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The Strategy of Conflict
... We use the analytical device of response curves in a repeated game to examine key aspects of deterrence relevant to modern conflict: escalation, de-escalation, incomplete deterrence, and deterrence by denial. Response curves (equivalently, reaction curves) draw on a rich literature in noncooperative game theory (Schelling 1960 and1966;Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). 1 ...
... We use the analytical device of response curves in a repeated game to examine key aspects of deterrence relevant to modern conflict: escalation, de-escalation, incomplete deterrence, and deterrence by denial. Response curves (equivalently, reaction curves) draw on a rich literature in noncooperative game theory (Schelling 1960 and1966;Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). 1 ...
... We don't take a strong stand on the underlying social welfare functions from which response curves might be derived. A response curve approach to analyzing episodes of conflict can encompass both rationalist and other explanations for conflict, such as leaders appeasing domestic audiences who might seek retribution (Fearon 1994), or conflict due to psychological biases or over-responses of combatants and decision-makers (Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985). 2 Much game-theoretic work focuses on a single crisis where the threat of conflict or escalation is greatly influenced by some unobserved characteristic of an opponent, which shapes 1 The idea of partial deterrence is developed in Freedman (2004). 2 Building on the original insights of Schelling (1960Schelling ( , 1966, Kahn (1960), Mearsheimer (1983) and Powell (1990), several formal game-theoretic models of deterrence have been proposed to tie up loose ends regarding complexities of credibility. Subsequent studies have yielded additional significant theoretical breakthroughs, providing rigorous game-theoretic foundations for analysis of current policy questions such as how to promote state building, or whether and how to militarily intervene to induce regime change (Fearon 1997 and2002;Powell 1999Powell , 2003Powell , 2012Myerson 2008;Baliga andSjöström 2009 andChassang andPadró i Miquel 2010). ...
We use response curves in a repeated game to analyze key aspects of mutual deterrence: escalation, de-escalation, incomplete deterrence, and deterrence by denial. In this approach, episodes of violence are due to interacting response curves, which disincentivize opponents from attacking through both deterrence and compellence. Both sides punish attacks to maintain credibility in future episodes, disincentivizing larger attacks and yielding nonviolent lulls. We empirically estimate those curves using detailed incident data from the Israel-Gaza conflict between 2007 and 2017. Our estimates match the dynamics of the raw data: very frequent episodes of low lethality violent exchange. Response curves are stable and probably Markovian. They exhibit a posture consistent with incomplete deterrence: i.e., episodes de-escalate, but to a violent equilibrium. Israeli missile defense shifts the Gazan response curve to a less aggressive posture, as predicted by theory.
... Yet Nobel Prize-winner Thomas Schelling famously observed that while such problems seem to defy a logical solution, people share surprisingly clear and consistent intuitions about a small set of "obvious" answers, with Grand Central Station at midday being the best. This ability to coordinate without communication is held to be critical for enabling behaviours ranging from passing without collision in corridors to the effective use of deterrence in armed conflict (Schelling, 1960). More broadly, the ability to identify what is mutually "salient" or "obvious" is also critical for negotiation, bargaining, and indeed for general verbal and non-verbal communication (e.g. ...
... This requirement that people have a good idea what one another are likely to be thinking has been widely noted (Chater et al., 2022;Clark, 1996;De Freitas et al., 2019;Schelling, 1960). For example, in Clark's classic analysis (Clark, 1996) the "common knowledge" that is necessary for communication not only includes basic facts (e.g. about prominent locations in New York) but also the tastes, values, and intuitions of communication partners, which may be founded on inferences from a wide range of contextual cues, including identity and community membership, history of prior interaction, and the current situation and objectives for the communication. ...
... Indeed, it has been noted that groups with different backgrounds or levels of experience may differ in their ability to coordinate even when they are capable of the necessary form of reasoning and share the necessary knowledge of basic facts (e.g. Camerer, 2003;Mehta et al., 1994a;Schelling, 1960). However, to our knowledge, this has never been directly investigated. ...
In pure coordination games, players seek to coordinate responses with one another without communicating. Without a logically correct response, success depends upon players intuiting a response that is mutually obvious. Previous work suggests that such coordination requires a distinctive form of thinking and sufficient mutual knowledge, but reveals little about the basis for the intuitive judgements themselves. Here, that question was addressed by examining the basis of coordination performance of groups whose intuitions might plausibly differ: children versus adults. In an initial and pre-registered study, two groups of children (4-to 5-year-olds, and 6-to 7-year-olds) and adults undertook four types of coordination game, and novel metrics allowed "intuitive alignment" in responses to be evaluated within-and between-groups. All groups performed above chance, and adults showed higher levels of alignment than children, but adults and children showed different patterns in their intuitions. Implications for intergenerational understanding and misunderstanding are discussed. ARTICLE HISTORY
... Here, we study two different approaches of game theory to network formations: Nash equilibrium game modelling and Neumann equilibrium for antagonistic two-player zero-sum games with mixed strategies. Game theory provided a natural framework for modeling of the trade-off between efficiency and stability for economical systems models (see [4] and references herein). However, such approach became very popular later for the formation of the architecture that connects the relay stations (RS) and their serving base station. ...
... Example 1. Two graphs for TPF (16,4) with 5 nodes are depicted on Fig. 1: a star and a perfect graph. Fig. 1a shows the partition graph which contains the internal node, (7,5,3,1) ≡ α, and four leaves, (6,6,4,0), (6,4,4,2), (8,4,2,2), (8,6,2,0). ...
