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Religion‐Related Hate Crimes: Data, Trends, and Limitations
Abstract
Both police report and victim survey data estimate that between 10 and 20 percent of all hate crimes are motivated by a religion bias. Yet, the volume of research on religion-related hate crimes pales in comparison to research examining race-based or sexuality-based hate crimes. We examine two data sources, the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), to assess trends and patterns in hate crimes involving religion. The UCR, which is based on police reports, suggests a downward trend in the number of religion-related hate crimes that mirrors the overall downward trend for all hate crimes. The NCVS, which is based on victim reports, suggests that religion-related hate crimes have been relatively stable in both number and as a proportion of all hate crimes. We conclude by suggesting potential directions for future research and data collection.
... Though the notion of motive is psychological, its significance is evident in laws that attempt to delineate guilt. Evidence, on the other hand, is based on a set of behavioral and societal markers to ascertain underlying intent, which speaks to the necessity of both national and international legislation that would create standardized practices to help surmount legal and anthropogenic barriers (B ateson, 2012;Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). ...
... Had it been interpreted this way, it would have allowed the generalization of their incitement to hatred. The French framework, on the other hand, struggles with defining intent on a precise level (Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). ...
... In Germany, laws against "Volksverhetzung," or public incitement to hatred, exist. As such, demonstrating intent aimed at a specific group is a demanding task, making addressing these types of crimes challenging in various legal realms (Bateson, 2012;Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). ...
To compare law insight to the dimension of hidden intent in a hate crime. Therefore, if one is to consider a crime to be a hate crime, showing the intent of hatred is a fundamental part of this process. The study examines the proofs and legal challenges in establishing such intent, especially in the case of defendants whose misdeeds were previously referenced as using circumstantial evidence, like behaviors, racist discourse, and symbols of hatred. It further looks into the ethical and political influences on judicial processes, investigating how media, public opinion, and hate speech impact the reading of evidence. The study explores the comparison of the legal systems of the United States with those of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. It ends by providing legal recommendations to improve mechanisms for demonstrating latent intent and guaranteeing the right to a fair trial in hate crime cases.
... Research examining religious individuals, communities, and/or congregations as victims of crime is quite limited (see reviews by Scheitle and Hansmann 2017;Scheitle 2018). Most of the extant research has been on bias crimes, and even that is mostly focused on crimes against individuals. ...
... Most of the extant research has been on bias crimes, and even that is mostly focused on crimes against individuals. A recent review by Scheitle and Hansmann (2017) found only 17 articles focusing on religious-based bias crimes, and these focused on victimization of Muslim individuals and not congregations. Given this lack of research attention to the issue of crimes affecting religious congregations, social scientists and policy makers do not have much information about questions such as: how does the likelihood of different kinds of victimization (overall, property, and violent) vary across religious traditions, community contexts, and congregational characteristics? ...
... In sum, there is scant research on crime victimization of religious congregations or crimes occurring at religious congregations (see reviews by Scheitle and Hansmann 2017;Scheitle 2018), a gap we hope to assist in filling here. Given the above guidance from crime opportunity context and systemic social control perspectives, as well as research on religiously motivated bias crime, we form three research expectations. ...
Religious congregations’ experiences with crime victimization are an under-researched and poorly understood phenomenon. Religious congregations represent a street crime target as a potential source of money, electronics, furniture and other goods, or as places where potential victims come and go. Furthermore, religious congregations are potential targets of bias crimes, especially certain minority religious traditions. This study examines survey data from a national sample of 1,385 religious congregations to investigate the role of religious tradition, criminal opportunity/routine activities factors, and surrounding structural disadvantage on criminal events experienced by congregations. We examine overall, property, and violent crime. We find that opportunity factors and structural disadvantage foster overall reported crime, as well as property and violent crime separately. By contrast, religious tradition is only associated with violent crime, specifically threats of violence. Jewish and Muslim congregations are more likely to report experiencing violent incidents, and report experiencing them more often.
... The religious composition in the United States and around the world has changed considerably within the past several decades, and the number of individuals who affiliate with Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism has rapidly increased. Consequently, online hate crimes motivated by religious bigotry have also escalated, although little research attention has been paid to religiousrelated hate crimes in comparison to racism-related and homophobia-related hate crimes (Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). Below are some incidents that illuminate examples of online hate crimes that were fueled by religious bigotry: ...
... As the number of religious groups from racial and ethnic minority cultures increases in numbers and presence, the issue of religion-based hate crimes, both online and offline, will be important to researchers, law enforcement, and policymakers (Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). ...
The purpose of this chapter was to review the definition and core characteristics of hate speech, the relevance of the online environment for offering a unique context for hate speech, outcomes of online hate crimes, frequency rates of hate speech and hate crimes, characteristics and functions of hate groups and their appeal to adolescents, and correlates of hate speech involvement. The chapter concludes with recommendations for reducing the risk of online hate speech and the negative consequences for adolescents by highlighting the roles of school personnel (i.e., teachers, principals, staff), parents, and Internet and social media providers in intervention and prevention efforts. Recommendations for intervention and prevention efforts that involve adolescents and parents are also described.
... Official statistics have shown an increase in religionbased hate crimes in the past several years (Government Accountability Office 2019; Levin 2017;Lichtblau 2015). Official hate crime statistics, however, are flawed and limited (Scheitle and Hansmann 2016). Moreover, such hate crime statistics represent only one type of hostility, discrimination, or intolerance that individuals might encounter because of their religion, and they do not allow researchers to understand the connection between religion and other social locations, such as race. ...
... The official hate crime statistics compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations have a number of well-known shortcomings, including their reliance on crimes reported to a law enforcement agency and the incomplete and inconsistent participation of law enforcement agencies in documenting hate crimes (McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003;Nolan and Akiyama 1999). Similarly, the National Crime Victimization Survey, a federally sponsored survey of individuals' experiences with crime, does ask victims about perceived bias motivations, but it does not ask respondents any questions about their religion (Scheitle and Hansmann 2016). ...
