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A model of heuristic judgment

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... Mechanistically speaking, when heuristic processes are used in decision-making, often a target attribute (i.e. the specific content about which a person needs to make a judgement) that is not easily cognitively accessible is substituted with a different, non-target cue that is more readily brought to mind (Kahneman and Frederick 2005). Methodologically, among the strongest evidence for decision-making heuristics comes from experimental work that induces high cognitive load on some participants. ...
... Liu, Xu, et al. 2019;Siegrist 2019). Siegrist stated that 'trust clearly fulfills the criteria of a heuristic' as defined by Kahneman and Frederick (2005) in that people substitute trust for target attributes in forming risk judgements. In other words, rather than engaging in a complicated cost-benefit analysis regarding the adoption of a new technology, a person might ask how much they trust the people/organizations developing and regulating the technology, and/or the technology's capabilities. ...
... In our study, this might have taken the form of substituting integrity, perhaps more readily brought to mind, for some target attribute (e.g. fatality rates) (Kahneman and Frederick 2005;Tversky and Kahneman 1974). To be clear, this is one possible interpretation of our findings; we did not assess mechanisms. ...
Article
Scholars have argued that trust acts as a decision-making heuristic, aiding people in assessing the risks of various technologies. This may be especially likely for social trust, or integrity (vs. calculative trust, or competence), and among people with limited experience with a given technology. The goal of this research is to provide an experimental test of the trust heuristic. In three experiments, which were identical except for the technology of focus (Study 1: autonomous vehicles, N = 1691; Study 2: nuclear power, N = 844; Study 3: airplane travel, N = 853), participants recruited from an online platform completed measures of trust, and then were randomly assigned to respond to measures of perceived risk in either a treatment (time pressure) or control condition. Competence and integrity were significantly negatively associated with risk perceptions. In Studies 1–2, the relationship between integrity (not competence) and risk was significantly stronger in the timed vs. untimed condition. However, Study 3, which focused on a context characterized by greater experience, did not find this effect. Results support the role of integrity, but not competence, as a decision-making heuristic, and suggest that greater levels of experience weaken the influence of integrity on risk.
... Heuristics are characterized by the frugality of information and computation required to reach a satisfactory solution. While the near-universal prevalence of heuristics is testament to their evolutionary 'staying power', heuristics have also been implicated in various sub-optimal decisions made by human beings [20]. These heuristics have been categorized as cognitive biases, and more than a hundred have been catalogued, with different kinds of decisions being affected by different biases [7]. ...
... Created as a way to help people to make wiser decisions, a nudge leverages cognitive biases present in every human being. A cognitive bias refers to the use of mental shortcuts and heuristics in decision-making [20]. These biases result in a predictable pattern of decision-making, when presented with a given context. ...
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This position paper briefly discusses nudging, its use by autonomous agents, potential risks and ethical considerations while creating such systems. Instead of taking a normative approach, which guides all situations, the paper proposes a risk-driven questions-and-answer approach. The paper takes the position that this is a pragmatic method, that is transparent about beneficial intentions, foreseeable risks, and mitigations. Given the uncertainty in AI and autonomous agent capabilities, we believe that such pragmatic methods offer a plausibly safe path, without sacrificing flexibility in domain and technology.
... In addition to examining deliberate and rational thinking, researchers have also investigated the role of intuition in the performance of chess masters. The findings indicate that both cognitive systems are present in high-stakes chess games (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1987;Kahneman & Frederick, 2005;Moxley et al., 2012). Chess players are regarded as being more intuitive than the general population, and greater expertise among chess players was linked to higher scores in intuition (Kelly, 1985). ...
... Previous research has extensively examined intuition and rational thinking styles and indicated that both are crucial factors in the performance of chess players (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986;Kahneman & Frederick, 2005;Moxley et al., 2012). Our investigation found that the rational thinking style was the only predictor that had a statistically meaningful impact and increased the likelihood of achieving an A-class result by up to 63 times, in the case of the best performance ever registered. ...
