Nano-weapons: Tomorrow’s Global Security Threat

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Nano-weapons: Tomorrow’s Global Security Threat
Greg Bonadies
North Carolina State University
November 17, 2008
Introduction
The exponential acceleration of the rate of increase in technological advancement
by the human race is indisputable.1 The confluence of advances in genetics,
nanotechnology and robotics brings unprecedented promise – and peril - to human
society. Genetic engineering techniques enabling RNA interference, cell therapies and
gene chips bring promise of increasing longevity, reversing degenerative disease,
combating heart disease and conquering cancer.2 Nanotechnology, pioneered by Eric
Drexler in his mid-1980’s Ph.D. thesis and subsequent books established a foundation
and roadmap for constructing molecular assemblers and nanometer-sized machines or
“kinematic cellular automata, built from reconfigurable molecular modules.”3
Drexler expressed optimism that nano-weapons will not be necessary in the future
because “the problem of world peace would have also been solved” by the time they
become available.4 However, others believe that nano-weaponry will make all
conventional weapons of war obsolete and “future world war will be a war of nano-
weapons.” 5 According to Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman (ret.), U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, “…applications of molecular manufacturing [nanotechnology] have even
greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the [global] balance of
power.” 6
The creation and deployment of nano-weapons represent a potential “existential”
threat that could prove to be far more destabilizing to the international system than even
nuclear weapons and could even empower non-state actors to wreak havoc and
destruction on an unprecedented scale. Any nation, even the United States, would be
powerless to resist a foe having a “nanotech advantage” in key areas including battle
technology (nano-weapons), physical fitness (nano-enabled biotechnology) and effective
command and control (enabled by nano-computing).7
1 Kurzweil, Ray. The Singularity is Near. New York, NY: Viking Penguin Group, 2005, p. 7-110.
2 Ibid, p. 206-217.
3 Ibid, p. 235; see Drexler’s Engines of Creation (1986) and Nanosystems (1992).
4 Navrozov, Lev. “Future Wars Will Be Waged With Nano-Weapons”, newsmax.com, September 5, 2008
(http://www.newsmax.com/navrozov/drexler_nanotechnology/2008/09/05/128018.html)
5 Ibid.
6 Phoenix, Chris. “Nanotech Weaponry” CRN, February 12, 2004
(http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/02/nanotech_weapon.html).
7 Treder, Mike. “Nano-Guns, Nano-Germs, and Nano-Steel” Nanotechnology Perceptions: A Review of
Ultraprecision Engineering and Nanotechnology, Volume 2, No. 1, March 27, 2006.
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Existential Risk
Nano-weapons may be included in that category of destructive technology
capable of producing a “quintessential low-probability, high-consequence”8 nuclear-
biological-chemical terrorism scenario that decimates humanity and in the extreme,
eliminates all life on planet earth. Analyses of human extinction scenarios and related
hazards have been conceptualized using the dimensions of scope, intensity and
probability to characterize the magnitude of risk.9 A risk typology delineates six
categories across two axes: scope and intensity (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Bostrom’s Risk Typology
Scope
Intensity
Global
Local
Personal
Endurable Terminal
Thinning of the
Ozone layer.
Recession
in a country.
Your car is
stolen.
Existential
Genocide
Death
Existential risks, in terms of humanity, are those that are both global in scope and
terminal in intensity. Deliberate misuse of nanotechnology can produce a scenario of
existential risk through self-replicating “nanobots” that consume soil or other organic
matter, spread uncontrollably and destroy the earth’s biosphere “by poisoning it, burning
it, or blocking out sunlight.”10
The consequences of nano-weapon attack parallel those cited for “conventional”
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction11 with the caveat that
scenarios resulting from a well-developed nano-weapon of mass destruction would tend
towards the terminal/global outcomes described in Bostrom’s risk matrix.
8 Falkenrath, Richard A., Newman, Robert D., and Thayer, Bradley A. America’s Achilles’ Heel.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001, p. 2.
9 Bostrom, Nick. “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards”
Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, 2002.
