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Deception and Division

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... In relation to the concept of self-deception, our paper contributes to the growing body of evidence documenting competing folk intuitions. In Experiments 1 and 2, we sought to investigate the folk concept of self-deception -a concept that has been widely debated by philosophers, with some arguing that it requires an intention (Davidson, 2004;Demos, 1960;Rorty, 1972), while others rejecting it (Mele, 2001;Nelkin, 2002;Scott-Kakures, 2002). Our initial objective was to ascertain whether the concept of selfdeception best aligns with any of these rival theories; yet, in pursuing this objective, we soon uncovered a pattern of results that was not commensurable with any classical definition of self-deception in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. ...
... The Intention condition is emphasized by the traditional account of selfdeception (D. Davidson, 2004;Demos, 1960;Rorty, 1972). Proponents of this account model self-deception on interpersonal deception and argue that self-deception operates much like interpersonal deception. ...
... A paradigmatic example of the traditional account, emphasizing the Intention condition, is the case of Carlos (Davidson, 2004). Carlos has compelling reasons to believe that he will not pass his driving test. ...
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Theoretical disputes over the concept of self-deception revolve around the necessary and sufficient conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features-such as intent, belief change, and motive-are treated as sufficient but non-necessary conditions for the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of meddling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or any combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. Consequently, the present experiments demonstrate that lay philosophical concepts can exhibit a prototype structure, and reveal why research in experimental philosophy often engenders partial support for rival theories-by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict through reliance on within-subjects designs.
... Patient narratives may not always be true, as patients may alter their personal narratives to cover up an insecurity or undesirable event through self-deception. In his essay Deception and Division, Donald Davidson (1986) explains self-deception as requiring both a belief in a proposition and its negation. He goes on further to say that the belief in the proposition sustains the belief of its negation. ...
... It is important for therapists to recognize and understand the importance of cultural narratives in personal development which in turn influences language use when working with patients of various cultural backgrounds. Davidson (1986) brings up issues with a normative model of rationality, where individuals and their actions are seen in relation to a norm. He states that it is unclear whose standards we are taking to be the norm that everyone else is being evaluated by. ...
... (b) implicit-knowledge accounts (e.g., Bach, 1981), where the subject does not believe that p, but recognizes the truth of not-p, while such knowledge is "shunned, ignored, or kept out of mind, and the subject acts in various ways" as if the subject believed that p, though other behaviour may betray the knowledge that not-p (p. 514); and (c) intermediate accounts, where the subject both believes that p and believes that not-p (Davidson, 1985), or where what the subject believes remains indeterminate (e.g., Funkhouser, 2009). ...
... 514). Nor do I propose an intermediate account, where the subject both believes that p and believes that not-p (Davidson, 1985), or where what the subject believes remains indeterminate (e.g., Funkhouser, 2009). Rather, I am proposing a view whose focus is on a process within which more than is dreamed of by our paradigmatic-state-account philosophy of self-deception may happen. ...
Article
In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception suffer from a problem of restrictedness that does not do justice to the complexities of the phenomenon. In particular, I argue that the very search for a paradigmatic state of self-deception greatly overlooks the dynamic dimension of the self-deceptive process, which allows the inclusion of more mental states than paradigmatic-state accounts consider. I will discuss the inadequacy of any such accounts, and I will argue that we should replace them with a dynamic view of self-deception that is more liberal regarding the mental states in which self-deceivers may find themselves.
... .) [that] tends to deny that self-deception is possible" (Kipp, 1980, p. 305) 1 or being sceptical about the idea (Haight, 1980). The academic discussion on the details of the phenomenon, e.g., if it is intentional (e.g., Davidson, 1985;Talbott, 1995) or nonintentional (McLaughlin, 1996;Mele, 2001), or whether or not it requires a divided self is vast (Davidson, 1985;Kurzban, 2010;Mele, 2001;Talbott, 1995). However, the details of the mode of operation are not important at this point. ...
