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Measures of Transparent Lobbying: How to Approach It and Evaluate It: A Preliminary Stage

Authors:

Abstract

Although the topic of lobbying attracts many scholars and activists, the evaluation of its quality is underdeveloped. The paper's aim is to propose a comprehensive catalogue of key measures of transparent lobbying that offers the space for later evaluation of the transparency of lobbying regulation and activities for discussion. The authors employed the qualitative analysis of existing approaches, namely the evaluation of " hard " lobbying regulation by the Centre for Public Integrity and recommendations of " transparency " measures by various international organisations, and finally propose their own set (catalogue) of measures that employs both the hard direct rules on lobbying, but also the indirect rules linked to lobbying, and informal rules and voluntary activities are also included.
Measures of Transparent Lobbying: How to Approach It and
Evaluate It: A Preliminary Stage
1
Šárka Laboutková1, a, Petr Vymětal2, b
1Faculty of Economics, Technical University of Liberec, Czech Republic
2Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic
asarka.laboutkova@tul.cz, bvymetal@vse.cz
Abstract
Although the topic of lobbying attracts many scholars and activists, the evaluation of its quality is
underdeveloped. The paper’s aim is to propose a comprehensive catalogue of key measures of transparent
lobbying that offers the space for later evaluation of the transparency of lobbying regulation and activities
for discussion. The authors employed the qualitative analysis of existing approaches, namely the evaluation
of “hard” lobbying regulation by the Centre for Public Integrity and recommendations of “transparency”
measures by various international organisations, and finally propose their own set (catalogue) of measures
that employs both the hard direct rules on lobbying, but also the indirect rules linked to lobbying, and
informal rules and voluntary activities are also included.
Keywords: lobbying, transparency, qualitative approach, catalogue, regulation.
JEL Classification: D72, D73, D82, D85
1 Introduction
The process of explicit direct measuring of the transparency of lobbying so far remains
unsolvable until lobbying is regulated. Unfortunately, in reality, the problem is the reluctance of
political representation to enforce statutory regulation and the differing approach to regulation
of lobbying across countries. This ranges from no regulation, through “soft” regulation (voluntary
systems, self-regulation) to “hard” legislative rules. For example, post-communist countries are
characterized by less institutional effectiveness and most of them are faced with the problem of a
weak (and large) state, underdeveloped civil society and a weak liberal tradition [16]. Currently
only 9 of the EU-28 countries have any regulation of lobbying; the others have opened discussion
about lobbying regulation, some did not finally pass a law (e.g. Czech Republic) and Hungary even
cancelled an act and replaced it with substitute rules on the legislative process [22]. There are
however a number of factors (besides regulation) that contribute to the transparency of lobbying:
laws on conflict of interests (including the so-called “revolving door” practice), legislative
footprint, various statements and declarations of officials and politicians, and/or arrangements
for the funding of political parties. Other rules can also be closely linked to lobbying ethical codes
of corporate or interest groups, a public guestbook at public institutions, a public service act, the
use of RIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment) and the CIA (Corruption Impact Assessment) in the
legislative process, the quality of the legislative process (unjustified amendments, limpets, etc.),
public consultation and publication of the list of consultants on government policies, and last but
not least electronic auctions, public contracts on the web, fully and comfortably furnished budgets,
etc. In other words, transparent lobbying exceeds the efficiency of a single law: it should be part
and package of a wider approach to governance, based on the principles of openness,
transparency, participation and disclosure.
1
Suggested citation: Laboutková, Š. and P. Vymětal. Measures of Transparent Lobbying: How to
Approach It and Evaluate It: A Preliminary Stage. In: Matějová, L. (ed.) Proceedings of the 21st International
Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017. Brno: Masaryk University, 2017. pp. 50-57. ISSN
2336-1239. ISBN 978-80-210-8448-3.
The standards and measures are widely discussed in existing literature, broadly accepted
good practices anchoring the rights to know and participate, effective control and oversight, and
open government. Especially in the case of lobbying, there can be various rules and measures
introduced. There are various approaches to how to classify rules ([6], [7], [10], [8], [23], [13] and
others). There are different reasons for the variety of measures jurisdictions focus on different
