at the G1000.
2.8% 4.9% 32.6% 44.0% 15.7%
I would agree to
participate in a G1000 if I
were randomly selected in
the future.
11.4% 10.9% 36.2% 29.8% 11.7%

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 65
was received with enthusiasm and considered legitimate. On the other hand,
however, only 16.1 per cent feel that the G1000 changed anything for democracy
in Belgium. Most people (60.1 per cent) neither agree nor disagree that the G1000
set democratic innovation in motion. So while there is widespread support for the
G1000, there is also doubt about the difference it made.
It is also noteworthy that citizens are undecided about whether the
recommendations of the G1000 should be binding. This is interesting in light of
recent discussions among deliberative democrats concerning the reach that the
proposals of mini-publics should have (see, for example, Goodin and Dryzek
2006; Smith 2009; Ryan and Smith 2014). Some scholars advocate automatic
implementation whereas others see a more modest role for these recommendations
because they think mini-publics should have a merely advisory function. The
respondents in our survey are also undecided concerning the impact that the G1000
should have on the political and legislative process, even though the advocates of
direct implementation (32.7 per cent) still outnumber those who are opposed (9.6
per cent).
Support for the results of the G1000
Finally, we turn to the uestion of specic results. n any deliberative process,
it is important that the recommendations formulated by the mini-public receive
some form of public endorsement. As Dryzek puts it: ‘decisions still have to be
justied to those who did not participate  . This means that the results
from a deliberative endeavour should be put to the test of publicity once more, and
receive public assent. This could be done by putting the results to a popular vote
in a referendum. Such a process of public endorsement was not part of the G1000,
which is why we rely on the survey data to see whether there is substantive support
for its ideas or not (Table 4.3).
f the rst two items, on labourmarketrelated uestions, both proposals
received overwhelming support among the survey respondents. No less than 72.3
per cent agreed with making the labour market more exible and . per cent
were in favour of lowering income taxes. The automatic indexing mechanism,
which increases salaries based on a consumption index, also received the support
of 60.6 per cent of the wider public.
The other three proposals (retirees on the labour market, non-discrimination
and a universal basic income) received weaker public endorsement. This is most
likely because there has never been a real public debate on these issues. People’s
opinions thus have not yet crystallised. Another interesting perspective on these
ndings is that members of the wider maxipublic do not automatically endorse
the decisions reached by the mini-public. This is the argument for deliberative
polls: opinions announced after deliberation are different from common opinion
because people have had the time and space to deliberate, exchange argument,
hear different points of view and to develop a more ‘enlightened’ opinion (Fishkin
1992, 2009).

66 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
Table 4.3: Support for results of G1000
Completely
disagree
Disagree Neither agree
nor disagree
Agree Completely
agree
Labour market has to
become more exible
so employees can
move more easily
between companies and
organisations.
2.4% 5.6% 19.7% 47.3% 25.0%
Income taxes should be
reduced and alternative
sources of public
nances must be found.
4.9% 9.6% 24.2% 40.5% 20.8%
Automatic indexing
mechanism for salaries
must be maintained.
5.1% 11.8% 22.5% 34.5% 26.1%
To prevent future
generations from
having to bear weight
of ageing population,
labour market should
be opened more to
retirees.
10.9% 16.7% 25.6% 34.4% 12.4%
Non-discrimination
should be main
principle for getting
subsidies.
5.1% 12.2% 37.0% 32.6% 13.1%
A universal basic
income should be
implemented.
18.2% 25.6% 28.6% 21.4% 6.2%
The conventional political uptake
The effect of the G1000 on the policy process was non-existent in the short term
but that does not mean that there were no inuences from the  on the major
political actors of the country. This section analyses the reactions of political elites
towards the G1000 and its idea of a different kind of democracy. First, we look
at the manifestos of the political parties that are the main players in the Belgian
political landscape (Deschouwer 2012). Second, we observe the discourses of
members of Belgium’s several parliaments and how they refer to the G1000.
Party manifestos
The notion of citizen political participation beyond the ballot box, including
deliberation as well as sortition (drawing lots), became an important element in