While concerns about the consequences of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and other forms of religious bias have grown in the past several years, the data available to examine these issues have been limited. This study utilizes new data from a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults featuring oversamples of key religious minority groups and an instrument dedicated to measuring the extent to which individuals experience hostility, discrimination, and violence due to their religion. Findings show that, while a sizable minority of Christian adults report such experiences, a much greater share of Muslim and Jewish adults report experiences with interpersonal hostility, organizational discrimination, and violent victimization due to their religion. Analyses show that these patterns are largely unchanged after accounting for individuals’ race and ethnicity, national origin, and other characteristics, suggesting that experiences with religious hostility are not epiphenomenal to other social locations.
... This phenomenon extends to conflict contexts, where hate crimes and speech manifest. For instance, Scheitle and Hansmann (2016) documented religious hate crimes targeting predominantly Jewish and Islamic groups in the United States. In Indonesia, Setu (2021) reported that between 2018 and 2021, the Ministry of Communication and Information addressed 3,640 hate speech incidents based on ethnicity, race, religion, and intergroup affiliations in digital spaces. ...
This study aimed to investigate the formation of group-based hatred in the context of latent conflict, as previous studies have predominantly explored the consequences of hatred in intractable conflicts. Group identification was hypothesized to lead to hatred of another group through perceived threat as a mediator, with the types of threat formulated from historical conflict narratives. The research context was the latent Muslim-PKI conflict in Indonesia. Realistic feelings of threat are formulated based on the narrative that the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) is perceived to be resurging and trying to change the foundation of the state into communism. Symbolic threat comes from the narrative that PKI resurgence aims to spread communist ideology. This study surveyed 508 Muslim Indonesian citizens aged at least 18 years. The results indicated that perceived realistic and symbolic threats fully mediated the influence of group identification as Muslims on hatred towards PKI. Consistent with the hypothesis, the results demonstrated that hatred can also occur in the context of latent conflict, with perceived threat mediating the relationship between group identification and group-based hatred, and the types of threat were rooted in the historical conflict.
... These dynamics, collectively, have the potential − though to a limited extent (Heaton, 2006), to deter religious individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour by increasing their perception of the informal consequences (Baier & Wright, 2001). On the other hand, other research suggests that religious distinctions can contribute to conflicts and tensions, possibly resulting in hate crimes or violence (Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). In this paper, the analysis is extended to explore the varying impacts that the predominant religion of each country may exert on homicide rates. ...
Homicide, which represents the most extreme form of violence, significantly devalues human life. This paper examines the impact of natural geography − a factor often underestimated − alongside socioeco-nomic disparities and institutional performance on global violentcrime rates, with a specific focus on homicide. By analyzing data from 180 countries for the years 2002−2021 and applying Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression models, it finds a significant correlation between geographic conditions and homicide rates. Specifically, it highlights that landlocked countries with higher mean temperatures report lower homicide rates compared to cooler, coastal countries. In addition, the findings reveal that countries with higher economic status, better education and well-functioning institutions tend to exhibit lower homicide rates.
... Los delitos de odio relacionados directamente con las religiones han sido menos abarcados que otros, siendo pertinente que se le preste más atención debido a su alta incidencia (Scheitle y Hansmann, 2016). Los delitos de odio relacionados con la religión abarcan "cualquier hecho que señala la existencia de un móvil de odio o discriminación hacia la víctima por sus creencias religiosas. ...
Con el objetivo general de facilitar un conocimiento pormenorizado de la percepción que los jóvenes españoles tienen sobre los delitos de odio en el panorama nacional, pero teniendo en cuenta la territorialidad de las comunidades autónomas, se llevó a cabo desde Columbares el presente estudio en colaboración con la Universidad de Murcia. Más específicamente se trata de un estudio que se propone conocer la percepción que tienen, analizar los motivos por los piensan que se producen, estudiar la importancia que dan a estos delitos, evaluar si son capaces de detectarlos, los lugares donde más ocurren y cómo actúan ante ellos. Este libro representa un esfuerzo conjunto de investigación, en el que hemos reunido datos, estadísticas y testimonios para ofrecer una visión panorámica de un problema que sigue siendo preocupante en nuestra sociedad. A través de los hallazgos obtenidos, se pretende, así, comprender la realidad actual de los delitos de odio y sentar las bases para la acción y la prevención.
... While the existing literature covers hate crimes targeting individuals because of race, gender, sexuality, and ability, there is comparably less research on hate crimes related to an individual's religion (Scheitle and Hansmann 2017). Scholarship that does focus on religion-based hate crimes examines how religious minority status has an impact on the likelihood of becoming the target of a hate crime (Disha, Cavendish, and King 2011;Turpin-Petrosino 2015). ...
An individual’s fear of hate crime victimization might be partially explained by direct experiences that influence their assessment of victimization risk. In some cases, though, fear of hate crime victimization is driven not by direct, personal experiences, but by historical and contemporary trauma suffered by those holding the targeted status. Using data from the 2019 nationally representative Experiences with Religious Discrimination Study (ERDS) survey, we show that part of Jewish and Muslim adults’ greater fears of victimization is explained by their past personal victimization experiences, their knowledge of close friends and family who have been victimized, and their greater religious visibility. Still, even after accounting for these factors, Jewish and Muslim adults report greater fears of religious hate crime victimization compared to Christian adults. We attribute this residual fear to the culture of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within the United States and violence attributable to that culture, as well as the collective memory of historical religion-based victimization of Muslim and Jewish communities. These findings suggest the collective memory and knowledge of contemporary religious victimization may continue to affect Jewish and Muslim adults via a mechanism of fear, which has implications for scholarly and policy efforts to decrease religious victimization and its impact.