10 Ibid.
11 See Falkenrath, et al. (2001), pp. 5-7 which lists and describes the seven general types of consequences
(massive casualties, contamination, panic, degraded response capabilities, economic damage, loss of
strategic postion, and social-psychological damage).
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Nano-weapons
Nano-weapons may be constructed applying a combination of techniques and
materials to produce very small (a nanometer is one-billionth or 10-9 of a meter)
mechanical devices or inorganic nano-materials or bio-materials that could interact with,
and potentially damage or otherwise alter, a number of different biological or non-
biological systems.
Such a broad definition encompasses such diverse potential weapons as
bacterium-scale self-replicating mechanical robots that can be targeted to destroy
individuals, groups or ecosystems by literally consuming them (ecophagy) and micro-
miniature “submarines” that can inject genetic material into cells to destabilize cell
reproduction and cause “rapid genetic mutations/recombinations to avoid the body’s
immune system response.”12 As an illustration of the hyper-destructive potential of
molecular-manufactured weapons, consider the example of a 200 micron antipersonnel
weapon built with nanotechnology that seeks human victims and injects a lethal dose of
botulism toxin (100 nanograms or one-hundredth the volume of the antipersonnel
weapon); a single suitcase may carry up to 50 billion such weapons – more than enough
to destroy the 6.3 billion inhabitants of earth!13
Conceivable types of nano-weapons are limited only by human imagination and
include a variety of agents that may be designed to kill or maim human beings, animals,
crops, or attack any of the many environmental systems composing the earth’s fragile
ecosystem. A small sample of the types of potential nanotechnology-based weapons
includes the following.14 Nano-poisons could be delivered to individual, small group or
large group targets, not only to kill or disable, but could also be used to trigger specific
brain functions or neural patterns thus effecting a form of mind control, for example, by
reducing aggressive impulses or rendering victims pliable and subservient. “Nano mind
erasers” could modify or even erase a person’s memory by inducing a succession of tiny
and unnoticeable “micro fields” targeted to certain brain areas creating Alzheimer-like
symptoms in its victims. Nano heart stoppers and stroke inducers would operate by
restricting neural or arterial blood flow causing excruciating pain, permanent damage or
death to its victims. Invisible nano needles could be projected at victims like bullets from
guns at extended distances to arrest victims’ physical movement or otherwise disable
them. In addition to serving as weapons of mass destruction and for targeted
assassination, nano devices can operate as “nano-dust spies” for reconnaissance purposes
or sentinels in defensive applications. Respiratory, ingestive or dermal exposure to
seeming innocuous nano-particles may pose a health hazard depending on the size,
surface composition and bioreactivity of the particles and can cause adverse cellular and
neural effects.15
12 Phoenix, Chris. “Mature nano-tech weapons.” Center for Responsible Nanotechnology. September 24,
2008. (http://wise-nano.org/w/index.php/Mature_nanotech_weapons).
13 Phoenix (2004).
14 Fin, Al. “Nano-Weapons of the Near Future” ALFIN2100, May 24, 2008
(http://alfin2100.blogspot.com/2008/05/nano-weapons-of-near-future.html).
15 Bennett-Woods, Deb. Nanotechnology: Ethics and Society. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008, p. 158.
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A catalog of potential military applications of nanotechnology include nuclear
weapons (new missile warhead designs featuring pure fusion without a fission trigger),
chemical weapons (capsules, active chemical bonding agents employing various vectors
for entry into the human body, cells and blood-brain barrier), and biological weapons
(capsules, active biological bonding agents for easier entry into body, cells, and brain and
an ability to overcome the human body’s immune reaction).16
Although most of the potential of nanotechnology remains “on the drawing
board,” it may represent the genesis of an entire generation of new weapons of mass
destruction.17 Fourth-generation nuclear weapons with superlaser triggers creating small
thermonuclear explosions are on the drawing board as are conventional weapons that,
through self-replication-based manufacturing, could be produced in sufficiently large
quantities as to constitute massively-destructive weapons.
