No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Duverger' s Law: Forty Years Later
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Генерално говорећи, већински изборни систем са једнокружним гласањем тежи двопартизму, пропорционални изборни систем тежи вишепартизму, док већински принцип са двокружним гласањем показује тенденцију ка вишепартизму, који се ублажава удруживањем странака (Duverger, 1964(Duverger, , стр. 2017. ...
The electoral system affects parties and the party system in several ways. Majority electoral systems reduce the number of parties, while proportional ones incre-ase them. Serbia had a majority two-round electoral system only in 1990 and since 1992 a proportional system. The proportionality of the electoral system (which depends on the number of constituencies, the number of representatives elected in them, the electoral formula, the electoral threshold, etc.) results in a more proportionate transposition and greater representation of minority parties, small parties, but also in the fragmentation of the party system. In such an electoral system, coalition governments are almost inevitable. By changing the number of constituencies, the degree of proportionality also changes. The larger the constituency and the smaller the census, the greater the proportionality. The more representatives elected in one constituency, the greater the chances of small parties. Given that Serbia has been a single constituency since 2000, the electoral system is highly proportional. This proportionality is partially reduced by applying the D’Hondt system, which is one of the least proportional electoral formulas in the proportional system (Lijp-hart 1994). Other tendencies arose from this, such as the high fragmentation of the party system, the strengthening of parties and party discipline, the fractioning and division of parties. Although the general rule states that the proportional electoral system is more conducive to the representation of minorities, political parties of national minorities in Serbia won the most seats (14) in the first parliamentary elections in 1990, when the majo-rity two-round system was applied. In 2020, after a boycott of the elections by a number of opposition parties, they won 19 seats under the proportional electoral system. The bipolarity of the party system also occurs as a consequence of the system with a directly elected president. In the text, we offer possible solutions to some of the indicated problems.
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Генерално говорећи, већински изборни систем са једнокружним гласањем тежи двопартизму, пропорционални изборни систем тежи вишепартизму, док већински принцип са двокружним гласањем показује тенденцију ка вишепартизму, који се ублажава удруживањем странака (Duverger, 1964(Duverger, , стр. 2017. ...
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Изборни систем је у узајамним и непосредним односима са партијским системом (Duverger, 1964;Duverger, 1986;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Cox et al., 1997;Lajphart, 1994;Лајпхарт, 2003;Орловић, 2015). Већински изборни системи редукују број партија, док их пропорционални повећавају. ...
... Генерално говорећи, већински изборни систем са једнокружним гласањем тежи двопартизму, пропорционални изборни систем тежи вишепартизму, док већински принцип са двокружним гласањем показује тенденцију ка вишепартизму, који се ублажава удруживањем странака (Duverger, 1964(Duverger, , стр. 2017. ...
... Grofman and Lijphart do not make it easier. Borrowing from Duverger (1951) and Rae (1967Rae ( , 1971) and extending with Fishburn (1983) they say for the analysis of electoral laws and their political consequences there are 18 aspects of elections to consider, like whether there is a proportional representation or a plurality/majoritarian systems, or yet something else (Grofman and Lijphart 1986, 3). ...
... Not everything goes. The three Duverger "laws" can be put under one umbrella for the average pattern (Duverger 1951(Duverger , 1986Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 144). 3 Taagepera and Shugart found that from logic the most likely number of parties to win at least one seat can be described as (Taagepera and Shugart 1993;Taagepera 2007, 116ff.): ...
... Not everything goes. The three Duverger "laws" can be put under one umbrella for the average pattern (Duverger 1951(Duverger , 1986Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 144). 3 Taagepera and Shugart found that from logic the most likely number of parties to win at least one seat can be described as (Taagepera and Shugart 1993;Taagepera 2007, 116ff.): ...
Since the late seventies there is a lot of support for the notion that voter volatility is normal. The so-called “frozen cleavages” were a temporary exception. Especially the Netherlands shows high voter volatility and was even called “exceptionally unstable”. A logical mechanism can be formulated that is based on the geographic location of voters. This mechanical approach demonstrates that the perceived volitality is bounded. When investigating three aspects of volatility (vote transfer, number of parties, social cleavages) it becomes clear that volatility can be limited to certain parties in certain situations and during certain periods. Voters can be called “loyal” to parties or within blocks. Although voters may be considered volatile (adrift), objective was to show whether it is possible to find specific voters at zip code level (around 35 people per zip code) that vote according to the campaign objectives “yes”, “no”, or “turnout”. This was tested with 2,144 active campaigners visiting 1,549,323 addresses in 66,040 Dutch zip codes while canvassing or distributing flyers. The result is that this is indeed possible. Flyering has an effect of 1 in 54-62 for the issue “no” and 1 in 22-33 for “turnout”. Canvassing has an effect of 1 in 7 for the issue “no” and 1 in 6 for “turnout”. Effect in this case is a combined effect of voter propensity and campaign effectivity which is not distinguished within the limits of this paper. There were not enough campaigners in the “yes”-campaign to produce valid results, but we do have some anecdotal data.
The application of the logical mechanism to design three referendum campaigns in the Netherlands confirms historic election data can predict the location of voter groups and their susceptibility to campaign messages. Voter volatility is not an obstacle.
... In other words, the party must be viewed as a competitor with a realistic chance of success. According to rational voting theories, voters are much less likely to support a party that does not have a legitimate chance of winning office (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997). ...
... For example, it has long been asserted that first-past-the-post electoral systems make it difficult for third-parties to achieve success (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997, and this assertion is commonly used to explain the inability of radical right parties to achieve success in specific settings (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009). The United States and the United Kingdom are prime examples of the ability of electoral rules to prevent thirdparties from becoming a significant electoral force. ...
Although the radical right in liberal democracies have received a wealth of attention in the literature, the mechanisms explaining individual radical right vote choice are unclear. This analysis provides the first comprehensive theoretical framework and empirical modeling of individual radical right vote choice. The choice to vote for a radical right party is a function of several factors. First, the opportunity structure in the form of external supply-side factors must be conducive for radical right success. Second, parties must make crucial decisions in order to take advantage of the opportunity structure (internal supply-side factors). Then, macro-social force illicit the adoption of crucial attitudes correlated with the radical right. Finally, these attitudes directly impact vote choice for radical right parties. This dissertation finds that attitudes alone do not necessarily lead to voting for a radical right party. Instead, macro-forces and supply-side factors play a significant role in the ability and desire to cast a vote for radical parties.
... O percentual da soma de resultados de candidatos dominantes e bicandidaturas, na média nacional, em 2012, chegam a 85%, ou seja, resultado similar à eleição de 2008. Os dados verificados nos municípios brasileiros nestas eleições são representativos dos efeitos redutores da competitividade eleitoral, quando não há a possibilidade do segundo turno, conforme visto por Duverger (2003): "Riker's analysis confirms that the link between two-party systems and plurality voting has been observed and verified for a longer time than the others". (DUVERGER, 2003, p.70). 8 Nesta situação, a solução para as lideranças partidárias dos partidos pequenos para participarem da corrida ao governo será estabelecer pactos, alianças ou coligações antes do pleito, já que os benefícios da entrada no governo após a eleição podem ser menores, resultando em influência diminuta em cargos ou ações do governo (SHUGART; CAREY, 1992). ...