... President George H. W. Bush signed the Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1990, which requires all states to collect data on hate crimes through the UCR (Anderson, Dyson, & Brooks, Jr., 2002). The UCR is a clearinghouse of information collected by state and local law enforcement (Scheitle & Hansmann, 2016). According to the UCR, hate crimes had been on a decline since 2008, but, in 2017, the FBI announced an overall 16% increase in hate crimes ( Hate Crime Statistics, 2017, 2018. ...
In this paper, we analyze seven-years of hate crime newspaper articles from seven newspapers. We explore the extent to which newspapers chose to report hate crimes and how they frame crimes of hates. The analysis is informed by social construction of claims-making and utilizes a content analysis approach. The central argument is that the portrayal of hate crimes may have an impact on public perceptions, values, attitudes, and behaviors in the short and long-term regarding crimes of hate. Findings suggest that newspaper reporting of hate crimes is sporadic with certain types of hate crimes receiving more newspaper coverage than others when compared to the number of hate crimes reported to the police.
... The Sikh community has documented higher rates of bullying for Sikh youth in comparison to other youth in New York City and San Francisco (The Sikh Coalition 2014). There has been notably little research conducted on the experiences of Jewish and Muslim youth with hate and bias victimization, despite the fact that these faiths are the most common targets of religious-based hate victimization (Scheitle and Hansmann 2016) and concerns about increased hate crime victimization targeting these communities have grown in recent years (Levin and Reitzel 2018). ...
Research has documented that a significant portion of youth are exposed to bias victimization. However, less is known about whether experiencing certain types of bias victimization (e.g., sexual orientation bias) is more or less likely to be related to a more extensive bias victimization history (i.e., experiencing multiple types of bias victimization) and whether exposure to multiple types of bias victimization explains any relationships between specific types of bias victimization and negative outcomes. To address these gaps, the current study explores relationships between exposure to multiple types of bias-motivated victimization, trauma symptomatology and perceived social support. Participants were 854 youth and young adults (60.9% female) from three higher risk communities who completed a survey on personal experiences with bias-related victimization. The average age of participants was 16.6 years; 28.5% of the sample described themselves as Black or African American; 13.4% as Hispanic or Latino (any race); 45.3% as White, and 12.8% as another race. Sixty-nine percent of the sample described their sexual orientation as heterosexual; 8.9% as gay, lesbian, or homosexual; 12.5% as bisexual; and 9.5% as another sexual orientation. Sixty-three percent of participants reported at least one type of bias victimization in their lifetime, and more than one in three youth (38.7%) experienced two or more types of bias victimization in their lifetimes (18.1% two types, 12.1% three types, and 8.5% four or more types). Experiencing multiple types of bias victimization was related to higher trauma symptomatology and less perceived social support. Experiencing multiple types of bias victimization attenuated or eliminated the association between individual types of bias victimization and well-being. The findings contribute to a growing body of research demonstrating the damaging mental health effects of occupying multiple marginalized statuses, and points to the cumulation of bias victimization experiences as an important factor contributing to significant differences in well-being and support among youth and young adults.
Human behavior in cyber space is extremely complex. Change is the only constant as technologies and social contexts evolve rapidly. This leads to new behaviors in cybersecurity, Facebook use, smartphone habits, social networking, and many more. Scientific research in this area is becoming an established field and has already generated a broad range of social impacts. Alongside the four key elements (users, technologies, activities, and effects), the text covers cyber law, business, health, governance, education, and many other fields. Written by international scholars from a wide range of disciplines, this handbook brings all these aspects together in a clear, user-friendly format. After introducing the history and development of the field, each chapter synthesizes the most recent advances in key topics, highlights leading scholars and their major achievements, and identifies core future directions. It is the ideal overview of the field for researchers, scholars, and students alike.
Putusan hakim dalam perkara penodaan agama tidak mencerminkan nilai-nilai maskulinitas dari para hakim yang memutus perkara tersebut. Seorang hakim dalam membuat putusan atas perkara yang ditangani harus bersumber pada kemampuannya untuk berfikir dan berkehendak secara independen namun dalam pembatasan tanggungjawab dan objektifitas. Pengambilan keputusan yang berdasarkan atas intuisi atau perasaan memiliki sifat subyektif, sehingga mudah terkena pengaruh. Kajian ini menegaskan bahwa putusan hakim dalam beberapa perkara penodaan agama lebih banyak dipengaruhi oleh unsur-unsur di luar pengadilan, baik berupa tenakan massa maupun fatwa-fatwa Lembaga keagamaan yang tidak mempunyai kekuatan hukum. Hal ini berarti bahwa sifat maskulinitas yang cenderung analitis dan memerinci segala sesuatu untuk memeriksa bagian-bagian secara teliti justru ditanggalkan. Majelis hakim kasus penodaan agama cenderung memanfaatkan sifat femininitas, yakni memiliki gaya yang lebih menyeluruh dan lebih berorientasi pada situasi.
Hate crimes are reprehensible acts driven by animosity and bias against specific target groups, transcending borders and geographical boundaries. Effectively addressing hate crimes necessitates a profound understanding of the victims impacted by prejudice and hostility. To combat crimes rooted in prejudice, it is crucial to delve into the experiences of the victims. A comprehensive understanding of their needs, characteristics, and perspectives becomes paramount for conducting thorough investigations, countering criminal activities, and preventing further victimization. Within this framework, this chapter encompasses the identification of victim groups affected by hate crimes and a detailed exploration of the requisite measures to eradicate victimization. This multifaceted approach aims not only to address the immediate consequences of hate crimes but also to implement proactive strategies that contribute to the prevention of recurrent victimization.
