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Journal of Environmental Planning and Management
ISSN: 0964-0568 (Print) 1360-0559 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjep20
An embodied perspective on the co-production
of cultural ecosystem services: toward embodied
ecosystems
Christopher M. Raymond, Matteo Giusti & Stephan Barthel
To cite this article: Christopher M. Raymond, Matteo Giusti & Stephan Barthel (2017):
An embodied perspective on the co-production of cultural ecosystem services: toward
embodied ecosystems, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, DOI:
10.1080/09640568.2017.1312300
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2017.1312300
Published online: 22 May 2017.
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An embodied perspective on the co-production of cultural ecosystem
services: toward embodied ecosystems
Christopher M. Raymond
a
*, Matteo Giusti
b
and Stephan Barthel
b,c
a
Department of Landscape Architecture, Planning and Management, Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Alnarp, Sweden;
b
Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University,
Stockholm, Sweden;
c
Department of the Built Environment, University of Ga€vle, Ga€vle, Sweden
(Received 6 July 2016; final version received 24 March 2017)
Despite arguments justifying the need to consider how cultural ecosystem services are
coproduced by humans and nature, there are currently few approaches for explaining the
relationships between humans and ecosystems through embodied scientific realism. This
realism recognises that human–environment connections are not solely produced in the
mind, but through relations between mind, body, culture and environment through time.
Using affordance theory as our guide, we compare and contrast embodied approaches to
common understandings of the co-production of cultural ecosystem services across three
assumptions: (1) perspective on cognition; (2) the position of socio-cultural processes and
(3) typologies used to understand and value human–environment relationships. To support
a deeper understanding of co-production, we encourage a shift towards embodied
ecosystems for assessing the dynamic relations between mind, body, culture and
environment. We discuss some of the advantages and limitations of this approach and
conclude with directions for future research.
Keywords: affordances; worldviews; social-ecological systems; ‘sense of place’;
relational values; cultural ecosystem services
1. Introduction
Globally, environmental managers are drawing on the ecosystem services framework
(Costanza et al. 2014; Daily 1997; de Groot, Wilson, and Boumans 2002) as a means to
maintain functional ecosystems in the light of threats such as climate change and
increased urbanisation. Structured approaches to valuation of provisioning, regulating,
cultural and supporting services have been developed and applied (e.g. MEA 2005;
TEEB 2010) in order to help decision-makers recognise the diverse forms of benefits
provided by biodiversity and ecosystems. These structured approaches are now being
mainstreamed into environmental policy. For example, Action 5 of the EU Biodiversity
Strategy to 2020 calls Member States to map and assess the state of ecosystems and their
services in their jurisdiction with the assistance of the European Commission (European
Commission 2016). To support a consistent approach to assessment, the Mapping and
Assessment Ecosystems and their Services framework has been developed, which links
socio-economic systems and ecosystems through flows of ecosystem services and
through human and non-human drivers of change that affect ecosystems. Emphasis is
placed on the direct impacts of human use of these services, or the indirect impacts due to
human activities (European Commission 2013; Maes et al. 2012).
*Corresponding author. Email: christopher.raymond@slu.se
Ó2017 Newcastle University
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2017.1312300
We are concerned that the current ecosystem services framework imposes a duality
between aspects of the ecosystem and the cultural system, and promotes an acultural and
decontextualised understanding of the types of benefits provided by ecosystems. The
dominant view is based on a disembodied approach, which views the mind as
independent of the body, culture and the environment. This paper finds that view
arbitrary. The problematic implications of this duality have been presented in recent
critiques, noting that the ecosystem services framework: (1) over-emphasises how
humans economically benefit from the ecosystem, as opposed to understanding how
local, cultural and psychological processes are important in human–environment
relationships (Raymond et al. 2013; Jackson and Palmer 2015; Setten, Stenseke, and
Moen 2012), and (2) superficially considers the inherent qualities of culture (Chan et al.
2012; Daniel et al. 2012), which in part requires us to consider not only how ‘things’
possess inherent worth, but also how individuals relate with nature and society (Chan
et al. 2016; James 2015; van den Born et al. forthcoming).
We begin to address this ecosystem-culture duality by recognising that there is
growing consensus that ecosystem services are co-produced between humans and nature
(Bennett et al. 2015; Palomo et al. 2016; Biggs, Schluter, and Schoon 2015; Andersson,
Barthel, and Ahrn
e2007). Co-production takes on a range of meanings, including: (1)
processes for combining multiples forms of knowledge and evidence to guide ecosystem
management (Guerry et al. 2015; Reyers et al. 2015; Teng€
oet al. 2014); (2) the mutual
entanglement between science and policy (Jasanoff 2006; Cutts, White, and Kinzig 2011)
and (3) the combination of different forms of natural, human, financial and manufactured
capital (including technology and infrastructures) to obtain ecosystem services (Palomo
et al. 2016; Biggs, Schluter, and Schoon 2015). As in point 3 and further literature
(Huntsinger and Oviedo 2014; Raymond et al. 2016), here we focus on the contribution
of human perception and culture to the co-production of ecosystem services. This form of
co-production is premised on the understanding that ecosystems are both physically and
culturally made through human–environment relationships (Setten, Stenseke, and Moen
2012). It is exemplified in many cases where: dry stone walls and hedgerows provide for
aesthetic, cultural heritage as well as ecological values (Raymond et al. 2016); managed
wood pastures provide for aesthetic values and timber production (Plieninger et al.