... Example 1. Two graphs for TPF (16,4) with 5 nodes are depicted on Fig. 1: a star and a perfect graph. Fig. 1a shows the partition graph which contains the internal node, (7,5,3,1) ≡ α, and four leaves, (6,6,4,0), (6,4,4,2), (8,4,2,2), (8,6,2,0). Any star have minimized the social cost G(S) when cost of edge equals 3 3 of 10 unilaterally. ...
The basic challenges of this work are twofold: demonstrating the dependence between the functional and topological qualities of partition networks and finding the simplest—with respect to algorithmic complexity—network elements. The study of these problems is based on finding the solution to an appropriate antagonistic vertex game. The results of the numerical simulations of antagonistic partition games demonstrate that the winner’s graphs are “almost always” dense and hyperenergetic compared to the loser’s graphs. These observations reveal that successful evolutionary mechanisms can be realized, in principle, by the simplest objects (such as viruses).
... Despite holding the position as a nuclear power for merely four years, the ideological tensions that ensued gave way to what some scholars describe as the golden era of strategic studies. While several theorists, including Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn, made significant contributions to this field, Thomas Schelling's ideas have proven to be the most enduring in the literature (Schelling, 1960). ...
... In Schelling's view, military power and its ability to harm others constitute the basis of deterrence. While Schelling emphasized the importance of the ability to harm an opponent in military power, he argued that its true value lies in determining the opponent's reactions to avoid it (Schelling, 1960). According to Schelling, using force to inflict harm would be a strategic failure, but if the enemy perceives that violence can be anticipated and avoided through compromise, this violence then holds coercive value (Schelling, 1966 were at their highest, Lawrence Freedman notes that the harm Schelling described was not necessarily related to nuclear weapons (Freedman & Freedman, 2013). ...
... According to Schelling, leaders who lack decisiveness can enhance the credibility of their threats by surrendering some degree of control over the final outcome. He posited that engaging in a limited war could increase the possibility of an accidental escalation to an "all-out" conflict, therefore increasing the credibility of threatening to initiate an "allout" war (Schelling, 1960). Alternatively, the science of rational deterrence has proposed a machine similar in principle to a game of Russian roulette, which would trigger an all-out nuclear conflict with a probability set by the user. ...
In the era of global Great Powers, it may prove to be more expensive for nations to either participate in conflict or cooperate. Nevertheless, deterrence becomes a significant point of reference for nations desiring to avoid war while also influencing the decisions and behaviors of their rivals. Discouraging an adversary's willingness to fight is not only less expensive than actual warfare, but also provides greater prestige and credibility for safeguarding national interests. In order to communicate deterrence policies to the other side, states often resort to signaling. Sometimes these signals are explicit, sometimes partial and ambiguous. Signaling can also sometimes be exclusively harsh and sometimes cooperative. Signaling studies, which pertain to a multidisciplinary literature spanning international relations to political communication and psychology, are increasingly critical in debates on state behavior. This is not only due to their academic significance but also their practical utility for actors. This study will examine the historical progression of deterrence and current deterrence theories utilizing various types of deterrence. The next section will discuss the use of signaling as a means of deterrence, analyzing the types of signals and the motivation of states to communicate with their adversaries in order to achieve their objectives. Following this, the literature on signaling will be reinforced with significant examples from international politics. Lastly, this study will conclude by discussing the transformative processes of deterrence and signaling debates in the modern era, taking into account emerging trends.
... The game builds on the fact that the duelist may obtain a greater payoff by firing as late as possible, but then the loss, when the other duelist shoots first, becomes more likely. If both the duelists shoot simultaneously, the payoff of each of them is 0 [9], [10], [5], [17]. ...
... x y (17) is a single saddle point by (18) and situation ...
... situation (11) is never optimal for . Consider entry nn k for (22) corresponding to situation (17). If situation (17) is a saddle point, then, in the n -th row of matrix (7), inequalities j n y x (23) and ...
A finite zero-sum game defined on a subset of the unit square is considered. The game is a generalized progressive discrete silent duel, in which the kernel is skew-symmetric, and the players, referred to as duelists, have identical linear accuracy functions featured with an accuracy proportionality factor. As the duel starts, time moments of possible shooting become denser by a geometric progression. Apart from the duel beginning and end time moments, every following time moment is the partial sum of the respective geometric series. Due to the skew-symmetry, both the duelists have the same optimal strategies and the game optimal value is 0. If the accuracy factor is not less than 1, the duelist’s optimal strategy is the middle of the duel time span. If the factor is less than 1, the duel solution is not always a pure strategy saddle point. In a boundary case, when the accuracy factor is equal to the inverse numerator of the ratio that is the time moment preceding the duel end moment, the duel has four pure strategy saddle points which are of the mentioned time moments. For a trivial game, where the duelist possesses just one moment of possible shooting between the duel beginning and end moments, and the accuracy factor is 1, any pure strategy situation, not containing the duel beginning moment, is optimal.
... (25) R L R 1,1 -1,-1 L -1,-1 1,1 More generally, this example is a case of what might be termed action-oriented coordination, where actions are coordinated between agents if the interdependencies between those actions are managed by the agents in service of a common goal (Schelling 1960;Lewis 1969;Malone & Crowston 1994;Clark 1996). (This can be compared to a more Stalnakerean attitude-oriented coordination, where an attitude (e.g a belief) is coordinated between agents if the attitude 'agrees' for all of the agents, and it is commonly supposed by the agents that this is so (Thomason 1990).) ...
... The treatment of coordination in game theory (Schelling 1960;Lewis 1969) standardly involves a 'simultaneous' game, where the payoffs for the choices are considered all at once by both agents in advance. Of course, in the setting of linguistic discourse, it is a bit hard to make sense of a simultaneous game. ...
