Citizen participation and changing governance: Cases of devolution in England

Abstract

The current process of devolving powers within England constitutes a significant change of governance arrangements. This process of devolution has been widely criticised for including insufficient consultation. This paper assesses whether that criticism is fair. Modifying Archon Fung’s framework for the analysis of public participation mechanisms, we begin by considering whether the depth of public engagement has been limited. Then, by comparing these consultation practices with other examples (including one we have ourselves trialled in pilot experiments), we find that deeper forms of public engagement would have been both possible (though at some financial cost) and productive.

Full text

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Policy & Politics • vol 45 • no 2 • 251–69 • © Policy Press 2017 • #PPjnl @policy_politics
Print ISSN 0305 5736 • Online ISSN 1470 8442 • https://doi.org/10.1332/030557317X14895974141213
Accepted for publication 10 February 2017 • First published online 20 March 2017
article
Citizen participation and changing governance:
cases of devolution in England
Brenton Prosser, b.prosser@sheffield.ac.uk
University of Sheffield, UK/Australian National University, Australia
Alan Renwick, a.renwick@ucl.ac.uk
University College London, UK
Arianna Giovannini, arianna.giovannini@dmu.ac.uk
De Montfort University, UK
Mark Sandford, sandfordm@parliament.uk
House of Commons, UK
Matthew Flinders, m.flinders@sheffield.ac.uk
University of Sheffield, UK
Will Jennings, w.j.jennings@soton.ac.uk
University of Southampton, UK
Graham Smith, g.smith@westminster.ac.uk
University of Westminster, UK
Paolo Spada, spadayale@gmail.com
University of Coimbra, Portugal
Gerry Stoker, g.stoker@soton.ac.uk
University of Southampton, UK/University of Canberra, Australia
Katie Ghose
Electoral Reform Society, UK
The current process of devolving powers within England constitutes a significant change of
governance arrangements. This process of devolution has been widely criticised for including
insufficient consultation. This paper assesses whether that criticism is fair. Modifying Archon
Fung’s framework for the analysis of public participation mechanisms, we begin by considering
whether the depth of public engagement has been limited. Then, by comparing these consultation
practices with other examples (including one we have ourselves trialled in pilot experiments), we
find that deeper forms of public engagement would have been both possible (though at some
financial cost) and productive.
key words governance • devolution • consultation • public participation
To cite this article: Prosser, B, Renwick, A, Giovannini, A, Sandford, M, Flinders, M, Jennings, W,
Smith, G, Spada, P, Stoker, G, Ghose, K (2017) Citizen participation and changing governance:
cases of devolution in England, Policy & Politics, vol 45, no 2, 251–69,
DOI: 10.1332/030557317X14895974141213
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A major reform of local and regional governance in England is currently under way.
Other nation states, such as the United States, Germany and New Zealand are also
adapting their sub-national governance arrangements (Hambleton, 2016), and still
others, such as Australia (Australian Government, 2017) and Holland (The Hague,
2017), have embraced a focus on ‘city deals’ adapted from the UK context. However,
the international prominence of the English experience, and the fact that England
has long been one of the most centralised countries in the western world, makes it
worthy of careful examination.
Currently, the UK government is pursuing ‘devolution deals’ with local authorities
in England. These deals are spurred on by the desire to promote regional economic
development outside London and the South East – particularly, but not exclusively,
in the so-called ‘Northern Powerhouse’. The deals give ‘combined authorities’ of
councils new powers and funding. They are bespoke to each area, involving diering
powers and, to some degree, diering institutional structures. Yet, despite the potential
responsiveness this creates to local needs and aspirations, this programme of devolution
deals has been widely criticised for lacking public consultation.
Our purposes in this article are twofold. First, we analyse whether the descriptions
of consultation oered by critics of the devolution deal process are accurate. To do
so, we describe recent devolution processes in England – starting with an overview
before working through three indicative cases in greater depth, and then analysing
our cases in terms of Archon Fung’s framework for the interpretation of consultation
mechanisms (Fung, 2006). Second, we evaluate whether the criticisms of these
processes made by their detractors are fair. In doing so, we compare them with
other forms of consultation that oer the prospect of wider and/or deeper public
engagement. Overall, our argument is that mechanisms for improved consultation
are available and could signicantly strengthen public condence in new governance
arrangements. However, improvement will become more likely only through a
concerted push from those who wish to reinvigorate local democracy.
English devolution: background
The concept of devolving power to intermediate-level elected governments in the
United Kingdom emerged on the political agenda in the mid-1990s. Legislation was
passed between 1997 and 1998 to devolve power to new assemblies in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland. Progressive devolution of powers to these national bodies has
continued ever since.