2015); manufactured capital provides the potential for humans to enjoy multiple cultural
ecosystem services such as recreation, aesthetics and spiritual experiences (Palomo et al.
2016); and children connect to non-human life forms and to one another through nature
routines (Giusti, Barthel, and Marcus 2014).
Despite the attention paid to co-production, we are concerned that there remains a
duality between individuals, culture and the environment in many human-nature
relationship frameworks, which have the potential to undermine successful
environmental management initiatives. The duality is perpetuated by a reliance on
methodologies that are grounded in disembodied scientific realism. In this metatheory,
and the related interactionist or computationalist style of thinking in environmental
psychology (Altman and Rogoff 1987): (1) reality comes divided into subjects and
objects in that aspects of the environment are seen as independent of the properties of
human minds or bodies (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Altman and Rogoff 1987); (2) the
individual is driven by factors located outside in the surroundings and by biological
determinants and (3) the bases for change in the state of the individual are the impacts
stemming from entities and conditions in the surroundings, as well pushes from within
the individual (Heft 2013). Disembodied scientific realism is revealed in co-production
2C.M. Raymond et al.
approaches which attempt to identify and assess the underlying causes of ecosystem
management (e.g. institutions and governance systems) separate from assessments on the
relationships between people and nature (D
ıaz et al. 2015). One can also draw parallels
between this disembodied realism and the ‘measurementality logic’ present in
international biodiversity assessments (Turnhout, Neves, and de Lijster 2014), including
IPBES, where the emphasis is on assessing the environment as a set of standardised units
of stocks, flows and beneficiaries (Borie and Hulme 2015). However, as Flint et al.
(2013) present, there are a range of positions on human-nature relationships (e.g. humans
as master, steward, guardian or participant) as well as multiple ways of characterising the
bond between humans and nature (e.g. utilitarian, altruistic, biocentric), even though the
predominant approach in ecosystem services is to use a utilitarian perspective. Yoshida,
Flint, and Dolan (forthcoming) show how these different positions can be held by US
Midwestern farmers.
In response to these shortcomings, we assert that a shift towards embodied scientific
realism is essential to better account for the dynamic relations between individuals,
cultures and ecosystems. This realism supports the inseparability of subject and object
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Maturana and Varela 1987), or in other words, dynamic,
multi-level relationships are possible between elements of the environmental and cultural
system, which imply that one cannot understand aspects of any ecosystem without also
understanding aspects of the intertwined socio-cultural system, or vice-versa. This
inseparability between environment and culture has been communicated in different
ways. Early works demonstrated that humans’ features and functional abilities need to be
viewed relative to the properties of the environment and that the properties of the
environment also need to be viewed in relation to the characteristics of the human or
animal (Heft 1989,1996). More recently, Muhar et al. (forthcoming) highlight complex
feedback mechanisms within the social-cultural system and ecological system, as well as
between these two systems. Kloek (forthcoming) shows that traditional cultural
representations of nature are associated with people’s perceptions of nature. Cooke, West
and Boonstra (2016) eloquently show that human–environment connections are not
solely produced in the mind, but through relations between mind, body and environment
through time. Fischer and Eastwood (2016) find intersections between the co-production
of ecosystem structures, ecosystem services proper and the social construction of these
structures and services. James (2015) highlights the many ways in which culture and
places are integral to people’s lives, and sets these in contrast to common assessments of
cultural ecosystem services in the environmental management literature. Brown (2016)
demonstrates how the experience of textured terrain can produce sensory and emotional
experiences that motivate regular exercise.
However, we are not aware of any studies that have considered the co-production of
ecosystem services from the perceptual ecological psychology theory of affordances
(Gibson 1979), which is premised on embodied scientific realism. While different
understandings exist, affordances are defined as ‘relations between abilities to perceive
and act and features of the environment’ (Chemero 2009, 150). Affordances define the
possibilities for action provided to an individual by the environment – by the substances,
surfaces, objects, and other living creatures that surround it (Gibson 1979). For example,
a ledge 150 mm high can be an edge-marker for adults and could be tripped over if the
adult is not paying attention to where he/she is going. However, for a child such a ledge
can function as a place to sit, as a structure to climb on and something to leap over (Heft
2010). Three core principles underpin Gibson’s ecological approach (Chemero 2003): (1)
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 3
perception is direct in that it does not involve computational or mental representations;
(2) direct perception-action processes are primarily for the guidance of action and (3)
because perception does not involve mental computational or mental representations yet
it can still guide behaviour, all the information and meaning necessary to guide adaptive
behaviour must be available in the environment to be perceived (Chemero 2009).
In this paper, we address the question of: can embodied scientific realism enhance our
understanding about how cultural ecosystem services are co-produced? We focus here on
cultural ecosystem services, since this category is about how people use, enjoy and obtain
different kinds of benefits from ecosystems. We argue that the co-production of cultural
ecosystem services can be conceptualised differently if we are prepared to adopt
embodied scientific realism, as reflected in embodied ecosystems. By embodied
ecosystems, we referred to relational, situational and dynamical features between humans
and the ecosystem with far-reaching consequences for its management over time. An
embodied perspective addresses an important knowledge gap concerning the complex
relationships between the individual and culture in the co-production of ecosystem
services. The implications of embodied scientific realism in the theory of affordances are
far-reaching. Embodied realism may: help environmental managers to better understand
why conservation strategies that aim to activate individual psychological factors (e.g.
knowledge, values, beliefs) often fail to achieve the desired level of ecosystem
stewardship among land managers; enable environmental managers to better understand
how individual values for ecosystems can change over time, and the processes through
which these changes occur, and; provide a means for valorising both western modern
society visions of biodiversity and those of non-western people, indigenous people and
local communities.
