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Handbook of Russian Information Warfare

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This handbook provides an introductory guide to the Russian concept of information warfare, including elements of cyber warfare. The guide also functions as a source book for further detailed research as required. The period since the Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 has seen a large number of new publications on the topic of Russian cyber and information warfare, of widely varying quality. Most of these works discuss a specific aspect of the challenge, and many were highly time-sensitive and are therefore already outdated. The aim of this handbook is instead to circumvent the need for extensive ab initio research by providing a guide to the Russian approach which is both comprehensive and durable. The guide takes as its basis material already in the public domain; this material has been collated from a wide range of disparate and sometimes obscure publications in Russian and other languages. Where possible, key concepts and approaches are illustrated and explained by direct quotations from senior members of the Russian defence and security communities. Unless otherwise specified, quotations in the text are from Russian sources, in many cases authoritative papers and essays on the theory and practice of warfare from military journals and conferences. Although not all the sources quoted are ordinarily available to the public, no classified material has been used. In addition to extensive citations in footnotes, each section concludes with a list of recommended reading for deeper research on specific topics. Russian-language titles here and in the citations have been translated into English. URLs for online access to publications have been provided where they are known and available.
Keir Giles
NATO Defense College
Collège de Défense de l’OTAN
November 2016 9
Keir Giles is an Associate Fellow of the
Royal Institute of International Aairs
(Chatham House) in London. He also
works with Conict Studies Research
Centre, a group of subject matter
experts in Eurasian security based in
Handbook of
Russian Information Warfare
Fellowship Monograph
Handbook of
Russian Information Warfare
Keir Giles
Rome, November 2016
NATO Defense College Cataloguing in Publication-Data:
Handbook of Russian Information Warfare
(NATO Defense College “NDC Fellowship Monograph Series”)
Fellowship Monograph 9
by Keir Giles
ISBN: 978-88-96898-16-1
e Research Division (RD) of the NATO Defense College provides NATO’s senior leaders with sound and timely analyses and
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Table of Contents
Notes on the Text 1
1. Introduction 3
2. Essential Concepts and Terminology 6
“Russian Cyber Warfare” 7
Implications 12
Further Reading 13
3. Aims and objectives 16
Strategic Victory 17
“Reexive Control” 19
Permissive Environment 22
Subversion and Destabilisation 23
Defensive Measures 27
Further Reading 30
4. History and Development 33
Russia’s reat Perception 36
e Arab Spring and Libya 41
Further Reading 44
5. Implementation 46
Cyber, Kinetic and Information Operations 49
Troll Farms and Botnets 54
Plausibility 57
Further Reading 60
6. Future Prospects 64
Internet Infrastructure 65
Convergence 68
Social Media Preparations 70
Targeting Personnel 71
Exploitation 72
Further Reading 75
7. Conclusion 76
Notes on the Text
is handbook provides an introductory guide to the Russian
concept of information warfare, including elements of cyber warfare.
e handbook’s target audience is NATO servicemen and ocials
who have not previously studied Russian principles of warghting, but
require an introduction to current and projected Russian operations in
the information and cyber domains. e guide also functions as a source
book for further detailed research as required.
e period since the Russian seizure of Crimea in early 2014 has
seen a large number of new publications on the topic of Russian cyber
and information warfare, of widely varying quality. Most of these works
discuss a specic aspect of the challenge, and many were highly time-
sensitive and are therefore already outdated. e aim of this handbook
is instead to circumvent the need for extensive ab initio research by
providing a guide to the Russian approach which is both comprehensive
and durable.
e guide takes as its basis material already in the public domain; this
material has been collated from a wide range of disparate and sometimes
obscure publications in Russian and other languages. Where possible,
key concepts and approaches are illustrated and explained by direct
quotations from senior members of the Russian defence and security
communities. Unless otherwise specied, quotations in the text are from
Russian sources, in many cases authoritative papers and essays on the
theory and practice of warfare from military journals and conferences.
Although not all the sources quoted are ordinarily available to the public,
no classied material has been used.
It should be noted that the majority of these Russian sources
present their research and ndings as describing not Russia’s own
approaches, but the approaches which they say are adopted by foreign
powers seeking to harm Russia. In some cases, the principles described
reect not home-grown theory, but Russian adoption of what it believes
to be Western practice.
In addition to extensive citations in footnotes, each section concludes
with a list of recommended reading for deeper research on specic topics.
Russian-language titles here and in the citations have been translated
into English. URLs for online access to publications have been provided
where they are known and available.
Translations from Russian are the author’s own unless otherwise
Handbook of Russian Information Warfare
1. Introduction
A new type of war has emerged, in which armed warfare has given up its
decisive place in the achievement of the military and political objectives of
war to another kind of warfare - information warfare.”1
Along with other Russian instruments of power, the concept of
information warfare has become the subject of sudden intense interest
in the West since the start of the crisis over Ukraine in 2014. However,
also in common with aspects of Russian power which had been largely
disregarded since the end of the Soviet Union, it is by no means a new
phenomenon. Instead, it reects enduring principles of the Russian
approach to competition between states, extensively updated and renewed
as part of Russia’s recent preparations for conict in conditions of overall
conventional inferiority. As described by President Vladimir Putin, “We
must take into account the plans and directions of development of the
armed forces of other countries… Our responses must be based on
intellectual superiority, they will be asymmetric, and less expensive.”2
Sections in this guide cover the basic concepts and terminology of
Russian information warfare; its aims and objectives; the history and
development of the current approach, and what can be learned from
it; features of current implementation by Russia; and nally, rapid and
ongoing evolution and possible future challenges. Two themes recur
1 V. Kvachkov, Спецназ России (Russia’s Special Purpose Forces), Voyennaya Literatura, 2004, http:// (accessed 21 July 2016). Vladimir Kvachkov is a former GRU
ocer, whose “theory of special operations,” including information operations, has reportedly been adopted
as the basis for Russian military instructional and training materials.
2 V. Putin, “Солдат есть звание высокое и почетное” (‘Soldier’ is an honourable and respected rank),
excerpts from annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Krasnaya zvezda, May 11,
2006, (accessed 22 June 2016).
throughout the handbook: the waging of information warfare during
notional peacetime; and the holistic, all-encompassing nature of the
“information” that is both the subject and the medium of the conict.
In the Russian construct, information warfare is not an activity
limited to wartime. It is not even limited to the “initial phase of conict”
before hostilities begin, which includes information preparation of the
battle space.3 Instead, it is an ongoing activity regardless of the state of
relations with the opponent;4 “in contrast to other forms and methods of
opposition, information confrontation is waged constantly in peacetime.5
e entry for “information war” (informatsionnaya voyna) in a glossary of
key information security terms produced by the Military Academy of the
General Sta makes a clear distinction between the Russian denition
- broad, and not limited to wartime - and the Western one – which it
describes as limited, tactical information operations carried out during
hostilities.6 For Russia, contest with the West in the information domain
has already begun. Ongoing information warfare is “a regular feature of
the country’s news and current aairs coverage.7
Furthermore, information warfare can cover a vast range of dierent
activities and processes seeking to steal, plant, interdict, manipulate, distort
or destroy information. e channels and methods available for doing
this cover an equally broad range, including computers, smartphones,
real or invented news media, statements by leaders or celebrities, online
troll campaigns, text messages, vox pops by concerned citizens, YouTube
videos, or direct approaches to individual human targets. Recent Russian
campaigning provides examples of all of the above and more.
3 P. Antonovich, “Cyberwarfare: Nature and Content,” Military ought, 2011, No.3, Vol.20, pp. 35-43.
4 R. Heickerö, “Emerging Cyber reats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information
Operations,” Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOI), 2010,, p. 20.
5 V.I. Slipchenko, “Future War (A Prognostic Analysis),” January 1998.
6 Словарь терминов и определени в области информационно безопасности, Voyennaya
Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba, 2nd Edition, Moscow Voyeninform, 2008.
7 As described in a BBC Monitoring media survey. See Stephen Ennis, “Russia’s xation with ‘information
war,’” BBC News, 26 May 2016,xation-with-information-war
(accessed 6 July 2016).
e overall eect of these tools and instruments in the information
domain is repeatedly described in Russian sources as being capable of
addressing highly ambitious “strategic tasks.” A strategic task such
as preventing a NATO consensus on meeting Article 5 commitments
when requested would be the ultimate prize for a Russian information
2. Essential Concepts and Terminology
For Russia, “information confrontation” or “information war” is a
broad and inclusive concept covering a wide range of dierent activities.8
It covers hostile activities using information as a tool, or a target, or a
domain of operations.
Consequently the concept carries within it computer network
operations alongside disciplines such as psychological operations
(PsyOps), strategic communications, Inuence, along with “intelligence,
counterintelligence, maskirovka, disinformation, electronic warfare,
debilitation of communications, degradation of navigation support,
psychological pressure, and destruction of enemy computer capabilities.9
Taken together, this forms “a whole of systems, methods, and tasks to
inuence the perception and behavior of the enemy, population, and
international community on all levels.10
Russia sees superiority in this broad application of information warfare
as a key enabler for victory in current and future conict:
“Wars will be resolved by a skillful combination of military, nonmilitary,
and special nonviolent measures that will be put through by a variety of
forms and methods and a blend of political, economic, informational,
technological, and environmental measures, primarily by taking
advantage of information superiority. Information warfare in the new
conditions will be the starting point of every action now called the new
type of warfare, or hybrid war, in which broad use will be made of
the mass media and, where feasible, global computer networks (blogs,
8 e distinction between информационное противоборство, (informatsionnoye protivoborstvo),
information confrontation, and информационная вона (informatsionnaya voyna), information war, is the
subject of detailed debate in ocial Russian sources. e distinctions are of little practical impact for assessing
Russian approaches, and for simplicity, “information war” is the term adopted throughout this paper.
9 K. Mshvidobadze, “e Battleeld On Your Laptop,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 March 2011,
10 A.J.C. Selhorst, “Russia’s Perception Warfare,Militaire Spectator, 185 No. 4, 2016, p. 151.
various social networks, and other resources).”11
is blending and coordination between dierent informational tools
is a distinctive feature of how Russia aspires to prosecute information
warfare. Critics of NATO practice suggest that within the Alliance, this
coordination is by contrast conspicuous by its absence, as is a coherent
overall approach. According to one assessment of NATO’s own denitions:
“ere is still a lack of consensus when it comes to dening all the
elements that make up the strategic application of power in the
information domain. Regarding the use of terms like Information
Warfare (IW), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Inuence Operations
(IO), Strategic Communications (STRATCOM), Computer Network
Operations (CNO), and Military Deception (MILDEC), there is a lot
of confusion as there are numerous conicting denitions, and these
terms are used in dierent contexts to describe dierent objectives and
Yet in the Russian context, all these dierent disciplines form a unied
whole under the heading of information warfare.
“Russian Cyber Warfare”
One fundamental distinction between Russian and Western
approaches to information activities is the categorisation of computer
network operations (CNO) and other activities in cyberspace.
“Cyber” as a separate function or domain is not a Russian concept.
11 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания вон будущего:
проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems and assessments),
Voennaya Mysl’ (Military ought), No. 10, 2015, p. 44-45. Col. (Rtd) Sergey Chekinov is cited repeatedly in
this handbook. is reects both his extensive range of publications on this subject, and his position as head
of the Centre for Military Strategic Research of the Russian General Sta Academy and hence as a reliable
indicator of current trends of thought within the General Sta.
12 P. Brangetto and M. A. Veenendaal, “Inuence Cyber Operations: e Use of Cyberattacks in Support
of Inuence Operations,” in N.Pissanidis et. al. (eds.), 8th International Conference on Cyber Conict,
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, June 2016,les/
multimedia/pdf/CyCon_2016_book.pdf (accessed 20 June 2016).
e delineation of activities in the cyber domain from other activities
processing, attacking, disrupting or stealing information is seen as
articial in Russian thinking. In this context, “Distributed denial of
services attacks (DDoS), advanced [cyber] exploitation techniques and
Russia Today television are all related tools of information warfare.13
e phrase “cyber warfare” in Russian writing describes foreign
concepts and activities, which do observe this distinction between
information activities on computers and networks and those “in real life.
Consequently, searches for “cyber” in Russian sources primarily return
references to Western doctrine and thinking. It follows that any research
on Russian capabilities and intentions which includes the word “cyber”
risks providing fundamentally misleading results.
By extension, research on Russias “Cyber Command,” “cyber doctrine,
and “cyber capabilities” is also often a misdirected eort, since these entities
and concepts, even if they exist, are not named or described in these terms.
Persistent reporting that “Russia’s Ministry of Defense is establishing its
own cyber command,14 and related reports on boosting military cyber
capabilities,15 even when they have any basis in fact, appear to refer to very
dierent organisations and notions than the words suggest to NATO ears.
At the same time it must be emphasised that verication of open source
reporting of organisational developments in the parts of the Russian Armed
Forces and other government bodies which prosecute not only CNO but
other aspects of information warfare is extremely challenging, given their
deeply classied nature.16 Detailed and factual public announcements,
13 D. J. Smith, ‘How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare,’ Defense Dossier, American Foreign Policy Council,
Issue 4, August 2012, p. 8,les/august2012.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016).
14 J. R. Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide reat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, Senate Armed Services Committee Statement for the Record, 26 February 2015.
15 Eugene Gerden, “Russia to spend $250m strengthening cyberoensive capabilities,” SC Magazine UK,
4 February 2016,ensivecapabilities/
printarticle/470733/ (accessed 14 June 2016).
16 Russia did at one point have a separate dedicated information security agency, the Federal Agency for
Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) – described in 2000 by one leading expert as “the
unocial Ministry of Information Warfare of the Russian Federation” – but this is long defunct, and its
of the kind made by the US when setting up Twenty-Fourth Air Force
(24 AF) or the UK when establishing 77 Brigade, simply do not happen
in Russia. As a result, discussion based on open sources of how Russia
organises and directs its information warfare eorts – in eect, who does
what within the Russian system – is largely speculative, and consequently
is not included in this handbook.
Instead of cyberspace, Russia refers to “information space,” and includes
in this space both computer and human information processing, in eect
the cognitive domain.17 Within information space, the closest Russian
thinking comes to separating out CNO from other activities is division
into the information-technical and information-psychological domains,
the two main strands of information warfare in Russian thinking.18 As
explained in one authoritative Russian textbook:
“Depending on the target of action, information warfare consists of
two types:
information-psychological warfare (to aect the personnel of
the armed forces and the population), which is conducted under
conditions of natural competition, i.e. permanently;
information-technology warfare (to aect technical systems which
receive, collect, process and transmit information), which is
conducted during wars and armed conicts.”19
It should be noted that “cyber” activities do not map directly to the
“information-technological” domain: as an integral part of information
warfare overall, they are also inherent and utilised in information-
functions absorbed into other government departments. See G. Bennett, e Federal Agency of Government
Communications & Information, Conict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, August 2000.
17 T.L.omas, “Information Security inking: A Comparison of U.S., Russian, And Chinese Concepts,”
Foreign Military Studies Oce, July 2001,
(accessed 15 July 2016).
18 T. L. omas. “Russian Information Warfare eory: e Consequences of August 2008,” in S. Blank
and R. Weitz (eds.). e Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, Carlisle,
US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 2010.
19 V. Kvachkov, Спецназ России (Russia’s Special Purpose Forces), op. cit.
psychological operations. It is also important to note that some operations
in both domains are undertaken “permanently” – regardless of the
notional state of cooperation or hostility between the opposing sides.
e key word therefore is information. In the Russian conceptual
framework, this information can be stored anywhere, and transmitted
by any means – so information in print media, or on television, or in
somebody’s head, is subject to the same targeting concepts as that held
on an adversary’s computer or smartphone. Similarly, the transmission
or transfer of this information can be by any means: so introducing
corrupted data into a computer across a network or from a ash drive is
conceptually no dierent from placing disinformation in a media outlet,
or causing it to be repeated in public by a key inuencer.
In keeping with the broader Russian understanding of “information
space,” the term “information weapon” has an impressively broad
application. “Information weapons” can be used in many more domains
than cyber, crucially including the human cognitive domain.20 But
even within CNO, an information weapon need not necessarily have a
destructive real-world eect in the style of Stuxnet. Instead, in keeping
with information warfare objectives more broadly, “inuencing the
transfer and storage of data means that the physical destruction of your
opponent’s facilities is no longer required.21
Importantly, multiple senior Russian ocials have reinforced the
point that open conict need not have been declared for hostile activity
in information space to begin. To take just one example, this includes
former Deputy Chief of the General Sta Lt-Gen Aleksandr Burutin,
who noted in January 2008 that information weapons can be “used in
an ecient manner in peacetime as well as during war.”22 is points
20 K. Giles and W. Hagestad, “Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Denitions in Chinese, Russian
and English,” in K. Podins et al (eds.), 5th International Conference on Cyber Conict, CCDCOE, Tallinn,
2013, (accessed 4 July 2016).