The concept of postsecular society highlights the increasing relevance of religion in social, cultural, and political affairs. Given this trend, criminology should pay increasing attention to how religion is linked to victimization and offending. Since the religion–crime studies have traditionally focused on offending, the research lacunae are biggest in the study of victimization. The inclusion of religion is particularly relevant in international surveys in religiously heterogeneous communities. In this article, we aim to develop a survey module suggestion for use in the context of the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD). We first examine the current content of the ISRD-4 sweep. To locate lacunae in it, we move to review how international surveys have tackled the dimension of religion, including the Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD), the European Social Survey (ESS), the World Values Survey (WVS), and the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). Building on these state-of-the-art examples, we propose a new ISRD module (Appendix) for studying the religion–victimization link in international crime surveys with limited space. In conclusion, we argue that criminology would benefit from increasing attention to religion and other cultural variables alongside traditional socioeconomic, structural, and individual factors.
Using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program and the Department of Education Government Accountability Office (DOE GAO), this study examines the prevalence of hate crimes directed at Muslim, Sikh, and Jewish students and explores whether hate crimes increased during the 2016 presidential election and Trump presidency. In this study we aggregate these groups as minoritized religious groups (MRG) in institutions of higher education (IHE). Conceptually grounded in the minoritized religious and spiritual campus climate framework (MRSCC), the findings indicate that offenses and incidents directed at MRG peaked from 2016–2018, and there were discrepancies in the reporting processes. Further research is needed to better understand how hate crimes directed at MRG are reported and its impact on policy and professional practice so that leaders in IHE are better equipped to address hate crimes.
Objectives
There is a growing body of macro-level studies examining hate crime. These studies however largely focus on ethnoracial hate crime, leading to a relative dearth of research investigating the etiology of anti-Jewish hate crime. The current study seeks to fill this gap by conducting a community-level analysis of anti-Jewish hate crime in New York City.
Methods
Using data from the New York Police Department’s Hate Crimes Task Force, the current study employs a series of negative binomial regressions to investigate the impact of defended neighborhoods, social disorganization, and strain variables on anti-Jewish hate crime.
Results
The results show that defended neighborhoods consistently predict higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in White, Black, and non-White neighborhoods even when accounting for social disorganization and strain variables. Results also demonstrate that anti-Jewish crime occurs in communities that are more socially organized and with better economic conditions.
Conclusions
This study’s findings reveal Jewish victims to be a catchall target when a minority group increasingly moves into a majority area. These defended neighborhoods, and other findings have intriguing implications for both criminology’s social disorganization theory and the police and others charged with combatting bias crimes.
Thoroughly revised and updated, this third edition offers a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the social psychology of aggression, covering all the relevant major theories, individual differences, situational factors, and applied contexts. Understanding the causes, forms, and consequences of aggression and violence is critical for dealing with these harmful forms of social behavior. Addressing a range of sub-topics, the firstpart deals with the definition and measurement of aggression, presents major theories, examines the development of aggression and discusses individual and gender differences in aggressive behaviour. It covers the role of situational factors in eliciting aggression and the impact of exposure to violence in the media. The second part examines specific forms and manifestations of aggression, including chapters on aggression in everyday contexts and in the family, sexual aggression, intergroup aggression, and terrorism. The new edition also includes additional coverage of gender differences, gun violence, and terrorism, to reflect the latest research developments in the field. Alsodiscussing strategies for reducing and preventing aggression, this bookis essential reading for students and researchers in psychology and related disciplines, as well as practitioners andpolicy makers.
The Price of Freedom Denied shows that, contrary to popular opinion, ensuring religious freedom for all reduces violent religious persecution and conflict. Others have suggested that restrictions on religion are necessary to maintain order or preserve a peaceful religious homogeneity. Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke show that restricting religious freedoms is associated with higher levels of violent persecution. Relying on a new source of coded data for nearly 200 countries and case studies of six countries, the book offers a global profile of religious freedom and religious persecution. Grim and Finke report that persecution is evident in all regions and is standard fare for many. They also find that religious freedoms are routinely denied and that government and the society at large serve to restrict these freedoms. They conclude that the price of freedom denied is high indeed.
The current study introduces a method to assess hate crime classification error in a state Incident-Based Reporting System. The study identifies and quantifies the “statistical accuracy” of aggregate hate crime data and provides insight from frontline officers about thought processes involved with classifying bias offenses. Random samples of records from two city and two county agencies provided data for the study. A systematic review of official case narratives determined hate crime classification error using state and federal definitions. A focus group sought to inquire about officers’ handling of hate crimes. Undercounting of hate crimes in official data was evident. When error rates were extrapolated, National Incident-Based Reporting System Group A hate crimes were undercounted by 67%. Officers’ responses validated complications involved with classifying hate crimes, particularly, incidents motivated “in part” by bias. Classification errors in reporting hate crimes have an impact on the statistical accuracy of official hate crime statistics. Officers’ offense descriptions provided greater awareness to issues with accurately interpreting and classifying hate crimes. The results yield useful information for officer training, understanding the true magnitude of these crimes, and a precursor for adjusting crime statistics to better estimate the “true” number of hate crimes in the population.
This research investigates variation in hate crime offending against Arabs and Muslims across U.S. counties in the months before and after September 11, 2001. Four questions are of particular interest. First, what were the determinants of anti-Arab and Muslim hate crimes prior to 9/11? Second, in what social contexts were Arabs and Muslims at greatest risk of victimization? Third, to what extent did hate crimes against these groups increase after the terrorist attacks? And last, did the predictors of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims change appreciably after 9/11? Findings show that hate crimes targeting Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically in the months following 9/11, although the structural determinants and geographic concentration of these crimes remained largely consistent after the attacks. Negative binomial regression results further suggest that counties with larger concentrations of Arabs and Muslims have higher incidents of such hate crimes, which likely reflects the availability of targets for this type of offending. At the same time, the likelihood of victimization for a given Arab or Muslim person is lowest in counties where the percent Arab or percent Muslim is highest, in line with a power-differential perspective on discrimination and intergroup violence. The findings imply that terrorist attacks may indeed incite retaliation and set off a wave of hate crime offending, but the location of these crimes is likely to remain consistent after a galvanizing event.
