Self-Censorship as a Socio-Political-Psychological Phenomenon: Conception and Research

Abstract

Self-censorship of information, defined as an act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles, serves as an obstacle to the proper functioning of a democratic society, because it prevents free access to information, freedom of expression, and the flow of information. It is of key importance in societies, as it blocks information that may shed new light on various societal issues. Nevertheless, it is recognized that in certain cases self-censorship is necessary. The present article provides a comprehensive conceptual framework for self-censorship and examines it from various angles with empirical examples. It describes its nature and psychological foundations, the motivations that underlie it, the conditions that facilitate its practice, its societal and individual consequences, and, finally, its measurement challenges.

Full text

Self-Censorship as a Socio-Political-Psychological Phenomenon:
Conception and Research
Daniel Bar-Tal
Tel Aviv University
Self-censorship of information, defined as an act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from
others in the absence of formal obstacles, serves as an obstacle to the proper functioning of a democratic
society, because it prevents free access to information, freedom of expression, and the flow of information. It is
of key importance in societies, as it blocks information that may shed new light on various societal issues.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that in certain cases self-censorship is necessary. The present article provides a
comprehensive conceptual framework for self-censorship and examines it from various angles with empirical
examples. It describes its nature and psychological foundations, the motivations that underlie it, the conditions
that facilitate its practice, its societal and individual consequences, and, finally, its measurement challenges.
KEY WORDS: self-censorship, censorship, flow of information, democracy
Self-censorship has the potential of being a plague that not only prevents building a better world,
but also robs its performer of courage and integrity.
One of the key socio-political-psychological questions that should preoccupy human beings is
why individuals do not reveal validated information even though no formal censorship is activated to
prevent its exposure. This phenomenon, called self-censorship, takes place in every social space,
beginning with the interpersonal through the intraorganizational and up to intrasocietal settings (see
Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Sharvit, in press). For various reasons, individuals decide not to reveal
truthful information to their family members, close friends, fellow group members, members of
organizations, media, leaders, or society members. In all of these cases, they believe that there is cost
in revealing the information, and therefore they choose to conceal it. Of special interest are societal
cases in which it is clear that the self-censored information may contribute to the improved perfor-
mance of the society and/or prevent its wrongdoing, and individuals still withhold it and do not reveal
its content to other society members (see as examples of cases, Nets-Zehngut & Elbaz, in press).
One example of self-censorship involves many thousands of French soldiers taking part in the
Algerian war who participated in—or witnessed—the widespread torture of hundreds of thousands of
Algerians—many innocent civilians (Nets-Zehngut & Elbaz, in press). Branche and House (2010) in
this vein noted: “During the war, the French security forces used torture on a very large scale not only
to fight against the nationalists.... Torture was, in essence, an everyday form of violence employed
throughout Algeria for many years by French troops.... Although impossible to count, the number of
victims of torture was numerous, possibly hundreds of thousands. They were civilians and fighters
37
0162-895X V
C2017 International Society of Political Psychology
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,
and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia
Advances in Political Psychology, Vol. 38, Suppl. 1, 2017
doi: 10.1111/pops.12391
bs_bs_banner

indistinctly called ‘rebels’. Resorting to violence was routine and perpetrated far from foreign eyes or
media attention and denied by the French state” (p. 117).
Although torture is forbidden by law, for many years after the war, until well into the 1990s, these
soldiers, with the cooperation of French society and French authorities, but with no formal censorship,
self-censored this horrible experience. With few exceptions, they did not talk about it, the mass media
did not investigate it, writers did not write about it, and film directors avoided this theme (for example,
see Austin, 2007, regarding self-censorship in French films).
The present article focuses precisely on these cases of self-censorship in a society. On this macro-
level, the response to the posed question is important as it illuminates a particular angle of societal
functioning, because self-censorship serves as a barrier, blocking information that could potentially
facilitate various constructive and functional processes of improving the society. Since the article
focuses on self-censorship in society, it is important to first clarify the general value of a free flow of
information. Following this, the article provides a definition of self-censorship and discusses its
nature. It then describes the psychological bases of this important phenomenon. The next section
introduces the underlying motivational basis of the self-censorship and differentiates self-censorship
from two sociopsychological concepts: conformity and obedience. The next two sections present its
antecedents and consequences. Finally, the article discusses issues of measurement. Relevant research
in the context of the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict
1
is provided as validating evidence of the
proposed conceptual framework.
The Importance of a Free Flow of Information
One of the major values in any democratic society is freedom of expression to assure a free flow
of information (Dahl, 2006). The free flow of information is intimately related to the civil liberties
that grant free expression (e.g., Barendt, 2005; Mill, 1869; Schauer, 1982). Where free flow of infor-
mation is not encouraged and protected, these liberties are diminished.
Freedom of expression is anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states
(Article 19): “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes free-
dom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
2
In fact, this principle not only guarantees freedom of
expression and protects the freedom to communicate in public, but it also promises free and full
access to information and the free flow of information. Such unrestricted access to all necessary offi-
cial information is a crucial dimension of general freedom and a condition for the development of a
free and critical political climate, enabling a well-functioning democratic society. A free flow of infor-
mation and free access to information also provides the necessary conditions in every society
3
for the
development of open-minded, well-informed, knowledgeable, and critically oriented group members
1
Intractable conflicts are violent, fought over goals viewed as existential, perceived as being of zero-sum nature and
unsolvable, occupy a central position in the lives of the involved societies, require immense investments of material
and psychological resources, and last for at least 25 years (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013; Kriesberg, 1993).
2
In 2005, a Human Rights Resolution was adopted focusing on the right to know the truth in very specific situations of
gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law. Specifically, the resolution
stresses the “imperative for society as a whole to recognize the right of victims of gross violations of human rights and
serious violations of international humanitarian law, and their families, within the framework of each State’s domestic
legal system, to know the truth regarding such violations, including the identity of the perpetrators and the causes, facts
and circumstances in which such violations took place.” This resolution goes beyond freedom of expression in requir-
ing disclosure of information that is often censored and self-censored by authorities of a society and by society mem-
bers (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/66, “Right to the Truth,”
April 20, 2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/66).
3
This article will refer to a society as a social unit because it focuses on macrolevel analysis that refers to a societal
phenomenon. I recognize that the outlined principles can also be applied to the analysis of microlevel units.
38 Bar-Tal

who know how to search for, process, use, and express information. This value is crucial for the ratio-
nal participation of citizens in democratic societies, who receive information and then can evaluate it
(Almond & Verba, 1963).
Moreover, full and free access to information in a society affects the public interest and the well-
being of a society in a number of important ways: (1) It raises the value of free expression and critical
thinking to a central position; (2) It increases the likelihood of development of free deliberative and
open discussions; (3) It increases the scope of public discussions; (4) It enables accountability and
transparence of the system; (5) It assists leaders and individual society members in making balanced,
well-informed, and well-merited decisions on societal issues; (6) It facilitates social management
according to moral codes by avoiding and preventing moral transgressions; (7) It provides efficient
and useful control and supervision of the system; (8) It expedites election of appropriate leadership;
(9) It allows dynamic change of opinions; and (10) It facilitates development of tolerance. In general,
the free flow of public information in any social group is a mark of good governance, transparency
and assurance that those in power will not hide their misdeeds. It also assures moral conduct of the
society in its intragroup and intergroup relations. Above all, it endorses effective participation of an
informed electorate that can evaluate the goals, policies, and actions of those who govern and make
decisions, as well as the views and behavioral intentions of the society as a collective. All these fea-
tures provide one of the bases for the development of the well-functioning democratic society and,
therefore, free flow of information that allows provision of information as one of its hallmarks.
It is axiomatic in the twenty-first century that every member of a democratic society has the right
to be informed and to inform others in order to enrich pluralistic societal public discourse. Freedom of
information involves the right of the people to know the whole truth; it compels the disclosure of
authorities’ affairs as well as matters of public interest. It emphasizes the need for transparency,
responsibility, responsiveness, openness, and accountability of authorities, government, formal institu-
tions, and public officials to the people. It should be practiced for the public good (Raz, 1991). Thus,
freedom of expression, free access to information, and free flow of information provide a set of crite-
ria to evaluate the functioning of the democratic society (Dahl, 2000; Raz, 1991). An uninformed soci-
ety can easily become unruly and hard to govern or in contrast, obedient and totalitarian; information
and knowledge are limited, censored, controlled, and manipulated as in Orwell’s 1984.Butthereisno
need to go so far; authorities and institutions even in democratic regimes often have a vested interest
in restricting information and opinions to prevent criticism, accountability, and transparency in order
to maintain their power.
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that in every group or society there is tension between the
free flow of information and its restraint. An unrestrained flow of information may also harm a group
or a society. In fact, even the most liberal, democratic, and enlightened states consider it necessary to
suppress at least some information and opinions. The European Convention on Human Rights (2010),
after setting out the essential rights to information and communication, states (Article 10):
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (p. 11)
This provision is not surprising because societies cannot function well without some level of
information limitation, especially in the area of security—but also in other areas—and therefore they
Self-Censorship in a Society 39

control and regulate the flow of information formally and informally (e.g., Halperin & Hoffman,
1976). This limitation does not apply only to various institutions and organizations related to security
but may even include scientific publications which could provide information leading to harmful acts
(O’Loughlin & Sherwood, 2005).
In addition, other arguments have appeared in different societies during different periods, all
advocating self-censorship, and the suppression of particular types of information. For example, in
societies that have experienced internal schisms with severe consequences, self-censorship has been
suggested in order to avoid continued societal polarization. In other words, it is argued that revelation
of past misdeeds leads to polarization and dysfunction in a society (e.g., Estmond & Selimovic, 2012;
Nets-Zehngut & Sagi Elbaz, in press). For example, in the case of Spain, many societal sectors prefer
silence rather than to investigate human rights’ violations during the Franco era, in order to avoid a
new societal schism (e.g., Richards, 2002). Additionally, sometimes there is a dilemma between the
freedom to know and the right to privacy, when the information may harm individuals, including lead-
ers, and in these cases too there are voices that support self-censorship (e.g., Volokh, 2000). Usually
societies define the domains of information that should be kept secret and adopt laws and rules to
assure that the information is not released. Individuals who violate these laws are punished, and vari-
ous mechanisms may often be used (for example, censorship) to prevent the information from being
disclosed (De Baets, 2002; Peleg, 1993).
In this vein, I suggest that almost all suppressed information can be considered in both ways,
either as a double-edge sword that with its revealing has negative and positive implications or as a
one-sided blade indicating that when the information is revealed, it can clean the malignant growth.
History has taught us that much censored information should and could have been revealed. Thus, the
two opposing societal needs must be balanced: on the one hand, the need for free expression and free
flow of information for a well-functioning society and, on the other, the need for secrecy to assure the
well-being of the society.
Groups differ in the way they manage this tension between the two opposing needs. In some
groups, there is less control and more flow of information than in others. Well-functioning democratic
societies allow more freedom of expression and free flow of information than societies which are gov-
erned by authoritarian regimes. The former societies cherish values of freedom, encourage free flow
of information openly in public discourse, and even set freedom of expression as a goal that should be
encouraged in the educational system. In any event, the continuing tension between the two opposing
societal needs characterizes every democratic society, and there is an ongoing struggle between views
of what should and should not be revealed to the public. Eventually, in line with their worldviews, val-
ues, and their normative patterns of actions, human beings decide the outcome of this struggle in their
role as leaders or citizens.
It is possible to postulate then that freedom of expression and free flow of information are at least
dependent on the nature of the regime that governs the society, the societal political culture, the politi-
cal socialization of the younger and older society members, and in the context in which the group
functions. As an example, one of the distinguishing contexts that has a major effect on free flow of
information is that of violent conflict (Hameiri, Bar-Tal & Halperin, in press). In this context, the for-
mal institutions usually limit free flow of information because the issue of security gets top priority
and, in their view, this need supersedes the value of freedom of expression in importance.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that free flow of information, free expression, and free access to
information are not only limited by formal laws, rules, and mechanisms but also by sociopsychologi-
cal limitations. People, acting as individuals and as members of collectives, limit free flow of informa-
tion, free expression, and free access to information, even when no formal obstacles exist. For
example, they may conform to perceived pressure of a majority and not express their opinions, or
they may be obedient to an expected worldview of the authorities. The present article focuses on one
40 Bar-Tal