21 Prof. V. Lisovoy, speaking at Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, 5 October 2010.
22 Interfax-AVN news agency, 31 January 2008.
to another obvious asymmetry with NATO practice. As put by Mark
Laity, Chief of Strategic Communications, Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE):
“e Russians use information from a covert stage through six phases of
warfare to the re-establishment of victory. Information confrontation
is conducted in every phase, including covertly, in peace and in war.
Our doctrines do not allow us to do a lot of this stu till the ghting
basically starts.”23
At the same time, some previous Russian writers while discussing
the permanent nature of information confrontation have drawn a
distinction between its nature in peacetime and wartime. According to
this categorisation, peacetime is mostly characterised by covert measures,
reconnaissance, espionage, building capabilities and degrading those of
the adversary, and manoeuvring for advantage in information space.
Wartime measures, by contrast, are overtly aggressive, and include
“discrediting [adversary] leadership, intimidating military personnel
and civilians... falsication of events, disinformation, hacking attacks
and so forth.”24 Furthermore, “the main eort is concentrated on
achieving political or diplomatic ends, and inuencing the leadership
and public opinion of foreign states, as well as international and regional
organisations.”25 If measured by these criteria, recent Russian activities
in the information domain would indicate that Russia already considers
itself to be in a state of war.26
23 “Russia: Implications for UK defence and security,” First Report of Session 2016–17, House of
Commons Defence Committee, UK Parliament, 5 July 2016, p. 17.
24 I. Sharavov, “К вопросу об информационно воне и информационном оружии” (On the
issue of information war and information weapons), Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 10, 2000,
pp. 2-5; V. Malyshev, “Использование возможносте средств массово информации в локальных
вооруженных конфликтах” (Making use of the media in local armed conicts), Zarubezhnoye voyennoye
obozreniye, No. 7, 2000, pp. 2-8.
25 Yu. E. Donskov, O. G. Nikitin, “Место и роль специальных информационных операци при
разрешении военных конфликтов” (e place and role of special information operations in resolving
military conicts) Voyennaya mysl’, No. 6, 2005, pp. 17-23.
26 Multiple indicative examples include CNO targeting the United States in a practically overt manner,
and Russia’s new lack of concern at accompanying damage to its international reputation. See Max Fisher,
e scope and potentiality of information warfare in the Russian
conception should not be measured against more recent Western concepts
of information operations, or information activities, and in particular
it should not be confused with cyber operations. e Ukraine conict
has provided clear demonstrations of how Russia sees cyber activity
as a subset, and sometimes facilitator, of the much broader domain of
information warfare.27
In the period since 2014, Russian information warfare has commonly
come to be identied in non-specialist literature with the simple
distribution of disinformation. But the Russian approach is much
broader than simply sowing lies and denial, for instance maintaining that
Russian troops and equipment are not where they plainly are. Instead,
Russian state and non-state actors have exploited history, culture,
language, nationalism, disaection and more to carry out cyber-enhanced
disinformation campaigns with much wider objectives. According
to veteran US scholar of Russian information warfare principles Tim
omas, writing in 1998:
[Russia’s] dierent prisms of logic may oer totally dierent conclusions
about an information operation’s intent, purpose, lethality, or
encroachment on sovereignty; and this logic may result in new methods
to attack targets in entirely non-traditional and creative ways.28
e Western approach to cyber defence has typically focused on
technical responses to technical threats, largely disregarding the interface
“In D.N.C. Hack, Echoes of Russia’s New Approach to Power,” e New York Times, 25 July 2016, http:// (accessed 15 September 2016).
27 For analysis of how this is implemented, see chapters in Kenneth Geers (ed.), “Cyber War in Perspective:
Russian Aggression against Ukraine,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE),
December 2015. See also M. Aaltola, “Cyber Attacks Go Beyond Espionage: e Strategic Logic of State-
sponsored Cyber Operations in the Nordic-Baltic Region,” Finnish Institute of International Aairs Brieng
Paper 200 (2016), 29 August 2016, http://www.ia./en/publication/606/cyber_attacks_go_beyond_
espionage/ (accessed 15 September 2016).
28 T. omas, “Dialectical versus Empirical inking: Ten Key Elements of the Russian Understanding of
Information Operations,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 1998, Vol.11, No.1, pp. 40-62.
with information warfare in the broad sense. is approach is entirely apt
for some persistent or background threats, but not always sucient for a
wider and more holistic approach like the one adopted by Russia.29
In other words, the West may be prepared to face “pure” cyber
challenges, but the capabilities and intentions embraced by Russia and
discussed in detail in later chapters show that it also needs to be prepared
for information war when these are melded with disinformation,
subversion, kinetic and EW operations, with highly ambitious aims up
to and including regime change in the target state.
Further Reading
In English
Dr A. Foxall, Putin’s Cyberwar: Russia’s Statecraft in the Fifth Domain, Policy
Paper No. 9 (2016), Henry Jackson Society Russia Studies Centre, May 2016.
(Provides a convenient list of recent targeted Russian cyber attacks.)
T. omas, inking Like a Russian Ocer: Basic Factors and Contemporary
inking on the Nature of War, Foreign Military Studies Oce, April 2016,
A%20Russian%20Ocer_monograph_omas%20(nal).pdf (accessed
22 June 2016).
(A guide to key elements of the framework of Russian planning and evaluation at
the strategic and operational level, in information warfare and beyond.)
K. Giles, “Russias Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,” in C. Czosseck
et al (eds.), 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conict, NATO
CCDCOE, Tallinn, June 2012,
29 P. Maldre, “e Many Variants of Russian Cyber Espionage,” Atlantic Council, 28 August 2015, http://
(accessed 13 July 2016).
“Stage 5: Information Warfare” in A. Grigas, Beyond Crimea: e New
Russian Empire, Yale University Press, 2016, pp. 44-56.
Unwala and S. Ghori, “Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War
and the Russia-Ukraine Conict,Military Cyber Aairs, Volume 1, Issue 1,
J. Weedon and L. Galante, “Intelligence Analysts Dissect the Headlines:
Russia, Hackers, Cyberwar! Not So Fast,” FireEye Blogs, March 12, 2014,
J. Darczewska, “Russias armed forces on the information war front. Strategic
documents,” OSW Studies, 27 June 2016,
In Russian
“Словарь терминов и определени в области информационно
безопасности” (Dictionary of terms and denitions in the eld of
information security), Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba, 2nd
Edition, Moscow Voyeninform, 2008.
(is glossary of key Russian information security concepts is highly instructive,
especially as it illustrates clearly many of the divergences between Russian and
Western thinking on the nature of information warfare and computer network
operations. In particular, it includes no entry for the term “cyber warfare.”)
“Концептуальные взгляды на деятельность Вооруженных Сил
Россиско Федерации в информационном пространстве” (Conceptual
Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information
Space), Russian Ministry of Defence, 22 December 2011,
science/publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle (accessed 22
June 2016).
(A Russian military cyber proto-doctrine. Its explanation of how the Russian
Armed Forces see their role in cyberspace is interesting but incomplete, focusing
on situational and threat awareness and force protection, with no mention
whatsoever of oensive cyber or information activity.)
3. Aims and objectives
Recently published Russian military theory gives information warfare
an increasingly prominent role. Recognition that Russia cannot compete
directly in conventional terms with NATO has led to persistent emphasis
in public statements on nding asymmetric responses. Information
warfare is presented as one of these responses, and specically as a means
of assuring victory in armed conict by predetermining the outcome:
“Information and psychological warfare will come on top of all forms
and methods of operations in future wars to achieve superiority in troop
and weapon control and to erode the morale and psychological spirit
of the opposing side’s armed forces personnel and population. Indeed,
information warfare and psychological operations lay much of the
groundwork for victory.” 30
But in its more ambitious descriptions, information warfare is
considered capable of avoiding the necessity of armed conict altogether
by achieving strategic goals on its own. As put by Mark Galeotti, Russia
is showing
“willingness to give primacy to non-kinetic operations, especially
information warfare. e traditional [Western] assumption has been
that subversion, deception, and the like are all ‘force multipliers’ to the
combat arms, not forces in their own right. At present, though, Russia
is clearly seeing the kinetic and the non-kinetic as interchangeable and
mutually supporting.”31
Information warfare campaigns can have a range of aims and objectives,
both oensive and defensive, all of which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Broad categories of objective are listed here in decreasing order
of ambition, from use as a stand-alone tool for achieving geopolitical
30 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания вон будущего:
проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future), op. cit., pp. 44-45.
31 Mark Galeotti, “Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?,” Small
Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27 No. 2, p. 291.
goals, to simple weakening of the adversary without necessarily any
specic end state in mind.
Strategic victory
Studies that consider the strategic eects of information warfare
have tended to conclude that for the West, “IW is almost by denition
countercommand and control warfare.32 But this is a more limited
construct than the Russian approach, which is far more ambitious. Recent
authoritative Russian papers on military theory state as follows:
“Under today’s conditions, means of information inuence have
reached a level of development such that they are capable of
resolving strategic tasks.33
“Winning information confrontations will result in the achievement
of strategic and political goals and in the defeat of an enemy’s armed
forces (and the capture of his territory, destruction of his economic
potential, and overthrow of his political system).34
Information activities as preparation for open conict are nothing
new. As put by James Sherr:
“One of the aims of the Russians pursuing what they have long called
the initial period of war is to incapacitate a state as much as possible
before that state is even aware that a conict has started. In Ukraine,
this was done very eectively. So at one dimension of activity, we are
dealing with something which is unfamiliar to us, but has been around
in Russian thinking since the 1920s.”35
32 S. Blank, “Can Information Warfare Be Deterred?” Defense Analysis 17, No. 2 (2001), p. 132.
33 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Влияние непрямых дестви на характер современно
воны” (e inuence of the indirect approach on the nature of modern warfare), Voyennaya mysl’, No. 6
2011, pp. 3-13.
34 V. Slipchenko, “Информационны ресурс и информационное противоборство” (Information
Resources and Information Confrontation) Armeyskiy sbornik, October 2013, p. 52.
35 Oral evidence: Russia: Implications for UK Defence and Security, HC 763, House of Commons
Defence Committee, 1 March 2016,
But in more recent constructs, involvement of conventional military
forces is reduced to a minimum, and they are replaced by eective use of
the internet:
“Of great importance here is the use of the global internet network to
exert a massive, dedicated impact on the consciousness of the citizens
of states that are the targets of the aggression. Information resources
have become one of the most eective types of weapon. eir extensive
employment enables the situation in a country to be destabilized from
within in a matter of days… In this manner, indirect and asymmetric
actions and methods of conducting hybrid wars enable the opposing
side to be deprived of its actual sovereignty without the state’s territory
being seized.” 36
In fact, senior Russian ocers have suggested that information eects
– including using the internet to aect mass consciousness - can in some
cases replace armed intervention altogether.37
It can be seen that the ultimate aim of this highly ambitious
implementation of information warfare is in eect regime change.
Importantly, this is achieved not only by targeting the ruling regime
itself, or its armed forces, but also the population as a whole:
“…the main aim of information-psychological conict is regime change
in the adversary country (through destroying the organs of government);
by means of mass inuence on the military-political leadership of the
(accessed 5 July 2016).
36 V. Gerasimov, “По опыту Сирии” (Based on the experience of Syria), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 9
March 2016,les/pdf/VPK_09_624.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016).
37 A. V. Kartapolov, “Уроки военных конфликтов, перспективы развития средств и способов их
ведения. Прямые и непрямые дествия в современных международных конфликтах” (Lessons of
military conicts and prospects for the development of means and methods of conducting them. Direct and
indirect actions in contemporary international conicts,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the
Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2015, pp. 28-29.
At the time of writing, Col-Gen Andrey Kartopolov is the commander of Russia’s NATO-facing Western
Military District, whose forces have been substantially augmented under his command. His previous post was
head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Sta. As such, it can be assumed that he is one of the
best-informed individuals in Russia on plans to initiate or resist confrontation with NATO.
adversary achieving as a minimum an increase in the amount of
time available for taking command decisions and lengthening the
operational cycle; by means of inuence on the mass consciousness of
the population – directing people so that the population of the victim
country is induced to support the aggressor, acting against its own
“Reexive control
Reexive control is the term used to describe the practice of
predetermining an adversary’s decision in Russia’s favour, by altering key
factors in the adversary’s perception of the world.39 As such, it represents
a key asymmetric enabler to gain critical advantages, neutralising
the adversary’s strengths by causing him to choose the actions most
advantageous to Russian objectives.40
Signicantly, the phrase “reexive control” is far more frequently
encountered in recent Western writing about Russian information warfare
principles than in original Russian sources. In Russian public discussion,
the term appears to have been superseded, and at least partially replaced
by “perception management” with a meaning similar to the Western
understanding of this approach. e Russian phrase “рефлексивное
управление” (additionally, “рефлексивны контроль”) now
primarily refers to “reexive practice” in an educational or personnel
management context. Nevertheless, given its widespread application in
Western analysis, and the absence of a suitable replacement, “reexive
38 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions: eory And
Practice), Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk No. 1 (46), 2014, p. 106.
39 An accessible summary of the Russian-language literature on principles of reexive control is available
in C. Kasapoglu, Russia’s Renewed Military inking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reexive Control, Research Paper
121, NATO Defense College, 25 November 2015,
(accessed 23 June 2016).
40 See M. Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Report I, September 2015, p. 9.
control” continues to oer a suitable descriptor for information activity
of this kind.
An information campaign within this category need not be limited
to inuencing a single decision. Similarly to a skilful barrister cross-
examining a witness, reexive control can lead the adversary to make a
series of decisions that successively discard options that would improve
their position, until they are nally faced with a choice between bad and
worse, either of which options would favour Russia.
Senior British analyst Charles Blandy describes the process as follows:
“Traditionally the Russian military mind, as embodied in the General
Sta, looks further ahead than its Western counterpart, on the basis
that ‘foresight implies control.’ Having made the ‘decision,’ the military
mind works backwards from the selected objective to its present position.
Subsidiary goals are identied for achieving the objective. e Soviet
and Russian General Stas over a long period of time have studied
the application of reexive control theory both for deception and
disinformation purposes in order to inuence and control an enemy’s
decision making processes, for:
Control of an opponent’s decision is achieved by means of providing
him with the grounds by which he is able logically to derive his own
decision, but one that is predetermined by the other side. is can be
By applying the pressure of force.
By assisting the opponent’s formulation of an appreciation of the
initial situation.
By shaping the opponent’s objectives.
By shaping the opponent’s decision making algorithm.
By the choice of the decision making moment.”41
41 C. Blandy, Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: e Russo-Georgian Five Day War, Defence Academy of
the United Kingdom, March 2009, http://conles/04.pdf (accessed 23 June 2016). is
is is a far broader approach than pure deception, or providing an
adversary commander with false operational information on which to
base his decision. Instead of consisting simply of disinformation, reexive
control implies a compound programme of targeting decision-making
factors through multiple vectors. e Russian General Sta Military
Academy’s glossary of information security terms denes “agitation
(агитация) as “one of the forms of information-psychological inuence
on the emotional plane of the target or group of targets with the aim
of achieving a specic psychological state which will lead to active and
specic actions being taken.”42 More general and less specic propaganda
and counter-propaganda eorts also play a role in establishing the
information background for decision-making.
Critically, as with strategic objectives above, the target for reexive
control activity need not be limited to key decision-makers, but can
include broader sections of the population as well – mass as well as
individual cognitive domains:
“e targets for inuence are both mass and individual consciousness.
ose ‘honoured’ with individual inuence are those persons whose
decisions determine issues of interest to the adversary party (i.e. the
president, the prime minister, head of the Ministry of Foreign Aairs,
diplomatic representatives, commanders of military formations and
so on). Information inuence involves distorting facts, or envisages
imposing on the target person emotional impressions which are
favourable to the inuencer.”43
case study argues that reexive control was in play against Georgia in the lead-up to the armed conict with
Russia in August 2008.
42 “Словарь терминов и определений в области информационной безопасности” (Dictionary
of terms and denitions in the eld of information security), Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba, 2nd
Edition, Moscow Voyeninform, 2008, p. 6.
43 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions: eory And
Practice), op. cit., p. 105.
Permissive environment
Russia seeks to inuence foreign decision-making by supplying polluted
information, exploiting the fact that Western elected representatives
receive and are sensitive to the same information ows as their voters.
When disinformation delivered in this manner is part of the framework
for decisions, this constitutes success for Moscow, because a key element
of reexive control is in place.
However, even if disinformation is not successfully inserted into the
policy-making chain, and only spreads in mass and social media, the
eect can be to create a permissive public opinion environment where
Russian narratives are presented as factual. Moscow’s potential gain at
this level of inuence is to win public support in adversary nations, and
thereby attenuate resistance to actions planned by Russia, in order to
increase their chances of success and reduce the likelihood of damaging
adverse reactions by the international community.
