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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
Pavlos Vasilopoulos
1
•Romain Lachat
1
ÓMacmillan Publishers Ltd 2017
Abstract Authoritarianism is a key concept in personality psychology, with a
strong impact on political behavior in the United States. Yet, it has rarely been
included in studies of political behavior in Europe. Drawing on a nationwide rep-
resentative sample of the French electorate, we assess the demographic correlates of
authoritarianism, as well as its impact on ethnic intolerance, economic conser-
vatism, and propensity to vote for the four major French political parties. Results
suggest that authoritarianism is positively associated with both intolerance and
economic conservatism. Moreover, there is a strong and positive impact of
authoritarianism on the propensity to vote for the far right Front National. Finally,
contrary to the common left-wing authoritarianism thesis, we find a significant and
negative association between authoritarianism and voting for the far left in France,
both with and without taking attitudinal factors into account. These findings extend
our understanding of the personality trait of authoritarianism and its impact on vote
choice and political attitudes.
Keywords Authoritarianism Voting choice Political issues France
&Pavlos Vasilopoulos
pavlos.vasilopoulos@sciencespo.fr
Romain Lachat
romain.lachat@sciencespo.fr
1
Cevipof, Sciences Po, 98 rue de l’Universite
´, 75007 Paris, France
Acta Polit
DOI 10.1057/s41269-017-0066-9
Introduction
The recent rise in the electoral appeal of authoritarian populism on both sides of the
Atlantic has led to the revival of an old concept in political psychology. More than
60 years ago, Adorno et al. (1950) portrayed the Authoritarian Personality (TAP), a
type of personality that was excessively prejudiced and aggressive toward
minorities and at the same time was ‘‘particularly susceptible to anti-democratic
propaganda’’ (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 1). The publication of the book was a milestone
transition in the study of political behavior, bringing for the first time to the fore
personality as an explanatory variable of social and political attitudes to a literature
largely analyzing political choice on the basis of socio-economic status and self-
interest. Subsequent theoretical and methodological criticism paled TAP into
insignificance, until a resurgence in the 1980s. In the late 2000s, more than half a
century since the publication of TAP, and after having been through significant
refinements, the concept is currently witnessing its second revival in the United
States in the context of the increasing interdisciplinary dialogue between psychol-
ogy and political science (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler
2009,2015; Johnston and Wronski 2015; Stenner 2005).
In Europe, in contrast, this concept has received far less attention in recent years.
A number of studies on the structure of citizens’ political preferences have stressed
the role of a value divide between ‘‘libertarian’’ and ‘‘authoritarian’’ preferences,
which taps varying levels of adherence to traditional social norms and morals
(Evans et al. 1996; Tilley 2005). Yet, the type of items used in these scales typically
capture manifestations of authoritarianism, by measuring support for authoritarian
policies, rather than aiming at measuring a psychological disposition (Feldman
2013). Moreover, these values are not conceptualized as aspects of personality
stemming from psychological structures. Rather they are considered as the product
of the new cleavages that arose during the transition to the postmodern society, due
to transformations of personal choices, increasing affluence, and expanding levels of
education that led to a questioning of the authority of traditional social institutions
and norms (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1997; Stubager 2008).
Similarly, several studies have looked into the impact of the endorsement of
authoritarian policies on the vote, and especially the far right vote in France
(Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Mayer 2013; Mayer and Perrineau 1992; Tillman
2016). The items used to approach authoritarianism in these works typically consist
of attitudinal questions that touch on various epiphenomena of the authoritarian
dispositions, such as attitudes toward censorship, the death penalty, or harshness of
penalties for offenders. At the same time the correlates of the trait of authoritar-
ianism, and especially its impact on voting behavior, have received surprisingly
little attention. Two notable exceptions are Dunn (2015) and Aichholzer and
Zandonella (2016) who studied the association of authoritarianism, perceived and
measured as a personality trait, with political behavior. They find a significant
impact of authoritarianism on voting for the Far Right in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
This article focuses on several aspects of the role of authoritarianism as
a psychological disposition in explaining political behavior. Focusing on the French
case, it investigates authoritarianism in three ways. First, it assesses the distribution
of authoritarianism across social and demographic groups. Emphasis is placed here
on Lipset’s thesis over the existence of potent authoritarian tendencies among the
working class due to this group’s specific life habits (Lipset 1960). Second, we
assess the effect of authoritarianism on economic and social values, investigating
the impact of authoritarianism in these key aspects of political ideology. Finally, we
explore the potential of authoritarianism in explaining party choice, with a special
emphasis over the existence and characteristics of left-wing authoritarianism in
France.
Overall this paper extends current knowledge on authoritarianism in two ways.
First, it investigates the social correlates of authoritarianism and its behavioral
consequences using a refined measure of this concept, which does not suffer from
the methodological flaws that undermined the validity of previous measures.
Second, it investigates the time-honored hypothesis over the association of
authoritarianism with economic conservatism and political identifications, by
tapping into the authoritarian disposition directly, rather than relying on attitudinal
products of authoritarianism, such as the endorsement of authoritarian policies or
tolerance toward outgroups.
France represents an interesting case for the study of authoritarianism, for at least
three reasons. First, France is experiencing a vast rise of the Far Right, as
highlighted by the recent win of the Front National in the 2014 European
Parliamentary election, as well as its impressive performance in the 2015 French
Regional and 2017 Presidential elections. Moreover, the Far Right in France is
particularly popular among the working class (Mayer 2014), a social group that has
long been hypothesized to be carriers of an authoritarian disposition. Second, even
though social characteristics such as social class and religiosity had been pivotal in
explaining voting choices in France in the past, their influence has significantly
declined.
