Organizational Response to Adversity: Fusing Crisis Management and Resilience Research Streams

Abstract

Research on crisis management and resilience has sought to explain how individuals and organizations anticipate and respond to adversity, yet—surprisingly—there has been little integration across these two literatures. In this paper, we review the literatures on crisis management and resilience and discuss opportunities to both integrate and advance these streams of research. We identify unique lines of work on crisis and crisis management—crisis-as-an-event and crisis-as-process. We review complementary streams of research in the resilience literature and explore their implications for studies of crisis. Building on these reviews, we develop an integrative framework that is focused around key themes of both crisis and resilience, including capabilities for durability; organizing and adjusting; responding to major disturbances; and a feedback loop from these experiences. Following this, we offer a research agenda that centers on understanding and explaining the interaction between crisis and resilience as they occur in a dynamic process. We then discuss research opportunities that explore the dynamic relationship of resilience and crisis as it relates to leadership, time, complexity, and mindfulness. Finally, we note how researchers can consider the dark side of resilience.

Full text

rAcademy of Management Annals
2017, Vol. 11, No. 2, 733–769.
https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2015.0134
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO ADVERSITY: FUSING
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE RESEARCH
STREAMS
TRENTON A. WILLIAMS
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
DANIEL A. GRUBER
Lindner College of Business, University of Cincinnati
KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE
Carey Business School, The Johns Hopkins University
DEAN A. SHEPHERD
Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame
ERIC YANFEI ZHAO
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
Research on crisis management and resilience has sought to explain how individuals
and organizations anticipate and respond to adversity, yet—surprisingly—there has
been little integration across these two literatures. In this paper, we review the litera-
tures on crisis management and resilience and discuss opportunities to both integrate
and advance these streams of research. We identify unique lines of work on crisis and
crisis management: crisis-as-an-event and crisis-as-process. We review complementary
streams of research in the resilience literature and explore their implications for studies
of crisis. Building on these reviews, we develop an integrative framework that is focused
around key themes of both crisis and resilience, including capabilities for durability,
organizing and adjusting, responding to major disturbances, and a feedback loop from
these experiences. Following this, we offer a research agenda that centers on un-
derstanding and explaining the interaction between crisis and resilience as they occur in
a dynamic process. We then discuss research opportunities that explore the dynamic
relationship of resilience and crisis as it relates to leadership, time, complexity, and
mindfulness. Finally, we note how researchers can consider the dark side of resilience.
INTRODUCTION
Organizations inevitably face adversity that
threatens functioning and performance (Boin, 2009;
Comfort, 2002; Drabek, 1985; Quarantelli, 1988;
Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). As a result, scholars
have sought to explain both the nature and impact of
crises and how organizations effectively prepare for,
respond to, and overcome their various forms and
degrees to preserve performance, to recover, or to pre-
vent decline and even failure (Meyer, 1982; Perrow,
2011; Roux-Dufort, 2007; Sine & David, 2003; Sutcliffe
& Vogus, 2003; Wan & Yiu, 2009). More recently, there
has been a rise in the degree and range of challenges
that threaten organizations including a severe global
economic downturn; an increasing number of
climatic episodes, natural catastrophes, and in-
dustrial accidents; devastating product recalls; in-
formation technology breaches and data security
violations; virally disruptive social media trends; and
the threat of terrorism (Choucri, Madnick, & Koepke,
2016; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Perry & Quarantelli,
2005; Ritchie, 2004; Scholtens, 2008; Toubiana &
Zietsma, 2016). In response to these trends, there have
We thank Elizabeth George, Sim Sitkin, and Laurie
Weingart for their helpful suggestions on a previous ver-
sion of this manuscript. Kathleen Sutcliffe gives special
thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation for a summer 2016
Rockefeller Fellowship during which some of the research
for this paper was conducted. We also thank presenters and
participants in the 2015 Academy of Management sym-
posium titled Repositioning Crisis Management.
733
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been a number of calls for organizational research to
better explain what we know about the crisis–
organization interaction, including how to develop
organizational resilience not only to respond to ad-
versity but also to mitigate it before it arises (Van Der
Vegt, Essens, Wahlstr¨
om, & George, 2015; Williams &
Shepherd, 2016a).
Despite the increasing need to better understand
crises and crisis management, this stream of research
has not played a prominent role in mainstream or-
ganization and management theory (Roux-Dufort,
2007; Roux-Dufort & Lalonde, 2013). In part, this may
be due to a lack of consensus around the definition
of crisis and its fragmented literature (Boin, 2004;
Kouzmin, 2008) as well as its normative and pre-
scriptive orientation. Relatedly, although scholars
have become increasingly interested in under-
standing how and why some organizations are more
resilient in the face of severe challenges, research on
organizational resilience has largely been explored
separately from crisis management; perhaps due to
an assumption that resilient actors (i.e., individuals,
organizations, and communities) avoid crises. That
is, they circumvent major disruption to functioning
before, during, and/or after adversity (Alexander,
2013; Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, &
La Greca, 2010; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Notwith-
standing the mutual focus on positive functioning in
the face of adversity, each of the literatures pays
particular attention to explaining a different aspect
of organizing such that each—independent of the
other—offers an incomplete picture of the phenom-
enon. Integrating research on crisis management
(i.e., the ability to return organizations and systems
to normal functioning after a disruption) and resil-
ience (i.e., the ability to maintain reliable function-
ing despite adversity) would seem to be a natural way
to more generally strengthen theory of organizational
functioning under adversity.
Consequently, we review the crisis management
and resilience literatures, highlight various concep-
tions and derivations of these concepts as expressed
in prior research, and identify key themes and em-
pirical findings. Our review reveals that the differ-
ences and similarities in how crisis and crisis
management are conceptualized and researched in
the literature hold important implications for how
scholars interpret and understand resilience. Thus,
the crisis–resilience relationship likely provides
new insights into how organizations anticipate,
adjust, and respond to adversity. At the conclu-
sion of our review, we present a process model as
a way of representing the literature to emphasize
differences in how organizations interact with
crises that occur over time (consistent with Huy,
2001; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven,
2013). By fusing the two literatures, we lay the
groundwork for a research agenda that seeks to
extend our understanding of adversity by account-
ing for both the crisis management and resilience
perspectives.
This paper proceeds as follows: we start by detail-
ing the method we used to systematically identify
the body of literature for our review. We then review
the crisis management and resilience literatures
and illustrate core themes related to organizing in
the face of adversity. Finally, we integrate these
themes and offer a research agenda to gain a deeper
understanding of how organizations interact with
adversity over time to build resilience.
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE REVIEW
Accumulating and then synthesizing the literature
“is a critical first step in priming the pump so that
accumulated knowledge is made available for inter-
pretation and use”(Rousseau, Manning, & Denyer,
2008: 507). To ensure that the body of research to be
included in our review was sufficiently broad, deep,
and rigorous, we followed established procedures
of conducting systematic reviews (e.g., Gregoire,
Corbett, & McMullen, 2011; Shepherd, Williams, &
Patzelt, 2015). This included systematic searches on
relevant keywords (e.g., resilience, crisis, and ad-
versity) in both mainstream management and crisis
management journals, which generated 384 articles.
We then manually explored additional research that
may have fallen outside of the initial search, focusing
on frequently cited domain-specific book chapters,
books, and other papers. With this body of literature,
we systematically reviewed articles and inductively
coded them into categories. We now turn to the
content of our review.
ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS IN THE
MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Management research on crisis has been highly
fragmented largely due to a lack of agreement on the
definition of the term crisis (Boin, 2004; Perry &
Quarantelli, 2005), challenges in observing crises
real time (Forgues & Roux-Dufort, 1998), and making
comparisons across these unique events (Roux-
Dufort, 2016) (for a detailed discussion of the
evolving definitions, see James, Wooten, & Dushek,
2011). Despite the fragmentary nature of the crisis
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literature, there are two broad conceptualizations of
crisis: crisis as an event and crisis as a process.
Crisis as an Event
Some of the initial theorizing and research on
crises began with the work of Hermann (1963: 64),
who articulated three key components of an organi-
zational crisis: (1) it threatens high-priority values of
the organization, (2) it presents a restricted amount of
time in which a response can be made, and (3) it is
unexpected or unanticipated by the organization.
Many of Hermann’s core ideas are embedded in the
definition of crisis that is most frequently cited in
the literature today: “a low-probability, high-impact
situation that is perceived by critical stakeholders to
threaten the viability of the organization”(Pearson &
Clair, 1998: 66). James et al. (2011) offer three addi-
tional (yet related) components—rarity of the event,
significance of the event, and level of impact on
stakeholders—as essential to understanding crisis
(and its subsequent management).
The focus on surprising and disruptive events gave
rise to typologies of crises (e.g., incidents, accidents,
conflicts) (Gundel, 2005; Lagadec, 1991; Pauchant &
Mitroff, 1992) and related crisis management tech-
niques to effectively respond to the event (e.g., Drabek,
1999; Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001). Importantly,
in these studies the event (incident, accident, disaster,
etc.) is the unit of analysis and studies typically
examine what triggers the event (Lagadec, 2007;
Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani, 1988) and
how the event disrupts or threatens organizational
survival (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Sayegh, Anthony, &
Perrewe, 2004). A surge of studies exploring shock-
ing accidents, such as oil spills (Pauchant & Mitroff,
1992), the Challenger explosion (Starbuck & Milliken,
1988), terrorist attacks (Rosenthal, 2003), and so
forth, have further enhanced the event orientation
of crisis theorizing. Crises are seen as unanticipated
contingent events (as opposed to routines, etc.)
that are isolated in space and time, have a dis-
cer nabl e sour ce or cause (for classification), and are
high impact (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, 1992;
Weick, 1988).
From this crisis-as-event perspective one cannot
completely plan for a crisis event given an inability
to consider probabilities of potential risks as these
events are inconceivable, unscheduled, and un-
expected (Rosenthal, 2003; Topper & Lagadec, 2013).
This has led to the traditional, frequently cited con-
ception of effective crisis management as the “indi-
vidual and organizational readjustment of basic
assumptions, as well as behavioral and emotional
responses aimed at recovery and readjustment”
(Pearson & Clair, 1998: 66 [emphasis added]). That is,
the goal of crisis management is to bring a system
back into alignment, which can only occur in the
aftermath of an adverse event. Indeed, a key benefit of
studying crises as events is seeking to understand the
dynamics of a crisis in its most acute stage and how
organizations react to bring things back into equilib-
rium as soon as possible (Lalonde & Roux-Dufort, 2010).
This perspective has given rise to a number of studies
exploring interorganizational collaboration, disaster
planning and prevention, and emergent organizing as
means for addressing crisis-induced needs, with a par-
ticular focus on alleviating suffering and preserving
life and property (Foster, 2012; Quarantelli, 1997;
Shepherd & Williams, 2014).
The crisis-as-event perspective by definition privi-
leges research that investigates actors’reactions to
rare and exceptional events, and, in many ways, ne-
glects research that aims to understand how the crisis
was produced in the first place (Roux-Dufort, 2016;
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Indeed, recently
crisis management scholars (e.g., Quarantelli, 2005;
Roux-Dufort, 2007, 2009) have suggested extending
the scope of crisis management from a focus on the
rare and exceptional event to investigate processes
that may lead to a crisis event. Next, we examine the
literature on the process perspective of crises to un-
derstand this complementary stream of research.
Crisis as a Process
In contrast to the event-centered perspective,
which focuses primarily on exploring the aftermath
of a crisis, the process perspective focuses on the
need to understand crisis-fostering environments,
processes of organizational weakening (Roux-Dufort,
2007), crisis evolution, and how organizations re-
spond to stages of a crisis. A crisis-as-a-process
perspective emphasizes that crises (1) develop over
time and sometimes in phases, including strategic
drift, incubation, triggering events, and resolution
(Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Roux-Dufort, 2016;
Turner, 1976) and (2) form a disjunction in normal
functioning—one that serves as a “fault line and
hinge between a degenerative organizational past
evolution and a future of change”—requiring a tran-
sition as actors interpret and process the “wave of
meaning”in the new environment (Roux-Dufort,
2007: 106, 111). The process perspective suggests
that there is a “genealogy of crises that may be po-
tentially tracked long before the acute phase ...
2017 735Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