This process was followed by proposals to create elected regional assemblies in
English regions, building upon a de-concentration of functions and development
of stakeholder networks in the early years of Tony Blair’s premiership (Tomaney
and Mawson, 2002; Tomaney and Pike, 2002). But proposals for an elected regional
assembly in the North East were overwhelmingly rejected at a referendum in
November 2004 (Rallings and Thrasher, 2006; Willett and Giovannini, 2014), after
which the government’s approach to sub-national geography drifted slowly towards
functional economic areas (HM Treasury, 2007; Pike and Tomaney, 2009; Bentley
et al, 2010; Haughton et al, 2016). Nevertheless, shifting powers away from central
government was still seen as an option.
This decentralisation agenda was underpinned by two waves of ‘city deals’, rst in
2010 between the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government and groups
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Citizen participation and changing governance
253
of local authority areas (Pike and O’Brien, 2015; Waite et al, 2013). This was followed
by a second wave in October 2012. Then, from November 2014, the Conservative
government proposed a series of more ambitious ‘devolution deals’. These would
cover clearly dened geographies, have broader powers and take statutory form. As
part of this move, new ‘metro mayors’ were introduced, with the rst elections due
in May 2017 (Sandford, 2016a; Centre for Cities, 2016a).
The emerging pattern of devolved governance in England is geographically
asymmetrical, driven by bilateral negotiations between teams of local representatives
and central government. Yet, though each deal is negotiated individually, a common
agenda appears to be driven by central government, based on its economic policies
and the concept of ‘public service reform’. As Sandford (2016b) argues, the devolution
deals resemble public sector contracting practices – the devolution of projects, specic
responsibilities and budget lines – rather than the wholesale devolution of policy
responsibility enjoyed by Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Deals have been
agreed, and implemented, through informal negotiation procedures between local
and central elites.
Similarly, there has been widespread criticism of the absence of public involvement
and consultation in the negotiation of devolution deals (see Blunkett et al, 2016; PSA,
2016; Prosser and Flinders, 2016; Randall and Casebourne, 2016), as well as of the
secrecy of the process (Hammond, 2016; Pike et al, 2016; PSA, 2016). Within the
exception of Cornwall (Cornwall Council, 2015), even those areas that published a
‘prospectus’ or ‘bid’ for devolved powers apparently did not consult publicly in advance.
While the legislation underpinning the deals requires statutory consultation when
a new combined authority is formed or where new powers are devolved, it gives
no status to the preferences expressed in such consultations. Further, as this paper
will examine, while local authorities can conduct consultations beyond the statutory
requirements, there is limited evidence of their doing so. In eect, there is little sign
that consultation outcomes have been heeded (Martin et al, 2015; CLG Committee,
2016; Cox and Hunter, 2015; Richards and Smith, 2016; Cox and Round 2016).
Evidence is emerging that the absence of consultation is stimulating public antipathy
towards the proposals (CLG Committee, 2016; Hammond, 2016), even though recent
polls suggest that opinion broadly welcomes devolution (Centre for Cities, 2016b;
ICE, 2016; Ipsos MORI, 2015; PwC, 2014). The charge is, therefore, that a potential
transformation of English governance is being forged without meaningful public
consultation, and this could aect the functioning, sustainability and legitimacy of
new devolved structures.
Mechanisms of public participation: the ‘democracy cube’
In order to assess whether this charge is justied, we analyse public consultation
processes in terms of comparative governance theory. Previous analyses of citizen
participation within political science have tended to focus on the importance of
more direct citizen power for greater democratic legitimacy (for example, Arnstein,
1969). Common among such conceptual frameworks is the notion of progression
from simple information provision upwards, through various stages, to empowerment
and direct citizen involvement. These frameworks oer a normative measure of better
citizen participation and/or stronger democratic legitimacy, but they miss sensitivity
to the challenges of networked governance (Rhodes, 2012). For these reasons, this
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article adopts Fung’s (2006) public participation assessment framework from within
governance theory.
What is useful from Fung’s approach is its armation that it is neither practical
nor desirable to seek direct participation in all decision-making. Rather, participation
is required primarily to correct deciencies in decision-making processes and to
complement political representation or bureaucratic expertise. This is not to suggest
that weak public participation or poor public consultation is desirable, rather, that
democratic legitimation requires the participation of the right public stakeholders,
through the right public forums, in the right place at the right time. Further, if this
public participation requirement is a challenge for central government, then it will
be equally so at other levels should any nation devolve powers to the sub-national
level. To explore this perspective, Fung proposes a ‘democracy cube’ around three
questions of democratic design: who participates? How do they communicate? What
is the connection between their participation and political action?
Participation in this framework focuses on who is eligible to participate, how they
become participants and whether their participation can remedy deciencies within
existing governance arrangements. Fung describes a range of possibilities along a
spectrum of inclusiveness starting with more exclusive, state-oriented methods,
moving through various forms of mini-publics to the most inclusive public sphere
(see Figure 1). He emphasises that each stage can be valuable in dierent contexts
because greater inclusion is not always better governance.