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"Literature is scarce regarding the psychological predictors of chess expertise and A-level chess performance. Methods: A cross-sectional study was designed and conducted on a total number of 90 Hungarian and Romanian competitive chess players. More than half were males, the average age was 32.07 (SD=12.99). The study aimed to explore the predictive influence of age, gender, number of hours spent practicing, preferences for rational and intuitive thinking styles, self-efficacy, and emotionality on the likelihood of obtaining a publicly accessible ELO rating within the range of 1800-2500 (indicating at least A-level expertise or higher). Binary logistic regression was applied to examine the weight of each predictor. Results: The data evinced the statistically significant role of gender, and rational thinking style on A-level chess expertise and from all the conclusive predictors the most determinant was the rational thinking style which raised the chance of high expertise more than 60 times. Conclusions: Practice contributes positively to the development of A-level competence. However, the most crucial factor in predicting high chess expertise and performance is the preference for rational thinking style. Keywords: chess expertise, ELO rating, A-level, emotionality, self-efficacy, rational thinking, intuitive thinking, practice, adults"
... Onderzoek leert dat leraren beslissingen vaak onderbouwen op basis van vluchtige observaties die onderliggende assumpties versterken . In differentiatieprocessen is het daarom van belang dat leraren deze onderliggende assumpties voldoende uitdagen door op basis van objectieve criteria naar beschikbare data te kijken (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). ...
... In dit onderzoek stonden ervaren leraren centraal. Eigen aan deze groep is dat zij op basis van hun ervaring reeds heuristieken ontwikkeld hebben in verschillende types van beslissingsprocessen (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Dat maakt dat het datagebruik in binnenklasdifferentiatie van minder ervaren leerkrachten er anders zou kunnen uitzien. ...
Article
Omgaan met verschillen tussen leerlingen is een belangrijke uitdaging voor leraren. Dat kan via binnenklasdifferentiatie; een beredeneerd beslisproces waarbij leraren beslissingen nemen op basis van kennis en data over verschillen tussen leerlingen. Tot op heden is nog onduidelijk hoe data-geïnformeerd dit beslisproces bij leraren verloopt. Een kwalitatief onderzoeksdesign met semigestructureerde interviews bij 12 leraren in het secundair onderwijs bood inzicht in hoe leraren voor een bepaalde leerling beslissen te differentiëren, hoe ze kennis over leernoden opbouwen en hoe ze de aanpassing waartoe ze beslissen te informeren. De resultaten tonen aan dat beslissingen met het oog op binnenklasdifferentiatie vooral vertrekken vanuit gedragsobservaties en grotendeels gedreven worden door ervaring, gevoelens en intuïtie. De bevraagde leraren dagen hun initiële beeld over leerlingen weinig uit, wat een reëel gevaar inhoudt voor confirmation bias en invloed kan hebben op het leren en de leerwegen van leerlingen.
... It works slow, with effort and concentration, and demands cognitive load [6]. The main function of T2 thinking is to control the T1 processing, overriding its responses when they are erroneous or not appropriate [5,6,[13][14][15][16]. It is also responsible for operating when T1 thinking cannot activate, for instance, due to the lack of previous experience dealing new situations [3,6]. ...
... If 5 machines make 5 widgets in 5 minutes, then 100 machines must make 100 widgets in 100 minutes. This fact suggests that people answering intuitively do not check their responses [14,17,45]. ...
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This paper aims to expand the literature on the determinants of the Cognitive Reflection Test scores, exploring the effects that the items sequence has on (1) Cognitive Reflection Test scores, (2) response time, (3) the relationship between Cognitive Reflection Test scores and response time, and (4) Cognitive Reflection scores, response time, and the relationship between both variables on men and women. The current study also explored the sex differences on Cognitive Reflection Test and response time according to items sequence. The results showed that manipulating the items sequence, the performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test improved significantly, but the response time were not significantly affected, although the results suggest that first items of the sequence could be working as training items. A positive relationship between Cognitive Reflection Test scores and response time was also found, except when the scores were maximized. Finally, some differences between men and women on the results were also found. The implications of these findings are discussed.
