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Realistic simulation and bizarreness in dream content: Past findings and suggestions for future research
... In general, hallucination model theorists appeal to the first-person testimony of dreamers to support their model. People tend to report having realistic, although often bizarre experiences that they thought were real at the time (Domhoff, 2007). Our discussion about the essential unfittingness of dream emotions in this model, thus, will be based on the inexistence of dreamed objects and the irrationality of our beliefs about their existence. ...
... We come to the same conclusion if we require the beliefs not only about the object of the emotion but about the whole evoking scenario to be rational for the emotion to be fitting. In this sense, dream emotions would be unfitting since dreamers can be considered to lack rationality in not realizing that they are in fact dreaming (Domhoff, 2007;Rosen, 2018). A counter-example is lucid dreams, dreams in which the dreamer realizes they are dreaming (LaBerge, 1981(LaBerge, , 1992, but these dreams are quite rare (Saunders et al., 2016). ...
... On waking up later, I checked my phone again to see the details, but on discovering that I had received no messages, I realised that the previous episode was a false awakening (personal dream report, 2009). Similar to the previous example, many dreams are "mundane" -wakelike scenarios that do not necessarily differ from normal waking experiences (Domhoff, 2007;Rosen, 2018). It is not clear that failing to realize that one is dreaming in such circumstances is necessarily irrational given the lack of bizarreness. ...
When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be “essentially unfitting”, that is, always inappropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate dream emotions for fittingness may depend on the model of dreams we adopt: the imagination or the hallucination model. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie plausible that dream emotions could fail to fit under the imagination model because it is unfitting to have an emotion toward an object we do not believe to be real. Under the hallucination model, dream emotions could be unfitting because their objects do not exist but we believe them to be real. More nuance, however, is required. By comparing dream emotions with the emotions we experience while imagining, engaging with fiction, and hallucinating, we conclude that although there are compelling arguments in support of the claim that dream emotions are essentially unfitting, these arguments are not entirely convincing, and it is more plausible that particular dream emotions can be assessed for fittingness under either model of dreaming.
... Threat simulations appear in a paradigmatic and powerful form especially in nightmares, bad dreams, and post-traumatic dreams, but are also abundant in many other types of dreams such as everyday dreams, recurrent dreams, and in various parasomnias such as RBD (REM-Sleep Behaviour Disorder). Domhoff (2007), who represents a similar psychological and content-analysis approach to dream research as Foulkes (1985), also characterizes dreams as mostly realistic and reasonable simulations of waking life. By emphasizing that, according to convincing empirical data from content-analysis studies of dreams, dream simulations are mostly realistic rather than overly bizarre and hyperemotional, Domhoff argues against the Hobsonian definition of dreaming as being full of bizarre contents. ...
... The minimal criterion for a dream to count as a social simulation is that the Dream Self is not alone in the dream but in the presence of at least some other animate character or characters. In less than 5% of dreams is the dreamer alone (Domhoff 1996); thus, on this minimal criterion, dreaming seems to consist-ently simulate social reality. The other animate characters simulated in dreams are predominantly human (normative finding in adults is about 95% human, 5% animal), but the proportion of animal characters varies in different cultures and age groups, being highest (up to 30-40%) in young children and in adults in huntergatherer societies (Domhoff 1996;Revonsuo 2000). ...
... In less than 5% of dreams is the dreamer alone (Domhoff 1996); thus, on this minimal criterion, dreaming seems to consist-ently simulate social reality. The other animate characters simulated in dreams are predominantly human (normative finding in adults is about 95% human, 5% animal), but the proportion of animal characters varies in different cultures and age groups, being highest (up to 30-40%) in young children and in adults in huntergatherer societies (Domhoff 1996;Revonsuo 2000). As human characters are reported in almost all dreams, and typically there are two to four non-self characters in a dream (Nielsen & Lara-Carrasco 2007), the presence of simulated human characters must be perceptually detected and registered in the dream by the dreamer. ...
A unique interdisciplinary collection of papers and commentaries by leading researchers and rising scholars, representing the latest research on consciousness, mind, and brain. This collection offers the most comprehensive collection on consciousness, brain, and mind available. It gathers 39 original papers by leaders in the field followed by commentaries written by emerging scholars and replies by the original paper's authors. Taken together, the papers, commentaries, and replies provide a cross-section of cutting-edge research in philosophy and cognitive science. Open MIND is an experiment in both interdisciplinary and intergenerational scholarship.