In some cases, rather than challenging or promoting specic facts, these
eorts are aimed at framing an ongoing debate in a manner favourable
to the end state desired by Russia.44 is can include the promotion of
specic narratives designed to constrain NATO freedom of action to
make defensive preparations,45 some of which have achieved striking
success in penetrating academic debate.46
Even responsible media reporting can inadvertently lend authority to
false Russian arguments. To take one example which is topical at the
44 As described in a study focusing on the Czech Republic: T. Wesolowsky, “Kremlin Propaganda In Czech
Republic Plays Long Game To Sow Distrust In EU,” RFE/RL, 16 June 2016,
czech-kremlin-propaganda-plays-long-game-sow-eu-distrust/27802234.html (accessed 24 June 2016).
45 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Russia’s myths about NATO: Moscow’s propaganda ahead of the NATO Summit,”
Federal Academy for Security Policy Working Paper No. 15/2016, undated,
baks010/les/working_paper_15_2016.pdf (accessed 24 June 2016).
46 As, to take just one example, in “Intellectual level of British leadership so low, it’s shocking - European
politics scholar,” RT, 19 February 2016,
british-leadership/ (accessed 24 June 2016). See also Taras Kuzio, “When an academic ignores inconvenient
facts,” New Eastern Europe, 21 June 2016,
books-and-reviews/2035-when-an-academic-ignores-inconvenient-facts (accessed 24 June 2016).
time of writing, in reporting on Canada’s status as a framework nation
for NATO’s multinational presence in Latvia, Canadian state broadcaster
CBC informed the public that the move “could be seen as a provocation,”
since NATO had “signed a treaty” with Russia in which it “explicitly
agreed not to station troops along the Russian border in former satellite
states.”47 ese are the terms in which Russia would wish the NATO-
Russia Founding Act to be interpreted, rather than what the Act actually
says; and description as “a provocation” is characteristic of Russian
statements. e result is that the Canadian public has now been informed
by its state media that Canada’s actions are in breach of NATO treaty
commitments to Russia.48
Individual examples like this may appear trivial; but in order to gauge
their eect, they have to be considered en masse and across all NATO
nations. e eect is even greater when, as in the CBC example above,
Russian narratives are repeated and validated by ocial and trusted
national media sources.
ese narratives need not be specically related to current events.
Historical events too can be distorted or selectively presented in order
to inculcate a world view which justies Russian actions. As described
by Estonia’s Internal Security Service, “Russia’s inuence operations in
the eld of history have always been an integral part of Moscow’s foreign
Subversion and Destabilisation
At the lower end of the scale of ambition of information warfare
47 Murray Brewster, “Canada to send troops to Latvia for new NATO brigade,” CBC, 30 June 2016, (accessed 15 July 2016).
48 For a detailed and insightful study on the roots of confusion over this section of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act, see W. Alberque, “’Substantial Combat Forces’ in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations,”
NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 131, July 2016,
php?icode=493 (accessed 15 September 2016).
49 Annual Review 2015, Estonian Internal Security Service, 2015,les/
public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202015.pdf pp. 12-15 (accessed 4 July 2016).
comes broad-based, long-term weakening and undermining of adversary
societies overall, without necessarily any specic short-term goal other
than increasing Russias relative strength in a classic zero-sum approach.
e underlying approaches of activities like this, and some guiding
principles, are broadly recognisable as reinvigorated aspects of subversion
campaigns from the Cold War era and earlier.50 At that time, aspects
of these campaigns were referred to as “active measures” in a sometimes
misleading adoption of Soviet terminology of the time. According to a
major Finnish study, active measures constitute:
“certain overt and covert techniques for inuencing events and
behaviour in, and the actions of, foreign countries. [ey] may entail
the following objectives:
inuencing the policies of another government
undermining condence in its leaders and institutions
disrupting the relations between other nations
discrediting and weakening governmental and nongovernmental
A key element of subversion campaigns is “spreading disinformation
among the population about the work of state bodies, undermining their
authority, and discrediting administrative structures.”52 is contributes
to the “dismay” eect in former NATO press ocer Ben Nimmo’s short
characterisation of Russian disinformation aims as to “dismiss, distort,
distract, dismay,”53 and can be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in
50 Victor Madeira, ‘Haven’t We Been Here Before?’, Institute of Statecraft, 30 July 2014, http://www.; ‘Soviet Propaganda In Western Europe’,
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Oce, March 1982,
51 K. Pynnöniemi and A. Rácz (eds.), Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conict in
Ukraine, FIIA Report No. 45, undated, p. 38
52 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions: eory And
Practice), op. cit., pp. 106.
53 Ben Nimmo, “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda Machine Works, and How to
the target society, particularly freedom of expression and democratic
principles. e range of targets is broad. Subversion campaigns can aim:
“to involve all public institutions in the country it intends to attack,
primarily the mass media and religious organizations, cultural
institutions, nongovernmental organizations, public movements
nanced from abroad, and scholars engaged in research on foreign
grants. All these institutions and individuals may be involved in a
distributed attack and strike damaging point blows [sic; presumably
точечные удары, more commonly translated as surgical strikes]
at the country’s social system with the purported aims of promoting
democracy and respect for human rights.54
An obvious target for distributing disinformation is the media, and a
direct link is seen between media campaigns and a society’s capacity to
“e mass media today can stir up chaos and confusion in government
and military management of any country and instill ideas of violence,
treachery, and immorality, and demoralize the public. Put through this
treatment, the armed forces personnel and public of any country will
not be ready for active defense.”55
But bodies and organisations other than the media can also be
targeted. At the time of writing, the US Senate Intelligence Committee is
advocating the reconstitution of an organisation within the intelligence
community that among its duties “would also investigate the funding of
front groups — or cover organizations for Russian operations — ‘covert
broadcasting, media manipulation’ and secret funding.”56
Counter It,” 19 May 2015,
machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/ (accessed 27 June 2016).
54 S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, “e Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” Military
ought (English edition), No. 4 2013. Emphasis as in original publication.
55 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of Wars and eir Impact on a Country’s
Preparations for a Future War,Military ought (English edition), No 4 2012. pp. 24-25.
56 Ali Watkins, “Senate Committee Looks To Revive Cold-War Era Body To Catch Russian Spies,”
Buzzfeed, 21 June 2016,
Direct links between Russia and political parties representing
the dissatised at either end of the political spectrum have become
increasingly well documented.57 But a much wider range of organisations
than established political parties can be used for subversive purposes:
“It is preferable to have a foreign nonprot nongovernmental
organization(NGO) that could best contribute to the attainment of
the goal of a hybrid operation. It can be established beyond the Russian
Federation under the rules of a foreign country [and] can draw its
members from residents of the disputed territory and its political
objectives will include discrediting the current government agencies,
eroding the prestige and public standing of the law enforcement
agencies, particularly the armed forces, buying up the mass media and
conducting information operations purportedly to protect democracy,
and nominating delegates for local government elections, and
inltrating them into the elected government authorities.”58
Once again it should be emphasised that when Russian military
theorists are describing these approaches, they are in the majority of
cases (including this last citation) presented as campaigns planned by
a hostile West against Russia, rather than as measures which Russia
itself is implementing. In addition, funding political parties or other
organisations with a view to promoting a specic agenda can hardly be
said to be a Russian invention. Nevertheless Russia can be seen adopting
and adapting these “lessons” from the West, within the framework of
existing information warfare theory. Furthermore, the adoption of
war-era-body-to-catch (accessed 22 June 2016).
57 As in A. Klapsis, “An Unholy Alliance: e European Far Right and Putin’s Russia,” Wilfried Martens
Centre for European Studies, undated,les/publication-les/
far-right-political-parties-in-europe-and-putins-russia.pdf (accessed 18 July 2016). See also P. Foster and M.
Holehouse, “Russia accused of clandestine funding of European parties as US conducts major review of
Vladimir Putin’s strategy,” Daily Telegraph, 16 January 2016,
europe/russia/12103602/America-to-investigate-Russian-meddling-in-EU.html and Alina Polyakova, “Why
Europe Is Right to Fear Putin’s Useful Idiots,” Foreign Policy, 23 February 2016, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2016/02/23/why-europe-is-right-to-fear-putins-useful-idiots/ (both accessed 18 July 2016)
58 I. N. Vorobyov and V. A. Kiselev, “Гибридные операции как новы вид военного противоборства”
(Hybrid operations as a new form of armed conict), Voyennaya mysl’, No. 5 2015, pp. 41-49.
damaging actions with no specic objective in mind beyond weakening
and undermining competitor societies should not be seen as a recent
innovation, but rather in the mainstream of Russian approaches from
Soviet times and even before. As described in 1839:
“Russia sees Europe as a prey which our dissensions will sooner or later
deliver up to her; she foments anarchy among us in the hope of proting
by a corruption she promotes because it is favourable to her views.”59
Defensive Measures
Awareness of the destructive potential of the techniques outlined
above has led Russia to re-institute control over the information to which
its own population is exposed.
For Russia, this was part of implementing the requirements of its
information security doctrine of “securing national information space,
and protecting it against “breaches.” Both of these isolationist concepts
are unfamiliar for the West, but were traditional security preoccupations
for Russia both during and before Soviet times, recognizing the enduring
concern that “the political system of Russia could not withstand twenty
years of free communication with Western Europe.60
Foreign ownership of media outlets has been limited, rebroadcasting
licences withdrawn, and independent sources of news closed or
constrained.61 One repeated element in this process is commercial control
over media companies being acquired by Kremlin-friendly individuals,
who then directly or subtly steer the editorial approach.62 What remains
of Russia’s free media has largely been either marginalized or intimidated
59 A. de Custine, Lettres de Russie: La Russie en 1839, P. Nora (ed.), Gallimard, 1975.
60 Ibid.
61 M. Tsvetkova and P. Devitt, “Russian editors ‘red over stories that irked ocials’,” Reuters, 13 July
2016, (accessed 14 July 2016).
62 ‘Russian media rms: Interesting news’, e Economist, 8 November 2014,
into compliance.63
In many cases mainstream journalism has reverted to its former role of
transporting leadership messages into the public space.
e key role of television in inuencing Russian society is well
documented, and research conrms the driving role of this government-
controlled medium in forming opinion even on the (comparatively)
free internet.64 e alternative reality broadcast on Russian television is
unrecognisable from real life.65 “State television — the well-funded and
primary news source for most Russians — broadcasts slickly produced
programs that focus on news that is either at sharp variance with that
available in the West or is cherry-picked to bolster the Kremlin’s image.”66
But contrary to Western expectations, this does not automatically lead to
its content or narratives being rejected, even by the educated and well-
travelled sections of the Russian-speaking audience.67
Information control is further tightened by measures such as
censoring school textbooks, so that Russians develop the approved vision
not only of current events but also of history.68 And in a direct echo of
Soviet and Tsarist repression of thought, Russia has already begun the
63 Andrei Malgin, ‘Russia’s State Media Get Away With Murder’, Moscow Times, 4 November 2014, http:// See
also ‘Russian media rms: Interesting news’, e Economist.
64 Christina Cottiero, Katherine Kucharski, Evgenia Olimpieva and Robert W. Orttung, ‘War of words:
the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet’, Nationalities Papers: e Journal of Nationalism
and Ethnicity, March 2015.
65 Gary Shteyngart, ‘Out of My Mouth Comes Unimpeachable Manly Truth’, New York Times, 18
February 2015,
66 Michael Birnbaum, Russia’s Putin signs law extending Kremlin’s grip over media, Washington Post, 15
October 2014,
grip-over-media/2014/10/15/6d9e8b2c-546b-11e4-809b-8cc0a295c773_story.html (accessed 14 July 2016).
67 J. Szostek, “News media repertoires and strategic narrative reception: A paradox of dis/belief
in authoritarian Russia,” New Media & Society, 7 July 2016,
early/2016/07/01/1461444816656638.abstract (accessed 15 September 2016).
68 Sasha Mordovets and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Putin’s Friend Prots in Purge of Schoolbooks’, New York
Times, 1 November 2014,ts-in-
criminalisation of alluding to historical facts which are inconvenient for
current state narratives.69 ere is an important distinction between this
process and a Western academic tradition which can now accept “history”
as a competition of narratives and interpretations rather than a collection
of facts. Rather than selective emphasis and open debate, the current
(and traditional) Russian approach is reliant instead on enforced amnesia
regarding inconvenient events, and promotion of ocially-sponsored
e regaining of control over domestic information space has been a
continuous process dating almost from the arrival in power of President
Putin in 2000; but in recent years it has both accelerated and spread to
the previously unrestricted internet. Russians have become dramatically
more isolated from alternative sources of information.70 is isolation
is not total and hermetic in the same way as during periods of the Cold
War – it is still possible for interested Russians to access foreign media via
the internet if they wish. But internet usage monitoring, and ltering and
misleading translation of foreign media reports online, also contribute
to the isolating eect.71 e Russian Security Council is reported even
to have given consideration to the implications of the country operating
without internet access altogether.72
e consequences for NATO nations are twofold. First, the challenge
to strategic communications is evident: it is hard to counter Russian
disinformation about the role, nature and activities of NATO among the
Russian population when the Russian state is working hard to prevent or
inuence their access to this kind of undesirable information. In addition,
69 Halya Coynash, “Russian ned for reposting that the USSR & Nazi Germany invaded Poland,” Human
Rights in Ukraine, 1 July 2016, (accessed 7 July 2016).
70 See also the extensive review of this process by Jill Dougherty, ‘How the Media Became One of Putin’s
Most Powerful Weapons’, e Atlantic, 21 April 2015,
71 K. Giles, “Putin’s troll factories: How Moscow controls access to western media,” e World Today, July 2015,e_information_war_Putins_troll_factories (accessed 23 June 2016).
72 K. Giles, ‘As sanctions bite, could Russia isolate itself by switching o the net?’, e World Today,
November 2014.
isolation facilitates distortion. It is easy for Russian media to provide
accounts or translations of statements by foreign leaders or organisations
which are misleading or entirely false, without being challenged within
the country.73
Second, these eorts to isolate the Russian population from a true
picture of events both in the outside world and in their own country help
the Russian authorities promote the notion of a Russia under threat from
an aggressive, expansionist West, by preventing domestic media users
from measuring against reality. e result is broad acceptance, at least
in public, of the version of reality endorsed by the Russian state. One
damaging consequence is the tendency of Russian leadership gures to
come to believe their own propaganda. In this way too, there are echoes
of Soviet times, when one analyst could describe Soviet leaders’:
“psychological tendency to accept ultimately as real an image of the
external world which may have been utilized originally for purely
domestic purposes... the leadership may very well believe what it tells
its subjects about the external non-Soviet world and yet also recognize
the usefulness of this image as a means of exacting greater sacrices
from them.”74
e most dangerous implication of Russian leaders believing what
they tell their subjects is the possibility that they could also then act on
that belief.
Further Reading
General Principles:
E. Lucas and B. Nimmo, “Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win
73 “Lies, Damn Lies and Translation: Mucking With Quotes in Russian,”, 10 June 2016, (accessed 19
July 2016).
74 John Reshetar, Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior, New York: Doubleday, 1955, p. 9.
It?” CEPA Infowar Paper No. 1, November 2015.
A.J.C. Selhorst, “Russias Perception Warfare,Militaire Spectator, 185 No.
4, 2016.
P. Koshkin, “e paradox of Kremlin propaganda: How it tries to win hearts
and minds,” Russia Direct, 2 April 2015,
(accessed 30 June 2016).
K. Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and
Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Chatham House, March 2016,
west (accessed 15 July 2016).
Current Implementation:
B. Nimmo, “Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia’s propaganda machine
works, and how to counter it,, 15 May 2015, http://www.
M. van Herpen, Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy,
Lanham, Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, 2015.
S. D. Bachmann and H. Gunneriusson, “Russias Hybrid Warfare in the
East: e Integral Nature of the Information Sphere,” Georgetown Journal of
International Aairs: International Engagement on Cyber V (2015).
History and Background:
T. L. omas, “Russian Information Warfare eory: e Consequences of
August 2008” in S. Blank and R. Weitz (eds.), e Russian Military Today
And Tomorrow: Essays In Memory Of Mary Fitzgerald, US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.les/pub997.pdf (accessed 23 June 2016). pp. 265-300.
“Soviet Inuence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda,
1986-87,” US Department of State, August 1987.