This research examines the ways in which assaults motivated by bias are similar to and different from other types of assault. Analyses are based on data from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), pooled across eleven states. We find evidence suggesting that offenders motivated by racial and ethnic bias are more likely to be versatile offenders than specialists: they are more (not less) likely to be using drugs and alcohol during the crime than conventional offenders. Bias offenders are also more likely to seriously injure the victim. Finally, we find that the risks of bias crime victimization (relative to the risk of assault victimization generally) are similar for blacks and other racial minorities.
Despite the high visibility of religiously charged international social, conflicts, the unique role of religion often is overlooked in social science research and theory. Some studies ignore religion, others conflate religion with other identities. Virtually all lack adequate data. We respond to these deficiencies by testing a theory-driven model of a particular form of social conflict, religious persecution. We investigate the proposition that religious regulation leads to religious persecution. Using measures coded from the 2003 International Religious Freedom Reports, we consider how both social regulation and government regulation of religion in 143 countries affect the level of religious persecution. We also consider and test competing hypotheses, particularly Huntington's clash-of-civilizations thesis. We find strong support for the religious economies arguments and only limited support for the clash-of-civilizations thesis and other competing arguments.
This study examines the social forces that affect law enforcement participation in hate crime data collection initiatives. Focused interviews were conducted in a stratified sample of police officers from various departments in 2 East Coast states. The findings from these interviews were used to create a survey instrument that was distributed to a sample of police officers and civilian employees in 4 police agencies, 1 from each region of the United States: Northeast, West, South, and Central. The survey findings reduced to 60 interrelated variables identified at the focus groups to 10 common factors (or constructs). These factors are: (a) organizational attitudes/beliefs; (b) utility in community relations; (c) organizational self-preservation; (d) efficacy of police involvement; (e) priority of resource allocations; (f) supportive organizational policies and practices; (g) individual attitudes/beliefs; (h) professional self-preservation; (i) work-related difficulties; and (j) organizational commitment. The results of this study provide valuable insight into ways to improve law enforcement participation in hate crime reporting.
The Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) of 1990 set into motion the structure and mechanisms for identifying and collecting data on the occurrence of hate crimes in this country. In this article, the authors briefly describe the data-collection program that was developed by the FBI and others in response to the HCSA. The authors also examine the FBI's progress in implementing this program as an adjunct to the widely known Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. Trends in law enforcement participation in the national program, along with steps being taken to improve this participation, are also examined. Also, the authors explore the future benefits that are anticipated as the UCR program shifts from a summary-based program to one that collects data on each criminal incident. Finally, the authors make general observations about hate crime in the United States based on the data currently held by the FBI.
Previous literature suggests crime victims' experiences or reactions to crime run on a continuum from little or no effects to extreme effects. Participants in this study reported minor to serious effects from criminal victimizations. Additionally, this study found that talking with the offender may be a helpful component to the victim's recovery, and high- lights the need for more research.
In spite of the fact that more than 10 percent of Americans claim no religion, academic investigations of the “nones” represent
an underdeveloped area in the sociology of religion. We find that people with religiously unaffiliated parents and those who
attended religious services less as a child are more likely to claim no religion. In addition, we find a strong association
between having a spouse and peer group that are non-religious and claiming no religion.
We view criminalization as a process of institutionalization that involves the diffusion of legal forms and practices. Conventional approaches to crimi- nalization have been dominated by historical case studies that illuminate the collective action and social structural bases of shifts in crime policy by fo- cusing on the dynamics internal to particular polities. Our event history analysis of U.S. states' adoption of hate crime laws indicates that criminali- zation is affected by a state's internal political culture and traditions as well as by its location within the larger interstate system. Thus, the diffusion of hate crime policies resembles the diffusion pattern of many other policy re- forms. However, detailed analyses of the content of hate crime laws reveal that as they diffused the variety of methods of altering the criminal code diminished while the domain and complexity of the laws increased. These findings suggest that criminalization, and by extension institutionalization, is characterized by countervailing forces: the simultaneous homogenization and differentiation of cultural forms. We discuss how consideration of these processes-especially differentiation-advances research on diffusion, insti- tutionalization, and criminalization. n the late 1970s, lawmakers throughout the United States began responding to a perceived escalation of racial, ethnic, reli- gious, and other forms of intergroup conflict with a novel legal strategy: the criminali- zation of hate-motivated intimidation and violence. As a result, throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s most state legisla-
This article investigates demographic and macroeconomic correlates of racially motivated antiminority crime in New York City (1987-95). Event count models indicate that crimes directed against Asians, Latinos, and blacks are most frequent in predominantly white areas, particularly those that had experienced an in-migration of minorities. No relationship is found between rates of racially motivated crime and macroeconomic conditions, such as the rate of unemployment among non-Hispanic whites; nor does there appear to be an interaction between economic conditions and in-migration of minorities. These findings seem to parallel ethnographic accounts of "defended" white urban neighborhoods. The article concludes by discussing the empirical implications of this theoretical perspective as applied to prejudice-based crime in other contexts.
How can we better conceptualize attitudes about difference in an increasingly diverse, multicultural United States? This article uses data from a recent, nationally representative telephone survey with oversamples of African Americans and Hispanics to analyze attitudes about two prominent sources of distinction in the United States. Race and religion were selected because they tend to be understood in very different ways—race as a social problem, religion as an individual choice and collective good. To assess the utility of these contrasting emphases built into common survey measures, we constructed a battery of questions that included parallel items for both. Our findings indicate that, with some notable exceptions, Americans' attitudes tend to be more similar than different, such that respondents see comparable (rather than contrasting) positive and negative aspects of race and religion in the United States. Based upon these results, we argue for a more multifaceted approach to the conceptualization, measurement, and analysis of race and religion, with implications for how we generally approach difference, diversity, and multiculturalism.
