An African Perspective on Global Governance

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6
An African Perspective on Global
Governance
Thomas Kwasi Tieku and Linnéa Gelot
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we seek to explore the complicated issue of an African perspec-
tive on global governance. It is a difficult exercise because the continent of
Africa exhibits extraordinary diversity in religious, political, societal, and
economic terms. Diversity in Africa manifests itself in many ways, including
different cultural practices (represented by the over 3,000 major ethnic
groups), various languages (reflected in over 2,000 major languages), colonial
history (at least five different colonial experiences), political structures (almost
all the major forms of political systems are present on the continent), race (all
major racial groups can be found in Africa), class (large rich Western-educated
elite but a great majority of Africans are notoriously poor), and power differ-
entials in terms of access and control of information and discourse. Thus, in
writing about the African perspective on global governance we run the risk of
over-generalizing, homogenizing, and essentializing the different views that
exist on the issue (Smith 2011; Mdembe 2001).
We are cognizant of the essentially contingent and unstable character of
such an intersubjective enterprise. Our task is made yet more difficult by the
fact that little has been written on the subject.
1
We sought to address the
analytical and methodological limitations by drawing insights from the views
and positions of the African Union (AU) on global governance.
1
There is a literature on global governance processes impacting on politics and social structures
in Africa. There is also a developing literature on African agency, see, for instance, Brown and
Harman 2013; Tieku 2013; Welz 2013.
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By focusing on the AU, we in some ways privilege views of trans-
national and oftentimes Western-educated elite with preferential access
to knowledge and power. We also inevitably privilege a formal regulatory
space of global governance, even though this highly hierarchical and
structured institution also interconnects with diverse informal expressions
of global and transnational networks and interconnections (Beswick and
Hammerstad 2013; Brown 2012). Yet the approach we have taken can be
defended on the grounds that the AU is mandated to speak on behalf
of its fifty-four member states, especially on global issues and in inter-
national fora.
The AU provides the institutional framework for African governments to
develop common African positions on key global governance issues such as
climate change, trade and development, and UN reform, among others.
Shared positions govern intra-African relations and also external relations
with the outside world. For good and bad, the AU is treated by regional,
local, and global publics as the nearest thing to a representative body for
Africa. Using the AU’s understanding of global governance to approximate
an African perspective is therefore methodologically defensible and perhaps
the best available approach to the issue.
Following Graham Harrison, we can defensibly speak of the African per-
spective in at least three senses: as a collective international actor; as a
collection of states with, in the broadest of terms, a shared history; and as
a discursive presence, used by both Africans and outsiders, in international
politics and policy (Harrison 2010). In terms of the latter sense, the AU’s
formulation of global governance positions and principles aims at both
internal identity construction and external projection of values or know-
ledge. It can be thought of as one significant enterprise among diverse
attempts to construct ideas of an African identity and African political
order that enables collective action and independence. The focus on the
AU provides us with one way to grasp a transnational encounter, between
traditional cultures and modernity, between particularism and univer-
salism, and between Africa’s regional transnational elite and the global
environment.
We identify a predominant feature of how African governments discuss and
practise global governance within the AU institutional framework. We call
this the relational approach to governance, and we illustrate how it is reflected
in the exercise of African agency and the way the AU defines and practises key
global governance issues. We illustrate the argument by reference to two
governance issues: security governance and human rights governance. The
conception of governance in relational terms adds an interesting dimension
to the Eurocentric and rationalistic ideas embedded in conventional narra-
tives of global governance.
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6.2 Nature of Relational Governance
In the relational governance approach, the decision-making of any society is a
collective endeavour; the capacity to steer society, or govern, any society is
the responsibility of the entire community. The concept of governance in
relational terms can be detected in the African humanist core ideal ubuntu and
its understanding of the person, which is considered to be the connecting
thread of the people of Bantu, the largest of the four main linguistic groups
in Africa (Gyekye 1987; Kamwangamalu, 1999). Most of the ethnic groups
spread throughout the so-called sub-Saharan African region belong to the
Bantu cultural and linguistic group (Iliffe 2007; Colins and Burns 2007).
The ubuntu idea of the person, or what Archbishop Desmond Tutu described
as the very essence of Africans’understanding of humanity, is wittily
expressed in the saying that ‘humans are humans because of other humans’
(Smith 2011, p. 33).
This understanding of the individual in which ‘I am because we are, and
because we are therefore I am’(Mbiti 1969) is based on the idea that actors
such as persons and states in collectivist societies are not independent entities;
rather, they are ‘integral members of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity’
(Okere 1984). The reasoning goes, collectivist cultures prioritize the social over
the personal and group preferences over individual interests and goals, and
they marginalize differentness, as well as uniqueness (Hofstede 1980; Kim
et al. 1994; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier
2002). In such cultures, individuals are deemed interdependent, and their self
is assumed to be inextricably linked with the selves of others (Markus and
Kitayama 1991; Oyserman and Marcus 1993; Triandis 1995).