[which] is the ultimate moment of a continuous
cumulative process of organizational failures”(Roux-
Dufort, 2009; Roux-Dufort, 2016: 27).
Extending research beyond rare, novel crisis
events highlights various forms of adversity organi-
zations face and the ways organizations enact, in-
teract with, and respond to the environment at
different stages of crisis. Moreover, it reinforces the
recognition that triggering events are one component
of crises. Beyond these events, other organizational
occurrences hold the potential to develop, accumu-
late, and advance to such a degree that they escalate
into triggering events. These occurrences could in-
clude system anomalies, organizational weakening,
vulnerabilities, and everyday challenges that are
unnoticed, ignored, misunderstood, or discounted
(Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016; Rudolph & Repenning,
2002; Turner, 1976).
Interestingly, much of the foundational literature
on crisis and crisis management argues for a process
definition of crisis. For example, Turner (1976) ar-
gued that there are six stages by which a crisis de-
velops, which begins with (1) a notionally normal
starting point and then evolves through (2) an in-
cubation period, (3) triggering event, (4) onset or
immediate consequences of a collapse, (5) rescue
and salvage (first stage of adjustment) or ad hoc ad-
justments to permit work of rescue and salvage until
(6) full readjustment and the establishment of new
norms. Similarly, Milburn, Schuler, and Watman
(1983) conceptualized crises as both an event and
a process, with three major aspects: (1) antecedents,
at the internal and external environment, (2) mod-
erators of the antecedents to a crisis and the crisis to
response relationships, and (3) individual and orga-
nizational responses. Finally, Shrivastava (1995)
argued that crises are not events but processes ex-
tended in time and space.
A crisis-as-process perspective broadens the po-
tential for research to investigate the “enigmatic or-
igin of the event and thepossible post-event futures . . .
[which allows researchers] to talk not only about
accidents but also about organizations”(Roux-
Dufort, 2007: 108) and, we add, about organizing.
For example, Rerup’s study (2009) reveals how
a merger between two pharmaceutical companies
led to a major crisis event when management failed
to attend to weak signals (in this case, chain of
command issues) over time and across multiple
levels of the organizational hierarchy. That is, the
inability to attend to weak signs of danger in a con-
sistent way across the organization built up over time
until they triggered a crisis event. In a related study,
Roux-Dufort (2009) found that an accumulation of
organizational imperfections combined with mana-
gerial ignorance of those imperfections developed
into organizational weakening over time, laying
a foundation for a triggering crisis event to occur.
Taken together, these studies represent an emerging
and important shift in research that explores the in-
cubation of crises as well as the evolutionary features
of crises (e.g., weakening and strategic drift) that may
(or may not) accumulate into a triggering event.
In summary, the crisis as process approach high-
lights the importance of preevent, in-event, and
postevent crisis management. Specifically, a trigger-
ing event can arise from everyday unexpected oc-
currences that remain unnoticed, “incubate,”and
accumulate into a pending crisis due to among other
factors (1) erroneous assumptions, (2) information
complexity, (3) a cultural lag in noticing and inter-
preting signals, and (4) a reluctance to imagine the
worst possible outcome (Turner, 1976: 393–394). A
process-centered perspective suggests that organi-
zations may address (i.e., eliminate) the threat of
crises before,during, and after the triggering event.
In Table 1, we summarize the different concep-
tions of crisis and crisis management. Having
reviewed the foundational perspectives of crisis and
crisis management, we now discuss the general
themes that emerged from our detailed review of the
literature.
Themes in the research on crisis management.
As we reviewed the literature on crisis and crisis
management, we found—consistent with our dis-
cussion earlier—that much of the empirical research
has focused specifically on the response to crisis
events. With this as a context, we observed three
primary themes: (1) crisis management as a norma-
tive and staged activity to restore equilibrium, (2) the
role of leaders in crisis management, and (3) the
importance of crisis management teams (CMTs).
Crisis Management as an Activity to Restore
Equilibrium
Much of the empirical research has focused on
a linear progression of response stages in the after-
math of a crisis event (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek,
1985; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson & Clair,
1998). These stages are seen as formulaic, sequential,
and based on a bureaucratic model in which plan-
ning, preparation, and hazard mitigation are co-
ordinated through a centralized decision-making
entity (e.g., government, organization) (Canton,
2007; Comfort, 2007; Schneider, 1992; Takeda &
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Helms, 2006). Following an exceptional event, en-
vironmental turbulence ensues due to disrupted
structures, routines, and capabilities. Thus, research
in this stream has sought to develop emergency-
management policies and procedures (Comfort,
2007; Iannella & Henricksen, 2007) that identify co-
ordination, communication, and other activities that
enable a more effective disaster response (Comfort &
Kapucu, 2006; Marcum, Bevc, & Butts, 2012), such as
“clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a for-
mal structure, and a set of policies and procedures”
(Schneider, 1992: 138; see also Quarantelli, 2005).
Effective crisis management involves five key pha-
ses of response: (1) signal detection, (2) preparation/
prevention (i.e., planning), (3) containment/damage
control, (4) business recovery, and (5) learning (James
& Wooten, 2010; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Schneider,
1992; Waller, Lei & Pratten, 2014). Although the ef-
fectiveness of crisis responses have been attributed to
the interpretation of the event (Jackson & Dutton,
1988; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010), decision-making
under high uncertainty (Anderson, 1983; Smart &
Vertinsky, 1977; Tjosvold, 1984), and response strat-
egies (Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011; Kahn, Barton, &
Fellows, 2013), as we noted earlier in this review,
there is much to be gained by exploring vulnerability
to crises and the means for reducing that vulnerabil-
ity (McEntire, 2013; Quarantelli, 2005). In addition,
research emphasizing normative approaches to di-
sasters has the opportunity to better integrate the
numerous ad hoc organizing efforts that inevitably
emerge in the aftermath of disasters (e.g., Lanzara,
TABLE 1
Conceptions of Crisis and Crisis Management
Key Terms Crisis as Event Crisis as Process
Crisis cDefinition: Low-probability, unanticipated, high-
impact (i.e., harmful) events that are unpredictable,
surprising, and threaten the viability of the
organization (Lagadec, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1998)
cDefinition: Processes extended in space and time,
where a “triggering event”is the result of a long
period of incubation; that is, crises occur in phases
(Roux-Dufort, 2007, 2016; Turner, 1976;
Shrivastava, 1995)
cProperties cProperties:
sIncident or accident is the unit of analysis
(Pearson & Clair, 1998)
sCrisis develop in stages-warning signals, acute
stage, amplification, and resolution (Turner 1976;
Fink 1986; Mitroff & Pearson 1993) for which the
acute peak is the accumulation of dysfunctions
and/or an isolated event (i.e., natural disaster)
sEvents are contingencies isolated in space and
time (Lagadec, 2007)
sTriggering events have a genealogy, which could
include incubation of problems (Turner, 1976;
Roux-Dufort, 2016)
sPossess a distinguishable origin, which has given
rise to crisis typologies (e.g., Gundel, 2005;
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992)
sVarious features (organizational, institutional,
etc.) make up the “sequences of disaster
development, accumulating unnoticed until
a precipitating event leads to the onset of the
disaster and a degree of . . . collapse”(Turner,
1976: 379).
sAssociated with uncertainty-inconceivable,
unstructured, unplanned, and unexpected
(Rosenthal, 2003; Topper & Lagadec, 2013);
therefore, one cannot fully plan for or measure the
probability of these events (Pearson & Clair, 1998)
Crisis management cDefinition: Coordinating stakeholders and resources
in an ambiguous environment to bring a disrupted
system (i.e., organization, community, etc.) back
into alignment (Sommer & Pearson, 2007).
cDefinition: Managing attention to “weak signals”
of crises-in process, in-event organizing, and
postevent actions to protect a system and
(when necessary) bring it back into alignment
(Ansoff, 1975; Roux-Dufort & Laloonde, 2013;
Portal & Roux-Dufort, 2013)
cProperties: cProperties
sReadjustment of basic assumptions, as well as
behavioral and emotional responses aimed at
recovery and readjustment
sThere are likely systematic patterns that influence
various stages of the crisis process (Deschamps
et al., 1997); studying the system could help
capture the complexity and ambiguity
surrounding crises (Kovoor-Misra, 1995)
sReaction oriented reduce the impact of the crisis
and resume “normal”activities as soon as
possible (Lalonde, 2004). sExplain and integrate the many relations linking
diverse stakeholders and issues and how these
influenced the crisis process (Perrow, 2011;
Shrivastava, 1995).
sFocus on precrisis scenario planning, preparation,
and postcrisis response (Kouzmin, 2008)
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1983; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007;
Shepherd & Williams, 2014; Williams & Shepherd,
2016b). Ad hoc organizing occurs after triggering
events as actors spontaneously converge to the scene
of the crisis to care for and offer help to alleviate
others’suffering (for a review, see Drabek & McEntire,
2003). Failure to attend toand incorporate these forms
of organizing in crisis management planning and in-
tegrate them into broader response efforts can lead to
organizational conflict, failure to complete objectives,
inefficiency, and (potentially) additional suffering
among crisis victims (Marcum et al., 2012; Mendonca,
Beroggi, & Wallace, 2001; Webb, 2004).
Leadership and Crisis Management
As a natural extension to the previous section on
the normative aspects of crisis management, to un-
derstand exceptional crisis recovery a substantial
body of research has examined the role of effective
leadership (James et al., 2011). Crises are believed to
represent an opportunity for managers to communi-
cate with stakeholders (Barton, 1993; Simpson, Clegg,
& Cunha, 2013), display leadership skills (Roux-
Dufort & Lalonde, 2013; Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011),
and particularly engage positive leadership (Brockner
& James, 2008; James et al., 2011) so as to facilitate the
organization’s progression through stages of recovery
to reduce the negative effect of the crisis (Auf der
Heide, 1989; Drabek, 1985). In a crisis, some leader-
ship styles are considered more effective than others
in helping organizations to respond (Ballesteros,
Useem, & Wry, in press; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015;
Stam, Van Knippenberg, Wisse & Pieterse, 2016).
However, the effectiveness of leadership styles at least
partly depends on the nature (and stage) of the crisis,
what led to the crisis (e.g. natural disaster, industrial
accident, gradual weakening) and how leadership style
interacts with how leaders and organizations prepared
for the possibility of an organizational crisis (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015). Preparation for different crisis scenarios
can influence how leaders react to the crisis, which in
turn affects crisis response outcomes. For example,
when the organization is at fault (i.e., industrial acci-
dent), acceptance of responsibility and the prior re-
lationship a leader had with the organization likely
shapes a leader’s social approval, how organizational
stakeholders perceive the crisis, and the organiza-
tion’s response (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Leaders
also engage in meaning making to help other stake-
holders make sense of information during the throes
of a crisis (Christianson et al., 2009), providing sta-
bility despite the potential for chaos (Schneider,
1992). Importantly, prior relationships are important
in shaping effectiveness of meaning making, where
anegativeleader–organization relationship can nega-
tively affect the organization’s reputation (Coombs &
Holladay, 2001).
However, despite the importance of leadership in
planning and preparing for a crisis response, de-
tailed planning and preparation cannot mitigate
every potential crisis (Drabek & McEntire, 2003;
Herbane, 2013; Neal & Phillips, 1995; Wenger,
Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1990). Consequently, effec-
tive crisis response also involves ad hoc capabilities,
such as improvising decision-making activities
(Drabek, 1985; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985) and
role enactment (Webb, 2004), identifying and mobi-
lizing resources (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993; Neal &
Phillips, 1995; Shepherd & Williams, 2014), and
establishing order through emergent communication
and coordination techniques (Dynes, 2003; Wenger
et al., 1990). Given the inherent limitations of the
command-and-control approach to disaster response
(Drabek, 2005; Dynes, 1994; Neal & Phillips, 1995),
emergent leadership behaviors and the development
of new norms (Schneider, 1992) are critical for
addressing organizational and community demands
in the crisis aftermath (Auf der Heide, 1989; Stallings
& Quarantelli, 1985; Wenger, 1992). Furthermore,
organizational and community leaders must be aware
that emergent groups are likely to arise in response to
crisis (Drabek & McEntire, 2003). Such groups have
the potential to offer aid but may also present a num-
ber of challenges (e.g., confusion over who is in
charge, congestion of people and supplies that create
logistical problems, mixed messages in communica-
tion, and so on) (Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Wenger,
Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1987). Therefore, effective
leaders must harness the contributions of emergent
groups while also minimizing the potential problems
associated with such groups.
Beyond explorations of crisis leadership in respond-
ing to disaster events, a small set of studies also
consider a more process-oriented approach to crisis
management. The actions leaders take before a crisis
can be influential in enabling them to successfully
navigate their organization through a crisis (James
& Wooten, 2010). For example, certain actions (e.g.,
deeply engaging in their contexts and directing
their behaviors toward proactively searching for
and making sense of potential trouble spots) have
been shown to enhance performance under trying
conditions (Barton, Sutcliffe, Vogus, & DeWitt,
2015). These studies underscore the importance
of ongoing actions by leaders that are heightened
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when organizations rely on those same leaders
during the climax (i.e., triggering event) of a cri-
sis. Leaders who can effectively notice “weak
signs of danger”(drift in performance, etc.), and
then organize action to bring those signals to the
collective view can potentially address the ad-
versity before it becomes a triggering event (Rerup,
2009). In contrast, if leaders remain “willfully ig-
norant”and retreat from the reality of accumulating
imperfection and vulnerabilities in their organiza-
tions, then these imperfections will build up until
reaching “a saturation point that takes them out of
managers’control”and results in a major disruption
(i.e., triggering event) (Roux-Dufort, 2009: 6).
Teams and Crisis Management
In addition to leadership, many of the normative
models for effectively managing crises focus on the
nature of CMTs (see Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff & Pearson,
1993; Pearson & Sommer, 2011; Sapriel, 2003). Re-
search on CMTs has generally tried to explain how
actors can minimize the impact of and then recover
from the disruption of a crisis to return to (or exceed)
pre-event functioning. For example, the effective-
ness of CMTs in recovering from a crisis depends on
the type and extent of training (Undre et al., 2007;
Young, 1998), the development of a shared (i.e.,
collective) understanding (Rentsch & Klimoski,
2001; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, &
Reynolds, 2001), and team composition [e.g., the
homogeneity of dispositional positive affect (Kaplan,
Laport, & Waller, 2013)]. Much of the research on
these teams is grounded in ideas from the study of
“high-reliability organizations”and/or organizations
that are accustomed to rapidly changing environ-
mental shifts (e.g., intermittent crises as a “normal”
part of business) (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Bigley &
Roberts, 2001; Colquitt , Lepine, Zapata, & Wild, 2011;
Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 1999).
Critical to adjusting to the rapidly changing work de-
mands triggered by a crisis event are building a trusting
CMT (Colquitt et al., 2011), balancing a bureaucratic
team structure with flexibility (Bigley & Roberts, 2001),
and establishing role development and flexibility
(Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011). For example, CMTs can
rapidly and flexibly reorganize resources to both reduce
stressors to the system and (potentially) generate novel
solutions that address changing conditions (Barton &
Sutcliffe, 2009; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Kahn et al.
(2013) argued that successful “relational systems”
within organizations can facilitate crisis sensemaking
such that teams and organizations end up better off
after the event than before it (consistent with
Brockner & James, 2008; James et al., 2011). This
“better off post-crisis”outcome is consistent with
the notion of posttraumatic growth, which describes
how positive psychological changes occur “as a result of
the struggle with highly challenging life circum-
stances”(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004: 1; see also Hobfoll,
Hall, Canetti-Nisim, Galea, Johnson, & Palmieri, 2007).
Therefore, despite the potential threats posed by ad-
versity, highly capable teams and other relational sys-
tems embedded in organizations can generate positive
outcomes and facilitate a return to (or improvement
upon) the status quo (e.g., James, et al., 2011; Kahn et al.,
2013; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). It is this tension
around whether adversity can be successfully nav-
igated by the organization via leaders or teams that
presents an opportunity to better explain not only
how organizations respond to challenges but also
how an organization disarms challenges before they
progress and trigger a crisis event.
Consistent with our earlier statements of research
on crisis management in general, research on teams
typically assumes the crisis-as-event perspective.
Despite the dominance of this perspective, some
studies explore the importance of leveraging multiple
stakeholders and decision makers to help organiza-
tions attend to and act on organizational imperfec-
tions and/or drift before those issues are no longer
controllable (Bazerman & Watkins, 2004; Chekkar-
Mansouri & Onnee, 2013; Roux-Dufort, 2009). Al-
though teams hold potential to benefit sensemaking,
teams that are reactive and are established as crisis
management groups can be prone to failing to
make sense of the crisis and identify root causes,
which can limit recovery and paralyze attempts to
understand what has transpired (Roux-Dufort &
Vidaillet, 2003).
An Inclusive Conceptualization of Crisis and Crisis
Management
Having examined the literatures on crisis and cri-
sis management, particularly how these concepts are
defined, we propose that a more inclusive defini-
tion of these terms provides a basis for theoretical
and empirical advancement; specifically, we offer
definitions that acknowledge the complementary
potential of the two conceptualizations of crises: crisis-
as-event and crisis-as-process. We define crisis as
a process of weakening or degeneration that can
culminate in a disruption event to the actor’s
(i.e., individual, organization, and/or community)
normal functioning. And thus we define “crisis
2017 739Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

