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The International Law of Economic Statecraft in the East-West Trade Context
Abstract
Economic statecraft, in the broad meaning given to the term by David Baldwin,1 could not as such be an object for international law analysis. International law seeks to control the conduct of states. Under a conduct-oriented approach, certain types of action, the authors of such action, its addressees, and its objectives have to be identified before legal analysis can be applied. What type of economic statecraft, therefore, are we confronted with in the context of East-West trade?
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When, on October 24, 1983, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California handed down its decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America and denied U.S. jurisdiction out of regard for the Honduran “system of justice,” there may have been some surprise that the case was still pending. The Timberlane decision of 1976 of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the matter to the district court, had already become a classic, even though it was preceded by the 1968 decision in United States v. First National City Bank on the production of documents located abroad. The Timberlane approach outlined by Judge Choy, under which the exercise of antitrust jurisdiction has to be restrained by a case-by-case analysis of various factors, was widely discussed (and usually praised) in legal writing, and was also followed by federal courts of the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 34th Supp; for a survey of CoCom and its geographic coverage, cf. Berman and Garson, “United States Export Controls—Past, Present, and Future
Permanent Court of International JusticeThe Principles and Standards of International Economic Law
- For A Classic Reference
- P C I J See Oscar Chinn Case
For a discussion of the notion of “enlightened self-interest” see Karl M. Meessen, “Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law