Open MIND grows out of the MIND Group, an independent, international body of young philosophers and scientists with a strong interest in the mind, consciousness, and cognition. The original and supporting materials are available online at open-mind.net.
Authors includeMichael L. Anderson, Andreas Bartels, Tim Bayne, Christian Beyer, Ned Block, Paul M. Churchland, Andy Clark, Carl S. Craver, Holk Cruse, Daniel C. Dennett, Jérôme Dokic, Chris Eliasmith, Kathinka Evers, Vittorio Gallese, Philip Gerrans, Rick Grush, John-Dylan Haynes, Heiko Hecht, J. Allan Hobson, Jakob Hohwy, Pierre Jacob, J. Scott Jordan, Victor Lamme, Bigna Lenggenhager, Caleb Liang, Richard Menary, Albert Newen, Alva Noë, Gerard O'Brien, Elisabeth Pacherie, Jesse Prinz, Joëlle Proust, Antti Revonsuo, Adina Roskies, Jonathan Schooler, Anil K. Seth, Wolf Singer, Evan Thompson, Ursula Voss, Kenneth Williford
... I then show, in section 3, how focusing on the dynamics and movement of thought during wakefulness suggests that bizarreness emerges from mechanisms that underlie spontaneous cognition independently of their occurrence in sleep or wakefulness. Much of the bizarreness we experience during dreaming is caused by the same mechanisms that result in frequent topic shifts and strange combinations in waking mind wandering (Domhoff, 2007(Domhoff, , 2017Klinger, 2012;Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). I also discuss possible benefits and functions of these discontinuities. 1 By integrating dreaming and mind wandering research, I propose an overarching framework of bizarreness in spontaneous cognition that casts doubt upon the frequent assumption that bizarreness in dreaming is indicative of cognitive deficiency. ...
... Like other continuity theories, Domhoff's neurocognitive account is not explicitly focused on explaining formal dream characteristics such as bizarreness. However, he considers content studies of dreams and illustrates that dreams are far less bizarre than commonly assumed (Domhoff, 2007). When bizarreness does occur, it results from either impaired cognitive functioning or figurative thinking (Domhoff, 2007). ...
... However, he considers content studies of dreams and illustrates that dreams are far less bizarre than commonly assumed (Domhoff, 2007). When bizarreness does occur, it results from either impaired cognitive functioning or figurative thinking (Domhoff, 2007). Thus, the neurocognitive theory of dreaming regards dreaming as structured in a lawful manner and considers bizarreness the exception (Domhoff, 2007(Domhoff, , 2019b. ...
Although we are beginning to understand the neurocognitive processes that underlie the emergence of dreaming, what accounts for the bizarre phenomenology of dreams remains debated. I address this question by comparing dreaming with waking mind wandering and challenging previous accounts that utilize bizarreness to mark a sharp divide between conscious experiences in waking and sleeping. Instead, I propose that bizarreness is a common, non-deficient feature of spontaneous offline simulations occurring across the sleep-wake cycle and can be tied to the specific characteristics of spontaneous thought as being dynamic, unconstrained, (hyper)associative, and highly variable in content. Rather than misrepresenting waking reality, bizarreness can be employed to investigate the very building blocks of spontaneous cognition. The absence of bizarreness in thought processes is imposed by automatic and deliberate cognitive constraints. By contrast, thought and memory processes operating on their own without such constraints are inherently marked by different degrees and types of bizarreness.
... Contrary to these assertions, the publications on the neurocognitive theory that are cited in the critique say distorted characters in dreams are very rare and that figurative thinking seems to be infrequent at best and therefore remains an unlikely hypothesis. Further, the continuity between dreaming and waking thought in the neurocognitive theory does not involve the frequency of waking events; instead, it is based on "personal concerns," which are simulated during waking thought and enacted or dramatized during dreaming through the process of "embodied simulation" (Domhoff, 2003(Domhoff, , 2007(Domhoff, , 2017Domhoff & Schneider, 2018). This reply stresses that theoretical differences are legitimate and to be expected, and not at issue. ...
... Professor Mageo (2019, p. 374) wrote that I "admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features," an assertion that is based on a citation to a chapter on realistic simulation and bizarreness in dreams; the citation to this chapter also includes a citation to the work of three activation-synthesis theorists (Kahn, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002). In effect, the neurocognitive theory is said to be similar to theirs, which is the opposite of what is claimed in the cited chapter (Domhoff, 2007). Contrary to her conclusion, the cited chapter summarizes an excellent lab study that shows how rare bizarreness is in dreams, including in the case of characters. ...