specific sociopsychological barrier to free flow of information and free expression, namely, self-cen-
sorship, that will now be defined and discussed at length.
The Nature of Self-Censorship
Self-censorship of information, defined as the act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding
information from others in the absence of formal obstacles, is one of the sociopsychological mecha-
nisms that often obstructs a well-functioning democratic society. Together with conformity and obedi-
ence, it should be considered as a sociopsychological barrier that prevents free access to information,
obstructs freedom of expression, and harms free flow of information.
Surprisingly, social-psychological research has relatively neglected the study of self-censorship,
which takes place on an individual level in a social context and which has important implications for
groups, including societies. Research has been preoccupied with a number of areas that are different
in their interest and emphasis: investigating the factors that allow a minority to influence the opinion
of a majority (De Dreu & De Vries, 2001; Prislin & Christensen, 2005); the conditions and effects of
dissenting opinions in groups (Allen & Levine, 1969, 1971); and the degree of freedom to express
opinions of critics in their group (Hornsey, 2006; Packer, 2008). These directions do not touch upon
the essence of self-censorship and have a different focus as they deal with the wide form of opinions.
However, self-censorship has been noted by other behavioral and social scientists. In micro social
environments, and especially families, it is viewed as secret keeping, and family experts have dis-
cussed it extensively (Roded & Raviv, in press; Brown-Smith, 1998; Karpel, 1980; Petronio, 2010;
Vangelisti, 1994). It has also been noted in the context of organizations, especially in the discussion
of malfunctioning organizations and whistleblowers, who break self-censorship and reveal informa-
tion (Adamska, in press; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Morrison Wolfe & Milliken, 2000;
Near & Miceli, 1996; Westin, 1981). Relatively little conceptual work has been done in the societal
context, in spite of the fact that this phenomenon has been observed to be quite prevalent, mainly in
the mass media or in other societal-cultural agencies (Antilla, 2010; Elbaz, Nets-Zehngut, Magal, &
Abutbul, in press; Kenny & Gross, 2008; Lee & Chan, 2009; Nelkin, 1995). For example, Maksudyan
(2009), who analyzed translations of history books into Turkish, demonstrates how writers, translators,
and editors in Turkey censored themselves when addressing information involving the genocide of
the Armenians during World War I either to avoid public censorship or to gain approval from the
dominant sector in society. He argues that self-censorship occurs “when the cultural agent censors the
work [a publication with the narrative] voluntarily, in order to avoid pubic censorship or in order to
achieve approval from the dominating sector in society” (p. 638).
Various conceptions of self-censorship have included expression of opinions, feelings, or
thoughts in their definitions (Gibson, 1992; Hayes, 2007; Horton, 2011). For example, Hayes, Glynn,
and Shanahan (2005) defined self-censorship as “withholding of one’s true opinion from an audience
perceived to disagree with that opinion” (p. 299). By defining it widely, the distinction between cases
of self-censorship and those of conformity is blurred (see, for example, the instrument developed by
Hayes, Glynn, Shanahan, 2005, to assess self-censorship, and their definition).
Elaborations on Components of Self-Censorship
If we focus on societal cases, the definition of self-censorship suggests the following prerequi-
sites: The actor must have new information that has not been revealed to the public, must be aware
that he or she has truthful information, and believes that the information has implications for the socie-
ty as a whole, for other society members, or for another group or set of persons or for an accepted
worldview. The act of censorship indicates that the individual intentionally and voluntarily decides to
Self-Censorship in a Society 41

withhold (does not share) this information in spite of the fact that there is no formal obstacle like
external censorship that prevents him or her from sharing it. This behavior implies that individuals
informally control and regulate the flow of information—or in other words, obstruct free access to
information, freedom of expression, and free flow of information. I will elaborate upon a number of
clarifications.
Information versus opinion. The present conception limits the nature of self-censorship to infor-
mation, that is, it focuses on withholding information rather than on withholding an opinion. Informa-
tion is viewed as factually based knowledge that can be known from personal or reported experience,
research, or a document. It refers to something that actually happened and is considered verified and
validated, that is, factual.
4
In this case, individuals believe that the information is based on evidence
and does not depend on personal views and is therefore truthful. In contrast, opinion is personal
knowledge that goes beyond the data. It reflects inferences, attributions, evaluations, or impressions
among others. Legal experts make the same distinction between information and opinions (Barendt,
2005; Schauer, 1982). They consider information as a synonym for facts, while thoughts, ideas,
beliefs, or value judgments are viewed as synonyms of opinions. Thus, opinions are an expression of
a subjective view that may rest on information, with the intention to elaborate and comment on it
based on personal understanding. In this conception, everybody is entitled to an opinion, and there are
many different opinions, and therefore the status of opinion does not possess the power of truthful
information. The latter has a different status for people, as it often does not have competition and is
frequently perceived as unequivocal in providing evidence. Since I am aware that subjective judgment
is possible when distinguishing between an opinion and information, from a sociopsychological per-
spective, the understanding of self-censorship requires that a person believes that the possessed infor-
mation is valid and truthful, and then he or she may decide, because of this perception, not to reveal
it.
Limitations of self-censorship. Self-censorship, as defined, is practiced only in cases where there
are no formal obstacles to withholding information, but individuals nonetheless decide voluntarily to
not reveal it. The present definition excludes cases in which there is a formal institutionally estab-
lished external obstacle that prevents sharing information, such as official censorship, orders, or laws
(e.g., De Baets, 2002; Tribe, 1973). In these cases, self-censorship is in line with formal directives and
therefore revealing information violates formal rules. The scope of self-censorship includes cases in
which individual thinks that there are formal obstacles to sharing information, while in reality there
are none. Individuals may imagine the existence of various types of formal censorship, but including
these cases in the definition broadens its scope extensively without clear boundaries. However, the
proposed definition also includes cases in which there may be social sanctions against sharing infor-
mation without the existence of official obstacles. Social sanctions may be applied informally by indi-
viduals, groups, or social agencies that disapprove of information disclosure. Thus, it is possible to
differentiate between formally enforced self-censorship and socially enforced self-censorship. While
the former is excluded from the scope of self-censorship behavior, the latter is included. It does not
mean that real or even imagined informal sanctions are disregarded. They may be very damaging and
punishing. Nevertheless, there is a need to distinguish them from the formal sanctions that come to
regulate behaviors formally with rules and laws. The other type of sanctions is of wide scope, and it is
impossible to evaluate their subjective severity.
Content of the withheld information. The contents of the withheld information may touch on
many different subjects that range from negative to positive meaning, such as immoral acts (for exam-
ple, atrocities, corruption, illegal behaviors, and violations of rules and codes), embarrassing behav-
iors, scientific evidence, and even good deeds. For example, in Poland and Bosnia, individuals
4
I do not intend to claim a positivistic argument, understanding that information may also be viewed subjectively. But
at least it is always based on the solid ground of factual knowledge.
42 Bar-Tal

withheld information about providing help to members of other groups (e.g., Jews in Poland, Muslims
in Bosnia) in order to avoid negative sanctions from their ingroup (see, for example, Broz, 2004). The
behavior about which information is withheld may be carried out by an individual or an authority or a
group (or even by nature) and can be performed intentionally and unintentionally for different
purposes.
In almost all cases, the person who has or gets the information believes subjectively that it has
negative implications, and this is the key thought that leads to a dilemma and eventually, possibly, to
self-censorship. The negative implications of information disclosure may include one of the following
types: (1) It may have negative implications for the individual(s). The person believes that revealing
the information may lead to negative sanctions against him- or herself. Moreover, in evaluating the
implications for the self, the person also considers his or her own self-image or how other group mem-
bers view him or her; (2) It may have negative implications for other specific individuals or a particu-
lar group. In this case, revealing the information may harm people who carried out the inappropriate
act; (3) It may have negative implications for the ingroup. The person believes that exposure of the
possessed information may harm the ingroup or segments of it; (4) It may have negative implications
for a valued belief. In this case, the person believes that revealing the information may harm the status
of a particular idea, value, goal, or ideology; (5) It may have implications for a third party (a person, a
group, or a society). The person in this case believes that exposure of the information may harm other
individuals, group(s), another interest group, an ally, a strong person, and so on.
Types of self-censorship. It is possible to differentiate between different types of self-
censorship. One distinction is between self-censorship carried out either by gatekeepers or by ordinary
people. The former are defined as individuals who hold positions in which they pass, transmit, and dis-
seminate information to the public (for example, politicians, journalists, teachers, filmmakers, and so
on; see Chang & Lee, 1992). According to Pettigrew (1972), gatekeepers are those “who sit at the
junction of a number of communication channels, are in position to regulate the flow of demands and
potentially control decisional outcomes” (p. 190). Ordinary individuals encounter information that, in
their view, has importance for the group, but they do not play a role that enables them to disseminate
it. Another differentiation is between individuals possessing first-hand versus second-hand informa-
tion. First-hand information is acquired by the individual either through personal experience (partici-
pating in an event) or being exposed to it directly (e.g., reading an original document). Second-hand
information is acquired through indirect exposure by getting it from another source: hearing or read-
ing. Thus, the first type of self-censorship is based on withholding unequivocal truthful information,
while, in the other case, its validity may be in question.
Psychological Bases of Self-Censorship
Self-censorship should be seen as sociopsychological phenomenon because by nature it involves
intrapsychological processes. Individuals process information, get to know the content, become aware
of its meaning, and then have to decide whether to reveal it or not (Cook & Heilmann, 2013; Horton,
2011). These processes are grounded in three psychological bases: The first is related to the funda-
mental human need to share knowledge that is violated by self-censorship; the second is related to the
human identification with the society as a main restraining influence for self-censorship on a societal
level; and the third is related to the personal experience of dilemma regarding the act of withholding
information.
The need to share. The first basis is related to a fundamental premise that human beings evolu-
tionarily tend to share, communicate, and disclose information and knowledge that they form,
observe, and/or collect. Many of the evolutionary characteristics that have enabled humans to adapt to
a wide range of physical environments, such as omnivorousness and toolmaking, create dependence
Self-Censorship in a Society 43