Questions are classically taken to be requests for information, while acknowledging a wide variety of ‘non-canonical’ questions that do not have this function (e.g. rhetorical questions, exam questions, etc). A standard current approach is to take the request-for-information view as an analytical starting point and then weaken it for the counterexamples. This paper proposes an alternative view of questioning that encompasses many of these counterexamples directly: to ask a question is to open coordination on the public resolution of an issue. This coordination-centric view, I argue, accounts for much of the landscape of both canonical and non-canonical questions, while generalizing much previous work related to Questions Under Discussion in discourse.
... Who are key decision-makers, and what motivates them? Answering these questions allows leaders to develop targeted strategies influencing opposing system trajectory, not necessarily through direct confrontation but through subtle, indirect methods exploiting vulnerabilities and amplifying internal tensions (Sun Tzu, 5th century BC; Schelling, 1960). ...
Within the Komsomol lies not merely historical curiosity but a revelatory blueprint of anti-Western social architecture that continues to threaten liberal democracy and market systems from within. This analysis unveils how this sophisticated ideological structure has evolved across diverse contexts-most insidiously within institutions meant to safeguard Western values themselves. The work reveals a framework designed to exploit open societies' inherent vulnerabilities by transforming democratic strengths into weaknesses: individual autonomy into isolation, pluralism into fragmentation, tolerance into relativism, and market competition into inequality narratives. Empirical evidence demonstrates this infiltration's progression across educational systems and corporate environments, where collectivist frameworks increasingly displace merit-based advancement and free exchange principles.
... When players arrive at the incomplete margin of an institution in an awkward moment, they are in the classic situation described by Schelling (1960). The players do not have common knowledge but might have a wider context to generate behavioural beliefs out of a focal point. ...
We propose a framework for institutional change in the ‘rules-in-equilibrium’ tradition and introduce the term institutional incompleteness. Institutions are incomplete when their constituent rules fail to induce behavioural beliefs about the strategies of others and hence fail to achieve an equilibrium. Even with deliberate preparation ex-ante, there will always be unanticipated situations not covered by the rules that can only be settled ex-post, especially in a complex and changing environment. At this crux, people creatively invoke focal point generating ideas . Ideas act as guides for coordination where rules cannot. If no focal points can form, further institutional collapse occurs. To understand which ideas guide better, economists will have to investigate an idea’s content. Our theory offers a way to look at institutional change due to incompleteness while also allowing the requisite room for ideas in explaining the patterned yet indeterminate trajectory of humanity.
... Schelling proposed that members of the same ethnic group share common expectations, which he termed as a "focal point." Therefore, due to this shared focal point, it is easier for instrumentalist elites to mobilize ethnic groups for their purposes (Schelling, 1963). ...
It's ironic that East Bengal, the region with the majority population, found itself striving for autonomy and eventual separation from the region with the minority population. Scholars have extensively studied this movement for autonomy and separation. However, these studies often lack proper contextualization within a nation-state framework that sensitises ethnic groups regarding their share of power. Since ethnic consciousness is inherently subjective, this study aims to understand the evolution of the movement from the perspective of Bengali intelligentsia and political activists involved in the movement. Therefore, an empathetic inquiry has been employed in this study. It is argued that the continual decline in East Pakistan's share of power fueled sentiments of autonomy and separation among its populace. Consequently, there existed a negative correlation between the diminishing share of power and the growing public commitment to a distinct Bengali identity in the case of East Bengal. In conclusion, the movement evolved from cultural expression, followed by economic rationalization, and escalated to its political manifestation through mass mobilization and ultimately led to civil war because of denial of due share in power through electoral means.
... The coordination problem is not easy to solve. As the equilibria in pure strategies cannot be Pareto-ranked or ordered in terms of risk-dominance, no particular pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can be singled out as being most salient (Schelling, 1960). Hence, without pre-play communication, players do not have enough information to implement a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (cf. ...
This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ markedly from the learning models commonly used in economics. We relate the learning model from the minority game literature to standard game-theoretic learning models, and show that in fact it shares many features with these models. However, the predictions of the learning model differ considerably from the predictions of most other learning models. We discuss the main predictions of the learning model proposed in the minority game literature, and compare these to experimental findings on congestion games.
... У випадку інформаційної безпеки це означає, що держава повинна бути готовою до безперервного вдосконалення своїх методів захисту, а також до постійного моніторингу та аналізу нових загроз. Стратегія безпеки повинна бути постійно-нескінченною, оскільки загрози невпинно еволюціонують, а відповідь на них повинна бути адекватною та своєчасною [2]. ...
... Por consiguiente, sí es posible conocer aquellas propiedades objetivas de un objeto que, aun siendo inútil, influyen en su funcionalidad como dinero y, en la medida en que los demás agentes económicos sean conscientes de esas propiedades objetivas, sean a su vez conscientes de que los otros agentes son conscientes de las mismas y sean finalmente conscientes de que cada uno de los otros agentes también son conscientes de que los demás son conscientes de las mismas (expectativas convergentes), un objeto que no sea un bien económico en t=-1 podrá ser demandado en t=0 para actuar como dinero entre t=1 y t=5 partiendo de aquellas propiedades objetivas que lo vuelven diferencialmente apto para proporcionar servicios de liquidez a su tenedor. En tal caso, podríamos decir que las propiedades objetivas de esa cosa constituyen el punto focal (Schelling 1960, 57) alrededor de la cual convergen las expectativas monetarias de los agentes. ...
En este artículo respondemos a la réplica de Joel Serrano (2022a) contra las críticas que previamente habíamos dirigido al teorema regresivo de Mises (Rallo 2019).