Global ecophagy by biovorous nanoreplicators represents one worst-case nano-
weapon scenario. The word ecophagy derives from “eco-“ meaning ecology or
ecosystem and “-phagy” which means “to eat or consume” suggesting the notion of an
“ecosystem eating” mechanism or process. The so-called “gray goo” scenario was first
outlined by Eric Drexler in his well-known 1986 book Engines of Creation. Drexler
warned of man-made threats like an “omnivorous bacteria-like nano-mechanism” that
could supplant all life on the planet by “out-competing” real plants, that spreads “like
blowing pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a matter of days.”18
A lengthy and comprehensive scientific study examining the phenomenon of
global ecophagy and specifically whether it has limitations or built-in constraints was
done by research scientist Robert Frietas. Because no systematic study of the risks and
limitations of molecular nanotechnology (MNT) has been done, Frietas endeavored to
assess the “risk that self-replicating nano-robots capable of functioning autonomously in
the natural environment could quickly convert that natural environment [or biomass] into
replicas of themselves [a nanomass] on a global basis…”19 Frietas, in his discussion of
the varieties of nanomachines composed of carbon-rich diamondoid materials or of other
nanochemistries based on aluminum-rich sapphire (Al2O3), boron-rich (BN) or titanium-
rich (TiC) materials, seems to favor the former since the carbon-based biomass can also
serve as a power source for nano-machine replication.
Frietas scrutinizes exponential replication rate and dispersal velocity, energy and
materials requirements and thermal pollution in relation to the ecophagic impact from
“runaway nanorobotic replicators or ‘replibots’ [that could] convert the entire surface
biosphere (the ecology of all living things on the surface of the Earth) into alternative or
16 Altman, Jurgen. Nanotechnology and Preventive Arms Control. University of Dortmond, Germany,
2005, (http://www.bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/pdf-docs/berichtaltmann.pdf), pp. 32-33.
17 Anonymous. “Nanotechnology: the potential for new WMD.” Jane’s Security News, January 15, 2003,
(http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jcbw/jcbw030115_1_n.shtml)
18 Drexler, K. Eric. Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology. New York, NY: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1986.
19 Frietas, Robert A., Jr. Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by Bivorous Nanoreplicators, with Public Policy
Recommendations, April, 2000, p. 2, (http://www.rfrietas.com/Nano/Ecophacy.htm).
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artificial materials.”20 Additional ecophagic scenarios characterized by Frietas include
“gray plankton” which destroys the Earth’s oceans, “gray dust” or “aerovores” that can
replicate through the entire atmosphere and block out all sunlight and “gray lichen” that
can cause ecophagic destruction of all terrestrial biology.
Researchers have cited concerns that innovations in nanotechnology “can
considerably enhance the delivery mechanisms of agents or toxic substances” through
application in development and deployment of chemical and biological weapons21 and
can make “conventional” chemical and biological weapons more deadly and easier to
conceal and deploy. Others have suggested that nano-weapons could be combined with
bio-weapons or chemical weapons to “provide the budding world religious or ideological
dictator with far more ultimate power than a few nuclear weapons.”22
Actors, Intent and Capability
The potential pool of sponsors or users of nano-weapons may be quite large and
consists of both state and non-state actors. However, development and acquisition of
such weapons may be limited for a number of reasons.
Developed countries like the United States have begun research and development
in nano-weapon technology as an extension of their defense programs which include
combating “conventional” nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It has been
reported that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) applies in excess of 30% of federal
investment funds in nanotechnology. Department of Defense sponsored nanotechnology
research funding for 2006 was estimated to be $436,000,000 with approximately
$1,000,000 allocated to risk-related research.23 Current and near-term nano-particle
research and development projects are being sponsored by the Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies (MIT), the Naval Research Laboratory, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army High Performance Computing Research
Center, the Institute for Collaborative Biotechnologies and the Army Research
Laboratory. Nanotechnology R&D programs sponsored by the U.S. DoD include
fundamental nanoscale phenomena and processes, nanomaterials, nanoscale devices and
systems, instrumentation research metrology and standards for nanotechnology,
nanomanufacturing and societal dimensions.24
At least one country, China, has been singled out as a potential threat to U.S.
national security in the realm of nano-weapons development.25 The title of Navrozov’s
article “Nano-nightmare: China builds futuristic weapons; U.S. sleeps” is provocative
but belies a lack of concrete evidence to the back author’s assertion other than his citing
20 Ibid, p. 4.
21 Wolbring, Gregor. “NBICS and Military Products.” Innovation Watch Newsletter, January 30, 2007
(http://www.innovationwatch.com/choiceisyours/choiceisyours-2007-01-30.htm).