management”as the actor’s attempt to bring a dis-
rupted or weakened system at any stage of crisis
back into alignment to achieve normal functioning.
These definitions include both the daily perturba-
tions that must be overcome—strategic drift or
gradual weakening over time—as well as the ex-
ceptional low-probability events that dominate
traditional crisis management studies (Cobb et al.,
2016; Rudolph & Repenning, 2002; Turner, 1976).
Advancements in research on crisis management
will likely come from integrating event and process
crisis research to focus on the weakening or de-
generation that precede triggering events (Boin &
McConnell, 2007; Roux-Dufort, 2007). Indeed, re-
search examining predictable surprises (Bazerman &
Watkins, 2004) and the ways organizations antici-
pate and contain everyday unexpected occurrences
(e.g., Weick et al., 1999) has grown. As a result, there
is a desire to understand how organizations interpret
and absorb various degrees of adversity that hold the
potential to accumulate into a triggering event. This
interest has led to a limited-but-promising body
of research linking crisis management to resilience
(see Aldrich, 2012; Boin & McConnell, 2007;
McEntire, 2013; Van Der Vegt et al., 2015; Williams &
Shepherd, 2016a).
In the following section, we review the literature
on resilience. Following this review, we highlight
opportunities to advance both crisis and resilience
literature and theory through integration.
RESILIENCE IN THE MANAGEMENT
LITERATURE
Resilience has been historically relevant in
organizational scholarship (see Alexander, 2013;
Linnenluecke, 2015; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003;
Wildavsky, 1988); but, as noted earlier, it has been
relatively absent in the crisis literature (Boin, et al.,
2010: 11). Comfort et al. (2010) propose that this state
of affairs may be due to the fact that researchers have
spent most of their energy exploring the causes, dy-
namics, and aftermath of crises rather than trying to
understand how organizations can resist adversity or
proactively deal with uncertainty and change. Yet, as
crisis researchers have shown repeatedly, the quality
of an organization’s response to crisis “critically
depends on the capacity to enhance improvisation,
coordination, flexibility, and endurance—qualities
that we typically associate with resilience”(Boin
et al., 2010: 11). This suggests that linking crisis and
resilience may provide a more complete understanding
of the organization–adversity relationship.
At its roots resilience originally stemmed from
resilire and resilio, which in Latin mean “bounce”or
“jump back”(Alexander, 2013; Klein, Nicholls, &
Thomalla, 2003). In the mid-1500s the term passed
into Middle French (r´
esiler), where it came to mean
“to retract”or “to cancel,”and then it moved into
English as the verb resile, meaning to “return to
a former position”(Alexander, 2013: 2708). Over
time, resilience has been studied in a number of
disciplines including psychology (especially how
children overcome adversity) (Bonanno, 2004;
Flach, 1988; Masten, 2013; Waller, 2001), the orga-
nization sciences (Linnenluecke, 2015; Sutcliffe &
Vogus, 2003), engineering (describing the strength
and ductility of steel beams) (Rankine, 1867) and
more recently in resilience engineering (e.g., Hollnagel,
Woods, Leveson, 2006), and ecology (Holling, 1973)
(referring to the capacity of an ecosystem to respond to
a perturbation or disturbance by resisting damage and
recovering quickly). Despite the clear interest across
fields of study, some critics claim that because the
concept of resilience has been defined, operationalized,
and applied differently across multiple levels of analy-
sis [e.g., individual (Bonanno, 2004, 2012), organiza-
tional (Manyena, 2006; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003), and
system (Holling, 1973; Walker et al., 2004)], its use-
fulness as a scholarly construct has been stymied
(Linnenluecke, 2015). Moreover, the study of resilience
in the management and organizations’literature is
fragmented and there is general agreement that although
theory surrounding resilience has proliferated, empiri-
cal studies have lagged (Van Der Vegt et al., 2015).
Definitions of Resilience
Resilience generally has been used to describe
organizations, systems, or individuals that are able
to react to and recover from duress or disturbances
with minimal effects on stability and functioning
(Linnenluecke, 2015; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). At the
organizational level, Meyer (1982: 520) used the
term resiliency to refer to an organization’s ability
(embodied in the existence of resources, ideologies,
routines, and structures) to absorb a discrete envi-
ronmental jolt and restore prior order. Wildavsky
(1988: 77) suggested that resilience is one strategy for
dealing with uncertainty and risk and defined it as
“the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers as
they become manifest, learning to bounce back.”
Gittell, Cameron, Lim, and Rivas (2006: 303) drew on
existing research to propose that resilience is a “dy-
namic capacity of organizational adaptability that
grows and develops over time.”In their early work,
740 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005: 750) define resilience
as a capacity; “a unique blend of cognitive, behav-
ioral, and contextual properties that increase a firm’s
ability to understand its current situation and to de-
velop customized responses that reflect that un-
derstanding.”In later work, Lengnick-Hall, Beck,
and Lengnick-Hall (2011: 244) define resilience as “a
firm’s ability to effectively absorb, develop situation-
specific responses to, and ultimately engage in
transformative activities to capitalize on disruptive
surprises that potentially threaten organization
survival.”
In extending the logic of organizational resilience
to broader systems, Boin, Comfort, and Demchak
(2010: 9) define resilience as the “capacity of a social
system (e.g., an organization, city, or society) to
proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances
that are perceived within the system to fall outside
the range of normal and expected disturbance.”
Similarly, Hall and Lamont (2013: 33) argue that re-
silient systems (society, community, etc.) provide
certain features that enhance organizational and in-
dividual capacities to “mount collective responses to
challenges.”That is, certain features of a system
(culture, social connections, etc.) play a role in how
actors within that system experience and respond to
adversity. Importantly, scholars in the systems tra-
dition generally describe resilience has having
multiple features, suggesting the workings of a dy-
namic process. Walker, Holling, Carpenter, and
Kinzig (2004: 4) argue that “resilience of a system
needs to be considered in terms of the attributes that
govern the system’s dynamics.”A dynamic per-
spective, therefore, would involve an interaction
between actors (i.e., organizations, individuals, and
institutions) and the environment that allows for “a
system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while
undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks”
(Walker et al., 2004: 5).
Much of what we know about individual resilience
with a few exceptions comes from psychology (see
Bonanno, 2004; Flach, 1988; Masten et al., 1990). In
summarizing early work on resilience in children,
Masten et al. (1990: 425) described resilience as
a“process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful
adaptation despite challenging or threatening cir-
cumstances.”Bonanno (2004: 20) builds on this work,
describing resilience as “the ability of adults in oth-
erwise normal circumstances who are exposed to an
isolated and potentially highly disruptive event, such
as the death of a close relation or a violent or life-
threatening situation, to maintain relatively stable,
healthy levels of psychological and physical func-
tioning.”Ong et al. (2006: 731) define psychological
resilience as a “relatively stable personality trait
characterized by the ability to overcome, steer
through, and bounce back”from daily adversity and
challenge. When applied to the workplace, resil-
ience has been defined as a developable “positive
psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’
from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, failure or even
positive change, progress, and increased re-
sponsibility”(Luthans Avolio, Walumbwa, & Li,
2005: 2002). A recent Academy of Management
Annals paper characterizes occupational resilience
as the cognitive, emotional, and physical hardiness
required in particular careers (e.g., artists, dancers,
doctors, firefighters, teachers) (Kossek & Perrigino,
2016). Kossek & Perrigino (2016: 764) go on to ar-
gue that the construct “reflects the multiple ways
in which individuals access resiliency resources
(traits, capacity, processes of appraisal and adapta-
tion, access to resources)”to respond to negative and
positive stress triggers to adapt performance over
one’scareer.
In summary, resilience has been defined and used
in a variety of literatures, demonstrating the broad
appeal it has across fields and the opportunity to find
common ground needed to build theory. As such,
advancements in organizational research will likely
come by integrating findings across levels. For ex-
ample, organizational resilience is likely not just
an “additive composite of individual”resilience
(Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011: 245), but rather includes
the interaction between an organization, its stake-
holders, and the environment while confronted with
adversity. In addition, perspectives on resilience
include positively adjusting in the face of adversity
(Weick et al., 1999), bouncing back from setbacks or
challenges (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003), coping to absorb
strain (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Edmondson,
1999), and adapting through “processes that help
organizations retain resources in a form suffi-
ciently flexible, storable, and malleable to avert
maladaptive tendencies”in dealing with the un-
expected (Gittell et al., 2006: 303; Walker et al.,
2004). Taken together, the multilevel and multi-stage
nature of resilience is an essential foundation to
understand what we know about resilience and how
to advance research moving forward.
An Inclusive Definition of Resilience
These definitions highlight some important issues
relevant to our analysis and integration. The first
2017 741Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