... It consists of three modules, each with a distinct purpose: 1) the reactive planner; 2) the OperA module; and 3) the behaviour library. Our solution, inspired by the dual-process theory presented by [24], employs a 'fast' system 1 and a 'slow' system 2 working in tandem for efficient decision making while taking into consideration its wider environmental and social context. ...
... This decision to reuse the same Senses enables code reusability but also constrains OperA's knowledge to that of the agent, which it uses for the action-selection process. Arguably, this is also a more realistic implementation of Kahneman's dual-system theory [24]: our system 1 acts reactively and system 2 acts deliberately, but the embodiment with its sensors and actuators, i.e. behaviour library, is shared by both systems. ...
Preprint
This paper presents the AWKWARD agent architecture for the development of agents in Multi-Agent Systems. AWKWARD agents can have their plans re-configured in real time to align with social role requirements under changing environmental and social circumstances. The proposed hybrid architecture makes use of Behaviour Oriented Design (BOD) to develop agents with reactive planning and of the well-established OperA framework to provide organisational, social, and interaction definitions in order to validate and adjust agents' behaviours. Together, OperA and BOD can achieve real-time adjustment of agent plans for evolving social roles, while providing the additional benefit of transparency into the interactions that drive this behavioural change in individual agents. We present this architecture to motivate the bridging between traditional symbolic- and behaviour-based AI communities, where such combined solutions can help MAS researchers in their pursuit of building stronger, more robust intelligent agent teams. We use DOTA2 -- a game where success is heavily dependent on social interactions -- as a medium to demonstrate a sample implementation of our proposed hybrid architecture
... In this study, information signals mechanism reflects the rational and logical demand-analytic process of consumers (Evans, 2007). Apart from a conscious product information processing system, consumers also experience an intuitive-heuristic process in which the brain automatically decides by selecting the relevant content directly from past experiences and memories without inference or calculation (Kahneman and Frederick, 2005). As this process is dominated by habit, automatic habit mechanism is considered another important part of cognitive process in affecting purchase judgment (Kahneman, 2003). ...
... This process is usually dominated by habit, making it difficult to control or change (Kahneman, 2003). An individual's decision-making process controlled by the conscious brain system is described as a demanding-analytic reasoning mode (hereinafter mode 1), whereas it is an intuitiveheuristic reasoning mode (hereinafter mode 2) under the unconscious brain system (De Neys and Glumicic, 2008, Kahneman and Frederick, 2005, Evans and Over, 1996. ...
Article
The increasing popularity of live streaming commerce has presented opportunity for sellers to generate revenue. Despite the obvious advantages of live streaming commerce offers reduced product uncertainty and encourages usage habit formation, studies have overlooked their effect on consumers’ purchase intention. On the basis of dual-process theory, this study proposes a research model with information signals mechanism and automatic habit mechanism. An online survey with 401 samples from several live streaming platforms is conducted to measure our model. Our results show that uncertainties in product quality and product fit have a significant negative influence on the purchase intention, while automatic habit is positively associated with the purchase intention. The result also indicates that habit moderates the relationship between product quality uncertainty and purchase intention. In addition, live streaming features can activate the two mechanisms. Our findings contribute to research by highlighting the importance of product information and habit.
... Being cognitive misers, we humans developed mechanisms that provide us with functional adaptation to the environment for "little money". By describing intuitive thinking (type 1 processes), Kahneman and Frederick (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005) explain that the mechanism of attribute substitution implies replacing the attribute that is more demanding to process with an attribute that is more receptive simpler, and close to the demanding attribute. According to the Kahneman and Frederick model, the connection between the changed attributes comes from knowledge structures; it is not random. ...
