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La gestion éthique des contrats publics
Abstract
In November 2015, the Charbonneau Commission filed a report that revealed the existence of collusive relations between private enterprises in the construction industry to obtain public contracts. The commission of inquiry also exposed the presence of influence markets taking place between political and private interests of the construction industry at political fundraising akin to political corruption. The sixty recommendations of the Commission, including the creation of an independent agency having the mandate to supervise public contracts, are all proposals aiming to safeguard the integrity of the public service and curb party favoritism and nepotism in the award of public contracts.
This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and
its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account
of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the ‘mass
party’ model of funding towards ‘elite party’ and ‘cartel party’ models. Party finance is
conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four ‘post-mass party’ financial
strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how
these four financial models perform in terms of ‘liberal’ and ‘populist’ theories of
democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the
‘democratic’ ideal, whilst the state-financed (‘cartel’) model is a reasonable pragmatic
response to the decline in party membership.
Corruption is a threat to democracy and economic development in many societies. It arises in the ways people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power, and in the strength or weakness of the state, political and social institutions that sustain and restrain those processes. Differences in these factors, Michael Johnston argues, give rise to four major syndromes of corruption: Influence Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls. Johnston uses statistical measures to identify societies in each group, and case studies to show that the expected syndromes do arise. Countries studied include the United States, Japan and Germany (Influence Markets); Italy, Korea and Botswana (Elite Cartels); Russia, the Philippines and Mexico (Oligarchs and Clans); and China, Kenya, and Indonesia (Offical Moguls). A concluding chapter explores reform, emphasising the ways familiar measures should be applied - or withheld, lest they do harm - with an emphasis upon the value of ‘deep democratisation’.
Rapport, du 8 juin 2016, du Commissaire à l'éthique et à la déontologie au président de l'Assemblée nationale au sujet de monsieur Sam Hamad, ministre responsable de l'Administration gouvernementale et de la Révision permanente des programmes
- Commissaire À L'éthique