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 67
the discourse of some Belgian parties in the electoral campaign of 2014. We have
analysed every manifesto of the thirteen parties22 that won at least one seat in
one of the parliaments directly elected in that year (European Parliament; House
of Representatives; Flemish Parliament; Walloon Parliament; Parliament of the
Brussels-Capital Region; Parliament of the German-speaking Community). All
the manifestos published by the parties for the three elections (European, federal,
and regional/community) were part of this comparison. Some parties, like the
Francophone ecologists (Ecolo) and Flemish regionalists (N-VA), produced one
manifesto for the three elections; whereas parties like the Francophone regionalists
(FDF) had four different ones (federal, Walloon, Brussels and European).
Moreover, we performed a thematic analysis on questions related to democratic
innovations, participation and deliberation.
The analysis yielded a fourfold typology. The rst group is composed of the
Flemish regionalists (N-VA) and the Francophone Union (UF). The topics of
participation or deliberation are not present in their manifestos. For the second
group, these questions are present in the manifesto only by the institution of
referendum. This is the case for the (radical) right-wing parties like the Francophone
Populist Party (PP) and Flemish radical-right party (VB). Thirdly, the majority of
party manifestos include general sentences asking for more participation, mainly at
local levels, but without concrete propositions for institutions or the formalisation
of this participation by citizens. This is the case for Francophone liberals (MR),
radical left (PTB GO!), regionalists (FDF) as well as Flemish socialists (sp.a) and
Christian-Democrats (CD&V). For instance, FDF explains in its Proposition 354
in the federal manifesto that ‘It should also adopt a code of citizen participation at
the provincial level according to the principle of participatory democracy’ (FDF
2014: 148) but the manifesto gives neither an explanation about the content of
this code nor does it state if this principle is also necessary at other levels of
governance.
Parties that seem more in favour of citizen-participation form the last group;
some of these parties had propositions comparable to the ones defended by
the G1000. This is the case for the two Green parties (Ecolo and Groen); the
Francophone socialists (PS); the Francophone Christian-Democrats (cdH); and
the Flemish liberals (Open Vld). This last group of parties all suggest delving into
hot political issues by organising citizen-panels or citizen-juries, which would be
in charge of formulating propositions. The Open Vld proposes the use of a form of
participatory budgeting (page 48 of its manifesto). The three Francophone parties
of this fourth group also recommend the use of sortition to select participants for
such experiments.
22. CD&V (Flemish Christian Democrats); cdH (Francophone Christian Democrats); Ecolo
(Francophone Ecologists); Groen (Flemish Ecologists); FDF (Francophone Regionalists);
MR (Francophone Liberals); N-VA (Flemish Regionalists); Open Vld (Flemish Liberals); PP
(Francophone Populists); PS (Francophone Socialists); PTB-GO! (Francophone Radical Left);
sp.a (Flemish Socialists); VB (Flemish Radical Right); UF (Union of the Francophone in
Flanders).