1
This underlies the need for alternative explanations of voting choice, and
until now, the role of authoritarianism has not been added to the puzzle. Third, there
has been much speculation during the past decade in France over a possible
authoritarian tendency on the far left of the political spectrum. Yet, until now, no
study has investigated the attitudinal and voting preferences of authoritarians in
France.
Conceptual and methodological perspectives on authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is seen as a long-term, dispositional orientation that remains fairly
stable throughout the life cycle and predicts a number of political attitudes such as
prejudice toward ethnic groups, homosexuals, and women. The authors of TAP
1
In a recent study, the combined impact of age, gender, social class, church attendance, education, and
income only accounted for six percent of the variability in vote choice in the first round of the 2012
French presidential election (Vasilopoulos et al. 2015).
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
conceptualized authoritarianism as a personality syndrome, consisting of nine inter-
associated dimensions: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian
aggression, anti-intraception, power and toughness, stereotypy and superstition,
generalized destructiveness and cynicism, exaggerated concerns of sex, and the
projectivity of one’s aggressive impulses toward society. By employing theoretical
tools from Freudian psychology, Adorno et al. (1950) argued that authoritarianism
has its roots in childhood and especially in the psychological responses of the child
to the presence of a stern and distant father. Simply put, they suggested
that the feelings of aggression stemming from a rigid and harsh parenthood
are repressed by the child. In turn these repressed feelings transform (through the
Freudian mechanism of displacement) to aggression toward outgroups.
In the years that followed its publication, TAP came under scrutiny on both
theoretical and methodological grounds. A basic focus of this criticism was the
employment of the Freudian framework, questionable in modern psychology
research, to connect child-rearing processes with the future development of
authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981; Duckitt 1992). Moreover, Adorno et al. were
criticized for failing to account for alternative explanations on the origins of TAP,
such as absence of education, low intelligence, and socio-economic status (Brown
1965). Finally, according to others, the F-scale, the original instrument used in the
study to measure authoritarianism, had a series of flaws that included acquiescence
bias effects and weak correlations among its components (Altemeyer 1981; Brown
1965).
Despite these criticisms, the main idea of the existence of an enduring
authoritarian disposition persisted. A subsequent refinement of authoritarianism as a
long-term psychological orientation was proposed by Altemeyer (1981,1988,1996)
and his concept of ‘‘Right-Wing Authoritarianism’’ (RWA). Altemeyer avoids
defining RWA as a personality trait but rather refers to it as an enduring orientation
or predisposition. RWA has three associated components: ‘‘a high degree of
submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in
the society in which one lives’’; ‘‘a general aggressiveness, directed against various
persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities’’; as well as
‘‘a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be
endorsed by society and its established authorities’’ (Altemeyer 1981, p. 148).
Essentially Altemeyer keeps only three out of the nine components set forward by
Adorno et al., namely authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and
conventionalism. Even though Altemeyer, similarly to Adorno et al., located the
roots of authoritarianism in childhood, he rejected the psychoanalytic interpretation
employed in TAP in favor of social learning theory. He traces the origins of the
development of authoritarianism within a person primarily from children’s imitation
of the behavior and attitudes of their parents. At the same time, he acknowledges the
influence of agents outside the family such as teachers, neighbors, friends, and even
television personalities, but the latter are secondary. Finally, similarly to Adorno,
Altemeyer considers, by and large, RWA as a disposition that is maintained
throughout the life cycle and is subject to major fluctuations only with dramatic
changes in one’s personal and social environment.
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
Regarding measurement, the RWA scale consists of 30 items and provides a
balanced set of positively and negatively worded statements that tap authoritarian
aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. The battery includes
items such as ‘‘What our country needs most is discipline with everyone following
our leaders in unity,’’ ‘‘It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities
censored magazines so that people would not get their hands on trashy and
disgusting material,’’ or ‘‘Gays and lesbians are as healthy and moral as anybody
else.’’ The RWA scale correlates highly with several manifestations of authoritar-
ianism such as ethnocentrism, economic conservatism, and prejudice against ethnic
groups, women, and homosexuals (Altemeyer 1998; McFarland and Abelson 1996).
Yet these high correlations became a point of criticism. Several scholars argued that
there exists a considerable overlap between the items of the RWA scale and the
target variables which it is supposed to predict. More specifically, some of the RWA
items tap support for authoritarian policies and hostility toward outgroups, rather
than a broad authoritarian disposition (Cohrs 2013; Feldman 2003,2013; Stenner
2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). In this sense, the criticism is
that despite conceptualizing authoritarianism as a disposition, RWA measures the
expression of this disposition, i.e., political attitudes, and that RWA would be more
suitable as a dependent variable, rather as a core disposition with explanatory merit
for political attitudes (Feldman 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005).
As Feldman (2003, p. 45) puts it, ‘‘a reasonable critique of much research using the
RWA scale is that it only shows that a measure of prejudice and intolerance predicts
prejudice and intolerance.’’