issue, illustrated particularly in definitions of em-
ployee resilience, pertains to the basic essence of
resilience—whether it is a trait, a capacity, or a pro-
cess. As Kossek and Perrigino (2016) make clear,
occupational (i.e., employee) resilience comprises
all three. At the organization level, the issue is not so
much whether an organization’s capacity is fixed
(e.g., trait-like) or malleable—most scholars agree
that organizational resilience develops over time
(Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005; Wildavsky, 1988);
rather it is whether resilience is an outcome or
a process. Resilience as an interactive process of re-
lational adaptation has to do with understanding,
responding to, and absorbing variations; maintain-
ing, gaining back, and/or building new resources. An
entity does not survive merely because of inner re-
sources; rather it survives and thrives on the basis
of its ability to adapt and/or dynamically relate to
its environment. The outcome of resilience relates
to the state of return. As Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011)
propose, some see organizational resilience as
a return to the status quo (where the organization left
off), whereas others see resilience as an exploitation
of current challenges to emerge stronger and more
resourceful.
Relatedly, a second issue pertains to severity of
the adversity. Resilience is generally inferred from
a judgment that an entity has survived or thrived in
the face of extenuating circumstances that posed
a threat to good outcomes (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003).
But, as Boin, Comfort, and Demchak (2010: 8) ask,
what about the severity of that adversity: is resilience
a capacity to deal with rare, devastating events, or it
is a capacity to deal with a much wider range of
disruptions and disturbances that fall outside “of the
set of disturbances the system is designed to handle”
(Boin et al., 2010: 8)? Research on employee and
occupational resilience seems to suggest that resil-
ience is more ordinary (e.g., Gittell et al., 2006;
Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005, 2009); something re-
quired to deal with a variety of stressors, conflicts,
and disturbances that occur over one’s occupational
or professional career. The idea that resilience is
more ordinary and required more broadly shows up
in the organizational literature as well. For example,
Van Der Vegt et al. (2015: 971) argue that organiza-
tional resilience is required “in our daily lives”as
well as “to shape and mitigate the consequences of
[adversity] when they occur.”
A third issue pertains to the point at which resil-
ience is most important—what Boin et al. (2010: 7)
call the “moment”of resilience. Does resilience
come after or before the onset of a major occurrence?
If we think of resilience as an outcome, and couple it
with the crisis-as-event perspective, resilience nat-
urally would be situated after the event. A mark of
resilience is the ability to recover. However, if we
think of resilience as a process, and couple it with the
crisis-as-process perspective, resilience naturally
would be situated earlier. A mark of resilience is “the
ability to negotiate flux without succumbing to it”
(Boin et al., 2010: 8).
Building on previous definitions and taking these
issues into account we take a middle ground ap-
proach and define “resilience”as the process by
which an actor (i.e., individual, organization, or
community) builds and uses its capability endow-
ments to interact with the environment in a way that
positively adjusts and maintains functioning prior
to, during, and following adversity. Importantly, and
similar to the crisis management literature, a process
definition of resilience accounts for the dynamic
nature of resilience as an interaction between the
organization and the environment. As such, it is
inclusive of preadversity capabilities, in-crisis
organizing and adjusting, and postcrisis resilience
responding.
In Table 2 we summarize the origins, derivations,
and conceptions of resilience across areas of inquiry.
We organize our review consistent with a configura-
tion that emerged from the empirical literature.
Although the conceptual literature has typically fo-
cused on building collective capacities, knowledge,
skills or abilities for resilience, our review of the
empirical literature suggests a more expansive con-
figuration. These include elements of resilience that
pertain to resource endowments, organizing prac-
tices, and postcrisis response.
Capabilities for Durability: Resource Endowments
Actors’various capabilities can facilitate interac-
tions with the environment that enable adjustment to
adversity. Capabilities are knowledge, skills, abili-
ties, and processes (i.e., routines) that facilitate
access to and manipulation of resources (Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Capabilities for durability
refer to the endowments actors possess prior to ad-
versity that shape their capacity for positive adjust-
ment (Bonanno et al., 2010; Hobfoll, 1989; Sutcliffe
& Vogus, 2003) and represent the first prominent
theme in the resilience literature. Although scholars
acknowledge the presence of individual-level trait-
based resilience effects (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker,
2000), prominent theories of stress (Bonanno, 2004;
Hobfoll, 1989) propose that developing and acquiring
742 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

various resource endowments is likely to influence
positive adjustment to challenges (over and above
trait-based attributes). Endowments facilitate resil-
ience by enabling adaptability (Gittell et al., 2006;
Pal, Torstensson, & Mattila, 2014), providing for
positive coping, and offering means by which an
actor (i.e., individual, organization, or community)
“interprets and responds to new challenges”in a
positive way (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003: 97). Financial
slack is a key endowment for resilience, to which
we now turn.
Financial capability endowments. Prior research
has emphasized the importance of appropriately
stockpiling resources (e.g., slack) in anticipation of
the need to withstand adversity (Bradley, Shepherd,
& Wiklund, 2011; Carmeli & Markman, 2011; George,
2005; Hobfoll, 1989; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli,
1992). For example, Gittell and colleagues (Gittell
TABLE 2
Origins, Derivations, and Conceptions of Resilience across Areas of Inquiry
Category Definition
Origins and derivations
a
cResilire,resilio (Latin): referring to “bounce”or “to leap”(Manyena et al., 2011).
s“Leaping, jumping, or rebounding”[Natural History, Pliny the Elder (Alexander, 2013: 2708)].
Perpetuated by St. Jerome (AD 347–420)
cR´
esiler (French): “to retract”or “to cancel”
cResile (English): state papers of King Henry VIII, 1529): “Retract,”“return to a former position”
cResilement. In Thomas Blount’s (1656) dictionary, “to rebound,”“to go back on one’s word”
cResiliency (Bell, 1839): fortitude in response to adversity, withstand challenges (i.e., earthquakes)
Psychology cAdjustment of children in response to adversity (Flach, 1988; Garmezy, 1971; Luthar, 2006; Masten,
2013; Murphy & Moriarty, 1976)
s“Process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening
circumstances”(Masten et al., 1990)
s“Buffering capacity”to resist shocks
cTheory on loss, trauma, and forms of acute adversity for adults (Bonanno, 2004)
s“Stable trajectory of healthy functioning in response to a clearly defined event”(Bonanno, 2012:
753). Emphasis is on maintenance (not loss and recovery) of functioningthroughout a crisis; one of
several trajectories individuals experience in response to threat (Bonanno & Mancini, 2012) that is
shaped by temporal and sociocontextual characteristics of stress and adaptation (Luthar et al., 2000)
Ecology cEquilibrium and stability of systems (Holling, 1973)
s“The persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain
the same relationships between populations or state variables”(Holling, 1973: 7)
c“Resilience (the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganizewhile undergoing change so
as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks) has four
components—latitude, resistance, precariousness, and panarchy—most readily portrayed using the
metaphor of a stability landscape”(Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004)
Organizational cExplains how organizations continually achieve positive outcomes despite strain and barriers to
adaptation (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015)
cPositive adjustment under challenging conditions. This involves (1) the ability to absorb strain and
preserve (or improve) functioning despite the presence of adversity (both internal adversity—such as
rapid change, lousy leadership, performance production pressures—and external adversity—such as
increasing competition and demands from stakeholders) or (2) an ability to recover or bounce back
from untoward events. (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003)
Disasters, threats, and surprises cRefers to both the maintenance of the status quo and adaptation (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006;
Zolli & Healy, 2012)
c“After a crisis, a system may experience a form of regression by a decrease in flexibility and complexity
and a consolidation of its most rigid structures, or a progression by the acquisition of new qualities and
properties to become more complex ... A resilient system is one that can adapt, be creative and
flexible, but also is able to self-regulate and have processes and routines capable of handling
complexity without oversimplifying. Resilience factors must therefore allow the emergence of
resilience”(Normandin & Therrien, 2016)
Multi-level cResilience arises from interaction across multiple levels of functioning (Boon, et al., 2012;
Bronfenbrenner, 2004; Drabek, 1986; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003)
s“Resilience is a systems concept, and the social-ecological system, as an integrated and
interdependent unit, may itself be considered a complex adaptive system”(Berkes & Ross, 2013: 14)
sCan prepare and develop organizations and communities for resilience (Boin & McConnell, 2007)
aSee Alexander, 2013, for a detailed review.
2017 743Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

et al., 2006) investigated the resilience of the airline
industry after the September 11th terrorist attack in
the United States and found that airlines with strong
financial reserves adjusted to the strains imposed by
the adversity and performed better than their less
well-off counterparts. In addition to financial and
material resources, positive functioning is main-
tained by other endowments, including cognitive,
behavioral, emotional, and relational capabilities.
Cognitive capability endowments. Cognitive ca-
pability endowments, such as a constructive con-
ceptual orientation (e.g., vision, sense of purpose,
strong values) (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011) as well as
deep knowledge and expertise help groups and or-
ganizations to apply and manage what they know in
the face of adversity so they can maintain or resume
functioning. These cognitive endowments enable
people and organizations to rapidly notice and make
sense of signals of potential disruptions, use critical
insights in creative and flexible ways, and combine
and deploy knowledge and repertoires of action to
resolve the problems at hand (Lengnick-Hall & Beck,
2005; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993; Weick, 1995). In
this way, organizations can prevent small things
from growing bigger. For example, Gittell’s (2008)
study of managed care providers suggested that
resilience was a consequence of more frequent,
timely, and accurate information-sharing and
problem-solving activities. The ability to quickly
assimilate new information helps individuals in-
terpret and navigate the altered environment (Aitken
& Morgan, 1999) and is crucial in directing attention
(Langer, 1989; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). Indeed, ad-
versity has the potential to shatter fundamental as-
sumptions about oneself, the environment, and one’s
belief in cause–effect relationships (Beder, 2005;
Haynie & Shepherd, 2011; Janoff-Bulman, 1992).
Avoiding such disruptions requires “establishing
a comfortable, integrated assumptive world”(Janoff-
Bulman, 2004: 30) that incorporates aspects of the
adversity, which can be facilitated by establishing
a culture of awareness (i.e., establishing the expecta-
tion for adversity and allowing employees to identify
and communicate “brewing”issues or challenges)
and identifying mechanisms to overcome blind spots
(i.e., silos). The difference between “triumph and
tragedy”hinges on an organization’s ability to make
sense of the dynamic contexts in which it is embed-
ded (Boin et al., 2005; Weick, 1995).
Behavioral capability endowments. Behavioral
capabilities involve action alternatives and behav-
ioral repertoires, which are often embedded in the
design of an organization—its structure, processes,
and activity configurations (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson,
1967)—that facilitate the processing and sharing of
information, work tasks,and so forth (March & Simon,
1958; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). All
of these capabilities aid functioning in the face of
adversity, and “timely crisis recognition . . . depends
crucially on both the capacity of individuals operat-
ing(partsof)systems...andtheorganizational‘de-
sign’for early crisis detection”(Boin et al., 2005: 19).
In his article exploring variance in the design struc-
tures of two companies operating high-risk nuclear
power plants, Carroll (1998) found that organizations
with fragmentary and myopic understandings of work
tasks (rooted in organizational design) are more likely
to experience recurrent problems and disruptions;
that is, they are less resilient.
Combining capabilities and structural aspects of
the firm, Lai, Saridakis, Blackburn, and Johnstone
(2016) found that, depending on firm size, human
resource management practices (i.e., team structure,
management formality, decisions to layoff or re-
deploy employees) during an economic downturn
influenced organizational resilience. Specifically,
smaller firms were more creative than large firms,
and these creative actions helped maintain positive
functioning despite the economic downturn, further
demonstrating how organizations can leverage vari-
ous endowments (e.g., employees, managerial skills)
associated with organizational design for resilience.
Behavioral capabilities also involve establishing
comfort with uncertainty, decision-making diffusion
across units (to allow for interpretation and action
on relevant information), and practiced behaviors
of cooperation and coordination (Boin & Lagadec,
2000). These behavioral capabilities are perhaps
best demonstrated by high-reliability organizations
(Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Weick et al., 1999) as well as
the emergence of new organizations that take action
during times of crisis (Drabek & McEntire, 2003;
Majcherzak et al., 2007; Shepherd & Williams, 2014).
Emotion-regulation capability endowments. Emotion-
regulation capabilities refer to a mental fortitude
that provides actors with mental hardiness and self-
regulation to cope with adverse situations, and produces
positive work-related outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction,
performance) (Avey, Luthans, & Jensen, 2009; Luthans
et al., 2005). Individuals and organizations are there-
fore likely to enhance resilience to adversity by culti-
vating endowments of emotional capital, which could
include (individual and/or collective) optimism,
hope, and opportunities to appropriately express
and discuss emotions (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller,
& Staw, 2005; Barsade & Knight, 2015). Emotions
744 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

play a functional role in facilitating how actors
make sense of and assign meaning to their envi-
ronment (Weick et al., 2005). Similarly, organiza-
tions differ in how they utilize and regulate emotions,
which can shape important organizational out-
comes including responses to adversity (Parke &
Seo, 2016). For example, emotional capabilities
facilitate employees’commitment to change initia-
tives despite the challenges and potential disrup-
tions such initiatives could cause (Shin et al., 2012),
and they provide individuals with the psychologi-
cal resources needed to persist in risky endeavors
with lower levels of stress (Baron et al., 2016). Fur-
thermore, individuals and organizations that are
more capable of regulating emotions (i.e., knowing
how and when to express or suppress emotions in
accord with situational demands) experience less
distress and demonstrate greater long-term adjust-
ment (Bonanno et al., 2004).
The psychology literature—exemplified by the work
of Fredrickson and colleagues (e.g., Fredrickson,
2001; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003;
Hayward et al., 2010)—has examined how individuals
with high resilience differ from those with lower
resilience, particularly in terms of experiencing and
using emotions. For example, in a study of resilience
after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Fredrickson
et al. (2003) found that psychologically resilient people
were buffered from depression by deliberately drawing
on positive emotions (e.g., gratitude and love) in the
wake of the attacks. Other studies have considered
individuals’affect regulation and tolerance for stress
as indicators of resilience (Bonanno 2004; Leyro,
Zvolensky, & Bernstein, 2010). For example, Stephens,
Heaphy, Carmeli, Spreitzer, and Dutton (2013: 15)
found that group resilience was directly tied to emo-
tional carrying capacity, or “the relationship’sca-
pacity to express more emotions overall, both positive
and negative . . . in a constructive manner.”Further-
more, emotional capabilities can be generated by
cultivating a broad organization-wide culture of an
“ethic of care”enacted through narrative practices
that document positive experiences, contextualize
challenges, and develop future-oriented stories; these
narratives foster an “ontology of possibility”that fa-
cilitates resilience (Lawrence & Maitlis, 2012: 641).
Finally, the capability to regulate emotions is
closely related to emotional ambivalence or the “si-
multaneous experience of contradictory feelings”
(Vogus, Rothman, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2014: 593).
Emotional ambivalence opens actors to alternative
perspectives that can increase judgment accuracy
(Rees, Rothman, Lehavy, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013),
enhance cognitive flexibility (Fong, 2006), and assist
in the anticipation of and preparation for the un-
expected (Vogus et al., 2014). Specifically, emotional
ambivalence likely enables resilience to both swift,
unexpected events (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), and
“weak signals of failure”that, when recognized and
acted upon, help avoid organizational crisis (Vogus
et al., 2014: 593). Moreover, emotional ambivalence
likely impacts relational interactions, which in turn
shapes the social dynamics of teams and organiza-
tions (Rothman & Wiesenfeld, 2007).1
Relational capability endowments. In the con-
text of adversity, relational capabilities—the social
connections that enable access to and exchange of
resources—play an important role in shaping im-
mediate actions and ultimately enabling positive
functioning in the face of adversity. Furthermore,
relational capabilities provide a context in which
cognitive, behavioral, and emotional capabilities can
be activated. For example, relationships—in the
form of coordinative practices—have been found to
be critical in overcoming challenges (Gittell, 2008).
In a study exploring interpersonal dynamics among
firefighters, Colquitt et al. (2011) found that trust was
based on coworker integrity, or the perceived con-
sistency between words, deeds, and values with
prior experience. Further, they found that in a vola-
tile environment, trust was paramount to achieving
positive outcomes, whereas trust was less important
in less volatile environments.
This finding suggests that organizations that do not
anticipate facing adverse conditions may fail to de-
velop elemental capabilities (i.e., trust) that will be
needed to function as a group or team.
Similarly, Shepherd and Williams (2014) found
that trust and network relationships among disaster-
impacted community members were critical in re-
sponse to a devastating bushfire. When the disaster
hit, those who had local values, knowledge, and
network relationships were better positioned to gain
the trust of disaster victims, which enabled a more
immediate and effective response to the widespread
suffering. In this case, trust facilitated community
resilience. In a related study, Williams and Shepherd
(2016b) found that prior knowledge of and experi-
ence with entrepreneurial activity further facilitated
1Despite these potential benefits, emotional ambiva-
lence could also have a potential downside in that it leads
to more deliberation in decision making (i.e., consumes
more time) and can result in biased information processing
in attempts to resolve the ambivalence (Nordgren, van
Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006).
2017 745Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