4. History and Development
As with other domains of warfare, Russia’s current approach
to information war “grows from indigenous military and political
traditions.”75 is follows the general principle explained by Tim omas
that “in Russian, discussions of armed conict [terms and denitions] are
associated with thinking from decades ago, indicating a strong continuity
of thought in Russian military theory.76
e techniques and approaches currently on display represent the
culmination of an evolutionary process in Russian information warfare
theory and practice, seeking to revive well-established Soviet techniques of
subversion and destabilisation and update them for the internet age.77 For
all their innovative use of social media and the internet, current Russian
methods have deep roots in long-standing Soviet practice.78 Importantly,
this continuity of thought from former generations of information
activity practice is not replicated in the West, where two generations after
the end of the Cold War, Russian practices of information warfare have
caused widespread surprise.
e development of thought on new methods of transmission of
information warfare eects can be traced to initial recognition of the
transformative eect of digitisation on warghting itself, stemming
from discussion of the Revolution in Military Aairs and in particular
observation of United States operations in the 1991 Gulf War and
subsequent campaigns. Early analysis in this trend emphasised precision
guided munitions as the dening factor of a new generation of warfare, but
75 M. Galeotti, “Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? op. cit., pp. 282-301.
76 T. omas, inking Like a Russian Ocer: Basic Factors and Contemporary inking on the Nature of War,
Foreign Military Studies Oce, April 2016,inking%20
Like%20A%20Russian%20Ocer_monograph_omas%20(nal).pdf (accessed 22 June 2016).
77 Examined in greater detail in Keir Giles, “Russia’s Toolkit,” chapter in “e Russian Challenge,”
Chatham House, London, June 2015.
78 C. Kincaid, “How Putin Uses KGB-style ‘Active Measures’,” Accuracy in Media, 9 April 2014, http://
already recognised that “one attribute of future war will be ‘information
confrontation’... [since] information is becoming the very same kind of
weapon as missiles, bombs, torpedoes and so on.79 Some Russian military
thinkers were alert from the earliest stages to the opportunities provided
by the Internet for extending information warfare practice into a new
domain, in particular to attack adversary decision-making structures and
command and control networks.80
is was followed by recognition of the potential of hyperconnectivity
oered by the internet for providing direct accessibility to target audiences
for “information-psychological” as well as “information-technical”
eect. e realisation that “it turns out that one can penetrate a state’s
information networks in the simplest way through Internet channels
in addition to the traditional channels of radio, television and the mass
media81 implied that mass audiences could be reached with much greater
impact, and much less expense and eort, than previous techniques of
planting and disseminating disinformation; in eect, by means of “the
use of ‘mass information armies’ conducting a direct dialogue with
people on the internet.”82 e perception of information activities as an
asymmetric enabler was reinforced by their potentially very high return
on investment: “Information has become the same kind of weapon as a
missile, a bomb and so on [but it] allows you to use a very small amount
of matter or energy to begin, monitor and control processes whose matter
and energy parameters are many orders of magnitude larger.”83
In parallel with the attenuated power and capability of its conventional
armed forces, Russias capabilities in the information warfare domain were
79 V.I. Slipchenko, “Future War,” op. cit.
80 See V.M. Lisovoy, О законах развития вооруженно борьбы и некоторых тенденциях в области
обороны, Issue 5, 1993.
81 V.I. Slipchenko, “Future War,” op. cit.
82 P. Koayesov, ‘eatre of Warfare on Distorting Airwaves. Georgia Versus South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in the Field of Media Abuse. Fighting by eir Own Rules’, Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 18 January 2009.
83 Vladimir Mukhin, “История завоевания ‘четвертого фронта’” (History of conquering the “fourth
front”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 22 July 2016,
(accessed 15 September 2016).
repeatedly exposed as decient in the 1990s and early 2000s. Repeated
setbacks resulted from a failure both to realise that the previously available
networks of subversion, disinformation and malign inuence which were
used by the Soviet Union were no longer available; and to realise the true
nature and utility of the internet in a timely manner.
Signicant steps in the evolution of Russian thinking in this area
took place with each failure to achieve desired results in international
information campaigns. Specic examples were the rst and second
Chechen wars, each of which took place in a distinct media environment
at an early stage in the expansion and globalisation of the World Wide
Web.84 Russias performance in the information domain during the rst
intervention in Chechnya in 1994-6 was ocially characterized as “the
quintessence of helplessness in the information sphere.85
But it was the armed conict with Georgia in August 2008 which
provided the impetus to overhaul and transform Russia’s information
warfare eort, along with the whole of the Russian armed services.86 It
was at this point that Russia signicantly stepped up eorts to exploit the
internet as another medium for controlling information. Open debate
on the best response to the challenge included calls for the creation
of Information Troops, a dedicated branch that could manage the
information war from within the military.87 Reecting the full-spectrum
nature of the Russian information war concept, these troops would
84 For more detail on this process, see K. Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity
and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Chatham House, March 2016,
publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west (accessed 15 July 2016).
85 Speech by then Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov at plenary meeting of Russian Academy of Military
Sciences, 18 January 2003.
86 Despite this complete overhaul, one analysis has identied a number of techniques and approaches
already applied by Russian state media at this stage which are identiable as the prototypes of later eorts in
2014-16. See J. Rogoża and A. Dubas, ‘Russian Propaganda War: Media as a Long- and Short-range Weapon,’
Centre for Eastern Studies Commentary, Issue 9, 11 September 2008,
commentary_09.pdf (accessed 1 July 2016).
87 K. Giles, “Information Troops – A Russian Cyber Command?” Proceedings of the ird International
Conference on Cyber Conict, Tallinn, June 2011.
include hackers, journalists, specialists in strategic communications and
psychological operations, and, crucially, the essential linguists to overcome
Russia’s now perceived language capability decit. Heavy investment
in language capabilities began, in order to reach non-Russian-speaking
target audiences directly.
Russia’s “lessons learned” process after this conict included close study
of the U.S. experience of maintaining active psychological operations
units within the Armed Forces, contrasted with Russia’s failure to do
so in the post-Soviet period.88 It is suggested that this was subsequently
addressed by “the revival of psychological operations units both at army
and frontline levels, subordinated directly to the GRU.” e careful,
long-term and well-funded development of these capabilities contributes
to their eectiveness by comparison with countermeasures with Ukraine,
which has attempted to replicate the same processes from a standing start
and consequently launches disinformation and propaganda eorts that
can appear crude, clumsy and counter-productive.
But throughout this process the mainstream of Russian security
thought about the nature of information, and its potential as both
an opportunity and a threat, remained relatively unaected. Russias
continuity of thought was facilitated by a continuity of leadership. From
the turn of the century onward, with alumni of the former KGB running
the country, the KGB’s approach to information security once again
became dominant. is is most perceptible of all in Russias approach
to the free circulation of information as a threat to its own security and
Russias reat Perception
A key and consistent element throughout this development process
88 S. Kozlov and E. Groysman, “Спецназ зарубежья: Невидимы фронт психологическо воны:
американски опыт” (Special Forces abroad. Invisible front in psychological warfare: US experience),
Bratishka, (accessed 21 July 2016).
has been Russia’s perception of the information warfare threat to itself,
which also informs the country’s defensive and protective measures
against undesirable information from abroad outlined above.
e perceived threat is an existential one. e received wisdom in
Russia is that “information confrontation campaigns” are developed
by the West to compromise Russia’s national sovereignty and facilitate
regime change.
In historical terms, this view does have some justication. To the
extent that Mikhail Gorbachev’s declaration of glasnost’, or freedom of
expression, triggered processes that led to state collapse in the form of the
end of the Soviet Union, this freedom can be viewed as a direct challenge
to Russian statehood.
Russia’s emphasis on information as a whole as the contested space, and
the disinclination to treat activities in electronic media as any dierent
from any other sphere of information processing, results in part from
the unbroken descent of current Russian information security principles
from the Soviet approach to restricting and controlling information. e
position on the merits and dangers of information held by the KGB and
its successor organisations has been consistent since before the end of
the Soviet Union. e uncontrolled distribution and reproduction of
information online has from its very beginning been seen as just as much
of a threat to Russia as was, previously, the invention of the photocopier.89
is attitude gave rise to early strong resistance by the Russian state
security bodies to adoption of the internet. At parliamentary hearings in
late 1996 entitled “Russia and the Internet: e Choice of a Future,” a
senior information security ocial characterised the internet as a whole
as a threat to Russian national security.90 Also in the mid-1990s, leading
89 As has been colourfully described in A. Soldatov and I. Borogan, e Red Web: e Struggle Between
Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries, London, PublicAairs, 2015.
90 State Duma proceedings, 17 December 1996. See also A. Soldatov, “Фапси—общественности:
‘меньше знаешь—крепче спишь’” (FAPSI to the public: e less you know, the sounder you sleep,
Segodnya, 12 December 1999.
Russian thinkers on information warfare were describing information
weapons as “more dangerous than nuclear ones,” and warned against
joining the inherently insecure internet:
“Russia’s participation in international telecommunications and
information exchange systems is impossible without the comprehensive
resolution of the problems of information security.”91
e anomaly in Russian practice was that adoption of the internet took
place at a time when the security structures were in relative terms weaker,
and not able to prevent the process being driven by commercial entities.
But more recently, and in particular in the period from 2013 onwards,
their hold on online activity has been applied and reinforced with direct
support from President Putin. Measures of control over online content
and its distribution were consistently aspired to by the FSB, but have
only been noticeably implemented in the course of the last three years.
Nevertheless this does give rise to incongruities, and tension between
concepts of information security that were developed for print, television
and radio, and the realities of the internet as a medium for data
transmission which by default has no respect for borders or “national
information space.” ere is a direct conict between the Western
concept of the internet insisting on the free, unrestricted and ungoverned
ow of information, and the consensus espoused by Russia and like-
minded states, that places important caveats on the ow of information
and insists on the principle of national sovereignty in cyberspace.
In eect, Russia sees a threat from online content as well as code; from
hostile information carried via the internet as well as hostile software.
Russian media ocials have consistently committed to “restrictions of
rights and freedoms only in the interests of security;”92 but the balance
91 G. Smolyan, V. Tsygichko, and D. Chereshkin, “Оружие, которое может быть опаснее ядерного.
Реалии информационно воны” (A Weapon at May Be More Dangerous an a Nuclear Weapon:
e Realities of Information Warfare), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye , 18 November 1995.
92 “Щеголев: цензуры Интернета в России не допустят” (Shchegolev: Internet censorship will not
be allowed in Russia), Interfax, 20 January 2012,
(accessed 13 July 2016).
point between these two conicting interests is at variance with the
normal range in the West. An indicative example is the use of the SORM
system for monitoring internet usage by private citizens in Russia.
Far from being a secret programme, this is an openly avowed feature
of internet usage, and one which has since its inception been accepted
without visible thought or question by the vast majority of users.
But in addition to information from abroad, the apps and software
used to communicate via the internet are also subject to suspicion.
Russian government statements and orders have repeatedly highlighted
“the dangers of using foreign-made software and foreign commercial
internet services, such as instant messengers, by Russian civil servants...
this [has] allowed criminals and foreign intelligence specialists to
access both Russian state secrets in economic and defense sphere and
the personal data of Russian citizens.93 Here, too, there may be some
justication for this security concern. e relative lack of visible hostile
cyber activity during the conict between Russia and Ukraine has been
attributed, among many other factors, to widespread use of Russian
mail servers by Ukrainian ocials – so there is no need for Russia to
hack e-mail accounts that they already have access to by default. It is
not unreasonable to assume that foreign governments might be able to
induce service providers to do the same to Russia.
At the same time, conrmation bias does reinforce Russian perception
of unrelated new developments as part of a consistent hostile campaign.
Apparently unable to conceptualise spontaneous public expressions of
mass civic dissent, the Russian authorities considered that protests over the
State Duma election results in December 2011 were provoked by a U.S.
cyber/information warfare campaign against Russia.94 In 2016, Russian
93 “Foreign special services step up online operations targeting Russia - top security ocial,” RT, 15 June
2016, (accessed 4 July 2016).
94 Although the election protests were the most widely reported outside Russia, a trend of greater readiness
to engage in civic protest – facilitated by social media – had been noted over the preceding years. See Susan
de Nîmes (editor), Potential Challenges to Public Order and Social Stability in the Russian Federation, Conict
Studies Research Centre, August 2011, http://conles/20110810_CSRC_Russia_Social.
pdf (accessed 23 June 2016).
Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskiy explained that the Netix video
streaming service is nanced by the U.S. government as a method of
“entering the minds of every inhabitant of the Earth.95 Even Pokémon
Go (a virtual reality game widely, but perhaps briey, popular at the time
of writing) has been described in ocial Russian sources as a component
of Western information warfare,96 with Minister of Communications and
Mass Media Nikolay Nikirofov suggesting it was “created with the help of
certain intelligence agencies, who are collecting video information from
territories all over the world.97 e dierence between this argument and
measures to restrict Pokémon Go in the United States is indicative. In the
US, the game has been prohibited inside Department of Defense facilities
because it would broadcast the movements of users inside those locations,
including indicating the location of secure facilities where connected
devices are not permitted.98 In Russia, by contrast, the concern over its
use in public spaces is reminiscent of Soviet times, when for example
photographing everyday locations like bridges or railway stations was
prohibited because it would provide useful intelligence to the enemy on
transport capacity in the event of war.
Whether based on a realistic current threat appreciation or not, Russia’s
perception is that information campaigns in the broadest sense pose a
serious and growing threat to the country, implemented and perfected
by the United States and the West in the course of a series of regime
change operations over decades. e 2007 conference of the Academy
95 “Медински обвинил власти США в попытке «залезть в кажды телевизор» через Netix
(Medinskiy accuses US authorities of trying to “inltrate every television” through Netix), RNS, 22 June
Netix--2016-06-22/ (accessed 24 June 2016). English-language reporting available at
96 James Mashiri, “An Absurd Signal: Pokémon Conrms Russia’s War Footing,” Image, 19 July 2016, http://
blogit.image./somesotilas/an-absurd-signal-pokemon-conrms-russias-war-footing/ (accessed 20 July 2016).
97 “‘e Devil has arrived through this mechanism’ e Russian authorities weigh in on Pokémon Go. Five
quotes,” Meduza, 18 July 2016,
this-mechanism (accessed 20 July 2016).
98 B. Gertz, “Pentagon bans Pokemon Go over spying fears,e Washington Times, 11 August 2016,
(accessed 15 September 2016).
of Military Sciences (AVN) highlighted the emergence of “non-military
threats.” According to then Chief of General Sta Yuriy Baluyevsky:
“Based on the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of
Yugoslavia, and on the examples of the colour revolutions in Georgia,
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere, one can clearly see that major
threats do objectively exist and are implemented not only by military
means, but primarily by covert and overt methods of political and
diplomatic, economic, and information inuence, various subversive
actions and interference in the internal aairs of other countries. In this
regard, Russian security interests require not only to assess these threats
but also to determine appropriate measures to respond to them.”99
e conference recommended that this new threat assessment be
reected in the next edition of Russias Military Doctrine; it did not in
the end appear in the 2010 version,100 and had to wait till 2014 – after
the start of the Ukraine crisis – to be highlighted.101
e Arab Spring and Libya
In the intervening period, strategic shocks in the Middle East and
North Africa appeared to conrm Russian perceptions of a consistent
Western campaign to remove regimes of which the United States
disapproved – and of the use of information as the primary tool to do so.
In early 2011, AVN President Army Gen Makhmut Gareyev pointed to
“subversive information technologies of the West” being the root cause of
99 For a detailed investigation of Russian threat assessments during this period, see S. Blank, “‘No
Need to reaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves,’” Russia’s Blueprint for a Police State, e New
Security Strategy,” in S. Blank and R. Weitz (eds.), e Russian Military Today And Tomorrow: Essays In
Memory Of Mary Fitzgerald, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010, http://www.les/pub997.pdf (accessed 23 June 2016).
100 K. Giles, “e Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Research Review, NATO Defense
College, February 2010, (accessed 21 June 2016).
101 A review of the 2014 Doctrine is available in P. Sinovets and B. Renz, “Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine
and beyond: threat perceptions, capabilities and ambitions,” Research Paper 117, NATO Defense College, 10
July 2015, (accessed 23 June 2016).
the disorder that came to be known as the Arab Spring:
“Internet networks were implanted in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya over a
two-year period. It started with systematic training for communication
checks, without direct calls for unlawful actions. At the right moment,
a centralized order was issued across all networks for people to take to
the streets.”102
Comments by then-president Dmitriy Medvedev in 2011 are regularly
quoted, but nonetheless indicative of Russian apprehension at the West’s
eventual objectives:
“Look at the situation that has unfolded in the Middle East and the
Arab world. It is extremely bad. ere are major diculties ahead...
We need to look the truth in the eyes. is is the kind of scenario
that they were preparing for us, and now they will be trying even
harder to bring it about.”103
Intervention by Western powers in the resulting civil war in Libya
precisely matched the pattern for “modern warfare” described by then
Chief of General Sta Nikolay Makarov in published articles, including
one the previous year: “use of political, economic and information
pressure and subversive actions, followed by the unleashing of armed
conicts or local wars, actions that result in relatively little bloodshed”
in order to achieve the aggressor’s intent.104 And the disastrous longer-
term consequences of destabilisation following Western interventions in
Libya and elsewhere bear out Russian arguments that Western powers
consistently failed to appreciate the second- and third-order eects of
102 Interfax news agency, 26 March 2011.
103 “Дмитри Медведев провел во Владикавказе заседание Националного
антитеррористического комитета” (Dmitriy Medvedev held a meeting of the National Anti-Terrorism
Committee in Vladikavkaz), Russian presidential website, 22 February 2011,
transcripts/10408 (accessed 19 July 2016, emphasis added).