In the sections that follow, we compare and contrast affordance theory to existing
approaches for assessing the co-production of cultural ecosystem services. We base our
comparison on: (1) perspective on cognition; (2) position of socio-cultural processes in
understanding human–environment relationships and (3) typologies used for
understanding and valuing human–environment relationships. We use the insights of this
comparison to present a new approach for valuing cultural ecosystem services, named
embodied ecosystems, which accounts for the dynamic relationships among mind, body,
culture and environment. We then discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this embodied
understanding.
2. Comparing ecosystem service co-production and affordance views on human–
environment relationships
2.1. Perspective on cognition
In the co-production literature, human–environment relationships are commonly defined
by isolating aspects of individual cognition (for example values, attitudes and beliefs)
from aspects of individual behaviour (e.g. Stern et al. 1999). Also, the meaning arising
from sensory perception is considered to be mediated by an internal representation of the
environment, which is then internally processed alongside other cognitive constructs to
form intended and deliberated action (Figure 1). Such independent dynamics are
reflected, for instance, in studies on the effect of communication frames and attitudes
toward ecosystem services on perceived benefits of ecosystem services (Opdam et al.
2015; Casado-Arzuaga, Madariaga, and Onaindia 2013); the effect of values, attitudes
and beliefs on the conservation of ecosystem services (Raymond, Brown, and Robinson
4C.M. Raymond et al.
2011), and; the effect of payments for ecosystem services on pro-social behaviour (Midler
et al. 2015). This theory of mind is computational. The process of thinking is suggested to
be the manipulation of internal representations similar to the functioning of a computer.
‘The basic idea is that the mind is to the brain as the program is to the computer that is
running it’ (Chemero 2009, 167).
Computational models of pro-environmental behaviour that attempt to generalise the
direct and indirect effects of cognition on behaviour are at the roots of disembodied
cognition (Clayton et al. 2016). Two widely used and validated examples are the value-
belief-norm theory (VBN) and the theory of planned-behaviour (TPB). The VBN theory
was devised by Stern and colleagues (Stern 2000; Stern et al. 1999). In a linear fashion, it
considers that values shape one’s environmental worldview, which in turn influences
general beliefs. These general beliefs in turn shape one’s personal norms, which are
thought to determine behaviour. Similarly, the TPB, originally devised by Ajzen (1985,
1991), models in a linear way how subjective norms (i.e. which reflect the way familiar
others evaluate options), perceived behavioural control (i.e. perception of personal
difficulty or ease to realise an option) and attitudes (i.e. positive or negative evaluations
of options) are associated with intentions, which in turn shape behaviour. In relation to
the environment, this means that behaving pro-environmentally depends on having a
positive attitude to behaving, feeling moral support from others, and believing that one
can make a difference.
Figure 1. Disembodied model of cognition, adapted from Hinton (2014).
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 5
In contrast, affordance theory in embodied cognition cuts across the dichotomy of
subjective-objective. In a truly relational fashion, affordances are neither an objective
property nor a subjective property (Gibson 1979), but they are relations between abilities
to perceive and act and features of the environment (Chemero 2009). We synthesise here
three fundamental principles from existing literature that categorically differentiate the
theory of affordances in embodied cognition from computational approaches in
disembodied theories of mind (Wilson and Golonka 2013; Wilson and Madsen Myers
2000; Anderson, Richardson, and Chemero 2012; Heft 2001; Shapiro 2011; Chemero
2009; Heft 2010). i.e. affordances are (1) relational, (2) situational and (3) dynamical.
(1) Affordances are relational. The theory of affordances rejects the computational
model of psychological research. This means that affordances refuses the
disembodied model of cognition in which sensorial perceptions, such as vision,
smelling, or hearing, create a stimulus that is later internally processed by the
brain into a representation of the external environment. As a consequence, in
affordance theory, individual action is not the product of one’s representation of
the environment that is computed alongside rules, values and social norms. In
order to explain behaviour, two processes underpin the theory of affordances,
namely direct perception and actualisation (Kytt€
a2002,2004).In affordance
theory, an individual does not require mental computation or representations
because the perception of meaningful behaviours is readily available in the
environment, hence direct. An individual directly perceives what his/her
opportunities for action are in an environment given the relations between the
observer’s knowledge, intentions, action abilities (constrained by body
morphology and physiology) and the properties of the environment itself (Canal-
Bruland and van der Kamp 2015). Perception is directly functional for the
guidance of action rather than for gathering information that requires what
Chemero terms “mental gymnastics” (Chemero 2009, 18). Because perception is
direct, all meaningful information necessary for guiding behaviour must be
available in the environment (Heft 2010). Thus, the environment provides
opportunities, as well as constraints, for action. Actualisation is then the process
of complementing environmental opportunities with personal abilities. In other
words, the environment provides something that the individual perceives as
offering the potential for activity, but actualisation of the activity only emerges
when the different characteristics of the individual, such as his or her physical
abilities, social needs and personal intentions, are matched in meaningful
relations with the environmental features (Kytt€
a2004).