Communication considers how participants interact within governance mechanisms.
In particular, it focuses on how they receive information, learn and change their
minds. Fung delineates this spectrum along levels of intensity, ranging from the role
of citizen spectator, through growing expertise via deliberation, to the high-level
technical advice of experts (see Figure 2). Again, this approach does not assume that
all participants should engage equally in institutionalised public decisions.
Finally, authority gauges the impact of public participation in governance. The
options here are arranged according to levels of authority, starting with no political
inuence, working through advisory roles and culminating in formal political power
(see Figure 3).
Figure 1: Mechanisms of participant selection
Expert administrators
Elected r
epresentatives
Pr
ofessional stakeholders
Lay
stakeholders
Random selection
Open/T
argeted recruiting
Open/Sel
f selection
Di
ffuse public sphere
More exclusive More inclusive
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Citizen participation and changing governance
255
We now turn to our two aims for this paper. First, in order to aid understanding
of current citizen participation eorts, identify gaps, and stimulate ideas to correct
deciencies, we apply this ‘democracy cube’ to current devolution activity in England.
However, it is important to note that the application of a conceptual frame from within
governance to the emerging case of English devolution provides an opportunity to
critique this frame – which speaks to the paper’s second aim.
English devolution: varieties of participation
To apply Fung’s framework to current consultation processes around English
devolution, we begin with an overview of patterns across nine devolution deals for
which sucient information is available, before investigating three of these cases –
Sheeld City Region, Greater Manchester and West Midlands Combined Authority
– in greater depth. Our overview draws on publicly available materials from research
conducted by the House of Commons Library. Our three case studies were reviewed
by policy ocers involved with each set of consultation activities to ensure that they
are comprehensive and accurate.
Figure 2: Mechanisms of communication and decision
Listen as
spectator
Ex
press preference
Develop
preference
Aggregate and bargai
n
Deliberate and
negotiate
Deploy technical
expertise
Least intenseMore intense
Figure 3: Mechanisms of authority and power
Least authority More authority
Personal benefits
Communicative
influence
Adv
ise and consult
Co
-governance
Direct
authority
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Overview
Figure 4 locates each local authority’s consultation activity within Fung’s ‘democracy
cube’. We do not show the third dimension of the cube – authority – as all cases
involved only advice/consultation on this dimension.
In terms of participation, all exercises involved an element of self-selection, which
Fung (2006, 67) describes as the least restrictive method of selection. But this
participation mechanism can be highly unrepresentative, as not all groups might
choose to participate equally. This raises the important question of how participation
is sought. Here there was widespread variation across the cases, which is not captured
by Fung’s framework. At one end, Durham County Council polled all its registered
voters by post, with a turnout of 21.7 per cent (Tallentire, 2016). By contrast, local
authorities in Sheeld, Liverpool and the West Midlands used only online consultation
mechanisms. As we will see in the case studies, this yielded much lower participation,
raising issues around access and representativeness. Other participation mechanisms
were also adopted. Coventry, within the West Midlands Combined Authority, used
selective recruitment to address issues of representation within its public consultation
process. Authorities such as Greater Manchester, the Northeast and Cornwall included
political, professional and lay spokespeople in their processes. Sheeld City Region
Authority consulted with both lay and professional spokespeople.
In relation to communicative mechanisms, all local authorities allowed participants to
express their preferences publicly through forums (although the capacity to do this
in Greater Manchester placed it closer to Fung’s description of ‘spectators’). Only in
Coventry could participants ‘develop preferences’, which Fung (2006, 68) describes
as allowing ‘participants to explore, develop and perhaps transform their perspective’.
Figure 4: varieties of public participation in English ‘devolution deals’
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Citizen participation and changing governance
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This was achieved through a citizens’ panel chosen to be broadly representative of
local areas.
Based on this snapshot, we now dig deeper into three cases: Greater Manchester,
Sheeld City Region, and the West Midlands Combined Authority. We chose these
cases for two main reasons. First, they present a range of pathways to devolution deals.
Greater Manchester already had a combined authority when its devolution deal was
announced. This was the rst devolution deal, to which other regions looked in their
negotiations. Sheeld sought to negotiate a deal swiftly, before conditions or available
resources changed, whereas the West Midlands formed a combined authority only as
devolution negotiations developed. Second, Figure 4 shows that Greater Manchester
used a minimalist approach to public consultation. Sheeld took a more conventional
approach, while the West Midlands combined conventional consultation with (in
Coventry) preference development through citizens’ panels. Across the three, we
see a spectrum that encompasses the range of approaches used by other authorities.