... Essa proliferação expressaria, por si, a existência de mais de dois partidos no sistema partidário. Qualquer dinâmica anti-dualista tenderia a reforçar a tendência de multipartidarismo (DUVERGER, 1970;DUVERGER, 2003 Os dados gerais, nacionais, são conclusivos em apontar que a competição eleitoral segue a tendência predita por Duverger (1970) acerca do aumento no número de competidores nas disputas por majority runoff, em comparação com a regra de plurality nas eleições de 2008. Apesar de os dados da região Sudeste desviarem um pouco da segunda lei de Duverger, e acabarem pesando para um resultado maior de bicandidaturas, isso não diminui a força explicativa da segunda lei de Duverger. ...
Neste estudo investigamos o efeito da fórmula eleitoral na competição eleitoral no Brasil, mais precisamente, nas eleições para o cargo de Prefeito em 2008 e 2012. Utilizamos o conceito de competição eleitoral que corresponde ao número de candidatos efetivos concorrendo em cada pleito. Para medir isso, recorremos ao número de candidatos efetivos (NCE), índice que estabelece o número efetivo de candidaturas que tem peso em uma disputa eleitoral. Nosso questionamento norteador é saber se haveria diferenciação na competição política nas cidades com turno único que utilizam a fórmula de plurality (maioria simples), comparada com aquelas cidades que possuem a possibilidade de segundo turno que utilizam a fórmula de majority runoff (maioria absoluta). Nosso objetivo é testar as Leis de Duverger, que indicam que quando é utilizada a fórmula de plurality tendemos para bicandidaturas, enquanto ao utilizarmos a fórmula de majority runoff tendemos para multicandidaturas na disputa majoritária. Essa tarefa será realizada pela análise comparada das competições municipais, em todas as cidades brasileiras, através dos dados provenientes do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) que mantém os resultados das eleições gerais no país.
... Al final, Duverger mismo se adelanta al enorme margen de maniobra interpretativo de sus fórmulas, llevándolo desde una relación cuasi causal hasta una interrelación de múltiples causas y efectos. Como sus críticos lo perciben principalmente como un representante de rígidas "leyes sociológicas", puede por fin presentarse casi como testigo principal en contra de la "errada interpretación" (Duverger, 1986: 69 y ss.) de sus observaciones. ¿En las tres fórmulas se agotan los efectos que tienen los sistemas electorales sobre el sistema de partidos? ...
... Reconoce en, segundo lugar, haber variado en el tiempo la relación causa-efecto entre sistemas electorales y sistemas de partidos en el sentido de recalcar su carácter de tendencia al sustituir un "conduce hacia" (leads to) por "tiende a conducir hacia" (tends to lead). Así, Duverger confirma en los años 80(Duverger, 1986: 170) finalmente la formulación de sus "leyes sociológicas" definidas en 1955: 2 En la versión original francesa: el sistema proporcional "tend à un système de partis multiples, rigides et independants les uns des autres", el sistema de mayoría absoluta "tend à un système de partis multiples, souples et dépendants les uns des autres", el sistema de mayoría relativa "tend au dualisme des partis"(Duverger 1950: 7). ...
Este artículo procura ser una minuciosa introducción teórica sobre el lobbying, un tema relativamente poco tratado en idioma castellano y para los casos de los países de América Latina. Con diferentes definiciones sobre la materia y un tratamiento analítico de las variables que comprende al fenómeno, el autor del trabajo busca tener una base teórica propia para un póstumo tratamiento de la materia en casos de América Latina.
... There is no support for the hypotheses that majority governments are more likely to occur (1) in small legislatures, (2) before the establishment of universal suffrage, (3) in unitary countries, or (4) where there are direct presidential elections. This latter result is both surprising and important to note for it is frequently alleged that the basic difference between the fourth and fifth French Republics is the existence of a presidential system that has stimulated bipolar majority-oriented electoral competition (Laponce, 1980;Duverger, 1986;Knapp, 1987). Our data suggest that whatever the French experience the impact of direct presidential elections cannot be generalized in this way. ...
... We include it. These propositions are derived from a broad literature including Taagepera, 1986;Carstairs, 1980;Riker, 1986;and Duverger, 1986. They continue to be commonly used for the election of a single individual to a particular office, that is a president or party leader. ...
This paper examines the electoral record of western democracies in terms of the incidence of one-party majority government. The record of 510 cases indicates that two features of the electoral sytem—the formula and district magnitude—contribute significantly to the creation of such governments. Regression analysis allows us to estimate precisely this impact and clearly distinguish among the political consequences of majority, plurality and PR systems.
... Таким образом, справедливые выборы могут стать возможными только при эффективном взаимодействии политических элит и институтов гражданского общества. Русская политология -Russian Political Science № 1, 2017 Тема номера: «Политические выборы в России и за рубежом» ИС -многих партий, ориентированных на взаимодействие друг с другом; 3) плюральные ИС -двухпартийной системы [Duverger 1986]. В свою очередь, Дж. ...
Статья содержит анализ регулирования государством миграционного кризиса
и его отражения в электоральном поведении граждан. Через анализ изме-
нений электоральных преференций европейских граждан автор выявляет
факторы, оказывающие влияние на принятие электорального решения. Путем
верификации ряда гипотез о взаимосвязи ограничительных мер государства
в области миграционной политики и изменений электоральных преференций
автор приходит к выводу о существовании нового типа партийно-политиче-
ских расколов (опираясь на теорию Стейна Роккана и исследование Дженса
Ридгрена), которые формируются, не исходя из реальных социально-эконо-
мических проблем и мер, но на основе их публичного оформления. Сделанное
предположение позволяет рассмотреть современное политическое позицио-
нирование ключевых акторов в ЕС и выделить ряд кластеров, объединяющих
известные прецеденты
... Opći konsenzus o tome ne postoji ni među politolozima, koji znaju da osim načela odlučivanja određeni izborni sustav određuju i drugi elementi, poput veličine izbornog okruga, zakonskog izbornog praga, prava na kandidiranje i dr. Na prvi bi pogled trebalo biti jasno kako mehanizam djeluje: ako se želi smanjiti broj stranaka u parlamentu, koristit će se jednokružni većinski izborni sustav, kako sugerira Duvergerov zakon (Duverger, 2002). Ako se pak želi ojačati stranački sustav u nastajanju, uvest će se razmjerni sustav. ...
What are the reasons for change of electoral system in a country in transition?