68 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
So what is the impact of the G1000 on these manifestos? In the previous
elections, of 2010, there was no reference to citizen-panels or random selection
in politics for the PS and Open Vld and the chapters on democratic innovation
concentrated on the reinforcement of existing institutions (parliaments; petitions;
use of public consultation). The G1000 is certainly not the only source of
democratic innovation but it inuenced the discourse of these parties on this topic.
In a chronicle published in 2014, the President of the Francophone Socialists
argued that the G1000 and the ideas defended by its organisers ought to inspire
public authorities to organise randomly selected bodies of citizens to transform
representative democracy.23 For the other parties of the group, institutionalised
participation by citizens had already been proposed in 2010 but we can see some
links with the G1000 in the two Green parties’ manifestos. In the Flemish Green
Party manifesto, one sentence was, in fact, inspired by one of G1000’s slogan:
emocracy is more than colouring in a box every four, ve or six years. The
manifesto of the Francophone reens was the most inuenced by the . They
take this experiment as an exemplar of good future practice:
Specically, colo calls for the development of citiens conferences or
deliberative panels such as panels of citizen-users to evaluate some policy;
roundtables with experts and citizens or the G1000. In other words, investigation
of an issue by a group of people randomly selected, through an improved public
debate (particularly with regard to environmental issues, societal debates or
other long-term issues) (Ecolo 2014: 000) [authors’ translation].
This extract reveals the indirect impact of the G1000. The initiative acts as a
point of reference, an argument, and an exemplar of best practice for parties that
want to promote or organise participation in public deliberation among ordinary
citizens. The G1000 is certainly not the only source of inspiration for them but
it acts as an important element of the issue-framing for people both outside and
inside the political arena. For instance, the President of the Study Centre of the
Francophone liberal MR organised a conference on 15 March 2014 with the title
Reinventing Democracy. The MR invited one spokesperson from the G1000 to
speak about the experience. One day before the conference, Jean Gol gave an
interview to the newspaper Le Soir to explain why the Belgian regime needed
democratic innovation. Furthermore, he argued that deliberation among randomly
selected citizens was a good means for achieving such renewal.24 In an open
letter, the President of the Francophone Brussels Parliament, Hamza Fassi Firi
(cdH), argued for the importance of making democracies more deliberative as they
faced the major issues of the twentyrst century. He then organised a conference
with another spokesperson of the G1000 (Fassi-Fihri 2014). In sum, several
political leaders have used the G1000 as an exemplar of desirable democratic
transformation.
23. Available online at: http://www.ps.be/Pagetype1/Actus/News/Chronique-de-Paul-Magnette-
Contre-les-elections.aspx (accessed 9 February 2016).
24. ‘La démocratie, avec tirage au sort’, Richard Miller, Le Soir, 14 March 2014.

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 69
G1000 in the parliament
As mentioned earlier, the formal political uptake of the G1000 was limited. In the
different parliaments of Belgium, the heart of representative democracy, a few
MPs did speak about the G1000. For example, in the session on 9 May 2012
three MPs from the two Green parties in the House of Representatives presented a
proposition for a resolution concerning the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
overnance in the conomic and onetary nion. pposed to the ratication of
this agreement, they proposed to organise a large debate with social partners before
proceeding to a vote. This large debate would use ‘innovative ways to encourage
reection based on the .25 Here, the G1000 was used by opposition MPs in
support of their criticism of the process of the negotiation of the treaty and to insist
on the idea that other forms of political process are possible.
In the Flemish Parliament, the Socialist MP Steve D’Hulster (sp.a) asked
the Flemish Minister-President a question about the initiative.26 He said that the
content of the report should be analysed by the Flemish government and that
the process could inspire other governmental initiatives. The Minister-President
responded, in a very formal style, that he had not yet read the report. Nevertheless,
he noted that this kind of initiative is very fruitful and that the participation of
citizens is a very important component in the process.
The social uptake
Since its very conception, the dissemination of the idea of a more participatory
and deliberative democracy was the aim of the G1000. That is the reason why, at
the margin of the G1000 summit, two events were organised to broaden the scale
of the project. With the G’Home, every citizen had the opportunity to participate
in a simultaneous online deliberation. This gave the opportunity to 730 citizens,
not randomly selected, to participate in the discussion and to exchange points of
view. Also, local mini-publics, the G’Offs, were organised by volunteers across
the country. n total,  participants met each other in fty locations to discuss
the same topics as in Brussels.
These two elements opened the G1000 to the outside world and gained the
support of people who wanted to nd new modes of political participation.
Some people were interested by the idea and the method and became defenders
of deliberative democracy. An example is very illustrative. A group of citizens
organised a G‘Off in Grez-Doiceau but they found the experience too short to
have any real effectiveness. A few months later, joined by other inhabitants of the
village, they decided to create their own democratic innovation in Grez-Doiceau.
Their G100 took place three years later in 2014, gathering volunteers and randomly
25. Doc 53 2180/001, Chambre des représentants de Belgique, 9 mai 2012, ‘Proposition de résolution
relative au Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique
et monétaire’, déposée par MM. Georges Gilkinet et Stefaan Van Hecke et Mme Muriel Gerken,
p. 12.
26. Vlaams Parlement, Handeling, Plenaire vergadering nr. 9 (2012–2013),14 November 2012.