2
The key identity
markers that follow from this perspective are group membership, such as
kinship relations and obligations. This leads members to cherish group har-
mony and the public show of unity by members of the ‘in-group’, however
shallow that harmony might be.
Within studies of personhood in Africa, some scholars have argued that
indigenous African societies exhibit strong features of collectivist cultures.
One finding even argues that some indigenous Africans ‘show practically no
self-awareness’(Stagner 1961). Ma and Schoeneman have suggested that the
‘individual in a traditional African society does not aim to master himself or
other things but instead aims to accept a life of harmony with other individ-
uals. According to this reading, the ideal of village life is correct behaviors and
relationships to other people’(Ma and Schoeneman 1997). At the same time,
African political systems are marked by checks and balances, and relationships
2
For a comparative worldview schematic, see Wade W. Nobles (1976).
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that ensure that rulers do not become dictatorial (Dunstan Wai, referenced in
Cobbah 1987).
While we have begun to sketch out some intellectual roots of relational
governance, it is important to note that, within African philosophy, there are
contested and diverging positions. We cannot provide detailed overview of
the debate; rather, we offer a glimpse of the diverse perspectives that exist on
the roots of relationality. Another stream of thought, for instance, agrees that
AU institutional politics can surely be read as relational, but relational more in
the sense of Africa’s historical and discursive position vis-à-vis the colonial
legacy (Appiah 1992). This means that identities, and constructions of collect-
ive identity markers, are always also relational. And drawing on Homi Bhabha,
it can even be said that there is nothing essentially African. According to
Bhabha, complex and indeterminate processes of negotiation always take
place between the social difference of one group in relation to another
(Bhabha 1994). Culture, for Bhabha, resides and thrives in the ‘in between
space’, where one supposedly settled notion of culture encounters another
and both are disturbed (Bhabha 1994, p. 2).
The idea of relational governance that holds so much influence in
today’s Pan-African politics draws its roots from the debate about African
identity.ScholarssuchasAppiahandMudimbehavedemonstratedthe
dynamism and diversity of African cultures, arguing that the very idea and
felt need to construct a particular African position is a response to coloni-
alism and global power configurations (Mudimbe 1988; Appiah 1992).
These scholars noted that such politics often tend to reproduce colonial
stereotypes and may close down the political space for exercising genuine
African agency.
In debates about African philosophy and culture, there is an enduring
clash of thought between collectivism and individualism. This debate is
beyond any supposed Western–Africandichotomyandisratheranenduring
topic within the philosophy of science. Individual autonomy precedes social
relations and society in classic liberal thought. However, a critique of indi-
vidual autonomy argues that a human being stripped of society and culture
is a mere abstraction. The reductionist conception of the human in a pre-
political and non-cultural ‘state of nature’contribute little to understandings
of complex society, because the very essence of the human has been taken
out (Cobbah 1987).
Globalization, colonial history, and formal education are processes which
weaken the political influence of collectivist traits in African political life.
Indeed, contemporary political elites seem to have fused the collectivist
behavioural persona with more individualist self-awareness and self-interest.
Nonetheless, discourses about collectivist cultural practices still, to some extent,
shape political behaviour in Africa in general, and in Africa’sinternational
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politics more specifically.
3
Unlike the projection of individualist behavioural
traits widely documented by global governance scholars, Pan-African diplomacy
is rife with African elites speaking of themselves and portraying themselves
not as independent, atomistic, isolated, and abstract entities, but as related,
dependent, parts of a greater whole. They speak not of having relations; rather,
one might say, they claim they ‘are’relations (Piot 1999). As result, it is import-
ant for in-group recognition and legitimacy for African political elites to be seen
as behaving in relational terms.
The mixture of individualism and collectivism in practices and decision-
making by political elites is what we call relationality. In other words, the
concept of relationality sits somewhere close to the intersection of collectiv-
ism and individualism. It is deeply socialized into African organizational
cultures. The relational approach to governance therefore holds the potential
of contributing new insights to the social scientific study of governance. The
influence of relationality in the thinking of African political elites is often at
the heart of tensions between African governments and their Western coun-
terparts on global issues (Tieku 2011; Grovogui 2011). Moreover, relationality
helps us to explain why African ruling elites deploy certain strategies: priori-
tizing group preferences over the specific interests of the states they repre-
sented at the international level; employment of consensual decision-making
procedures rather than frequent use of competitive voting systems to reach
agreement on major global governance issues; and a tendency to prioritize
group harmony and solidarity in dealing with global governance issues.
6.3 Practising Relational Governance
Political discourse on governance in an African context is pregnant with a
relational view best captured by the African proverb, ‘it takes a village to raise a
child’. Governance as a collective responsibility is manifested both within
foundational legal documents and more informally as unwritten rules or
codes of conduct in Pan-African affairs. At innumerable meetings and sem-
inars on global governance issues, African heads of states and AU senior
policymakers and officials make references to the primacy of African culture,
indigenous values, and specific historical African traditions such as consensus
politics by stating that no one should stand idly by while a neighbour’s house
burns down (e.g. Deng and Zartman 2002).