... With their glitter of seeming insight and the accompanying feelings of enrichment and closure, metaphoric interpretations deceive interpreters and dreamers alike" (Domhoff, 2003, p. 37). Similarly, the later discussion of this issue that is cited (Domhoff, 2007) focused on the rarity of likely figurative elements in dreams. ...
In an article claiming that a mimetic theory of dreaming (with mimesis defined as “image-based, visual thinking”) is superior to the neurocognitive theory of dreams, 4 assertions are attributed to me that I did not make. The article states that I “admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features,” claim there is a considerable amount of figurative thinking in dreams, and believe that “How frequently an event occurs in waking life, according to the continuity hypothesis (CH), can predict the frequency of a similar dream event; the frequency of waking concerns and thoughts is predictive of subsequent dream content” (Mageo, 2019, pp. 371–372). Contrary to these assertions, the publications on the neurocognitive theory that are cited in the critique say distorted characters in dreams are very rare and that figurative thinking seems to be infrequent at best and therefore remains an unlikely hypothesis. Further, the continuity between dreaming and waking thought in the neurocognitive theory does not involve the frequency of waking events; instead, it is based on “personal concerns,” which are simulated during waking thought and enacted or dramatized during dreaming through the process of “embodied simulation” (Domhoff, 2003, 2007, 2017; Domhoff & Schneider, 2018). This reply stresses that theoretical differences are legitimate and to be expected, and not at issue. However, it is also legitimate to point out inaccurate characterizations of empirical conclusions and explanatory concepts, which may lead to misperceptions of the neurocognitive theory of dreams and to a blurring of distinctions among theories.
... I argue, however, that not all dreams involve bizarre beliefs. Mundane dreams are more common than fantastical ones (Colace 2012;Domhoff 2007). False awakenings, for example, in which I believe I have woken up despite still dreaming, would not necessarily contradict any waking beliefs. ...
... Would we even need to move our eyes to generate such a hallucination? Dream reports do not support dreaming as static, or necessarily vague (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018a), although the dreams of young children are more visually simplistic (Colace 2010;Foulkes 1999). Neither are dreams necessarily unstable or bizarre (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018b). ...
... Dream reports do not support dreaming as static, or necessarily vague (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018a), although the dreams of young children are more visually simplistic (Colace 2010;Foulkes 1999). Neither are dreams necessarily unstable or bizarre (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018b). Setting these alternatives aside, I discuss how visual direction constancy may occur in dreams. ...
Our eyes, bodies, and perspectives are constantly shifting as we observe the world. Despite this, we are very good at distinguishing between self-caused visual changes and changes in the environment: the world appears mostly stable despite our visual field moving around. This, it seems, also occurs when we are dreaming. As we visually investigate the dream environment, we track moving objects with our dream eyes, examine objects, and shift focus. These movements, research suggests, are reflected in the rapid movements or saccades of our sleeping eyes. Do we really see the dream world in the same way that we see the real world? If we do, how could dreaming, usually assumed to be mind-generated hallucinations, replicate such an experience? This problem would be deflated if dreams are not hallucinations at all, but rather imagination, illusion or simply unrealistic. I argue that imagination and illusion views do not satisfactorily explain away the problem of vision and action in sleep. The imagination model is not a complete description of dreaming that is consistent with empirical research, and it is unlikely that the visual dream world is an illusion. Given that the dreaming visual experience is most likely active, hallucinatory, and at times a realistic world simulation, there are important implications for our understanding of visual perception and its relationship to movement. Evidence suggests that our dream eyes investigate the dream world as our waking eyes investigate the waking world. If changes to the unconsciously generated dream environment are perceived as external and unintentional while dream body movements are perceived as self-generated and intentional, current theory of visual perception may have to be expanded to account for how the dreaming mind generates a stable world in which we track and visually explore mind-generated objects.
... In virtually all wisdom traditions, dreams are invoked as an important source of revelation or prophecy (Paulson et al., 2017). But, in addition to some dreams appearing emotionally overwhelming, some dreams are less exciting (Domhoff, 2007). ...