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Numerous psychological models of the rationality of human thinking have been developed since the middle of the last century within the line of research known as the heuristics and biases approach, descriptive theory of rationality or decision-making, complex cognition, or the psychology of rational thinking. The focal processes or phenomena are reasoning, decision-making, judging, and inferencing. Families of models revolve around the formal (cumulative) prospect theory, the cognitivist fuzzy trace theory, ecological rationality, and dual process theories. Regarding complex cognitive processing, there is a limited set of principles that researchers in the psychology of rationality implicitly, and sometimes uncritically, attribute to the human cognitive system. These principles may be called "boundary conditions" of the validity of psychological rationality theories, meaning that all psychological models of rational thinking, including currently dominant dual process theories, belong to a set constrained by the postulated qualities of the cognitive system's architecture. Those principles that have not yet been explicitly stated in the literature are as follows: cognitive miserliness, cognitive processing dependence on the environment, knowledge structures, probabilism, and the challenge of individual differences. The paper presents the mentioned principles and their historical antecedents and a proposal for future research questions based on such a juxtaposition.
... Overconfidence is a characteristic that clearly relates to a cognitive bias, meaning that an individual overvalues their judgment and decision-making capabilities (Frederick and Kahneman, 2005). ...
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The principal objective of this article is to gain insight into the biases that shape decision-making in contexts of risk and uncertainty, with a particular focus on the prospect theory and its relationship with individual confidence. A sample of 376 responses to a questionnaire that is a replication of the one originally devised by Kahneman and Tversky was subjected to analysis. Firstly, the aim is to compare the results obtained with the original study. Furthermore, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) will be employed to ascertain whether behavioural biases are associated with cognitive abilities. Finally, in light of the significance and contemporary relevance of the concept of overconfidence, we propose a series of questions designed to assess it, with a view to comparing the various segments of respondents and gaining insight into the profile that reflects it. The sample of respondents is divided according to gender, age group, student status, professional status as a trader, status as an occasional investor, and status as a behavioural finance expert. It can be concluded that the majority of individuals display a profile of underconfidence, and that the hypotheses formulated by Kahneman and Tversky are generally corroborated. The low frequency of overconfident individuals suggests that the results are consistent with prospect theory in all segments, despite the opposite characteristics, given the choice of the less risk-averse alternative. These findings are useful for regulators to understand how biases affect financial decision making, and for the development of financial literacy policies in the education sector.
... The heuristics-and-biases approach, pioneered by Teversky and Kahneman [37], distinguishes between two modes or systems of thinking [38,39]. In dual-process theory, System 1, also known as the heuristic-thinking system, operates swiftly and effortlessly, often without conscious awareness. ...
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Article 5 of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act is intended to regulate AI use to prevent potentially harmful consequences. Nevertheless, applying this legislation practically is likely to be challenging because of ambiguously used terminologies and because it fails to specify which manipulation techniques may be invoked by AI, potentially leading to significant harm. This paper aims to bridge this gap by defining key terms and demonstrating how AI may invoke these techniques, drawing from insights in psychology and behavioural economics. First, this paper provides definitions of the terms “subliminal techniques”, “manipulative techniques” and “deceptive techniques”. Secondly, we identified from the literature in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics three subliminal and five manipulative techniques and exemplify how AI might implement these techniques to manipulate users in real-world case scenarios. These illustrations may serve as a practical guide for stakeholders to detect cases of AI manipulation and consequently devise preventive measures. Article 5 has also been criticised for offering inadequate protection. We critically assess the protection offered by Article 5, proposing specific revisions to paragraph 1, points (a) and (b) of Article 5 to increase its protective effectiveness.
... Therefore, if Q(Tasking) is difficult to estimate, the short-asking statement would be less likely to produce a contrast effect and more likely to produce an assimilation effect. Second, if Q(Tasking) is difficult to estimate and consumers are asked to estimate Q(Tasking), they tend to replace the difficult estimation task with a less difficult one (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). For example, if the short-asking statement asks consumers how many boxes of cereal (10.8 oz in a box) they would likely consume in one day, consumers may find it difficult to answer that question and therefore estimate how many boxes they would likely consume in one week instead. ...