action in the aftermath of the bushfire disaster, sug-
gesting that various forms of human capital shape
actions, which in turn influence resilience. Interest-
ingly, although those with entrepreneurial experience
were more likely to organize efforts to help others,
those with entrepreneurial experience who failed to
engage in compassion venturing (i.e., creating a new
venture to alleviate others’suffering) had the lowest
levels of postdisaster functioning. This finding high-
lights the notion that the mere possession of a resource
does not necessarily confer an advantage; resources
need to be used, or else they may be detrimental to
functioning (Hobfoll, 1989, 1991).
Preadversity Organizing: Preparing and Restoring
The second prominent theme in the resilience lit-
erature relates to organizing processes aimed at antic-
ipating, preventing, or mitigating “potential dangers
before damage is done”(Wildavsky, 1988: 77) and
adjusting to deal with unexpected or unknown con-
tingencies and emerging breakdowns so as to lower the
likelihood that these disruptions will grow into trig-
gering events.
Preparing: Managing risks to reduce vulnerability.
Although some crises can be seen as more “normal”
emergencies (e.g., fires, traffic accidents, hostage tak-
ings) (Patriotta & Gruber, 2015; Perrow, 2011) other
crises that potentially threaten people and organiza-
tions result from high-impact, fast-onset triggering
events, such as natural disasters, economic downturns,
the emergence of new technologies, and political in-
stability (Zhou, Wan, & Jia, 2010). Resilience to these
phenomena is important given that such events are
“collectively experienced, [have] an acute onset, and
[are] time delineated,”thus, swift decision-making in
highly ambiguous contexts is vital to avoid additional
suffering (McFarlane & Norris, 2006: 4). Fast-onset
crises can cut across all social strata and often prove to
be highly disruptive (Bonanno et al., 2010) to in-
dividuals and organizations. Given the nature and
impact of these crises, a considerable body of research
(primarily in sociology) has explored how organiza-
tions can anticipate, respond, and decrease vulnera-
bility, particularly while drawing on government and
nongovernment organizations as resource providers
(for a review, see Drabek & McEntire, 2003).
Despite advancements in our understanding of
organizational responses to disaster events, recent
studies (Comfort, 1994; Shepherd & Williams,
2014; Van Der Vegt et al., 2015; Williams &
Shepherd, 2016a, 2016b) highlight the importance
of understanding how organizations can cultivate
predisaster resilience by strengthening preventative
measures, including developing networks, coordination
techniques (within and between organizations), and
individual members’resilience. This proactive “in-
vestment”orientation toward potential adversity
likely helps “reduce the short- and long-term negative
social and economic impacts on people’slivesand
business”(Van Der Vegt et al., 2015: 977).
Restoring. Strategies of preparing and anticipating
work best for “risks that can be predicted and are well
understood”(de Bruijne, Boin, & van Eeten, 2010:
22). But some dangers are unanticipated, especially
when levels of complexity are high. When organi-
zations face these scenarios quick action is required
to alert decision makers to unfolding conditions
to keep operations within a bandwidth of accept-
able performance (Schulman, Roe, van Eeten, & de
Bruijne, 2004) or to actively develop contingent re-
sponses (Weick et al., 1999). Effective and timely
identification of and response to emerging chal-
lenges is particularly important for some organiza-
tions in some industries or contexts. For example,
studies of high reliability organizations (HROs)
(Roberts, 1990)—organizations that manage poten-
tially hazardous technical systems (e.g., commer-
cial aviation, nuclear power, nuclear submarines)
(Roberts, 1990; Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994)—
show that they (HROs) expend resources to defend
against particular risks, but they also engage in
establishing organizing practices to be able to im-
provise and “craft what [they] need, when [they]
need it, even though [they] previously had no idea
[they] would need it”(Wildavsky, 1995: 433). From
this high-reliability perspective, resilience involves
improvising and using generic resources described
in the prior section (e.g., knowledge, communi-
cation, financial resources, emotional, relational,
structural capacities) to avoid a catastrophe or to
mitigate its evolution. More specifically, processes of
catastrophe-avoidance (e.g., organizing to ensure
that a system does not weaken or drift) in-
clude carefully allocating and distributing attention,
knowledge, and resources across the organization to
facilitate the recognition and interpretation of po-
tential problems (Marcus & Nichols, 1999); enhanc-
ing sensemaking and decision-making processes by
engaging in daily practices and routines (Vogus &
Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick et al., 1999); focusing on ac-
countability and the salience of signals (Barton et al.,
2015; Roberts et al., 1994); and reducing tensions
between high-reliability structures and the broader
contexts in which the organization is embedded
(Bierly & Spender, 1995).
746 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

Research has also investigated preparation, role
structuring, and coordination by emergency re-
sponders and/or response groups as an important as-
pect of resilience. For example, resilience in a pediatric
intensive care unit involved repeated iterations of team
structuring and design and continuous efforts to buffer
the unit from the parent organization’spressures
(Madsen et al., 2006). Similarly, fast-response medical
teams must balance planned activities (e.g., reliance on
protocols) with more impromptu actions (e.g., joint
sensemaking and protocol breaking) (Faraj & Xiao,
2006), and firefighter strike teams balance structural
mechanisms (e.g., role switching, system resetting)
with constrained improvisation and cognition man-
agement (e.g., communication, shifting) (Bigley &
Roberts, 2001). If these teams and organizations fail
to appropriately interpret environmental cues and
make changes to address shifts in the situation, they are
likely to be less resilient to the adverse and complex
environments they face (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Faraj
& Xiao, 2006), which can then result in a crisis event.
Responding to Major Disturbances
The third prominent theme in the resilience liter-
ature is responding to major disturbances that result
from the climax of organizational weakening or
surprising external event (e.g., a disaster). When ex-
posed to a major disturbance, actors face increased
uncertainty about what actions to take (Duncan,
1972; Milliken, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and
thus try to generate a range of possible responses.
The most effective responses appear to be those
that involve “innovative, continually changeable
behavior”(Stacey, 1995: 478), “improvising lo-
cally”(Shepherd & Williams, 2014: 977), and the
“capacity for spontaneous changeability”(Stacey,
1995: 478). Taking stock of the various forms of re-
sponses to major disturbances, it is useful to high-
light the specific mechanisms organizational
members and/or organizations use to maintain pos-
itive functioning under this adversity (Bunderson &
Sutcliffe, 2002; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Maintain-
ing positive functioning in the aftermath of a disaster
or some other major disturbance depends on the or-
ganization’s cognitive and behavioral responses,
which are in turn reinforced by context.
Cognitive responding. Positive cognitive responses
that help maintain positive functioning in the face
of major disturbances involve an actor’s ability to
notice, interpret, and analyze changes in the envi-
ronment and to formulate responses (Dewald &
Bowen, 2010) that go beyond “simply surviving the
ordeal”(Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005: 750). For ex-
ample, in contrast to decision makers who perceive
innovative business-model introductions as threats
and thus resist adopting changes to strategy, de-
cision makers who perceive these innovations as
opportunities are more likely to adopt aspects of
these innovations into their core practices, enabling
adjustment to a changed competitive landscape
(Dewald & Bowen, 2010). Similarly, cognitive re-
sponses that facilitate adjustment to adversity assist
decision makers in directing attention appropriately,
allowing them to focus on the best action options
available to reduce complexity and generate viable
alternatives for a path forward (Lengnick-Hall & Beck,
2005). Specifically, to the extent that decision makers
are better able to understand the content and duration
of a major disturbance; the ways that disturbance-
induced change influence the broader environment;
and the structural, routine, or other (if any) organiza-
tional changes needed, the more likely they are to
maintain positive functioning in the new environ-
ment (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005). When facing ex-
treme adversity, flexible decision-making processes
are essential as rigid decision-making processes can
compound losses, thus resulting in even more dis-
ruptive outcomes for individuals andfirms (Bonanno
et al., 2010; Hobfoll, 2011; Rahmandad & Repenning,
2016).
When facing a major disturbance, individuals
must draw upon immediately available resources
and make time-sensitive decisions between “staying
the course”and deviating from planned routines.
When resources are unavailable (i.e., they are not
“fungible”and not readily available to be redeployed
for alternate purposes) and decision makers delay
corrective action in organizational routines, organi-
zational capabilities for adjustment and flexibility
erode (Rahmandad & Repenning, 2016), which in-
creases vulnerability to subsequent adversity. For
example, in his classic study of the Mann Gulch di-
saster, Weick (1993) highlighted breakdowns that
occurred in how a firefighting team perceived,
interpreted, and acted on surprising environmental
conditions. He found that “mediated communica-
tion”imposed unnecessary structure on the small
group of firefighters, which limited the “interper-
sonal cognitive processes”they needed to create
a shared interpretive scheme of the environment.
Without a shared sense of meaning, the team had
disjointed “frameworks”for identifying solutions,
resulting in a collapse of sensemaking that led to the
death of 13 firefighters (Weick, 1993: 645). Forming
a positive cognitive response to surprising events
2017 747Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

appears to require individuals to rapidly direct their
attention from structures to meaning (and back again)
as an input for either reaffirming or reconstructing
their interpretive systems (Weick, 1993: 646).
Another example of cognitive responses to a major
disturbance is how passengers and crew members
aboard a hijacked airplane (Flight 93 on September
11th) organized courageous collective action to
compel the hijackers to crash the plane into the
ground rather than into a national landmark. In
a study of this event, Quinn and Worline (2008)
found that individuals engaged in narratives to help
them understand and manage the intensity of the
immediate situation, explain the duress to make
moral and practical judgments about how to act, and
formulate a sense of a “collective”body of resources
that could be mobilized. These findings demonstrate
the influence of time, surprise, new frame develop-
ment, and resource mobilization on the development
and deployment of group cognitive processes and
demonstrate the wide range of “organizing”that
shapes resilience processes.
Behavioral responding. Behavioral responding to
a major disturbance is a natural extension of cognitive
responding as it involves actors’enacting solutions or
courses of action to address the environmental un-
certainty (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005; Rahmandad &
Repenning, 2016; Weick, 1993). Specifically, positive
behavioral responding to an adverse event is “the
engine that moves”an actor forward in the face of
uncertainty (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005: 751) and
includes balancing varied action repertoires with
structured “functional habits”(e.g., rehearsed rou-
tines for managing uncertainty) (Sutcliffe & Vogus,
2003: 107). As with other aspects of the resilience
process, behavioral responses to adversity involve the
interaction of multiple factors at various levels. For
example, an innovative response (presumably one
that is more adaptive) to organizational decline is
more likely when the firm operates in a less in-
stitutionalized environment, concentrates power
(rather than diffusing power in the organizational
structure), and accesses many uncommitted re-
sources (Mone, McKinley, & Barker, 1998). Addi-
tional research highlights the importance of aligning
specific tactics (i.e., behaviors) with overarching
strategies when developing a behavioral response to
adversity. For example, when applying the resilience
of the Republic of Rome to modern-day organizations,
Carmeli and Markman (2011) theorized that resilient
firms carefully balance their strategic emphasis on
growth and development (i.e., capture) with efficiency
and self-management (i.e., governance). Within the
context of these strategies, firms also need to balance
their strategy with specific tactics-saving power,
maintaining a stronghold base, isolating adversaries,
and creating forward outposts (Carmeli & Markman,
2011).
Beyond broadstrategic actions and tactics involved
in resilience, specific organizational activities can
facilitate adjustment to substantial disturbances. For
example, Bechky and Okhuysen (2011) found that
police SWAT teams and film production crews
developed critical socio-cognitive resources for
managing uncertainty through bricolage, including
restructuring activities by role shifting, reorganizing
routines, and reassembling work activities. These
creative team actions generated feedback to provide
an updated and dynamic perspective on team struc-
ture, communication, and collaboration to manage
unexpected events. Similarly, highly skilled “ex-
treme action”medical teams appeared to offer a swift,
coordinated, reliable response to adversity by meld-
ing hierarchical and bureaucratic role-based struc-
tures through specific crisis-actions (e.g., rapid and
repeated delegation, careful training of new team
members), again demonstrating how resilient teams
balance structure and improvisation when dealing
with dynamic and unpredictable events (i.e., in this
case, patients’traumatic injuries) (Klein, Ziegert,
Knight, & Xiao, 2006).
Individuals can also display positive behavioral
responses that enable resilience. For example, in
war-torn Afghanistan, some individuals still identify
and pursue entrepreneurial opportunities (Bullough
et al., 2013); in the aftermath of an earthquake in Haiti
(Williams & Shepherd, 2016a) and a bushfire in
Australia (Shepherd & Williams, 2014; Williams &
Shepherd, 2016b), victims mobilized resources and
created new ventures to alleviate others’suffering;
and in the wake of the Great Recession, entrepre-
neurs used their ventures as vehicles to repurpose
their identity, which in turn influenced day-to-day
behaviors that ultimately shaped the firms’strategic
response to the adversity (Powell & Baker, 2014). It
appears that resilience involves (at least in part)
transitioning from a dependence on slack resources
to self-reliance based on resourceful emergent ac-
tions that enable actors to enact “who they want to
be”—that is, to activate new roles and identities
(Powell & Baker, 2014; Williams & Shepherd, 2016a,
2016b).
Contextual reinforcement of responses to adversity.
Context is important in explaining responses to
adversity as it provides the foundational setting
in which cognitive and behavioral responses are
748 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