on collective knowledge and cooperative information sharing—a kind of obligatory interdependence
(Brewer & Caporael, 2006). In the words of Harber and Cohen (2005), “there is a universal, prehistor-
ic, and quite powerful motive for people to socially share major events. Behaviors in line with this
fundamental motive increase group and self-survival” (p. 384).
In addition to these evolutionary needs, psychology recognizes that sharing troubling events ena-
bles their meaningful understanding, frees resources for coping with them, and also restores positive
self-worth (Harber & Cohen, 2005; Pennebaker, 1990; Stiles, 1987). Harber and Pennebaker (1992)
proposed an additional three reasons for the human tendency to share information about significant
events: (1) It is based on emotional drive; (2) It serves a therapeutic function; and (3) It contains
important implications for the listeners. Similarly, Kubey and Peluso (1990) suggested that people
pass on major news stories not out of an altruistic desire to inform others but simply to relieve their
own feelings (see also Stiles, Shuster, & Harrigan, 1992). I would add that society members who cher-
ish democratic values are aware of the importance of a free flow of information and thus of the impor-
tance of providing information that is relevant to societal life and therefore feel the responsibility to
reveal valid information to other society members. All these premises suggest that society members
have a psychological and societal incentive to share information and not to practice self-censorship,
especially in matters that are relevant and important for societal functioning. Thus, this psychological
basis suggests that self-censorship in principle negates natural individual tendencies, and therefore, a
serious motive must lead to this behavior. The next basis deals with this challenge and presents one of
the most important reasons for the behavior of self-censorship.
Identification with a group. The second psychological basis for self-censorship in many cases is
identification with a group. In contrast to the previous basis, this often provides an explanation for the
practice of self-censorship. This case, which is of special interest for the presented conception, indi-
cates that individuals as group members care about their group, try to maintain its positive image, and
prevent acts or information that have negative implications for the image of the ingroup. One of the
main reasons for this effort is that their personal identity is partly based on their social identity which
also impinges on their self-worth. However, it should be noted that in some cases, it is exactly this
basis which may lead to the motivation to reveal negative information that in view of the knowledge
holder may improve the group functioning (Packer, 2008).
Social identity is denoted as the “part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional sig-
nificance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). The process of constructing social identi-
ty is an individual one, based on self-categorization process (Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982; Turner, 1991;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). It is a pervasive and central human cognitive pro-
cess that enables the organization of the complex social world into a meaningful structure (Brown,
2000; Tajfel, 1969, 1981). It includes a number of basic components: (1) the feeling of belonging to
the given group; (2) the willingness to belong to the given group; (3) the importance ascribed to this
belonging by the person; (4) the emotional attachment one feels towards the group; (5) the commit-
ment to benefit the group; (6) considering the group as having highly valued qualities; and (7) defer-
ring to the group’s norms and cultural symbols (David & Bar-Tal, 2009; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz,
Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). Each of these components is unique and adds a layer to the identification
wholeness.
To strengthen the argument about the power of identification with the group, the concept of col-
lective identity is also useful, indicating the shared awareness of group members who share the same
social identity (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000; Melucci, 1989). This “shared social identity is the
basis of collective social power” (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010, p. 60). Collective identification
goes beyond the individual group member’s cognitive-emotional processes to the characterization of
the entire collective. Of special importance are its two features: a sense of common fate and concern
for the welfare of the collective and mobilization and sacrifice for its sake (David & Bar-Tal, 2009).
44 Bar-Tal

The former pertains to the sense of unity and the feelings of mutual dependence that prevail among
members of a collective. It is the feeling of “togetherness,” the “cement” that connects individuals
and social groups in unity (Brown, 2000) and enables them to define themselves as belonging to the
same collective despite variability in values, beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. But the signif-
icance of shared fate is more extensive and implies that the fate of each of the collective’s individuals
is perceived as dependent on the fate of the whole collective (Kashti, 1997). Doosje, Ellemers, and
Spears, (1999) and Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) have drawn connections between the com-
mon fate and members’ commitment, that is, the extent to which group members feel that they have
strong emotional ties with the collective. They found that a high level of commitment is related to
behavioral mobilization for the sake of the group (see also Reykowski, 1997). In addition, a society
maintains norms and moral codes of what is accepted, allowed, and forbidden for self-protection.
Society members learn these norms and codes and on their basis may use self-censorship. In sum,
identification is a major sociopsychological mechanism that leads to protection of the ingroup. Certain
contents are viewed as harmful, and society members are prodded either formally or informally to
withhold them.
To a great extent, this basis underlies the act of self-censorship in a collective. In their attempt to
protect their group, group members try to prevent dissemination of information that may harm the
group. Revelation of such information by its nature often disrupts the harmony, the structure, the
well-established functioning, and solidarity of a group. Thus, group members encourage and reward
self-censorship, and they impose it upon themselves voluntarily to defend the group. In other cases,
even if they are initially ready to share the truthful information that may have negative consequences
for the group, they know that disclosure will have penalties for other members and/or the group
authorities who try to protect the group.
But at the same time it should be noted that identification with the group may lead to contrary
behavior as well. Society members who are loyal and care about their group may decide to reveal
information that may even initially shed negative light on the group. But they do it in order to change
the group direction or the way it carries out its policies or actions (Packer, 2008). This is the case
when some group members, for example, observe that the group is behaving immorally, and they
think that revealing these acts may influence the direction of group behavior. Thus, in both cases,
identification with the group may have serious implications for self-censorship and is an important
psychological basis for its understanding.
Experiencing dilemma. The third psychological basis of self-censorship refers to the experi-
ence of dilemma. In the case of self-censorship, a person is aware of possessing new unexposed
information that is relevant to the society and should be revealed, but at the same time, is aware
that revealing the information violates another principle, norm, dogma, ideology, or value and may
cause harm. The level of the dilemma may vary from person to person and be dependent on the
type of information, context, or other factors. But an individual always experiences at least a mini-
mal level of dilemma when practicing self-censorship. The psychological rule is to reveal informa-
tion, except when a person realizes that the information may hurt him- or herself, another person,
a group, or an idea. In all these cases, after facing a dilemma and entertaining the options, the per-
son may decide not to reveal the information, thus practicing self-censorship. This decision is also
always dependent on the self-deliberation of pro and con considerations as to whether to reveal
the information that involves both cost and reward calculations. Individuals assess what the costs
and rewards may be for oneself, the ingroup, the outgroup, the system, or the idea, among others.
When the costs exceed the rewards, the dilemma is resolved in favor of self-censorship (Afifi &
Steuber, 2009; Omarzu, 2000). If a person does not experience a dilemma, thinking that the infor-
mation can be revealed, he or she shares it without hesitation. Contrastingly, a person may think
that the information has no value and is therefore not worth sharing. In this case, withholding the
information does not indicate self-censorship.
Self-Censorship in a Society 45

Motivations for Self-Censorship
A number of different, but not mutually exclusive, motivations may drive individuals to adopt
self-censorship. Five of them are especially salient: motivation to protect the ingroup, personal moti-
vation to avoid external negative sanctions and gain positive rewards, motivation to protect self-
image, motivation to protect a belief, and motivation to protect a third party. The first motivation is
based on the assumption that the information possessed may hurt the group and/or its cause, and there-
fore it should not be revealed. The perceived harm can be of a different nature such as hurting the pos-
itive image of the group by revealing information that sheds negative light on the ingroup or
impairing the mobilization of the group members for a particular goal or goals. The information may
also damage the interests or activities of the group; it may cause physical harm or hurt the dominant
narrative, goals, ideology, policies, or leaders. For example, protection can refer to either a small
group that has committed an immoral act or to the whole society because the act was carried out by
its members. The most common motivations are based on the willingness not to harm an image of the
ingroup (see Sagi Elbaz, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Tamir Magal, & Guy Abutbul, in press; Magal, in press;
Nets-Zehngut & Fuxman, in press; Vered, Ambar, Fuxman, Nahhas Abu Hanna, & Bar-Tal, in press).
Thus, for example, society members avoid presenting information about immoral conduct as in the
case of Belgians in the Congo, the Americans in Vietnam, the British in Kenya, the Dutch in Indone-
sia, or Israeli Jews in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
From another angle, a study by Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) centered on the likelihood and
impact of a dirty bomb attack by terrorists on the Los Angeles harbor. They omitted some important
classified material from the paper they posted on the Internet in order to protect the ingroup from
someone’s possible use of the material to build a bomb.
The second distinguishing motivation focuses on self and reflects self-care. Individuals practice
self-censorship motivated by self-interest to avoid external negative sanctions and gain positive ones.
On the one hand, revealing information may lead to damaged reputation, delegitimization, and being
ostracized, or concrete punishment such as dismissal, imprisonment, and even physical violence (Hor-
ton, 2011; Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Papadakis, Peristianis, & Welz, 2006). In the case of gatekeepers such
as journalists—they may not get any more information from their governmental sources (Elbaz &
Bar-Tal, 2014). This motivation is underlined by fear. On the other hand, not revealing information
may lead to receiving positive reinforcement, such as social approval, awards or concrete rewards,
and even self-satisfaction. Leaders may withhold information believing that it has negative implica-
tions for them—and thus are motivated not to reveal it. For example, in Israel at least some of the sol-
diers who have carried out or witnessed violations of Palestinian human rights self-censor the
information, because they do not want to get negative sanctions from their friends in the military unit,
from their immediate social environment, from the army, and/or from the societal formal and informal
institutions (Kimhi & Sagy, 2008).
The third motivation is intrinsic. Individuals adopt self-censorship to maintain their positive self-
view. Having a positive personal identity is a fundamental motivation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), and
thus society members do not want to perceive themselves as being slanderers and/or informants. In
addition, society members draw the value of personal identity from their membership in a group (Taj-
fel, 1981). If the name of the group is damaged, the bad name also affects them. Thus, protecting the
view of the group is also a protection of their own identity. With this motivation, French ex-soldiers
or Israeli soldiers face themselves in their internal mirrors.
Self-censorship may be also motivated by the desire to defend and uphold a particular idea—a
value, dogma, goal, policy, ideology, or belief. Individuals who adhere to a particular view may be
motivated to uphold it even in the face of contradicting information. Nelkin (1995) noted that self-
censorship is motivated by the desire to prevent exposure of “stories that run counter to prevailing val-
ues” or that are “politically charged” (pp. 111–112). For example, Antilla (2010) noted that the
46 Bar-Tal

American press practiced self-censorship and did not fully reveal scientific information about earth
warming to the American public ostensibly in order to provide balanced reporting. This was done
because “a highly organized and well-funded group of deniers of climate change has been exploiting
the media in order to insert climate myths and questionable economic theories into the public dia-
logue” (p. 242).
Finally, self-censorship may possibly be employed to protect a third party because of care, inter-
ests, altruism, or other considerations. The third party can be a particular individual (for example, a
leader or a friend), a small group, an interest group, or even another society. For example, some states
in the world avoid publicizing information about the Armenian genocide in order not to offend Turkey
(Hovannisian, 1999). In some ways, this motivation can be considered a protection of oneself or one’s
own group because the third party may harm the persons or the group if the information is revealed.
But the boundaries of this motivation are blurred, and therefore I have decided to cite it separately.
Two studies have investigated self-censorship by gatekeepers and their motivation to practice this
behavior. One interview study was designed to investigate whether gatekeepers
5
in three formal insti-
tutions (the National Information Center, the IDF/army, and the Ministry of Education) exercised self-
censorship from 1949 to 2004 regarding the causes for the Palestinian exodus in 1948 and what their
motivations for this behavior were (Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). It has been unequivocal-
ly established that one of the causes of the Palestinian exodus during 1948 war was their expulsion by
Jewish military forces. This was strongly denied by the formal social institutions through the years.
The results showed that the interviewed institution gatekeepers widely practiced self-censorship: Out
of 33 interviewed gatekeepers,
6
20 admitted that they had practiced self-censorship. Of the 20 inter-
viewees that said they self-censored, six worked in the Information Center, eight in the IDF, and six
in the Ministry of Education. Collectively, they held their positions in these institutions largely
throughout the research period, from the 1950s to at least 2004. Self-censorship may in fact have been
more widely practiced, as 10 of the remaining 13 interviewees may have censored themselves despite
not having admitted to this practice. They all knew that Jewish military forces had expelled Arabs dur-
ing the 1948 war but decided (without being told by their superiors) not to bring this information to
the public in their published materials. For example, referring to his work in the Information Center,
one interviewee explained: “The topic of expulsions was not mentioned .... we practiced self-
censorship about what could have been written and what not. We practiced self-censorship about
controversial topics.” The situation in the IDF was similar. One interviewee told of the assumption
underlying the work at the Chief Education Officer’s Headquarters: “The general premise was that we
all do not deviate; we are all patriots, all Zionists, do not want to admit that we expelled refugees.”
Similarly, in the Ministry of Education, an interviewee explained that there was general agreement
that the expulsion would not be included in the Curricula Branch’s publications, an agreement that he
himself termed “self-censorship.” Talking about himself and his colleagues at the Curricula Branch
he said: “None of us dared to convey the narrative of the expulsion.”
In addition, content analysis of the interviews identified the following five major motivations for
the self-censorship reported by the interviewed officials in the three institutions.
Protection of Israel’s positive image. The first motivation aimed to protect the ingroup and spe-
cifically to prevent negative use of the information by the Arabs, as well as maintaining a positive
image of Israel in the international community. The officials in the three institutions stated that they
5
The interviewed persons were 33 key officials who had worked in the three institutions almost throughout the research
period, covering this period almost fully (e.g., heads of the IDF Information Branch, directors of the Information
Center, and history team leaders in the Curricula Branch at the Ministry of Education).
6
The interviews were conducted with all living and available officials, currently or formerly holding senior positions in
the three institutions and being responsible for their publications. Exceptions are the commanders of the IDF Informa-
tion Branch; because of the fast turnover in the Branch (commanders were replaced every two to three years), only
some commanders were interviewed, covering the main segments of the entire research period.
Self-Censorship in a Society 47