(2) Affordances are situational. As we just described above, direct perception-action
processes actualise relations between environment, body and mind. It is worth
noticing that the perception-action process always occurs in a situation. Because
perception is direct, meaningful actions are spatially and temporally located (i.e.
situated), ubiquitously providing information about ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘me’ and
‘now’ (Chemero 2009) alongside socially and culturally constructed meanings
(Lave and Wenger 1991; Wengers 1998). Information perceivable in any given
situation specifies patterns of relations between the organism and the
environment (Shapiro 2011). Situations can have motivating qualities, which can
either attract us as in the case, of a low ledge for children or can repel us as in the
case of an aggressive dog (Heft 2010) (Kytt€
a2003). Thus, patterns of affordances
6C.M. Raymond et al.
at any given situation not only offer the opportunity to act, but also can invite and
attract the action (Withagen et al. 2012).
(3) Affordances are dynamical. Perception-action processes are not static, but rather
are constantly changing. An individual’s perception and action in the
environment influences both surroundings (e.g. by manipulating objects,
affecting others, moving) and abilities (e.g. by learning, acquiring new skills),
and in doing so it opens up possibilities for new or reshaped patterns of
affordances (Heft 1996; Shotter 1983). Additionally, because activities take time,
the information included in the perception-action process is dynamical. That
means that direct perception is not only about quantities, as for weight, position,
distance, but also, or primarily, about dynamics and change, as for acceleration,
speed, directions (Chemero 2009).
The paradigmatic consequences of affordance theory on the individual decision-
making processes are summarised by Gibson himself when he writes: “The rules that
govern behaviour are not like laws enforced by an authority or decisions made by a
commander: behaviour is regular without being regulated.” (Gibson 1979, 225).
Embodied cognition therefore holds a paradigmatically different view on what
constitutes human–environment relationships.
2.2. The position of socio-cultural processes in understanding human–environment
relationships
In the co-production literature, cultural ecosystem services are regularly defined in
isolation to physical, supporting and regulating services. For example, research into the
social valuation of ecosystem services has often separated cultural ecosystem services
from other service types (Brown, Montag, and Lyon 2012; Raymond et al. 2009;
Plieninger et al. 2013; Brown and Fagerholm 2014). A key exception is the work of
Barthel and colleagues who found that environmental features are not only matched with
physical abilities but knowledge and social-ecological memory (Giusti, Barthel, and
Marcus 2014; Marcus, Giusti, and Barthel 2016; Barthel, Folke, and Colding 2010).
Social-ecological memory in this case could be seen as a means of linking the physical
qualities of place to its cultural qualities and deeper meanings related to environmental
management practices.
In contrast, research into embodied cognition recognises that culture is related to the
environment, just as the environment is related to any culture. This means that some
associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are situated in a socio-
cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values and habits (Leung et al. 2011;
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Gibson 1979). Embodied cognition therefore does
not only describe the link between body, mind and environment, but also the bodily
experiences in a culture supported by meaningful imperatives, expectations and norms
(Leung et al. 2011). Figure 2 presents this wider interpretation of embodied cognition.
Affordance theory recognises that there are strong interconnections and inseparability
between social and cultural influences and nature experience. Emphasis is not placed on
the benefits of the experience, but rather on how social and cultural processes influence
the actualisation, and especially perception, of affordances. Pickering (2000) believes
that human perceptual process is loaded both socially and culturally. A range of new
affordances for the same object was found to combine physical, symbolic, social and
cultural elements into an inseparable unit. Heft (2001,2013) suggests that sociocultural
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 7
processes are both a product of individual’s actions and serve as a background to the
constitution of those actions. Hence from the viewpoint taken herein it becomes obvious
that many ecosystem services, for instance a food product such as caviar or a restorative
experience in a park, will be both co-produced and used in perceptual processes loaded
both socially and culturally.
2.3. Typologies used to understand and value human–environment relationships
Early research on ecosystem services focussed on the monetary assessment of use values
(e.g. ecosystem functions as services) and exchange values (e.g. ecosystem services as
monetisable and exchangeable through sale) (G
omez-Baggethun et al. 2010). More recent
socio-cultural assessments have highlighted the importance of intrinsic, shared, social and
plural values for ecosystem services (Kenter et al. 2015; Raymond et al. 2014;Davidson
2013) and relational values between individuals, societies and nature (Russell et al. 2013;
Chan et al. 2016). Co-production research and associated biocultural approaches to
conservation recognise the need to manage for a diversity of value types, engrained in
multiple forms of knowledge (Gavin et al. 2015;Lyveret al. 2016; Buizer, Elands, and
Vierikko 2015; Barthel, Crumley, and Svedin 2013).
Like early research into ecosystem services, affordance theory originally focussed on
the instrumental or functional values individuals obtain from the environment. Heft
(1988) provided a taxonomy of affordances in children’s outdoor environments which
has since been expanded upon (Sandseter 2009; Storli and Hagen 2010). The focus is on
environmental qualities that support certain affordances and the different nature of those
affordances (Table 1). For example, flat relatively smooth surfaces afford cycling,
running, skipping and skating. The same environmental qualities also provide functional
affordances for sociality such as role-playing and following/sharing adult’s business.
Figure 2. Embodied model of cognition including cultural processes, adapted from Hinton (2014).
8C.M. Raymond et al.
Kytt€
a and colleagues have used these taxonomies to assess the different types of
functional affordances in urban and rural settings (Kytt€
a2004) and the child-friendliness
of environments in terms of independent mobility and the actualisation of such
affordances (Broberg, Kytt€
a, and Fagerholm 2013). More recent work has extended the
theory of affordances to green space preference studies (Hadavi, Kaplan, and Hunter
2015) and the importance of affordances for everyday physical activity among
adolescents (Aradi, Thor
en, and Fjørtoft 2015). These studies point to interconnections
between environmental affordances and green space design attributes, and to the
importance of neighbourhood design in promoting physical activity.