4
This governance discourse builds
3
In regard to the specific value of ubuntu, see South African Government White Paper in 2011
on the ubuntu-infused foreign policy.
4
Participant observation and content analysis of AU summits and decision-making, elite
interviewing, as well as our scholarly engagement with the Union’s activities over the years
confirm this observation.
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a collective claim for enhanced agency in global politics. At work is a process
of internal identity construction and an enactment of African agency in
global affairs. The AU framework enables conversations and imaginations of
‘Africa rising’, and an Africa perceived locally, regionally, and globally as a
valid knowledge producer and legitimate authority. This is what Amitav
Acharya (2009) refers to as ‘regional worlds’, namely ‘sites for ideational and
normative contestations, resistance and compromises, involving both states
and civil societies which transcend regional boundaries and overlap into other
regional and global spaces.’These are neither autonomous entities nor purely
subsets of global dynamics. Instead, they ‘create, absorb and repatriate idea-
tional and material forces that make world politics and order.’Regional worlds
do not only self-organize their economic, political, and cultural interactions
and identity, but also produce their own mental image of other regions
and the global space in general. Acharya’s insightful inside-out view of the
role of regions in world politics is a good analytical complement to the
concept of relational governance, since the term ‘regional world’includes
the notions of regional order and regional institutions, as well as economic
regionalization.
We illustrate the ongoing processes of internal identity construction by
referring to the ‘AU Agenda 2063’and its revitalization of ‘African renaissance’
through claims about shared history, identity, and destiny (AU Commission,
2015).
5
This agenda seeks to nurture Pan-Africanism, and is written with
words that stir the collective political imagination, allowing African stake-
holders to imagine the world, and Africa’s place in it. It entails a vision of how
to reach the collective aim, ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa,
driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the inter-
national arena.’It states, ‘We, the people of Africa and her Diaspora, united
in diversity, young and old, men and women, girls and boys from all walks of
life, deeply conscious of history, express our deep appreciation to all gener-
ations of Pan-Africanists’(AU Commission, 2015, para 1). It is written in the
name of ‘African people’, with the aim of developing a narrative in which
modern Africa is a united Africa, without neglecting the colonial legacy and its
contemporary implications; an Africa capable of rallying support around a
common agenda and speaking with one voice.
6
The Agenda 2063 vision presupposes a shared Africa’sculturalidentity
for its success. This is reflectedinparticularinthesecondgoalofAgenda
2063, which states that it seeks to promote ‘Africa [which] is self-confident
5
This was adopted at the 24th AU Assembly meeting in January 2015.
6
The contested discussion about projecting one African voice intensified during the process of
introspection following the fall of the Gaddafiregime in Libya in 2011 (Gelot 2016).
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in its identity, heritage, culture and shared values and [which is] strong,
united and influential partner on the global stage making its contribution
to peace, human progress, peaceful co-existence and welfare.’
7
The Agenda
presents itself as a fully participatory process, one that will engage African
populations and harness citizens’creativity. In this way, it offers a road-
map for how the AU shall become accountable. Relational governance can
be detected in this language in the sense that it depends on unity of
interest and collective positions for Africa to ‘take her rightful place in
the political, security, economic, and social systems of global governance’
(para 61).
There is a long-term expectation that enhanced regional integration and
governance capacity facilitated by the AU will further its popular legitimacy,
and the AU is doing it utmost to promote the principle of inclusivity, or what
they call ‘popular participation’in governance. This principle has been legal-
ized in key international legal instruments that govern relations between
African states. The Constitutive Act of the African Union, the supreme legal
instrument of Africa, codifies in Article 3 popular participation as the key
ingredient of governance (AU 2001). The idea that popular participation is
the thread that holds together the rings of AU’s approach to governance is
reinforced in many documents of the AU, including the African Charter
for Popular Participation in Development, adopted in Addis Ababa in July
1990, the Cairo Agenda for Action, adopted in Cairo in 1995 and the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which entered into force
on 15 February 2012. The otherwise formal and hierarchical AU structure has
thus embedded in it the mechanisms for broader participation. However, this
does not mean that popular participation marks all AU decision-making in
practice, since in decision-making on key strategic matters the discussions are
inclusive to state members concerned. They most often take place behind
closed doors, and consultations continue until a shared position has been
reached. Popular participation could also be read as an influence from a liberal
rationale, rather than a collectivist decision-making process. Indeed, in most
of the legal documents and Charters of the AU, one may detect this blend
between particularism and universalism. For example, in the preamble to the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the membership of
the AU recognizes the universality of democracy, governance, human rights,
and the right to development. At the same time, the preamble states that it is
‘Cognizant of the historical and cultural conditions in Africa’(African Union
2007, preamble and article 2:1).
7
Solemn Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union at
Addis Ababa, 26 May 2013.