enacted and integrated (Lengnick-Hall & Beck,
2005). At the organizational level, different types
of organizations are likely to experience adver-
sity differently and thus have distinct perceptions
of its potential costs. For example, for some orga-
nizations (e.g., nuclear submarines, air craft car-
riers), avoiding failure is of paramount importance
(Roberts, 1990; Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 1994;
Weick & Roberts, 1993), whereas for others,
(i.e., new entrepreneurial ventures), failure is a
more acceptable (although undesirable) outcome
that is considered a “normal”part of the process
(Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013).
Organizations have different levels of social con-
nectivity and varied information-sharing mecha-
nisms, which may impact their resilience. In his
classic study exploring the Mann Gulch disaster,
Weick (1993) found that despite the seemingly tight
integration of the “smoke jumping”teams, their social
connections were insufficiently deep, leading to mis-
communications, inability to rapidly align in interpret-
ing the environment, and confusion in the face of novelty
(which cost most of them their lives).
Beyond individual organizations, different com-
munities may have varied levels of social capital
that enable or constrain resilience. Community so-
cial networks among neighbors and proximate or-
ganizations provide access to various resources in
adverse situations, such as information, loans and
gifts for property repair, shelter, and emotional and
psychological support (Aldrich & Meyer, 2014;
Shepherd & Williams, 2014). Different types of so-
cial capital may serve complementary functions in
helping individuals endure and recover from ad-
versity. Bonding social capital—namely, strong,
densely connected ties—translates into greater
levels of trust and more widely shared norms within
the community (Coleman, 1990), which fosters
resilience. Various studies have shown that local
social connections regularly serve as first re-
sponders in disaster situations well ahead of pro-
fessional and formal rescue operations (Kapucu,
2008; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). Bridging social
capital—namely, weak, sparsely connected yet di-
verse ties—on the other hand, facilitates access to
novel information and resources (Burt, 1992) and
accelerates long-term recovery (Hawkins & Maurer,
2010).
Resilience Feedback Loop
As organizational members and organizations take
action in response to adversity, they may gain new
insights and perspectives that feed into resource
endowments, ongoing organizing, adaptation, prep-
aration, and response to adversity. The interaction
between the environment and actors is an inherently
dynamic process (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005) such
that interpretations evolve over time and are resha-
ped depending on the nature of the adversity and the
behavior of the actor. Enhancing resilience from
feedback has largely been explored in terms of actors’
experiences and interpretations.
Experience, feedback, and resilience. Prior ex-
periences with adversity appear to be linked to sub-
sequent resilience, but there is considerable variance
in the nature of this relationship (Brewin, Andrews,
& Valentine, 2000; Bonanno, Westphal, & Mancini,
2011). It seems that individuals’resilience to adver-
sity depends on the similarity of that adversity to
difficulties they have experienced in the past [e.g., an
individual’s resilience to a disaster is facilitated
when he or she has previously experienced a disaster
but not so much from other forms of adversity
(Bonanno et al., 2010)]. Therefore, resilience can be
facilitated by learning from experience with adver-
sity, and this learning—as individual organizational
members encode new information, adjust mental
models, and encode new knowledge into organiza-
tional routines—can be direct or vicarious (Madsen,
2009). However, this learning to enhance resilience
is not likely static or linear in nature. For example,
organizations oscillate between periods of empha-
sizing safety and periods of emphasizing other
goals, such as efficiency or innovation (Haunschild,
Polidoro, & Chandler, 2015). As a consequence, the
ability to learn from an experience with adversity
weakens over time, increasing an organization’s
vulnerability. Moreover, firms are more vulnerable
to adversity when their managers seek feedback from
those in their network who have similar experiences
(i.e., like-minded advisors from close network ties)
because this feedback can lead to misinterpreting
signals about the adverse environment contributing
to an organizational crisis (McDonald & Westphal,
2003). This further demonstrates the dynamic and
interactive nature of resilience between subjects and
the environment.
Interpretations of tasks and relationships. Ex-
posure to adversity also influences how decision
makers interpret future challenges and disruptions,
identify appropriate tasks, and activate relationships
to address issues. Interestingly, prior exposure to
adversity may hinder resilience. For example, re-
peated interruptions of routines and tasks can pre-
cipitate a crisis because the constant interruption can
2017 749Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

make it difficult to differentiate noise from “true”
signals of change (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002). For
example, the team working on the Challenger space
shuttle “missed”the O-ring data because of repeated
disruptions that “crowded out”the signal of the true
problem at hand (Vaughan, 1996). Similarly, some
novel scenarios appear so extraordinary that actors
cannot accommodate them into existing worldviews
(Cerulo, 2008), resulting in relatively little learning
or response. What is important to realize is that the
ability of human systems to interpret and accom-
modate surprising feedback is “contextually and
temporally dependent”(Rudolph & Repenning,
2002: 3).
In summary, the literature emphasizes that resil-
ience evolves over time as the actor (i.e., individual,
organization, or community) interacts with the envi-
ronment (i.e., adversity), highlighting the dynamism
of resilience. Furthermore, our review highlighted
different uses of resilience in the literature, includ-
ing an emphasis on building collective capacities,
knowledge, skills, and abilities for resilience, as well
as resource endowments, organizing practices, and
postcrisis response. In combining these streams of
research, we highlighted the benefit of exploring
resilience as a process of adaptation, improvisation,
and recovery, which lends itself to a fusion with the
crisis management research.
INTEGRATING CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
RESILIENCE—FRAMING FUTURE RESEARCH
Our reviews of the two literatures suggest that in
many ways, crisis management and resilience are
two aspects of the same challenge—the challenge of
adversity. Because of this common ground, the way
crisis and crisis management are conceptualized
holds important implications for building theory on
resilience, and vice versa. As such, we seek to in-
tegrate crisis management and resilience. In Figu re 1,
we offer a model of the fusion of crisis management
and resilience that integrates the major themes
identified in the review above and serves as a foun-
dation for building a future research agenda. We offer
this model as a framing for how future research might
integrate important aspects of both crisis and resil-
ience in explaining the mechanisms through which
organizations anticipate, prepare for, and respond to
adversity.
As portrayed in Figure 1, organizations that de-
velop cognitive, behavioral, emotional, and re-
lational capabilities can realign in response to drift as
well as facilitate the anticipation of and responses to
triggering events. These capabilities in turn interact
recursively with organizing efforts related to reli-
ability and risk reduction. As these processes play
out, there is ongoing organizing and adjusting as
additional threats are processed and addressed (or
missed). As time progresses, gradual weakening
could escalate into a triggering event. Alternatively,
a surprising event could occur that did not result
from weakening that threatens functioning. When
these events occur, organizations respond (cogni-
tively and behaviorally) as an interaction with the
triggering event. After experiencing and overcoming
a major crisis, there is a feedback loop in which ac-
tors’interpretations of the tasks and relationships
they experienced during adversity shape organizing
for subsequent adversity. Finally, we anticipate that
there are both positive and negative outcomes that
result from resilience. Although resilience likely
enhances perseverance, functioning, and reliability
to challenging events, it may also result in resistance
to change, failure to learn and adapt, and or an in-
ability to pivot or transform. This negative outcome
from resilience is a novel and unanticipated contri-
bution from our review.
In the following sections, we highlight five over-
arching themes for future research that emphasize
the dynamic, process-oriented perspective of crisis
and resilience exhibited in Figure 1. These themes
are (1) leadership in the face of adversity, (2) the role
of time in adversity, (3) complexity and adversity, (4)
mindfulness and adversity, and (5) the dark side of
resilience.
Future Research on Leadership in the Face of
Adversity
As noted earlier, research on crisis management
has emphasized the importance of postevent lead-
ership in helping navigate obstacles generated by
adversity to motivate positive action in others
(Pearson & Clair, 1998; Quarantelli, 1988, 1996).
More recently, research has begun to articulate the
microprocesses that fuel resilience before crises oc-
cur, emphasizing leadership behaviors that enable
quicker recognition and resolution of potential dis-
ruptions. For example, in a study of wildland fire-
fighting, Barton et al. (2015) made the case for
contextualized engagement: when leaders proac-
tively engage with those on the front lines who face
difficult situations, actively searching for discrep-
ancies and unexpected problems and making sense
of them, rather than avoiding or merely coping with
the adversity. By more quickly understanding what
750 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

FIGURE 1
Process View of the Fusion of Crisis Management and Resilience.
Type of adversity:
Situations that hold
potential to jeopardize
survival
Resilience
development
and enactment
Positive outcomes
The dark side of
resilience
“ROUTINE” HARDSHIP—MAINTAINING A POSTURE
•Potential system stress: Ongoing, requiring attention,
mobilization, and management
•Anticipation: Non-surprising, daily obstacles within
the scope of “the possible”; moderate urgency
•Occurrence: Ongoing, asynchronous, recurring, non-novel
•Cause: Organizational malaise and/or external changes
DISCONTINUOUS EVENT
•
•
•
•
System stress: Punctuated stress, challenging capacity
Anticipation: Surprising, severe, broad in scope
Occurrence: Temporary, novel (either proximal or distal)
Cause: Climax of organizational weakening OR a surprising
external event (e.g., disaster, economic crisis, terrorist attack)
Escalation of organizational
weakening, misalignment,
and/or an
isolated event
Resilience
Feedback
Loop
Perseverance, enhanced reliability to
challenging events
Resistance to change, escalation of
commitment, failure to learn and adapt:
organizational weakening or misalignment
Functioning despite extreme adversity,
maintenance of core activities
Lack of learning from extreme event,
opportunism, poor adaptability to “new normal,”
inability to pivot or “transform”
Responding to major disturbances
Cognitive
Behavioral
Contextual Reinforcement
Reliability organizing
and adjusting
Preparing:
Managing risks
to vulnerability
Restoring
Cognitive
Behavioral
Emotion-regulation
Organizing and
adjusting
Organizing and
adjusting
Relational
Capabilities for
durability: Resource
endowments
2017 751Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