In summary, both co-production and affordance literatures are increasingly
recognising the importance of a diversity of understandings of value and meaning, but as
pointed to earlier, the processes through which value and meaning are elicited are starkly
different. In the next section, we provide an embodied perspective to account for the
relational dynamics between mind, body, culture and the environment, thereby
addressing some of the disembodied limitations associated with the co-production of
cultural ecosystem services.
3. From the co-production of ecosystem services to embodied ecosystems
Adopting embodied cognition in the conceptualisation of cultural ecosystem services
implies moving from the framework of co-production of cultural ecosystem services to
the framework of embodied ecosystems. Embodied ecosystems respond to the call for the
consideration of relational values in psychological processes, bodily functions and socio-
cultural processes (green lines, Figure 3). Like James (2015), we argue that culture is an
inherent value, not merely instrumental or intrinsic in nature. Embodied ecosystems are
not co-produced in this sense because there is no process of interaction between humans
and the environment, and there is no direction of influence on, and benefit from, the
ecosystem. Rather, the ecosystem is a web of embodied relations that exist between
humans and the environment. As a consequence, embodied ecosystems are a desirable
subset of all the patterns of relations that define an embodied ecosystem. There are three
key assumptions that underpin the framework of embodied ecosystems,
Table 1. Examples of children’s actualised affordances related to different environmental qualities
(from Heft 1998; Kytt€
a2002; Storli and Hagen 2010).
Environmental qualities Examples of functional affordances
Flat, relatively smooth surfaces Affords: cycling, running, skipping, skating, playing
(football, ice hockey, tennis or badminton)
Graspable detached objects Affords: throwing, digging, building of structures, playing
with animals, drawing, scratching, spearing, skewering
Attached objects Affords: jumping over, jumping down from
Climbable feature Affords: climbing, looking out from, passage from one
place to another
Water Affords: swimming, fishing, splashing, floating objects
Great heights Affords: climbing,
Mouldable materials (e.g. dirt, sand) Affords: digging, modification of its surface features
Shelter Affords: prospect, refuge
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 9
(1) Embodied ecosystems are relational. At any point in time embodied ecosystems
are constituted by a web of relations between environment, culture, body and
mind;
(2) Embodied ecosystems are situational. At any point in time direct perception-
action processes actualise relations between environment, culture, body and
mind;
(3) Embodied ecosystems are dynamical. At any point in time embodied ecosystems
and the value they provide change through pathways of actualised perception-
action processes (Figure 3).
We discuss each of these assumptions in the text that follows using mountain biking
as an example of an embodied ecosystem service.
3.1. At any point in time, embodied ecosystems are constituted by of a web of relations
between environment, culture, body and mind
Embodied ecosystems comprise a web of relations environment, culture, body and mind
(Figure 3). For example, the speed at which we enjoy riding our mountain bike in a forest
is related to environmental features, such as the flatness and dryness of the trail
(environment), cultural factors, such as the acceptance of mountain bikers on forest trails
and the kind of bicycle we are using (culture), our physical fitness (body) and the
perceived safety of the riding speed (mind) (green lines, embodied ecosystems t.0,
Figure 4). In this embodied ecosystem, only a subset of this web of relations can provide
an embodied ecosystem value at any given point in time. Indeed, enjoying mountain
biking in a forest environment can be enjoyable only if certain relations are available.
The technology in our bicycle (e.g. suspension, robustness) has to be in a desirable
relation with the terrain we are riding. Usingacitybicycleinasteepandrockyterrain
would unlikely provide any recreational value. It is important to notice here that the
Figure 3. Model of embodied ecosystems in time.
10 C.M. Raymond et al.
lack of recreational value should not be attributed to the bicycle alone, but rather the
unsuitable relation between the bicycle and specific environmental features. The same
is valid for the relation between the environment and our physical fitness (e.g. too
steep) or the amount of enjoyment we obtain from the relation between speed and
safety (e.g. too fast, too slow). As we have seen in the theory of affordance, embodied
ecosystems reflect the ubiquitous spatial and temporal information of a person in a
situation. In this example, the web of relations between environment, culture, body,
and mind defines the range of possible riding speeds upon which the mountain biker
can enjoy riding, i.e. when the embodied ecosystem value exists. One rider sitting on
his bicycle could say: “this trail is too difficult for me today”. The issues for the rider
could be that he/she is unfamiliar with the terrain (environment), does not have an
appropriate bicycle (culture), is in poor physical shape (body), is in a bad mood
(mind), or all of the above. It is also important to notice that none of these relations
are independent from each other, indeed the same web of relations could still provide
embodied ecosystem value in a race situation.
3.2. At any point in time, direct perception-action processes actualise relations
between environment, culture, body and mind
Through direct perception-action processes, an individual actualises a web of relations
between environment, culture, body and mind that support his or her abilities and
intended actions at any moment in time (Kytt€
a2002). How they are actualised depends
on the real-time relations between a mind, a body with particular abilities, an
environment that offers opportunities for acting on those services, as well as culturally
specific meanings present in the locale (blue stripe, embodied ecosystems t.0, Figure 3).
Returning to the mountain bike example, through perception-action processes the rider
chooses to actualise the existing web of relations between the slope (e.g. flatness and
dryness), regulations (e.g. trail laws), norms and style of riding, individual body
condition, and individual perception of safety into a certain riding speed. The
actualisation of this web of relations establishes, at any given point in time, the embodied
ecosystem within which the rider performs. As a consequence, the recreational values he
or she obtains from this ecosystem at any point in time is embodied in the possibility for
the rider to enjoy that specific environment, within that specific riding-culture and within
that specific body condition (embodied ecosystems t.0, Figure 4).