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Another element of how enhanced regional integration can be seen as a
relational objective is the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. Subsidiarity concerns the
relations and roles of the continental with respect to subregional layers in the
AU institutional framework. Regional Economic Community Communities
(RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are the regional integration institu-
tions of the AU, and some of them, most notably Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa Development Commu-
nity (SADC), have had in place institutional capacity and peace and security
structures in their regions that predate the birth of the AU. Over the course of
the AU’s institutional growth, the debate about appropriate coordination
between the AU and its RECs/RMs is raised on a regular basis. In 2008, a
Memorandum of Understanding between AU and RECs/RMs was signed to
reconfigure these relations. In this document the democratic/inclusive poten-
tial of subsidiarity principle is recognized (African Union 2008). Noting this,
Michelle Ndiaye argues for a nuanced and vertical approach to subsidiarity
issues, rather than a hierarchical one that predominated the early phase of the
AU. She links this to the Union’s objective to represent all African citizens
and of their overall objective to promote the well-being of African peoples.
The people-centred vision, Ndiaye points out, can only be achieved if
approaches to relations with sub-regions are vertical and flexible (Ndiaye
2016, pp. 53–4).
In the context of globalization, and seen against the background of the
colonial heritage, this relational governance discourse coexists with a
neoliberal political rationality, most evident in the areas of trade and
regional integration. The cultural relational dimensions become entangled
with liberal or ‘Western’ideas, and expectations from external actors that
Africa should ‘catch up with’or integrate more fully into the global economy
and world order. From a neoliberal viewpoint, the existence of the AU’s
regulatory framework should result in ever more efficient governance,
since decentralization, privatization, and liberalization are seen as prod-
ucts of global governance processes and as positive forces towards more
efficient governance. However, African political actors often view external
relations through the historical veil of colonialism. Thus, the discourse
about unity and collectivism can be seen as part of a set of strategies that
the AU adopts to enhance its agency in global governance. In adopting
relational strategies, drawing upon ideas about cultural identity helps to
maintain a public perception of unity, and contesting views are thereby
more easily marginalized. Thus, relational governance rhetoric can be
coopted in order to silence dissent and enable the AU to intervene in the
domestic jurisdiction of a member state. It also serves the purpose of
reducing external intervention in the affairs of member states from inter-
national actors.
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6.4 Illustrations of Relational Governance in Africa
6.4.1 Issue I: African Agency in Global Governance
The relational governance approach is reflected in the way that African actors
exercise agency–conceived as the autonomy Africans and their lawful repre-
sentatives (governments) have to define, act, own, control, and lead on global
issues that affect them at the international level (Tieku 2013). Relational
governance ideas encouraged African actors to engage in coalition politics in
the form of South–South cooperation in global fora. In the World Trade
Organization (WTO) system, for instance, African actors formed the Africa
Group (AG), which allows them to develop common African positions, strat-
egy, and negotiation teams during major global trade-related negotiations.
Even African government representatives’management of the day-to-day
work of the WTO is done primarily through the AG. The representatives
meet every Tuesday morning to strategize and plan for the week.
8
Similarly, African governments have often taken advantage of their
numerical strength—the African continent comprises fifty-four of the 193
independent states recognized by the United Nations (UN)—and the support
from like-minded Southern counterparts to promote their interests to contrib-
ute to setting agendas in the UN framework. It is not mere coincidence that
Africa-related issues dominate the UN’s discussion and activities. For instance,
over 60 per cent of UN Security Council discussions and 60 per cent of UN
peacekeeping operations focus on Africa. Certainly, Africa dominates the UN
agenda because of the nature of its peace and security challenges and the
pressure exerted by former colonial powers within the UN framework to
promote their interests in Africa, but also in part because the politics of
coalition enables African actors to attract greater attention to their cause.
African actors have used coalition politics to protect governing elites from
external attacks, and they have sometimes employed the power of coalition
politics to generate and capture material resources and moral power.
6.4.2 Issue II: Security Governance
Relational governance thinking has led to the predominance of interdepend-
ent security concepts such as human security (defined as the protection of
people and communities rather than of states) among the fifty-four AU mem-
ber states. The emphasis that human security places on protection of groups
and communities reinforces the prioritization given to collective interests over
those of individuals in relational governance theory. Little wonder that it was
8
For discussion of the nature and impact of the coalition politics that African states play in the
global trading system, see Lee 2012.
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not difficult for African elites, through the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and subsequently the AU, to embrace human security and adopt it as
the preferred approach to the security of the African continent.
9
As Stephen
Bernstein tells us, an idea is adopted when it resonates with a pre-existing
norm (Bernstein 2002). Because the majority of African elites are socialized to
think in relational terms, it was easy for them to embrace group and inter-
dependent concepts of African security. The AU legalized the group-centred
approach to security in its Constitutive Act. Both Article 4(h) and Article 4(i)
make it clear that African people as a collective rather than individuals have a
‘right to live in peace’.
The attraction of relational thinking in the AU opened the normative space
for AU bodies to provide a legal basis for intervention in the internal affairs of a
member state under certain conditions. Conditions for military intervention
are laid out in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The Article gives
AU the right to intervene in the affairs of a member state in order to ‘prevent
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.