22 Fin (2008).
23 Wolbring (2007).
24 Ibid.
25 Navrozov. Lev. “Nano-nightmare: China builds futuristic weapons; U.S. sleeps.” WorldTribune.com,
July 8, 2007 (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/lev7_06.asp).
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the facts that molecular nanotechnology is not in any national school curriculum except
China’s, all of Drexler’s books and articles are on the Chinese Internet, and finally, his
speculation regarding China’s intent to “crush the West…[and] circumvent Mutual
Assured Destruction by destroying the Western means of nuclear retaliation.”26
Other state actors with new or incipient nano-technology (not necessarily
offensive nano-weaponry, but apparently defensive in nature) include Sweden, Israel and
India although precious little public evidence exists for mature, well-funded programs.27
Russia, with competencies in both nanotechnology and sophisticated military technology
will no doubt endeavor to compete with the United States which boasts 80-90% of world-
wide spending on military research and development of nanotechnology (a great deal of
which goes to the Pentagon).28
Motives for acquisition and use (and constraints thereof) of nano-weapons of
mass destruction by state and non-state actors also parallel the rationale for acquisition
and use of “conventional” covert nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.29 Also like
NBC weapons, nano-weapons could find their way into the hands of those other than the
inventor and first user and may be more easily reverse engineered.30 Nuclear weapons
require easily trackable massive, industrial-grade research and development efforts,
whereas nano-weapons may be developed faster and more economically making covert
development more feasible.31 Unlike nuclear weapon development, nano-weapons don’t
require rare isotopes (uranium, plutonium) or easily-identified manufacturing plants.32
Technical hurdles and barriers to entry for development of nano-weapons are non-
trivial and may, in fact, rival those for developing effective nuclear weapons.33 Certainly
the most dreadful and destructive technologies – biovorous nanobots capable of
comprehensive ecophagy – are extremely difficult to build (much of the technology is
still under development), “requir[ing] exquisite attention to numerous complex
specifications and operational challenges…[and] a lengthy period of purposeful focused
effort.”34 These requirements appear to obviate the possibility that rogue states or non-
state actors will develop nano-weapons. However, it has been suggested that totalitarian
governments could easily and arbitrarily allocate funding for such projects (whereas the
political bureaucracy in democracies would like likely frown upon heavy investment in
nano-weapons “because they sound militaristic to Congress.”35
26 Ibid.
27 Wolbring (2007).
28 Bennett-Woods, Deb. Nanotechnology: Ethics and Society. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008, p. 143.
29 Falkenrath, et al. (2001), pp. 29-96.
30 Wolbring (2007).
31 Phoenix (2004).
32 Bostrom (2002), p. 5.
33 See for example a discussion of the technical barriers that delay and complicate NBC acquisition in
Falkenrath, et al. (2001), pp. 85-88 and the challenges of acquiring fissile material and developing nuclear
weapon detonation mechanism pp. 126-137.
34 Frietas (2000), p. 2.
35 Navrozov (2008).
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It is difficult to summarize the relative lethality, portability and accessibility36 of
nano-weapons and their pre-cursor technologies because of the wide variety of nano-
weapon types, the nascent status of much of the development and deployment
technologies and the great secrecy that indubitably surrounds nation-state’s military R&D
efforts.