Figure 4. Model of embodied ecosystems illustrated by the example of riding a mountain bike.
Actualising the web of relations of the embodied ecosystem at t.0 expands the web of relations for
the embodied ecosystem at t.1.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 11
3.3. At any point in time, embodied ecosystems and the value they provide change
through pathways of actualised perception-action processes
By acting in the environment the individual changes the types of affordances that can
be perceived, used and shaped (i.e. actualised). This process in-turn expands or
contracts the potential web of relations that can be actualised in the future. Hence, the
relationships between culture and the environment change in time through pathways
defined by the actualisation of perception-action processes. Returning to our previous
example, the act of riding improves individual body condition, which in-turn has an
effect on what kind of environment can be perceived as safe and enjoyable. Skills are
embodied by repeatedly practicing mountain biking allowing a rider to perceive a
rocky and wet slope as safe and enjoyable, thereby enabling the rider to approach it
and enjoy it at a faster riding speed. The new skills (and abilities) in-turn expands his
or her web of relations that collectively define the recreational qualities of the
embodied ecosystem (embodied ecosystems t.1 in Figure 4). On the other hand, an
injury in a specific section of the trail, or a complaint from a hiker, will have opposite
effects. Even after recovery, a physical injury may change permanently the web of
relations existing in a specific section of the trail. As the rider approaches the section
where he/she became injured, the fear for that specific environmental feature might
alter his/her perception of safety, riding speed and overall enjoyment. A similar
pathway of perception-action processes might be triggered by social feedback such as
a complaint from a hiker. The actualisation of webs of relations between mind, body,
culture and environment are therefore under constant shaping and re-shaping. New
pathways emerge and new webs of relations are constantly being formed (see changes
fromt.0tot.1inFigures 3 and 4).
4. Discussion
The aim of this perspective was to present an alternative approach for understanding
the co-production of cultural ecosystem servicesbasedonembodiedscientificrealism.
Weofferembodiedecosystemsasanapproach to begin to assess relations between
environment, culture, body and mind. This approach helps to overcome the implicit
separateness or duality between ecology, psychological processes and culture, and
moves discussions towards a truly relational view that sees biophysical and social
components not only as interrelated, but as co-constituted. We encourage a shift in
scholarly discussions from the co-production of cultural ecosystem services to
embodied ecosystems in recognition that culture is nested in all aspects of human
perception and action within environmental settings. Chan et al. (2016) also encourage
a consideration of relational values between culture and ecosystems. They define
relational values as “preferences, principles, and virtues associated with relationships,
both interpersonal and as articulated by policies and social norms” (1462). Our
embodied approach also recognises the importance of such relational values.
However, we suggest that that they form and change through a set of inherent and
embodied relations between mind, body, culture and environment, rather than as a set
of independent relations existing between individuals, culture and the environment
which are analysed in their component parts.
This discussion focuses on the consequences, advantages and limitations of an
embodied approach for guiding scientific enquiry into the valuation of ecosystems. We
then highlight critical implications for management.
12 C.M. Raymond et al.
4.1. Consequences of an embodied ecosystems approach for research into the
co-production of ecosystem services
An embodied ecosystems approach fundamentally changes how to assign values to cultural
ecosystem services. Existing economic and non-economic valuation techniques focus on an
individual or group’s preference for a desired state or flow of ecosystem services, or attempt
to encourage changes in values and behaviour linearly across time. However, an embodied
ecosystem approach highlights that value is an emergent property of a constantly changing
relationship between an ecosystem and socio-economic system comprising of the individual
body and mind, culture and the environment. For instance, values ascribed to any mountain
bike trail will be different depending on season and latitude, whether a person has previous
experience of riding it, whether he/she has the right technology and holds abilities fit for the
task of riding the trail, and whether he/she shares social norms of how to care for the trail
within a biking culture. Since any of these entities are constantly changing, the values
ascribed to the trail in question will also change.
An embodied approach also has consequences for pro-environmental behaviour
theory and conservation strategies designed to encourage sustainability transitions.
Rather than viewing behaviour as a static concept which is subject to a set of direct and
indirect anthropogenic drivers (D
ıaz et al. 2015), an embodied ecosystems approach
recognises that behaviour is dynamic and constantly changing with respect to the types of
affordances available in a given environment. This points to the need to move away from
linear and static models of behaviour formation and change (e.g. VBN and TPB theories)
to network theory models for understanding the relationships between biodiversity and its
functions on the one hand, and driving subsystems of perception-action processes on the
other. Recent network theory techniques offered by Mulder et al. (2015) are, in our view,
a step in the right direction.
Third, an embodied ecosystems approach may help us better understand how
psychological processes within the individual (e.g. their values, beliefs and norms)
interact with group processes to influence behaviour at a given point in time. Bodily
experiences and abstract concepts are often situated in a socio-cultural context, informed
by cultural imperatives, values and habits (Gibson 1979; Leung et al. 2011; Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Individual and sociocultural factors determine which of the
perceived affordances become used affordances within a given experience (e.g. sat on,
swam in, climbed on). As a case example, parents and other significant adults have an
important role in promoting and constraining affordances in children’s lives through
processes of socialisation (Kytt€
a2002). In a similar way, one’s values for and use of
ecosystem services are likely to be constantly shaped by the value emphases of groups
important to the individual, including parents. This consequence points to the need for a
much greater focus on how an ethic of relatedness may transpire in mainstream thinking
and practices on ecosystem services (Jackson and Palmer 2015). From a valuation
perspective, this requires multi-level theories and assessment frameworks for valuing and
managing cultural ecosystems services. Such multi-level models have attracted more
interest in the conservation sciences and in environmental psychology (Manfredo et al.