... For a review of electroencephalographic, neuroimaging, brain injury, pharmacological, and brain stimulation studies in the field of lucid dreaming, see Baird et al. (2019). New approaches to stimulus control are needed (Bulkeley, 2017;Domhoff, 2007Domhoff, , 2022Dresler et al., 2011;Scarpelli et al., 2022). ...
Compared to ordinary memories, dream memories still have something mysterious about them and invite interpretation. The aim of this study was the simple but fundamental question whether this (perceived, presumed) emotional–mental specificity of dream memories is associated with something specific at the level of brain physiology. Subjects were n = 30 healthy volunteers, aged 21–62 years, who had experienced a significant high-intensity dream or had repeatedly experienced such a dream. Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a recognition memory paradigm, we investigated the neural correlates of recognition of “dream words” compared to “story words.” Thirty dream words that best represented the dream were extracted during a qualitative dream interview with intensive dream reliving. Thirty story words were learned through self-directed effort from a written short story. These items, along with 60 additional distractor words from the dictionary, were randomly presented on the scanner in an old/new decision task. When dream words were statistically contrasted with story words in terms of their blood-oxygen-level-dependent effects, the difference was significant (p < .001, effect size dz = 1.2). By superimposing the mean contrast image on a reference brain, we were able to localize the specificity of dream activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex/medial prefrontal cortex, a central part of the default mode network. The results suggest that dream memories are differentially processed in these areas. A novel experimental design was demonstrated that allows precise control of dream stimuli for future functional magnetic resonance imaging studies.
... One strand considers dreams to be characteristically different to standard waking experience, the other posits broad continuity in content and experiential features. Recent years have seen renewed efforts to renegotiate how dreams relate to conscious wake states, including mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2016;Domhoff, 2007Domhoff, , 2011Domhoff, , 2017Domhoff & Fox, 2015). Daydreaming and mind wandering refer to conscious thoughts and experiences during wakefulness that unfold freely and associatively and are unrelated to different degrees to the ongoing tasks and the here-and-now. ...
... Bizarreness has long been thought to be a distinctive feature of dreaming, separating conscious experiences in sleep from waking (Hobson et al., 1987;Mamelak & Hobson, 1989;Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995;Revonsuo & Tarkko, 2002). By contrast, proponents of the continuity between dreaming and waking consciousness (Domhoff, 2001(Domhoff, , 2011Foulkes, 1990;Foulkes & Fleisher, 1975;Schredl, 2003Schredl, , 2006Schredl & Hofmann, 2003) emphasize that dreaming involves an overall realistic simulation of waking like (Domhoff, 2007) and consider dream bizarreness as an exception. A better understanding of bizarreness therefore promises to shed light on the relationship between dream and waking experiences, including mind wandering and daydreams. ...
... In contrast with the view that dreams are inherently bizarre (Hobson 2004;Scarone et al. 2007), mundane dreams are very common (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018a). Whether FoAs are also mundane, we often need to assess them indirectly as there may be no mention of bodily sensation. ...
... According to Synofzik (2008) "in order to transit from abnormal experience to delusional belief, an unusual belief formation processing-i.e., on the level of the JoA-must be postulated" (Synofzik 2008: 232). The two-factor theory is plausible for dreams since the hallucinatory dream scenario provides the first factor, the neuropsychological condition of unusual experience, and the second factor is clearly demonstrated by cognitive dysfunction, in particular, the dreamers' common failure to realise that they are dreaming despite bizarre and implausible occurrences (Domhoff 2007;Rosen 2018a). Underlying these cognitive mechanisms, similarities in neural activation between waking delusions and dreams provide evidence of a neural basis. ...
Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency displayed in dreams is perplexing as we are mostly shut off from real stimulus whilst asleep. Theories of waking sense of agency, in particular, comparator and holistic models, are analysed in order to argue that despite the isolation from the real environment, these models can help account for dream experience. The dreamer might feel an increased sense of control of their dream bodies and a sense that they can directly control elements of the dream world. Such experiences may at times be caused by superstitious or delusional thinking due to altered cognition and changes to the sleeping brain. Here it is argued that some such experiences are akin to specific waking delusions, such as delusions of grandeur, with similar cognitive features. However, other instances of increased sense of agency in dreaming appear to be sui generis and nothing like what we experience when awake. Lucid control dreams, in which the dreamer realises that they are dreaming and that they can control the dream environment, are examples of such an experience although further nuance is required to account for their specific cognitive attributes. Future empirical research should focus on controlled dream reporting conditions in order to clarify the types of experience that occur and determine the relevant cognitive mechanisms that relate to each type.