Who are the actors involved and how they do that? What consequences it has
for parliament and the party system? This paper attempts to provide answers
to these questions in the case of Ukraine. In that country, in less than two decades
three types of electoral systems have been implemented: majority system
in 1994, mixed system in 1998, 2002 and 2012, and proportional system
in 2006 and 2007. Such frequent changes occurred due to elite-manipulation
which aimed at satisfying self-interests of political elites. Both parliamentary
and non-parliamentary elites have been involved in that process, and the most
important actors among them have been oligarchs and the President. When the
Ukrainian oligarchs as veto-players began to intensively participate in parties’
activities, parties began to play a more important role than they did before.
We conclude that the type of electoral system and oligarchic influence on parties
and elections impacted the way how the party system has been shaped.
We show that this system has been instrumentalised to achieve particular objectives
of the dominant segments of political and business elites in Ukraine.
Keywords: Ukraine, Electoral System, Party System, Oligarchs, Non-democratic
Regime
... Los sistemas electorales han sido objeto de un estudio sistemático en la disciplina, al punto tal que sus consecuencias se han postulado al nivel de "leyes sociológicas" (Duverger, 1951;Riker, 1982;Sartori, 1986;Duverger, 1986) debido a que éstos producen efectos sistemáticos sobre el número de partidos, la composición de los parlamentos y congresos, y la formación de los gobiernos. La literatura especializada en general y en forma comparada ha producido una serie de hallazgos respecto de las consecuencias que los sistemas electorales introducen en la vida política (Taagepera y Shugart, 1989;Lijphart, 1994;Cox, 1997;Farrell, 1997, entre otros). ...
El trabajo analiza el impacto del sistema electoral sobre la conformación partidaria de los consejos deliberantes de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. La muestra utilizada está integrada por 118 municipios, los cuales son observados en 12 elecciones consecutivas, desde 1987 a 2009, lo que arroja un resultado de 1.416 observaciones. El trabajo demuestra que la magnitud de distrito y el tamaño de los consejos deliberantes producen efectos sistemáticos sobre el número de partidos que obtienen al menos una banca y el tamaño del partido más grande. Se observan patrones regulares a lo largo del período. Adicionalmente se encuentran efectos específicos que pueden deducirse de las elecciones de medio término, de la fórmula de reparto proporcional y los altos umbrales, y de coyunturas críticas como la elección de 2001. Curiosamente, salvo raras excepciones (Varani, 2004), el estudio de los sistemas electorales municipales, y sus consecuencias político-partidarias, ha sido ignorado por completo en la ciencia política argentina. Conocemos con un poco más de profundidad cómo funcionan las reglas electorales a nivel nacional y, desde hace poco tiempo, a nivel provincial (por ejemplo Jones, 1995; Calvo y Escolar, 2005). Sin embargo, tenemos una borrosa idea acerca de cómo lo hacen en el nivel municipal. Ello no se debe a la falta de estudios sobre el ámbito municipal, sino al tipo de orientación de los trabajos: éstos son estudios de casos sobre eventos políticos específicos o bien suelen enfocarse comparativamente en las condiciones administrativas para la gestión (por ejemplo Bernaza, 2007) así como en la problemática distribución de los recursos (por ejemplo Sanguineti, Sanguinetti y Tommasi, 2001), en sus competencias y funciones (por ejemplo Iturburu, 2000), en la autonomía y la participación (Di Paola
... Making sidepayments to coalition partners in return for support is a common means in the process of coalition building to form a government. This sort of argument has been repeatedly made since Lowell (1896) and Duverger (1986) developed those claims on the party systems. ...
The type of government, whether the cabinet is a single-party majority, multiparty coalition, or minority, is often claimed to be one important factor affecting the shape of bureaucratic reform. Masashi’s research investigates empirically whether this statement can be applied to the case of New Zealand, where government type has shifted from majoritarian to consensual since the introduction of the MMP electoral system in the mid-1990s. Through the investigation of impacts of differences in cabinet type on government organisational restructuring, Masashi’s research has shown that New Zealand did not follow the commonly stated pattern in the relationship.
... For the Indian and other first-past-the-post (single-member district, simple plurality or SMSP) systems, Duverger's law predicts that first-past-the-post systems tend towards two-party systems, a 'law' that applies primarily to the district (constituency) level, which can get translated to the state/province level in a federal system or the national level in a British-type unitary system (Duverger, 1963(Duverger, , 1986. ...
This paper analyses the defeat of the Congress party in the India’s 2014 election in which it plummeted to its lowest ever vote share (19 per cent) and seat tally (44 of 543). We argue that the defeat is the end result of a gradual decline punctuated by recoveries that began much earlier. We show that the Congress was gradually becoming less competitive in more and more states and constituencies as indicated by its falling to third position or worse. We try to relate this to the desertion of the party by social groups that once supported it in a number of states and other factors. The larger question is whether a Congress-type, encompassing, umbrella party can survive the sharpened politicisation of social cleavages, in the Indian case, religious, caste and regional cleavages since such a party will tend to lose out to parties based on religious, caste and regional identities in identitarian outbidding.
... At least since the seminal contribution of Duverger (1954Duverger ( , 1986, the effects of electoral systems on party system fragmentation have been understood as a matter of electoral coordination. As defined by Cox (2000: 49), 'electoral coordination refers to a variety of processes by which groups of voters and politicians coordinate their electoral actions in order to win more legislative seats or executive portfolios'. ...
This paper shows the existence of a coordination dilemma in multi-level countries that hold elections for different parliaments, at different territorial levels, and with different electoral rules. With evidence from Spain, our analysis identifies interaction or contamination effects between national and sub-national electoral arenas that generate, just as in most mixed-member electoral systems, a centrifugal force that increases the number of electoral parties in national elections. The incentives that solve this coordination dilemma faced by small regional or local parties are theoretically discussed and empirically tested.
... Bawn (1999) argues that at its base there must be some voters who use information from the district tier in calculating their party vote. Duverger (1986) himself suggested that district competition could spill over into the PR tier. Most scholars focus on additional factors that cross tiers (such as party interests) and may increase the number of district candidates Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). ...
This paper addresses the effects of the mixed system used for the last three elections in Lesotho (2002, 2007 and 2012), a small African country with a turbulent history regarding opposition acceptance of elections. The decision to implement a mixed system was in part to encourage democratic stability, yet whether the electoral system has become more conducive to democratic competition is unclear. Through an analysis of national and district-level results, this paper addresses the following questions. First, at the district level, is competition consistent with Duverger’s law or the contamination thesis and is a progression over time evident? Second, does the population size of a district influence the number of candidates and the concentration of votes? Finally, following recent research on detecting electoral fraud, this paper tackles whether the reports of district results suggest extra-institutional manipulation.
... ive systems. Initial proponents view these systems as a form of natural laboratory where both tiers behave independently holding all else constant (Lancaster & Patterson 1990;Moser 1997;Stratmann & Baur 2002;Moser & Scheiner 2004). Increasing evidence suggests additional incentives for more parties to run candidates in SMDs beyond that expected by Duverger. Duverger (1986) himself suggested that district competition could spill over into the PR tier, yet most scholars supportive of a contamination thesis focus on additional factors that cross tiers, such as party interests or qualifying for public funds, that may increase the number of district candidates (Herron & Nishikawa 2001;. For example, district c ...