Case 1: Greater Manchester
Greater Manchester was the rst area to gain the status of ‘pilot statutory city-region’
in 2009, and formed the rst combined authority in 2011. The so-called ‘Devo Manc’
deal, between the Treasury and the ten local authorities of the Greater Manchester
Combined Authority (GMCA), was signed in November 2014. Devo Manc resulted
from a double coincidence of interests (Kenealy, 2016). First, unlike any other area in
England, the local authorities had long cooperated successfully and could therefore
work eectively together to build strong relationships and political leadership (Kenealy,
2016). Second, this interest complemented the economic and political agenda of
central government at the time. Initial negotiations were led by political elites; public
consultation was introduced only later.
The government launched a rst round of consultation on the Devo Manc deal
between January and February 2015. This involved the GMCA’s constituent councils,
the area’s Local Enterprise Partnership and the Business and Leadership Council.
Responses from these stakeholders were sought via email, to be submitted to the
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Views from the
public did receive brief reference in the DCLG’s subsequent report (DCLG, 2015,
4), but the consultation design was poorly promoted, highly technical and targeted
experts rather than public participants (Kenealy, 2016). Participation thus matched
what Fung (2006, 68) denes as ‘professional stakeholders’, ‘elected representatives’
and ‘expert administrators’. Citizens could ‘listen as spectators’ (Fung, 2006, 70) but
with no direct avenue for public power.
A further statutory consultation followed when additional powers (in health, social
care and justice) were added to the Devo Manc deal after March 2015. This involved
a survey available via the GMCA website. A second phase of consultation occurred
between July and August 2016 to address various aspects of the deals, including mayoral
functions and funding. The scheme proposed by GMCA has been submitted to the
Secretary of State for approval alongside the results of these consultations.
These surveys are based on ‘self-selection’ and the mechanism for participation is
crucial. In contrast to the large-scale response seen in Durham, the rst phase of the
Greater Manchester online consultation received just 237 responses, of which 169
came from members of the public (GMCA, 2016a). Similarly, the second phase received
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229 responses (out of 278) from members of the public (GMCA, 2016b). Considering
that Greater Manchester includes 2.8 million people, this is clearly minimal.
Beyond this, we note scant evidence of attempts to ‘aggregate’ such views into
collective decisions (Fung, 2006, 69). The online reports state that:
Responses to the GMCA consultation will continue to inform the
development of GM strategy and the strategies of the constituent members
of the CA. The views expressed will support our work to strengthen
transparency and accountability for our work, ensuring we exercise our
statutory duties in ways that support the diversity of GM communities.
(GMCA, 2016a, 43; GMCA, 2016b, 40)
In terms of direct inuence, this suggests an (at most) ‘consultative’ or ‘communicative’
role where ‘ocials preserve their authority and power’ (Fung, 2006, 69).
Moreover, the survey questions and supporting information overtly promoted the
benets of the new powers. The consultations assessed not the underlying decision
to create a new layer of government, but only the merits and economic impact of
Devo Manc. Despite the tone of advocacy, many respondents used the avenue of
‘open answers’ to voice concerns. This led the GMCA to report that:
Many respondents to the consultation used the opportunity to refer to
broader issues relating to devolution, rather than the specics of the published
Scheme. These responses have been counted separately and will be inputted
into work that falls outside the purpose of this report, for the purposes of this
report these responses are now termed as being out of scope. (GMCA, 2016a, 8;
GMCA, 2016b, 8, italics added)
Interestingly, ‘out of scope’ responses accounted for the majority of the answers
oered to all but one of the 11 questions in the rst phase of consultation – but it
is unclear how or if these views will be considered. Overall, empowerment through
the survey process was limited, and the consultations had ‘little or no expectation of
inuencing policy action’ (Fung, 2006, 69). Moreover, Kenealy (2016, 578), drawing
on interviews with members of the local political elite, nds that Greater Manchester
politicians ‘embrace the secrecy of the process’ that led to the devolution agreement.
In sum, we see in GMCA a strategic and pragmatic approach to public participation.
Viewed through Fung’s framework:
• it involves limited consultation;
• participants were few in number;
• negative expressions of preference were noted, but sidelined; and
• public ocials were determined ‘to move ahead of public opinion’. (Kenealy,
2016, 578)
Case 2: Devolution to Sheffield City Region
The Sheeld City Region Combined Authority (SCR), established in April 2014,
comprises nine local councils. Following an oer of additional powers in December
2014, its leaders announced a ‘proposed Agreement’ on devolution with government in
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October 2015, which was put to public consultation in December 2015. After approval
from the nine councils in March 2016, a legislative process is underway to enable
mayoral elections. This involves a formal governance review and public consultation.