... Based on content analysis studies of dreams, Revonsuo, Tuominen, and Valli (2015, pp. 4 -5) argued that social perception, social interaction, and social behaviors are simulated in dreams (see also Franklin & Zyphur, 2005;McNamara, McLaren, Kowalczyk, & Pace-Schott, 2007;McNamara, McLaren, Smith, Brown, & Stickgold, 2005). 3 Like Domhoff (2003Domhoff ( , 2007, they argued that bizarreness is not definitive of dreams; rather they assert dream duplications of simulated persons and objects are often flawless. Yet they admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features and according to one study over 60% (Domhoff, 2007;Kahn, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002). ...
... 3 Like Domhoff (2003Domhoff ( , 2007, they argued that bizarreness is not definitive of dreams; rather they assert dream duplications of simulated persons and objects are often flawless. Yet they admit that over half of simulated humans in dreams have bizarre features and according to one study over 60% (Domhoff, 2007;Kahn, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002). Again, in my view (Mageo 2017a(Mageo , 2018(Mageo , 2019a, mimesis is replication with variations that reflect thought about a topic and bizarreness is simply extreme visual variation. ...
By forwarding a mimetic theory of dream mentation, this paper critiques two important current theories of dreaming—the Continuity Hypothesis and Social Simulation Theory. The Continuity Hypothesis (CH) holds that dreams are continuous with waking concerns. Social Simulation Theory (SST) postulates dream simulations select waking materials that allow dreamers to rehearse interpersonal skills and bonds instrumental for species survival. Using data from a study of undergraduate American dreamers, this paper argues the story-like dreams that tend to occur in REM sleep neither merely continue waking concerns, nor merely replicate the social bonds that help to make life meaningful. Rather, dreamers think mimetically about the cultural models through which people understand waking concerns and social bonds by copying visual metaphors for models that circulate in a social world and altering these images. The paper defines mimesis as an image-based form of thinking in which simulation of an image specifies a topic and variations represent thought about this topic. This idea about the nature of dream mentation casts new light on bizarreness in dreams. From a mimetic perspective, bizarreness is extreme visual variation and variation from slight to extreme is intrinsic to dream mentation. When images are realistic verisimilitude indicates they are not the focus of dream thinking. SST posits that social perception, social communication, and social behaviors are simulated in dreams. A mimetic perspective shows such simulations supply subjects for dream thinking while variations raise questions about the fidelity of perceptions as well as about the meanings of communications and behaviors.
... For instance, if I currently lack access to the memory that a relative is dead, then encountering them in a dream won't clearly be a reason for me to investigate that something odd is going on. 32 Finally, many theorists-see Domhoff (2007)-think dream bizarreness isn't typical and that dreams are normally accurate reflections of waking life. It's thus far from clear that an appeal to dream bizarreness provides reason to deny that dreamers are ever competent while dreaming. ...
Are subjects ever morally responsible for their dreams? In this paper I argue that if, as some theories of dreams entail, dreaming subjects sometimes express agency while they dream, then they are sometimes morally responsible for what they do and are potentially worthy of praise and blame while they dream and after they have awoken. I end by noting the practical and theoretical implications of my argument.
... Some of these have involved asking the dreamer, or an independent judge reading the dream report, to rate the dream on a scale ranging from the dream being realistic, in that events in it could have happened in waking life, to the dream events being unlikely to occur in waking life, to the events of the dream being impossible in waking life. Domhoff (2007) acknowledged that aspects of dream content can be unusual and perhaps nonsensical, but emphasised the rareness of dream bizarreness, in comparison to how people often think dreams are. He cites Dorus et al. (1971), who found that 8.9% of sleep lab dreams were highly improbable by waking standards, and Strauch and Meier (1996), who found for home dreams that there were no bizarre elements in 23.9% of the reports, and only one bizarre element in another 39.3%. ...
... Carefully collected dream reports dating back to the 1960s repeatedly show that the setting, characters, and events in dreams tend to be overwhelmingly familiar to the dreamer (Schredl, 2019). Several lines of research show that following an individual's dreams across long periods of time reveals incredible consistency across time in themes, settings, and characters in dreams, even across decades of one's life (Domhoff, 2007). Most dreams are about normal, everyday activities and only a small number are described as having bizarre or unusual content, both in laboratory and home studies. ...