... .) [that] tends to deny that self-deception is possible" (Kipp, 1980, p. 305) 1 or being sceptical about the idea (Haight, 1980). The academic discussion on the details of the phenomenon, e.g., if it is intentional (e.g., Davidson, 1985;Talbott, 1995) or nonintentional (McLaughlin, 1996;Mele, 2001), or whether or not it requires a divided self is vast (Davidson, 1985;Kurzban, 2010;Mele, 2001;Talbott, 1995). However, the details of the mode of operation are not important at this point. ...
Article
The paper enquires into the role of self-deception in public relations struggling with discrepancies between heterogeneous stakeholder expectations and organizational interests and particularly between normative expectations of truthfulness and practical temptations of deception. Drawing on theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology and sociology, we propose a framework for the origins, drivers, and functions of self-deception in public relations. The analysis reveals that under specific conditions self-deception can be an essential mechanism in public relations because it relieves practitioners from tensions driven by conflicting perceptions of truth and legitimacy. Self-deception is most likely to occur in situations of cognitive dissonance for practitioners to balance internal information processing and in situations of normative pressure when practitioners seek to comply with external expectations.
... Precisely because of its paradoxical connotation, akrasia is included in the broader category of 'motivated irrationality' (such as self-deception or wishful thinking), when individuals' intentional behaviors deviate from criteria of rationality (Davidson, 1985;Pears, 1982). Davidson disrupted the dualistic scheme proposed by the classical philosophers, which envisaged reason on the one hand (with its logical and rational criteria), and the emotional dimension on the other (seen as irrational and uncontrollable). ...
Article
Akrasia, otherwise known as ‘weakness of will’, is a state of mind whereby people act deliberately against their better judgment. This paper aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding akrasia from psychosocial perspectives that assume the self is multiple and strongly interconnected with the relational flow of which it is a part. Drawing on key ideas from Dialogical Self Theory, we analyze the main dialogical dynamics that can generate akratic episodes with reference to how individuals organize their personal position repertoire, and to the relational and socio‐cultural setting in which the actions are taken. The discussion enables us to identify some indicators to frame the tendency to betray one's good intentions, and to offer some suggestions on how to reduce the occurrence of the various forms of akrasia analyzed.
... Second, self-deception could be either self-enhancing or selfdiminishing, showing a bidirectional nature. False beliefs could be pleasant as well as disagreeable (Davidson, 1987;Demos, 1960) like self-handicapping (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985) and defensive pessimism (Norem, 2002), protecting oneself via negative thinking or self-handicapping behaviors. Even in optimists, a retroactive pessimism strategy is sometimes used to regulate their mood when they face failures (Sanna & Chang, 2003). ...
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As one of the commonly used folk psychological concepts, self-deception has been intensively discussed yet is short of solid ground from cognitive neuroscience. Self-deception is a biased cognitive process of information to obtain or maintain a false belief that could be both self-enhancing or self-diminishing. Study 1 (N = 152) captured self-deception by adopting a modified numerical discrimination task that provided cheating opportunities, quantifying errors in predicting future performance (via item-response theory model), and measuring the belief of how good they are at solving the task (i.e., self-efficacy belief). By examining whether self-efficacy belief is based upon actual ability (true belief) or prediction errors (false belief), Study 1 showed that self-deception occurred in the effortless (easier access to answer cues) rather than effortful (harder access to answer cues) cheating opportunity conditions, suggesting high ambiguity in attributions facilitates self-deception. Studies 2 and 3 probed the neural source of self-deception, linking self-deception with the metacognitive process. Both studies replicated behavioral results from Study 1. Study 2 (ERP study; N = 55) found that the amplitude of frontal slow wave significantly differed between participants with positive/self-enhancing and negative/self-diminishing self-deceiving tendencies in incorrect predictions while remaining similar in correct predictions. Study 3 (functional magnetic resonance imaging study; N = 33) identified self-deceiving associated activity in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and showed that effortless cheating context increased cheating behaviors that further facilitated self-deception. Our findings suggest self-deception is a false belief associated with a distorted metacognitive mental process that requires ambiguity in attributions of behaviors.