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Marketers often use messages such as “Stock up and save” to encourage consumers to buy more units of a product. Governments use messages such as “Store at least a two-week supply of water and food” to encourage consumers to stock up on essentials for emergencies. This research finds that these messages may not work as effectively as hoped and introduces a method that can increase consumers' purchase quantity in these situations. Dubbed as SALE (“Short-Asking with Long-Encouraging”), this method couples a “long-encouraging” statement (e.g., “Stock up for two weeks”) with a “short-asking” statement (e.g., “Think about how many you will consume in one day”) in an advertisement. Two field studies, four lab experiments and a survey with salespeople demonstrated the effectiveness and novelty of SALE and identified the mechanism, moderators and boundary conditions of the effect.
... However, framing effect strengths are often smaller in within-subjects studies than in between-subjects designs (Piñon and Gambara, 2005;Aczel et al., 2018). This difference is still commonly explained by the higher transparency of manipulations in within-subjects designs (Kahneman and Frederick, 2005). ...
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We report two studies investigating individual intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles as moderators of the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's famous Unusual Disease problem setting. We examined framing effects in two ways: counting the number of frame-inconsistent choices and comparing the proportions of risky choices depending on gain-loss framing. Moreover, in addition to gain-loss frames, we systematically varied the number of affected people, probabilities of surviving/dying, type of disease, and response deadlines. Study 1 used a psychophysical data collection approach and a sample of 43 undergraduate students, each performing 480 trials. Study 2 was an online study incorporating psychophysical elements in a social science approach using a larger and more heterogeneous sample, i.e., 262 participants performed 80 trials each. In both studies, the effect of framing on risky choice proportions was moderated by risk-styles. Cognitive-styles measured on different scales moderated the framing effect only in study 2. The effects of disease type, probability of surviving/dying, and number of affected people on risky choice frequencies were also affected by cognitive-styles and risk-styles but different for both studies and to different extents. We found no relationship between the number of frame-inconsistent choices and cognitive-styles or risk-styles, respectively.
... 10 This suggests that subjects do have a cognitive capacity for algebra but they're simply failing to correctly exercise it for the CRT. The most popular explanation of failure on the CRT is that subjects use substitution heuristics: they replace the task with a simpler task that is easier to solve using the norms of elementary algebra (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). This can be rationalized: it would be too costly for reasoning to correctly implement each step of the algorithm that solves the task while following the norms of elementary algebra. ...
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The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn’t seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense with norms entirely. Alternatively, Stupple and Ball have argued that norms must be used, but the arbitration problem should be solved by favouring norms that are sensitive to the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. In this paper, I argue that the design of reasoning tasks requires the selection of norms that are indifferent to the factors that influence human responses to the tasks—which aren’t knowable during the task design phase, before the task has been given to human subjects. Moreover, I argue that the arbitration problem is easily dissolved: any well-designed task will contain instructions that implicitly or explicitly specify a single determinate norm, which specifies what would count as a solution to the task—independently of the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. Finally, I argue that discouraging the use of these a priori task norms may impair the design of novel reasoning tasks.
... In spite of the popularity of relying on superstition in people's life, scientific understanding of superstition is still rather limited. Because of its irrational or paranormal nature, believing in superstition is often considered as nonscientific and unfounded [9], or as a failure of human rationality [10,11]. Recently researchers started to explore and recognize the psychological benefits of believing in superstition, however, particularly in adverse situations. ...
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Fortune telling is a widespread phenomenon, yet little is known about the extent to which people are affected by it—including those who consider themselves non-believers. The present research has investigated the power of a positive fortune telling outcome (vs. neutral vs. negative) on people’s financial risk taking. In two online experiments (n1 = 252; n2 = 441), we consistently found that positive fortune telling enhanced financial risk taking particularly among men. Additionally, we used a real online gambling game in a lab setting (n3 = 193) and found that positive fortune telling enhanced the likelihood that college students gambled for money. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of these three studies demonstrated that the effect of positive fortune telling versus neutral fortune telling was significant for men, but virtually absent for women. Thus, positive fortune telling can yield increased financial risk taking in men, but not (or less so) in women.
... It seems unlikely that these choices resulted from explicit calculations. It is more plausible that the choices were based on an intuitive judgment that a desired more expensive premium smartphone is affordable since the price would be the same or lower than the regular cash price of a cheaper smartphone (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Of those about one third of the participants who chose a more expensive premium smartphone, close to half of them would also pay a higher price. ...