Written by a clinical psychologist, this chapter examines claims related to dream interpretation. People have attempted to make sense of dreams for the entirety of recorded history. Most modern dream analysis flows from the psychoanalytic ideas of Sigmund Freud, which posits that understanding the unconscious forces behind dream content can allow us to understand the true roots of mental health problems. The chapter concludes by providing a deep dive into research on dreams.
... This suggests not just that dreams can be bizarre or unusual, but that they can replicate specific delusions. While a large proportion of dreams are likely to be mundane (Domhoff, 2007;Rosen, 2018a;Snyder, 1970), unusual, bizarre and delusional dreams are experienced by most individuals and are more likely to be remembered than mundane dreams (Foulkes, 1999). These experiences are usually dismissed as simply random and bizarre yet paying more attention to the specific similarities between dreams and delusions could give us a better understanding of mental illness from a first-person perspective. ...
The conscious experiences we have during sleep have the potential to improve our empathetic response to those who experience delusions and psychosis by supplying a virtual reality simulation of mental illness. Empathy for those with mental illness is lacking and there has been little improvement in the last decades despite efforts made to increase awareness. Our lack of empathy, in this case, may be due to an inability to accurately mentally simulate what it’s like to have a particular cognitive disorder. Dreaming can help mitigate these deficits by placing the dreamer directly into a realistic virtual simulation and thus increase their capacity for empathy. Increasing empathy would go some way towards reducing the stigma and discrimination faced by people in this group. Recent work suggests that virtual reality can increase empathy towards a variety of marginalised groups, however, this technology is limited in its ability to simulate mental illnesses such as delusions. Dreams, however, are at times virtual reality delusion simulators. They can replicate, to a reasonable degree, delusions and psychosis, and through these experiences, we can learn ‘what it’s like’ to have these conditions. It is essential that we recognise these experiences for what they are, attempt to remember and reflect on them. Instead of disregarding dreams due to their unusualness and bizarreness, we can learn from these experiences and expand our understanding of the human condition and its many forms.
... This virtual dream reality may at times be bizarre and unusual, but it may at others be a convincing facsimile of waking of life (Domhoff 2007;Revonsuo and Tarkko 2002;Rosen 2018b). In fact, the inability of most dreamers to realise they are dreaming is evidence for this claim, although an alternative explanation is that reduced cognitive capacity, including failure to pay attention and metacognise (Kahan and LaBerge 2011;Kahan and Sullivan 2012;Thomas et al. 2015), which refers to cognitions about cognitions (Moses and Baird 1999), causes us to fail to notice the differences between dreaming and reality. ...
The experience of skilled action occurs in dreams if we take dream reports at face value. However, what these reports indicate requires nuanced analysis. It is uncertain what it means to perform any action in a dream whatsoever. If skilled actions do occur in dreams, this has important implications for both theory of action and theory of dreaming. Here, it is argued that since some dreams generate a convincing, hallucinated world where we have virtual bodies that interact with virtual objects, there is a sense in which we can perform virtual actions. Further, we can also perform skilfully, although not all apparent skilful performance is as it seems. Since the dream world is generated by the dreamer’s own mind, it can be difficult to determine whether the dream world simply allows goals to be achieved without the abilities that would be required in a similar waking scenario. Because of this, individual dream reports alone are insufficient to determine what skills are demonstrated in a particular dream. However, taken with evidence from REM sleep behaviour disorder, incompetent dreams, lucid dreams and motor-skill practise, it is likely that skilled virtual dream performance at times involves both opportunity for virtual behaviour and the display of competence. Evidence from cognitive science suggests that dreamers can also lose competence through forgetting and other cognitive incapacities but, more surprisingly, it is possible to gain abilities in a robust sense, consistent with the idea that some dreams, at least, are virtual realities rather than imagination.
... In a comparison of 120 lab and 120 nonlab dream reports collected from 12 young adult male participants, only 10% of the dream reports in either sample had one or more of the four types of bizarreness included in an Unusual Elements scale (Domhoff & Schneider, 1999, p. 142), and another lab versus nonlab comparison reported similar results (Hunt, 1982). Similar findings emerge from quantitative analyses of dream reports collected in nonlab settings (Barrett, 1991;Domhoff, 2007;Revonsuo & Salmivalli, 1995). ...