... The paradox here differs from the well-known paradoxes involved in selfdeception, as it does not concern the contents and the dynamics of propositional attitudes. In particular, it does not result from believing and disbelieving, or desiring and repelling the same thing (Davidson 1985;Galeotti 2018). Talks of alienation rather suggest that we can happen to experience the attitudes, emotions, and actions we undergo as if they are not, or not fully, our own. ...
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Alienation has been recently revived as a central theme in critical theory. Current debates, however, tend to focus on normative rather than on explanatory issues. In this paper, I confront the latter and advance an account of alienation that bears on the mechanisms that bring it about in order to locate alienation as a distinctive social and psychological fact. In particular, I argue that alienation can be explained as a disruption induced by social factors in the sense of mental ownership that comes with the first personal awareness of being a subject of attitudes, emotions, and actions, and outline how social factors can play a structuring causal role in the process that brings it about. In the first section, I introduce the theme and explain why it is important to focus on the mechanisms that underlie alienation. In the second section, I maintain that understanding how alienation works is crucial to make sense of false consciousness. In the third section, I consider the relevance of mental ownership to explaining alienation and discuss existing evidence about whether and how it can fail. In the final section, I argue that disturbances in the simulation routines that support social cognition might underpin alienation, and outline how social factors might play a structuring causal role in this connection.
... The degree to which the above empirical findings are evidence for conceptual representation is a matter of debate and depends on the definition of conceptual representation and, critically, on whether one accepts the possibility of concepts without natural language (for linguistic approaches see Bermúdez, 2003;Chater & Heyes, 1994;Davidson, 1985;Searle, 1994; for non-linguistic approaches see Allen, 1999;Allen & Hauser, 1991;Beck, 2018;Carruthers, 2004;Evans, 1982;Stich, 1979). The position we present here is that even if one assumes that non-linguistic conceptual representations exist, and even if one permits a liberal interpretation of the evidence regarding conceptual representation in animals, still, the empirical evidence suggests a conceptual system that does not reach a minimum limit to support a conceptual representation of certain goals, for certain animals. ...
Article
This paper proposes and develops the feelings of goals hypothesis (FGH). It has two aims: first, to describe the evolutionary function of emotional feelings (EFs), and second, to describe the content and the format of EFs. According to FGH, the evolutionary function of EFs is to enable motoric flexibility. Specifically, EFs are a component of a psychological mechanism that permits differential motoric reactions to the same stimulus. Further, according to FGH, EF is a special type of mental representation with the content of an action goal, and with a non-motoric, non-conceptual format. This paper thoroughly clarifies the assumptions underlying FGH and discusses its theoretical implications and empirical predictions.
... With respect to this last point, we shall see that the Reveries' analysis of the unconscious mind's ability to advance the self's ends bears directly on contemporary philosophical debates about the role of intentionality in the self-deceptive process and straddles the divide separating intentionalist and non-intentionalist approaches. On this point, I shall focus primarily on the elements of Rousseau's analysis which undermine strong forms of intentionalism like that developed by Donald Davidson (1986; see also Bermudèz, 2000;Pears, 1991), but I also attend to the subtle but critical role that the agent herself plays in allowing self-deceptive processes to run uninterrupted (cf. Fingarette, 2001;Galeotti, 2012;Scott-Kakures, 2002). ...
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Though Rousseau is recognized to have treated the problem of self‐knowledge with great sensitivity, very little is known about a centrally important aspect of that treatment—his understanding of self‐deception. I reconstruct this conception, emphasizing the importance of purposive but sub‐intentional processes that work to enhance agents' self‐esteem. I go on to argue that Rousseau's fundamental concern about the theater is its capacity to manipulate these processes in ways that make spectators both complicit in their own falsification and vulnerable to elite domination. This argument, with its focus on the pervasive and often subconscious character of self‐deception, not only problematizes an influential reading of Rousseau which emphasizes the epistemic availability of the “true” or “sincere” self, but also highlights the ongoing civic and moral threat posed by self‐deceptive mental states.