How do institutional factors shape district competition in mixed legislative systems? Preliminary evidence suggests the distinction between sub-types of mixed systems alone poorly explains variation in district results. Consistent with the contamination thesis, this analysis suggests three additional national-level factors at play: fused ballots, the electoral threshold for proportional representation seats, and the existence of compulsory voting laws. Regression analysis on an original dataset covering 90 mixed system elections in 23 countries (1990–2012) finds that while mixed member majoritarian systems correlate with fewer district candidates, these three often overlooked factors are also statistically significant. This analysis highlights the complexity of mixed systems and suggests why many of them diverge from Duverger's Law.
... Por tudo isto, vários autores têm afirmado que é expectável que as eleições presidenciais induzam uma lógica de bipolarização nas legislativas (Duverger, 1986;Lijphart, 1994Lijphart, -1995. Horst Bahro é bastante taxativo sobre a influência bipolarizadora das presidenciais sobre as legislativas em Portugal (1996, pp. ...
O regime republicano português foi um fenómeno precoce no quadro europeu, mas a sobrevivência deste ao longo do século XX, sobretudo considerando a longa experiência autoritária, demonstrou a rápida consolidação das instituições republicanas na sociedade portuguesa e sobretudo em alguns segmentos das suas elites. Entre a primeira e curta Presidência de Manuel da Arriaga e a Presidência de Cavaco Silva, a vida política portuguesa passou de um regime parlamentar instável, que sucumbiu perante curtas e longas ditaduras militares e civis, a uma democracia política consolidada. Os Presidentes, ainda que os seus poderes variassem muito ao longo dos últimos quase 100 anos, estiveram muitas vezes no centro da vida política portuguesa. Este livro pretende fazer o balanço do poder presidencial em Portugal, concentrando-se sobretudo no regime democrático.
... Cox and Schoppa 2002;Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005). The assumption is that the PR tier increases the number of district candidates, quite in contrast to Duverger's (1986) suggestion that SMD competition could spill over into the PR tier. Empirical evidence suggests that many mixed systems exhibit greater district electoral fractionalization than Duverger predicted. ...
Why does Mexico’s mixed legislative system diverge from Duverger’s Law? Rather than rehash cultural and historical explanations, we suggest two institutional factors – a fused ballot and compulsory voting laws – may explain this divergence. Cross-national evidence controlling for these factors suggests Mexico is not an outlier and that the fused ballot encourages multiparty district competition. The results also suggest ways reforms could bring competition closer toward Duvergerian expectations.
... Within the many variations of PR electoral systems, the Irish STV has been found to mediate differently with candidate selection depending on the district size (McGing, 2013), with three-seat constituencies being the least facilitating of female political aspirants, as political parties tend to stick with the tried and tested incumbent, usually a man. However, electoral systems have been found to have not alone mechanical effects but also psychological consequences for voters and parties (Duverger, 1986). 3 It is argued that these psychological effects have a direct impact on how parties nominate their candidates (Blais et al., 2011;Gallagher & Marsh, 1988). ...
In 2012 legislative gender quotas were introduced as part of the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government's political reform agenda. The legislation specifies that payments to political parties 'shall be reduced by 50 per cent, unless at least 30 per cent of the candidates whose candidatures were authenticated by the qualified party at the preceding general election were women and at least 30 per cent were men'. The 30 per cent gender threshold came into effect at the 2016 general election. Research demonstrates that gender quotas work to increase women's political descriptive representation, but to do so, political parties must engage with them in 'goodwill', be 'wellintentioned' or place women in 'winnable seats'. This article examines if this was the case at the 2016 general election. Using statistics, as well as drawing from interviews with party strategists, the article assesses the impact of gender quotas on women's candidate selection and election. We conclude that parties did embrace the spirit of the gender quota law but resistance remains.
... Slovenija je za volitve v spodnji dom parlamenta (državni zbor) uzakonila proporcionalni volilni sistem. Upoštevajoč vpliv volilnih sistemov na značilnosti strankarskih sistemov in sestavo vlad (Duverger, 1986;Laver in Schofield, 1990;Norris, 2004) ne preseneča, da so bile vse dosedanje slovenske vlade koalicije več strank. 4 Ko govorimo o vladah, je nujno potrebno določiti merila za določitev njihovega trajanja oziroma merila, kdaj lahko govorimo o novi vladi. ...
V koalicijskih vladah stranke pogosto sklene-jo koalicijske sporazume. Sporazumi imajo več funkcij, med njimi je za namen upravljanja in zagotovitve preživetja vladnih koalicij praviloma mogoče najti tudi mehanizme za preprečevanje in zmanjšanje ter tudi možnosti za razreševanje konfliktov med koalicijskimi partnerji. Slovenija ima dolgoletne izkušnje s koalicijskimi vladami in številnimi konflikti v njih. Namen članka je analiza koalicijskih sporazumov v Sloveniji med letoma 1990 in 2018, še zlasti pa umestitev omenjenih mehanizmov v te sporazume.. Analiza je razkrila, da je kljub izraziti prevladi javno-političnega področja v koalicijskih sporazumih v njih mogoče zaslediti tudi vedno večji poudarek na mehanizmih za preprečevanje in zmanjšanje konfliktov, v manjši meri pa so se skozi čas dodatno razvijali tudi mehanizmi razreševanja konfliktov med koalicijskimi partnerji.
Příručka vykládá klasické typologie stranických systémů, jmenovitě Duvergerovy, Blondelovy a Sartoriho a vysvětluje jejich souvislosti s různými druhy koalicí, opozicí atd. Díky tomu čtenář pochopí, jak fungují moderní politické režimy, ať už jsou demokratické nebo autokratické.
Institutions, was the answer presented by the positive theory, in the last three decades to explain the production of political equilibria. However, the following question is inevitable: Which institutional setting is most apt to produce stable political order and balance? Concentrated power based on the sovereign’s political virtues? Government divided into veto points that neutralize each other? This article revisits the literature that examines the effects produced by different institutional designs on stability and polyarchic performance, showing that there is no univocal and consensual connection between institutional configuration and generated results.
Concurrent elections are widely used to increase turnout. We theorize and show empirically how concurrency affects electoral outcomes. First, concurrency increases turnout and thereby the participation of peripheral voters. Second, in combined elections, one electoral arena affects the other. In our case of majoritarian executive elections concurrent to proportional representation (PR) legislative elections, the centripetal tendency of majoritarian elections colors off to the concurrent PR race. Third, concurrency also entails spillovers of the incumbency advantage of executive officeholders to the concurrent legislative race. Drawing on quasi-random variation in local election timing in Germany, we show that concurrency increases turnout as well as council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and centrist parties more generally, with slightly more pronounced gains for the political left. As a consequence, concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by leading to less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local governments.