Nano-weapons: Defense and Mitigation
Conceptually, technological counter-measures to nano-weapons are as feasible to
develop as the weapons themselves. Antiviral nanobots could be developed to combat
bioengineered viruses and “blue goo” (that is, good-guy anti-ecophagic “police”
nanobots) could be developed to counter the varieties of malicious ecophagic gray goos:
plankton, dust and lichen.37 Defensive technologies, such as an “active shield” or a
“global nanotech immune system” may be considerably more difficult to develop leaving
open a window of vulnerability to be exploited by opportunistic antagonists.38
Defensive measures available to counter nano-weapons may include an array of
general strategies (faster information processing, more autonomous decisions, withdrawal
of humans and use of artificial systems, etc.), passive protection (avoid contact, sieves
with molecule-size pores protecting against penetration, complete encapsulation, making
adhesion to surfaces more difficult, hardening by providing a nano-layer shield against
mechanical abrasion or heat, stronger structures against impact), active defense (small
missiles/projectiles fired against approaching mini-micro-vehicles, active surface for
destruction of approaching or adhering objects, micro-/nano-robots as ‘guards’ on outer
surface, inside own systems/positions or within body/cells, preventive ‘inoculation’), and
offense strategies (counterattack, pre-emptive or preventive attack).39
In the case of an outbreak of malicious ecophagy by “badbots,” prophylactic
measures can be taken by manufacturing and strategically placing enormous quantities of
“goodbots” whose release can be triggered by nano-sentinels’ detection of “badbots”40
thus “seeding the bio-mass with protective immune-system nanobots.41
An entire platform of social, political and judicial measures has been outlined as a
program of defense to mitigate the perils of GNR and its destructive effects.42 The
platform includes a broad range of measures: streamlined regulatory process for genetic
and medical technologies (which could impede the malevolent application of
nanotechnology), monitoring or sampling for unknown or evolving biological pathogens,
temporary moratoriums on certain areas of research or development considered non-
36 See the framework used by Falkenrath, et al. (2001) to assess logistical characteristics of covert nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
37 Kurzweil (2005), pp. 403, 416.
38 Bostrom (2002), p. 5.
39 Altman, Jurgen. Nanotechnology and Preventive Arms Control. University of Dortmond, Germany,
2005, (http://www.bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/pdf-docs/berichtaltmann.pdf), p. 34.
40 Frietas (2000), p. 24.
41 Kurzweil (2005), p. 425.
42 Kurzweil (2005), pp. 418, 422-426.
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productive or of no constructive value, definition of safety and ethical guidelines, raising
public awareness to the perils of nanotechnology, encouraging international cooperation
to detection and remediation of maleficent uses of nano-technology, impeding access by
terrorists and rogue nations to weapons of mass destruction, funding of police authorities
and the intelligence community to identify and manage impending threats from both state
and non-state actors.
Formal efforts have been proposed to control the development of nano-weapons
under the umbrella of current protocols such as the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC).43 Very specific
limits have been proposed to limit the risks and exposures from uncontrolled, or
unregulated nano-technology development: a ban on distributed sensors below several
centimeters in size, a ban on metal-free small arms and munitions (and update of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces as new weapons are devised), a ten-year
moratorium on non-medical body manipulation, a ban on armed autonomous systems and
limits on unarmed systems, a ban on mobile systems below 0.2-0.5 meters in size, and a
general ban on space weapons.44
Three specific policy recommendations are cited by Robert Frietas to preclude
global ecosystem destruction by ecophagic nano-technologies (which can occur,
hypothetically, in less than 3 hours): (1) “an immediate moratorium on all artificial life
experiments” including development of “autonomous foraging replicators,” (2)
“continuous comprehensive infrared surveillance of Earth’s surface by geostationary
satellites…to monitor the current biomass inventory and to detect…any rapidly-
developing artificial hotspots,” and (3) a research and development program “to
counteract ecophagic replicators, including scenario-building and threat analysis with
numerical simulations, measure/countermeasure analysis, theory and design of global
monitoring systems capable of fast detection and response, IFF (Identification Friend or
Foe) discrimination protocols, and eventually the design of relevant systemic defensive
capabilities and infrastructure.”45
General guidelines and provisions have been offered as part of the effort to
prevent inadvertent or unauthorized release of self-replicating nanotechnology entities:
do not enable artificial replicators’ capability to replicate in a natural, uncontrolled
environment, do not enable evolution of nano-mechanisms in the context of a self-
replicating manufacturing system, build proliferation limits into replicating-enabled
systems and assure traceability, limit access to molecular manufacturing development
capability to responsible actors, only allow replication requiring materials not found in
the natural environment, separate the process of replication from the functionality of end
products (so manufactured devices can create end products but cannot replicate
themselves), and require replication codes and security mechanisms (such as the
43 Altman, Jurgen. Nanotechnology and Preventive Arms Control. University of Dortmond, Germany,
2005, (http://www.bundesstiftung-friedensforschung.de/pdf-docs/berichtaltmann.pdf).