104 N. Makarov, “Характер вооруженно борьбы будущего, актуальные проблемы строительства
и боевого применения Вооруженных Сил РФ в современных условиях” (e Character of future armed
conict, and current problems of organisational development and combat application of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation under contemporary conditions),” Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the
Academy of Military Science), No. 2, March 2010.
their actions.
Events in the Middle East and North Africa also conrmed Russian
perceptions of social media as a dangerous and destabilising tool of
Russia’s enemies.
ere had already been publicly released studies of the use of social
media for political inuence purposes; but even during the Arab Spring,
assessments of their utility for facilitating regime change appeared to
receive attention only from a narrow circle of specialists in the West.105
Russian attention, however, must have been drawn to public statements
by NATO regarding use of social media posts from within Libya to
contribute to actionable intelligence, including targeting information.106
And once again, the fact that the majority of social media platforms
were foreign-owned contributed to their classication as an instrument
for exploitation by Western governments:
“e security and intelligence services [spetssluzhby] of the Arab states
were not able to prevent the distribution of [social media] messages
because they did not have access to the controlling servers of the social
networks, which are located on the territory of the United States security
and intelligence services.”107
Social media in fact present multiple challenges to Russia, even beyond
threats to the homeland itself. e experience of Russian servicemen
posting to social media from eastern Ukraine – where they are ocially
not supposed to be – provides a clear demonstration that in the absence of
strictly enforced operational security disciplines, incautious social media
usage makes available valuable operational intelligence for harvesting by
105 As, for example, S. Railton, Revolutionary Risk - Cyber Technology and reats in the 2011 Libyan
Revolution, US Naval War College, 2013.
106 R. Norton-Taylor and N. Hopkins, “Libya air strikes: Nato uses Twitter to help gather targets,” e
Guardian, 15 June 2011,
twitter (accessed 19 July 2016).
107 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions), op. cit., p. 107.
an adversary.108
Taken together, the obvious problems presented by unrestrained and
unregulated use of social media exacerbate Russian perceptions of the
internet as a whole as both a tool for exercising inuence abroad, and a
direct vulnerability for Russia itself. Finally, virtually unrestricted freedom
of expression on social media must in itself compound the impression
that greater control is long overdue. In 2012, President Putin described
the experience of listening to an independently-minded Russian radio
station as “having diarrhoea poured over him day and night.109 Putin
and those who think like him are now presented with social media
disseminating widely online criticism of Russia, including prolic and
highly-skilled satire exercised via Twitter. It can reasonably be assumed
that their reaction to this is even more emphatic.
Further Reading
In English
A. Soldatov and I. Borogan, e Red Web: e Struggle Between Russia’s Digital
Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries, London, PublicAairs, 2015.
M. Snegovaya, “Putin’s Information War in Ukraine: Soviet Origins
of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,Institute for the Study of War, Russia Report
1, September 2015,les/
Warfare.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016).
108 Patrick M. Gillen, Real-Time Detection of Operational Military Information in Social Media, Naval
Postgraduate School, September 2015, (accessed 23 June 2016).
109 “‘Я не обижаюсь на вас, когда вы поливаете меня поносом’: Путин пообщался с руководителями
СМИ” (“I don’t get upset with you when you pour diarrhoea on me”: Putin chats with media leaders), Gorod
novostey, 19 January 2012, (accessed 13 July 2016).
K. Giles, “Can Russia switch o the net?” e World Today, October-
November 2014.
K. Giles, “’Information Troops’ - A Russian Cyber Command?,” in Czosseck,
Tyugu and Wingeld (eds.), ird International Conference on Cyber Conict,
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), June
2011, http://conles/Russian_Cyber_Command.pdf
(accessed 23 June 2016).
In Russian
Igor Panarin, “Система информационного противоборства” (A system
of information confrontation), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, 15 October
2008, (accessed 18 July 2016).
V. Sulimov and P. Muraveyko, “Ретроспектива развития способов
ведения информационного противоборства в военных конфликтах”
(Retrospective on the development of information-warfare methods in
military conicts), Nauka i Voyennaya Bezopasnost, No. 4, 2008, pp. 3-10.
5. Implementation
Russian information campaigning can serve multiple concurrent
objectives at any given time. As described by Mark Laity, Chief Strategic
Communications at SHAPE:
“If you look at what they [Russia] did when they annexed Crimea
and invaded eastern Ukraine, the information line of eort was
fundamental, not just to give them a strategic narrative to try to justify
what they did, but [also] to use information to deceive, delay and
disrupt, like a smokescreen.”110
More recently, analysts have observed dierent elements in the same
toolkit used to facilitate operations in Syria.111
is blending of dierent disciplines and approaches inherent in
Russian concepts of information warfare is reected in grey zones of
overlap between activities that are often considered separate and distinct
in Western thought. Some techniques for disseminating disinformation
are indistinguishable from marketing; some cyber attacks use the same
exploits as cyber crime; some information operations are dependent on a
kinetic attack as a facilitator.
RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik are usually the rst to be
named in discussions of Russian information campaigns via the mass
media. But they are only the most visible elements in a very wide range of
dierent outlets, both those which are avowed and those which conceal
their elements, tailoring their output to the expectations of their intended
readers and viewers. e media eort is thus able to adopt a dierent
approach for dierent forums, ranging from simple fabrication, through
110 “Russia: Implications for UK defence and security,” First Report of Session 2016–17, House of
Commons Defence Committee, UK Parliament, 5 July 2016, p. 17.
111 S. Blank, “Russia’s information wars in Syria and Ukraine,” European Geostrategy, 21 June 2016, (accessed 27
June 2016).
confusion with half-truths, to sophisticated argument.
Even those parts of Russian information campaigns that are visible
to audiences in any one language are only part of a broad multilingual
front, including not only state-backed media and trolling, but also fake
media – sock puppet websites set up to resemble genuine news outlets,
but seeding their news feeds with false or contentious reporting that ties
in with Russian narratives.112 e nature of the internet means that the
eective placing of disinformation in reputable news outlets is vastly
cheaper, simpler, and more permanent than in previous decades when
the primary medium was newspapers.
A study of information dominance published in an authoritative
Russian military source lists the main principles of media campaigns as
“e primary methods of manipulating information used by the mass
media in the interests of information-psychological confrontation
objectives are:
Direct lies for the purpose of disinformation both of the domestic
population and foreign societies;
Concealing critically important information;
Burying valuable information in a mass of information dross;
Simplication, conrmation and repetition (inculcation);
Terminological substitution: use of concepts and terms whose
meaning is unclear or has undergone qualitative change, which
makes it harder to form a true picture of events;
Introducing taboos on specic forms of information or categories of
112 Dalibor Rohac, “Cranks, Trolls, and Useful Idiots: Russia’s information warriors set their sights on
Central Europe,” Foreign Policy, 12 March 2015,
Image recognition: known politicians or celebrities can take part in
political actions to order, thus exerting inuence on the world view of
their followers;
Providing negative information, which is more readily accepted by the
audience than positive.”113
But inuence on mass consciousness in adversary societies involves
activity against a much broader range of targets than the media. According
to senior scholar of Russia John Lough, the instruments to carry this out
include “other agents of the Russian state who are looking to inuence
the opinion of security specialists, people in think-tanks, academics
and maybe even some journalists.114 is extends, naturally enough,
to direct inuence on politicians and decision-makers. Multiple studies
have investigated Russian links to European politicians; one Hungarian
institute has produced reports focusing on these links with both the right
wing115 and the left.116
ere are even broader implications. Principles of subversion and
weakening the adversary outlined in Russia include targeting a broad range
of areas which the West does not traditionally think of as vulnerabilities:
“e types of actions to deprive the enemy of its ability to ght...
seek directly to aect not only the enemy’s military potential proper
but also its political, economic, information, scientic-and-technical,
moral, culturological, demographic and environmental potentials...
113 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions, op. cit., p. 107.
114 Oral evidence: Russia: Implications for UK defence and security, House of Commons Defence
Committee, UK Parliament, 19 April 2016,
russia-implications-for-uk-defence-and-security/oral/32126.html (accessed 4 July 2016).
115 e Russian Connection: e spread of pro-Russian policies on the European far right, Political
Capital Institute, March 2014,les/pc_ash_report_russian_
connection.pdf (accessed 24 June 2016).
116 Péter Krekó-Lóránt Győri, Russia and the European Far Left, Political Capital Institute, undated,les/documents/Peter%20Kreko%20Far%20Left%20denitive.
pdf (accessed 24 June 2016).
Here, culturological warfare means coercive action or counteraction
with regressive or progressive goals in the sphere of science, education,
pastoral care, the arts, the national language, religion and traditional
ways of life.”117
In this respect, Russia is not unique. Other hostile actors including
Islamic State have identied and exploited the same attack vectors. As
noted in 2015, “Both Russian and ISIS information campaigns astutely
target inherent weaknesses in Western liberal democratic societies, and
exploit a range of self-inicted vulnerabilities which are fundamental to
those societies’ views of themselves and their values.118
Cyber, Kinetic and Information Operations
Recent practice indicates that the broad nature of the Russian
information warfare concept can include real-world operations designed
to create information eects as well as the reverse, and a seamless
integration of “cyber” concepts and operations throughout.
Russian capabilities to exploit cyber vulnerabilities for damaging
physical eect are widely discussed in open sources.119 But for the
purposes of information warfare, expensive one-shot cyber weapons, or
noisy and unpopular DDoS attacks, are entirely unnecessary if you can
gain physical control of internet infrastructure – as was demonstrated at
an early stage during the seizure of Crimea. Occupation of the Simferopol
Internet Exchange Point and disruption of cable connections to the
mainland contributed to total information dominance on the peninsula
for Russia, greatly facilitating further operations.120
117 V. Kvachkov, Спецназ России (Russia’s Special Purpose Forces), op. cit.
118 K. Giles, “Осознание Западом серьезности информационного противоборства” (e West
Wakes Up To Information Warfare), Ninth International Forum “Partnership of state, business and civil
society for international information security,Moscow State University, 2015, pp. 294-308.
119 O. Matthews, “Russia’s Greatest Weapon May Be Its Hackers,” Newsweek, 5 July 2015, http://www. (accessed 15 July 2016).
120 Shane Harris, “Hack Attack. Russia’s rst targets in Ukraine: its cell phones and Internet lines,” Foreign
e prehistory of this kind of operation includes the traditional
seizure or destruction of civilian broadcast facilities at the rst stage of
any attempt at regime change, whether imposed from abroad or the result
of a domestic coup. Extension of the principle into targeting internet
infrastructure is a relatively new development, but one which had been
agged in Russian conceptual writing on information warfare. A much-
quoted analysis of the new capabilities required by Russia following the
armed conict in Georgia in 2008 noted that:
“To construct information countermeasures, it is necessary to develop
a centre for the determination of critically important information
entities of the enemy, including how to eliminate them physically,
and how to conduct electronic warfare, psychological warfare,
systemic counterpropaganda, and net operations to include hacker
And the Russian Armed Forces’ 2011 cyber proto-doctrine included
provision for “deploying forces and resources to provide for information
security on the territories of other states.”122 Parsed through Russian
doctrinal language, this innocent-sounding formulation was interpreted
as also referring to setting up units that would target adversary
communications facilities.123
Commentary at the time speculated whimsically on “commandos
parachuting into server centres, iPads in hand”; but events in Crimea,
indicating the embedding of telecommunications network expertise within
Russian SOF, show that this picture was in fact not far from the truth.
Policy, 3 March 2014, (accessed 15 May 2016).
121 BBC Monitoring: “Russia is underestimating information resources and losing out to the West,” Novyy
Region, 29 October 2008 (emphasis added).
122 “Концептуальные взгляды на деятельность Вооруженных Сил Россиско Федерации в
информационном пространстве” (Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed
Forces in Information Space), Russian Ministry of Defence, 22 December 2011,
publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle (accessed 13 July 2016).
123 K. Giles, “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,” in C. Czosseck et al (eds.), 2012 4th International
Conference on Cyber Conict, NATO CCDCOE, Tallinn, 2012,
ings/2_1_Giles_RussiasPublicStanceOnCyberInformationWarfare.pdf (accessed 13 July 2016).
Even within cyberspace itself, with an overlap of tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) between cyber crime, cyber activism, and cyber attack,
from a Russian perspective the synergies between the dierent forms of
hostile CNOs are clear. According to Austrian researcher Alex Klimburg:
“e dierences between these categories of cyber activity are often razor
thin, or only in the eye of the beholder. From the perspective of a cyber
warrior, cyber crime can oer the technical basis (software tools and
logistic support) and cyber terrorism the social basis (personal networks
and motivation) with which to execute attacks on the computer
networks of enemy groups or nations.”124
is overlap means there is little practical obstacle to using criminal
networks to further state aims in cyberspace while limiting attribution
risk to government.125
Furthermore, “cyber” attacks can be used as a facilitator for information
campaigns whether or not they cause signicant impact – or, indeed,
when they have not even taken place. According to one unpublished
analysis, facilitators can include “demonstrative actions in cyberspace
that inict no substantial economic or other damage to the target state
[but only] cause panic among the population and, as a result, distrust
in the authorities.” At the time of writing, it is suggested that this is
one possible explanation for a chain of unexplained disruptive incidents
crossing the boundaries between cyber and physical eects in Sweden,
during a period of intensied hostile messaging from Russia over the
possibility of Swedish membership in NATO.126
124 A. Klimburg. “Mobilising Cyber Power,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 53, no. 1,
February-March 2011, pp. 41-60.
125 Highlighted in “M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines,” Mandiant, undated, https://www2.
reye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016).
126 For an overview, see Edward Lucas, “Cyber in Tallinn,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 6 June
2016, (accessed 21 July 2016). See also M. Piotrowski, “e Swedish
Counter-Intelligence Report on Hostile Russian Activities in the Region in a Comparative Context,” Polish
Institute of International Aairs (PISM), Bulletin No. 25 (875), 24 March 2016,
les/?id_plik=21575 (accessed 21 July 2016).
Russian disinformation campaigns routinely involve the use of forged
documents,127 in a tradition that dates back to Soviet active measures and
beyond.128 In some cases, these are provided to media outlets with the
claim that they have been obtained by hacking activities. In many cases, it
appears likely that these documents were produced and obtained by other
routes altogether. But the eect of the “cyber attack” story is twofold: it
creates the impression that Russian–backed hackers are far more eective
than they may necessarily be; and it also entices Western media editors to
publish the contents of the documents before establishing their reliability
or provenance, since they have the added spice of having been apparently
obtained by a sexy and exciting means.129
e threat, as opposed to the use, of military force is another key
ingredient of Russian information campaigns. A repeated feature of
Russian rhetoric toward NATO and the West both before and after the
seizure of Crimea has been emphasis on military preparations for conict,
up to and including discussion of the use of nuclear weapons.130 Subsets
of this narrative include provoking air and sea incidents which can be
misrepresented in order to portray legitimate activities by the United
States or other NATO allies as dangerous and provocative,131 and repeated
127 See for example J. L. Feder and V. Stepanov, “e U.S. Embassy In Russia Just Exposed A Forgery In
e Best Way Ever,” Buzzfeed, 18 November 2015,
(accessed 21 July 2016).
128 “Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations,” United States Department
of State Special Report No. 88, October 1981,les/documents/
October%201981.pdf. See also Mikhail Agursky, “Soviet Disinformation And Forgeries,” International Journal
on World Peace, Vol. 6 No. 1 (January-March 1989), pp. 13-30,
(both accessed 21 July 2016).
129 See for example J. Smith, “Pro-Russian Hackers Expose U.S. Military Contractor Activity in
Ukraine,” Observer, 3 February 2015,
130 For a detailed exploration of Russian nuclear messaging, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuclear Implications
of the Russian-Ukrainian Conict,” NATO Defense College Research Report, April 2015, http://www.ndc. (accessed 15 July 2016).