In an effort to move away from the narrow conceptualization of authoritarianism
by RWA, Feldman and his colleagues proposed a second major refinement to the
concept (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Feldman’s reconceptualization rests on the
idea that being a member of a society creates a trade-off between the opposing
values of personal autonomy and social control. This trade-off is an inescapable
aspect of any society. Different individuals attach different importance to these
conflicting values. On the one hand, some people will be almost exclusively
concerned with personal autonomy. These individuals will overly value diversity
and freedom at the expense of conventionalism and authority. In turn this inclination
will lead them to be supportive of civil liberties and outgroups that do not abide to
conventional norms. On the other hand, some citizens will give much weight to
social conformity, favoring obedience, clinging to authority and social norms,
perceiving the latter as stemming from some form of higher authority (Feldman
2003, p. 49). Consequently, they will be supportive of restrictions on various civil
liberties, and will be intolerant and prejudiced toward outgroups. Moreover,
according to Feldman, as people who deviate from social norms may well be
perceived as a threat to social order by conformists, individuals who overly favor
social conformity will both be more in favor of restricting civil liberties and at the
same time exhibit punitive behavior toward non-conformists.
This novel approach of authoritarianism was accompanied by an improved
measurement of this trait. The goal was to create a scale that captures the value
trade-off between personal autonomy and social control with high validity and
reliability. Furthermore, in order to avoid tautology (as was the case with RWA) and
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
be applicable across different cultures and time periods, the scale had to avoid any
reference to specific targets or political arrangements (Stenner 2005). Several
researchers proposed a battery based on child-rearing values. Respondents are
presented with pairs of qualities that may be fostered among children, and asked
each time to indicate which one they consider to be most important. More
specifically, respondents have to indicate whether it is more important for a child to
be independent or respectful of his/her parents or grandparents, to have an enquiring
mind or be well-mannered, to be well-behaved or creative, and to be obedient or
autonomous (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). The key role played by
child-rearing values in tapping distinct worldviews had already been highlighted
since the early 1960s. As Martin (1964, p. 86) argues ‘‘how to ‘bring up’ or socialize
children is a matter of profound consequence, involving basic human values and
objectives.’’ The child-rearing values scale taps the trade-off that lies at the heart of
the concept of authoritarianism, namely the dilemma between personal autonomy
and submission to conventional norms, without at the same time touching on
specific political objects. Moreover, the dimension has been found to exist in
different cultures (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Subsequent studies have demonstrated
that the scale has high validity (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), correlating highly
with need for cognition, attitudes toward gay rights, religiosity, foreign policy,
ethnocentrism, but also Altemeyer’s RWA scale in several countries (Hetherington
and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). A growing number
of scholars use the child-rearing value items to measure authoritarianism (Brandt
and Henry 2012; Brandt and Reyna 2014; Federico et al. 2011; Henry 2011;
Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Before we proceed in our empirical analysis, a word of caution is needed. As we
mentioned above, authoritarianism has been conceptualized as a personality trait
(Adorno et al. 1950), a long-term, socially learned cluster of orientations rooted in
childhood (Altemeyer 1981), and as a disposition (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005).
The exact nature of authoritarianism still puzzles researchers today (Hetherington
and Weiler 2009). For the purposes of this article, we remain agnostic as to whether
authoritarianism is a personality type or a stable disposition that complements
political ideology. However, at the very minimum, and in line with all approaches
on the topic, we consider authoritarianism as a dispositional trait that is causally
prior to political attitudes and vote choices.
The social origins and political consequences of authoritarianism
After having presented the concept and measurement of authoritarianism, we turn to
the questions that relate to its social correlates and its effects on political attitudes
and behavior. These are the aspects that will lie at the center of our empirical study.
More precisely, we will investigate how authoritarianism varies between social
classes and religious groups. Also, we consider its impact on economic and cultural
attitudes, as well as on voting choice. Past research in the United States has provided
evidence on the distribution of authoritarianism in specific social groups. In his
famous ‘‘Working class authoritarianism’’ essay, Lipset (1960) posits that the socio-
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
economic profile as well as the life conditions faced by members of the lower social
classes contribute to the cultivation of authoritarian tendencies. More specifically,
he argued that lack of education, absence of thick social bonds due to geographical
isolation, solitary employment, economic insecurity, and physical punishment
practices within the family, all foster the development of authoritarianism. Further,
Lipset argued that authoritarianism should be associated with support for left-wing
economic policies, arguing that the two go hand in hand as they both are
complementary facets of the Communist ideology that was predominantly endorsed
by the working class (1960).
A number of studies have critically examined the Lipset thesis, and many have
reassessed the expected relation between social class and authoritarianism.
Scheepers et al. (1990) investigated the social correlates using the original F-scale
in the Netherlands, and found evidence that, regardless of differences in education,
authoritarianism runs high among unskilled workers, yet no more than farmers or
the self-employed. Other scholars however suggest that education is in fact the key
correlate of authoritarianism. The knowledge and development of cognitive skills
that come with education makes it easier for the educated individual to cope with
diversity and complexity (Stenner 2005). An additional explanation is that
differences in mean authoritarianism between the high and low educated may to
some extent reflect differences in cognitive ability (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Grabb (1979), for instance, argued that differences in education are the main driving
factors behind the association of working class and intolerance of outgroups,
followed by levels of income and cynicism. Similarly, Dekker and Ester (1987)
administered the F-scale to a representative sample in the Netherlands and found
social class to be insignificant, once controlling for age, education level, and
urbanity. Drawing on a World Values Survey data that included 19 countries,
Napier and Jost (2008) investigated the association of facets of authoritarianism
with education and income. They found that while obedience and cynicism were
negatively associated with education and income, moral absolutism and conven-
tionalism were not.