had concealed the information about the Jewish expulsion of Arabs to prevent its falling into the hands
of Arab states, the Palestinians, or third parties in the international community and then being used by
them for their political goals. For example, an official at the Information Center said “Alongside the
realwarbeingwagedonusbytheArabs,alongtheborders and in terror attacks against civilians, an
Arab information war is being waged across the world. This Arab information, aided by anti-Semitic
elements—governments and individuals—is directed against the State of Israel and the Jewish people.”
Mobilization of the Israeli Jewish citizens. The second major motivation also intended to pro-
tect the ingroup—this time within Israeli society. The officials thought that it was their role to prevent a
negative image of the state among the Israeli Jewish public who were the target audience of the publi-
cations issued by the three institutions. They stated that Israel was facing serious challenges and needed
the complete devotion of its citizens and their mobilization to successfully cope with them. An illustra-
tion of this motivation was expressed by the former head of the IDF Information Branch, saying: “The
soldier needs a sense of purpose that arouses the willingness to fight, and he carries within himself the
courage to fulfill any duty, the capability to withstand the suffering of war and the willingness to sacri-
fice his most important possession—his life.... The duty of education is to bring the soldier to a will-
ingness, a willful decision, stemming from recognition of and identification with the goal.”
Protection of the Zionist ideology. The third motivation was to protect the Zionist narrative,
which is a major part of the Zionist national ideology, by not presenting contradictory information.
Considering themselves Zionists, they felt that this was the right prism from which to view events.
One interviewee in the IDF said “In my opinion, some of us were very blocked off to other opinions
regarding the Zionist story, and we even diminished, suppressed, and parenthesized facts that sur-
faced, that were clearly facts, like the expulsions.”
Institutional norms. The officials in these state institutions adopted norms determining that it
was their role to represent the state and thus present its narrative. This was a kind of bureaucratic
motivation that indicated identification with the institution that one works for and then internalizing
its views. This fourth motivation in some way represents the willingness to protect the state, feeling
part of its organizational fabric. For example, as an interviewee at the Information Center reported:
“Usually we were very very loyal, not only to the official line of information [...] so it’s true that we
were seen as agents of the state. First of all, we really were agents of the state. Anyone working at the
Information Center is an agent of the state. That’s just how it is.”
Fear of sanctions. This fifth motivation reflects the wish to protect oneself. Officials of the three
institutions reported that fear inhibited critical writing and led them to censor themselves preemptive-
ly, thinking that they might be sanctioned by dismissal, denunciation, and ostracization—although this
behavior was based on speculation because no formal instructions had been issued by the authorities
to direct the content of the publications. As an employee in the Ministry of Education said: “I call it
‘political pressure’ because there was constantly the concern that if a question [about our publications]
were raised in the Israeli Parliament, there would be a scandal... many things could have been done
to us. They could have told us: ‘Go to be school inspectors; enough, we’re sick of you as writers.”
In a similar study (Elbaz & Bar-Tal, 2014), use of self-censorship during a military encounter
(i.e., the Second Lebanon War in 2006) was investigated on the basis of the finding that during the
war, the Israeli media mainly presented the official narrative of the government and the army (Elbaz
& Bar-Tal, in press). The findings based on 30 in-depth interviews with prominent Israeli journalists
and public leaders, ministers, and parliament members showed that self-censorship was normatively
widely practiced as part of the requirements of a state of war. The interviewees worked for eight lead-
ing Israeli news organizations, representing the most influential and/or popular news outlets within
different types of media. Among the eight news organizations, there are three leading print-digital
news outlets (Yedioth Ahronoth,Haaretz,andMaariv), all three broadcast outlets in Israel: two com-
mercials (Channels 2 and 10) and one public (Channel 1) and two Israeli popular news radio stations
(Kol Israel and IDF radio).
48 Bar-Tal

The journalists interviewed represented various journalistic positions: senior editors, midlevel edi-
tors, senior reporters, commentators, and hybrid positions. Quantitatively, of the 30 interviewees, 18
talked explicitly about practicing self-censorship. Twelve other interviewees referred to this practice
indirectly by citing similar journalistic practices such as disinformation or publication of information
as a result of personal relationships between journalists and politicians. Thus, we can say that through-
out the war, the Israeli editors and reporters internalized the formal military censorship even when it
was not necessary. The interviewed military correspondents and other journalists referred explicitly to
the complete “mobilization” of the journalists on behalf of the military campaign, talked about wide-
spread self-censorship and unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative from governmental and
military sources of information. We identified five motivations for self-censorship during the War in
Lebanon, three of them pertaining to the protection of the ingroup: maintaining national consensus,
mobilizing citizens, fear of harming motivation among the soldiers; the other two referred to self-pro-
tection: fear of personal sanctions and fear of harming relations with sources of information within the
government and the military elite. The mass media journalists practicing self-censorship thought that
during a war they had to rally the public to support the military campaign and not to divide it by pre-
senting information that could lead to disagreement with the governmental decision to go to war and
then to implement it. They also thought they had to mobilize the Jewish Israeli population for active
participation and not to cause harm when the challenges were so serious. Finally, they did not want
specifically to undermine the motivation of the soldiers who were conducting the dangerous mission,
and their motivation was crucial for the success of the war. But they also described self-centered moti-
vations aiming at self-protection before possible sanctions of their superiors or the public. In addition,
they understood that in order to receive information from governmental and military sources they had
to report their narrative—otherwise they would be punished and disconnected from their sources of
information. Some of the examples of sentences expressed by the interviewees were:
“The media is more patriotic today and play one tune because of the collective wish to
be part of the consensus, especially in time of war when everyone is very militant.
Under these circumstances, anti-war expressions are almost seen as betrayals of the
nation.”
“I would like to say: when I was asked to join Channel 1 for as long as the war contin-
ued, I went to strengthen hands and not to let go of hands. So my current thoughts and
expressions are not relevant.”
“Once the war begins, all feel an obligation to be united. Suddenly all party barriers
fall, and people want to be together. The manifestation of this is the well-known
expression: ‘be quiet, now shooting.’”
“It was clear that Yedioth Ahronoth wholeheartedly supported this war. Whoever wrote
differently was ‘exiled’ to less prominent pages than the first pages.”
“Most of the media information sources come from the government and the army.
Once the media are not attentive to the establishment, it will block the oxygen of its
information. Of course, the media cannot afford this situation.”
Self-Censorship in Comparison to Related Concepts
Several other sociopsychological concepts and societal mechanisms are related to self-censorship
and contain several related features, yet self-censorship can and should be distinguished from them:
Among them are conformity and obedience.
Self-Censorship in a Society 49

Conformity
Conformity is the tendency to change one’s beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors to match those of
others who are in the majority (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This change is in response to concrete
pressure of group members (involving the physical presence of others and expression of what should
be said) or imagined group pressure (involving the expected pressure as a result of norms or past expe-
riences). The literature differentiates between private conformity (also acceptance or conversion) and
public conformity (also compliance). The former takes place when individuals truly accept the beliefs,
attitudes, or behaviors of the majority-group members, viewing them as reflecting valid and true posi-
tions. The latter takes place when individuals publically express the views of the majority, but private-
ly continue to hold different views. The literature also differentiates between normative and
informational conformity (influence). In the former case, people do not want to appear deviant, and in
the latter case, people want to be accurate and have valid knowledge (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The
following features distinguish between conformity and self-censorship.
Nature of the act. Conformity is related to the fact that a group member perceives himself or
herself to be a minority, and this perception leads him to hide his or her view by expressing the view
of the majority. Self-censorship is not related to the perception of being a minority or a majority, but
to the understanding that providing the information may hurt the ingroup, the person, or the idea.
Thus, the point of departure from the individual perspective in both cases is different—in the case of
conformity, the point of departure is that the majority holds a different view from that of the group
member, and his or her view is not accepted by society. In the case of self-censorship, the point of
departure is that a person has information which, if revealed, might hurt a society member or an idea.
As an implication, in the case of conformity the knowledge that additional society members hold the
view helps to reveal it, while in cases of self-censorship, this fact does not necessarily change behavior
because the major motivation is often to block the information from coming into the public sphere
(Allen & Levine, 1971).
Nature of the withheld knowledge. In the case of conformity, group members do not express
either opinion or information in public, whereas in case of self-censorship the withholding of knowl-
edge refers only to information that is viewed as truthful. Thus, the case of conformity covers a wider
range of knowledge, and more often it refers to opinions because they tend to be more frequently in
disagreement than validated information. In turn, self-censorship does not include opinions because it
is clear that group members are entitled to hold different opinions, and they are subjective reflections
in contrast to validated information.
Avoidance versus approach. Self-censorship focuses on silence—withholding information—
that is, the avoidance of an action. Conformity in contrast implies an action—acting or reacting in line
with the majority, that is, expressing an opinion or supporting information that confirms the view of
the majority.
Different relations to the collective. Whereas self-censorship leads to withholding and conceal-
ing of information from the collective, conformity leads to adoption (at least publically) of the collec-
tive’s majority views. Self-censorship does not indicate any acceptance of the view that the society
holds regarding the subject of the information but indicates an awareness of the negative implications
of revealing the information.
Motivation. While in many cases, the principal motivation to exercise self-censorship is to pro-
tect the group, in cases of conformity the primary motivation is always to protect oneself. In other
words, the main motivation to conform is largely personal and self-focused, and it lacks the group-
oriented motivation inherent in many decisions to self-censor information. Thus, in many cases of
self-censorship, identification with the collective, as well as patriotic feelings, play a major role in the
decision to withhold information.
50 Bar-Tal