Violence motivated by racism, anti-Semitism, misogyny, and homophobia weaves a tragic pattern throughout American history. Fueled by recent high-profile cases, hate crimes have achieved an unprecedented visibility. Only in the past twenty years, however, has this kind of violence-itself as old as humankind-been specifically categorized and labeled as hate crime. Making Hate a Crime is the first book to trace the emergence and development of hate crime as a concept, illustrating how it has become institutionalized as a social fact and analyzing its policy implications. In Making Hate a Crime Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet show how the concept of hate crime emerged and evolved over time, as it traversed the arenas of American politics, legislatures, courts, and law enforcement. In the process, violence against people of color, immigrants, Jews, gays and lesbians, women, and persons with disabilities has come to be understood as hate crime, while violence against other vulnerable victims-octogenarians, union members, the elderly, and police officers, for example-has not. The authors reveal the crucial role social movements played in the early formulation of hate crime policy, as well as the way state and federal politicians defined the content of hate crime statutes, how judges determined the constitutional validity of those statutes, and how law enforcement has begun to distinguish between hate crime and other crime. Hate crime took on different meanings as it moved from social movement concept to law enforcement practice. As a result, it not only acquired a deeper jurisprudential foundation but its scope of application has been restricted in some ways and broadened in others. Making Hate a Crime reveals how our current understanding of hate crime is a mix of political and legal interpretations at work in the American policymaking process. Jenness and Grattet provide an insightful examination of the birth of a new category in criminal justice: hate crime. Their findings have implications for emerging social problems such as school violence, television-induced violence, elder-abuse, as well as older ones like drunk driving, stalking, and sexual harassment. Making Hate a Crime presents a fresh perspective on how social problems and the policies devised in response develop over time. © 2001 by American Sociological Association. All rights reserved.
Although the subject has received very little systematic research, media reports of crimes occurring on the property of places of worship appear regularly. While the national media often focus on violent incidents involving religious bias, local media often report on the more common issues that many congregations face, such as vandalism and theft. This article presents analyses of newspaper reports of crimes taking place on religious congregations’ property in 2012. The data indicate that crimes occurring on the property of religious congregations are not an uncommon event. Analyses suggest that congregations of religious minorities do not appear to be more likely to have an incident occur on their property, but the crimes that do occur on their property appear to be more bias-motivated. Future research would benefit from a nationally representative survey of places of worship that included questions measuring experiences with crime.
This volume presents data from an enumeration by nation, state, and county for 236 religious groups. For further information, see http://www.rcms2010.org/.
Recent legislative responses to a perceived increase in hate crimes have resulted in efforts to quantify the rates of occurrence of such crimes. However, there remains little understanding of the processes by which statutory requirements are implemented at the level of front-line personnel like the police. This article examines the situated decisionmaking practices of police detectives in two divisions of a large urban police department charged with collecting official hate crime data. The authors argue that police detectives engage in certain routine practices in order to determine the hate-related status of an incident and that these practices are inflected by the particular institutional arrangements of the divisions and the department in which they operate. They describe in detail the various categorization practices employed in these two divisions and the ways that a seemingly common orientation to the prevalence of hate crimes have differential consequences for the reporting of hate crimes in each division.
Although specific victimizations may differ, there appear to be common psychological responses across a wide variety of victims. It is proposed that victims' psychological distress is largely due to the shattering of basic assumptions held about themselves and their world. Three assumptions that change as a result of victimization are: 1) the belief in personal invulnerability; 2) the perception of the world as meaningful; and 3) the view of the self as positive. Coping with victimization is presented as a process that involves rebuilding one's assumptive world. Introductions to the papers that follow in this issue are incorporated into a discussion of specific coping strategies adopted by victims.
We examine the processes by which states pass hate crime laws. We argue that states' decisions to enact such legislation are influenced by both state characteristics and the monitoring of the actions of other states. We find that the repeal of a sodomy law in a state does not increase its rate of enactment, but as more and more states enact hate crime laws, these that have repealed their sodomy laws are more likely to follow suit. We also find that states in which the political party of the governor differs from that of the majority of legislators are more likely to become referents to this process, so that once they have enacted a hate crime law, others quickly follow suit. We find no support for the claim that hate crime laws diffused within regions. Finally, with regard to state-level characteristics, we find that wealthier states with Democrat-dominated legislatures that have been policy innovators in the past have higher rates of enactment. Those states that have passed an earlier, less controversial hate crime law have lower rates of enactment.
State and federal hate crime laws punish crimes involving discrimination on the basis of a person's group characteristic, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, gender, or disability. The Supreme Court has refined the definition of hate crime through decisions which affirmed one type of hate crime law, but rejected another. Punishing hate crimes is consistent with the traditional aims of our criminal justice system. Our criminal laws consistently enhance penalties for seemingly similar conduct based on the risk, severity, and context of a particular crime. Carefully drafted hate crime laws punish conduct that is objectively more dangerous to victims and society.
Speci.c offences of racially aggravated crimes were established in Britain by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. A number of offences with a racial aggravation now attract a higher penalty than those without. The United States has a long experience of similar legislation. But critics of so-called ëhate crimeí laws in the US argue that the legislation has failed to ful.ll expectations. It is therefore timely to ask what are the objectives behind the legislation in Britain, and what are the prospects for achieving them? This article argues that the most signi.cant impact of the legislation is likely to be on the criminal justice agencies expected to deal with racially aggravated crime.