Besides social class and education, a broad stream of research argues that an
additional causal antecedent of authoritarianism is religiosity, as captured by one’s
frequency of church attendance. Interestingly, the effect remains consistent across
religious dogmas (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996,1998; Canetti-Nisim 2004;
Hunsberger 1995; McCleary et al. 2011; Osborne and Sibley 2014). The explanation
for the positive impact of religiosity on authoritarianism is that most organized
religions preach the adherence to tradition and social conformity which are both key
components of authoritarianism (Osborne and Sibley 2014). In addition, church
environments combine the taught intolerance toward certain groups, such as
homosexuals, with an uncritical attitude and a dogmatic certainty toward the in-
group’s beliefs (Altemeyer 1996,1998).
This brings us to a first set of three hypotheses, which concern the association of
social characteristics with authoritarianism. Based on the research presented above,
we anticipate that authoritarianism will be higher among the working class (H
1
),
positively associated with church attendance (H
2
), and negatively associated with
education (H
3
). In addition, following Lipset’s claim, we anticipate that
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
authoritarianism will be associated with support for left-wing economic policies
among the working class, as the economic insecurity experienced by these segments
of the population may forge a higher demand both for authoritarian tendencies and
economic protection (H
4
).
A further question concerns the broader relation between authoritarianism and
political ideology. Several studies have indicated that authoritarianism is often
associated with support for populist right or extreme right ideology (Aichholzer and
Zandonella 2016; Dunn 2015). Attitudinal products of authoritarianism, such as
intolerance, ethnocentrism and prejudice, are also more frequently found at the right
end of the ideological scale (see Mayer et al. 2016 for the case of France). Yet, the
relationship between authoritarianism and ideology is less straightforward than one
could expect from these findings. This is due to two main reasons.
The first concerns the content of conservatism itself. For some researchers, the
term ‘‘conservative’’ encompasses two independent dimensions: economic conser-
vatism and social conservatism (Stenner 2005,2009; see also Feldman and Johnston
2014). According to Stenner, while social conservatism is conceptually identical
with authoritarianism, it is independent or even negatively associated to economic
conservatism. In her own words, it is ‘‘illogical’’ that ‘‘those who demand
authoritative constraints on the individual in all matters moral, political, and racial
would tend to reject government intervention in the economy’’ (Stenner 2009,
p. 146). On the other hand, Jost and his colleagues offer an alternative
conceptualization of the relationship of authoritarianism, social, and economic
conservatism. They argue that conservatism includes two associated aspects,
namely the acceptance of inequality and the resistance to social change (Carney
et al. 2008; Jost et al. 2003,2008,2009). According to them, conservatives have
deep epistemic and existential needs that include a high sense of threat, an increased
intolerance to uncertainty, and a strong need for order (Jost et al. 2003,2008,2009).
Based on this approach one should expect that authoritarianism should have a
positive impact on conservative policy preferences regardless whether these are
social or economic in content. In fact, drawing on ESS data and using a proxy of
authoritarianism consisting of four components, Napier and Jost (2008) report a
positive relationship between two aspects of their authoritarianism scale (conven-
tionalism and moral absolutism) and economic conservatism.
The second feature that makes the relationship between authoritarianism and
left–right ideology puzzling concerns the hypothesized presence of authoritarian
tendencies among far left groups. In fact, one of the aspects on which TAP was
initially criticized is the almost exclusive focus on the ‘‘nativist-fundamentalist’’
aspects of authoritarianism. Several authors argued for a U-shaped distribution of
authoritarianism along the left–right axis (Eysenck 1954; Rokeach 1960; Shils
1954). As Shils (1954) puts it, ‘‘at the left pole of their continuum, there is to be
found an authoritarian impressively like the Authoritarianism of the Right.’’ The
idea of the existence of a left-wing authoritarian is as old as the concept of
authoritarianism itself, and rests on two main grounds. The first brings up
similarities between the communist and fascist regimes. The content of the
communist ideology and the totalitarian regimes that had been installed based on it
epitomize authoritarian preferences for rigidity, order, and submission to authority,
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
all of which are, as we discussed above, central values of authoritarianism. The
second line of argumentation refers to supposed similarities between the psycho-
logical profiles of adherents of far left and right ideologies. Eysenck (1954) has
claimed that what connects the two extremes of the left–right continuum is a
tendency to be rigid, inflexible, and tough-minded, whereas he considered moderate
individuals to be more humanistic, open, and tender-minded. The bulk of studies
however have refuted the existence of left-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1996;
Stone 1980).
2
During the last decade, the idea of some form of convergence between the far left
and the far right in terms both of programmatic positions and electoral support
appears to be regaining ground, both in France and in the rest of Europe. The
parallelism is partly grounded on the fact that both political families appeal to
groups who are hurt the most by the economic crisis and sometimes appear to justify
violence and aggression (Visser et al. 2014). Another line of argumentation touches
on Euroscepticism and the existence of an assumed common nationalistic trait
between the far left and far right. This aspect became the center of discussion in the
aftermath of the 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty and the
divisions inside the Socialist Party that eventually gave birth to the Far Left Parti de
Gauche.