The rst stage (before the proposal’s announcement) included consultation with
the SCR Local Enterprise Partnership and business leaders. Such activity aligns with
Fung’s (2006, 68) ‘professional’ stakeholder involvement. The second stage (December
2015 to January 2016) focused around an online survey to allow people to ‘have
their say’. Although some other participation activity was in place (SCR, 2016a, 2),
Sheeld City Council minutes said: ‘The online survey was the main, large-scale form
of consultation on the proposed Devolution Agreement’ (SCC, 2016, 14). This survey
utilised ‘self-selection’. As in Greater Manchester, participation was minimal: 245
responded. The consultation report notes ‘that while the survey provides an important
and useful perspective of people in SCR on the devolution proposals, it is a relatively
small sample and is relatively unrepresentative of some key population groups’ (SCR,
2016a, 1). The surveys asked the public to ‘express preferences’, but there was little
‘attempt to translate the views or preferences of participants into a collective view or
decision’ (Fung, 2006, 68). Rather, the report explains that the ‘main purpose for the
survey was to enable people and organisations across SCR to give their unrestricted
views on the SCR devolution proposals’ through an ‘open-ended’ and ‘non-linear’
approach (SCR, 2016a, 3). Meanwhile, ‘it was not possible to provide a statistically
robust quantitative assessment of the results because of the qualitative design’ (SCR,
2016a, 1). Nor could participants reject the decision to strike an agreement. Rather,
a tone of advocacy for the proposal’s benets emerges throughout the survey (SCR,
2016b). The report – unsurprisingly – concludes that views are ‘positive about the
potential for more devolution’ (2016b, 14).
Nowhere does the information around the online surveys give any indication of
commitment from SCR to act on the views collected. Further, the decision to collate
views for ‘the SCR as a whole’ (SCR, 2016a, 3), rather than break down into individual
councils, rendered dierences in view by area inaccessible, which depoliticised the
results and reduced any potential pressure on individual councillors to oppose the
proposal. That said, the minutes of a Sheeld City Council Extraordinary Meeting
do note that:
The views and perspectives oered by residents and business have been
critical in supporting the pursuit of a stronger devolution proposal for the
SCR. This is particularly true in relation to strengthening accountability
arrangements and securing the legislative changes necessary to allow voters
in district councils in SCR to benet from the new powers and resources
and participate in the proposed mayoral elections (SCC, 2016, 14).
Once the deal had been approved, the subsequent public meeting stage involved a
further online survey (with publicity material disseminated through councils, libraries
and public service contact centres) supported by online material, public engagement
events, and public meetings across the region. These meetings were ‘open to all
residents and businesses’ and allowed them ‘to ask questions of the council’s leaders’
(SCR, 2016b). But such meetings, like online consultations, face challenges of under-
representation. No attempt was made to build consensual views across the dozen or
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more events held. Further, the events took place after the deal had been signed, so
could not reverse the path already taken.
In summary, Sheeld took a conventional approach to swift, cost-ecient, pragmatic
public participation that contains little political imperative for action. It reected,
rather, a determination by local leaders to secure devolved powers and funding so that
‘we can shape our own future and full the city’s huge potential’ (SCC, 2015, 4). The
open-ended survey oered the potential to generate new ideas from the community,
but made a ‘statistically robust’ rejection of the proposal unfeasible. Eorts pursued the
pragmatic goals of generating support for devolution and identifying areas of public
interest that could strengthen negotiations with central government before nal
approval. In terms of the Fung framework, this case of public participation activity was
limited in its capacity to address issues of democratic representation and legitimacy.
Case 3: Consultation around the creation of the West Midlands Combined
Authority, devolution and elected mayors
The West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) formed in June 2016 and
comprises seven metropolitan borough councils. Its creation – agreed in principle with
the government in November 2015 (WMCA, 2016a) – was preceded by public and
partner engagement activity by six of the metropolitan councils and, independently,
by Coventry City Council (CCC).
The WMCA (2016b) summary report on consultation is based on an online
survey (January–February 2016) around attitudes on the new Combined Authority
and proposals for its operation, fullling the statutory consultation requirements.
In addition, Coventry City Council commissioned a Citizens’ Panel (held on 9
September 2015) that focused on understanding citizens’ views on the future of
their city (Democratic Society, 2016). Once the deal was agreed, WMCA developed
a scheme outlining powers and functions required to deliver the devolution deal via
a Mayoral Combined Authority. Another phase of (statutory) online consultation
took place in mid-2016 (WMCA, 2016a).
In the online survey, self-selection was again employed; although a range of support
activities were used to promote public participation (WMCA, 2016b; CCC, 2016).
There were 1,907 respondents, of whom 832 contributed free-form comments
(WMCA, 2016b). While demographics are not addressed specically in the available
materials, the online survey shared the issues of representation highlighted above.
That said, online and ward forums were scheduled to maximise participation, and
the CCC process included a dedicated focus group for older citizens (CCC, 2016).
The survey concerned the formation of a WMCA, so questions about any proposed
devolution agreements were premature at that time. Regarding comments made
on devolution itself, the consultation report said: ‘Though recognised as important
views, such responses will be considered as part of on-going and future engagement
on devolution’ (WMCA, 2016b, 20). In short, the survey did not explicitly collect
or report information on attitudes to devolution, nor did it commit to any political
action based on this information.