Political parties are the main actors that significantly shape political institutions, but parties and the party system are also strongly influenced by the political institutions within which they operate. Institutions are a set of rules that significantly determine the behavior of actors. Parties and party systems are influenced by different political institutions. In the previous 30 years, the framework of the state in which the party competition took place changed (SFRY, SRY, SCG, Serbia), the status of Kosovo and Metohija changed (UNSC Resolution 1244, Brussels Agreement), the number of municipalities and cities changed. These changes affected political parties programmatically (unitarians, federalists, autonomists, separatists), organizationally (whether the parties were organized at the national level, regionally and/or locally), but also on the nature of competition. The law on political parties has changed, which means that the number of necessary signatures for party registration and registration of the list in the elections has changed (from 100 signatures to 10,000 signatures). The Law on Financing Political Activities was changed. The state-centric concept of financing political parties in Serbia has seemingly increased the autonomy of parties in relation to larger owners of capital, corporations and interest groups, but parties are not completely independent of them. The electoral system changed several times, mostly proportional (1992, voting for a person – a candidate or voting for a party – a list), the number of constituencies changed (1993, 1997, 2000). The more representatives elected in one constituency, the greater the chances of small parties. The electoral threshold for political parties of national minorities changed (2003) and for relevant parties (2020), the mandatory number of women on the lists and the determination of the order on the lists changed (2009).The larger the constituency and the smaller the census, the greater the proportionality. The proportionality of the electoral system results in a more proportionate transposition and greater representation of minority parties, small parties, but also the fragmentation of the party system, strengthening of parties and party discipline, fractionalization, splitting and division of parties. In such an electoral system, coalition governments are almost inevitable. The lower the electoral threshold, the greater the fragmentation of the party system. All the time, there is a system with direct election of the President of the Republic (semi-presidential system), but the way of electing the President has changed (abolition of the obligation to win more than 50 percent in the second round). The consequence of the system with the direct election of the President of the Republic is the bipolarity of the party system. Mostly, the strongest candidate of the ruling party and the strongest candidate of the opposition party enter the second round of the presidential elections. The strongest candidate, who is usually more popular than the party, also contributes to its rating. Another dimension of the influence of the system with the direct election of the head of state on the parties and the party system is the presidentialization of politics.
Nagel and Wlezien's ‘vacant centre’ theory suggests that parties close to the centre tend to do better when a political system is highly polarised, creating an empty space in the political market. Cross-nationally, this does not seem to be true when overall system polarisation is used as the independent variable: indeed, there seems to be a slight negative relationship. The farther apart conservative and social democratic parties are, however, the better that liberal parties tend to do. This parallels Nagel and Wlezien's findings for Great Britain specifically.
The author begins the article by calling attention to Duverger's methodological principles, which he then draws on to analyse and interpret 'Duverger's laws' concerning the effect electoral systems have on parties and party systems. Duverger's classification of party systems, which he asserts are closely linked to electoral systems, is dealt with in the conclusion of the article, where the author draws attention to the more elaborate version of the classification that is hinted at in parts of his 1951 book Les partis politiques and that he then formulated explicitly in 1960. The author compares this later version with Sartori's famous typology of party systems.
In this article we will discuss the political consequences of electoral system in Serbia. Since 1992 Serbia has proportional representation electoral system. In this electoral system, citizens are voting for parties, which leads to party and program oriented campaigns. Serbian system is extremely proportional because there is only one electoral unit. Higher proportionality of electoral system usually means that party system will be fragmented, which leads to wider and numerous coalitions. In a closed list system, voters are choosing between parties, while open list allows choice between candidates. Serbian Parliament lacks territorial representation. After the last electoral system changes, at least one third of MPs will be women. Electoral threshold in not applied for ethnic minority parties. In proportional systems, MPs elected from the lists are elected indirectly by the parties, and therefore they are more loyal and show higher level of party discipline. In the case when a whole country is one electorate, the link between voters and MPs is weak(est). Number of parties in the parliament can be reduced by gradation of electoral threshold. Higher number of electoral units would reduce proportionality, and consequentially fragmentation of the party system. Introduction of mixed or personalized proportional system and preferential votes would increase accountability and autonomy of elected representatives and reduce party influence, leading further to their internal reform. Cumulative effects would be reduced partocracy that is burdening the process of consolidation of democracy in Serbia.
By revealing the contextual conditions which promote or hinder democratic development, Comparative Politics shows how democracy may not be the best institutional arrangement given a country's unique set of historical, economic, social, cultural and international circumstances. Addresses the contextual conditions which promote or hinder democratic development. Reveals that democracy may not be the best institutional arrangement given a country's unique set of historical, economic, social, cultural and international circumstances. Applies theories and principles relating to the promotion of the development of democracy to the contemporary case studies.
The effective number of candidates tends to be equal to the magnitude of the district plus one. This is an extension of Duverger’s law, called the “M + 1 rule.” The results of Lower House elections in Japan, with a single non-transferable voting system before 1994, prove the rule.
Because the number of seats contested in each constituency had been 3 to 5 in the past Lower House elections in Japan, earlier studies proved the rule in the range of 3 to 5. The number of seats in Prefectural Assembly elections has a broader range. This article widens the range of the application of the M + 1 rule using data from the Prefectural Assembly elections.
In addition, this article also focuses on the large sample size of the prefectural-level data and examines how conditions of electoral competition, such as urbanization and reapportionment, have affected the validity of the rule.
In der wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit den Entwicklungstendenzen der westeuropäischen Parteiensysteme lassen sich zwei Phasen deutlich unterscheiden. Bis Ende der sechziger Jahre dominierten die Analysen, die die Persistenz der Parteiensysteme betonten und ihre Hauptaufgabe darin sahen, „the absence of change in a far from static period in political history“ (Rose/Urwin 1970: 295) zu erklären. Dies änderte sich in den siebziger Jahren, und seither ist die „destabilization of democratic party systems“ (Dalton/Beck/Flanagan 1984: 8) das beherrschende Thema. Beide Sichtweisen blieben jedoch nicht unwidersprochen. Die folgenden Ausführungen werden zeigen, daß eine differenzierende Betrachtungsweise notwendig ist, die weder Konstanz noch Wandel verabsolutiert, mit generellen, für ganz Westeuropa Gültigkeit beanspruchenden Aussagen zurückhaltend umgeht und Entwicklungstendenzen nicht monokausal zu erklären versucht.
The elections to the Swiss Federal Council in December 2015 re-established a system of party-centred concordance, cherished in consociational theory, consisting of two representatives of the Swiss People's Party, two Radicals, two Social Democrats and one Christian Democrat. At the same time, the government has rarely been as unbalanced in terms of the representation of Switzerland's languages and regions. The article analyses the concept of concordance with regard to both aspects of governmental inclusiveness. It also highlights the crucial role of electoral rules used in governmental elections. It argues that they resemble the Alternative Vote, a majoritarian electoral system that has been criticized in consociational theory but prescribed by the rival, centripetalist approach to power sharing.