2014; Dietsch, Teel, and Manfredo 2016), but have yet been applied to cultural
ecosystem service assessments. From a management perspective, it requires a new
understanding of ecosystem services which recognises the importance of reciprocal
social relations between diverse individuals and groups, including between indigenous
and non-indigenous people (Jackson and Palmer 2015).
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 13
4.2. Implications of embodied ecosystems for environmental management
The framework of an embodied ecosystem and its dynamics is not limited to users of a
particular setting (e.g. bike riders), but it is also applicable to environmental managers.
For example, the web of relations perceived and acted upon by the manager of a
mountain bike trail is remarkably different from that of the rider. While embodying the
same environmental features (i.e. trail), the web of relations of the embodied ecosystems
for the trail manager is defined by the manager’s responsibility to create a safe trail with
minimal environmental disturbance, and the institutional rules and norms which shape
the responsibility (e.g. environmental and safety laws and regulations). However, trail
design and management must consider the embodied ecosystem of the rider. In the earlier
example, ‘good management’ could be considered as interventions to shape pathways
that support ecological integrity, safety and allow most riders to enjoy the trail. Desirable
environmental interventions are indeed characterised not by the perception of safety
based on the manager’s skills, but the perception of safety that the collective riders are
expecting to perceive and act upon.
In this light, we recommend that environmental management plans be targeted at the
web of relations which exist between mind, body, culture and the environment. There are
two potential ways of managing such webs of relations: (1) revise them after they collapse
by encouraging the actualisation of new affordances in the landscape, and (2) design or
implement environmental management plans for both emergent and collapsing relations
from the outset. The first strategy is reactive and is aligned with commonly applied
environmental management techniques, whereas the second strategy is proactive. In either
case, given that embodied processes are temporally located, management strategies also
need to be temporally specific and thus revised and re-invented after certain webs of
relations, e.g., goals, have been achieved. These strategies will find direct implementation
in approaches of natural resource governance that focus on learning processes and enabling
conditions, such as adaptive co-management (Plummer et al. 2014; Westley et al. 2013).
How could environmental managers design or implement environmental management
plans for both emergent and collapsing relations from the outset? One option is to
consider how the web of relations within a given socio-ecological context could be
perceived, used and transformed across time in response to a management regime, and
then attempt to actively manage for different potential outcomes. Table 2 provides the
examples of collapsing and emergent relations stemming from two management regimes
linked to cycling. In the first example of closing off a road to motor vehicles, the manager
needs to consider collapsing relations with respect to the management of conflicts
associated with reduced motor vehicle access, and simultaneously emergent relations
associated with the new affordances of biking, walking and socialising with friends in
quieter streets. However, management does not end there because these affordances open
up spaces for the actualisation of other affordances, such as shopping for clothes, dining
options and spaces for gardening and growing food. These new affordances then need to
be actively managed for within the constraints of the embodied system. Similarly, in the
example of creating separate cycling and walking trails, the manager needs to consider
collapsing relations such as soil erosion and weed invasions resulting from new trail
development. At the same time, he/she can cater for emergent relations such as the
shaping of positive affordances of biking, walking and running and reduction in repelling
affordances such as intergroup conflicts. The shaping of positive affordances in-turn
opens up spaces for new affordances such as high-speed cycling, and in-turn other
affordances, such as the practice of cultural rituals linked to that form of cycling.
14 C.M. Raymond et al.
In each example, the manager can have an active role in shaping the web of relations
within a given embodied ecosystem, but not necessarily how they are actualised. Emphasis
therefore needs to be placed on guiding the boundaries of the embodied ecosystem towards
a desired end-state, as opposed to implementing interventions that activate only one part of
the system. Given diversity of potential actualisations within the embodied system, the
manager will have to accept a high level of uncertainty about the success of his/her actions
and be committed to adaptive management and ‘learning by doing’.
4.3. Strengths and limitations of an embodied ecosystems approach
An embodied ecosystems approach has a range of strengths over co-production of
ecosystem services approaches that rely on disembodied scientific realism. The embodied
approach first enables us to understand the potential for ‘hidden’ or ‘dormant’ values, and
the potential for ecosystem values to change over time. Following affordance and embodied
cognition theories, hidden or dormant values have not yet been actualised by individuals,
but they exist as potential webs of relations for further use in the landscape. By actualising
these relations we open pathways for other people to perceive new perception-action
possibilities in the landscape, which can result in establishing new values, revitalising
hidden ones, or simply reinforcing existing cultural relations. For example, who could have
imagined a forest full of affordances for people on bicycles in the 1950s?
An embodied ecosystems approach may provide an operational bridge between
objective assessment of the relationships between biodiversity, functions and services
and subjective assessments of the inherent relations which exist between individuals and
cultures responsible for managing the ecosystem. Such understandings are irreconcilable
at present. Borie and Hulme (2015) observe that during the development of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) conceptual
Table 2. The associations between management regions, collapsing relations and emergent
relations within embodied ecosystems.
Management regime Collapsing relations Emergent relations
Closing off a road to
motor vehicles in
order to support
cycling and walking
Managing for conflicts
associated with
reduced car
mobility and access
Creation of new affordances such as biking,
walking and socialising with friends and
reduction in repelling affordances such as
vehicle noise and air pollution.