is happening (rather than hoping for the best), teams
are better able to respond in flexible, adaptive ways.
This provides insight into how organizing processes
help to forestall or mitigate crises as they unfold and
is consistent with literature on the importance of
active sensemaking (Gephart, 1993, 2007, Weick,
1995) and the avoidance of normalizing (Vaughan,
1996; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). Sensemaking is crit-
ical for noticing disruptions and understanding their
significance (Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld, 2005). Fur-
thermore, it is a useful extension of the positive ap-
proach of James et al. (2011) to crisis management
and focus on recovery in that it suggests that beyond
merely framing an event, leadership is critical to
actively facilitating resilience. As Wildavsky high-
lighted (1988), for organizations to accommodate the
reality of organizational uncertainty, they must en-
gage in deliberate efforts to become better at coping
with surprise not only by gaining strength from stress
but also by “expanding general knowledge and
technical facility, and generalized command over
resources”(p. 221).
Future research can make a substantial contribu-
tion to the literature by exploring the role of leader-
ship in preparing for, adjusting to, and responding to
adversity as well as building endowments in a way
that promotes greater resilience, thereby avoiding
a triggering event and the need for crisis manage-
ment. First, research on leadership has advanced our
understanding of how effective leaders deploy re-
sources when taking organizational actions (Walter
& Bruch, 2009; Yun, Faraj, & Sims, 2005). However,
there is less research on how leaders build endow-
ments (in the organization and/or themselves), es-
pecially endowments that promote resilience. For
example, leadership research can build on the sub-
stantial literature on trust (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012;
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) to gain an un-
derstanding of how leaders can build trust as an
endowment of resilience. Although we know that
trust increases in value during adverse situations
(Colquitt et al., 2011), it is critical that we gain
a deeper understanding of the nature of trust, with
whom that trust resides, and how it is maintained for
it to represent an endowment that can be called upon
quickly during adversity. Leadership research can
also explore how leaders can design their organiza-
tions for greater resilience and/or how different de-
signs enable or constrain the types of leadership
needed for building resilience. Can leaders encour-
age a better understanding of how their organizations
interpret and interact with the environment to pro-
mote greater resilience? What styles of leadership
expose individuals to these interactions and with
what effect?
Second, there is more to learn about the role of
leadership in organizing resilience. For example, in
addition to the contextualized engagement noted
earlier (Barton et al., 2015), what leadership behav-
iors are necessary to develop “extraordinary levels of
vigilance”to avoid crisis events (e.g., leadership
behaviors that promote reliability and risk manage-
ment to reduce organizational vulnerability), and
how do these behaviors differ from more ordinary
leadership behaviors? It could be that while we
normally think of leaders as promotion focused
(emphasizing opportunities; potential rewards in
terms of gains and nongains), preparing for adversity
may require leaders with more of a prevention focus
(emphasizing threats; potential rewards in terms of
nonlosses) (see Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999).
Perhaps, leaders are more effective when they have
a prevention focus when preparing for adversity and
a promotion focus when responding to it. Future
research can explore these and other questions in-
corporating theories that are fundamental to leader-
ship and decision-making.
Third, when responding to adversity, leaders
likely need to possess the cognitive and behavioral
attributes that facilitate resilience. Although in-
dividuals possess unique traits that influence their
responses to adversity in different ways (Bonanno,
2004; Bonanno et al., 2010), we need a greater un-
derstanding of how leaders are able to “bring out”
these attributes in organizational members (in-
dividually and as a collective) so as to facilitate
resilience. What leadership behaviors before, dur-
ing, and immediately after key challenges trigger the
sort of resourcefulness and responsiveness neces-
sary for resilience? Perhaps, as alluded to earlier, the
leadership required for responding to adversity is
different than that required for building an endow-
ment and preparing for it. If this is the case, what are
these differences, and how does an organization or
organizational member make such a switch?
Finally, although most leaders and other organiza-
tional members understand the importance of learning
from mistakes, surprising events, and crises (Deverell &
Hans´
en, 2009; Madsen, & Desai, 2010; McGrath, 1999),
most people and organizations find this difficult to
accomplish (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Cannon &
Edmondson, 2001, 2005; Edmondson, 2004). Although
learning from a crisis is likely to be a way to build
endowments for resilience, we do not yet fully un-
derstand how leaders facilitate the process by which
organizations and organizational members learn from
752 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

a crisis in a way thatpromotes resilience to subsequent
adversity. Therefore, future research will hopefully
investigate how leaders facilitate crisis sensemaking
and learning while avoiding “overcorrecting”or en-
couraging rumination or other nonproductive cogni-
tions and behaviors (Carmeli, Brueller, & Dutton,
2009; Carmeli & Gittell, 2009) that could undermine
resilience to subsequent adversity. An answer could
lie with the organization’s psychological safety (Baer &
Frese, 2003; Edmondson, 1999), emotional capability
(Huy, 1999; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011), and/or
attention structures (Ocasio, 1997); this is fertile
ground for future research.
Integrating crisis management and resilience re-
search also brings to the forefront several theoretical
mechanisms that they have in common, including
time, complexity, and mindfulness. The next section
details these mechanisms and highlights additional
avenues for future research.
Future Research on the Role of Time on Adversity
Research has illustrated the importance of con-
sidering time for understanding resilience and for
understanding crisis management, as some crises
continue for an extended period and new crises
sometimes emerge after an initial crisis has been
managed. For example, Barton and Sutcliffe (2009)
showed how organizations use a variety of practices
to overcome dysfunctional momentum—the escalation
of negative outcomes. This research fits into a larger
body of work that has made the case for renewing
sensemaking as tasks and the environment continue to
evolve rather than becoming stuck in one way of op-
erating that prevents new interpretations of a situation
(LeBaron, Christianson, Garrett, & Ilan, 2016; Rudolph,
Morrison, & Carroll, 2009). This updating and the im-
portance of time are evidenced in social media, in
which a crisis can arise in a matter of hours if the proper
detection and responses are not enacted (Gruber,
Smerek, Thomas-Hunt, & James, 2015). The real-time
speed and public nature of platforms like Twitter mean
that organizations need to be more vigilant and re-
sponsive. Specifically, we anticipate a number of op-
portunities for future research to explore the role of time
in the stages an organization goes through when expe-
riencing adversity in public forums.
First, adversity is heterogeneous; some challenges
are triggered quickly, evolve rapidly, and are short in
duration, whereas other challenges emerge slowly,
evolve more gradually, and are extended over time.
However, this time dimension is likely to differ for
actors based on their endowments, preparation, and
response. For example, when preparing for adver-
sity, an organization may quickly detect sources of
adversity and rapidly respond such that any dis-
ruption to positive functioning is minor and short in
duration. Recent research explored how a news or-
ganization created an infrastructure to respond to
breaking news stories on a routine basis while
maintaining its main objective of producing time-
bound newscasts (Patriotta & Gruber, 2015). Given
the frequency of unexpected events and importance
of deadlines in their environment, news organiza-
tions are more accustomed to dealing with and
responding to intense situations quickly and fluidly
than a typical organization. Similarly, in their study
of a French bank, Chekkar-Mansouri and Onnee (2013)
found that double-loop learning and organization-
level-focused learning policies helped reduce the vul-
nerability of the bank to recurrent adversity. That is,
when the bank employed double-looped learning they
were better prepared to eliminate small problems that
could have led to another crisis. In contrast, when they
did not have formal organizational learning protocols
they were more likely to experience another crisis.
These recent studies underscore the importance of
considering both everyday unexpected occurrences
and less-frequent major events to gain an understand-
ing of which become crises and which are detected and
mitigated before they become crises.
Second, although endowments are a resource
“stock,”focusing on time enables us to explore the
“flow”of resources. For example, how (and over
what time) are capabilities and other endowments
built, and can they regress and/or lose value over
time? In his extensive work on responses to stress,
Hobfoll (1989, 1991, 2011) argued that resource los-
ses are more salient than resource gains given the
speed at which loss occurs compared to gains. For
example, a disaster can instantly wipe out what took
a lifetime for individuals to build. As losses are more
salient, it is critical that those experiencing adversity
identify pathways to generate new and immediate
resource gains (Hobfoll, 2011). Timing is critical as
initial gains can trigger “gain spirals”such that initial
gains prompt subsequent resource gains that likely
facilitate resilience. Future research can build on
several emerging studies that highlight the benefits
of challenging work in the face of adversity
(Gorgievski & Hobfoll, 2008; Williams & Shepherd,
2016b) to explore what it takes to maintain and/or
update endowments for resilience. That is, what
endowments, preparation, or responses trigger re-
source gains (or losses) in the face of adversity, and
how can those be promoted (or avoided)?
2017 753Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

Third, when preparing for and responding to ad-
versity, much is made of speed. Although there has
been some research on accelerating decision speed
(Bakker & Shepherd, 2016; Eisenhardt, 1989), we
need to gain a deeper understanding of how actors
can accelerate their preparations (e.g., risk manage-
ment and vulnerability assessments) and their re-
sponses to facilitate resilience. The answer may lie
with the current list of endowments, other endow-
ments not currently recognized in the literature, and/
or some other spontaneous mechanisms of acceler-
ation. These endowments could include potential
resources like community embeddedness, social
networks (including both structure and content), and
broader context or institutional factors. Further-
more, research can challenge the assumption that
“more speed is better”by exploring if and under
what circumstances slowing the organization down
may facilitate resilience in the face of certain types of
adversity.
Finally, learning from failure can be enhanced by
the passage of time—that is, time helps reduce the
negative emotions triggered by a failure, which helps
reduce obstacles to learning from the experience
(Shepherd et al., 2011). Does the passage of time help
organizations (i.e., organizational members collec-
tively) interpret their experiences with adversity in
a way that builds endowments or otherwise helps
them to be better prepared for subsequent adversity?
If we can gain a deeper understanding of what hap-
pens during this period of learning, then perhaps
learning can be accelerated or otherwise enhanced.
Future Research on Complexity and Adversity
The increasing complexity, dynamism, and inter-
connectedness of contemporary business environ-
ments coupled with increasing information-processing
requirements tend to intensify the impact of adversity
on organizations (Lagadec, 2009; Topper & Lagadec,
2013). As an example of the evolving complexity in
the environment, the microblogging website Twitter
now sees the “one-in-a million chance of something
going horribly wrong 500 times a day”(Hill, 2014).
The potential for things to go wrong has increased
dramatically along with the concomitant implications
of responding to events in forums where the world
is watching. This has important implications for
extending foundational work on how organizations
anticipate and respond to adversity (Thompson,
1967). Although organizations have always faced ex-
ternal threats (Thompson, 1967), contemporary or-
ganizations are embeddedin a web of interconnected
stakeholders. Different stakeholders are likely to have
varying interests and objectives (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978) and may thus impose conflicting and compet-
ing demands on organizations, pulling them onto di-
vergent paths.
Extending research on control theory. The in-
creased degree of environmental complexity chal-
lenges traditional organizational mechanisms to
detect, respond to, and control ongoing operations.
To date, a considerable body of research focuses on
how organizations develop and manage systems to
account for and control a range of normal and/or
expected disturbances (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long,
2004, 2010; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Giglioni &
Bedeian 1974; Klein, 1989; Snell, 1992). Despite
the long tradition of research exploring systems of
control, these studies generally explore systems that
are designed for situations that fall outside of the
notion of “crisis”discussed throughout this review.
Indeed, despite the potential connection, our sys-
tematic review did not uncover “control theory”as
a substantial research theme in the crisis and resil-
ience literatures. We anticipate that future research
might explore how organizations design mecha-
nisms of “control”that involve responding to dis-
turbances that “fall outside the range of normal and
[the] expected”(Boin, Comfort, & Demchak, 2010: 9).
Some bodies of literature such as work on HROs
(Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 1999) provide some in-
sight and more recent empirical studies are in-
vestigating the micromechanisms (e.g., Barton et al.,
2015). Still, how do more ordinary organizations
design resilient systems to be better prepared for
unexpected challenges? Is it possible to build re-
silient controls and if so, how can these be used to
build resilient organizations, systems, and commu-
nities (Van Der Vegt et al., 2015)? We anticipate that
contributions can be made to control theory by
addressing how organizations recognize potential
disruptions, prepare for those challenges, and over-
come surprises in an effective way.
Addressing multi-faceted demands of hybrid
organizations. Further complicating the increasing
environmental complexity is the shifting power, sa-
lience, and urgency of different types of stakeholders
over time (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Such dif-
ferences and changes in perspectives and opinions
across stakeholders may lead to confusion about
the organization’s identity and may make strategic
decision-making, such as how to allocate internal re-
sources, more difficult. These challenges, if not well
managed, may escalate into major disruptions, which
could in turn lead to resource withdrawal and even
754 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

organizational demise. Attending to the complexity of
organizational life and the ways actors manage these
competing demands on a day-to-day basis thus has
important implications for understanding organiza-
tional resilience in preparation for unexpected events
in increasingly complex environments (Zhao, Fisher,
Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017).
There appear to be ample opportunities to in-
tegrate the emerging research on environmental
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011; Wry, Cobb, &
Aldrich, 2013) with resilience and crisis manage-
ment studies. The increasing prevalence and prom-
inence of hybrid organizations provides an ideal
setting for such integration. Hybrid organizations
combine multiple organizational forms and embed
multiple missions/values not just in their mission
statements but also in their everyday practices
(Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012). Because of
their simultaneous pursuit of different and often-
times competing missions, these organizations tend
to experience divergent pressures from different
stakeholders and face unique challenges in manag-
ing the associated complexity (Besharov & Smith,
2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Zhao & Lounsbury,
2016). Building resilience is therefore a strong im-
perative for hybrid organizations.
Despite the increasing scholarly attention to hy-
brid organizations and the environmental complex-
ity they face as well as the practical importance of
resilience for hybrid organizations, the literatures on
environmental complexity, hybrids, and resilience
have largely been developed independent of each
other. We call for a more integrative effort across
these literatures. To begin, there is a great opportu-
nity to study how a hybrid organization enhances
resilience under conditions of high environmental
complexity. To pursue this stream of research, we
first need research that more explicitly conceptual-
izes and operationalizes the structure and intensity
of environmental complexity. Past studies have
suggested that both the sheer number and degree
of incompatibility of different institutional logics—
beliefs and practices that guide and shape individual/
organizational identities and actions (Thornton,
Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012)—contribute to environ-
mental complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). How-
ever, we know little about the relative salience of each
logic and what drives the incompatibility of these
logics. To this end, future research can explore the
connections and clashes between logics, the ways
broader logics evolve (rapidly and slowly), and the
ways organizations facilitate resilience to these changes
(Zhao & Wry, 2016).
In addition, facilitating resilience under environ-
mental complexity requires that effective mecha-
nisms are put in place so organizations can manage
potential tensions across stakeholders and resolve
conflictsshouldtheyarise.Recentresearchonenvi-
ronmental complexity has uncovered various
mechanisms organizations employ when managing
competing pressures and navigating different stake-
holder demands. These studies on environmental
complexity have mainly focused on the context of so-
cial enterprises—a particular type of hybrid organiza-
tion that strives to integrate two distinct organizational
forms (i.e., business and charity) at its core—and have
suggested various hybrid-organizing approaches as
effective strategies for facilitating resilience under in-
creasingly complex environments (Battilana & Lee,
2014). These hybrid-organizing strategies have been
shown to be effective for managing the internal and
external tensions caused by environmental complex-
ity (see Battilana & Lee, 2014 for a summary), which
enrich our understanding of the mechanisms under-
lying resilience—mechanisms that mitigate potential
tensions in day-to-day activities and avoid the escala-
tion of these tensions into major crises.
Conversely, the resilience and crisis management
literatures can also help formulate a more complete
theory of hybrid organizing in social enterprises;
hybrid organizing is not simply reactive to a chang-
ing environment but entails a full range of organiz-
ing processes that are both proactive and reactive,
such as understanding the initial conditions (i.e.,
organizational endowment), preparing for/preventing
adversity, and responding to triggering events.
These are exciting opportunities for future research.
For instance, how effective are initial resource en-
dowments (e.g., financial slack) in mitigating the
competing pressures social enterprises face? Are
pluralist leaders with paradoxical thinking better
positioned to navigate complex demands, make more
optimal resource-allocation decisions, and mitigate
the risks of internal conflicts? What are the best reso-
lution mechanisms when potential tensions across
stakeholders escalate into major disruptions (e.g., the
Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis in India and the
No Pago movement in Nicaragua)? Resilience and
crisis management research are well positioned to
provide important insights for answering these
questions.
Future Research on Mindfulness and Adversity
As we have argued, various new contingencies, such
as breakdowns in information and communication
2017 755Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