Dieser Beitrag betrachtet Wahlsysteme und fasst die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur zu Wahlsystemen in etablierten und jungen Demokratien zusammen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Auswirkungen des Wahlrechts auf den Typus des Parteiensystems und dessen Rolle als Vermittler zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat in pluralen Gesellschaften.
In Chapter 2, the constitutional powers of the Russian President and Parliament provided an initial framework for determining the executive and legislature’s spheres of influence in the policy process and the type of political system in Russia. The political structure in a given country defines how and the extent to which a president and parliament can exercise their constitutional powers. Structural factors, such as the procedure for selecting the president and parliament, the composition and strength of political parties and committees and the length of sessions and autonomy of agenda-setting in the chamber, are examined in this chapter to further analyze the power of the President and Parliament in Russia.
Dieser Beitrag betrachtet Wahlsysteme und fasst die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur zu Wahlsystemen in etablierten und jungen Demokratien zusammen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Auswirkungen des Wahlrechts auf den Typus des Parteiensystems und dessen Rolle als Vermittler zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat in pluralen Gesellschaften.
De gemeente Lansingerland heeft de gelukkige omstandigheid dat er een ruime plurale lokale pers is die journalistiek inhoudelijke stukken produceert. Vier lokale kranten (waaronder AD/Rotterdams Dagblad) en twee televisiezenders (waaronder TV Rijnmond) bedienen het publiek van meer dan 60.000 inwoners. 3B-Krant stelde een vraag over de aanstaande gemeenteraadsverkiezingen: "wat het zegt over Lansingerland dat er geen flankpartijen (PVV, Denk, Bij1, FvD, SGP, 50Plus, zelfs de SP niet) meedoen aan de verkiezingen. Hoe komt dat? Overwint de consensus het poldermodel in de polder?" Ik beantwoord vragen bij voorkeur niet door alleen een mening te geven, maar door data te onderzoeken. Deze paper is bedoeld voor wie meer wil weten over de achtergronden van mijn antwoord. Ik zal niet te diep ingaan op die achtergronden. De literatuurlijst en links naar andere publicaties geven daar nog gelegenheid toe.
მოცემული კვლევის მიზანს საქართველოში პარტიების რაოდეობაზე შერეული საარჩევნო სისტემის გავლენის შესწავლა წარმოადგენს. კვლევა, 1990-დან 2016 წლის ჩათვლით ჩატარებული ყველა საპარლამენტო არჩევნების რაოდენობრივი შესწავლის საფუძველზე, აანალიზებს პროპორციული და მაჟორიტარული კომპონენტებისა და სამართლებრივი ბარიერის მექანიკურ და ფსიქოლოგიურ ეფექტებს ეფექტიანი პარტიების რაოდენობაზე, ასევე ოლქის პროექციას ეროვნულ დონეზე. წინამდებარე კვლევა ამოწმებს შერეული საარჩევნო სისტემის ჯვარედინი კონტამინაციის ეფექტსაც. მოცემული ანალიზი გამოკვეთს საქართველოში პარტიული პატერნების არასტაბილურობას. კვლევის შედეგად პროპორციული და მაჟორიტარული კომპონენტების დამოუკიდებელი ფსიქოლოგიური ეფექტი ეროვნულ დონეზე არ დასტურდება, ერთმანდატიანი ოლქების დონეზე კი ძლიერად ვლინდება 2003 წლის არჩევნების შემთხვევაში. 2008, 2012 და 2016 წლების არჩევნებზე მკაფიოდ გამოიხატა შერეული საარჩევნო სისტემის კონტამინაციის ეფექტის არსებობა. უმეტეს შემთხვევაში მაჟორიტარული კომპონენტის მექანიკური გავლენა საპარლამენტო პარტიების რაოდენობის შეზღუდვაზე უფრო ძლიერად გამოიხატა. 1995 წლის არჩევნებზე კი სამართლებრივი ბარიერის მექანიკური ეფექტი პარტიების პარლამენტში შესვლისთვის უფრო მეტად შემზღუდავი აღმოჩნდა, ვიდრე მაჟორიტარული კომპონენტი. ოლქის დონესთან შედარებით, ეროვნულ დონეზე ეფექტიანი პარტიების უფრო მაღალი დონის არსებობა დასტურდება 1999 და 2003 წლების არჩვენების შემთხვევაში, ხოლო არ დასტურდება „ვარდების რევოლუციის“ შემდეგ ჩატარებულ არცერთ არჩევნებზე.
The aim of the research is to study influence of the mixed-member electoral system on the number of parties in Georgia. Based on the quantitative analysis of all the parliamentary elections held from 1990 to 2016, the research tries to evaluate effect of the proportional representation (PR) and single member district (SMD) components and existence of the legal threshold on the mechanical and psychological effects on the effective number of parties (ENP), and district projection to the national level. Present study also checks cross-contamination effects between the mixed-member electoral system components. Given analysis underlines instability of the Georgian party patterns. The research conclusion does not prove independent psychological effect of the PR and the SMD components to the national level, whereas it is highly noticeable at the district level during the 2003 elections. The 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections clearly showed the existence of the contamination effect. Mostly, the mechanical influence of the single member district on limiting the number of parliamentary parties was more evident. Whereas, the mechanical effect of the legal threshold had more limiting effect on parties to enter the parliament in 1995 elections, rather than the SMD component. Compared to the district level, existence of the effective parties at the national level is vivid in the 1999 and 2003 elections and is not proven to be the case at the elections held after the ‘Rose Revolution’.
This book gives a full account of past experience, present structures and processes, and probable developments, of the voters- party-electoral systems nexus in twenty-one advanced Western democracies. The analysis is based on an original 1945-2007 comparative data set including all relevant political and institutional variables. © Gianfranco Baldini and Adriano Pappalardo 2009. All rights reserved.
Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über Konzepte, Theorien und Befunde der Wahlsystemforschung. Es werden Elemente von Wahlsystemen (Wahlkreis, Form der Kandidatur, Stimmgebungsverfahren, Stimmenverrechnungsverfahren) vorgestellt. Unmittelbare und mittelbare Wirkungen von Wahlsystemen werden in Bezug auf zugrundeliegende Wirkungsannahmen diskutiert. Ein Überblick über die Forschungsliteratur zeigt Wahlsystemwirkungen auf die Zahl der Parteien, das Wettbewerbsverhalten von Parteien und Kandidaten, die politische Partizipation sowie die Stabilität politischer Systeme. Das Zustandekommen von Wahlsystemen wird vor dem Hintergrund der Forschungsliteratur diskutiert. Abschließend werden grundsätzliche methodische und methodologische Probleme der Wahlsystemforschung behandelt.
Schlagworte: Wahlkreis; Stimmgebungsverfahren; Mehrheitswahl; Verhältniswahl; Stimmverrechnung; Disproportionalität; mechanische Effekte; psychologische Effekte; Kubus-Regel; strategisches Wahlverhalten; taktisches Wahlverhalten.
