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Ancestral emotions, current decisions: Using evolutionary game theory to explore the role of emotions in decision making
... For example, the aversive feeling state that accompanies the experience of guilt has been shown to reliably exert a motivating influence on cooperative behavior by virtue of "disincentivizing" self-interested behavior (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Along these lines, I have suggested that our capacity to produce "guilty feelings" may have evolved, in part, to provide us with "information" about the "costs" of not cooperating in situations that resemble indefinitely repeated social bargaining games (Ketelaar, 2004(Ketelaar, , 2006. Smith's (1759) view that certain emotions operate as "moral sentiments" that "commit" us to pursuing a more virtuous course of action, in part, by enabling us -like Odysseus strapped to the mast--to overcome the immediate attraction of less virtuous courses of action. ...
... Smith's (1759) view that certain emotions operate as "moral sentiments" that "commit" us to pursuing a more virtuous course of action, in part, by enabling us -like Odysseus strapped to the mast--to overcome the immediate attraction of less virtuous courses of action. Consistent with Adam Smith's view, evolutionary interpretations of guilt have converged on the idea that this emotion evolved as a "commitment device" that, when activated, provides the agent with a powerful incentive to stay the "cooperative" course, especially when we are exposed to spuriously attractive immediate incentives that run contrary to our long-term interests (see Frank, 1988Frank, , 2001Hirschleifer, 1987Hirschleifer, , 2001Ketelaar, 2004Ketelaar, , 2006Nesse, 2001b). Consider, for example, how strong feelings of guilt can commit a person to a long-term goal of losing weight by enabling them to overcome the immediate attraction of a second piece of cake. ...
... Another study found that research participants provoked to feel disgust, sadness, or fear were observed to require less evidence to make a strong negative moral trait attribution (i.e., uncharitable, unfriendly) compared to individuals placed into a sanguine mood (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005). In short, emotional influences appear to be a fundamental part of many forms of moral "reasoning" that have traditionally been conceptualized as processes of rational decision-making (Bloom, 2016;Haidt, 2001;Greene, 2013;Ketelaar, 2004;2006;Ketelaar & Koenig, 2007). Barsky and Kaplan (2007) conducted a meta-analysis (45 studies, 57 distinct samples) on the association between affective states and perceptions of justice. ...
The current chapter applies an evolutionary lens to motivated reasoning and other forms of identity-protective cognition. A central assumption is that in many instances in which different individuals have reviewed the same evidence, but sincerely claim to have observed different “facts” (e.g., “they saw a Game”) or sincerely assert that they have “rationally” arrived at contradictory conclusions regarding the same evidence, we are not witnessing a trivial difference of opinion, but rather a clash of competing worldviews. After introducing several philosophical caveats from Kant’s Transcendental Psychology that cast doubt on the claim that all members of a species will necessarily have access to the same “shared reality” or worldview, I review evolutionary insights into the utility of cognitive biases (i.e., the Smoke Detector Principle), including the argument that argumentation itself evolved, not for locating truth, but in service of achieving consensus. Equipped with these evolutionary and philosophical insights, and utilizing an “Affect-as-Information” framework, I review the literature at the intersection of emotion and motivated reasoning. I argue that these processes may be more accurately seen, not as “bugs” in our “mental software,” but as “design features” of the human mind.
... According to this theory, the game is instinctual behavior and is, in essence, a form of more elaborate behavior that he or she will have to deal with in the future.. This theory is disproved, because the study of researchers suggests that the game is not ancestral behavior (Camerer, 2011;Ketelaar, 2004). Isaacs (1896-1934): Isaacs was influenced by Froebel and considered the game a way to express feelings. ...
It should be remembered that the play helps the child transform the personality and, in advancing to him, is a very effective factor for the development and the reason for the child's muscle development and growth. On the other hand, it causes the child to be drained and this protects the child against the force, unrest, teasing, anger and evil. The important point is that the play is a means to treat behavioral and mental problems. Play is a filter and eliminates the suppressed energy. In this article, the views of intellectuals have historically been evaluated about the role of played in children development and psyche.
... Guilt is further considered a moral emotion that leads to prosocial behaviors (Frank 1988;Ketelaar 2004). Scholars have argued that when guilt is aroused, individuals seek to reduce that emotion by engaging in moral acts, such as prosocial behavior (Antonetti and Maklan 2014;Nguyen and Johnson 2020;Urbonavicius et al. 2019;Xu, Bègue, and Bushman 2012;Xu, Bègue, and Bushman 2014). ...