This article assesses the neurocognitive theory of dreams on the occasion of its 20th anniversary. The theory synthesizes findings from 3 strands of dream research, which focus respectively on the neural substrate that subserves dreaming, the development of dreaming in children, and quantitative findings on adult dream content, all 3 of which are necessary ingredients in any theory in cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner & Kosslyn, 2014). The article compares the current standing of the theory with that of 4 other theories with a neural dimension: the Freudian, activation-synthesis, memory-consolidation, and threat-simulation theories of dreaming. It concludes that the neurocognitive theory differs from the other 4 in that many of its key building blocks were created and have since been replicated by independent investigators in 3 different research areas. The other theories lack a developmental dimension, and their claims sometimes do not accord with established findings on dream content. On the other hand, the neurocognitive theory has been strengthened by neuroimaging findings revealing that the neural substrate that enables dreaming is a subsystem of the default network, which supports imagination in waking; it also includes key hubs in the waking self-system, which may help explain the focus on personal concerns in dreams. This subsystem of the default network, when unconstrained and activated, leads dreamers to experience themselves as being in hypothetical scenarios that include vivid sensory environments, which also usually portray interpersonal interactions. Dreaming is an intensified and enhanced form of spontaneous thought that can be characterized as an "embodied simulation."
... Recent research, especially by Bulkeley (2007) and Domhoff (2007), has confirmed that our dreaming reflects issues of current emotional concern to the dreamer, bringing to the surface of consciousness thoughts, feelings and memories which have not been fully processed. Our human mammal brains require about one third of our life's time regularly for rest, refreshment, and the mysterious inner theatre of dreaming, where we find ourselves involved in observing, acting or interacting with a range of figures, animate and inanimate, which have something to show us or tell us -if we simply pay attention. ...
Recent research in dream science has established that we dream about the issues that matter to us emotionally: from immediate personal problems to spiritual and political issues. Indigenous cultures constantly call us to honour our relationship with Nature, and prophets throughout history have urged us to care for God’s creation. Evolutionary psychology also suggests that a primary purpose of disturbing dreams is to raise issues that threaten our survival or wellbeing, so that we seek solutions. A major issue pressing on our consciousness now is the health of our very planet, the literal ground on which all life depends, so it is not surprising that some of us are having dreams and nightmares warning us that our environment is in great danger – as if the Earth itself is calling us to action. In this paper I consider a series of striking dreams from New Zealanders which are relevant to this theme. Waitara Kei ngā rangahau pūtaiao moemoeā o ko tata tonu atu nei e kī ana moemoeā ai tātou mō ngā take kare-ā-roto e ngākau nuihia ana e tātou: mai i ngā raruraru whaiaro tata, ki ngā take wairua atu ki ngā take tōrangapū. Kūmea tonuhia ai tātou ki te whakamānawa i tō tātou piri ki te ao tūroa, ā mai noa ngā tohunga e aki ana i a tātou ki te manaaki uri o ngā atua. E kī anō ana te mātai hinengaro kunenga ko te pūtake o ngā moemoeā whawhe he whakaara kaupapa whakawetiweti ake i te ora i te hauora rānei, ana ka rapu oranga haere. Ko tētahi kaupapa matua ē pēhi ana i ō tātou hinengaro i tēnei wā ko te oranga o te ao, te mata o Papatūānuku, nōreira kāre noa iho e ohorere ana e moemoeā e kuku ana ētahi o tātou mō ngā whakatūpatotanga ki te āhua o te taiao — pēnei i te mea nei e whakaohohia ake ana tātou ki te whakatika. I roto i tēnei pepa ka whakaaro ake au i ngā moemoeā whai kiko mai i ngā tāngata o Aotearoa e pā ana ki tēnei kauapapa.
The author has been studying, practising and teaching practical dreamwork in New Zealand for over 20 years, and believes the time is overdue for New Zealand universities and polytechnics to include courses in Dream Studies as part of the curriculum in the training of counsellors, psychotherapists, and psychologists. She cites relevant literature, summarises basic principles, gives case examples from her own practice, and outlines the components of a basic course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of New Zealand Journal of Counselling is the property of New Zealand Association of Counsellors and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
It is generally said that dreams are experienced as real. But the notion of reality is often used, in the philosophical literature, along with that of presence. A big problem, in this respect, is that both these terms may assume different meanings. So understanding the nature of presence and reality in dreams depends on the way we conceive these two notions. This paper contributes to the literature on dreaming by describing the experience of presence and reality in dreams in a very specific sense. I consider the experience of presence as related to the experience of possibility of motoric interaction, and the experience of reality as related to the experience of mind-independence. Then, endorsing that dream experiences are different from perception, and similar to imagery, I suggest that the dreamer can experience reality but not presence, with three lines of argument, concerning visual determinacy, stereopsis and peripersonal localization.