44 Ibid, p. 5.
45 Frietas (2000), p. 27.
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“broadcast architecture”) that are encrypted and time limited.46 These provisions are
operationalized in a set of guidelines and scorecards in a document obtained from the
website sponsored by the Foresight Institute (which Eric Drexler founded).47
The equivalent of the Manhattan Project, which was initiated to develop U.S.
nuclear weapons in the 1940’s, has been proposed with a cost of $5,000,000,000 to
develop nano-technologies and defenses against nano-weapons.48 Drexler, the father of
nano-technology, shared his theories in Congress before the Senate Subcommittee on
Science, Technology and Space. The chairman of the subcommittee, Al Gore, was so
impressed at the time, he proposed to fund the “Nanhatten Project” based on the
recommendations outlined by Drexler’s Foresight Institute.49 To the chagrin of some
observers, government investment in commercial applications of nano-technology
(suntan lotion, ski wax, paint) has far outweighed strategic countermeasure investment.50
Conclusion
Although considered by some the stuff of science fiction, nano-weaponry is at
least conceivable given ongoing rapid technical developments and the confluence of
genetic engineering, nano-technology and robotics (GNR). Bio-engineered viruses, self-
replicating “nanobots” or some other creative combination of technologies and
deployment mechanisms pose a potential lethal threat, possibly of an existential nature,
i.e., to the survival of live on the planet. Nanotechnologist Eric Drexler’s book “Engines
of Creation” regarding the promise and peril of nanotechnology has been likened to
Albert Einstein’s famous letter to President Roosevelt on August 2, 1939 noting the
existence of precursor technology for building “extremely powerful bombs of a new
type.” Drexler puts the potential threat into perspective: “A [nuclear] bomb can only
blast things, but nano-machines…could be used to infiltrate, seize, change, and govern a
territory or a world.”
It behooves policy-makers and political leaders to consider now the implications
of nano-weapons as their development can adversely impact international relations due to
arms race and crisis instabilities against which the Cold War nuclear arms race would
pale.51 Nanotechnology itself, in full flourish, is a disruptive technology that can easily
and radically alter the balances of power in global affairs through changes in economic
influence and interdependence and can preclude “the ability of powerful nations to
‘police’ the international system…[and] by making small groups self-sufficient, it can
encourage the breakup of existing nations.”52
46 Kurzweil (2005), pp. 418-419.
47 Jacobstein, Neil. Foresight Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology Development. Foresight
Institute, April, 2006 (http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/ForesightGuidelinesV6.pdf).
48 Navrozov (2004).
49 Navrozov (2007).
50 Ibid.
51 Bostrom (2002), pp. 5-6.
52 Phoenix (2004) referencing an essay by Tom McCarthy.
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Incremental increases in research and development investment are a reasonable
way to begin building defenses to the inevitable existential risks that are sure to come
from a lethal combination of misanthropic terrorist minds or power-hungry, belligerent
nation-states and future GNR technology threats. The major challenge for leaders and
decision-makers is to balance the immediate threats and risks of today with the threats
and risks that tomorrow may bring – an unenviable task given the myriad sources of
danger (terrorism, natural disasters, war, disease, etc.) our governments are attempting to
manage currently.
Perhaps Al Qaeda, nuclear non-proliferation and the instability of failed or failing
nations are the proper focus for our energies and resources in today’s world, but we
should keep an eye on future threats, especially ones that can literally turn us and our
beautiful world into gray goo.
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References
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(http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jcbw/jcbw030115_1_n.shtml
)
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Navrozov. Lev. “Nano-nightmare: China builds futuristic weapons; U.S. sleeps.”
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