... To coordinate behavior, there are therefore several solutions and to formalize this, Lewis mobilizes the coordination games of Thomas Schelling (1960) characterized by the existence of several equilibria. Lewis' first example is the meeting game between two individuals (without a cell phone at the time), which is the archetype of the coordination problems analyzed by Schelling. ...
... Moreover, a common feature of most of analyzed sources is simplification of considered, negotiated issues to delivery terms and prices, without taking into consideration other aspects of cooperation as joint investments in cooperation, joint improvement of parties. Therefore, an original, author's approach to strategies of multiparty negotiations is presented, based on classic works, discussing negotiation strategies in general, such as [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. ...
... Gintis (2009) now calls for game theory to drop mi. "Structural Individualism" as proposed by Elster (2007) and Demeulenaere (2011) ical and political puzzles, from democracy (Downs 1957;Buchanan and Tullock 1962), to collective action (Olson 1965), marriage, family, addiction, discrimination (Becker [1957(Becker [ ] 1971(Becker [ , 1976(Becker [ , 1981, segregation (Schelling 1978), war (Schelling 1960(Schelling , 1966Fearon 1995;Wagner 2000;Powell 2002Powell , 2006, and group conflict (e.g., Hardin 1996;Fearon and Laitin 1997). Stripped to the bare bone, all these authors strive to explain social outcomes by explaining individuals' actions with "rational" maximization of utilities alone. ...
Idea, action, and outcome are identified as the three key objects of social sciences and are also explained as the key tasks of social sciences. Our failure to grasp the ontological differences between these three objects is shown and the fact that explaining them may require different epistemological stands and methodological tools has been a key cause of the sterility of many epistemological and methodological debates. Explicitly differentiating the three objects and understanding that an explanation is required for these different stands and tools therefore provides us with a better picture of the empirical challenges of social sciences and paves the way toward more scientific progress. This discussion also holds important pedagogical value.
... More precisely, we add (Section 2) to a generic macroeconomic game an ex ante stage in which the government first commits to a reaction function that specifies policy responses as a function of every possible private sector's aggregate action, following Schelling (1960) and, more recently, Bassetto (2005). Then the private sector is competitive, that is, each private agent optimizes given the expectation of what other agents do and the government's future response. ...
The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self‐fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static macroeconomic games, the government can obtain a unique equilibrium with any low level of commitment ability. We finally derive implications for models of bailouts and capital taxation.
... Ellsberg's perspective at RAND is reflected in a series of studies on conflict and bargaining, including an analysis of the deterrence policy a superpower can enforce to prevent 'attack' from becoming a dominant strategy for the opponent (Ellsberg 1959). The approach was not to use abstract game-theoretic notions, and he focused more on decision processes than on equilibrium outcomes, much like Schelling (1960). The informational conundrum that military decision-makers are plunged into when acting in a real strategic context analyzed in one of these papers (Ellsberg 1961b) is quoted by Ellsberg in the thesis as an obvious example of uncertainty that cannot be dealt with as if risk. ...
Daniel Ellsberg was a multifaced personality who belonged to multiple worlds: academia, the military, and, in the second part of his life, political activism. This essay reviews Ellsberg’s analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, which has been highly influential in economics and reflects his diverse experiences.
... Thus, economists have developed methods designed to elicit normative beliefs directly, and the idea of norm uniqueness has guided the design of these measurement techniques (Nosenzo & Görges, 2020). Krupka and Weber (2013) elicit individual normative beliefs by asking participants to play a "pure matching" coordination game (Mehta et al., 1994;Schelling, 1960) in which their goal is to anticipate the extent to which others in their group will rate an action as socially appropriate or inappropriate, and to respond accordingly. The incentives do not reward participants for revealing their own views, but instead reward them for matching their appropriateness ratings with other participants in the experiment. ...
Norm-based accounts of social behavior in economics typically reflect tradeoffs between maximization of own consumption utility and conformity to social norms. Theories of norm-following tend to assume that there exists a single, stable, commonly known injunctive social norm for a given choice setting and that each person has a stable propensity to follow social norms. We collect panel data on 1468 participants aged 11–15 years in Belfast, Northern Ireland and Bogotá, Colombia in which we measure norms for the dictator game and norm-following propensity twice at 10 weeks apart. We test these basic assumptions and find that norm-following propensity is stable, on average, but reported norms show evidence of change. We find that individual-level variation in reported norms between people and within people across time has interpretable structure using a series of latent transition analyses (LTA) which extend latent class models to a panel setting. The best fitting model includes five latent classes corresponding to five sets of normative beliefs that can be interpreted in terms of what respondents view as “appropriate” (e.g. equality vs. generosity) and how they view deviations (e.g. deontological vs. consequentialist). We also show that a major predictor of changing latent classes over time comes from dissimilarity to others in one’s network. Our application of LTA demonstrates how researchers can engage with heterogeneity in normative perceptions by identifying latent classes of beliefs and deepening understanding of the extent to which norms are shared, stable, and can be predicted to change. Finally, we contribute to the nascent experimental literature on the economic behavior of children and adolescents.
... We consider three distinct mechanisms that could explain leaders' relative authority over different activities. In general, authority may be derived from (a) the power to sanction (Machiavelli, 1532;Parsons, 1963); (b) the ability to coordinate behavior in the community (Chwe, 1999;Schelling, 1980); or (c) beliefs about the duty to obey, that is, legitimacy (Levi, 1988;Tyler, 2006). In the first case, leaders' authority stems from their ability to use positive or negative inducements to get citizens to do things they would otherwise not want to do (Mares & Young, 2016); leaders may directly dole out sanctions or organize other community members to distribute sanctions. ...