131 “Shouldering Incident Reminiscent of Sea of Japan Bumpings,” Naval Historical Foundation, 30 June
(accessed 6 July 2016), Keir Giles, “Russian High Seas Brinkmanship Echoes Cold War,” Chatham House, 15
April 2016,
declarations of intent to deploy Iskander-M missiles (or, previously,
advanced air defence missile systems) in Kaliningrad in response to any
development in Europe of which Russia disapproves.132
It is the nuclear threats in particular that create an impression of
Russia as an unpredictable and irresponsible security actor, and cause
bewilderment and concern in the West. But this is precisely their intent,
since threats like this are an integral part of Russias “asymmetric response
to perceived security challenges:
Asymmetrical actions in the military eld may include: measures
making the opponent apprehensive of the Russian Federation’s
intentions and responses; demonstration of the readiness and
potentialitiesof the Russian Federation’s groups of troops (forces) in
a strategic area to repel an invasion with consequences unacceptable to
the aggressor; actions by the troops (forces) to deter a potential enemy
by guaranteed destruction of his most vulnerable military and
other strategically important andpotentially dangerous targetsin
order to persuade him that his attack is a hopeless case.”133
Any forms and methods will do todeterthe aggressorby force, such
as… an ultimatum with a caution that Russia would (in the event
of war) use nuclear weapons immediately and exercise no restraint
in employing high-precision weapons to destroy strategically vital
objectives on the aggressor’s territory; and planning and conduct of an
information campaign to mislead the adversary about Russia’s readiness
war (accessed 6 July 2016).
132 is is a perennial feature of Russian messaging, despite the deployments proceeding according
to a long-planned schedule. For two recent examples of this schedule being treated as news, seeAndrew
Osborn, “Russia seen putting new nuclear-capable missiles along NATO border by 2019,” Reuters, 23
June 2016, (accessed 24 June
2016).and“Iskander-M missile systems to be deployed in Kaliningrad region till 2018” [sic], TASS, 16 May
2015,(accessed 24 June 2016).
133 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Асимметричные дествия по обеспечению военно
безопасности России” (Asymmetric actions to provide for the military security of Russia), Voennaya Mysl’
(Military ought), No. 3 2010, p. 10. Emphasis as in original.
to beat o aggression.”134
Troll Farms and Botnets
One of the most prominent aspects of Russian information
campaigning in Western public consciousness is the ubiquitous activities
of trolls (online personae run by humans) and bots (run by automated
processes), interacting directly with readerships in a range of media.135 A
substantial body of research on Russian troll campaigns has developed in
the West since early 2014, some of which is listed in “Further Reading”
ese false accounts can pose as authoritative information sources,
redistributing disinformation from sock puppet media outlets. But in
addition to this use of trolling as a direct injection method, the eect
can also on occasion be subtle and indirect, and contribute to the aim
described above of establishing a permissive environment. is can be
achieved by diverting or suppressing any debate that runs counter to
the Russian version of events, and thus creating an atmosphere and an
impression of consensus, rather than pushing specic disinformation
or narratives.136 In addition, on occasion the intent of online trolling
can be indistinguishable from the original (internet) meaning of the
word – simply provoking argument and confusion. As described in one
Ukrainian study, “it is important to keep in mind that arguments with a
troll are not really discussions with a real person but with a virtual image
created specically to sow discord.137 is remains true whether the troll
134 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of Wars and eir Impact on a Country’s Preparations
for a Future War,Military ought (English edition), No 4 2012. pp. 24-25. Emphasis as in original.
135 Lawrence Alexander, “Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign,” 2
April 2015, (accessed 27 June 2016).
136 As described for example in R. Read, “Poland Is Under Assault From Russia’s Cyber Troll Propaganda
Army,” e Daily Caller, 23 June 2016,
russias-cyber-troll-propaganda-army/ (accessed 27 June 2016).
137 Yuriy Savytskyi, “Kremlin trolls are engaged in massive anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Poland,”
EuroMaidan Press, 21 June 2016,
massive-anti-ukrainian-propaganda-in-poland/ (accessed 27 June 2016).
is acting on behalf of Moscow or not.
Factors like these leave mainstream media unsure as to whether the
sway of opinion reected in their correspondence or comments pages is
genuine and should be publicised, reported or reected in editorial lines.
Despite widespread experience of the hostile attentions of the Russian
social media armies over the course of more than a year, some sections of
the Western media require constant reminders of their intent and their
is persistent amnesia also augments the eectiveness of troll and
bot intimidation of journalists, researchers and authors who are critical
of Moscow. Once their work is considered suciently important or
inuential to pose a risk of discrediting Russia, they are subjected to a
broad campaign of harassment and intimidation of which troll and bots
constitute an integral part. e result is that writing about Russia entails
either compromise, or a signicant degree of personal, reputational,
nancial and social risk. While there are individuals who take this risk,
suer the consequences and continue to write, others entirely blamelessly
decide that too much is at stake and retreat. is chilling eect represents
a victory for Russian information campaigning.139
e origins of what is casually referred to as the “Kremlin Troll
Army” can be traced to prototypes like the short-lived “Kremlin School
of Bloggers” in the last decade, which pre-dated todays broad uptake
138 When commenting on Russian issues in live media interviews, the author has repeatedly had to explain
to presenters and interviewers why their programmes were being suddenly deluged with e-mails and tweets in
support of Russia and critical of Western policy.
139 For indicative examples, see E. Nakashima, “Russian hackers harassed journalists who were
investigating Malaysia Airlines plane crash,” Washington Post, 28 September 2016, https://www.
ac72-a29979381495_story.html (accessed 28 September 2016), and S. Oksanen, “What It’s Like To Write
About Russia,” 14 June 2016, UpNorth,-oksanen-what-its-like-to-write-about-
russia/ (accessed 15 September 2016). See also P. Tucker, “Exclusive: Russia-Backed DNC Hackers Strike
Washington ink Tanks,” Defense One, 29 August 2016,
exclusive-russia-backed-dnc-hackers-strike-washington-think-tanks/131104/ (accessed 15 September 2016).
of social media in Russia.140 But the sophistication of the tools and
processes in use is constantly developing, and the stereotype described in
mainstream media or academic research tends to be consistently out of
date and oversimplistic.
e nature of the trolls and bots themselves provides another example
of how an oversimplied notion of Russian capabilities and assets may
leave the targets of disinformation open to surprise.141 Paid trolls are
joined by misguided individuals in the target countries who support their
activities for a wide range of personal reasons.142
is reects a key principle described across information warfare
theory, of exploiting already existing vulnerabilities and divisions in the
target society:
“e vast majority of the population of the victim country does not even
suspect that it is being subjected to information-psychological inuence.
is leads in turn to a paradox: the aggressor achieves his military
and political aims with the active support of the population of the
country that is being subjected to inuence. Control over strategically
important state resources is handed over voluntarily, since this is seen
not as the result of aggression, but as a progressive movement toward
democracy and freedom.143
It is also normal for troll operators to take over previously established
online personae with established authority in their respective media for
authority, such as senior members of discussion boards or well-established
Twitter accounts. ese, and deliberate measures outlined in “Future
140 Nathan Hodges, “Kremlin Launches ‘School of Bloggers,’” Wired, 27 May 2009, https://www.wired.
com/2009/05/kremlin-launches-school-of-bloggers/ (accessed 23 June 2016).
141 See D. Herrick, “e Social Side of ‘Cyber Power’? Social Media and Cyber Operations,” in
N.Pissanidis et. al. (eds.), 8th International Conference on Cyber Conict, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, June 2016,les/multimedia/pdf/CyCon_2016_book.
pdf (accessed 20 June 2016).
142 “Portrait of a troll,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), 19 June 2016, (accessed 21 June 2016).
143 Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных
условиях: теория и практика” (Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions, op. cit., p. 108.
Prospects” below, mean that there is no easy method of determining
the line between an orchestrated troll campaign and the expression of
genuinely held, even if misguided, opinion. ey also mean that the
potential future impact of more sophisticated campaigns on social media
– going far beyond inuencing media coverage or public opinion - is at
present underestimated.
Identifying and rebutting falsehood in Russian information campaigns
has been a focus of Western overt counter-disinformation eorts. It is
commonly suggested that the most eective response is “establishing an
eective counter-narrative which calls a lie a lie,” and learning “oensive
stratcom that tells people the truth.”144
But this may not be the most eective way of addressing the challenge
overall, since plausibility or lack of it is not always a measure of Russias
success or failure in meeting its objectives.145 While it is true that in the
Russian view, “falsifying events and imposing restrictions on the activity
of the mass media are among the most eective asymmetric means of
warfare,”146 this does not necessarily mean that this falsication is intended
to be credible or persuasive. A RAND study from 2016 notes that this
aspect of Russian campaigning directly contradicts accepted principles of
successful information campaigns in the West - but this counter-intuitive
nature makes it even harder to devise eective countermeasures.147
144 As described in J. Lindley-French, “Conference Report: ‘NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating
Hybrid reats’,” NATO Defense College, 19 May 2015,
(accessed 20 July 2016).
145 See for example N. MacFarquhar, “A Powerful Russian Weapon: e Spread of False Stories,” e
New York Times, 28 August 2016,
disinformation.html (accessed 29 September 2016).
146 V. Gerasimov, “По опыту Сирии” (Based on the experience of Syria), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 9
March 2016,les/pdf/VPK_09_624.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016).
147 C. Paul, M. Matthews, “e Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work
and Options to Counter It,” RAND, 2016, (accessed 15
September 2016).
ere is no shortage of examples of statements by Russian media
and ocial gures which are so remote from reality that they are not
even expected to be believed by the listeners. At the time of writing, a
recent prominent example is the threatening, but evidently nonsensical,
language to Finland used by President Putin on a visit to the country
in early July 2016. According to Putin, in the event of Finland joining
NATO, Russia would reverse the current situation where “we have pulled
back our troops from the border between Finland and Russia to a distance
of 1,500 kilometres” – which if true, would mean most of European
Russia was demilitarised.148
Multiple untruths, not necessarily consistent, are in part designed
to undermine trust in the existence of objective truth, whether
from media or from ocial sources. is contributes to eroding the
comparative advantages of liberal democratic societies when seeking to
counter disinformation, by neutralizing the advantages associated with
credibility.149 Even the existence of mutually contradictory Russian
narratives is not an inherent disadvantage as described in some Western
analysis. As described in a Finnish study:
As the main objective of these measures is to dazzle and disorient
Western public [sic], running several parallel narratives is not a
deciency, but an asset and important feature of Russian strategic
In addition, countering every single piece of Russian disinformation
is labour-intensive out of all proportion to the result. According to US
148 A. Vinokurov, “Путин рассказал финнам о воне с НАТО” (Putin tells the Finns about war with
NATO),, 1 July 2016, (accessed
28 September 2016). See also English-language explanation at “Putin’s comment about location of Russian
troops baes” [sic], Yle News, 2 July 2016, http://yle./uutiset/putins_comment_about_location_of_
russian_troops_baes/9000152 (accessed 20 July 2016).
149 See Maria Przełomiec, ‘Is the West able to eectively ght back against Russia’s information war?’, Polish
Institute of International Aairs, 27 February 2015,
150 K. Pynnöniemi and A. Rácz (eds.), Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conict
in Ukraine, FIIA Report No. 45, 10 May 2016, p. 18.
ambassador to Ukraine Georey Pyatt:
“Everyone knows the Kremlin seeks to use information to deny, deceive,
and confuse… You could spend every hour of every day trying to bat
down every lie, to the point where you don’t achieve anything else. And
that’s exactly what the Kremlin wants.”151
But over and above tactical questions, the evolving nature of political
life in the West itself poses a more fundamental challenge to a model for
information confrontation that relies on “truth.” Recent Euro-Atlantic
political phenomena such as the popularity of Donald Trump as a
presidential candidate in the United States, and the obscuring of fact by
speculation and fantasy in the UK’s debate over leaving the EU,152 have
highlighted the trend towards what has been described as a “post-fact” or
“post-truth” political environments.153
In this context, when Russia seeks to undermine trust in authority
gures, much of its work has already been done. Challenging Russian false
narratives needs to overcome the basic obstacle of prominent Western
politicians also relying on falsehoods to achieve political resolutions,
and the proliferation of unchallenged false and spurious arguments that
ensues from the resulting lack of trust.154
“Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible” was the title of a book
published in late 2014 by journalist Peter Pomerantsev, which did much
to bring the Russian use and abuse of information to greater notice. But
its title could equally well be applied to the attitude of those sections of
151 ‘Interview: U.S. Ambassador Georey Pyatt on Euromaidan, Ukrainian reforms and Kremlin trolls’,
Business Ukraine, 5 December 2015,
152 “’Glaring deciencies’ in EU debate, Electoral Reform Society says,” BBC News, 1 September 2016, (accessed 15 September 2016).
153 For discussion and detail, see “Art of the lie: Politicians have always lied. Does it matter if they
leave the truth behind entirely?” e Economist, 10 September 2016,
(accessed 15 September 2016).
154 Such as, to take an example popular in Russia, the deception practiced by then Prime Minister Tony
Blair to lead the United Kingdom into war with Iraq during 2002-3.
Western societies which instinctively distrust authority.155 In this manner,
Russia today is reaping unexpected benets from Soviet campaigns
targeting previous generations. An intellectual heritage permeated by
postmodernist and relativist attitudes has now laid down fertile ground
for disinformation and deception campaigns not only among Western
historians, academics and even left-wing politicians, but among wide
sectors of society not suciently well informed or motivated to sift
evidence for themselves. Just as with overt and covert information
activities in former decades, so in the current environment in some cases
Russia does not instigate social or intellectual trends, merely exploits
them for perceived strategic advantage.
It follows that eective answers to Russian information campaigning
lie elsewhere than in simple rebuttals. But they are also dependent on the
future, not current shape of information warfare capabilities. ese are
evolving rapidly, and will be discussed in the next section.
Further Reading
In English
e Ukraine Campaign
K Geers (ed.) Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine,
NATO CCD COE, Tallinn, December 2015,
(accessed 13 July 2016).
T. Maurer and S. Janz, “e Russia-Ukraine Conict: Cyber and Information
Warfare in a Regional Context,” e International Relations and Security
155 An unintentionally revealing comment by an instructor on a BBC journalism course attended by this
author in the mid 1990s was: “Don’t trust any government ocials. ey may be wearing a suit, but it doesn’t
mean they’re stupid.”
Network, October 17, 2014,
K. Pynnöniemi and A. Rácz (eds.), Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of
Deception and the Conict in Ukraine, FIIA Report No. 45, 10 May 2016.
M. Jaitner and P.A. Mattsson, “Russian Information Warfare of 2014,
in M. Maybaum et al. (eds.), 2015 7th International Conference on Cyber
Conict, NATO CCDCOE, Tallinn, 2015,
proceedings/03_jaitner_mattsson.pdf (accessed 13 July 2016).
(An overview of information operations in the early stages of the Ukraine crisis.)
J. Darczewska, “e anatomy of Russian information warfare: the Crimean
operation, a case study,” Point of View No. 42, OSW, May 2014, http://les/the_anatomy_of_russian_information_
warfare.pdf (accessed 13 July 2016).
(A survey of the ideological background to planning and implementation of
information operations in Crimea.)
R Szwed, Framing of the Ukraine–Russia conict in online and social media,
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, May 2016, http://ict-online-and-social-
media (accessed 20 June 2016).
Analysis of Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine, NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, July 2015, http://www.stratcomcoe.
org/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against-ukraine-1 (accessed 20
June 2016).
A. Rácz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist,
Finnish Institute of International Aairs, Report No. 43, Helsinki, 2016,
(accessed 13 July 2016).
Social Media, Trolls and Bots
T. E. Nissen, “#eWeaponizationOfSocialMedia @Characteristics_of_
Contemporary_Conicts” [sic], Royal Danish Defence College, March
Wikipedia entry on “Web brigades,”
“What’s it like to be hated by the Russian internet?” e Guardian, 26 May
Broader Russian Inuence and Approaches
P. Pomerantsev & M. Weiss: e Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin
Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money. e Institute of Modern Russia,
New York 2014.
Kovalev, “Life after facts: how Russian state media denes itself through
negation,” Open Democracy, 13 June 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.
denes-itself-through-negation (accessed 19 July 2016).
(An enlightening exploration of the reasons for acceptance of propaganda and
obvious fabrications by Russian audiences.)
Antczak-Barzan, “Russian phobia or a real threat? Propaganda-based
elements of Russian hybrid warfare and their implications for NATO,”
NATO Defense College, forthcoming publication.
M. Winnerstig (ed.), “Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and
Non-military Inuence in the Baltic States,” FOI report FOI-R--3990--SE,
December 2014.
R. Skaskiw, “Nine Lessons of Russian Propaganda,Small Wars Journal, 27
March 2016,
propaganda (accessed 19 July 2016).
“Written evidence submitted by Ben Nimmo and Dr Jonathan Eyal: Russia’s
information warfare - airbrushing reality,” House of Commons Select Committee
on Defence, UK Parliament, 14 March 2016,
html (accessed 19 June 2016).
(Focusing more closely on Russian inuence exerted in and on the UK during the
Brexit referendum campaign.)
B. Nimmo, “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda Machine
Works, and How to Counter It,, 19 May 2015, http://
machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/ (accessed 27 June 2016).
M. Van Herpen, Putin’s Propaganda Machine. Soft Power and Russian Foreign
Policy. Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 2016.