... you know p while knowing it is false is anti-representation. Consider next the definition in Davidson (1985) that is further developed by Fallis (2013) where to lie is to intentionally represent oneself as believing what one does not. Again, signaling that one believes what one does not is anti-representation. ...
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Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm‐based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge merely for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.
... Intentions are important for interpersonal deception and lying, but the hiding of true intentions is crucial. It is essential for deceivers or liars to represent themselves as sincere persons who truly believe that the propositional contents of their assertions are true (Davidson, 1987). Except for the importance of intentions, the distinctive feature of lying is a verbal expression of falsehood. ...
Article
The evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers was the first to address the well-known psychological phenomenon of self-deception from the standpoint of natural science. According to Trivers, self-deception evolved as an offensive strategy in the evolutionary arms race between the deceiver and the deceived. Though apparently both tenable and plausible, Trivers? evolutionary theory of self-deception, which takes the enhancement of interpersonal deception as the proper function of self-deception, is burdened with the number of difficulties. In this paper, I will argue that it is conceptually impossible for self-deceivers to deceive others about false beliefs they have falsely acquired as if they were true. If interpersonal deception is the conceptual impossibility for self-deceivers, then interpersonal deception cannot be the proper function of self-deception.
... In a more recent paper, Fallis develops a different proposal; possibly, one that could be read as a refinement of ACF1. Drawing on some observations by Davidson (1985Davidson ( , 2001, Fallis (2013) identifies the following assertion-condition for defining lying: ...
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Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts (like promises, assertions, and oaths) that can be lies and speech acts (like commands, suggestions, or assumptions) that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying.
... The intentionalist account models self-deception on interpersonal deception. According to this account, self-deceived subjects intentionally get themselves to believe p, all the while knowing or believing not-p (Davidson 1985;Sorensen 1985;Pears 1986;Rorty 1988). Similarly, we can conceive of self-deceived subjects who intentionally get themselves to withhold judgment while knowing or believing p. ...
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Self‐deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter‐evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one's situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self‐deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self‐deception or we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality.
... For example, Levesque (1984) relies on situations, semantic entities that might support the truth or falsity of a formula, but can also support neither and even both (cf. the truthmaker semantics of Fine 2017). A more 'traditional' approach is the logic of local reasoning of Fagin and Halpern (1988), which uses standard possible worlds but follows the idea that, rather than having a single system of beliefs, real agents have a number of distinct systems, with different ones working on different contexts (the fragmentation/compartmentalization of Davidson 1986, Egan 2008). ...
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The paper proposes a logical framework representing the notion of explicit knowledge as the combination of awareness of and awareness that. The setting, semantically combining neighbourhood models with ideas from awareness logic, separates the mere fact of entertaining some information (being aware ofφ\varphi) from the acknowledgement that the information is indeed the case (being aware thatφ\varphi holds). The text discusses not only the main properties these concepts obtain under the given representation, but also several of the epistemic actions that can be defined, and the way they affect the agent’s awareness (and thus her knowledge).
... Pears viewed the subject-self as "a small temporary system, like a camp set up for the duration of a particular campaign and then abandoned, and the force that splits it off from it is an ordinary wish" (Pears, 1985, p. 77). The desire to avoid accepting what the requirement of total evidence counsels causes this functional isolation (Davidson, 1985). ...
... Nelkin (2012, p. 135) also claims (and I am inclined to agree) that belief is compatible with doubt in a stronger sense, being not-completely-certain. 14. Perhaps most famously, this kind of view was defended by Davidson (2004aDavidson ( , 2004b. ...