10
It is important to note
that the AU conditions for intervention are centred on group rather than
individual suffering. War crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity are
group-oriented acts. They were selected by African leaders from the many
ideas in international law and embedded in the Constitutive Act, primarily
because they resonate with the prior conception and acceptance of relational
governance. In other words, the specification of war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity was not only motivated by a desire to provide clearer
benchmarks for intervention, as noted by many observers, but rather, it was
also driven by a longing for culturally appropriate ways to manage African
security.
11
These human security ideas were the first of three new security innovations
to be embedded in the African subsystem during the first decade of the
twenty-first century. The specific human security ideas were introduced by
the Kampala Movement, an initiative of civil society groups that met in
Kampala, Uganda in the early 1990s to develop a regime of principles regard-
ing security, stability, development, and cooperation for Africa (Deng
and Zartman 2002). At the heart of the human security principles, widely
known as the CSSDCA norms, was a conscious effort to redefine security and
sovereignty, and to demand certain ‘standards of behaviour ...from every
9
The Organization of African Unity was created in 1963, and was replaced in 2001 by the
AU. For the process through which human security was selected as the preferred definition of
continental Africa security, see Tieku 2004; Deng and Zartman 2002.
10
The article has been amended to include intervention to ‘restore peace and stability’and in
response to ‘a serious threat to legitimate order’.
11
For a discussion of the importance of the specification of war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity, see Powell and Tieku 2005; Weiss 2004.
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government [in Africa] in the interest of common humanity’(Obasanjo and
Mosha 1992, p. 260). The Kampala Movement demanded that African leaders
redefine their states’security as a multidimensional phenomenon, one that
extends beyond military considerations to include economic, political, and
social aspects of the individual, family, and society. In the view of the move-
ment, ‘[t]he concept of security must embrace all aspects of society ...[and
the] security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the
individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs’(Obasanjo and
Mosha 1992, p. 265).
The human security document was submitted and adopted by the OAU
summit in Lomé in July 2000. A refined and watered-down version of the
CSSDCA document was accepted as the guiding norms and guiding principles
of security, stability, development, and cooperation in a Memorandum of
Understanding adopted by the AU in July 2002 in Pretoria in South Africa.
They have been integrated into all major legal instruments the AU has
adopted since July 2000, including the Constitutive Act of the African
Union, the Common African Defense and Security Pact, the Protocol Relating
to African Union Peace and Security Council, among others.
The relational view of governance has led to the conception of state sover-
eignty different from the conventional Westphalian model. The AU concept
of sovereignty seeks to protect African states from military intervention by
non-African states while making room for African states to intervene collect-
ively in each other’s internal affairs with or without the consent of the target
country (see Bachmann and Gelot 2013). The sovereign’s right to govern is
conditional upon minimum adherence to and commitment to the principles
and laws upheld by the AU. Several mechanisms have been put in place to
monitor state behaviour and compliance. Correctional action or intervention
can take different forms, including mediation (as in the case of Kenya in
2008), rebuke (as in the case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2010), suspension from
participation in activities of African international organizations (as in the
case of Mauritania in 2009), and, as a last resort, military intervention (as in
the case of Comoros Islands in 2006 and 2007, Somalia (2007) or the Central
African Republic (2013)). These interventions were decided upon by consen-
sual decision-making.
The widespread acceptance of conditional sovereignty paved the way for
the introduction of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-like principles in Africa’s
international system (Powell and Tieku 2005; Welsh 2010). Indeed, the
formation of AU and legalization of languages similar to R2P in the AU
Constitutive Act is seen as important in the evolution of R2P at the global
level (Okeke 2011). The R2P-like language informs various AU decisions,
declarations, and legal instruments. Its clearest expression can be found
in the Ezulwini Consensus. In the Ezulwini Consensus, fifty-four African
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governments endorsed R2P and submitted this document to the 2005 World
Summit Outcome as the common African position on R2P (African Union
2006b). The Ezulwini Consensus reiterated the three pillars of R2P, namely,
responsibility of states to protect their citizens, responsibility of the inter-
national community to help states protect their citizens, and responsibility
of the international community to protect citizens of states that are incapable
or unwilling to protect their citizens. There are, however, three important
caveats in the Ezulwini Consensus which showed a slightly different under-
standing of R2P than the conventional view outlined in either the report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
or the report of the UN World Summit in 2005. First, the Ezulwini Consensus
sought to shift to regional organizations the power to decide when, where,
and how to intervene, contrary to the argument put forth by the original R2P
report. The R2P report unequivocally argued that the UN Security Council is
the best placed institution to authorize intervention.
The Ezulwini document, however, claimed that the UN General Assembly
and Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts and may not be
best placed to undertake a proper appreciation of the nature and development
of conflict situations. The collective wisdom of members of the AU is that
regional organizations are the best placed institutions to make the appropriate
assessment and should be ‘empowered to take actions in this regard’. Second,
the Ezulwini document warned powerful states in the international system
not to use R2P as an excuse to embark on regime change, noting that, ‘it is
important to reiterate the obligation of states to protect their citizens, but this
should not be used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of states’(African Union 2006b).