Scholars increasingly recognize the plurality of leaders who exercise de facto authority in governing communities. But what limits different leaders’ power to organize distinct types of collective action beyond the law? We contend that leaders’ influence varies by activity, depending on the degree to which the activity matches the leaders’ geographic scope and field of expertise (“domain congruence”). Employing conjoint endorsement experiments in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, we test whether domain congruence predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with leader requests across different activities and examine the mechanisms that explain its importance. We find limits on leaders’ authority, that the concept of domain congruence helps predict the activities over which leaders have the greatest influence, and that leaders’ domain legitimacy may underpin the relationship between domain congruence and authority.
... We analyse the conditions under which a norm prescribing the signalling of group identity can emerge to facilitate parochial cooperation. Combining our model with existing work that evaluates how groups coordinate on a specific signal among the multitude of potential candidates could help understand signalling norm emergence more generally [5,[57][58][59][60][61]. To gain a more realistic understanding of how large numbers of group members come to recognize a specific signal as a reliable marker of group identity, future work could allow agents to choose their partners based on displayed signals or consider the possibility that certain individuals can send signals at a lower cost, kick-starting their recognition in the population [33,57]. ...
Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practises or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup ‘friends' and outgroup ‘foes', facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes—albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Social norm change: drivers and consequences’.
In everyday life, we frequently make coarse-grained judgments. When we say that Olivia and Noah excel in mathematics, we disregard the specific differences in their mathematical abilities. Similarly, when we claim that a particular automobile manufacturer produces high-quality cars, we overlook the minor variations among individual vehicles. These coarse-grained assessments are distinct from erroneous or deceptive judgments, such as those resulting from student cheating or false advertising by corporations. Despite the prevalence of such judgments, little attention has been given to their underlying mathematical structure. In this paper, we introduce the concept of coarse-graining into game theory, analyzing games in which players may perceive different payoffs as identical while preserving the underlying order structure. This framework allows us to examine the rational inference processes that arise when players equate distinct micro-level payoffs at a macro level, and to explore how Nash equilibria are preserved or altered as a result. Our key findings suggest that coarse-grained games possess several desirable properties that make them suitable for modeling phenomena in the social sciences. This paper demonstrates two such applications: first, in cases of overly minor product updates, consumers may encounter an equilibrium selection problem, resulting in market behavior that is not driven by objective quality differences; second, the lemon market can be analyzed not only through objective information asymmetry but also through asymmetries in perceptual resolution or recognition ability.
War Termination (WT) can occur through negotiations while the war is still ongoing. The situation of WT in a conflict between a great power and a regional power in a limited war is especially interesting. In such cases, WT through negotiations cannot easily end with a win-lose scenario, even if the regional power holds an advantage on the battlefield. To support this thesis, the authors investigated WT in the Russo-Japanese War and sought to answer whether Japan, as a regional power, could have obtained a more advantageous peace from the conflict against the great power Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, following its successes on the battlefield. Finally, the authors draw conclusions regarding the possible WT of the Russo-Ukrainian War in Europe.
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including all-but-one, are fully efficient. (JEL C78, D71, D72, F53)
In research on the Middle East, there is a tendency and preponderance for studies of interstate wars that have plagued the region for decades. Having said that, in recent times, with the accelerated process of technological development and the impact of the relationship between science and war, confrontations have been acquiring new elements, without moving away from the clausewitzian maxim that war is the continuation of politics with the mixture of other ways. Therefore, nowadays, rapid scientific progress, with emphasis on cybernetic issues, presents crucial components for achieving the military and political objectives underway in a war. In this sense, this research proposes to answer the following question: can the Stuxnet case be characterized as an act of war, according to Clausewitz’s perception? Thus, it is based on the clausewitzian understanding that war is a political act, with the aim of disarming the opponent and imposing their will. Based on this, this article observes and analyzes how the development of this worm is constituted and applied, being able to understand whether it constitutes an occurrence of an act of war. The hypothesis developed, which is intended to be corroborated, presents that Stuxnet can be characterized as an act of war, taking into account that it was a political act with the intention of forcing its purpose on the opponent. The results reveal a contemporary approach, without ignoring the contributions of the past, by highlighting this relationship between war and cyber technology. Based on this panorama, the work consists of a discussion with a single case study, in the area of Military Sciences, aiming to work with the Stuxnet episode that had Iran as its main target, in the early 2010s.
Massive intergroup violence such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to inflict devastating harm to individuals and societies. Civil societies generally do not need to remain inactive and can support peace processes even in severely escalated, apparently unsolvable intergroup conflicts. However, such engagement is delicate, and the exact conditions that make such commitment possible and effective in ‘classic’ interstate war settings remain unclear. Herbert C. Kelman (1927–2022), a social psychologist at Harvard University, developed seminal approaches of unofficial ‘Track Two’ diplomacy and problem-solving, mainly in the Israeli-Palestinian intergroup conflict. Using metatheory and critical hermeneutics, we suggest its current updated form is the conceptual enhancement from inter-group to complex intra/inter-national settings. Therefore, Track Two approaches can be valuable in the Russia/Ukraine setting. The paper outlines initial efforts of ongoing facilitated dialogue, unilateral on both sides and inter-coordinational between , offering inroads in an interstate context where conflict transformation is desperately needed.