Article
In this paper, I argue against three leading accounts of self-deception and propose a heretofore overlooked route to self-deception. The central problem with extant accounts is that they are unable to balance two crucial desiderata: (a) to make the dynamics of self-deception (e.g., the formation of self-deceptive beliefs) psychologically plausible, and (b) to capture self-deception as an intentional phenomenon for which the self-deceiver is responsible. I argue that the three leading views all fail on one or both counts. However, I claim that many or most cases of self-deception conform to a different model, which I call ‘self-deception as omission.’ In these cases, the process of self-deceptive belief formation and the intentional act for which the self-deceiver is responsible come apart, allowing us to meet both desiderata. Self-deceptive beliefs are often formed by unconscious mechanisms closely analogous to “System 1” processes of dual-systems psychology, or by other mechanisms of motivated reasoning. The nascently self-deceptive subject then acquiesces in the comforting belief and commits an epistemic failure by allowing it to persist. If this is done for motivationally biased reasons – for example, preferring that the belief in question be true – then the subject is self-deceived and is blameworthy for her epistemic omission.
... For a typical account of intentionalism seeDavidson (1985); for deflationism seeMele (2001); for a more elaborate introduction to this debate seeDeweese-Boyd (2012). ...
... Several different theories for explaining self-deception have been proposed. Intentionalists, such as Davidson (1985), hold that we should model the phenomenon on interpersonal deception. Such cases involve a deceiver who believes that ~p and who convinces a victim, the deceived, that p. ...
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A major problem posed by cases of self-deception concerns the inconsistent behavior of the self-deceived subject (SDS). How can this be accounted for, in terms of propositional attitudes and other mental states? In this paper, we argue that key problems with two recent putative solutions, due to Mele and Archer, are avoided by “the shifting view” that has been advanced elsewhere in order to explain cases where professed beliefs conflict with actions. We show that self-deceived agents may possess highly unstable degrees of belief concerning the matters about which they are self-deceived.
... Pears viewed the subject-self as "a small temporary system, like a camp set up for the duration of a particular campaign and then abandoned, and the force that splits it off from it is an ordinary wish" (Pears, 1985, p. 77). The desire to avoid accepting what the requirement of total evidence counsels causes this functional isolation (Davidson, 1985). ...
Book
On Multiple Selves refutes the idea that a human being has a single unified self. Instead, David Lester argues, the mind is made up of multiple selves, and this is a normal psychological phenomenon. Lester expands on his earlier work on the phenomenon, illuminating how a “multiple-self theory of the mind” is critically necessary to understanding human behavior. Most of us are aware that we have multiple selves. We adopt different “facade selves” depending on whom we are with. Lester argues that contrary to the popular psychological term, “false self,” these presentations of self are all part of us, not false; they simply cover layers of identity. He asserts that at any given moment in time, one or another of our subselves is in control and determines how we think and act. Lester covers situations that may encourage the development of multiple selves, ranging from post-traumatic stress resulting from combat to bilinguals who speak two (or more) languages fluently. Lester’s views of multiple selves will resonate with readers’ individual subjective experience. On Multiple Selves is an essential read for psychologists, philosophers, and social scientists and will fascinate general readers as well.
... It affects directly reasons for belief and, by extension, reasons for action. While there are competing conceptualisations of this phenomenon (Bach 1981;Davidson 2004;Mele 1987), there is a clear overlap on paradigm cases: a believer is faced with some compelling evidence that something is the case; yet, she strongly desires this not to be so. Viewed through the lens of her partial motivation, the unwelcome evidence is recast as consistent with, if not favourable to, what she wants to be the case. ...
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The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents make sense of their actions, we identify a distinctive but underexplored space for assessing individual responsibility within collective actions. As a case in point, we concentrate on reason-giving for one's own involvement in systemic corruption. We characterize systemic corruption in terms of its public ‘unavowability’ and focus on the redescriptions to which corrupt agents typically resort to vindicate their actions (e.g., when they present bribes as tokens of appreciation for services rendered). Through a multidimensional approach to reason-giving, we show that the individual rationalisations these redescriptions point to are necessarily less-than-successful since they keep thedifferent categories of reasons involved in making sense of one’s own conduct misaligned. We argue that this involves a kind of tainted reasoning at the interface between epistemic vice and epistemic disadvantage. We then consider such test cases as self-deception, wilful ignorance, and actions on ‘autopilot’ to show that tainted reasoning is constitutive of systemic corruption, not merely caused by it. On this ground, we expound a new view of responsibility centred on reason-giving as the epistemic core which all responsibility assessments track. To demonstrate the interest of this view, we compare it with existing alternatives revolving around the ideas of accountability and attributability. We conclude by showing how our understanding of responsibility can shed new light on the analysis and normative assessment of an agent’s responsible ignorance.