Knowledge. In the case of informational conformity, individuals accept the view of the group as
reflecting reality, yielding to the pressure of the majority. This means that individuals experience lack
of clarity regarding their knowledge. But in the case of self-censorship, the information that individu-
als hold is clear to them. Thus, while the motivation in informational conformity is to create valid
knowledge, in self-censorship, the wish is to prevent valid knowledge.
Obedience
Obedience is defined as performance of behavior(s) as a result of orders and instructions of the
authority. Obedience, which refers to blind execution of orders without any consideration of their
meaning or implication, was demonstrated in seminal studies by Stanley Milgram (1974). He pro-
posed that it “is the psychological mechanism that links individual behavior to political purpose. It is
the dispositional cement that blinds men to systems of authority. Facts of recent history and observa-
tion in daily life suggest that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tenden-
cy, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy and moral conduct” (p. 1).
Obedience is based on the beliefs that the authority has the right to make these orders and instruction,
and it is required to follow them (Benjamin & Simpson, 2009). In contrast to obedience, self-
censorship refers to withholding information on a person’s own initiative, without receiving explicit
orders to do so. This is not done because of obedience in its classic sense. Even so, it is important to
note that the collective-oriented motivations for self-censorship stem from the strong commitment to
the group’s dogmas and beliefs, and this may be seen as obedience to the system or to the existing
order.
In sum, self-censorship as a unique social complement to behaviors of conformity and obedience.
These three behaviors are syndromes of withholding behavior—abstaining from freely expressing
one’s own opinions and ideas, accepting orders without evaluating them and withholding information.
They seriously harm a free flow of information, critical thinking, and freedom of expression, all need-
ed for democratic functioning. Thus, it is not surprising that these behaviors are always found in
authoritative collectives, even when the authorities do not use formal means of imposing censorship.
Contributing Factors
A focal question for understanding self-censorship is: What are the conditions that facilitate its
occurrence? In trying to respond to this question, I would like first to propose the following categories
of variables that influence the appearance of self-censorship: the context of the group, personal charac-
teristics of the person who has the information, the type (content) of the information that is the subject
of the potential self-censorship, and circumstantial factors. Each of the factors will be discussed
below.
Context of the Group
Theories in social sciences have generally accepted the basic assumption that the study of a social
context is essential for understanding the functioning of societies (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Parsons, 1951).
Recently, Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) have defined social context as the “general
and continuing multilayered and interwoven set of material realities, social structures, and shared
belief system that surround any situation” (p. 103). The significance of the collective context lies in
the fact that it dictates the society members’ needs and goals and the challenges that they have to
meet in order to satisfy them. It also provides opportunities and limitations, stimulations and inhibi-
tions, as well as the spaces and boundaries for human behavior.
Self-Censorship in a Society 51

In this line of thinking, the study of macro contexts is of special importance. Without the study of
context, it is impossible to understand the functioning of individuals in groups, since human thoughts
and feelings are embedded in historical, social, political, and cultural contexts (Bar-Tal & Sharvit,
2008). This embeddedness is a result of shared social life experiences, which include constant and
continuous communication, social learning, and interaction (Giddens, 1984; Parsons, 1951). In other
words, the thoughts and feelings of individuals represent the norms, beliefs, values, and attitudes of
their group under certain conditions and in a particular epoch that construct the particular context in
which people live. This includes two types of categories—one pertains to the political-economic-
cultural characteristics of the society in which the case takes place, and the other refers to the
particular situation in which this society lives. The first refers to more stable characteristics of demo-
cratic tradition, or traditional culture, as, for example, stratification, differentiation, authoritarianism,
tolerance, closed climate, and norms for information exchange, among others. Examples include self-
censorship practiced by the Hong Kong media (Ngok, 2007), avoiding criticism of Chinese political
repression. The other variables refer to a relatively limited situational context of man-made character-
istics that may last for a long period of time and have effects on involved societies, on the individual
and collective levels (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). Examples include an intractable conflict or a mili-
tary regime that has taken power. In a more limited framework, a closed system of communication,
an intolerant society, threats and conflict, among others, provide a fertile ground for the evolvement
of self-censorship. One example is the self-censorship conducted by the American media (Mitchell,
2002) and even academia (Bhattacharjee, 2006; Bowen, 2005) during the War on Terror carried out
by U.S. President George W. Bush. The other example is self-censorship in Israel as an accepted and
even openly encouraged practice because of the ongoing intractable conflict with the Palestinians and
also with other Arab nations.
In general, both types of context categories encourage or discourage the free flow of information,
free expression, and free and full access to information, and this considerably affects the scope and
extent of self-censorship. In extreme cases without formal censorship, formal organs of an authority
or informal organizations may use thugs and even hit squads to impose self-censorship. The shooting
of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 in Russia because she revealed information
about the Chechen wars that damaged the image of the state is a reminder that establishing a fearful
political climate is possible.
Individual Factors
Self-censorship is also greatly influenced by the individual characteristics of society members.
They include personality traits, general and specific worldviews, values, ideology, emotions, anxieties,
attitudes, motivations, behavioral intentions, and others. These characteristics are relatively stable, but
some of them can be aroused in the particular situation in which an individual is considering whether
to reveal the information and are thus situation based. Examples of specific characteristics may
include need for closure, anxiety, authoritarianism, collectivism, conservatism, identification with the
group, level of patriotism, and type of patriotism. In addition, the role and the status of the person, as
well as his or her level of involvement in the specific information and/or event may be considered.
This category may also include personal expectations about possible future sanctions. This variable is
related to the level of experience, fear about damaged reputation, delegitimization, dismissal, impris-
onment, and even physical punishment.
Type of Information
An important category of variables relates to the type of information that a person holds. This cat-
egory includes among other characteristics severity of the information, relevance to the present, type
52 Bar-Tal

of act that the information involves, time that the information relates, objects of the information, and
issues raised in the information. All these variables have an effect on the way a person may handle the
held information.
Circumstantial Factors
This category refers to variables that relate to the circumstances of collecting the information,
such as how it was received, how many people know about it, and characteristics of the potential audi-
ence for revealing it (their identity, role, status, etc.). Of special importance is the time that has passed
since a person or persons obtained the information and whether they personally were involved in the
events that relate to the information. As time passes, a societal norm may develop not to reveal the
particular information. This category of variables also encompasses the characteristics of the small
group involved in particular acts that are the subjects of the information. A group such as a military
unit may be cohesive, imposing a great deal of self-censorship on its members.
Three studies have examined the effects of circumstantial, informational, and personal variables
on self-censorship (Shahar, Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Raviv, in press). Specifically, they examined the
effect of the following factors: characteristics of the potential audience, type of information that per-
tains to the social role of the parties involved in the event embedded in the information, type of infor-
mation that pertains to the consistency of the information with the official narrative, and the effect of
the conflict-related, personally held ideologies. The experimental role-playing method was used in
which the extent of the agreement to self-censor as a dependent variable was assessed. In the first
study, the goal was to examine the effect of the characteristics of the potential audience (i.e., informa-
tion recipients) on the participant’s willingness to self-censor information about the ingroup. Israeli
Jews were ostensibly asked to evaluate the clarity of different news information that presented Israelis
(i.e., the ingroup) in a negative way. The article presented an official real report written by The United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), who estimated that since 2009, hundreds of Palestinian children
were arrested, interrogated, and sentenced by the State of Israel, using tactics of violence and degrada-
tion, in violation of the UN’s children’s rights convention and international law. Participants were
then asked to indicate how willing they are to share the negative information with four different infor-
mation recipients who differed with regard to closeness to the participant: (1) closely related figures
(e.g., family and close friends); (2) ingroup superiors (e.g., a commanding officer or a supervisor); (3)
ingroup Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) (e.g., Israeli civil rights organizations); and (4)
outgroup NGO’s (e.g., international civil rights organizations). The results showed that participants’
willingness to self-censor was strongest in the case of outgroup audience (i.e., outgroup NGOs) and
significantly weaker for ingroup close recipients (i.e., family and close friends). This shows that
reporting ingroup transgressions to outside individuals, organizations, or authorities is often consid-
ered a serious violation of the implicit rule that group members should not criticize their ingroup in
front outsiders. As Elder, Sutton, and Douglas (2005) noted: “[I]t seems that an in-group critic speak-
ing to an in-group audience is seen as ‘clearing the air’ by highlighting the group’s weaknesses, there-
by promoting growth and improvement..., but when speaking to an out-group audience, he or she is
perceived to be ‘airing the group’s dirty laundry” (pp. 240–241).
In the second study, Israeli Jewish males were asked to read a vignette that described an individu-
al who witnesses harm done by Israelis to Palestinians. The participants were then asked to try and
“enter” the role of that individual: “to try experiencing what he feels and thinks when he witnesses
the described events.” In each vignette, we manipulated the role of the actors (i.e., the Israelis commit-
ting harm to Palestinians) who could be either civilians or IDF soldiers and the role of the observer
(i.e., the role-playing target) who could be either a civilian or an IDF soldier. The vignette was as
follows:
Self-Censorship in a Society 53

Imagine you’re a soldier serving [a civilian working in a private security company] in
Judea and Samaria. As part of your duty, you’re manning a position which overlooks a
repair of a road that passes near Palestinian agricultural land. After a few weeks at the
observation post, you see a rather frequent phenomenon: Soldiers [civilian security
guards] who are responsible for the security of the work area, leave their position,
approach the Palestinians who harvest in the nearby fields, and verbally and physically
assaults them, sometimes causing even a severe physical injury that requires medical
care.
Then the participants were asked about their willingness to reveal the observed event to sources
as in the first study. The results showed two significant main effects for social roles of the persons
involved in the event, that is, the content of the information. First, participants were significantly more
inclined to self-censor the information when they played the role of a soldier observer in comparison
to when they played the role of a civilian observer. Participants were also significantly more inclined
to self-censor the information presented in the vignette when the actors in the scene were soldiers in
comparison to civilians. This effect confirms a well-established phenomenon that soldiers and security
forces have a unique and meaningful status in Israeli society, involved in an intractable conflict
(Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999). One can assume that damage to the soldier’s image is strongly per-
ceived as direct damage to the ingroup image and stance against rival groups because they perform a
formal role representing the state.
In the third study, Israeli Jewish participants were seemingly asked to help a group of researchers
in the validation process of an educational curriculum that deals with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Specifically, the participants were presented with a series of photos that portrayed this conflict: Half
were conflict-supporting narratives presenting the ingroup (Israeli Jews) as moral and the outgroup
(Palestinians) as vicious and immoral, and half were narrative-incongruent presenting opposite images.
Each participant then was asked to decide whether or not each presented an image that should appear
in the planned educational curriculum (i.e., willingness to self-censor the information) that would be
presented to different audiences. Unlike study 1, the information recipients’ conditions were manipulat-
ed as a between-subject variable. One-third of the participants were told that the curriculum they now
validate would be presented to Jewish high-school student in Israel. Another third were told that it
would be presented to Arab-Israeli high-school students. Finally, a third of the participants were told
that the presentation would be presented to European high-school students who come to visit Israel.
The study unsurprisingly showed that willingness to self-censor is influenced by the type of infor-
mation presented. Thus, participants in the study were more willing to self-censor official narrative-
incongruent information in comparison to official narrative-congruent information. These findings
show the willingness of the ingroup members to protect their image and to actively block information
that sheds negative light on the ingroup. More specifically, when the information was narrative-
incongruent, there was no difference across the information recipient’s conditions—participants were
generally quite willing to self-censor the information in front of all the potential recipients. However,
when the information was narrative-congruent, there was a significant difference between the informa-
tion recipients’ conditions. Thus, participants showed significant higher levels of self-censorship in
the Arab high-school condition in comparison to the European high-school condition. No significant
differences were found between the Jewish-Israeli high-school condition and the two other
information-recipients’ conditions. It is possible that the participants realized that this information will
not be received well by Arab-Israeli high-school students who have well-established views about the
Israeli Jews.
In addition, in each of the studies, personal variables were employed. The analyses demonstrated
that the readiness to self-censor was related to the following personal characteristics: right-wing
54 Bar-Tal