In this chapter, different types of international environmental problems are analyzed from the perspective of elementary game theory. For the case of reciprocal environmental spillovers, as foremost climate change, the basic strategic interactions between countries that determine the outcome in the non-cooperative setting are described in a simple binary game model. It is shown that different game types may occur and how the type of the game may be transformed, e.g., through changing abatement costs or fairness motivations. Concerning the cooperation, it is explained how in repeated games international cooperation can be ensured over time by means of various threat strategies thus overcoming the stability problem of international environmental agreements between sovereign states. Finally, we describe—with a focus on global climate policy—how international cooperation works in reality and which factors are favorable for making international cooperation on environmental problems successful.
This paper sets out a simple model of political realism where a nation’s security is deemed primary and examines the actions of a hegemon in seeking to protect its hegemony. Contrary to the received view that the presence of a hegemon is beneficial to the world in promoting prosperity and peace, in the contemporary scenario in which there has been a unipolar hegemon in the last three decades, it is in the interest of the hegemon to stir up instability elsewhere. The presence of a military-industrial complex is shown to benefit the hegemon through this instability, even at the expense of its allies. First, it induces greater defense expenditures on the part of its allies, which the hegemon can free-ride on and, second, it earns profits for the hegemon from the sale of weapons to its allies. The validity of the theory is shown in the case of the Ukraine-Russia war, in which NATO (comprising the hegemon, United States, and its allies in the European Union) are pitted against Russia. The paper casts serious doubt on the neoliberal justification that NATO offers for its expansionary actions eastward in Europe.
ABSTRACT
Sabarimala Sree Ayyappan Temple, the temple dedicated to lord Ayyappa, has a long history of having banned women's entry into the temple – these are associated with many myths. In the past, women devotees of menstruating age were not permitted to enter inside the temple so as to protect the celibate nature of the deity. Many legends exist about the temple and according to one of them, when lord Ayyappa (an abandoned son born to Shiva) and Mohini (who was an incarnation of Vishnu) kill the demoness Mahushasuri, she turns into a beautiful woman and asks lord Ayyappa to marry her. He however refused the proposal saying that he is ordained to be in the forest as a brahmachari and answer prayers of devotees. When the woman persisted, he told her that he would marry her when there are no Kanni Swami’s (new devotees) to the temple. Since the temple witnesses new devotees every year, Mahushasuri could never marry him. She is now worshiped as goddess Malikappurthamma in the neighbourhood. Thus, to protect the celibate nature of lord Ayyappa women between 10 years and 50 years were not allowed entry inside the temple.
Il dibattito recente sulla natura delle competenze organizzative ha dato ampio risalto alla nozione di routine, spingendo talora a una sostanziale assimilazione dei due concetti [Teece, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Wernefelt, 1984; Amit e Shoemaker, 1993; Teece, Pisano e Shuen, in stampa]. Questo capitolo si propone di offrire una presentazione del concetto di routine e delle principali discussioni riguardanti la sua natura, con una particolare attenzione a come tale concetto debba essere articolato per offrire una più adeguata rappresentazione delle competenze di una impresa. Le competenze consistono nella capacità di un'impresa di impiegare i propri assets, ossia alla capacità di attivare processi organizzativi per ricombinare le proprie risorse [Amit e Schoemaker, 1993:35]. La qualità, la miniaturizzazione, i sistemi di integrazione, le best practices sono spesso citati quali esempi di competenze dell'impresa. Le routine fanno riferimento alla parte automatica e abitudinaria del "saper fare" di una organizzazione, ovvero a quelle abilità che sono depositate in pratiche e comportamenti svolti in modo non problematico e con scarso o nullo ricorso alla deliberazione [Nelson e Winter 1982].
This research uses a behavioural game-theoretic paradigm to study the role of emotions in forming and preventing international conflict. We find that when two countries’ strengths mismatch their resource, one of the two sides is motivated to initiate a conflict. However, national-dignity-related emotions can reduce this motivation. This is because countries with emotional populace are more likely to retaliate, thus becoming less susceptible to provocation. Meanwhile, these countries’ leaders are more cautious in provoking other nations due to the fear of losing face from failed provocations. Consequently, long-term patriotic education can reduce international conflict by fostering these emotions.
Interacción de las grandes potencias en Asia Oriental (1): EEUU, la RPC e India Interacción de las grandes potencias en Asia Oriental (1): EEUU, la RPC e India Publicado originalmente en: Asia Oriental, la interdependencia como causa de conflicto Editado en septiembre de 2023 Resumen: El papel clave de Estados Unidos en la disputa sobre Taiwán es el mayor ejemplo de que la actuación de las potencias en Asia Oriental es esencial para la región, en primer lugar porque viene marcado por la geopolítica global de nuestros días: la rivalidad estratégica entre China y Estados Unidos. En la misma, los estadounidenses están apostando por las alianzas como el AUKUS, el Quad o el Marco Económico para el Indo-Pacífico. Una política adjunta a la superioridad tecnológica y militar que Estados Unidos aún mantiene sobre China. Por su parte, China propugna un nuevo orden internacional diferente del liberal surgido tras la II Guerra Mundial, con ideas e iniciativas que introducen nuevas narrativas en la comunidad internacional, en especial atractiva para los países del Sur Global, aunque se acompañe de problemas de deuda externa en el marco de las inversiones y préstamos de la Iniciativa de la Franja y Ruta de la Seda. India, una potencia tradicionalmente no alineada en la política de bloques y que ha estado orientada hacia su vecindario próximo, parece dispuesta a ser un actor relevante en la región, pero ¿conseguirá ser autónoma o se verá arrastrada por la rivalidad chino-norteamericana?
The present chapter is devoted to non-cooperative games, games in which players are not bound by prior agreements. If prior agreements are possible, they are included in the strategies available to the players. Concept of Nash equilibrium.