3
More recently, Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) compared party manifestos on
the issue of European integration in France and Greece to conclude that ‘‘there is a
trend where radical parties whether right or left are consistently nationalist and
Eurosceptic’’ (2012, p. 523). Apart from programmatic convergence, an additional
aspect concerns the overlap between the electorates of the far left and the far right.
Perrineau (2016) identifies three types of overlap: The first concerns Front National
voters who come from left leaning families, the second concerns FN voters who
place themselves to the far left, while the third concerns FN voters who vote for the
Left in the second round of Presidential elections. However, it is unclear to which
extent these similarities are a reflection of authoritarianism in the far left and right
electorates.
Based on this discussion, we can formulate two additional hypotheses. In line
with the arguments of Stenner and Jost et al., among others, we expect
authoritarians to exhibit increased ethnic intolerance (H
5
). Further, we anticipate
that authoritarianism will increase the likelihood to support right-wing parties (H
6
).
Given the divisions in the literature, however, we refrain from making any
prediction about the impact of authoritarianism on economic conservatism and
voting for the far left.
2
Altemeyer posits that since Communism was not the established authority in the Western world, the
concept of left-wing authoritarianism made little sense. Studies conducted in Eastern Europe have indeed
demonstrated that authoritarianism correlates positively with favorable attitudes toward communism
(Hamilton et al. 1995; De Regt et al. 2011).
3
See Reynie
´(2005) for an overview.
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
Methodology and data
Our data come from the first two waves of the 2017 French Election Study,
4
carried
out in the period of November 20–29, 2015, and from January 22 to February 3,
2016, on a nationwide representative sample. 24,369 respondents participated in the
first wave, and 21,351 (or 88%) in both waves. Interviews were conducted using
computer assisted web interviewing.
5
The demographic, attitudinal, and authoritar-
ianism items come from the first wave, while propensity to vote scores were
measured in the second wave.
Our key variable is authoritarianism which, as described above, is an additive
scale based on four items about child-rearing values. For each of these, respondents
had to choose which value, linked either to personal autonomy or submission to
conventional norms, they considered most important for children to acquire: being
independent or respectful of their parents or grandparents, to have an enquiring
mind or be well-mannered, to be well-behaved or creative, and to be obedient or
autonomous. This additive scale is recoded to the 0–1 range, with higher values
corresponding to a more authoritarian disposition.
6
(Appendix Table 5provides
descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.)
Among socio-demographic variables, we construct a social class schema based
on respondents’ current occupation, following the categories distinguished by the
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
7
That is, we distinguish
between the following groups: farmers, self-employed, managers, middle-level
professionals, clerical and service staff, manual workers, pensioners, other non-
labor force participants. Education is a three-point scale that indicates respondents’
highest diploma: below ‘‘bac’’ (high school diploma, value -1), at the bac level
(value 0), or higher (?1). Age is coded in years and centered at the average (of
46 years). Gender is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for female respondents.
The religiosity variable, finally, is based on the level of church attendance. It is a
five-point scale that ranges between 0 ‘‘never’’ and 1 ‘‘at least once a week.’’
As far as attitudinal and political variables are concerned, our analyses include
ethnic intolerance and economic conservatism attitudes, as well as propensities to
vote for the four major French parties. The scale of ethnic intolerance is based on a
battery of questions related to immigration and Islam. It includes four items, all
measured on five-point Likert scales, that ask respondents whether they agree or
disagree with the following statements: ‘‘Islam is a threat to the West,’’ ‘‘Children of
immigrants born in France are French as anyone else’’ (R), ‘‘Immigration is a source
4
The 2017 French Election Study began in November 2015 and was concluded in June 2017 after
collecting 16 waves of responses.
5
In the French Election Study, the sample was quota controlled for age, gender, professional status, and
stratified by size of community and region (Ile de France, North-West, Northeast, South-West, South-
East). The study was conducted for the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po by the polling
institute Ipsos.
6
The scale yields a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.60, which is considered sufficient given the few items of the
scale (see Hetherington and Suhay 2011). A tetrachoric correlation analysis showed that all items are
positively and significantly correlated yielding coefficients that range between 0.38 and 0.54.
7
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=nomenclatures/pcs2003/pcs2003.htm.
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
of cultural enrichment’’ (R), and ‘‘There are too many immigrants in France.’’ Items
denoted with a R where reversed to construct the scale, which shows a high degree
of consistency, with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.84. The scale of economic conservatism
is based on one question capturing attitudes toward economic redistribution.
Participants in the survey were invited to indicate on a five-point scale whether or
not they agree with the statement ‘‘In terms of social justice, we should take from
the rich and give to the poor.’’ Both attitudinal scales were recoded to the 0–1 range
for the purpose of our analyses, with higher values corresponding to more
conservative preferences.
In order to assess the impact of authoritarianism on support for right-wing
populist and other parties, we rely on measures of party utilities or ‘‘voting
propensities’’ (van der Eijk et al. 2006). These capture the perceived electoral
attractiveness of various parties in competition, and have been widely used as the
dependent variable in models of vote choice. These expected party utilities are
measured by asking respondents to indicate how likely they are to ‘‘ever vote’’ for a
given party. Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, ranging from ‘‘not likely at
all’’ to ‘‘very likely,’’ and coded into the 0–1 range for the purpose of these analyses.