Empirical investigations that search for a link between dreaming and sleep-dependent memory consolidation have focused on testing for an association between dreaming of what was learned, and improved memory performance for learned material. Empirical support for this is mixed, perhaps owing to the inherent challenges presented by the nature of dreams, and methodological inconsistencies. The purpose of this paper is to address critically prevalent assumptions and practices, with the aim of clarifying and enhancing research on this topic, chiefly by providing a theoretical synthesis of existing models and evidence. Also, it recommends the method of Targeted Memory Reactivation (TMR) as a means for investigating if dream content can be linked to specific cued activations. Other recommendations to enhance research practice and enquiry on this subject are also provided, focusing on the HOW and WHY we search for memory sources in dreams, and what purpose (if any) they might serve.
This chapter examines and answers four counter-arguments that have been set forth against ECM. They are (1) the argument from high bandwidth, (2) the argument from predictive processing, (3) the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, and (4) the dream challenge. The first two counter-arguments aim to block the inference from EM to ECM, that is, the first argument for ECM presented in the second chapter of this book. The last two criticisms especially challenge the second argument for ECM (the inference from sensorimotor enactivism to ECM) but also the third argument (the inference from embodiment to ECM). However, this chapter shows that they are not successful in cutting off the inference relations of these arguments, and hence none of them refutes ECM.KeywordsPredictive processingBrain-in-a-vatDream argumentAndy ClarkAntti RevonsuoAlva Noë
DREAMING IS AN UNUSUAL PHENOMENON WITH SO MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, INCLUDING, WHY DO WE DREAM?
This article surveys some of the major milestones of scientific dream research, often in response to sleep research, as well as main points of exchange and disagreement with philosophy, with a focus on Western philosophy and non-lucid dreams. It argues that the increasing establishment of dreaming as a target phenomenon for the interdisciplinary study of consciousness, alongside recent advances in sleep and mind wandering research, is leading to revisions in our understanding of sleep, wakefulness, and consciousness.
Objective:
As existing findings are inconclusive, this paper aims to provide a thorough analysis of the bizarreness of everyday dreams and to explore its relations to the emotional quality of dreams and the dreamers' quality of life.
Method:
61 women's two week long dream journal (502 dreams) were analyzed using two different kinds of scales in order to capture the bizarre qualities of the reports. The emotional qualities of the dreams were also classified. At the end of the dream log participants filled in the WHOQOL-100 questionnaire to evaluate the different aspects of their quality of life. We examined the frequency and distribution of the distinct forms of distortions in every day dreams by using descriptive statistics. We carried out one-way analysis of variance to analyze the connection between the emotional tone of dreams and their bizarreness. To explore how the inter-individual differences in the qualities of dreams relate to the dreamers quality of life, Spearman correlation and Linear regression were calculated.
Results:
According to our findings, although most home reported dreams contain some bizarre elements, they are rarely extremely unrealistic, and there is also a considerable amount of totally mundane dreams. The distortions are not randomly distributed but are mostly related to those parts of the reports which are created during the process of narrative formation. Our findings implicate substantial individual differences regarding the bizarreness and emotional tone of everyday dreams, and both of them correlate with some aspects of the subject's quality of life.
Conclusions:
Those theories should be favored, which can accommodate both unrealistic and totally mundane reports, and can account for the interpersonal differences in this quality of dreams.
En el capítulo se expone el proyecto pedagógico de tres profesores de la Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México de la academia de cultura científica y humanística quienes diseñaron un Núcleo temático sobre el arte rupestre paleolítico para trabajar la materia del área de cultura científica y humanística a nivel licenciatura. La experiencia pedagógica implicó una investigación acerca del arte rupestre considerando aspectos de varias disciplinas, de manera que se tocaran temas como la hominización, los orígenes de la cultura y el pensamiento simbólico, la Prehistoria. Además, se buscó explorar el tema con los estudiantes a partir de lecturas, visitas a museos, práctica de campo, talleres sobre pintura rupestre, proyección de una película en la Cineteca Nacional y conferencias con especialistas de la Escuela Nacional de Antropología.
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