We study game-theoretic models of human evolution to analyze fundamentals of human nature. Rival-claimants games represent common situations in which animals can avoid conflict over valuable resources by mutually recognizing asymmetric claiming rights. Unlike social-dilemma games, rival-claimants games have multiple equilibria which create a rational role for communication, and so they may be good models for the role of language in human evolution. Many social animals avoid conflict by dominance rankings, but intelligence and language allow mutual recognition of more complex norms for determining political rank or economic ownership. Sophisticated forms of economic ownership could become more advantageous when bipedalism allowed adaptation of hands for manufacturing useful objects. Cultural norms for claiming rights could develop and persist across generations in communities where the young have an innate interest in learning from their elders about when one can appropriately claim desirable objects. Then competition across communities would favor cultures where claiming rights are earned by prosocial behavior, such as contributions to public goods. With the development of larger societies in which many local communities share a common culture, individuals would prefer to interact with strangers who identifiably share this culture, because shared cultural principles reduce risks of conflict in rival-claimants games.
How do leaders select their top-level foreign policy appointees? Through a formal model of the domestic and intragovernmental politics surrounding an international crisis, I investigate the trade-offs shaping leaders’ appointment strategies. In the model, a leader selects a foreign policy appointee, anticipating how the appointment will affect the advice he receives in the crisis, the electorate's evaluation of his performance, and ultimately the policies that he and his foreign counterparts pursue as a consequence. The analysis uncovers a fundamental tension in the leader's ability to use appointments to advance his core political and policy objectives of deterring foreign aggression, obtaining accurate advice, and maximizing domestic approval: any appointment that advances one of these objectives invariably comes at the cost of another, and the leader's appointment strategy must balance across these trade-offs. Analyzing cross-national appointment patterns to the offices of ministers of defense and foreign affairs, I find descriptive evidence consistent with the model's predictions: leaders from dovish parties are more than twice as likely as leaders from hawkish parties to select cross-partisan and politically independent appointees, and such appointments are less likely for leaders of either party as they approach re-election.
This chapter offers perspectives on protecting nuclear facilities and materials from external threats and how these approaches have evolved over time. The authors also identify new technologies and practices to mitigate threats to facilities and materials. Indian author Anil Kumar argues that physical protection systems must employ defense in depth and follow a graded approach, increasing or decreasing with the potential threat to various materials and systems. Kumar specifically focuses on the challenge of transporting nuclear and radiological materials safely. U.S. authors James McCue and Alan Evans describe the Design Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) process through which U.S. physical protection systems are constructed and discuss how it could be improved. They explain how the DEPO process applies to physical protection systems in ICBM launch facilities as well as to transportation scenarios.
In a dyadic game, strategic asymmetric dominance occurs when a player's preference for one strategy A relative to another B is systematically increased by the addition of a third strategy Z, strictly dominated by A but not by B. There are theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that this effect should decline over repetitions, and other grounds for believing, on the contrary, that it should persist. To investigate this question experimentally, 30 participant pairs played 50 rounds of one symmetric and two asymmetric 3 × 3 games each having one strategy strictly dominated by one other, and a control group played 2 × 2 versions of the same games with dominated strategies removed. The strategic asymmetric dominance effect was observed in the repeated-choice data: dominant strategies in the 3 × 3 versions were chosen more frequently than the corresponding strategies in the 2 × 2 versions. Time series analysis revealed a significant decline in the effect over repetitions in the symmetric game only. Supplementary verbal protocol analysis helped to clarify the players' reasoning and to explain the results.
Can international courts influence state policies and facilitate interstate cooperation? Existing literature argues that they can. Courts can make cooperative outcomes easier for states by formulating or endorsing rules around which state expectations and practice can converge. While it is widely assumed that court rulings may become focal points and play a role in harmonizing state practices, we know little about the conditions under which they have such an effect. We suggest that court rulings can often have an opposite, defocalizing effect, which may durably harm the prospects of convergence around what the law requires. We introduce defocalization as a process and discuss its possible types and implications. We argue that defocalization may be driven by incongruence of court rulings with existing treaty law and state practice and inconsistency of rulings over time. We illustrate our argument by examining the effect of key judicial rulings on the convergence of state views about the appropriate maritime delimitation rules by relying on an original dataset. Our findings show how defocalization unfolds and suggest that complexity can accumulate over time through legal rulings that are incongruent with existing state practice or treaty law, and can be maintained through inconsistent court decisions.
Recent theoretical work rationalizes evidence that many chief executive officers (CEOs) have biased levels of confidence. The main limitation of these studies is that they consider a limited number of modes of competition. The model in this paper allows the degree of competition to include the full spectrum of possibilities from perfect competition to perfect collusion. The results show that boards of directors (or owners) can benefit from hiring overconfident CEOs in a strategic setting when there is less competition and less product differentiation. The relatively large parameter space that supports this conclusion is consistent with the empirical evidence that many CEOs are overconfident. In addition, the relatively small parameter space that supports underconfidence is consistent with the fact that some CEOs are relatively cautious. From a policy perspective, the model suggests that society may be better off if boards of directors focus on the interests of a broad range of stakeholders, not just shareholders.
This commentary aims to discuss the article “Ordo-responsibility in the Sharing Economy: A Social Contracts Perspective” from a sympathetic viewpoint toward its implementation of a constitutional contractarian approach to business ethics and due consideration of digital platforms as institutions resulting from a social contract. Nevertheless, the commentary also wants to criticize the article’s interpretation of constitutional contractarian theory and institutional reconstruction of the phenomenon, and thus even the governance structure it is proposed for sharing platforms. The commentary presents another understanding of constitutional contractarianism, referring to both the ex ante agreement and the ex post compliance problem. Moreover, it reframes the history of the evolutionary process of institutions’ selection within the domain of the sharing economy consistently with the idea that the Internet should be framed as a common pool resource. In this way, the commentary suggests an alternative governance structure for sharing platforms, that is, platform cooperatives.