Compared to traditional measures of electoral choice, they have the advantage of
being measured separately for each party and respondent. This allows for a more
fine-grained test of the impact of authoritarianism and other variables on party
preferences. In our analyses, we focus on the expected utilities for the main two
mainstream parties, the Socialist Party and the center right Les Re
´publicains, as well
as the right-wing populist Front National, and the far left Parti de Gauche. These
four parties correspond to the main players in the French partisan landscape at the
time in which the surveys were conducted.
8
The social correlates of authoritarianism in France
As a first step, we explore the relation between socio-demographic characteristics
and authoritarianism. There are clear differences between social classes in the
average levels of authoritarianism (Fig. 1). The overall sample average is at 0.64
(on the 0–1 scale), a value which is similar to that observed in other countries (see
Stenner 2005, p. 92). The lowest levels of authoritarianism are found among
managers (0.57) and the highest among manual workers (0.70) and clerical and
service staff (0.67). Authoritarianism runs higher among the working class. This
finding confirms our first hypothesis. Moreover, in line with past research in the
United States (Altemeyer 1998; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and our second
hypothesis, results show a negative association of education with levels of
authoritarianism (Fig. 2). The difference between the highest and lowest groups is
about 0.13 points, which is similar to that between higher-grade professionals and
manual workers.
8
Note that La Re´publique en Marche, the party of the current French President Emmanuel Macron, did
not exist yet at the time, as it was founded in April 2016.
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
Further, results confirm our third hypothesis as we observe a positive association
between religiosity and authoritarianism, though it appears to be less systematic
than in the case of education (Fig. 3). The largest contrast between religious groups
is about 0.1 point. Furthermore, the largest differences are found between those
respondents who never attend a religious service, and those who go at least
sometimes. A further increase in the frequency of church attendance is not clearly
linked with higher levels of authoritarianism.
In order to analyze the socio-economic correlates of authoritarianism in more
detail, we estimate a regression model that includes social class, education, and
religiosity, as well as age and gender as further socio-demographic controls. While
.5 .6 .7 .8
Authoritarianism
Farmers
Self−employed
Managers
Mid−level professionals
Clerical/Service
Workers
Pensioners
Others
Fig. 1 Mean level of authoritarianism by social class, with 95% confidence intervals
.5 .6 .7 .8
Authoritarianism
Below bac Bac Above bac
Fig. 2 Mean level of authoritarianism by education, with 95% confidence intervals
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
all of the contrasts highlighted above remain significant, we notice that the
magnitude of the class differences is somewhat smaller in this multivariate analysis
(Table 1). This is mainly due to the effect of respondents’ education level. One of
the reasons behind the higher level of authoritarianism of the working class is the
lower average level of education. But nonetheless, we still observe significant
differences, with authoritarian dispositions being lowest among higher-grade
professionals, and highest among manual and non-manual workers.
.5 .6 .7 .8
Authoritarianism
Never
Only special occasions
Sometimes
1−2 times/month
Once a week or more
Fig. 3 Mean level of authoritarianism by religiosity, with 95% confidence intervals
Table 1 Relation between
socio-economic variables and
authoritarianism
*p\0.05; ** p\0.01;
*** p\0.001
Coef. Std. err.
Social class (ref: middle-level professionals)
Farmers -0.03 0.02
Self-employed -0.02 0.01
Managers -0.03*** 0.01
Clerical and service staff 0.04*** 0.01
Manual workers 0.04*** 0.01
Pensioners 0.01 0.01
Non-labor force participants -0.01 0.01
Education level -0.06*** 0.00
Religiosity 0.14*** 0.01
Age 0.00*** 0.00
Female 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.62*** 0.01
N24,325
R
2
0.05
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
We now move to the second step of our analysis, considering the relation
between authoritarianism and attitudes toward ethnic intolerance and economic
conservatism. As mentioned above, our measure of ethnic intolerance is based on a
battery of questions about attitudes toward immigration and Islam, while economic
conservatism is captured by a question on income redistribution. At the bivariate
level, authoritarianism is moderately associated with ethnic intolerance (correlation
of 0.35), but only marginally related to economic conservatism (correlation of 0.05).
Table 2reports the results of more detailed regression models. When controlling for
a range of socio-demographic characteristics, authoritarianism has a positive and
significant impact on ethnic intolerance. Same is the case with economic
conservatism, although the effect although statistically significant is so small that
is not substantively important. In terms of the other individual characteristics, we
see that ethnic intolerance in France is higher among male, older, less educated, and
more religious citizens, as well as those with a lower professional background. At
the same time, results suggest that despite controlling for these characteristics,
authoritarianism bears a positive and statistically significant impact on ethnic
intolerance. These results are fully in line with Napier and Jost (2008). Moreover,
results suggest that opposition to economic redistribution is higher among
respondents with a higher level of education, among frequent churchgoers, as well
as among managers, self-employed professionals, and pensioners. The very weak
positive relationship between authoritarianism and opposition to income
Table 2 Impact of authoritarianism and socio-economic characteristics on political attitudes
Ethnic intolerance Economic conservatism
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Authoritarianism 0.26*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.01
Social class (ref: middle-level professionals)
Farmers 0.05* 0.02 0.04 0.02
Self-employed 0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01
Managers -0.01* 0.01 0.05*** 0.01
Clerical and service staff 0.06*** 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Manual workers 0.06*** 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Pensioners 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01
Non-labor force participants 0.04*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Education level -0.03*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.00
Religiosity 0.06*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01
Age 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female -0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.00
Constant 0.35*** 0.01 0.35*** 0.01
N24,304 24,321
R
2
0.16 0.03
*p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
redistribution stands against Stenner’s hypothesis over the association between
authoritarianism and support for left-wing economic policies.