However, the presence of a citizens’ panel within this case requires further
examination. CCC commissioned the Democratic Society to run a one-day event
with the aim of ‘understanding what people think are the most important parts of
Coventry’s local, city-wide, national and global identities and exploring what people
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Citizen participation and changing governance
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who live in Coventry want for the future of the city’ (Democratic Society, 2016, 3).
This consultation was to inform the Council’s decision on whether to participate
in the proposed West Midlands Combined Authority. In July 2015, CCC used an
independent market research company to conduct a random telephone survey
to identify 214 people interested in panel participation. The Democratic Society
invited two people per ward with the aim of securing a ‘broadly representative panel
by demographics and geography’ (Democratic Society, 2016, 7). In total, 35 people
participated in the panel. This is what Fung (2006, 68) denes as ‘random selection’,
which ‘is the best guarantee of descriptive representativeness’.
The panellists received information and heard from expert witnesses to foster
discussion and deliberation (Democratic Society, 2016, 13–15). This approach allowed
participants to do more than express their existing views. Rather, it encouraged
them ‘to learn about issues and, if appropriate, transform their views and opinions
by providing them with educational materials or briengs and then asking them to
consider the trade-os or merits of dierent alternatives’ (Democratic Society, 2016,
68). The panel’s focus was on Coventry’s identity within the WMCA and the future
of the city. Hence, the conclusions related not to devolution per se, but to concerns
around lack of information and the importance of city pride, identity and voice
(Democratic Society, 2016, 35–37).
The second phase of consultation concerned the powers and functions required
to deliver the devolution deal via a Mayoral Combined Authority. According to the
supporting website:
This consultation asks for views on the dierent functions it is proposed
that the Mayoral WMCA could have. Prior to any decisions being made,
ndings from the consultation will be sent as part of the Mayoral WMCA
Functions Scheme to inform the decision making of the Secretary of State
for Communities and Local Government…It will give the Secretary of
State an understanding of what the public, partners, stakeholders, businesses
and voluntary sector think of the functions and responsibilities of a Mayoral
WMCA. (WMCA, 2016a)
In summary, this case involved a conventional public consultation augmented by a
citizens’ panel. While the combination of ‘propositions’ and ‘open questions’ in the
two surveys enabled some common views to be identied, neither provided a specic
avenue to assess support or opposition for the devolution deal or an elected mayor.
The citizens’ panel oered scope for deeper engagement, but was limited to the future
identity of Coventry within a devolved body. In terms of Fung’s framework, we see
a case that is more representative and deliberative than conventional online collation
of preferences alone; but still, this could only oer recommendations to inform the
debate and decisions. It thus remained, for the most part, disconnected from political
authority or inuence on policy.
Assessment and alternatives
Our analysis in the preceding section of consultation practices within the process of
devolution in England shows them to have been unambiguously limited on two of
Fung’s three dimensions. With regard to communication, with only one exception, they
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have allowed those involved to do no more than express preferences, and in some
cases, they have in practice created little more than opportunities for members of the
public to listen to those in power. The one exception where preference formation
was also possible – the Coventry citizens’ panel – was limited to only narrow aspects
of identity within the devolution agenda. In terms of authority, no case involved more
than limited consultation.
On Fung’s third dimension – participation – processes appear at rst glance to have
been more inclusive, in that, in all cases, at least some point in the overall process, there
were opportunities for self-selection. We suggest, however, that this shows a weakness
in Fung’s framework, for it fails to distinguish between processes that generate only
small-scale and unrepresentative participation and those leading to large-scale and/
or representative involvement. That is, it fails to distinguish between, at one end,
poorly advertised online consultations that attract only a few hundred submissions
from populations in the millions and, towards the other end, processes such as those
in Durham that generate responses comprising a large slice of the population. And
it does not adequately reect the fact that (stratied) random selection can be more
inclusive than self-selection because it yields a more representative set of responses.
If we modify Fung’s analysis to reect who actually participates rather than just who
can participate, we nd that, on this dimension too, most of the consultations around
English devolution have been highly restrictive.
Critics are correct, therefore, to say that these consultations have been limited. As
we emphasised in introducing Fung’s framework, however, that does not mean that
consultations have necessarily been less than they could have been. As Fung stresses,
greater inclusion is not in all circumstances superior to lesser inclusion. In cases
where expert judgement is paramount, for example, extensive consultations may be
cumbersome and even counterproductive. Our task is, therefore, to consider what is
appropriate in this case.
To do so, it is useful to consider why extensive consultations might not be employed.
Three reasons may be highlighted. The rst is practicability: deep consultations are
costly and time-consuming to run. In an era when local councils are cash-strapped
and at a time when central government is pushing for rapid progress on a key policy
initiative, such consultations may simply appear unfeasible. The second relates to
expertise as just suggested: some decisions may be better left to those with relevant
specialised knowledge. In the case of local governance reform, it might be argued that,
while the public at large can have clear, grounded views on what they want from their
local authorities, they are unlikely to have the perspective that would allow them to
judge the institutional arrangements most likely to deliver such outcomes. Much better,
so the argument goes, to leave such technical matters to local governance experts.