An online experiment was conducted to examine a past moral deed’s influence on consumers’ response to guilt appeals in environmental advertising. The findings suggested that a guilt appeal ad increased irritation when participants engaged previously in a moral deed. Further, the results indicate that the perceived irritation mediated the interaction between past moral behaviors (i.e., previously engaged versus not engaged) and green message types (i.e., a guilt appeal versus a nonguilt appeal) and attitude toward the green advertisement and the message’s credibility. The results demonstrate that participants who performed a prior moral deed chose conventional detergent over an eco-friendly detergent when they were exposed to a guilt appeal that promoted recycling. However, no moral licensing behaviors were observed among participants in the nonguilt appeal ad. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed further.
... In addition, the negative feelings of immorality following misconduct may also prompt CEOs to adopt a more open and cooperative posture when dealing with stakeholders interested in understanding the nature and cause of the misconduct. Research shows that moral motives can direct individuals' attention toward the interests of those who were harmed by their transgression (De Hooge et al., 2007;Frank, 1988;Ketelaar, 2004), such as by increasing cooperation (De Hooge et al., 2007) and concern for the welfare of the victim (Liao et al., 2018). Consequently, rather than engaging in actions that may attempt to distort, delay, or deny outright the nature of the misconduct to influence stakeholders' perceptions, CEOs who feel the need to restore their moral self-concept are more likely to attempt to remedy the situation by working proactively and transparently with affected stakeholders. ...
When firm misconduct comes to light, CEOs are often faced with difficult decisions regarding whether and how to respond to stakeholder demands as they attempt to restore their firms’ legitimacy. Prior research largely assumes that such decisions are motivated by CEOs’ calculated attempts to manage stakeholder impressions. Yet, there are likely other motives, particularly those of a morally-relevant nature, that might also be influencing CEOs’ decisions. To address this limitation, we advance moral cleansing as an alternative explanation of how and why CEOs lead their firms to respond to stakeholder demands following the firm’s misconduct and, in turn, whether they can successfully restore their firm’s legitimacy. In the context of firm misconduct, moral cleansing motives reflect CEOs’ desire to restore their threatened moral self- image resulting from the misconduct. We theorize that a CEO’s moral cleansing motives increase the likelihood that their firm will engage in a series of reparative responses that can restore the firm’s legitimacy (i.e., discovery, explanation, penance, and rehabilitation). In addition, we explicate the unique implications of CEOs’ moral cleansing in a post-misconduct context by theorizing how such motives may simultaneously improve one form of their firms’ legitimacy while hindering another. Specifically, we theorize that CEOs’ moral cleansing motives increase (decreases) the authenticity (strategic cognition) of their firm responses, which strengthens (weakens) the effectiveness of those responses on the firms’ ability to restore its moral (pragmatic) legitimacy with stakeholders. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work.
... For a further analysis of the sense of guilt as a fi tness-enhancing emotion see also, e.g.,Trivers (1985) andKetelaar (2004). 10 Experiments show, e.g., that a capuchin rejects a cucumber as a reward when she sees that another capuchin is off ered a grape (the good that is more valued by capuchins than cucumbers); see, e.g.,Brosnan (2006). ...
The volume presents original contributions from the 2009 Knowledge, Value, Evolution conference, held in Prague in 2009. While the conference was held during the year of Darwin's double anniversary, its aims were not historical. Rather, we brought together researchers from many different countries who work on topics at the interface of philosophy, the humanities and evolutionary biology. Chapters included in this volume give a very comprehensive picture of the work on a Darwinian-inspired epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, social philosophy, as well as a more empirical study of cognition and religion.
... Despite extensive behavioral ecological studies that demonstrate the value of adjusting patterns of effort depending on risks and the availability of rewards, the value of low mood remains contentious (Gilbert, 1992;Hagen, 2011;Nettle, 2004;Wakefield et al., 2017). Studies of anger and other social emotions bring in game theory to help explain unpredictability (Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006;Ketelaar, 2004;Skyrms, 1996). Expanding the study of utility to all negative emotions will provide an important missing foundation for dealing with the painful clinical conditions they give rise to. ...
Recent quantitative studies have advanced emotions research substantially, but they have done little to resolve enduring large-scale controversies. This article suggests that tacit creationism is at the root of the problem. Envisioning emotions as aspects of a designed machine encourages searching for answers of a kind that do not exist. The quest for the Holy Grail of agreement on the number, nature, and functions of emotions is futile because the emotions are aspects of organically complex systems whose structures and functions are radically different from those of machines. A fully evolutionary foundation for emotions research discourages hopes for simple elegant models but it can nonetheless advance research by dispelling misconceptions and suggesting new questions.
... In another laboratory study individuals who were provoked to feel disgust, sadness or fear required significantly less evidence to make a strong negative moral trait attribution (i.e., uncharitable, unfriendly) compared to individuals who were placed in a more sanguine mood (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005). In short, affect-laden influences appear to be a fundamental part of many forms of moral "reasoning" that traditionally have been conceptualized as operating in the domain of rational decision-making (Bloom, 2016;Haidt, 2001;Greene, 2013;Ketelaar, 2004;Ketelaar & Koenig, 2007). ...