The enforcement by the allied coalition of the no-fly zone over Libya in
2011 has served as a recent reminder for many African heads of states and
officials of just how quickly the pretext of protecting civilians can become a
full-blown regime change agenda (Bachmann and Gelot 2013). This has been
a contentious topic of discussion at the annual meetings of the two councils,
the African Union Peace and Security Council (the AUPSC and the UNSC), and
against the background of tensions surrounding management and leadership
in crises in Libya but also Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Central African Republic. In
2014, the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the AU Commission’s
Peace and Security Department tried to clarify the complementary role that
the two organizations can play in a Joint Framework for an Enhanced Part-
nership in Peace and Security.
Third, though the Ezulwini Consensus and the original R2P report con-
verged on the idea that intervention by regional organizations ‘should be
with the approval of the Security Council’, an interesting subtle qualification
was inserted in the Ezulwini Consensus which challenges a core principle in
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international law. The Ezulwini Consensus is emphatic that the approval of
the UN Security Council is needed for intervention by regional organizations,
‘although in certain situations, such approval could be granted “after the fact”
in circumstances requiring urgent action’. Controversially, the consensus
suggested that, ‘In such cases, the UN should assume responsibility for finan-
cing such operations (African Union 2006b, p. 6). The language used here in
the document was meant to encourage the UN to accept and even institution-
alize a practice started by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and later replicated by the AU, whereby a regional organization
can intervene in conflicts without UN Security Council approval but later seek
not only UN authorization but also to pressure the UN to keep the peace
that the regional organization has imposed. This practice was employed by
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the AU adopted the same strategy in
Burundi, Comoros Islands, Sudan, and Somalia.
Moreover, the language in the Ezulwini Consensusisasubtleattemptby
AU member states to make the UN share with regional organizations the
primary responsibility for maintaining peace in regional contexts. The UN
Charter, however, is unambiguous on the UN’sprimacyinpeaceand
security matters in the world, including on the African continent. A more
blunt case in favour of making regional organizations such as the AU take
the lead in peace and security matters on the African continent was made
in an AU PSC communiqué issued by the AU Peace and Security Resolution
on AU–UNcooperationandthereportoftheChairpersonofAUonthe
same issue released prior to the January 2012 UN Security Council debate
on AU–UN cooperation. The move to challenge the UN as the sole inter-
national organization with primary authority to promote and maintain
peace in the world has angered some powerful members of the UN Security
Council. As Susan Rice put it during the January 2012 Security Council
debate on AU–UN cooperation, UN–regional ‘cooperationcannotbeonthe
basis that the regional organization independently decides the policy and
United Nations member states simply bless it and pay for it. There can be
no blank check, politically or financially’(Rice 2012). Her opening remarks
went to greater lengths to indicate that the UN is not and should not be
made ‘subordinate to other bodies or to regional groups, schedules or
capacities’(Rice 2012).
Concerns expressed by the United States, Britain, and France made the
Security Council members insert in Resolution 2033, which was only adopted
after much debate, language reflective of Article 54 of the Charter of the
United Nations which requires regional and subregional organizations to
keep the UN Security Council fully informed and to manage in a coordinated
way any peace and security-related activities undertaken in their region. These
disagreements and turf battles have led the AU leadership to call for the
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amendment of the UN Charter to allow regional organizations to take a lead
role in peace and security issues in their regions.
12
6.4.3 Issue III: Human Rights Governance
Relational thinking has figured prominently in the African conception and
practice of human rights (Organization of African Unity (OAU) 1981). All
major regional African human rights instruments which have been adopted
since decolonization placed greater emphasis on group and interdependent
rights. In 1979, the then Senegalese President Leopold Senghor argued that
human rights in Africa had to respect group rights as much as individual
rights, as well as the right to development (Senghor 1979).
13
This conception
of rights had to reflect African traditional societies, which were at their core
collectivist and not as individualistically oriented as mainstream human
rights ideas tend to be (Ake 1987). Human rights ideas in global fora have
historically been derived from a Western natural rights perspective and from
liberal political philosophy, which place individualism at their core. A closer
reading of the various human rights documents shows that a premium is
placed on people’s rights. Indeed, according to the African Charter on
Human and People’s Right (adopted in 1998, the Protocol came into effect
25 January 2005), the individual has not only rights but also duties to uphold
community and family life and values (Articles 27–9). Moreover, the family is
seen as the natural unit and basis of society and shall receive protection from
the state to be able to carry out this function (Article 18). The right to
development is upheld, since the satisfaction of economic, social, and cultural
rights (of individuals and groups) is seen as a guarantor for the effective
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
The AU reinforced the tradition of a relational conception when it empha-
sized people’s rights over individual rights in its numerous human rights
provisions (Shivji 1989). The AU Constitutive Act indicates that the AU shall
respect human rights, and work topromote and protectthem in accordance with
the Banjul Charter and other relevant human rights instruments (Article 3h).