Negotiation is the core of diplomacy, and the various elements and aspects of diplomatic practice closely relate to the organization and conduct of negotiations. This article discusses the impact of diplomatic essentials – diplomacy’s basic features stemming from its idea, spirit, culture, traditions, and methods – on negotiating in diplomatic settings. Diplomats need to use these essentials to negotiate effectively. Therefore, in diplomacy, to be a good negotiator, one needs to be a good diplomat. By analyzing the negotiation implications of diplomatic representation, aspiration, groundwork, timing, intercourse, code of conduct, and language, I argue that the essential features of international diplomacy can be seen as important assets of the strategic management of diplomatic negotiation. In other words, diplomatic actors can have a significant impact on negotiation effectiveness by using and managing these seven diplomatic essentials.
Populist governments engage in “unpolitics” when the electoral incentives for doing so outweigh the distributive risks from policy failure. Studying the joint procurement of vaccines against Covid-19, I show that a group consisting of mostly populist governments led by Austria negotiated in bad faith, rejected compromise solutions, and obstructed joint problem-solving. They deployed these “unpolitical” tactics only once the legal framework for joint procurement was in place and the roll-out of the jointly ordered vaccines had begun. At this point, populist governments no longer faced the distributive risk of having limited access to affordable vaccines. By contrast, the electoral incentives for hard-nosed bargaining in bad faith increased, as the distributive issue of vaccine allocation became more salient and as populist governments came under pressure to deflect responsibility for having ordered insufficient vaccine doses.
There exists an ambiguous attitude in economic theory toward referring to the details of exchange mechanisms as a social system. To date, in classical theories, the main research target has been the exchange mechanism for commodities in general. Instead of studying the exchange of the broader social or community system, recently, much work has focused on auction mechanisms for particular goods in the context of experimental design. However, the advent of the community currency and crypto-currency suggests that we should study the feasibility and sustainability of the broader system. In this article we will focus on systems of exchange with auctioneers and without auctioneers. We then examine the properties of bilateral exchange between randomly selected traders without auctioneers and explore the resulting properties of iterations of such transactions. Finally, we mention special issues of cryptocurrency in the face of the Byzantine General Problem and discuss a well-coordinated distributed system involving digital tools such as blockchain.
This chapter examines major concepts in the study and does an in-depth analysis of the theories and issues in foreign policy and role conceptions in general and Nigeria’s foreign policy in particular. It attempts a comprehensive review of existing knowledge, identifies elements that are relevant to the book and highlights the gaps, which underline the importance of this current study as far as contribution to foreign policy analysis and expansion of knowledge are concerned.
p>As part of the experimental study, the change in the images of subjects (the image of oneself and the image of another) included in the conflict interaction was assessed; the relationship between the images of communicants and the level of their reflexivity was revealed. A wide range of methods were used in the work: “Diagnosis of the level of development of reflexivity (A.V. Karpov); scaling Petrovsky - Uvarina, "Who am I?" (M. Kuhn, T. McPartland (modified by T.V. Rumyantseva)). The study was conducted on the “Experiment for studying negotiations” setup (idea by V.A. Lefevre, modification by B.I. Khasan). After the experimental interaction, the participants of the study had significant changes in the assessment of personality traits in terms of "Communicative Self" (T= 2.246 at p≤0.025) were revealed. In subjects with a "low" level of reflexivity, a significant correlation was found between self-identification by a set of characteristics related to the "Active Self" and the perception of characteristics the other (opponent) (r = 0.523 at p≤0.05) In subjects with a "high" level of reflexivity, a significant inverse correlation was determined between the self-identification of the subjects according to the characteristics included in the indicator-component "Communicative Self" (r = - 0.668 at p ≤0.05). The data obtained indicate the existence of a connection between the level of formation of reflexivity, the construction of the image of oneself and the opponent in conflict interaction.</p
This study analyzes the North Korea, China, and Russia coalition amidst complex global crises like the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russia crisis, and the North Korean nuclear issue, using coordination games and problems as analytical tools. In the ‘New Cold War’ context, they identify a focal point, form coalitions, and coordinate strategies based on reactive anti-US policies and confrontations with coalitions involving ROK, the US, and Japan. However, differing perspectives on the ‘New Cold War’ and external factors leading to divergent focal points resulted in strategic uncertainty. Forming a stable grand coalition as an institution is challenging, and there is a risk of abandonment when forming a specific coalition based on interests. Moreover, the emergence of spoilers within the coalition breeds apprehension among other nations, rendering the coalition unsustainable. Consequently, the sustainability of the North Korea-China-Russia coalition diminishes, fostering ongoing non-cooperative behavior amidst a temporary phase of adhesion.
Scholars have long recognized that interpersonal networks play a role in mobilizing social movements. Yet, many questions remain. This Element addresses these questions by theorizing about three dimensions of ties: emotionally strong or weak, movement insider or outsider, and ingroup or cross-cleavage. The survey data on the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests show that weak and cross-cleavage ties among outsiders enabled the movement to evolve from a small provocation into a massive national mobilization. In particular, the authors find that Black people mobilized one another through social media and spurred their non-Black friends to protest by sharing their personal encounters with racism. These results depart from the established literature regarding the civil rights movement that emphasizes strong, movement-internal, and racially homogenous ties. The networks that mobilize appear to have changed in the social media era. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
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