The third reason is political will: local authority leaders may know what they want
and be reluctant to engage processes that could disturb this. Where negotiations with
central government are involved, they may feel that they need to present a united
front in order to gain the best outcome for their area – consultations that expose a
diversity of opinion could disrupt that.
To evaluate these arguments, we can compare the standard consultation procedures
used in our three case studies with two alternatives. One is the kind of large-scale
consultation conducted in Durham, where wide participation was achieved by mailing
a survey to all eligible electors. The other is the use of ‘deliberative mini-publics’ –
groups of randomly selected citizens who gather to learn about, deliberate upon, and
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Citizen participation and changing governance
263
reach conclusions regarding the issues in hand. The citizens’ panel in Coventry falls
into this category. But we will draw here also on two additional cases. In autumn 2015,
the authors ran two pilot citizens’ assemblies – in Sheeld and Southampton – that
examined options for local and regional governance in their areas. In each case, these
assemblies gathered around 30 local people: in Sheeld, all were selected randomly
to be broadly representative of the local population; in Southampton, the majority
were selected this way, while a minority of local politicians were also included. We
have described these assemblies in detail elsewhere (Flinders et al, 2016) so will not
do so again here. Rather, we consider the lessons each of these carries for processes
of local consultation in changing governance contexts.
The rst objection to deeper consultation processes such as those used in Durham,
Coventry, and our pilot assemblies was practicability: such processes cost too much
and take too long. We consider the time issue to be of minor importance. Even the
limited consultations by authorities described above typically took several months,
as tools were developed, time for responses was allowed, and those responses were
then analysed. It does not appear that the exercises in Durham or Coventry took
any longer. For instance, in Durham, letters were sent out in mid-January and results
announced a little over a month later (Durham County Council, 2016). A full-scale
citizens’ assembly that achieves the deepest and most transformative deliberation
can take substantially longer: such assemblies elsewhere have in some cases taken
over a year (Fournier et al, 2011, 6). But a shorter exercise can still be valuable.
The Coventry panel met for just one day while our pilot assemblies lasted for two
weekends spread three weeks apart. Such events do take time to establish – around
two months in Coventry (Democratic Society, 2016) – but if their usage became
more standardised this time could be minimised. That said, cost could be a more
signicant constraint. Durham County Council (2016) expected the cost of its
poll to be between £200,000 and £230,000, for an eligible electorate of around
380,000 people. In areas with populations of several million, costs would have been
substantially higher. The costs of deliberative mini-publics do not rise with larger
populations: representativeness is achieved through the quality rather than the size
of the sample. They are, nevertheless, costly: learning materials must be developed,
support sta engaged and accommodation hired. The one-day Coventry citizens’
panel was criticised for costing £21,500 (Reid, 2015). Our pilot assemblies suggest
that this was an unnecessarily high gure, but expenditure in excess of £20,000 for
a full weekend of meetings is certainly to be expected.
Whether such costs should be thought justiable depends on the eects that
deeper consultations may have. This leads to the second potential criticism of such
consultations: that technical questions of governance are better addressed by experts
than by wider publics. To assess this claim, we can consider two questions: whether
issues of devolution are indeed technical, ‘expert’ issues or not, and whether it is
unreasonable to expect that members of the public could gain sucient expertise to
express informed views in a relatively short space of time.
As the Coventry exercise suggests, questions of identity can be central to local
governance reform. Indeed, as earlier experiences of local government reform in
England show, if people do not identify with the areas in which they are governed,
they are less likely to accept any new arrangements. Identity is not a matter of expert
judgement, and is a textbook case where inclusive consultation exercises – such as
those deployed in Durham – are appropriate. The Coventry exercise took place
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in the context of a rival ‘devolution bid’ from neighbouring Warwickshire (since
abandoned), which sought to include Coventry. Decisions on what area to be part
of are appropriately inuenced by questions of identity.
Given its limited remit and duration, the Coventry citizens’ panel does not oer
useful information on whether ordinary citizens can engage meaningfully with
more technical aspects of devolution. But our pilot citizens’ assemblies do provide
such information. They suggest (Flinders et al., 2016) a positive assessment: both
assemblies were able, after just two weekends, to reach coherent conclusions that
reected substantial understanding of the issues. In Sheeld, there was a strong desire
for powerful regional government for Yorkshire as a whole; both areas saw particular
concern over mechanisms of democratic accountability. Yet, for some issues, more
time would have been helpful to explore in further depth. Devolution is a genuinely
complex subject, and high-quality deliberation on its details does therefore require
time. Thus, it is appropriate to limit them to an advisory rather than decision-making
role.