Early Draft of Manuscript: This is not the authoritative document of record, but rather a very early draft of a document submitted to Psychological Review (and rejected). This draft has more of a polemical tone, but contains several key ideas that will be incorporated into my current project --on Psychological Foundations of Political Correctness--which aims to provide a more traditional scholarly review and presentation of a theoretical framework.
... Emotions are multifaceted (i.e., behavioral, physiological, and experiential) and each facet serves a different function to help individuals to engage in and adapt to their surroundings . A person's emotional state can influence all aspects of hazard identification, valuation, and decision process, as observed in the appraisal of consumer goods , selection of political leaders (Keltner et al., 1993) and evaluation of losses and gains (Ketelaar, 2004). In particular, research by and showed that emotions can strongly affect an individual's perception and tolerance of risk. ...
Safety training despite being the key measure to keeping workers safe within any occupational environment has not kept pace with the significant advancement in the fields of behavioral psychology and education. As a result, researchers have found that the pre-dated safety training techniques on construction sites fail in communicating information in a way that promotes long-term retention of knowledge among adult learners and they also end up generating a negative attitude towards safety among workers. Understanding the psychological antecedents to risk-taking behavior and utilizing prominent adult learning theories to revolutionize safety training could allow academics and practitioners to improve workers’ hazard recognition performance and risk assessment skills while promoting risk-averse behavior.
This dissertation therefore aims to (1) test and validate the role of integral and incidental affective arousal in influencing key safety outcomes (hazard recognition performance, valuation of danger, and safety decisions); (2) use the findings to design a safety training program that generates targeted affective arousal but is also rooted in self-directed learning model to facilitate learning; (3) deliver the simulation-based multimedia training module as an intervention to construction workers in a quasi-field experiment to measure changes in affect and situational interest; and (4) apply multivariate statistics to validate if the training environment generated the desired emotional engagement and learning outcomes among workers.
Analysis of the proposed conceptual model showed that the integral negative affective arousal increased perception of risk and promoted risk-averse decision-making in construction safety training context. The quasi-field experiment on 489 construction workers showed that the proposed safety training module generated context-driven negative emotions and also improved situational interest levels regarding safety training which is a primary precursor to learning. Moreover, these results were consistent across all relevant demographical groups common to construction sites in the United States. This work is the first effort that ascertains the efficacy of various adult learning mechanisms incorporated in the proposed training module and also validates relationship between affect, risk perception, and decision-making in an occupational training environment. Future research should seek to validate the application of this format of safety training for safety training in other domains and study the long-term effects of such training on skills and retention of knowledge of the workforce.
... Given that current research findings suggest that within the body there are three key neural systems, or "brains," involved in decision making, one in the head, one in the heart, and another in the gut, it would not be surprising then that individual differences, competencies, and preferences might show up in how people use these neural systems in decision making. Indeed, emotions involving the heart and instincts/ feelings involving the gut have evolved over time because of their adaptive functions in both genotypic and phenotypic survival (Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006;Ketelaar, 2004). We also know that the enteric nervous system evolved first before the intrinsic cardiac network and before the encephalization of the head-brain (Bishopric, 2005;Mayer, 2011;Porges, 2001). ...
There is a growing body of literature that supports the idea that decision making involves not only cognition, but also emotion and intuition. However, following extant “dual-process” decision theories, the emotional and intuitive aspects of decision making have predominantly been considered as one “experiential” entity. The purpose of this article is to review the neurological evidence for a three-factor model of head, heart, and gut aspects of embodied cognition in decision making and to report on a study carried out to design and validate a psychometric instrument that measures decision-making preferences across three separable interoceptive components, representing the complex, functional, and adaptive neural networks (or “brains”) of head (analytical/cognitive), heart (emotional/affective), and gut (intuition). Development and validation of the Multiple Brain Preference Questionnaire (MBPQ) instrument was carried out in three phases. Translational validity was assessed using content and face validity. Construct validity was undertaken via exploratory factor analysis of the results from the use of the instrument with 301 subjects from a global sampling, and reliability tests were performed using internal consistency and test–retest analysis. Results confirmed extraction of three factors (head, heart, and gut) was appropriate and reliability analysis showed the MBPQ to be both valid and reliable. Applications of the tool to coaching and leadership are suggested.
... For the evolutionary functionalists, emotions are thus not only minimally functional but also teleologically functional: their benefits or functions account for their presence. Emotions have evolved precisely because of their adaptive functions in genotypic and phenotypic survival (Hasselton & Ketelaar, 2006;Ketelaar, 2004). ...
This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity-an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.
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