Variation in compliance with public policies across local settings is examined through an analysis of the number of reported hate crime incidents in United States counties. Particular attention is given to the role that activist organizations play in promoting, or impeding, compliance with public policies. Each hate crime reported to the federal government is conceptualized as a successful outcome of social move- ment mobilization. Drawing upon political mediation theory and Fine's model of discursive rivalry, the analysis shows how social movement resources, framing pro- cesses, political incentives, and features of local contexts combine to promote suc- cessful social movement outcomes. The presence of resourceful civil rights organiza- tions in a county can lead to higher numbers of reported hate crimes, but the influ- ence of civil rights organizations is contingent upon the political context and upon objective conditions that lend credibility to civil rights framing.
Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus have become an increasingly significant part of American religion in recent years. Yet scholarship on these groups has been limited largely to case studies and qualitative observations. We analyze data from a large national survey that permits comparisons among Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Christians. The data reveal that members of non-Western religions in the United States resemble Jews in having notably higher socioeconomic status than Christians. They resemble the rest of the population on other measures of actual or potential social integration, including political knowledge, generalized trust, neighborhood contacts, and interreligious ties. However, low levels of voting, a tendency to express feelings of alienation, and fewer connections with community elites suggest a continuing lack of political integration.
This study explores how racial composition, in-migration and community identity influence the distribution of antiblack and
antiwhite hate crimes. Drawing on six years of Chicago Police Department reports, two decades of census data and community
survey data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, the paper evaluates hypotheses derived from racial
threat, macrostructural opportunity and defended community perspectives. Negative binomial models controlling for spatial
dependence reveal different patterns for antiblack and antiwhite hate crimes across Chicago communities. Consistent with a
defended communities model, antiblack hate crimes are most common in homogenous white communities with strong community identities
undergoing recent black in-migration. In contrast, antiwhite hate crimes are most numerous in communities where blacks and
whites comprise near equal proportions, supporting macrostructural opportunity perspectives.
Crime data collected through the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) are used by Congress to inform policy decisions and allocate federal criminal justice funding to states. As such, it is important to understand how each program collects and reports crime data, and the limitations associated with the data. This report reviews (1) the history of the UCR, the NIBRS, and the NCVS; (2) the methods each program uses to collect crime data; and (3) the limitations of the data collected by each program. The report then compares the similarities and differences of UCR and NCVS data. It concludes by reviewing issues related to the NIBRS and the NCVS. The UCR represents the first effort to create a national, standardized measure of the incidence of crime. It was conceived as a way to measure the effectiveness of local law enforcement and to provide law enforcement with data that could be used to help fight crime. UCR data are now used extensively by researchers, government officials, and the media for research, policy, and planning purposes. The UCR also provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. The UCR reports offense and arrest data for 8 different Part I offenses and arrest data for 21 different Part II offenses. The NIBRS was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to respond to the law enforcement community s belief that the UCR needed to be updated to provide more in-depth data to meet the needs of law enforcement into the 21st century. The NIBRS collects data, including data on offense(s), offender(s), victim(s), arrestee(s), and any property involved in an offense, for 46 different Group A offenses and 11 different Group B offenses. Despite the more detailed crime data that the NIBRS can provide, nationwide implementation of the program has been slow, for a variety of reasons, including cost considerations.
Using existing data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, time series analyses were conducted on hate crime data from 2001 around the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A statistically significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime occurred after 9/11, and anti-Islamic hate crime leveled off within 8 weeks of the occurrence. News stories reporting anti-Islamic hate crimes, stories reporting fear of such bias crime, and public calls for calm, tolerance, and/or reaction to anti-Islamic bias crime followed a similar pattern found within the official data. A city-by-city analysis found that UCR reported anti-Islamic hate crime was essentially non-existent in New York City and Washington, DC. It is suggested that public calls for calm and tolerance and in-group/out-group dynamics may have impacted anti-Islamic hate crime frequency, thus accounting for rises and reductions in this form of bias crime over time.
A prevalent theme in the public forum on the recent wave of black church arson in the United States is that the events are part of an overarching conspiracy on the part of hate groups to start a race war. In attempting to discount this theme, critics have concluded that events of black church arson are not racially motivated, and instead are random acts of insurance fraud and delinquency. We argue that competition theory sheds light on these recent events by moving us away from both sides of this debate. We argue that, in the absence of good data on connections between various hate groups, it is useful to consider this wave of ethnic violence as a result of ethnic competition for economic and political resources. Using yearly event counts and time-series cross sectional data, we test hypotheses derived from competition theory. We conclude that competition for both economic and political resources increases the yearly counts of black church arson.
Efforts to apply racial threat theory to explain interracial violence in America are restricted to historically dated events such as lynchings or to relatively infrequently occurring events such as race riots, hate crimes or interracial homicides. The present study extends extant research by using county-level data, drawn from South Carolina's National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), race-specific voting data, and demographic data to investigate the relationship between racial threat and interracial and intraracial violent crimes. Results from a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis show that one dimension of racial threat, economic competition, has a modest substantive effect on interracial crimes involving white perpetrators and black victims—as economic competition increases between whites and blacks, whites commit more violent crimes against blacks. Political threat has no statistically discernable effect on the white-on-black crime rate. Further, neither measure of racial threat, economic competition nor political threat is associated with the black-on-white crime rate, the white-on-white crime rate or with the black-on-black crime rate. The implications of these findings for racial threat theory are discussed.
Prior research on those who are “not religious” in the traditional, organizational sense has focused on a broad category of people in the United States who do not identify with an established religious tradition. We distinguish three categories of people who are religiously nonbelieving or nonbelonging: atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers. Examining issues of religious belief and identity, we compare private spiritual life, attitudes on political issues, and stance toward religion in the public sphere for these three categories of nonreligious respondents. Atheists are the most uniformly antireligious. Agnostics, by comparison, are less opposed to religion overall, while unchurched believers display higher levels of personal religiosity and spirituality than atheists or agnostics. While atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers are similar in their political identification and attitudes related to religiously infused political topics, unchurched believers are as strongly opposed to religion in the public sphere as atheists.