systems, have increased uncertainty and vulnera-
bility for all organizations. Thus, all organizations
can benefit from actively facilitating resilience before
facing adversity even though neither the costs of ad-
versity nor the price of being alert to surprises can re-
ally be determined in advance (Almklov & Antonsen,
2010). Some industries and organizational contexts,
such as wildland firefighting, health care, and other
hazardous industries (e.g., commercial aviation, nu-
clear power, and chemical processing) have no choice
but to work constantly on their resilience (e.g., Vogus
et al., 2014). As Barton et al. (2015) explained, these
organizations must perform reliably despite uncer-
tainty, thus underscoring the need to actively work to
become alert and aware of emerging threats as they
unfold. This collective capability to discern discrimi-
natory detail about emerging issues and to act swiftly
in response to these details (Weick et al., 1999; Vogus &
Sutcliffe, 2012)—known as collective (i.e., organiza-
tional) mindfulness—is another mechanism common
to both crisis management and resilience.
As Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane (2016) described in
a recent cross-level review of mindfulness research,
qualitative and quantitative studies have linked
collective mindfulness to greater organizational re-
liability; more effective responses to near disasters,
traumas, and actual disasters; and improved clinical
outcomes and decreased mortality rates. Thus, re-
search has suggested that mindfulness and the pro-
cesses through which it is enabled fuel resilience.
That said, a few important opportunities for future
research exist that touch on both domains of inquiry.
Perhaps, the most important question to be answered
relates to the goals of collective mindfulness and the
ultimate outcomes thereof. If higher reliability is
produced through processes of mindful organizing,
we should expect that organizations (or their sub-
units) that organize for mindfulness will experience
fewer crises and be more resilient over the long term
than their not-so-organized counterparts. More rig-
orous studies examining the effects of mindful or-
ganizing on resilience are needed, particularly in
more prosaic organizational settings and contexts
outside high-risk industries.
Weick et al. (1999) proposed that organizational
mindfulness is not about single individuals being
mindful or engaging in meditative practices, al-
though the veracity of that claim is unsettled. The
integration of crisis management and resilience po-
sitions us to better understand various relationships,
such as the associations between individual and or-
ganizational resilience and individual and collective
mindfulness as well as their cross-level associations.
Given that mindfulness has been found to facilitate
self-regulation and reduce automatic mental pro-
cesses (Glomb, Duffy, Bono, & Yang, 2011), does in-
dividual mindfulness enable attentional stability,
breadth, and vividness (see Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006),
which might help employees notice and/or respond
to emerging threats more quickly? More studies that
enhance our understanding of the link between crisis
management and resilience are likely to make im-
portant contributions to organizational science.
Exploring the “Dark Side”of Resilience Research
Our final area of future research is one that was
a bit of a surprise from our review, what we have
labeled the “dark side”of resilience. Clearly, resil-
ience has its benefits in enabling actors to maintain
functioning in the face of adversity (Bonanno, 2004;
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Van Der Vegt et al., 2015).
However, it is possible that this functioning may
come at a cost, which means that there is a possible
“dark side”to resilience. For example, those who
are more resilient typically possess (overly) posi-
tive self-conceptions [e.g., “self-enhancing biases”
(Westphal & Bonanno 2007: 422)], which can “give
rise to ‘positive illusions’that enable people to be
energeticandhappy...yetmaybeincompatible
with an honest acknowledgement of failure, and
thus, while promoting happiness, can inhibit
learning”(Cannon & Edmondson, 2005: 302). We
anticipate that important contributions will be
made by future research that explores the potential
downsides of resilience and the ways these down-
sides might accelerate or exacerbate a triggering
event.
First, negative emotions can be generated in those
facing adversity, providing a clear signal that
“something went wrong here”that requires attention
and action (McGrath, 1999; Shepherd, 2003). Al-
though disruptive, these negative emotions can
motivate reflection on and sensemaking of causes
leading up to the disruption and can ultimately
generate high levels of learning (for review, see
Shepherd, Williams, Patzelt & Wolfe, 2016; Ucbasaran
et al., 2013). If resilient individuals are “immune”to
these sensemaking triggers in the face of challenges,
they may fail to attend to and act on signals in-
dicating the need to make changes to improve indi-
vidual, group, or venture performance. Future
research can explore whether and how resilience
influences learning from adversity: does sense-
making still occur but through other mechanisms
(i.e., not triggered by negative emotions)? Perhaps
756 JuneAcademy of Management Annals

certain types of adversity (e.g., self-caused adversity,
such as errors or personal failure) result in lower levels
of learning for more resilient actors vis-a-vis those who
experience the adversity as a major disruption.
It then becomes important to explore the cognitive
and decision-making mechanisms (e.g., regulatory
focus, attribution, framing) that obstruct the actor
from reflecting on and learning from experiences
with adversity (assuming that learning helps in pre-
paring for and responding to subsequent adversity).
Relatedly, future research can more carefully ex-
plore the role resilience plays in seeking to mitigate
or curtail potential risk behavior after experiencing
a near miss. When people escape a pending disaster,
such as avoiding a near collision, they can interpret
their experience as one of resilience (i.e., a close call,
a disaster that did not occur, a crisis avoided) or one
of vulnerability (i.e., a near hit, a disaster that almost
occurred, a crisis narrowly averted) (March, Sproull,
& Tamuz, 1991). A series of experiments by Tinsley,
Dillon, and Cronin (2012) showed that when people
escape disaster and frame their experience in terms
of resilience (i.e., as a close call), they underestimate
the danger of future similar situations and are less
likely to take actions to mitigate potential risks. In
other words, framing an event in a resilient way leads
to more risky behaviors in the future which lead to
even more devastating consequences.
Second, and related to the previous point, resil-
ience assists actors in persisting in activities despite
hardship. Although noble in many cases, there are
situations in which persistence may be ill chosen,
such as escalation of commitment to a losing course
of action (Brockner, 1992; Ross & Staw, 1993) or the
inability to overcome dysfunctional momentum to
adjust actions (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). Further-
more, at the system or institutional level, an
outpouring of well-meaning yet uncoordinated
response efforts can result in the “mass assault”of
decentralized activities (Perry, 1991: 202), including
overabundance of volunteers, congestion of people
and vehicles, information overload, and inability to
effectively divide tasks and jurisdictional bound-
aries (Drabek, 1985; Quarantelli, 1986; Wenger et al.,
1987). Future research can explore how resilience
influences escalation of commitment to failing
courses of action, delayed decisions to terminate
poorly performing endeavors, and inability to read-
just and change course. These delayed terminations
may ultimately lead to a major disruption. Therefore,
somewhat ironically, resilience to adversity may—
under some conditions—create the basis for a sub-
sequent major disruption.
Third, while “uniquely adaptive following expo-
sure to”adversity, resilience tends to “be associated
with at least some maladaptive characteristics in
normal circumstances”(Westphal & Bonanno, 2007:
422). For example, individuals higher in resilience
sometimes tend to be narcissistic and self-enhancing,
evoking negative impressions in others (John &
Robins, 1994) and creating a potential liability. Al-
though these behaviors provide coping advantages
during adversity, they can result in social liabilities
(Bonanno, Keltner, Holen, & Horowitz, 1995;
Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005). This type of
coping is described as pragmatic or ugly coping and
can include emotional disassociation (i.e., emotional
numbing), which offers an escape from the negative
consequences of adversity but is associated with long-
term health costs (Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno & Singer,
1990). Future research can explore the conditions
under which resilience is a liability as opposed to an
asset for individuals, teams, and organizations. Do the
social-liability characteristics associated with indi-
vidual resilience transfer to the team or organizational
levels of analysis? What are the costs and benefits
of having resilient leaders in organizations? Does
aleader’s emotional disassociation generate organi-
zational resilience but at the cost of personal and/or
organizational member functioning?
Finally, individual and organizational resilience
can be purposely nurtured and developed (Sutcliffe
& Vogus, 2003; Wildavsky, 1988), but doing so can be
time and resource consuming (Dewald & Bowen,
2010). Individuals and organizations vary in how
much attention they dedicate to adversity depending
on roles (individual level), organizational objectives,
and institutional environments. These attentional
differences influence preparation, decision-making,
and resource allocation for everyday occurrences
and major disruptions (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Perrow, 2011). Advancements in research on resil-
ience need to account for differences in attention to
adversity and link them to the capabilities, pro-
cesses, and responses that constitute resilience.
Understanding trade-offs between the allocation of
resources for building resilience and other activities
(innovation, entrepreneurship, etc.) is likely key to
finding the “right”balance on this key strategic
issue.
In summary, research on the dark side of resilience
is virtually unexplored, and therefore provides an
important and critical opportunity to extend our
understanding of the role and influence of resilience
in organizational life. Although resilience clearly
plays a positive role in organizing in the face of
2017 757Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao

adversity, there are likely “downsides”to resilience
in certain scenarios, which to date are virtually
unexplored.
CONCLUSION
In this review and integration, we have sought to
move crisis management away from its focus on ex-
ceptional (i.e., low-probability) events and integrate
it with the concept of resilience. As our review ex-
plains, some crises may be exceptional, but some are
also evolutionary. Resilience points to the means of
counteracting weakening or strategic misalignment
as well as responding and adjusting to triggering
events. Thus, crisis and resilience are related in an
essential way. By fusing these two literatures, we are
in a better position to understand why some organi-
zations successfully adjust to and even thrive amid
adversity, whereas others fail to do so and how or-
ganizations transform their resilient capacities and
capabilities into resilient functioning.
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Trenton A. Williams is an Assistant Professor at the
Indiana University, Kelley School of Business. Prior to
joining the Kelley School Trent was a faculty member at
the Whitman School of Management at Syracuse Univer-
sity. His research includes venture emergence under extreme
resource constraint, resourcefulness, resilience, emergent re-
sponses to disasters, and decision-making under uncertainty.
Daniel A. Gruber is Associate Dean for Innovation and New
Ventures at the University of Cincinnati’s Lindner College of
Business. Prior to joining the Lindner College, he was a fac-
ulty member at Northwestern University’sMedillSchoolof
Journalism, Media, Integrated Marketing Communications
and Kellogg School of Management (Courtesy). Dan com-
pleted his Ph.D. in management and organizations at the
University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business. His re-
search focuses on organizational sensemaking, social media,
and managing the unexpected.
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe is a Bloomberg Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Business and Medicine at the Johns Hopkins
University with appointments in the Carey Business
School, the School of Medicine, and the School of Nursing.
Her research program has been devoted to investigating
how organizations and their members cope with un-
certainty, team and organizational learning, and how or-
ganizations can be designed to be more reliable and
resilient.
Dean A. Shepherd is the Ray and Milann Siegfried Pro-
fessor of Entrepreneurship at the Mendoza College of
Business, Notre Dame University. Dean received his doc-
torate and MBA from Bond University (Australia). His re-
search and teaching is in the field of entrepreneurship;
he investigates both the decision making involved in
leveraging cognitive and other resources to act on oppor-
tunities and the processes of learning from experimenta-
tion (including failure), in ways that ultimately lead to high
levels of individual and organizational performance. Dean
has published papers primarily in the top entrepreneur-
ship, general management, strategic management, opera-
tions management, and psychology journals and has
written (or edited) over 20 books.
Eric Yanfei Zhao is an Assistant Professor of Management
and Entrepreneurship at the Indiana University, Kelley
School of Business. His research interest lies at the in-
tersection of strategic management, organization theory,
and entrepreneurship, with a particular focus on strategic
paradoxes, investigating how various types of organiza-
tions become resilient under complex institutional and
organizational challenges.
2017 769Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe, Shepherd, and Zhao