However, as we discussed in the previous section, the relationship between
authoritarianism and economic conservatism may be conditioned by social class
(H
4
). In line with Lipset’s thesis we may expect higher levels of authoritarianism to
be associated with left-wing economic policies among working-class individuals,
but not among other social classes. To examine this possibility, we estimated a
similar model of the impact of authoritarianism on economic conservatism, letting
this effect be conditional on social class. This shows indeed that the relation
between authoritarianism and opposition to redistribution differs between classes. It
is strong and positive among higher social classes (managers, middle-level
professionals, self-employed), while it is weaker or null among manual and non-
manual workers (as well as among non-labor force participants). The full results of
this model can be seen in Appendix (Table 6). Figure 4illustrates this difference by
showing the contrast between manual workers and managers. Contrary to our
hypothesis (H
4
), authoritarianism is not associated with increased support for left-
wing economic policies among the working class. On the contrary, we find a strong
positive effect of authoritarianism on economic conservatism among the upper
classes. This finding illustrates that instead of left economic attitudes reflecting
working-class authoritarianism it is conservative economic attitudes that partly stem
from authoritarian inclinations among the economically affluent.
We now move on to assess the impact of authoritarianism on the propensity to
vote for the four major French parties: the center left incumbent Parti Socialiste, the
center right Les Re
´publicains, the far left Parti de Gauche, and the far right Front
National. At the bivariate level, authoritarianism is significantly related to the
propensity to vote for each of these parties. Citizens with a more authoritarian
disposition have a higher expected utility for Les Re
´publicains (correlation of 0.12)
.35 .4 .45 .5 .55
Linear Prediction
low .25 .5 .75 high
Authoritarianism scale
Managers Manual workers
Fig. 4 Predicted values of Economic conservatism, by social class and level of authoritarianism
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
Table 3 Authoritarianism, socio-economic characteristics, political attitudes, and support for left-wing parties
Parti de Gauche Parti Socialiste
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Authoritarianism -0.14*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.16*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Ethnic intolerance -0.36*** (0.01) -0.59*** (0.01)
Economic conservatism -0.25*** (0.01) -0.19*** (0.01)
Social class (ref: middle-level professionals)
Farmers -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03)
Self-employed -0.09*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.13*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01)
Managers -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Clerical and service staff -0.03*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
Manual workers -0.02* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Pensioners -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Non-labor force participants -0.04*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
Education level -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Religiosity -0.14*** (0.01) -0.09*** (0.01) -0.13*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01)
Age -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00)
Female 0.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.00)
Constant 0.39*** (0.01) 0.60*** (0.01) 0.52*** (0.01) 0.79*** (0.01)
N20,640 20,624 20,591 20,574
R
2
0.05 0.21 0.05 0.25
*p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
Table 4 Authoritarianism, socio-economic characteristics, political attitudes, and support for right-wing parties
Les Re
´publicains Front National
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Authoritarianism 0.13*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.22*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Ethnic intolerance 0.22*** (0.01) 0.83*** (0.01)
Economic conservatism 0.37*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Social class (ref: middle-level professionals)
Farmers 0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Self-employed 0.10*** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Managers 0.05*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
Clerical and service staff 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Manual workers -0.02 (0.01) -0.03* (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Pensioners 0.04*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
Non-labor force participants -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Education level 0.03*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) -0.05*** (0.00) -0.03*** (0.00)
Religiosity 0.28*** (0.01) 0.23*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Age -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00)
Female 0.01* (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.00)
Constant 0.18*** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) -0.17*** (0.01)
N20,109 20,094 20,231 20,215
R
2
0.05 0.17 0.08 0.35
*p\0.05; ** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
and especially for the Front National (r=0.22), while they are less likely to support
the Parti Socialiste (r =-0.17) or Parti de Gauche (r=-0.16). This reflect a
relatively clear left–right contrast in the relation between authoritarianism and
partisan preferences. A stronger authoritarian disposition increases the chances of
supporting a right-wing party, and this effect is even more pronounced for the far
right Front National. At the same time, it lowers the perceived attractiveness of the
main two left-wing parties. These relations remain when controlling for social class
and additional socio-demographics characteristics. This can be seen in the first
model for each party. The corresponding coefficients are presented in Table 3for
left-wing parties, and in Table 4for the right.
However, this effect of authoritarianism largely disappears when controlling for
attitudinal preferences (Model 2). It becomes indistinguishable from zero for the
Socialist Party and the Front National, while some marginal effect remains for the
Parti de Gauche and for Les Re
´publicains. But even in that case, the effect is
strongly weakened. This shows that differences in partisan preferences between
citizens with stronger or weaker authoritarian dispositions are almost entirely
mediated by differences in political attitudes. Authoritarianism does not exert a
direct impact on partisan preferences—or at least not a very strong one. In line with
the previous findings that showed a strong association of authoritarianism and ethnic
intolerance, the reduction of the authoritarianism effect is stronger for the party the
support of which is more closely related to attitudes toward ethnic groups, that is,
the Front National.