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In the Nordic countries with growing markets for consumer credit, a concern is that consumption desires in conjunction with easily accessible credit make financially constrained young adults vulnerable to problem debt and over-indebtedness. In addressing this concern empirically, we investigate whether retail offers of instalment payments of discounted cash prices tempt young adults to finance purchases of more expensive premium smartphones than they would purchase by cash payment. Descriptions of smartphones ranging from budget to latest premium models are in an online experiment presented to 152 Swedish young adults between 18 and 25 years. We employ a within-group design requiring the participants in counterbalanced order to choose a preferred smartphone twice, either if the default choice is paying the regular cash price or two-year monthly instalments with a 20% discount on the cash price. Although a majority chose the same smartphone twice seemingly not influenced by the retail offer, this was not the case for about one third of the young adults who despite a negative attitude to borrowing choose instalment payments of more expensive premium smartphones, and more than half of them at a price exceeding the regular cash price they choose to pay for a cheaper smartphone. Instalment payments as well as rental contracts are penetrating many consumer markets in which young adults are large segments. These new forms of accessible credit should be particularly attractive to those who are financially constrained with potentially negative consequences for their solvency. Our results suggest that regulation policies may need to be considered.
... In research on decision-making in general, and complex decision-making in forensic investigations in particular, the dualprocess theory (5) has been used (2). The dual-process theory has, since its initial conception [e.g., (6)], undergone changes (3,7), but the central dividing of type 1 processing from type 2 processing remains. Decisions based on the more automatic type 1 processing are made quickly and virtually effortless, but when more complex problems emerge, type 1 processing should be replaced by the analytical type 2 processing. ...
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Background Which type of information experts use to make decisions regarding legal insanity within forensic psychiatric investigations (FPI) is relatively unknown, both in general and when considering variations due to case context. It is important to explore this area to be able to counteract the effects of various kinds of cognitive bias. Method The aim was to explore whether FPI expert groups differed regarding case-specific as well as general use of information types required to make decisions on severe mental disorder (SMD). Three FPI case vignettes were presented to three professional groups involved in FPIs in Sweden (n = 41): forensic psychiatrists (n = 15), psychologists (n = 15), and social workers (n = 11). The participants reported which types of information they required to reach conclusions regarding SMD in each case. They also reported which types of information they had used within general FPI praxis during the previous year and the information types’ perceived usefulness. Results The expert groups differed somewhat regarding what type of information they required for the cases (e.g., results from cognitive testing), but some information was required in all cases (e.g., client’s self-report). Regarding the preliminary assessment of SMD in the three cases, minor differences were found. Within the general FPI praxis, experts reported using several information types, while the general perceived usefulness of these sources varied. Discussion The professional groups relied partly on a “core” of information sources, but some case-specific adaptations were found. The professional groups’ inclination to suspect SMD also varied somewhat. This indicates a need to explore the potential consequences of these similarities and differences.
... In line with cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences, we start by emphasizing how individuating performance progression information constitutes stimuli that serve as a potential prompt for particular behaviors-reaction and active use of that performance information. Whether the stimuli cause behavioral action depends on the frontline employees' cognitive processing-and, thus, on their thinking dispositions and use of heuristics (Kahneman and Frederick 2005;Stanovich et al. 2014). By referring to decision rules that produce quick mental judgments based on constraints in cognitive capacity and limited information, heuristics allow for judgments and decision-making even when substantive information is absent or incomplete (Kahneman 2011;Lau and Redlawsk 2006;Simon 1947;Sniderman et al. 1991). ...