Phenomenological analyses of 50 victims' experiences are presented. The format of the results preserves what it was like to live through being victimized, including the temporal flow and the vicissitudes of the experience. This presentation tries to put readers in touch with existential meanings of being criminally victimized, especially the radical threat to the victims' sense of social order and of community. It also draws out implications for strengthening citizens' sense of mutuality. Concrete suggestions include advice to police officers and to designers of victim brochures. Theoretical integration of representative research studies is offered. The article provides clarifications about qualitative methods, including their advantages and constraints.
Abstract In recent years, church burnings in the South have attracted a great deal of attention. Many commentators have charged that they are a product of strained race relations throughout the South, and particularly of severe racial tensions in Southern rural areas. In this study we evaluate these claims. We begin by mapping the spatial coordinates of recorded church burnings from 1990 to 1997, and find that church arsons indeed are concentrated in the South. Church burnings, however, are a more urban phenomenon than popular media accounts would suggest. Our analysis then explores the influence of contextual factors (population and locale, racial composition and inequality, so-cioeconomic conditions, local religious ecology, and patterns of reported crime) on church burnings in counties located in the study region. Logistic regression models confirm that church arsons are most likely to occur in small metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and non-MSA counties containing a city of at least 10,000 residents. Church burnings also are especially likely in counties with a higher percentage of black residents, a larger number of churches relative to the rest of the state, and a higher arson rate. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for future research and public policy.
Criminal laws that punish discriminatory “hate crime” offenses relating to race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, and other status characteristics trace their roots back to the nation’s founding. Unlike today, in early America, status distinctions in law, particularly racial ones, were intended to restrict the exercise of civil rights. Today’s hate crime laws are the refined modern progeny of an important class of remedial post–Civil War laws and constitutional amendments. Although the Supreme Court has vigorously upheld enhanced punishment for hate crimes over the last decade, it has also established restrictions on the government’s authority to punish bigoted conduct and expression. This article examines, through an analysis of historic cases, laws, and constitutional changes, the legal evolution that culminated in the passage of modern hate crime laws.
New immigration and global communication have greatly increased the cultural presence of non-Western religions in the United States. More Americans currently practice Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism than ever before, and many more Americans are exposed to these religions through television, travel, higher education, and contacts in school or at work. I examine the implications of this increasing religious diversity for the study of American religion. I begin by distinguishing diversity as a descriptive concept from pluralism as a normative one. I then consider the importance of understanding such practical concerns as religious intolerance and adaptation to diversity, after which I discuss the intellectual and normative challenges posed for a scholarship historically indebted to Christianity that must now seek to understand the relationships among major religious traditions in broader terms.
This study used the person perception vignette method to examine whether people perceive hate crime victims as more culpable than non-hate crime victims. In a between-participants design, participants were randomly assigned to read a vignette depicting a nonhate crime or a comparable hate crime motivated by the perpetrator's hatred for either the victim's race, sexual orientation, or religion. Results showed that participants assigned more blame to the victim in the non-hate crime condition compared to the victims in each of the three hate crime conditions. In addition, they perceived the perpetrators as more guilty in each of the three hate crime conditions compared to the non-hate crime condition. In addition, people with prejudiced attitudes perceived both hate crime and non-hate crime victims as more culpable and both hate crime and non-hate crime perpetrators as less culpable than did unprejudiced people.
An important source of antagonism between ethnic groups is hypothesized to be a split labor market, i.e. one in which there is a large differential in price of labor for the same occupation. The price of labor is not a response to the race or ethnicity of those entering the labor market. A price differential results from differences in resources and motives which are often correlates of ethnicity. A split labor market produces a three-way conflict between business and the two labor groups, with business seeking to displace higher paid by cheaper labor. Ethnic antagonism can take two forms: exclusion movements and "caste" systems. Both are seen as victories for higher paid labor since they prevent undercutting.
Objectives. The study of crime directed at gay and lesbian targets is hampered by two measurement problems: Police agencies provide unreliable data on hate crime, and tract-level census data contain no direct information about gay or lesbian population density. This article attempts to gauge two quantities that cannot be measured directly or unambiguously: the size of the gay and lesbian populations and the number of hate crimes directed at gay and lesbian targets. Methods. Population data for New York City were gathered from market research lists and from a special tabulation of the 1990 Census. Hate crime data were obtained from the Anti-Violence Project and the New York Police Department. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the reliability of each measure and the correlation between latent population density and hate crime. Results. Each of these measures offers a reliable means by which to assess cross-sectional differences in the population density and victimization of gay men. Census and police data prove to be inferior indicators of lesbian population density and antilesbian hate crime. For both men and women, population density is strongly correlated with the incidence of hate crime. Conclusions. Despite the fact that advocacy groups record many more antigay incidents than do the police, both sources of data are in agreement about where hate crimes occur. The strong correlation between population density and hate crime against gay men implies that Census data could be used to forecast the occurrence of hate crime in areas where no police records exist.
Portraits of American Life Study, 2nd wave
- Michael O. Emerson
- David Sikkink
Down the passage which we should not take: The folly of hate crime legislation
- Fleisher Marc
Current issues in victimization research and the NCVS's ability to study them
- Lynn A Addington
How crime in the United States is measured. Congressional Research Service report RL34309
- Nathan James
- Logan Rishard Council
Anti-Sikh hate crimes hard to quantify but very real
- Mark Potok
Mistaken for Muslims, Sikhs hit by hate crimes
- Hoang Lien
The challenge of diversity
- Wuthnow
American grace: How religion divides and unites us
- Robert D. Putnam
- David E. Campbell
General Social Surveys, 1972–2014: Cumulative codebook
- Tom W. Smith
- Peter V. Marsden
- Michael Hout