... There are at least three groups of theorists who disagree with this condition. The first group pertains to those who maintain that SD is an analogue of interpersonal deception (Davidson, 1985;Pears, 1985;Rorty, 1988, Bermudez, 2001, and thus consider that condition (1) is not enough. ...
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Cases of twisted self-deception (SD, from hereon) where the self-deceiver ends up believing that p despite not wanting that p posed as a challenge to the current intentional and non-intentional accounts of SD. I argue that attempts to provide explanation to these cases within their respective accounts failed because they also fail to appreciate the role of emotions and desires as motivating influences in SD. The conditions they set for entering SD are more suitable for the straight cases where S believes that p because of the desire that p. In this work, I comment Mele’s list of conditions for entering SD in acquiring a belief that p. I argue that like most accounts of SD his list of conditions is more suitable for straight cases. I am suggesting a modification on his list so as to accomodate the twisted cases as well.
... However, a natural flaw in the brain is that it sometimes produces a "short circuit" and can send a wrong sense to individuals and cause wrong behavioral decisions. Individuals, however, still believe in the wrong guidance provided by the brain, and this is what we often call "self-deception" (Davidson, 1985). Mitchell (2000) proposed that self-deception refers to the fact that even though there are things that people insist are contrary to the facts, they still adhere to a positive belief in these things. ...
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The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of self-control and social status on self-deception. The present study adopted a forward-looking paradigm to investigate how self-control and social status influence self-deception. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to complete 10 questions, after they predicted and completed 40 questions (commonsense judgment materials) either with or without answer hints. The results indicated that the participants had higher predicted scores under conditions with answer hints compared with conditions without answer hints and that the predicted scores were much higher than the actual scores under conditions with answer hints. In Experiment 2, individuals with different self-control traits were chosen to perform the operation and induction of the perception of social status and then complete tests such as Experiment 1. The results showed that differences in the predicted scores between conditions with answer hints and those without answer hints were observed to be greater in individuals with low self-control traits than in individuals with higher self-control traits, however, such differences between individuals with higher and low self-control traits were only observed in conditions with low social status perception, not in the conditions with high social status perception. The findings indicated that compared with individuals with high self-control, low self-control individuals tended to produce more self-deception. In addition, high social status in the individuals’ perception could restrain the influence of low self-control on self-deception, while low social status in the individuals’ perception could increase the self-control’s influence on self-deception.
... This point bears emphasis. Davidson (1980Davidson ( , 1985 points out that irrationality is only possible against a background of rationality. And Daniel Dennett (1987), similarly, holds that in order to attribute mental states to a being at all, one must assume that being is mostly rational. ...
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This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large background of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious credence; seeing that difference in turn enables us to pose interesting normative questions about various mental states labeled "belief."
... Some have downgraded the self-deceptive act from fully intentional to something less than that (Mele, 1997); others have downgraded the self-deceptive state from fully doxastic to something than that (D'Cruz, In prep.;Gendler, 2007;Darwall, 1988); still others have thought it would suffice to give up on a certain degree of psychological unity (Davidson, 2004;Pears, 1984). ...
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This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account of self-deception. The account offered is independently plausible and avoids the main problems that plague other views. It also yields the result that some delusional subjects are self-deceived. The conclusion is not, however, that those subjects are blameworthy. Rather, a distinction is made between blameworthiness and ‘attributability’. States or actions can be significantly attributable to a subject—in the sense that they are expressions of their wills—without it being the case that the subject is blameworthy, if the subject has an appropriate excuse. Understanding delusions within this framework of responsibility and excuses not only illuminates the ways in which the processes of delusional belief formation and maintenance are continuous with ‘ordinary’ processes of belief formation and maintenance, it also provides a way of understanding the innocence of the delusional subject that does not involve the denial of agency.