Conclusion
Much of extant research investigates prejudice and the rise of the far right on the
basis of social group memberships. However, the decline of the explanatory merit of
these traditional theoretical tools calls for alternative explanations of individual
differences on the propensity to vote for populist leaders or endorse anti-immigrant
attitudes. This is why we investigated in this article the socio-demographic origins
of authoritarianism in France as well as its potential to explain political attitudes and
voting preferences, using an improved measure that is free from the methodological
flaws of the past. Our findings largely corroborate two time-honored findings of past
research that employs the RWA or the F-scale: First we find that authoritarianism in
France, as is the case in other national contexts, is higher among people with low
education, the working class, and church goers. When treated as an independent
variable, our results indicate that authoritarianism is a strong and significant
predictor of ethnic intolerance.
At the same time authoritarianism is only weakly related to economic
conservatism. Further, our results stand against the hypothesis of a positive relation
between working-class authoritarianism and the endorsement of left-wing economic
policies. Yet it is noteworthy that despite the very feeble effect of authoritarianism
on economic conservatism on the whole sample, our findings show that authori-
tarianism among the managerial classes is a strong predictor of conservative
attitudes in the economic domain. Taken together, these findings suggest an overall
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
positive association between authoritarianism and economic conservatism in the
case of France. These findings are in line with past studies that have found a positive
relationship between RWA and facets of economic conservatism (Altemeyer 1998).
Finally, the results offer little support for the assumption of a convergence of the
extremes, as they indicate that authoritarianism divides the electorate along the left–
right ideological axis: There is a strong and significant association between
authoritarianism and the propensity to vote for the two right-wing parties, the far
right Front National and Les Re
´publicains. On the contrary, authoritarianism has a
strong negative relationship with voting both for the left, and especially with the
Parti de Gauche. Interestingly, it is often the cases that the impact of authoritar-
ianism exceeds the respective impact of key demographic characteristics such as
social class or religiosity. It should be noted that the combined explanatory power of
models that include only demographics and authoritarianism on the vote is low
compared to models that include political attitudes, indicating that even though
authoritarianism has an important influence on the vote, still its interpretive merit is
inferior compared to political attitudes.
Future research could build on and extend these findings in multiple ways. First,
expanding the investigation of the relationship between authoritarianism and
preferences for economic policy by including additional items other than attitudes
toward economic redistribution would add to our understanding of the endorsement
of conservative economic preferences that appear to be on the rise in France. These
may include attitudes toward economic inequality, poverty, or cuts in the welfare
state. Moreover, at a broader level this article investigated for the first time in
France the potential of dispositional traits in understanding individual-level
differences in political behavior. Adding additional concepts from political
psychology, such as Social Dominance Orientation, the Big Five, or Need for
Cognition, would shed additional light on how structural psychological differences
may shape both vote intentions and policy preferences, allowing us to capture a full
range of the psychological motivations that these political choices serve (see Jost
et al. 2003 for a discussion). Finally, an interesting question concerns the way in
which authoritarianism interplays with various threatening stimuli such as economic
insecurity, physical threats, terrorism, or the presence of ethnic minorities. The key
question here is whether this wave of authoritarianism that we witness throughout
Europe and the US is due to the activation of authoritarians by various types of
threat and/or a change of the social correlates of authoritarianism. During the last
decade, authoritarianism has reemerged as a key concept for explaining patterns of
prejudice and radical vote choices. Yet, it has rarely been used in analyses of
political choices in Europe. Adding it to political science models could lead to a
better understanding of what drives ideological endorsements, political attitudes,
and voting choices.
Appendix
See Tables 5and 6.
Authoritarianism and political choice in France
Table 5 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Authoritarianism 0.64 0.31 0 1 24,325
Ethnic intolerance 0.54 0.25 0 1 24,304
Economic conservatism 0.44 0.28 0 1 24,365
Voting propensities
Parti de Gauche 0.24 0.29 0 1 20,672
Parti Socialiste 0.37 0.35 0 1 20,622
Les Re
´publicains 0.37 0.35 0 1 20,138
Front National 0.25 0.37 0 1 20,263
Social class
Farmers 0.01 0.08 0 1 24,369
Self-employed 0.03 0.17 0 1 24,369
Managers 0.13 0.34 0 1 24,369
Middle-level professionals 0.18 0.38 0 1 24,369
Clerical and service staff 0.21 0.41 0 1 24,369
Manual workers 0.07 0.26 0 1 24,369
Pensioners 0.23 0.42 0 1 24,369
Non-labor force participants 0.14 0.35 0 1 24,369
Education level 0.40 0.83 -1 1 24,369
Religiosity 0.26 0.21 0 1 24,369
Age 0.00 15.63 -30 51 24,369
Female 0.57 0.50 0 1 24,369
Table 6 An interactive model
of authoritarianism, socio-
economic characteristics, and
economic conservatism
Coef. Std. err.
Authoritarianism 0.10*** 0.01
Social class (ref: middle-level professionals)
Farmers 0.01 0.05
Self-employed 0.10*** 0.02
Managers 0.05*** 0.01
Clerical and service staff 0.03* 0.01
Manual workers 0.05** 0.02
Pensioners 0.07*** 0.01
Non-labor force participants 0.04** 0.01
Interactions
Auth. 9Farmers 0.05 0.07
Auth. 9Self-employed -0.04 0.03
Auth. 9Managers 0.02 0.02
Auth. 9Clerical and service staff -0.07*** 0.02
Auth. 9Manual workers -0.11*** 0.03
Auth. 9Pensioners -0.06** 0.02
P. Vasilopoulos, R. Lachat
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Authoritarianism and political choice in France