The Constitutive Act speaks of the right of peoples (not individuals) to partici-
pate in the activities of the Union. In a study of how the African Commission
on Human Rights has interpreted the group rights provisions of the Banjul
Charter (Articles 19–24), Basil Ugochukwu et al. finds that group rights have
indeed trumped individual rights. According to him, group rights claims are
12
See speeches by the African group during the 2013 debate on relations between the UN
and regional organizations.
13
Address delivered by H.E. Mr Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal,
OAU DOC CAB/LEG/67/5.
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disregarded only when they imply a challenge to state sovereignty or to the
integrity of state boundaries (Ugochukwu, Baradu and Okafor 2011). Many
contested issues are embedded in the interpretation of group rights, and
some of these contestations are currently being brought to light by civil society
groups and intellectuals in Africa during the complicated process of merging
the African Court on Human Rights and the African Court of Justice into one
overarching African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
The dispute between the AU and the International Criminal Court (ICC)
clearly brings out the differences between the African conception and practice
of humans right and global approaches to human rights. Relational govern-
ance in the human rights sphere emphasizes how human beings give recog-
nition to each other and recognize rights as correlative to duties. Social
relationships and human community is the departure point, and the individ-
ual, and his/her freedom and interests are a function of them. The human
being is constituted by the character of the social relations in which he stands
(Cobbah 1987). The AU as an institution and many of its member states have
often disagreed with the ICC’s implementation of its mandate on African soil.
The argument of the AU has been that the ICC should consult more with the
AU before issuing arrest warrants against incumbent leaders.
14
For the AU, the
ICC interpretation of its mandate often complicates efforts aimed at negoti-
ating political solutions to complex crises in places such as Libya, Kenya, and
Sudan. As Murithi explains:
All inter-governmental organizations would want to determine how their member
states engage with issues relating to transitional justice, peacebuilding democratic
governance and the rule of law, without feeling that there is an overbearing and
patriarchal entity in effect stipulating how the continent should be going about
doing so. (2013, p. 6).
The dispute reached a critical level when the AU convened an extraordinary
summit on 12 October 2014 to discuss a possible bloc withdrawal of African
countries from the Rome Statute.
15
A bloc withdrawal was avoided, nonethe-
less the AU made a collective petition for the ICC to grant immunity to any
sitting African head of state, no matter the crime the accused is charged with.
Nonetheless, the AU–ICC dispute should not be overemphasized, since subtle
but important openings in the assumed ‘stand-off ’tell us that some African
14
If examined in a simplistic and impressionistic way, this is just a ploy by African leaders to
protect each other. Protecting incumbent regimes from prosecution may well be part of the
argument, but a careful reading of African politics will show that the AU claim goes deeper than
a simple attempt to protect its sitting presidents from prosecution.
15
The Rome Statute is the founding treaty of the ICC. It was adopted on 17 July 1998 and it
entered into force on 1 July 2002. Forty-seven African states were present for the drafting of the
Rome Statute at the Rome Conference in July 1998 and the vast majority of these countries voted
for its adoption.
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states are on good terms with the ICC, and indeed invite its proceedings into
their sovereign affairs (Kersten 2016).
The process of operationalizing the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights has added more tension within the AU–ICC relationship and must be
understood against the backdrop of the contending visions of human rights
protection upheld by the AU and the ICC, respectively. The recently approved
draft protocol has expanded the proposed African Court’s jurisdiction to
include international crimes including genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity as well as transnational crimes such as trafficking in persons
or drugs, terrorism, and piracy. NGOs have argued that the drafting process
would have benefited from a process of consultation, not least with relevant
expert stakeholders and civil society actors (du Plessis 2012, p. 11). Given that
the Court and the ICC would occupy the same jurisdictional space, the fact
that the draft protocol is silent on the relationship between the Court and the
ICC is a challenge to the universal jurisdiction of the ICC (ibid., p. 10). The
protocol also includes a contested article that grants immunity to African
senior government officials.
16
Importantly, this conflict reflects a larger debate about ‘peace vs justice’
dilemmas in human rights governance (Dolidze 2011). There has been a
tendency to reduce the AU–ICC dispute to those either for or against account-
ability, even though the issues at stake have deep philosophical and historical
roots. With the non-cooperation position, the AU has challenged the object-
ivity of the ICC and its selective (anti-African) implementation of its mandate.
Notwithstanding, there are ongoing processes in line with African values and
relationalism to enhance accountability and to end gross human rights abuses
in Africa (Maru 2013; Forji 2013).
17
Ongoing initiatives seek to mend AU–ICC
relations, and in this regard, Mehari Maru advised African states to use a
relational approach—bloc voting—to instead reform and change the ICC’s
position in Africa (Maru 2013). Africa has a bloc advantage in the ICC, as just
over one-quarter (thirty-four) of the 122 states which are parties to the Rome
Statute are member states of the AU. Generally, little has so far been written on
relational-inspired ways to support an understanding of an African approach
to human rights (for an exception, see Murithi 2013).