Set against the concern that members of the public may lack the necessary expertise
is the hope expressed by democracy activists and many scholars of deliberative
democracy (for discussion, see Dryzek, 2001) that engaging people in the design
process may increase the legitimacy of the structures that are created and promote their
eective operation. This view should also be challenged as there are two reasons for
thinking that deep consultations could harm legitimacy. First, as experience in Coventry
suggests, the extra expense of deep consultation processes may be criticised in the
local press. Second, if deliberative mini-publics replace mechanisms of participation
involving self-selection, members of the public who have and want to express strong
views may feel unfairly excluded. Nevertheless, evidence strongly suggests that greater
inclusion, when well designed, can promote legitimacy (Bloomeld et al, 2001; Innes
and Booher, 2004; Fournier et al, 2011, 130–2). Deliberative mini-publics should only
ever complement self-selection-based mechanisms of inclusion: those who want to
express themselves should be able to do so, either in evidence to the citizens’ panel,
jury, or assembly, or through a parallel traditional consultation exercise.
This analysis points to the conclusion that consultation processes around English
devolution have been not only limited, but also unhealthily limited: opportunities
for deeper public engagement would have allowed more thorough examination of
public concerns, particularly about local identities and democratic accountability.
This would have entailed additional short-term nancial costs – but only on a scale
that some local authorities thought worthwhile.
This leaves us with our third constraint on such consultation procedures, namely
political will. Central government was keen to move quickly in implementing
its devolution agenda, and it had a clear view on the structures through which it
wanted this to happen. While it negotiated the details of each deal locally, particularly
to determine the exact powers that would be devolved, it was unwilling to give
way on key provisions, such as the existence of an elected mayor – despite much
evidence of local disquiet on this point. The detailed commitments within each
deal text form another bulwark against consultations inuencing outcomes. Local
authority leaders, meanwhile, were caught by the need to respond quickly in order
to secure the additional funding that was on oer: they secured a few veto powers
over matters such as budgets, strategies and spatial planning, but the deals oer little
discretion for locally-driven policy. It is clear that space for extensive, open-minded
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Citizen participation and changing governance
265
local consultations would open up only if central government adopted a rather
dierent approach.
Developments towards the end of 2016 suggest that limited consultation may
be starting to impinge on the eectiveness of English devolution. In September,
the North-East devolution deal collapsed, over concerns that the UK government
was unable to underwrite EU structural fund payments after the UK left the EU.
In November, the deals in Norfolk/Suolk and Greater Lincolnshire also collapsed
after participating councils voted to withdraw. The creation of an elected mayor was
the lightning-rod for discontent; but it is signicant that the government was not
open to consultation on this and that no attempts were made by local elites to enlist
popular support to challenge this position. Consultation-related issues have also led
to delay, and further doubts, in the Sheeld City Region. At the time of writing,
the mayoral election planned for May 2017 had been delayed for 12 months, and
this hiatus has encouraged the re-emergence of proposals for a ‘pan-Yorkshire’ deal.
Conclusion
This article has examined a widely-voiced argument that the devolution deals rolled
out in England have been subject to inadequate consultation. Having outlined the
background to devolution and set out an analytical framework for interpreting
consultation processes, we then analysed those processes in two ways. In line with
our rst aim, we considered whether they have been limited in any way according to
the three dimensions identied by Fung (2006). We showed that they are very clearly
constrained on two of those dimensions – communication and authority. We also
concluded that, while they appeared more expansive in relation to participation, this
actually reected a weakness in Fung’s schema: in terms of who actually participated
rather than who could have participated. This insight speaks to a second aim, which
was to assess and critique Fung’s governance framework through application to the
contemporary case of English devolution.
We then considered the normative question of whether these consultations have
been limited to an undesirable extent. Our evidence suggests that they have. We argue
that, even given a desire by political leaders to move quickly, the examples of Durham
and Coventry show that wider and deeper forms of consultation would have been
possible. Deliberative mini-publics would also have usefully accessed informed public
opinion on aspects of system design such as priority areas for devolved powers or
arrangements for democratic accountability. Such deeper consultation exercises could
appropriately have remained constrained to oering advice and consent. Nevertheless,
they could have created opportunities for stronger public engagement in, and thereby
legitimation of, the local governance reform process. It appears that this has not
happened not because it would be undesirable, but because leaders in government –
both central and local – have preferred to maintain tighter control.
It may be argued that a speedier devolution process is desirable if it can deliver
expected benets to local communities earlier, while central government clearly has
a legitimate role in steering the overall direction. There are concerns, however, about
the public legitimacy of the arrangements being put in place and about whether they
will stand up to scrutiny in coming years (particularly as several were put to the test
in late 2016). It may be that deeper processes of consultation could, to some degree,
have addressed such concerns.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council Urgency
Grant number ES/N006216/1.
We are grateful to Artur Foguet Gonzalez for his invaluable assistance in gathering
information on consultation exercises around England.
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