... Although there are other approaches to the phenomenon of lying, such as Reboul (1994),Meibauer (2014), and the Davidsonian treatment of lying and deception(Davidson, 2004), I will use this view in order to distinguish the group of members (self-deception, deception, lies and manipulations) as technically different within the family of behaviours called generalized deception here. ...
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According to a growing literature in many fields of the social sciences and humanities defending the mind-modularity thesis, the brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on persuasive behaviour? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of argumentative moves are used within this mental design in a controversial social context.
... For a typical account of intentionalism seeDavidson (1985); for deflationism see Mele(2001); for a more elaborate introduction to this debate see Deweese-Boyd (2012). ...
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Chapter
La raison était supposée autrefois constituer ce qui unit les êtres humains. Elle n'a plus à présent de forme unitaire et dominante ; elle est au contraire fragmentée en une multitude de rationalités diverses, réelles ou supposées telles, qui coexistent de façon conflictuelle. Parmi les philosophes qui ont le plus compté au cours du XXe siècle, bien peu ont été des défenseurs de la raison et des Lumières ; et certains de ceux qui ont exercé (et continuent encore aujourd'hui à exercer) l'influence la plus considérable ont été ses adversaires declarés. Notre époque a même été confrontée à un processus d'"irrationalisation de la science", dont certains de nos maîtres à penser postmodernes ont essayé de nous convaincre qu'elle n'était en aucune façon le produit exemplaire de la raison et de l'effort pour tendre à une connaissance objective de la réalité.On peut néanmoins percevoir depuis quelque temps, à des signes divers, qu'au lieu de tenir la raison pour responsable de la plupart des maux de notre époque, il se pourrait bien que la seule solution qui s'offre désormais à nous soit de nous décider à lui accorder réellement une nouvelle chance. Jusqu'à quel point et à quel prix la raison peut-elle espérer réussir à reconquérir au moins en partie le rôle qu'elle a joué autrefois comme faculté d'unité et d'universalité ? C'est une entreprise évidemment difficile et problématique, qui suppose notamment que l'on ait répondu de façon suffisamment claire et convaincante à la question de savoir ce qui peut être conservé et ce qui doit être abandonné dans l'héritage des Lumières.
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Chapter
This chapter presents a formal model that constitutes the logical correlation to the conceptual schema for Explicit Aware Knowledge (EAK-Schema). Using neighbourhood semantics this model depicts the informational attitudes of a non-omniscient epistemic agent. It represents the awareness of and awareness that of the agent and the different combinations of them that result in Explicit Aware Knowledge, implicit knowledge and other forms of knowledge. The model also includes the formalisation of epistemic actions and discusses the main properties of the informational attitudes and the corresponding epistemic actions that change these attitudes.
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According to a growing literature in many fields of the social sciences and humanities defending the mind-modularity thesis, the brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on persuasive behaviour? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of argumentative moves are used within this mental design in a controversial social context.
Chapter
Insofar as the notion of systematic philosophy can make sense in the analytic world, Donald Davidson is a systematic philosopher. While he has never directly written about some of the most fundamental branches of philosophy, as the classic systematic philosophers used to do (he has never discussed ethical or political issues, for example), Davidson’s fundamental contributions to many fields, such as the philosophy of language and metaphysics, epistemology and the theory of action, the philosophy of mind and the theory of explanation form a complex, integrated whole in which any single part is interdependent on the others. This holistic feature of Davidson’s philosophy gives us clear evidence of its systematic character — besides being a major source of its notorious difficulty. However, in his quite formidable, but remarkably original philosophical system, two notions play a fundamental role: interpretation and causation.
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In the sense of irrationality that interests Davidson, an act or a belief is irrational if it is inconsistent or undesirable in the agent’s own terms, by criteria or in light of facts he or she implicitly acknowledges.1 What is philosophically interesting about this kind of ‘internal’ irrationality is the way it presses on the nature of the mental; for ‘holism’ tells us that something can be construed as a belief or an intention only if it is linked to other such states in those generally rational ways that internal irrationality apparently ignores.
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