In Russian
Yu. Kuleshov et al., “Информационно-психологическое
противоборство в современных условиях: теория и практика”
(Information-Psychological Warfare In Modern Conditions: eory And
Practice), Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh Nauk No. 1 (46), 2014, pp. 104-110.
6. Future Prospects
Russia’s concepts of operations are in constant development, and
future campaigns will not resemble the ones seen to date. e process
of rotating as broad a range of personnel as possible through operational
deployments to the Ukrainian border and to Syria is mirrored by an
intensive programme of applying lessons learned in both theatres.
e US assessment is that eastern Ukraine presents “an emerging
laboratory for future 21st-century warfare.”156 Here, Russia and Russian-
backed militias have made use of their access to highly sophisticated and
eective electronic attack technology, including GPS spoong to defeat
navigational and guidance systems.157 Meanwhile, Russian descriptions of
operations in Syria emphasise how military force is no longer the primary
determinant of eect and can take second place to other elements of
state power. As expressed by Chief of General Sta Valeriy Gerasimov, in
contemporary conict, “the emphasis on the methods of ghting moves
toward the complex application of political, economic, information, and
other nonmilitary means, carried out with the support of military force.”158
Gerasimov also explains that Russian experience of campaigning in
Syria has conrmed the advantages of:
“achieving political goals with the minimum armed impact on an
adversary. Predominantly by undermining his military and economic
potential, by applying informational and psychological pressure, and by
156 G. Warwick, “Assisting e Human Central to Pentagon’s ird Oset,” Aviation Week, 4 January 2016,set (accessed 15 July 2016).
157 P. Tucker, “In Ukraine, Tomorrow’s Drone War Is Alive Today,” Defence One, 9 March 2015, http:// (accessed 15
July 2016); “Russia overtaking US in cyber-warfare capabilities,”, 30 October 2015, http:// (accessed 15 July
158 V. Gerasimov, “По опыту Сирии” (Based on the experience of Syria), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 9
March 2016,les/pdf/VPK_09_624.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016, emphasis
active support for internal opposition and for insurgency and subversive
is conrms the trend noted from Russian operations in Ukraine;
a shift of emphasis reducing the relative weight of forms of intervention
which are overt, as was seen in Russian operations in Georgia in 2008, and
increasing that of those that are covert, deniable (plausible or otherwise),
and completed before open hostilities are declared or begun. Overall:
“Informational and psychological operations in future wars will have
to comply with the basic principles of new type (hybrid) warfare - they
must be timely, unexpected, and clandestine.”160
Internet Infrastructure
Nevertheless, current activities do provide pointers to the possible
shape of future Russian operations. Intensied investigation of foreign
civilian internet communications infrastructure is likely to be an indicator
of planning options under consideration.
In multiple domains, Russia appears to be showing an increased sense
of urgency in this task, with the result that previously discreet activities
are now widely reported. A prime example is investigation of subsea
communications cables. is is believed to be one of the tasks of Russias
Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research (GUGI), a previously highly
secretive organisation which is now receiving public attention due to the
greatly increased tempo and prominence of its operations.161
Meanwhile in space, unusual manoeuvres carried out by Russian
159 V. Gerasimov, “По опыту Сирии” (Based on the experience of Syria), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’er, 9
March 2016,les/pdf/VPK_09_624.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016).
160 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания вон
будущего: проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems
and assessments), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military ought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44-45.
161 See “Main Directorate of Deep-Sea [sic] Research (Military Unit 40056),”, undated, (accessed 20 July 2016).
vehicles in the vicinity of communications satellites162 combine with an
intensive programme of test launches of anti-satellite weapons163 in an
alarming pattern of rehearsal for hostile action. Disruption of adversary
satellite communications would be considered a key enabling factor of
information dominance providing important advantages in conventional
“Modern leading states manage communications, navigation,
reconnaissance, the whole command of strategic nuclear forces and
aerospace defence, and high-precision conventional weapons through
space. Disrupting this entire system through radio-electronic and
other asymmetric means could greatly reduce this advantage of the
e reason for this interest may well lie in the Russian experience
of eective interference with civilian telecommunications infrastructure
leading to information dominance in Crimea in March 2014, but these
are not the only implications. Investigating and exploiting vulnerabilities
of internet infrastructure can facilitate espionage operations, isolation, or
means of planting disinformation - or a combination of all of these. In
addition, information interdiction should also be thought of in a broader
context. Capabilities displayed by Russia in eastern Ukraine include a
much enhanced electronic warfare (EW) capability, including for GPS
jamming.165 Even where physical access to facilities is not available, a role
is described for Russia’s EW forces in suppressing civilian traditional and
online media:
“e EW forces will take on a new mission in this operation [the
162 For detail see Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity
operations in space,” e Space Review, 5 October 2015,
163 Bill Gertz, “Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile,” Washington Free Beacon, 27 May 2016, http://ight-tests-anti-satellite-missile/ (accessed 19 July 2016).
164 Army General Mahmut Gareyev, cited in “Как развивать современную армию?” (How to develop
a modern army?), Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 March 2016,
razvivat-sovremennuyu-armiyu (accessed 22 June 2016).
165 See “Russia overtaking US in cyber-warfare capabilities,” SC Magazine, 30 October 2015, http://www.
initial phase of conict] - blocking radio and television signals, and
signal trac in social networks to shut out propaganda disinformation
pouring into the ears of the population and Armed Forces personnel.166
e sense of urgency appears to extend into CNO. As put in February
2016 by US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, “Russia
is assuming a more assertive cyber posture based on its willingness to
conduct operations even when detected and under increased public
As a consequence, NATO “should be prepared to operate despite the
loss or disruption of cyber infrastructure and hardware, including loss
of space assets, network servers, undersea cables, radio communications,
and power generation.168 In other words, in time of conict NATO
states may nd that access to internet resources may be degraded or
entirely absent – including for the purposes of communicating with their
own civilian populations or Armed Forces personnel outside hardened
and discrete networks. is applies in equal measure to using any other
friendly capabilities which may be compromised by lack of access to the
electromagnetic spectrum, including to GPS signals. Assessments voiced
by senior NATO ocers in open debate include the suggestion that
at the outset of hostilities, Russian EW assets deployed in Kaliningrad
could shut down communications over large areas of the region’s NATO
Russia may already have undertaken steps to prepare for this kind of
operating environment. According to a well-informed Russian general
speaking in 2012, Russia had detected that its military ocers were
166 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания вон будущего:
проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems and assessments),
Voennaya Mysl’ (Military ought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44-45.
167 J. R. Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide reat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, Senate Armed Services Committee Statement for the Record, 9 February 2016, https://www.les/documents/SASC_Unclassied_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf (accessed 1 July 2016).
168 “Framework for Future Alliance Operations,” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, August 2015,
available atao-2015.pdf, p. 41 (accessed 28 June
losing the skills of “low tech war,” and consequently required additional
“training to face an opponent with total information superiority.” In
particular the Kavkaz-2012 exercise had shown that ocers were losing
the ability to work without information systems – “so when information
support and command and control systems are switched o, there are
problems.” e answer was “how to teach ocers to work with paper
maps again, not electronic ones.169 And as noted above, the Russian
Security Council is reported to have investigated the implications of the
country operating without internet access at all.
e requirement to think of cyber and information vulnerabilities
in the physical domain as well is a symptom of what Martin Libicki
refers to as “convergence,” the integration of capabilities cutting across
disciplines which the West has traditionally thought of as disconnected.
Close observers of Russian operations in Ukraine have noted that these
operations make use of “not just cyber, not just electronic warfare, not just
intelligence, but […] really eective integration of all these capabilities
with kinetic measures to actually create the eect that their commanders
[want] to achieve.170 As assessed by a study of the new dimension of
commercial UAV warfare in Ukraine, “experience of current combat
operations shows that the dividing lines between these dierent kinds of
warfare are becoming increasingly blurred and irrelevant.171
But this is to apply a Western perspective to Russian planning, which
169 Lt-Gen Andrei Tretyak, former head of Main Operations Directorate, speaking at NATO Defense
College, 27 November 2012.
170 S. J. Freedberg, “Army Fights Culture Gap Between Cyber & Ops: ‘Dolphin Speak’,” BreakingDefense.
com, 10 November 2015,ghts-culture-gap-between-cyber-ops-
dolphin-speak/ (accessed 15 July 2016)
171 K. Hartmann and K. Giles, “UAV Exploitation: A New Domain for Cyber Power,” in N. Pissanidis et.
al (eds.), Cyber Power: 8th International Conference on Cyber Conict, NATO CCDCOE, Tallinn, 2016, (accessed 4
July 2016).
as always risks fundamental misinterpretation. Russian military planners
do not need to grapple with the problem of convergence in the same
way as their Western counterparts, because – thanks to the holistic and
integrated approach to information warfare – they never went through a
process of divergence in the rst place.
Characteristic in this integrated information warfare spectrum is the
prominent role of Russian EW capabilities, the subject of belated concern
in Western militaries. According to a Russian assessment in 2010, “in the
near future fundamental changes in the development of EW means and
materiel should allow it to develop into a specic main form of combat
action, which in many ways will determine the course and outcome
of armed conict,” since “the eect of the actions of EW means are
comparable with the use of modern high-precision weaponry.”172
“Future wars will be launched by electronic warfare (EW) forces, which
will protect friendly forces, block foreign propaganda disinformation,
and strike at enemy EW forces and assets, blending with strategic and
aerospace operations, with the latter augmented by cruise missiles and
reconnaissance assets (UAVs, robots) delivering strikes and res.”173
Beyond this application of EW eects to targets which lie outside the
Western conceptual framework, there is a further signicant implication
for NATO force planners. After the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan,
rather than return to a structure and posture for conventional warfare
as it was conceived in previous decades, NATO should be prepared to
defend itself in an entirely new operating environment and under entirely
new conditions.
172 “Состояние сил РЭБ: интервью с начальником воск РЭБ ВС РФ О. Ивановым” (e condition
of the EW Troops: interview with commander of the RF EW Troops O. Ivanov), Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 April
173 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания вон
будущего: проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems
and assessments), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military ought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44-45.
Social Media Preparations
A process of building up of capabilities on social media is visible, in
particular in the form of accumulation of trusted social media accounts
with large networks and numbers of followers. ese accounts are at the
present moment not used for any overtly hostile process, but engaged
in establishing their credibility, and developing tactics for defeating
analytical methods used to identify false personae. In particular these
tactics include tailored and sophisticated features which generate followers
and interaction from genuine accounts.
It has been argued that as well as state-sponsored disinformation, the
use of trolls and bots in this manner can also be explained by marketing
exercises. But this argument overlooks the fact that in exactly the same
way that the tactics, techniques and procedures for cybercrime are the
same as those used for cyber espionage, so marketing on the one hand,
and maximising the visibility of disinformation on the other, also use
exactly the same techniques.174
Examples are already available of how the transfer between one
domain and another is seamless.175 Twitter accounts can follow this
pattern, with examples of accounts that were originally set up to generate
revenue as click bait now repeating Russian disinformation, with proles
providing links to RT.176 Russia has also taken opportunities to hijack
already existing authoritative social media accounts.177 In addition to
those instances already visible, it can be assumed that other high prole
accounts are also under Russian or Russian-backed control, and ready to
174 is overlap is discussed, inter alia, in Jerey L Caton, “Distinguishing Acts Of War In Cyberspace:
Assessment Criteria, Policy Considerations, And Response Implications,” U.S. Army War College Strategic
Studies Institute, October 2014.
175 For further analysis, see Kenneth Geers, “Strategic Analysis: As Russia-Ukraine Conict Continues,
Malware Activity Rises,” FireEye, 28 May 2014, https://www.
strategic-analysis-as-russia-ukraine-conict-continues-malware-activity-rises.html (accessed 29 June 2016).
176 Private correspondence with Joonas Vilenius, CIO of WG Consulting, a social media intelligence
177 Patrik Oksanen, “TV4:s twitter blev ryskt,” helahä, 3 February 2015, http://www. (accessed 21 July 2016).
be put into use at the appropriate moment.
Targeting Personnel
Another campaign for which Russia appears to be developing, testing
and accumulating capabilities is the targeting of personnel, en masse but
on a personalised basis. NATO should be prepared for false messaging on
a mass scale, directed to named individuals, which appears to come from
trusted sources personally known to those individuals.
Painstaking individual collection of data on targets need not be
undertaken when identities and credentials are broadcast by smartphones,
and therefore easily harvested and processed on an industrial scale by
anyone with the capability to pretend to be a legitimate ISP – over
and above the personal information that is volunteered online by even
the most discreet users of social media. Russia deploys equipment in
eastern Ukraine and elsewhere which not only lters the information
available to internet users, blocking access to a range of websites and
replacing them with Russian sources, but also collects data from personal
electronic devices.178 In addition Russia watches which individuals from
the militaries of NATO nations are posted within its easy reach, and has
practised exploiting their vulnerabilities.179
ese vulnerabilities continue to be oered for exploitation. Visitors
to the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 received clear advice that
“communications while at the Games should not be considered private,”
and that “travelers [sic] may want to consider leaving personal electronic
devices (e.g. laptops, smartphones, tablets) at home.”180 But this was
178 “Army busts internet provider blocking access to Ukrainian websites, TV in east,” Interfax-Ukraine, 6
January 2016. “Ukrainian troops nd jamming device in Luhansk Region,” Interfax Ukraine, 2 January 2016.
See also Keir Giles, ‘e Next Phase in Russian Information Warfare’, NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence, November 2015.
179 Ibid.
180 “Security Tip (ST14-001): Sochi 2014 Olympic Games,” US-CERT, 4 February 2014, https://www. See also R. Oliphant, “Russia planning ‘near-total surveillance’ of visitors,
athletes at Sochi Winter Olympics,” Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2013,
an isolated example of bringing attention to the dangers inherent in
using connected devices in Russia. At the time of writing, behaviour by
servicemen and ocials from NATO nations in information security
environments controlled by Russia continues to indicate a widespread
lack of threat awareness.
e December 2015 cyber attacks on Ukrainian energy networks, with
the accompanying mass telephone campaign preventing energy consumers
from contacting their providers, was an aberration from the relative lack
of visible cyber activity that characterized the remainder of the Ukraine
conict.181 At the time of writing, speculation in open sources is continuing
as to the attack’s motivations and intended result. But while diverging from
the general pattern of limited visible cyber attacks in the context of the
Ukrainian conict, the accompanying telephone campaign – in eect a mass
denial of service attack suppressing information distribution and hampering
recovery operations - tied in with the trend of testing and exploiting new
methods of information conict involving mass targeted communications.
Other examples include the mass simultaneous telephoning of Polish
military personnel from Russia, and precisely geographically targeted
intimidatory text messages in Ukraine.182
e most dangerous feature of this targeting is information that
appears to come from a trusted source, whether via text message, social
media, or email. One possible scenario is for this capability to be used
to spread mass and persuasive disinformation or false instructions at a
critical moment in a crisis involving confrontation with Russia.
Multiple examples above demonstrate how activity in the information
Winter-Olympics.html (both accessed 21 July 2016).
181 P. Maldre, “e Many Variants of Russian Cyber Espionage,” op. cit.
182 Detailed, together with other incidents, in K. Giles, e Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,
op. cit.
domain is used by Russia as a precursor or preparation for hostile action in
other domains. It follows that Russias focus on information as an enabler
before and during conict provides opportunities to gather indicators
and warnings.
According to one authoritative Russian analysis, overt information
campaigns in the approach to conict should include
“a package of measures, including broadcasts of information on various
communication channels about intensive and wide-ranging preparation
of the Russian economy and public for war, mobilization of reservists
in many age brackets, relocation of army units on high alert, and
deployment of reserves from the heartland. is information must be
backed up by false activities to be captured by adversary reconnaissance.
A broad campaign is to be launched simultaneously to inform the public
about the adversary’s destructive motivations and intentions.”183
But in addition to observing these clear indicators and being fed
“false activities,” defensive intelligence preparations should include close
monitoring of shifts and trends in Russian information campaigning,
including on social media. At the level of theory, NATO has already
recognised the need for investment in collection and analysis to exploit
early signals in order to provide pointers to imminent Russian activity:
“It will be important for the Alliance to monitor and analyse adversarial
messaging and narratives in order to contribute to the early network of
indications and warning to help recognise, characterise and attribute
an emerging hybrid threat. An adversary’s message may be sophisticated
and nuanced to address the target audience in each respective nation, or
organization but by rapidly assessing an adversary’s narrative, NATO
may be able to get ahead and take the initiative.”184
183 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Initial Periods of Wars and eir Impact on a Country’s
Preparations for a Future War,Military ought (English edition), No 4 2012. pp. 24-25.