Giovanni Sartori’s typology of party systems has long been dominant in Japanese political science. However, it has lost its relevance, at least in its initial formulation. There has been controversy regarding party system and electoral system ever since the so-called political reforms (1988-94): the identifiability/accountability argument for the two-party and first-past-the-post systems versus the representation argument for moderate pluralism and proportional representation. Yet Sartori’s typology cannot defend either of them, for it underestimates the difference between a two-party system and moderate pluralism. What is required is to modify Sartori’s typology in order to fill in the gaps (See Table 3 in Section 4). Then, it may be possible to classify party systems in a more structured way. Moreover, by distinguishing the three types of moderate pluralism (consociational, negotiational and bi-coalitional), the modified typology will make it possible to identify the party system that satisfies both the arguments. This would be the bi-coalitional type of moderate pluralism.
Z Çalışmanın konusu, Türkiye'de parti sistemleridir. Amaç, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşundan günümüze, J. Blondel ve G. Sartori'nin kıstaslarını esas alarak Türkiye'deki parti sistemlerini ve parti sistemlerinin oluşmasının arkasındaki nedenleri tespit etmektir. Çalışmada, yöntem olarak betimsel analiz yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın sonunda, Türkiye'de istikrarlı bir parti sisteminin olmadığı; tek partili, iki partili ve çok partili sistemin farklı şekillerinin zaman içerisinde görüldüğü tespit edilmiştir. Türkiye'de, toplumsal sorun boyutu ekseninde, ülke gerçekleriyle uyumlu bir parti sisteminin oluşamamasının nedenleri olarak askeri darbeler, seçim sistemleri ve parti kapatmalarının etkili olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Çalışmanın önemi ve özgünlüğü, J. Blondel ve G. Sartori'nin parti sistemlerini belirlemedeki kıstaslarını bir arada uygulaması ve Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca her bir yasama dönemini tek tek ele alarak analiz etmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi parti sistemleri, tek partili sistem, iki partili sistem, çok partili sistem, Türkiye.
In the context of “Shou-senkyoku=Hirei-daihyou=Heiritsu-sei, “Duverger's Law” will be studied using a game theoretical model. The main result is two theorems. The Negative Theorem is that exit from an election, which means implicit alliance, occurs only if the Condorcet winner is not the biggest party. The Positive Theorem is that except for the case of a chicken game without suitable focal point, the Condorcet winner always wins the election in the equilibrium.
The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the ‘emotional’ and the ‘rational’ conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these organizations have been ill-equipped to compete within the existing structure of the social cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.
This chapter examines the rise and fall of the PDP from its formation in 1998 through its 16 years of firm grip of power at the national level and in most of the 36 states of the federation. It discusses some theoretical perspectives on party systems and a dominant party, showing how the dominance of PDP was fostered by the ability of the party to build a fairly truly multiethnic coalition across the country, the influence of retired military officers as a strong power bloc in Nigerian politics post-1999; the ineffectiveness of election administration, abuse of power of incumbency, poor state of the economy and inherent contradictions associated with opposition parties. The chapter discusses the crisis of internal democracy which ultimately led to the implosion of the party, including the inability of the leadership of the party to handle the implementation of its zoning policy.
The development of political parties in Ukraine is characterized by institutional features that are not typical for political parties of the countries that form the basis for the development of Western European theories. One of the defining characteristics of the political parties of Ukraine is the level of public endorsement, which is one of the lowest in Europe. The growing number of registered political parties clearly stands out against the background of low public endorsement of the institution of political parties. Such parties are not always able to compete in the political battle. Yet the conducted analysis showed that in recent years there’s been a growing number of non-party deputies elected on the lists of political parties. This, in its turn, proved to be a negative factor not only for the functioning of political parties, but it also threatens the effective functioning of the parliament.
The development of political parties in Ukraine is characterized by institutional features that are not typical for political parties of the countries that form the basis for the development of Western Euro- pean theories. One of the defining characteristics of the political parties of Ukraine is the level of pub- lic endorsement, which is one of the lowest in Europe. The growing number of registered political par- ties clearly stands out against the background of low public endorsement of the institution of political parties. Such parties are not always able to compete in the political battle. Yet the conducted analysis showed that in recent years there’s been a growing number of non-party deputies elected on the lists of political parties. This, in its turn, proved to be a negative factor not only for the functioning of political parties, but it also threatens the effective functioning of the parliament.
Seit den frühen 90er Jahren haben mehr als 30 Länder Wahlsysteme eingeführt, die die Mehrheitswahl in Einerwahlkreisen mit Elementen der Verhältniswahl verbinden. Es vermag daher nicht zu überraschen, dass die wissenschaftliche Zurückhaltung, mit der solchen kombinierten Wahlsystemen anfangs vor dem Hintergrund der idealtypischen Unterscheidung zwischen Verhältnis- und Mehrheitswahlrecht begegnet wurde, inzwischen einem erheblichen Forschungsinteresse gewichen ist (Massicotte und Blais 1999; Shugart und Wattenberg 2001; Ferrara et al. 2005). Nicht nur die Entstehung solcher Wahlsysteme (Bawn 1993; Shugart 2001), sondern auch deren Bedeutung für strategisches Wählen und den Eintritt neuer Parteien in den politischen Wettbewerb wurden dabei ausgiebig untersucht (Bawn 1999; Gschwend et al. 2003; Moser und Scheiner 2005). Die Literatur hat inzwischen auch den Einfluss kombinierter Wahlsysteme auf das Verhalten des Gesetzgebers (Lancaster und Patterson 1990; Stratmann und Baur 2002; Bawn und Thies 2003) und die Entwicklung von Parteiensystemen (Shugart und Wattenberg 2001; Ferrara et al. 2005) analysiert.
This volume is a compilation of articles that were presented at the 3rd International Conference on European Political and Economic Affairs organized by the Athens Institute of Education and Research (ATINER). The papers presented offer a glimpse into the broad and vast spectrum of world politics, while providing knowledge and insight into both contemporary and historical issues in global affairs. The authors themselves make up a diverse group of individuals from around the world, representing 15 countries in total. Each of these authors has explored various issues, and this book presents the papers under three central themes: world politics, European politics, and economic and industrial global affairs.
World Politics
There are ten papers in this section. Lecturer Talshir, from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel, opens this section with his paper addressing the re-conceptualisation of citizenship. He provides a comparative analysis of Anthony Gidden’s Third Way theory and Tony Blair’s New Labour ideology. Talshir distinguishes between theory and politics and argues that while the ideology stems from the theory, and both aim to refigure the public sphere, the resulting forms of social democracy are quite contrasting. The next paper is by Lecturer David from the University of Lisbon in Portugal. This paper analyzes the components of the politics of the state, specifically questioning the roles that federalism and sovereignty play. The author considers the true goal, and limitations, of federalism. The following paper also addresses sovereignty, but focuses on how it has changed with the expansion of the international system. This paper, written by Assistant Professor Ertekin, from Anadolu University in Turkey, discusses the changing definition of sovereignty in developing countries in an age of globalization, and the resulting complex interdependent relationships. Next, Lecturer Papadimos of the Australian Catholic University examines the economic, political, and social implications of entering the WTO for both China and Taiwan. Papadimos addresses each country separately before going on to analyze the effect that their membership will have on their relationships.