political orientation, adherence to the ethos of the conflict,
7
and blind patriotism. This finding corre-
sponds with the results of the research in the field of political ideology, which indicates that individu-
als who hold right-wing ideologies such as hawkish political orientation (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund,
1994), strong adherence to the ethos conflict (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012), and blind
patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) are characterized by glorification and defense of the
ingroup have a stronger adherence to the group’s norms and are less open to information that contra-
dicts the dominant narratives (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).
In another experimental study by Shahar, Hameiri, and Bar-Tal (2014), participants were exposed
to a story about Israel’s violation of human rights of Palestinian children (which was revealed at that
time) and were asked to evaluate the informer (Israelis who worked in the Israeli detention center)
under different conditions. It was found that participants viewed ingroup members who informed a
non-Israeli organization (UNICEF) about ingroup immoral acts more negatively than when they
informed an Israeli organization (The Israeli Council for the Well-Being of Children). This study
shows that in a society involved in intractable conflict, individuals who reveal information to out-
groups are not liked and are viewed as harming the ingroup image and goals.
In sum, Figure 1 describes the process of decision making that an individual who is exposed to
valid information goes through in deciding whether he or she will practice self-censorship in cases
when the information has implications for a society.
The figure notes that when a person receives valid new information that is unexposed to the pub-
lic and has to decide whether to reveal it or not, the decision is affected by the previously described
four categories of variables: personal characteristics, context of the society, type of information, and
circumstantial factors. In deciding what to do, the person considers the implications of revealing the
information to him/herself, the other persons in his/her immediate social environment (for example,
friends, coworkers, family members), the influence on the groups, the effect on the particular societal
belief for which the information is relevant and a third party who may be affected by the revelation of
the information. In this consideration, the person calculates subjective costs and rewards for each deci-
sion and then deals with the dilemma that arises, resolving the dissonance. The outcome of these
personal-subjective considerations determines whether a person will reveal the information, to whom
and what part or the whole, or whether she or he will practice self-censorship.
Consequences of Self-Censorship
Self-censorship practiced by society members has a number of effects that can be detected on the
individual and collective levels. With regard to the negative effects on the individual level, self-
7
Ethos of conflict is defined as the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant ori-
entation to a society at present and for the future in the contexts of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013). It
is composed of eight major themes about issues related to the conflict, the ingroup, and its adversary: (1) Societal
beliefs about the justness of one’s own goals, which outline the contested goals, indicate their crucial importance and
provide their explanations and rationales; (2) Societal beliefs about security stress the importance of personal safety
and national survival and outline the conditions for their achievement; (3) Societal beliefs of positive collective self-
image concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive traits, values, and behavior to one’s own society; (4)
Societal beliefs of victimization concern the self-presentation of the ingroup as the victim of the conflict; (5) Societal
beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent concern beliefs that deny the adversary’s humanity; (6) Societal beliefs of patri-
otism generate attachment to the country and society, by propagating loyalty, love, care, and sacrifice; (7) Societal
beliefs of unity refer to the importance of ignoring internal conflicts and disagreements during intractable conflicts to
unite the society’s forces in the face of an external threat; and (8) finally, Societal beliefs of peace refer to peace as
the ultimate desire of the society.
Self-Censorship in a Society 55

censorship may cause personal distress as the person may be aware that the withheld information is
relevant for the well-being of the society, or that norms of free flow of information are violated. In
addition, the content of the information may itself be stressful, and withholding it prevents healing or
dealing with the traumatic experience (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Kubey & Peluso, 1990). Individ-
uals may feel guilt and shame for not revealing the information which may come from different sour-
ces, evoked by moral values, patriotic feelings, and/or adherence to certain values.
On the collective level, self-censorship blocks relevant information and thus decreases access to
information and reduces the free flow of information. It leads to ignorance of the public on issues that
may have importance for the society and later leads to impaired decisions because of the missing
information. It impoverishes public debate. It harms transparency and critical views, and it blocks
changes as well as reinforcing reproduction of particular dogmas, norms, and practices because of
withheld information that could change them. It may also lead to moral deterioration because it pre-
vents information about societal misdeeds (Shinar Levanon, in press).
A study by Bar-Tal, Hameiri, and Shahar (2013) investigated perceived consequences of practic-
ing self-censorship. We provided a vignette about an anonymous state in South America called X (no
name was noted), supplying the same information about this state to all the participants, but in addi-
tion, we told half of them that the state had a norm of self-censorship (describing it properly in line
with the definition)—and we informed the other half that it had a norm of openness. Participants were
then asked to evaluate the particular state on different characteristics related to societal consequences.
The results showed that participants noted liabilities when self-censorship was instituted. They noted
that a state with self-censorship has significantly fewer democratic values, less openness, and less plu-
ralism than the state without it. Thus, it can be assumed that when society members decide to adopt
self-censorship they are also aware of the costs that a society may pay for their practice.
Nevertheless, there are also positive consequences of self-censorship. It allows maintenance of a
positive image and a positive social identity, prevents potential harm to the ingroup from outside par-
ties, and increases unity and solidarity by preventing disagreements, controversies, and schisms.
Individual Context of
Society
Type of
Factors
Person
Inf
o
rm
at
i
o
n
for Silence for Revealing
Dilemma (Dissonance)
Sel
f
-
Censorship
Revealing the
Decision Making
Decision
the
Figure 1. Process of decision making to self-censor.
56 Bar-Tal

Those are important consequences that often influence society members to practice self-censorship
and to withhold what they consider information that may harm the ingroup.
Measurement of Self-Censorship
The challenging problem is how to measure self-censorship since not everyone has had this expe-
rience on a societal level, and it is very difficult to create a situation which will elicit this behavior in
a realistic way. Therefore, we began to use approximate measures by assessing the readiness and
appropriateness of using self-censorship in a certain situation. In the first study by Hameiri, Sharvit,
Bar-Tal, Shahar, and Halperin (in press), the individual factors that contribute to the functioning of
self-censorship as a sociopsychological barrier to conflict resolution were investigated (Bar-Tal &
Halperin, 2011). The rationale for this study was that self-censorship is viewed often by authorities
and segments of a society as a necessary sociopsychological mechanism that protects the ingroup in
the context of intractable conflict by blocking the dissemination of information that is perceived as
detrimental to the society’s goals and interests. Its practice enables the maintenance of the society’s
dominant conflict-supporting narrative and prevents the disclosure and dissemination of alternative
information that contradicts the dominant narrative. Thus, in order to prevent its disclosure and dis-
semination, societies resort not only to methods of official censorship and other societal mechanisms
(Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, 2014; Kelman, 2007), but
also propagate norms of practicing self-censorship and use social sanctions to enforce them (Bar-Tal,
2013). For example, in Israel, Minister of Culture Limor Livnat openly said “I, who am opposed to
censorship, call on all of you (film directors) to [conduct] self-censorship” (Haaretz,February28,
2013). Under such conditions, these norms are internalized by some society members. Accordingly,
self-censorship in times of conflict can be viewed as a sociopsychological barrier to peacemaking.
Along with the biases in information processing investigated in previous research (Bar-Tal, 2013;
Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), self-censorship should be seen as a barrier that has societal implications.
By blocking alternative information and allowing the maintenance of conflict-supporting narratives, it
contributes directly to the continuation of the intractable conflicts. Society members in these cases, on
the one hand, voluntarily, intentionally, and consciously prevent the diffusion of new information that
may provide an alternative view of the conflict, the adversary, and the goals of the ingroup or the con-
flict, even if they believe that this information is valid. On the other hand, they support this practice
and sanction those who violate this norm, and in this way, they help to maintain self-censorship.
It was a longitudinal study conducted among a large sample of Jews in Israel between February
2012 and January 2013, during which another cycle of violence in the Gaza Strip erupted in Novem-
ber 2012: the Israeli Operation Pillar of Defense (OPD). In this study, a number of measures of sup-
port to use self-censorship were employed: General Support for Self-Censorship (for example, “The
media should publish reliable information on immoral deeds that governments or militaries conduct,
even if this might harm the society or state in which this information is being published”); Support for
Self-Censorship During Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip (for example, “To what
extent do you think that the soldiers who participated in OPD should [have] pass[ed]on reliable infor-
mation regarding harm to Palestinian civilians?”; and Support for Self-Censorship in Other Nations
measuring participants’ support for self-censorship used in other nations, such as Russia and the Unit-
ed States, rather than Israel (e.g., “The media in other nations, such as Russia and the United States,
should publish reliable information regarding immoral deeds done by the government”).
In addition, three different predictors of support for self-censorship were assessed, representing
specific conflict-supporting beliefs and general worldviews that each taps a different aspect of a con-
servative orientation. The first investigated antecedent was right-wing authoritarianism (RWA),
which refers to a type of personality that advocates a conservative view of the world, including
Self-Censorship in a Society 57

adherence to traditional values and closure to new ideas (Altemeyer, 1996). The second antecedent
was ethnocentrism, which denotes the tendency to accept the ingroup and reject outgroups (Bizumic
& Duckitt, 2012). The third selected antecedent was siege mentality, which reflects a generalized soci-
etal belief that the whole world is against the ingroup, deep feelings of threat, and a sense of collective
victimhood (see Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992).
Finally, two variables were chosen to serve as consequences of self-censorship support for concil-
iatory measures toward the Palestinians, namely negotiations with the Palestinian leadership and pro-
vision of humanitarian aid to Gaza residents. These two variables represent a complementary view on
the conflict. While the first indicates the level of the willingness to embark on the road to peace, indi-
cating openness because a change of the conflict-supporting narratives is required (Halperin & Bar-
Tal, 2011), the second reflects the strong adherence to the conflict-supporting narratives and negative
emotions that support hurting the adversary when humanitarian aid is refused (Halperin & Gross,
2011).
The findings showed that armed confrontation significantly increases support for self-censorship
in comparison to times of relative calm. Support for self-censorship thus aims to protect the society in
conflict by blocking the dissemination of information viewed as harming a society that is threatened
by the rival group and is coping with vital challenges in a violent conflict. In addition, the findings
revealed that personal characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, siege mentality) predicted
support for self-censorship, which, in turn, mediated the effect of personal characteristics on support
for peace negotiations with the Palestinians and for providing humanitarian aid to the suffering resi-
dents of Gaza. The findings thus indicate that support for self-censorship serves, in this sense, as one
of the expressions of conservative political ideology that supports the maintenance of the conflict
(Bar-Tal, 2013).
Indeed, our findings demonstrated that general support for self-censorship assessed during the
violence predicted reduced support for negotiations and humanitarian aid to the Palestinians three
months after the operation. This result remained significant even after controlling for the outcome var-
iables assessed at an earlier time. These results suggest that support for self-censorship is not merely a
by-product of an ongoing conflict, but a significant process that acts as a barrier to conflict resolution.
It is an outcome of individual characteristics and societal circumstances that leads to human stagna-
tion. It is a mechanism of closure that aims to block information which may potentially shed new light
on the conflict and the rival and thus lead to a change of views by society members and possibly a
change of policies regarding the conflict.
Of interest is the finding that Israeli Jews did not support self-censorship in other societies, such
as the United States or Russia, probably realizing that it harms the functioning of the democratic sys-
tem by preventing free flow of information. This finding reflects double standards, whereby individu-
als expect other persons and groups to uphold certain moral standards, while excusing themselves and
their own groups from upholding the same principles on the basis of various rationalizations
(Ashmore, Bird, Del-Boca, & Vanderet, 1979; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Individuals also apply
different standards of judgment while evaluating similar behaviors by their own society versus another
society. While the behavior of the ingroup is judged positively, the same behavior by the other group
is often judged negatively (Oskamp, 1965; Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989).
Eventually we decided to develop a concept and construct a general scale that could assess atti-
tudes towards self-censorship in different social settings. We developed a scale called the self-
censorship orientation (SCO) with the assumption that those who support the use of self-censorship
are also more likely to practice it (Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Hameiri, Shahar, Zafran, & Raviv, 2015). After
generating about 50 items and asking judges to evaluate them, we gave the selected items to a nation-
wide sample of Israeli Jewish adults with other comparable scales. Eventually, at the end of the pro-
cess, factor analysis yielded two opposite factors: a self-censorship factor with six items (for example,
“Providing credible information which presents our group in a negative light to the media weakens
58 Bar-Tal