These affordances then encourage new
actualisations such as shopping for clothes,
going out for dinner and spaces for gardening
and food growing, which in-turn encourage
other actualisations, each requiring active
management within the bounds of the
embodied ecosystem.
Creating separate
cycling and walking
trails
Managing for new
environmental
impacts resulting
from trail
development,
including soil
erosion and weed
invasion
Shaping of positive affordances of biking,
walking and running and reduction in repelling
affordances such as intergroup conflicts.
This shaping in-turn opens up spaces for new
affordances, including high speed cycling
competitions and group walking, which
promote other actualisations (e.g. performance
of cultural rituals), each requiring active
management within the bounds of the
embodied ecosystem.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 15
framework there were contests between ‘western modern society’ visions of biodiversity
and ‘non-western, indigenous people and local communities’ visions, resulting in
illustration of blue and green representations of human–environment relationships in the
IPBES conceptual framework (D
ıaz et al. 2015). An embodied ecosystems approach
provides space for valorising both western scientific knowledge, local ecological
knowledge and indigenous knowledge, and brings a holistic set of relationships to the
forefront of environmental management. That is, the individual mind (e.g. emotional
reaction and cognitive perception of physical objects), body (e.g. bodily sensations and
movement), culture (cultural values, imperatives, habits and rules) and environment (the
physical environment which we dwell within) are all important to consider in
environmental management. Embedding such diversity in what the ecosystem is, rather
than how the ecosystem is managed, would also provide a gateway for understanding a
range of different perceptions of human–environment relationships, and a means to
clarify seemingly contrasting worldviews as observed during the development of the
IPBES (Borie and Hulme 2015).
We recognise that there are limitations to the embodied ecosystems approach. First, the
approach is most applicable to those services where humans are likely to be involved in
immediate perception-action processes, that is, those services where humans are directly
involved in their perception and co-production. There are important embodied processes
relevant to provisioning services of e.g. food, fibre, timber and freshwater given that so many
of our everyday thoughts, actions and cultural activities are linked to these service types. It is
possible that our embodied approach may be able to reveal currently hidden dimensions of
cultural influence on provisioning services such as food (e.g. the growing of traditional
wheat varieties to support genetic diversity and cultural traditions), but such relationships
require further research. It is more difficult to identify how an embodied ecosystems
approach can explain the relationships between culture and supporting and regulating
services such as carbon sequestering, air filtration and habitat services, because they are not
directly perceived but rather indirectly understood through natural science, or through
complex processes of environmental regulation that occur without humans knowing about
them.
The question of how to prioritise the allocation of ecosystem services, and how to
identify and manage ecosystem service conflicts cannot be easily addressed using an
embodied ecosystems approach. While we know individuals value affordances, we
currently have no methods, indicators or metrics for assessing the monetary and non-
monetary value of different forms of affordances based on the principles of embodied
ecosystems presented here. We also have no methods for assessing the potential for
conflict between different affordances in a given ecosystem, nor conservation strategies
for encouraging the actualisation of new affordances in the landscape. These areas could
provide fertile ground for future research.
We acknowledge that there are substantial issues with assessing the component parts of
an embodied perspective, given it stretches the philosophy of embodiment. As Heft (2013)
notes, by developing concepts and operational measures of human–environment
relationships we inevitably move away from the relational qualities of embodied realism.
The critical question is how we can move the co-production of ecosystem services towards
a more embodied (as opposed to fully embodied) understanding? We believe researchers
have a responsibility to develop new analysis techniques for better understanding the
relational qualities between mind, body, culture and environment in environmental
management research. Bringing together different paradigms and methodologies to further
our understanding of human–environment relationships also remains a great challenge in
16 C.M. Raymond et al.
environmental psychology (S€
orqvist 2016;Claytonet al. 2016; Devine-Wright 2013).
Further research is needed on operationalising and mainstreaming this embodied
ecosystems approach within different land management contexts and management regimes
across the globe to better understand its theoretical and practical strengths and limitations.
We particularly encourage scholars to engage with dynamic systems theorists and computer
modellers to test this new metatheory. Also, there is potential for testing the dynamics of an
embodied ecosystems perspective within virtual environments where different elements of
the culture and environment can be controlled for.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the embodied ecosystems approach as a means to move
away from the duality between culture and environment present in co-production of
ecosystem services research. Unlike co-production frameworks which involve
computational or mental representations about human–environment relationships, embodied
ecosystems are: (1) relational – at any point in time embodied ecosystems are constituted by
a web of relations between environment, culture, body and mind; (2) situational – at any
point in time direct perception-action processes actualise relations between environment,
culture, body and mind; and (3) dynamical – at any point in time embodied ecosystems and
the value they provide change through pathways of actualised perception-action processes.
The embodied ecosystems approach has many implications for the methods used to assess
human–environment relationships, and how to begin to manage environmental management
problems. We showed through the example of the mountain biker how to approach
environmental management from an embodied ecosystems approach. However, we
recognise that an embodied approach has both strengths and weaknesses. To this end, we
encourage researchers to consider how different positions on science can come together to
address much of the complexity facing human-ecosystem dynamics in the Anthropocene.
This will not only necessitate a willingness to engage in transdisciplinary science and
practice, but openness to alternative metatheories or worldviews of human–environment
relationships, some of which may never have been considered before.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the special issue editors and five anonymous reviewers for their insightful
feedback on this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Christopher M. Raymond http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7165-885X
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