The next paper discusses the effects of urbanization on poverty rates in Bursa City, Turkey. With Turkey holding one of the highest urbanization rates in the world, Assistant Professor Altunbas, from the Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University, in Turkey, explains various ways to combat the growing urban poverty that cities, specifically Bursa City, are facing. Associate Professor Dogan and Assistant Professor Gokdemir from Inonu University in Turkey, continue with this theme, examining the rural, urban, and regional differences that have resulted from economic development and income distribution in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey. They place emphasis on the importance of rural development, while proposing strategies for long term development. The seventh paper is also focused on Turkey, but is an historical account of the Turkish political situation regarding Cyprus, between the years of 1980 and 2005. Assistant Professors Dogan and Asma from Erciyes University in Turkey recount the changes in policies and political parties, and offer a final analysis of the importance of resolving Greek-Turkish disputes in order to achieve full peace and stability in Cyprus.
Professor Martin from Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate University in the U.S.A. shifts the focus of this section to a different region of the world and discusses in his paper the fictitious representations of American political figures, as supported in an age of media. Martin explores the relationship between the influences of the media and the created political personas. Director of the Center for Terrorism Law and Associate Professor Addicott of St. Mary’s University School of Law in the U.S.A. discusses the current War on Terror led by the United States. Addicott describes the necessary strengths, and priorities, the United States must have in order to prevail in this particular war situation. The Director of Science and Technology, T.A. Gardner, at Raytheon Technical Services Company in the U.S.A, brings us the final paper in this section on World Politics. Gardner’s paper explores the variables that influence U.S. Senators voting patterns, specifically regarding energy research and development.
European Politics
Part II of this volume comprises 13 papers. The first paper comes from Ph.D. Student Vykoupilova, from Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, and provides an analysis of Euro-federalists groups in the European Union, with specific focus on those groups residing in new EU member countries, such as the Czech Republic. The following paper also discusses the European Union, but is an analysis of the EU enlargement and the economic transition the Central and Eastern European countries must undergo in order to catch up with the economic standards and ways of the Western European countries. Senior Research Associate Hishow of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Berlin in Germany also examines the necessary economic conditions that must exist in these countries in order for them to achieve the new economic standards. Assistant Professor Molchanov, from St. Thomas University in Canada, writes the next paper exploring the dilemmas of post-soviet countries as they are trying to re-establish their identities, and determine whether it is best to gravitate towards Russia or towards the growing EU. Based on his research and analysis, the author concludes that it is more beneficial for these countries to unite with Russia than with the EU or NATO. The fourth paper, by Ph.D. Student Kaloudis from The Catholic University of America in the U.S.A., describes the evolution of Russian foreign policy and explains the country’s current strategy of geo-economics. The paper describes how in order to regain world power, Russia is using their natural resources of energy, to establish economic power, as well as exerting control over Ukraine, a strategic country which provides access to the EU and NATO. The fifth paper, by Graduate Student Ramos, also from The Catholic University of America in the U.S.A., discusses Russia’s relationship with Germany. Ramos focuses on their interdependent relationship, explaining their historical evolution and the implications of such an alliance.
Researcher Leven, from The College of New Jersey in the U.S.A., examines the recent emigration from Poland in the next paper. Leven explores which people are emigrating and where they are going, while also discussing the political transitions in Polish government that have paved the way for this change in emigration opportunities. The seventh paper is by Professor Kaloudis, from Rivier College in the U.S.A. This paper provides an historical account of the transition of Greek politics from 1974 to the present. Kaloudis discusses the changes that Greek society has undergone as it has moved from authoritarianism to democracy, as well as what the positive developments in the country’s international relations has meant for the society as a whole. Ph.D. Student Ellinas, from Princeton University in the U.S.A. provides a specific analysis of the Greek far Right, and the nationalist components that support its potential for ascendance. In his paper, Ellinas focuses on electoral conditions in Greece, the far right parties since 1974, and the mainstream parties, and their appeal which prevents the right from rising to power. The ninth paper is by Ph.D. Student Koktsidis, from The University of Edinburgh in the U.K., and provides a comparative analysis of the political conflicts between the radical nationalist parties, Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna, and Northern Ireland, and the Basque Country, respectively. Koktsidis further compares and contrasts the methods used by the two regions in response to these radical political groups. Assistant Drezgic of the University of Rijeka in Croatia writes the next paper in the European Politics Section. Drezgic examines the role of income tax as a tool to boost economic development and general growth in a country, before specifically examining income tax in Croatia.
The eleventh paper is by Jean Monnet, Chair and Reader in International Relations from Coventry University in the U.K. His paper examines the factors that have shaped British foreign policy towards the European Union during the 1997-2005 period. Assistant Professor Kandogan, from the University of Michigan-Flint in the U.S.A., measures the trade creation and diversion effects of major European agreements based on the results of a correctly specified triple-indexed gravity model with bilateral fixed effects. The final paper in the European Politics Section is by Professor Sdogati from the Politecnico di Milano in Italia. The aim of the paper is to show that EU enlargement has generated new policies both at industrial and governmental levels.
Economic and Industrial Global Affairs
The final section in this volume is comprised of six papers that address the economic and industrial aspects of global issues. This section begins with a paper by Assistant Professor Subasi-Ertekin from Anadolu University in Turkey. It provides an historical account of the Kyoto Protocol and then discuses the importance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Then it goes on to analyse the implications of the Protocol for different countries and regions and their economies. Associate Professor Wiley, from Hofstra University in the U.S.A, writes the second paper in this section on the ways in which small island states are responding to globalisation. It specifically addresses the challenges they face and the adaptations that must ensue in order to fit into the changes and integration the world is undergoing. The next paper, by Professor Murray, from the University of Arkansas in the U.S.A., investigates the role that socio-economics plays in risk management decisions, particularly with international food safety standards. Ph.D. Student Chatzopoulou, from Roskilde University in Denmark, explores the economic development of the Greek agricultural sector, both before and after Greece became part of the EU. In this paper, Chatzopoulou seeks to analyse the domestic institutional structures and their impact on the economic performance of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Assistant Professor Ozdemir-Yilmaz, from Yeditepe University in Turkey, writes a comparative analysis of trade competitiveness between Turkey and particular EU countries. The study specifically addresses relative labor costs and productivity and confirms the existence of a positive and significant international competitiveness between Turkey and EU countries. The final paper in this section is by Head of the ICT Department and Teaching Assistant Andreica from the “Babes-Bolyai” University of Cluj-Napoca in Romania. This paper discusses information and communication technology and its importance on organizational activity, while providing strategies to successfully implement information systems, specifically in Romania.
This volume is suitable for all those students of International Affairs that would like to have a wider knowledge of current issues. It was not intended to cover a unified subject, but it reflects the spirit and qualities of the participants of this international conference.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.