Embedded in the AU’s argument is the reference to a value of collective
decision-making and participation by local, national, and regional agents for
16
Non-state actors have argued that the immunity article goes against the founding principles of
the AU, and most clearly the AU Charter Article 4(o) which sets out that the AU must respect the
sanctity of human life and condemn and reject impunity. In addition, it seems to strip the proposed
Court of its integrity and ability to reach its mandate.
17
Taking a critical position towards the AU stance, Alex Obote-Odora argues that the AU is
becoming a tool in the hands of authoritarian African leaders who wish to protect each other’s
power positions against the global drive toward accountability (Obote-Odora 2013).
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seeking justice. The literature on peace-building often argues that local
and cultural approaches to seeking peace and justice cannot be sidelined
or neglected if indeed the objective is stability, the rule of law, and nation-
building in order to prevent large-scale human rights abuses from occurring
again (Villa-Vicencio 2009). Villa-Vicencio argues that national criminal
jurisdictions as well as traditional African reconciliation structures have a
community-based acceptance and richness in ideas and values that should
be affirmed and, where relevant and necessary, adapted to meet the demands
of international law (meaning, some flexibility within the framework of
universalism).
18
Relational ideas that inform the human rights discourse on the continent
hold the potential for both good and bad; as they have the potential to
increase conflict and reconciliation simultaneously. It is difficult to see the
merits in the AU stance on non-cooperation with the ICC if it complicates the
search for accountability for mass atrocity crimes, and undermines the pros-
pects for the development of international justice, particularly on the African
continent. The refusal by some countries to place themselves under the
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute means, according to African governments,
that the ICC will fall short of being a genuinely international court, as Murithi
(2013, p.7) has pointed out.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we argued that a relational perspective underpins the policies
of African states with regard to global governance. In this context, the capacity
to steer society, or govern, is the responsibility of the entire community and
not the responsibility of a select few. This collectivist-driven conception of
global governance is reflected in the way that African states seek to exercise
their agency on global issues and in the global system. The relational idea adds
another dimension to the atomistic and rationalistic ideas embedded in con-
ventional narratives of global governance.
We have tried to show that this alternative conception of governance, in
which group membership trumps most consideration, is embedded in the
African international subsystem. The relational traits shaped African govern-
ments’attitude towards global issues in many ways, including encouraging
them to prioritize group preferences, making them adopt consensual and block
decision-making procedures, and influencing them to seek group harmony
18
Importantly, he makes the case for a distinction between blood crimes and less serious forms
of crime, recognizing that traditional courts rarely have the competency to deal with the former,
especially not where mass killings and genocide are involved (Villa-Vicencio 2009).
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and solidarity. The relational governance approach has led to the creation
of novel regional security institutions which make many other regional
organizations, and even the UN, appear conservative. Unlike other conti-
nental organizations, the AU has adopted a conditional sovereignty concept
which represents a challenge to the Westphalian sovereignty model. This
reformulation of sovereignty has provided the basis for AU members to
think about global issues different from the conventional conception of
global governance.
The adoption of a relational approach to governance has allowed the Union
to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state with or without the
consent of the target country. The AU has exercised its power of intervention
in different ways in countries such as Comoros Islands, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali,
Mauritania, and Kenya. Similarly, it paved the way for the AU to accept major
elements of the R2P framework. Indeed, many governments in Africa consider
the creation of AU peace and security institutions a critical juncture in the
development and conceptualization of R2P principles at the global level. The
acceptance of R2P ideas by the AU opened the gate for the Pan-African
organization to develop the full spectrum of new peacemaking measures.
The new security tools have put the Union in a position where it is, in
practical terms, sharing with the UN the primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of peace and security in Africa. The AU is insisting on a reopening of
the principles and legal articles that have governed UN–regional relations. It
has argued that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter should be opened to novel
interpretations which reduce the paternalistic attitude by some major powers
towards regional organizations and their memberships. Specifically, the AU
wants powers and legal backing to: (i) seek the Security Council’s approval for
peacemaking activities, including military intervention, after the fact; (ii) to
seek to commit the Security Council to deploying peacekeepers after the AU’s
military intervention; (iii) to seek to commit the UN to pay for the bulk of its
peacemaking activities. These demands necessitated by the AU’s relational
approach to governance have created a wedge between the Union and the
UN system. The relational governance approach to human rights adopted by
the AU has also put the Union on a collision course with the ICC.
The discourse around shared African characteristics strengthens the AU’s
claims both towards the external environment and towards the national and
local spheres. The AU is in a sense developing a language and powerful
symbols with which to assume its place in global governance processes. This
takes on even more importance for an organization which comprises some of
the world’s weakest economies. It is simultaneously seeking to build legitimate
authority in the eyes of African publics and civil society. We have not in
this chapter sought to answer how far South–South coalitions, regionalism,
and African common positions can be said to enrich or challenge future
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opportunities for multilateralism. The AU is not calling for any ‘revolutionary’
rejection of multilateral channels, international law, or global governance
institutions. Rather, it is looking for ownership and authority within the
evolving world order. The AU’s symbolic position, in the midst of trans-
national and multidirectional interactions and dependencies, encourages it
to push for pragmatic political space.
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