Article
Public service organizations periodically collect and disseminate performance information that enables frontline employees to act based on two aspects of performance: current performance (how is the client performing right now?) and performance progression (is the client performing better, similarly, or worse than previously?). Yet knowledge of how frontline employees use performance information about their clients’ performance progression remains limited. Building on cognitive psychology and street-level bureaucracy research, this article theorizes and tests how information on changes in client performance over time affects frontline employees’ performance information use. We develop a theoretical framework that comprises three competing hypotheses on how performance progression information (on performance improvement, performance stability, and performance deterioration) shapes purposeful performance information use at the frontlines of public services delivery. Each hypothesis relates to a distinct cognitive bias: needed-deservingness bias, negativity bias, and change-react bias. Using a pre-registered survey experiment among Danish public school teachers (n = 925), we find support for the change-react bias. Teachers are more inclined to take behavioral action when presented with performance progression information showing change (either improvement or deterioration) relative to no change (stability) in student performance. These results expand our understanding of performance information use at the frontlines by suggesting that frontline employees process performance information showing change different from performance information showing stability.
... For instance, data obtained from a within-subjects design often show a smaller framing effect size than data obtained from a between-subjects design (see e. g. [4,10]). Researchers often explain this difference with higher transparency of the framing manipulation in within-subjects studies [13]. ...
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The present study investigates the influence of framing, different amounts to lose, and probabilities of a risky and sure choice option, time limits, and need on risky decision-making. For a given block of trials, participants were equipped with a personal budget (number of points). On each trial within a block, a specific initial amount is possibly taken from the budget by the outcome of a gamble or the choice of a sure loss option. The goal was to avoid losing points from the budget for not falling below a predefined need threshold. Three different levels of induced need were included. Employing a psychophysical experimental approach, we furthermore tested a sequential component of human risk behavior towards a need threshold inspired by research on animal foraging behavior. Risk-sensitivity models and the Stone-Geary framework serve as generating hypotheses on need thresholds. We found that framing, need, and probabilities influenced risky choices. Time limits and initial amounts moderated the framing effect. No sequential component was observed.
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We report the findings of an adversarial collaboration examining whether the cognitive reflection test (CRT) measures anything beyond mathematical aptitude and, if so, whether its incremental predictive validity can be attributed to reflection, per se. We found that an 8-item CRT has greater predictive validity than an 8-item Mathematical Aptitude Test (MAT) consisting of comparably difficult items which lack dominant intuitive lures. Further, the incremental predictive validity stems from the CRT’s measurement of reflection, which we show using both structural equation models and a dual-response paradigm that helps distinguish susceptibility to intuitions from inadequate mathematical aptitude.
Chapter
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This book sheds new light on the importance of Black representation in the US science curriculum from a social, cultural, cognitive, and scientific perspective. Incorporating new methodologies and approaches focused on inclusion and belonging, it will appeal to scholars, researchers, upper-level and post-graduate students with interest in STEM education, race and ethnicity in education, equity, and research methods in education. Weaving together content, new methodologies, and science education pedagogies, it opens up new space for the meaningful inclusion of the science capital and cultural capital of Black people in the US science curricula. Drawing on ethnographic interviews with African American Gullah-Geechee and research outcomes from qualitative and quantitative research and curriculum development, it brings home the importance of attending to a sense of belonging in the K-12 science curricula toward lasting equity and inclusion. The author uses applied cognitive psychology theories as frameworks to show how perceptions about the perceived value of Black representation as a way of knowing is influenced by identity, culture, and social schemas. Incorporating new methodologies and approaches focused on inclusion and belonging, it will appeal to scholars, researchers, upper-level and post-graduate students with interest in STEM education, race and ethnicity in education, equity, and research methods in education. Visit: https://www.routledge.com/9781032757193 for more information.
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Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I present some of the more famous work in cognitive science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain systematic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity of philosophy could be constrained. Then I present evidence that, according to performance on the CRT (Frederick 2005), those who have benefited from training and selection in philosophy are indeed less prone to one kind of systematic error: irrationally arbitrating between intuitive and reflective responses. Nonetheless, philosophers are not entirely immune to this systematic error, and their proclivity for this error is statistically related to their responses to a variety of philosophical questions. So, while the evidence herein puts constraints on the worries about the integrity of philosophy, it by no means eliminates these worries. The conclusion, then, is that the present evidence offers prima facie reasons to ascribe a mitigated privilege to philosophers' ability to rationally arbitrate between intuitive and reflective responses.
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