70 Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe
selected people during one weekend to discuss and engage proposals for the future
of the municipality.
t is always difcult to measure the inuence of one specic event on the spirit
of a time but several initiatives can be considered to be clearly the result of the
G1000. The most evident example is the G1000 that was organised on 22 March
2014 in Amersfoort, a city just south of Amsterdam, three days after the municipal
elections. The logo and the general atmosphere were similar to the ones in Brussels.
The project was also organised by independent citizens but the major difference
was that traditional political actors were more integrated with the process. Every
discussion table was composed of randomly selected citizens alongside public
ofcials and elected representatives, as in the case of reland.
Several initiatives were also born in Belgium in the wake of the G1000, mainly
at the local level, such as the G100 organised by the community centre in Ath,
K35 in Kortrijk or the local CD&V of Kuurne, who organised a G100. These
experiences make the trajectory of the G1000 interesting to consider. Indeed, these
grassroots events inspire more traditional political actors like political parties, and
public and semi-public bodies. G1000 projects exist also in Uden and Rotterdam
in the Netherlands, in France and in Hungary.
All these elements can help us rethink the relation between deliberative small-
scale democratic venues and democracy in the whole system (Chambers 2009).
Goodin and Dryzek (2006) explain that mini-public deliberation can be used
to inform the public debate; to test propositions for reform; and to legitimate
policy. With the example of the G1000, we can add a new sort of output: the
existence of a mini-public used by other political actors, traditional and non-
traditional, as a reference to promote a more deliberative democracy. For them,
while the content of the nal proposition of the  is irrelevant, the process
remains crucial.
Conclusion
The G1000 was certainly an outlier in the Belgian political context. In a country
in which not just political parties but also civil-society organisations are the
backbone of the political system, such a citizen-led initiative was received with
both great caution and great expectations. The G1000 received praise for its input
and its throughput legitimacy because of its overall organisation and bottom-up
approach. Moreover, this bottom-up approach was seen as especially successful
as it was reinforced by a will to maintain wide inclusiveness that relied on random
selection. However, on the output side, the G1000 failed to have an impact on
short-term policy-making, despite the concrete proposals made by the G32 citizens
after three weekends of deliberation.
Nevertheless, in the longer run, the political and social uptakes of the G1000
are increasing: most political parties now advocate some form of participatory and
deliberative democracy. What is more, the G1000 sparked a debate in Belgium and
in neighbouring countries about new ways of designing democracy. Therefore the
weak output legitimacy assessment that was given immediately after the G1000

The Macro Political Uptake of the G1000 in Belgium 71
now needs to be nuanced. And this nding is interesting in light of the debate
raised by this book.
To be sure, the G1000 cannot be described as a constitutional mini-public. It
was not designed by any political bodies, let alone by any constitution-making
ones. Above all, the aim of the G1000 was not reforming the Belgian constitution,
even partially. Yet the G1000’s macro-level political uptake, broadly understood,
has been increasing steadily in the years since it happened. In fact, this citizen-
led initiative sparked a more general debate about the nature of democracy in
Belgium and, especially, about the role of citizens. The public authorities are not
necessarily going to call for a constitutional convention inspired by the G1000 but
this initiative has paved the way for this possibility in a country in which, because
of the divide between the two main language-communities and the consociational
legacy (Swenden 2013; Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014a), citizens are often kept
away from political negotiations about the future of the country.
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News websites of articles referenced in the chapter
http://www.demorgen.be
http://www.dhnet.be
http://www.gva.be
http://www.hbvl.be
http://www.knack.be
http://www.lalibre.be
http://www.lesoir.be
http://www.levif.be
http://www.rtbf.be
http://www.standaard.be