184 “Framework for Future Alliance Operations,” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, August 2015,
available atao-2015.pdf, p.23 (accessed 28 June
One specic element of Russian capability which is strikingly under-
studied in open sources is the analysis function which must necessarily
precede information campaigns. It is unlikely that Russia embarks
on information operations without prior research and collection of
operational intelligence, societal data and personal information to
ensure their eectiveness. Russia itself appears to have arrived at the
same conclusion with regard to the notional threat from the West. In
July 2016, a law sponsored by former KGB ocer Andrey Lugovoy was
passed by the State Duma criminalising research into Russian television
audiences by foreign organisations.185 Shortly afterwards, the highly-
regarded and independent Levada-Center polling organisation was given
“foreign agent” status, eectively curtailing its activities.186
is move was widely interpreted in the West as an indication of
weakness or nervousness by the Russian leadership over domestic public
opinion.187 Instead, it suggests that suggests that target audience analysis is
viewed as a critical enabler of information warfare, and Russia has moved
to close o this vulnerability. It follows that similar audience research
activities conducted or commissioned by Russia within NATO member
states should be assessed as probing for vulnerabilities, and part of the
process of Russia determining its key measure of the correlation of forces
and means (COFM) with regard to information warfare. Consequently,
this too would contribute to indicators and warnings of the future
direction of Russian eort.188
185 Chris Dziadul, “Major blow for TNS in Russia,” Broadband TV News, 23 June 2016, http://www. (accessed 21 July 2016).
186 “Поддержка Левада-Центра” (Support for Levada-Center), Levada-Center, 12 September 2016, (accessed 29 September 2016).
187 “‘Strongman’ Putin is so fragile, he’s cracking down on polling,e Washington Post, 13 September 2016,
on-polling/2016/09/13/354f4374-7917-11e6-bd86-b7bbd53d2b5d_story.html (accessed 15 September 2016).
188 COFM in Russian usage is a tool to reveal Russian advantages and adversarial disadvantages, and
hence identify opportunities to project force, whether military or nonmilitary. In the past this has involved
intensive programmes of assigning numerical values to threats and capabilities in order to calculate the
balance of power, with the assumption that imbalance in the adversary’s favour was inherently unstable and
threatening, regardless of their intent. See omas, “inking Like A Russian Ocer,” op. cit., and interview
with Vladimir Pavlovich Kravchenko, former head of the KGB First Main Directorate Foreign Intelligence
Further Reading
K. Giles, “e Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare,” NATO
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, November 2015, http://
(accessed 20 June 2016).
“Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia,” NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, undated,
internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0 (accessed 20 June 2016).
For a case study of the preparatory information campaign ahead of the Russian
intervention in Syria, see M. Czuperski et al., “Distract Deceive Destroy:
Putin at War in Syria,” Atlantic Council, undated, http://publications. (accessed 27 June 2016).
K. Hartmann and K. Giles, “UAV Exploitation: A New Domain for
Cyber Power,” in N. Pissanidis et al. (eds.), 8th International Conference on
Cyber Conict: Cyber Power, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre
of Excellence,les/multimedia/pdf/
CyCon_2016_book.pdf (accessed 22 June 2016), pp. 205-222.
Information Systems Scientic Research Institute (НИИ информационных систем внешне разведки
Первого Главного Управления КГБ СССР), Alfa-Resurs, undated,
(accessed 1 July 2016).
7. Conclusion
Five nal points deserve to be emphasised.
NATO and Western policymakers cannot aord to underestimate
the extent to which Russian concepts and approaches in information
activities dier from what they may take for granted. Options for action
at all levels, strategic, operational and tactical, which appear rational in
NATO capitals should not be taken as a guide to what appears sensible
or practical in Moscow.
is includes the specic question of when, or whether, hostile
action in information space or cyberspace constitutes an act or state of
war.189 As noted above, an overt state of conict with Russia need not
necessarily exist in order for Russian capabilities to be deployed. But this
also means that in information space, as elsewhere, activities by NATO
nations which appear to them to be entirely innocent and unprovocative
can be assessed from Moscow as immediately hostile, and provoke a
reaction which once again takes NATO by surprise.
e Russian challenge in the information domain is not static, but
constantly and rapidly evolving. is includes absorbing and adapting
lessons both from foreign military experience, and from Russia’s own
current operations in Ukraine and Syria. It follows that NATO and its
member states must remain agile and adaptable even simply to track
the current state of Russian theory and capabilities, let alone to devise
plausible countermeasures.
At the same time, Russian information activities take place against a
background noise of similar processes. Distinguishing hostile information
operations commissioned abroad from home-grown legitimate dissent
is challenging, but vital.
189 As detailed in K. Giles and A. Monaghan, Legality in Cyberspace: An Adversary View, U.S. Army
War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2014,
display.cfm?pubID=1193 (accessed 23 June 2016).
Finally, in information warfare, there are no rear areas. According
to Russian CGS Valeriy Gerasimov, a key feature of modern warfare is
“simultaneous eects to the entire depth of enemy territory, in all physical
media and in the information domain.”190 If and when information
warfare with Russia moves to an overt phase, it is not just NATO
servicemen that will be the targets; but their families, their communities,
their societies and their homelands, no matter how safely far away from
Russia they may presently consider themselves to be.
190 V. V. Gerasimov, “Роль Генерального штаба в организации обороны страны в соответствии с
новым Положением о Генеральном штабе, утвержденным Президентом Россиско Федерации”
(e Role of the General Sta in the Organization of the Country’s Defense in Accordance with the New
Statue on the General Sta, Approved by the President of the Russian Federation), Vestnik Akademii Voennykh
Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, pp. 14-22.
NATO Defense College, Via G. Pelosi, 00143 Roma, Italy
... To illustrate disinformation aimed at disorientation, consider the so-called "Firehose of Falsehood" model of propaganda 10 (Paul & Matthews, 2016). Observers of Russian propaganda have noticed that the apparent intention of many recent Russian disinformation operations is not to produce false beliefs, but is instead to pollute an audience's epistemic environment with such a confusing array of inconsistent information that the audience becomes unwilling to trust in anything at all (Giles, 2016). Consider the following example: ...
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Existing analyses of disinformation tend to embrace the view that disinformation is intended or otherwise functions to mislead its audience, that is, to produce false beliefs. I argue that this view is doubly mistaken. First, while paradigmatic disinformation campaigns aim to produce false beliefs in an audience, disinformation may in some cases be intended only to prevent its audience from forming true beliefs. Second, purveyors of disinformation need not intend to have any effect at all on their audience’s beliefs, aiming instead to manipulate an audience’s behavior through alteration of sub-doxastic states. Ultimately, I argue that attention to such non-paradigmatic forms of disinformation is essential to understanding the threat disinformation poses and why this threat is so difficult to counter.
... Критичне ставлення населення до кандидатів на посаду президента та використання дезінформації самими американськими політиками створили сприятливе середовище для діяльності російських інтернет-тролів (Giles, 2016). ...
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Стаття присвячена технології інтернет-тролінгу у контексті інформаційного протиборства. Актуальність теми дослідження зумовлена масштабністю використання акторами міжнародних відносин мережі Інтернет для маніпулювання громадською думкою на державному і міжнародному рівнях. Одним з сучасних трендів інформаційного протиборства є використання державами «фабрик тролів» для проведення пропагандистських і дезінформаційних кампаній, з метою досягнення певних політичних цілей. У статті проаналізовано діяльність російської «фабрики тролів» під час президентських виборів у США 2016 і 2020 років. Метою статті є визначення особливостей інтернет-тролінгу як інструменту інформаційного протиборства. Показано, що дієвість інтернет-тролінга як технології інформаційно-психологічного впливу зумовлена такими його характеристиками, як маскування (мімікрія під місцевих жителів або громадські організації), таргетинг (вплив на конкретні цільові аудиторії та експлуатація їхніх вразливостей), провокативність (поширення повідомлень про актуальні і резонансні суспільні проблеми), гнучкість (зміна моделі поведінки і тактик залежно від ситуації та специфіки цільових аудиторій), багатопрофільність (ініціювання дискусій на різноманітні теми), дифузний характер впливу (децентралізоване поширення повідомлень нібито з різних, не пов’язаних між собою джерел), багатоканальність тощо. Маскування, таргетинг, провокативність повідомлень, децентралізоване поширення інформації дає змогу тролям привернути увагу інтернет-користувачів до їхнього контенту, здобути довіру цільових аудиторій та непомітно перетворити їх на провідників потрібних ідей. Інтернет-тролінг можна порівняти з диверсійними діями ворожої країни, які у певний момент часу набувають підтримки всередині країни-об’єкта впливу, і громадяни, не усвідомлюючи цього, починають підривати власне суспільство зсередини.
... Den russiske forståelse af dybden af den påvirkning, man søger at opnå, er central. Således skelner den russiske debat mellem "informationspsykologisk krigsførelse", som har til formål at påvirke de vaebnede styrkers personel og befolkningen, og "informationsteknologisk krigsførelse", som har til formål at påvirke tekniske systemer, der modtager, indsamler, behandler og overfører information (Giles, 2016;Jonsson, 2019). I forhold til den informationspsykologiske krigsførelse er antagelsen, at man med påvirkningsoperationer kan opnå en kognitiv påvirkning. ...
Hvordan tænker den russiske sikkerhedspolitiske og militære elite påvirkningsoperationer? Og hvordan har man brugt påvirkningsoperationer i praksis i de to krige i Ukraine, i 2014 og 2022? Dette undersøger vi ved at søge at indfange den russiske forståelse af påvirkningsoperationer ved hjælp af begreberne ”aktive foranstaltninger” og ”maskirovka”. Og som man måske kunne forvente, er aktive foranstaltninger og maskirovka blevet anvendt aktivt af Rusland i krigene mod Ukraine. Størst succes havde man i 2014, hvor Ukraine og Vesten stort set blev taget på sengen og Krim erobret nærmest uden kamp. Under invasionen i 2022 har de russiske påvirkningsoperationer dog også haft succes. Først og fremmest i forhold til at vildlede Ukraine om, hvor hovedangrebet blev sat ind. En vildledning, der kunne have haft fatale konsekvenser for Ukraine.
This chapter analyzes Russia’s revisionism. After the consolidation of its system of authoritarian governance and a temporary economic and political upswing in the 2000s, Moscow began to combat what it viewed as Western threats on its great power prerogatives and, increasingly, its regime security. Although its relative rise of the 2000s did not hold, its revisionist needs and intent became only stronger over the years. Struggling ontologically, politically, economically, and normatively, Moscow practices a form of “destructive revisionism” to undermine the status quo—by combining legacy great power capabilities like military coercion with “guerilla” practices of hybrid warfare. All of this serves one purpose: to protect the survival of Russia as an imperial and authoritarian great power.
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The risks of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being subjected to electronic attack are well recognised, especially following high-profile incidents such as the interception of unencrypted video feeds from UAVs in Iraq and Israel, or the diversion and downing of a UAV in Iran. Protection of military UAV assets rightly focuses on defence against sophisticated cyber penetration or electronic attack, including data link intercepts and navigational spoofing. Offensive activity to counter adversary drone operations presumes a requirement for high-end electronic attack systems. However, combat operations in eastern Ukraine in 2014–16 have introduced an entirely new dimension to UAV and counter-UAV operations. In addition to drones with military-grade standards of electronic defence and encryption, a large number of civilian or amateur UAVs are in operation in the conflict. This presents both opportunities and challenges to future operations combating hybrid threats. Actual operations in eastern Ukraine, in combination with studies of potential criminal or terrorist use of UAV technologies, provide indicators for a range of aspects of UAV use in future conflict. However, apart from the direct link to military usage, UAVs are rapidly approaching ubiquity with a wide range of applications reaching from entertainment purposes to border patrol, surveillance, and research, which imposes an indirect security and safety threat. Issues associated with the unguarded use of drones by the general public range from potentially highly dangerous situations such as failing to avoid controlled airspace, to privacy violations. Specific questions include attribution of UAV activities to the individuals actually directing the drone; technical countermeasures against hacking, interception or electronic attack; and options for controlling and directing adversary UAVs. Lack of attribution and security measures protecting civilian UAVs against electronic attack, hacking or hijacking, with the consequent likelihood of unauthorised use or interception, greatly increases the complication of each of these concerns.
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The belief in the power of information is deeply ingrained in the minds of the Russian top leadership, which operates under the premise that public opinion can be effectively influenced in order to reach desired outcomes domestically as well as on foreign soil. Ever since the beginning of the Euromaidan demonstrations, Russia has been seeking to promote its own narrative domestically, in Ukraine, and beyond, making use of the unique features of the cyberspace. As the crisis deepened in early spring of 2014, information operations played an important role in facilitating the de facto annexation of the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation, as well as throughout the continuation of the crisis. This paper sets out to examine the information-related events of early 2014 with a particular focus on the annexation of Crimea. The aim is twofold. First, it provides an insight into the Russian world of ideas regarding information and its power applying the concept of information superiority and how it connects cyber and information warfare. Second, this paper exemplifies how Russia or pro-Russian entities make use of a wide array of tools and methods - kinetic, cyber, and informational - with the purpose of achieving information superiority. The paper concludes with a discussion regarding the impact of cyber within Russian Information Warfare as experienced in Ukraine.
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Evaluating an actor's ‘cyber power’ is an inherently complex problem involving a laundry list of military, normative, and technical variations. However, one important but under-theorised factor is the relationship between military social media operations and cyber operations. Policymakers, journalists, and even some academics often treat social media activity as a proxy variable for an actor's latent technical proficiency and even cyber capability, in other words, its cyber power. Actors that are extremely successful at engaging in social media activities are assumed to be technically proficient and even capable of engaging in cyber operations. This paper argues that an actor's social media use is a poor proxy for its technical and cyber security competency. In fact, under certain conditions social media activity may actually magnify the vulnerability of that actor. This paper synthesises cross-disciplinary research from strategic studies, political science, and technologists to develop a theoretical framework for better understanding the role of social media in cyber operations. It outlines the similarities and differences between social media and cyber security, and categorises different military social media operations into three types: information-gathering (IGMO), defensive social media operations (DeSMO), and offensive social media operations (OSMO).
With Internet access, citizens in non-democracies are often able to diversify their news media repertoires despite government-imposed restrictions on media freedom. The extent to which they do so depends on motivations and habits of news consumption. This article presents a qualitative study of the motivations and habits underlying news media repertoires among a group of digitally connected university students in authoritarian Russia. Interviews reveal awareness and dissatisfaction vis-a-vis the ‘propagandistic’ nature of state-controlled news content, resulting in a preference for using multiple different sources – including foreign websites and ‘non-official’ citizen accounts – to build a personal understanding of what is ‘really’ going on. The article then examines how the students make sense of conflicting narratives about international affairs which they encounter in state and non-state sources. Paradoxically, low reported consumption of distrusted, ‘propagandistic’ state television is often accompanied by reproduction of the overarching strategic narrative which state television conveys.
Cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare share a common techno-logical basis, tools, logistics and operational methods. They can also share the same social networks and have comparable goals. The differences between these categories of cyber activity are often razor thin, or only in the eye of the beholder. From the perspective of a cyber warrior, cyber crime can offer the technical basis (software tools and logistic support) and cyber terrorism the social basis (personal networks and motivation) with which to execute attacks on the computer networks of enemy groups or nations. An article in a Russian military journal from 2007 declared that isolating cyberterrorism and cybercrime from the general context of international information security is, in a sense, artificial and unsupported ... it is primarily motivation that distinguishes acts of cyberterrorism, cybercrime, and military cyberattacks … [without knowing the motivation one cannot] qualify what is going on as a criminal, terrorist or military-political act. The more so that sources of cyberattacks can be easily given a legend as criminal or terrorist actions. 1 Alexander Klimburg is a Fellow at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs and an adviser to governments on cyber security. He is the principle author of a forthcoming European Parliament study on cyber warfare. PROOF This is a non-printable proof of an article published in Survival, vol. 53, no. 1 (February–March 2011), pp. 41–60. The published version is available for subscribers or pay-per-view by clicking here.
Влияние непрямых действий на характер современной войны" (The influence of the indirect approach on the nature of modern warfare), Voyennaya mysl
  • S G Chekinov
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S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "Влияние непрямых действий на характер современной войны" (The influence of the indirect approach on the nature of modern warfare), Voyennaya mysl', No. 6 2011, pp. 3-13.
Информационный ресурс и информационное противоборство" (Information Resources and Information Confrontation) Armeyskiy sbornik
  • V Slipchenko
V. Slipchenko, "Информационный ресурс и информационное противоборство" (Information Resources and Information Confrontation) Armeyskiy sbornik, October 2013, p. 52.
House of Commons Defence Committee
Oral evidence: Russia: Implications for UK Defence and Security, HC 763, House of Commons Defence Committee, 1 March 2016, Network, October 17, 2014, Articles/Detail/?id=184345
Прогнозирование характера и содержания войн будущего: проблемы и суждения" (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems and assessments)
  • S G Chekinov
  • S A Bogdanov
S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "Прогнозирование характера и содержания войн будущего: проблемы и суждения" (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems and assessments), Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44-45.