the group’s ability to endure”; “People who disclose credible information to external sources, which
exposes my group to criticism should be condemned”; “Exposing credible information which presents
our group in a negative light is playing into the hands of our enemies”) and a “breaking the silence”
factor with eight items (for example, “If I encountered problematic conduct among my group mem-
bers, I would feel responsible for bringing that information to light”; “It is important to expose fail-
ures/errors by group members in order to learn from them and improve”; “I am concerned that
concealing credible information about wrongdoings in my group will lead us to moral decline”).
In the validating phase of the research, we found that the self-censorship factor was negatively
related to support for abstract democratic values, constructive patriotism, and support for universalistic
values. The breaking-the-silence factor was on the one hand related positively to support for abstract
democratic values, constructive patriotism, and support for universalistic values, and, on the other
hand, was negatively and moderately related to conformity, RWA, blind patriotism, and support for
group narrative (FENCE),
8
and negatively and weakly related to identification with the ingroup. Final-
ly, and more importantly, the breaking-the-silence factor significantly predicted readiness to present
on the EU website images portraying Israelis as aggressors and/or Palestinians as victims. The study
supported the proposed conceptualization of the concept support for self-censorship, demonstrated its
measurability, showed its uniqueness and relations to other similar concepts, and established its
importance for predicting different types of attitudes and behaviors.
Conclusion
This article has introduced the concept of self-censorship as well as proposed a conceptual frame-
work for its understanding. It is a unique and important phenomenon that social psychology has rela-
tively disregarded. The article has limited the scope of the concept to exposure of information,
placing expression of an opinion beyond the definition. The conceptual framework has located the
concept within a societal analysis of freedom of information, freedom of expression, and free flow of
information, which are all crucial ingredients for developing democracy and a well-functioning
society.
But self-censorship has two faces as described. It often leads to public ignorance, impoverishes
the public debate, harms transparency, leads to moral deterioration, impairs decisions, blocks change
and reproduction of norms, ideas, and beliefs that may even be detrimental to a society. But it also has
positive functions as it enables retention of positive self-collective image, positive social identity, and
in some cases, even strengthens solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. Moreover, it is recognized
that in some cases self-censorship is required for maintaining security, preserving the well-being of a
society, and safeguarding the privacy of society members.
I recognize the dialectical approach to this important social phenomenon. On the one hand, many
well-documented cases have indicated that self-censorship was detrimental to the society and pre-
vented exposure of information that was essential for its well-functioning—as, for example, thousands
knew about the futility of the Vietnam War but only Daniel Ellsberg and few others had the courage
to break the silence and tell the nation about the lies of American politicians and military
commanders. Thousands practiced self-censorship to prevent information about atrocities committed
by the Belgians in the Congo, the British in Kenya, or the Dutch in Indonesia. In Spain, as previously
noted, individuals still practice self-censorship about the dark period of Franco rule, and Israeli
officials openly encourage artists, academics, and journalists practice self-censorship to cover Israeli
moral misdeeds carried out against Palestinians. The same detrimental effect exists with regard to
8
The scale “firmly entrenched narrative closure” (FENCE) assesses the value that individuals place on protecting and
defending their group’s historical narrative in the context of an intergroup conflict (Klar & Baram, 2016).
Self-Censorship in a Society 59

self-censorship that covers corruption or other types of misdeeds. But it is also clear, on the other
hand, that there is a need for self-censorship when information can harm the society in the present or
in the future. Especially in the realm of security, society members practice wide-ranging self-censor-
ship to protect their nation. But borders are very blurred as to what should be exposed and what should
be kept secret with self-censorship. The recent case of the information revealed by Edward Snowden
about massive violations of civil rights in the United States and other countries by the U.S. National
Security Agency provides evidence of how grey and equivocal the use of imposed self-censorship is.
Self-censorship in this framework is defined as being employed only when there are no formal
rules that prevent exposure of information—but, as noted, people also break rules for patriotic reasons.
They care about the well-being of their society exactly because the borderline determining what infor-
mation serves the well-being of the society and what does not often depend upon the subjective view
of the leaders who are sometimes not sufficiently supported by hard evidence. Citizens must constant-
ly be on their guard. Leaders in different collective entities are often deeply interested in preventing a
free flow of information for reasons irrelevant to the functioning of the entity. In many cases, they just
want to cover their misdeeds or poor decisions. Thus, it is the free flow of information that serves as
an important mechanism to stop many malpractices by the leaders and authorities. Self-censorship as
a norm widely practiced and supported is an obstacle to this desirable state of affairs.
It is clear that one of the most salient antecedents to the practice of self-censorship is societal-
political context. Specifically, it is possible to formulate at least two rules: The first one says that the
more authoritarian is the system by preventing the free flow of information, the more society members
as individuals and in different roles as gatekeepers will practice self-censorship. The second one says
that the more society members feel their individual and collective security threatened, the more they
practice self-censorship to protect their group. The first rule implies practice of self-censorship
because of personal fear to be sanctioned by the authorities, and in the second case the practice is
based on patriotic feelings towards the group. But in a number of cases, the two different contexts are
sometimes related. Authoritarian regimes may engage in violent conflicts that lead to feelings of inse-
curity by society members. In addition, societies that are engaged for a long time in a violent conflict
necessarily develop lines of authoritarianism because they try to limit the free flow of information in
order to mobilize society members to participate in the conflict. Finally, I do recognize that individu-
als differ in their personal characteristics, and therefore there are also individual differences in the
practice of self-censorship and in its support. We have indications that individuals with more conser-
vative views practice and support more self-censorship. These individuals try to preserve the present
system and/or ideological views and/or situation and thus support blocking information that may
shake the foundations of the particular system, views, or situation. In both cases, however, practice of
self-censorship and support of this practice have serious societal consequences. Necessarily, blocking
information leads to ignorance and intolerance, impoverishes public debates, causes a lack of transpar-
ency and accountability, and serves as a fruitful setting for immoral deeds.
There are many different motivations that lead individuals in different organizations and groups
to practice self-censorship. They can be classified in general categories: Those that are based on inter-
est to avoid personal sanctions and gain personal rewards and those that are based on the concern for
the well-being of the collective, mostly the ingroup. It is possible to widen the last category to protec-
tion of ideas, ideologies, or religions. People with their different personal characteristics and living in
very different contexts vary with their specific motivations to practice and support self-censorship.
But it is possible to assume that it is a widely spread sociopsychological phenomenon that can be
found wherever human beings live in groups. The recent book Self-Censorship in Different Contexts:
Theory and Research that I edited with Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Keren Sharvit opens a new window to
explore this phenomenon in different systems, settings, and contexts such as family, organizations,
mass media, education, violent conflicts, security forces, and academia. With this article and the book,
I hope that the academic and public discussion about self-censorship, its enforcement by formal and
60 Bar-Tal

informal agents, the needs and motivations of those who practice it and those who socially enforce it,
and the conditions that facilitate it and its boundaries will contribute to the strengthening of democrat-
ic societies and how they function.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Parts of this article were presented as a keynote address presented at the annual meeting of the
International Society of Political Psychology, Herzliya, Israel. The author would gladly like to
acknowledge the helpful comments of Ruthi Pliskin, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, Amiram Raviv, Boaz
Hameiri, Eldad Shahar, and Ofer Shinar to earlier drafts of this article. The author would also like to
acknowledge the financial help of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research of the Tel Aviv
University to carry out empirical studies. Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
E-mail: daniel@post.tau.ac.il
REFERENCES
Adamska, K. (in press). Self-censorships in organizations. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-cen-
sorship in different contexts: Theory and research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Afifi, T., & Steuber, K. (2009). The revelation risk model (RRM): Factors that predict the revelation of secrets and the
strategies used to reveal them. Communication Monographs,76(2), 144–176.
Allen, V. L., & Levine, J. M. (1969). Consensus and conformity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,5,
389–399
Allen, V. L., & Levine, J. M. (1971). Social support and conformity: The role of independent assessment of reality.
Experimental Social Psychology,7(1), 48–58.
Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture and democratic stability. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Antilla, L. (2010). Self-censorship and science: A geographical review of media coverage of climate tipping points.
Public Understanding of Science,19, 240–256.
Ashmore, R. D., Bird, D., Del-Boca, F., & Vanderet, R. C. (1979). An experimental investigation of the double standard
in the perception of international affairs. Political Behavior,1, 123–135
Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An organizing framework for collective identity: Articula-
tion and significance of multidimensionality. Psychological Bulletin,130, 80–114.
Austin, G. (2007). Drawing trauma: Visual testimony in Cache and J’ai 8 ans. Screen,48, 529–530.
Bar-Tal, D. (2000). Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American Behavioral Scientist,50,
1430–1453.
Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Intractable conflicts: Socio-psychological foundations and dynamics. Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press.
Bar-Tal, D., & Antebi, D. (1992). Siege mentality in Israel. International Journal of Intercultural Relations,16,
251–275.
Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2011). Sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), Intergroup
conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective (pp. 217–240). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2013). The psychology of intractable conflicts: Eruption, escalation, and peacemaking. In L.
Huddy, D. O. Sears, & J. S. Levy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political psychology (2nd ed. pp. 923–956).
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Bar-Tal, D., Hameiri, B., & Shahar E. (2013). Perceived consequences of self-censorship. Unpublished manuscript,
Tel Aviv University.
Bar-Tal, D., Nets-Zehngut, R., & Sharvit, K. (Eds.), (in press). Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and
research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Bar-Tal, D., Oren, N., & Nets-Zehngut, R. (2014). Socio-psychological analysis of conflict-supporting narratives: A
general framework. Journal of Peace Research,51, 662–675.
Self-Censorship in a Society 61

Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., & Freund, T. (1994). An anatomy of political beliefs: A study of their centrality confidence, con-
tents, and epistemic authority. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,24, 849–872.
Bar-Tal, D., & Sharvit, K. (2008). The influence of the threatening transitional context on Israeli Jews’ reactions to Al
Aqsa Intifada. In V. M. Esses & R. A. Vernon (Eds.), Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations: Why neighbors
kill (pp. 147–170). Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
Bar-Tal, D., Sharvit, K., Halperin, E., & Zafran, A. (2012). Ethos of conflict: The concept and its measurement. Peace
& Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology,18, 40–61.
Barendt, E. (2005). Freedom of speech. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Bhattacharjee, Y. (2006). Should academics self-censor their findings on terrorism? Science,312, 993–994.
Benjamin, L.T., & Simpson, J. A. (2009). The power of the situation: The impact of Milgram’s obedience studies on
personality and social psychology. American Psychologist,64, 12–19.
Bizumic, B., & Duckitt, J. (2012). What is and is not ethnocentrism? A conceptual analysis and political implications.
Political Psychology,33, 887–909.
Bowen, R. (2005). Academic freedom undermined: Self-censorship. Retrieved from http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/
academe/2005/JA/Col/ftgs.htm
Branche, R., & House, J. (2010). Silences on state violence during Algerian war of Independence: France and Algeria,
1962–2007. In E. Ben-Ze’ev, R. Ruth Ginio, & J. Winter (Eds.), Shadows of war: A social history of silence in the
twentieth century. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press
Brewer, M. B., & Caporael, L. R. (2006). An evolutionary perspective on social identity: Revisiting groups. In J. A.
Simpson, M. Schaller, & D. T Kenrick (Eds.), Evolution and social psychology (pp. 143–161). Madison, CT: Psy-
chosocial Press.
Brown-Smith, N. (1998). Family secrets. Journal of Family Issues,19(1), 20–42.
Broz, S. (2004). Good people in evil times. Portraits of complicity and resistance in the Bosnian War. New York, NY:
Other Press
Chang, T., & Lee, J. (1992). Factors affecting gatekeepers’ selection of foreign news: A national survey of newspaper
editors. Journalism Quarterly,69, 554–561.
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual Review of Psychology,
55, 591–621.
Cook, P., & Heilmann, C. (2013). Two types of self-censorship: Public and private. Political Studies,61, 178–196.
Dahl, R. A. (2000). On democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, R. A. (2006). On political equality. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
David, O., & Bar-Tal, D. (2009). A socio-psychological conception of collective identity: The case of national identity.
Personality and Social Psychology Review,13, 354–379
De Baets, A. (2002) Censorship of historical thought: A world guide, 1945–2000. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
De Dreu, C. K. W., & De Vries, N. K. (Eds.) (2001). Group consensus and minority influence: Implications for innova-
tion. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judg-
ment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,51, 629–636.
Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1999). Commitment and intergroup behavior. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B.
Doosje (Eds.), Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp. 84–106). Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
Elbaz, S., & Bar-Tal, D. (2014). Voluntary silence: Israeli media self-censorship during the second Lebanon war. Manu-
script submitted for publication
Elbaz, S., & Bar-Tal, D. (2016). Dissemination of culture of conflict in the Israeli mass media: The wars in Lebanon as
a case study. Communication Review,19, 1–34.
Elbaz, S., Nets-Zehngut, R., Magal, T., & Abutbul, G. (in press). Self-censorship of narratives of political violence in
media. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit, (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and
research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Elder, T. J., Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2005). Keeping it to ourselves: Effects of audience size and composition
on reactions to criticisms of the ingroup. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,8(3), 231–244
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and Social Identity. Annual review of psychology,53(1), 161–186.
Estmond, M., & Selimovic, M. J. (2012). Silence as possibility in postwar everyday life. The International Journal of
Transitional Justice,6, 502–504.
European Convention on Human Rights. (2010). Strasbourg, France: European Court of Human Rights
Gibson, J. L. (1992). The political consequences of intolerance: Cultural conformity and political freedom. American
Political Science Review,86(2), 338–356.
62 Bar-Tal

Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Introduction of the theory of structuration. Stanford: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C., & Martinko, M. J. (2003). The decision to blow the whistle: A social information
processing framework. Academy of Management Review,28, 107–123.
Halperin, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to peace making: An empirical examination within the
Israeli Jewish society. Journal of Peace Research, 48, 637–657.
Halperin, E., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Emotion regulation in violent conflict: Reappraisal, hope, and support for humanitari-
an aid to the opponent in wartime. Cognition & Emotion,25, 1228–1236.
Halperin, H. M., & Hoffman, D. N. (1976). Secrecy and the right to know. Law and Contemporary Problems,40,
132–165.
Hameiri, B., Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (in press). Self-censorships in societies involved in violent conflicts as a barrier
to peacemaking. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit, (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory
and research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Hameiri, B., Sharvit, K., Bar-Tal, D., Shahar, E., & Halperin, E. (in press). Support of self-censorship among Israelis as
a socio-psychological barrier to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political Psychology.
Harber, K. D., & Cohen, D. J. (2005). The emotional broadcaster theory of social sharing. Journal of Language and
Social Psychology,24, 382–400.
Harber, K. D., & Pennebaker, J. W. (1992). Overcoming traumatic memories. In S.-A Christianson (Ed.), The handbook
of emotion and memory: Research and theory (pp. 359–387). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2010). The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power.
New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Hayes, A. F. (2007). Exploring the forms of self-censorship: On the spiral of silence and the use of opinion expression
avoidance strategies. Journal of Communication,57, 785–802.
Hayes, A. F., Glynn, C. J., & Shanahan, J. (2005). Validating the willingness to self- censor scale: Individual differences
in the effect of the climate of opinion on opinion expression. International Journal of Public Opinion Research,
17(4), 443–455.
Hornsey, M. J. (2006). Ingroup critics and their influence on groups. In T. Postmes & J. Jetten (Eds.), Individuality and
the group: Advances in social identity (pp. 74–91). London, United Kingdom: Sage.
Horton, J. (2011). Self-censorhip. Res Publica,17, 91–106.
Hovannisian, R. G. (Ed.). (1999). Remembrance and denial: The case of the Armenian genocide. Detroit, MI: Wayne
State University Press.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.
Psychological Bulletin,129, 339–375.
Karpel, M. A. (1980). Family secrets. Family Process,19(3), 295–306.
Kashti, Y. (1997). Patriotism as identity and action. In D. Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), Patriotism in the lives of individu-
als and nations (pp. 213–228). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Kelman, H. (2007). Socio-psychological dimensions of international conflict. In W. Zartman (Ed.), Peacemaking in inter-
national conflict: Methods and techniques (pp. 61–107). Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Kenny, T., & Gross, P. (2008). Journalism in central Asia: A victim of politics, economics, and widespread self-censor-
ship. International Journal of Press/Politics,13, 515–525
Kimhi, S., & Sagy, S. (2008). Moral justification and feeling of adjustment to military law-enforcement situations: Israeli
soldiers serving at army roadblocks. Mind & Society,7, 177–191.
Klar, Y., & Baram, H. (2016). In DeFENCE of the ingroup historical narrative in an intractable intergroup conflict: An
individual-difference perspective. Political Psychology,37, 37–53.
Klandermans, B., & De Weerd, M. (2000). Group identification and political protest. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R.
W. White (Eds.), Self, identity, and social movements: Social movements, protest, and contentions (Vol. 13, pp.
68–90). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kriesberg, L. (1993). Intractable conflict. Peace Review,5, 417–421.
Kubey, R. W., & Peluso, T. (1990). Emotional response as a cause of interpersonal news diffusion: The case of the
space shuttle tragedy. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media,34(1), 69–76.
Lee, F. L. F., & Chan, J. (2009). Organizational production of self-censorship in the Hong Kong media. The Internation-
al Journal of Press/Politics,14, 112–133
Lomsky-Feder, E., & Ben-Ari, E. (1999). The military and militarism in Israeli society. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Magal, T. (in press). Self-censorship in the armed security forces. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.),
Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer
Self-Censorship in a Society 63

Maksudyan, N. (2009). Walls of silence: Translating the Armenian genocide into Turkish and self-censorship. Critique,
37(4), 635–649.
Melucci, A. (1989). Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual needs in contemporary society. London,
United Kingdom: Hutchinson Radius.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Mill, S. J. (1869) On liberty (4th ed.). London, United Kingdom: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2002). 911: Criticism and crisis. Critical Inquiry,28, 567–572.
Morrison Wolfe, E., & Milliken F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic
world. Academy of Management Review,25, 706–725.
Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1996). Whistle-blowing: Myth and reality. Journal of Management,22, 507–526.
Nelkin, D. (1995) Selling science: How the press covers science and technology (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: W.H.
Freeman.
Nets-Zehngut, R. (2011). Origins of the Palestinian refugee problem: Changes in the historical memory of Israelis/Jews
1949–2004. Journal of Peace Research,48(2), 235–248.
Nets-Zehngut, R., & Elbaz, S. (in press). Self-censorship of narratives of political violence: Four international case stud-
ies. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and
research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Nets-Zehngut, R., & Fuxman, S. (in press). Self-censorship of narratives of political violence in the academia. In D. Bar-
Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and research. Cham, Swit-
zerland: Springer.
Nets-Zehngut, R., Pliskin, R., & Bar-Tal, D. (2015). Self-censorship in conflicts: Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus.
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology,21(3), 479–499. http://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000094
Ngok, M. (2007). State-press relationships in post-1997 Hong-Kong: Constant negotiation amidst self-restraint. China
Quarterly,192, 949–970.
O’Loughlin, S., & Sherwood, J. (2005). A 20-year review of trends in deliberate self-harm in a British town, 1981–2000.
Social Psychiatry and Psychiatrics Epidemiology,40, 446–453.
Omarzu, J. (2000). A disclosure decision model: Determining how and when individuals will self-disclose. Personality
and Social Psychology Review,4, 174–185.
Oskamp, S. (1965). Attitudes toward U.S. and Russian actions: A double standard. Psychological Reports,16, 6–43. doi:
10.2466/pr0.1965.16.1.43
Packer, D.J. (2008). On being both with us and against us: A normative conflict model of dissent in social groups. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Review,12, 50–72.
Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N., & Welz, G. (2006). Divided Cyprus: Modernity, history, and an island in conflict. Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press.
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Peleg, I. (Ed.). (1993). Patterns of censorship around the world. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Pennebaker, J. W. (1990). Opening up: The healing power of confiding in others. NewYork, NY: William Morrow.
Petronio, S. (2010). Communication privacy management theory: What do we know about family privacy regulation?
Journal of Family Theory & Review,2, 175–196. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2589.2010.00052
Pettigrew, A. M. (1972). Information control as a power resource. Sociology,6(2), 187–204.
Prislin, R., & Christensen, P. N. (2005). Social change in the aftermath of successful minority influence. European
Review of Social Psychology,16, 43–73.
Raz, J. (1991). Free expression and personal identification. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,11, 303–324.
Reykowski, J. (1997). Patriotism and the collective system of meanings. In D. Bar- Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), Patriotism: In
the lives of individuals and nations (pp. 108–128). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Richards, M. (2002). From war culture to civil society: Francoism, social change and memories of the Spanish Civil
War, History & Memory,14, 93–120.
Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S., Halevy, N., & Eidelson, R. (2008). Towards a unifying model of identification with
groups: Integrating theoretical perspectives. Personality and Social Psychology Review,12, 280–306.
Roded, A., & Raviv A. (in press). Self-censorship in the family: The double-edged sword of family secrets. In D. Bar-
Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and research. Cham, Swit-
zerland: Springer.
Rosoff, H., & Von Winterfeldt, D. (2007). A risk and economic analysis of dirty bombs attacks on the ports of Los
Angeles and Long beach. Risk Analysis,27, 533–546.
64 Bar-Tal

Sande, G. N., Goethals, G. R., Ferrari, L., & Worth, L.T. (1989). Value-guided attributions: Maintaining the moral self-
image and the diabolical enemy-image. Journal of Social Issues,45(2), 91–118.
Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriot-
ism. Political Psychology,20, 151–174.
Schauer, F. (1982). Free speech: A philosophical inquiry. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Shahar, E., Hameiri, B., & Bar-Tal, D. (2014). Self-censorship in the context of intractable conflict. Unpublished manu-
script, Tel Aviv University.
Shahar, E., Hameiri, B., Bar-Tal, D., & Raviv, A. (in press). Self-censorship of conflict-related information in the context
of intractable conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Sharvit, K., Bar-Tal, D., Hameiri, B., Shahar, E., Zafran, A. & Raviv, A. (2014). Self-censorship orientation: Scale
development, correlates and outcomes. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.)
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183–242). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Shinar Levanon, O. (in press). Self-censorship in emerging democracies: A legal perspective. In D. Bar-Tal, R.
Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-censorship in different contexts: Theory and research. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer.
Stiles, W. B. (1987). “I have to talk to somebody.” In V. J. Derlega & J. H. Berg (Eds.), Self disclosure (pp. 257–382).
New York, NY: Plenum.
Stiles, W. B., Shuster, P. L., & Harrigan, J. A. (1992). Disclosure and anxiety: A test of the fever model. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology,63, 980–988.
Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues,25(4), 79–97.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between
social groups (pp. 61–76). London, United Kingdom: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Tribe, D. (1973). Questions of censorship. London, United Kingdom: Allen & Unwin.
Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: Open University.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A
self-categorization theory. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. A. (2007). Moral hypocrisy: Social groups and the flexibility of virtue. Psychological Sci-
ence,18(8), 689–690. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01961.x
Vangelisti, A. L. (1994). Family secrets: Forms, functions and correlates. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships,
11, 113–135.
Vered, S., Ambar, E., Fuxman, S. Nahhas Abu Hanna, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (in press). Between solidarity and openness:
Self-censorship in education. In D. Bar-Tal, R. Nets-Zehngut, & K. Sharvit (Eds.), Self-censorship in different con-
texts: Theory and research. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Volokh, E. (2000). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people
from speaking up. Stanford Law Review,52, 1049–1124.
Westin, A. F. (Ed.) (1981). Whistle-blowing! Loyalty and dissent in the corporation. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Self-Censorship in a Society 65