features and characteristics of lobbying to define the rules. First, for effective regulation,
systematic regulation should be introduced. In terms of the form, there can be legal rules (hard
rules) as well as self-regulatory approaches. Second, for vibrant regulation, both the direct rules
(for lobbyists) and indirect rules (for targets of lobbying politicians and civil servants) and
therefore both sides of lobbying activities shall be covered. Third, the rules for lobbying do not
cover only one law; rather it is a series of complementary legislation (legal provisions), internal
and procedural rules (system arrangement and institutional mechanisms as distinguished e.g. by
Open Governance Scorecard Methodology published by TI UK (2015)). The linkage between
selective and narrow aimed rules in the light of a systemic approach of lobbying regulation is
needed. Fourth, the effective control of the lobbying activities should be independent and under
public scrutiny.
However to build strong rules on one hand and transparent ones on the other, for all
subjects in the industry, is not easy, but is possible. Transparent rules support “fairness”
conditions for the profession/activity and can guarantee to some extent also the process aspects
of lobbying activity as many academics argue ([10], [3], [11], [14], [9] and others). Current
regulatory approaches do not always go this way there are various measures introduced to deal
somehow (directly or indirectly) with lobbying, they are poorly linked with each other (isolated
measures) and the systemic approach is lacking. The key issue is the exact and proper
fundamental definitions of basic terms used in rules, namely who is a lobbyist, what is lobbying
and/or lobbying contact, who is a public office holder/designated officer and others.
The aim of this paper is to propose a catalogue and key elements of transparency
measures that can support transparency of lobbying activities and that will serve as a platform
for evaluation in the future research.
The key methods used in this article are a rather explorative and explanatory one in terms
of lobbying rules on one hand and analyses of current approaches of lobbying regulation
transparency on the other. Therefore the main part of the paper is a qualitative approach focusing
on choosing the fields (groups) of relevant variables describing transparency of lobbying rules.
The summarization of all relevant data and variables finally systematically built a more complex
picture of various aspects of lobbying (and its regulation).
The paper is organized as follows. The second chapter discusses current approaches to
evaluating lobbying transparency the CPI index and the recommendations for transparent
lobbying, and both advantages and disadvantages are mentioned. The third chapter deals with the
authors’ proposed categories for how to evaluate transparency of lobbying in its broader scope.
The authors conclude with the next steps for catalogue finalization including each variable for
subsequent evaluation of transparency of lobbying activities.
2 Material and Methods
Evaluating the transparency in lobbying activities is difficult now, because there is almost
no systematic approach for evaluation. If there is attention paid to the lobbying activities, it is
mostly caused by several scandals and affairs. The authors thus propose a research design for
more complex evaluation of transparency of lobbying rules and activities. For this purpose we
combine two approaches that were tried in the past to examine and evaluate lobbying and
transparency the Centre for Public Integrity index of lobbying regulation, and the
recommendations of international organisations in the field of transparency and lobbying.
From the methodological point of view, the qualitative analysis of documents, academic
papers, existing recommendations of international organisations, as well as the existing measures
applied in jurisdictions in terms of lobbying are collected. Although the sampling theory is usually
associated with a quantitative type of research, it is suitable for our research due to the limits of
the relevant quantitative material based on the formulated research question. This data sample is
then analysed in terms of its relevance of content to the lobbying and all recommendations are
extended by those furthermore linked to the transparency principle. In the final stage, the data
are re-categorised into logical groups for supposed later evaluation.
There were several trials in the past to evaluate the rules in the field of lobbying. The most
frequently used schema for evaluation was developed by the Centre for Public Integrity in 2003
when it published a report and methodology for evaluating the influence of legislators [4]. The
index currently evaluates 48 criteria in 8 areas and uses the scale from 0 to a variable maximum
of 1, 2, 3 or 4 points according to question [5] with the total score of 100 points. The CPI index
only evaluates existing rules on lobbying and lobbyists that are explicitly expressed in “hard”
forms of regulation acts and bills (statutory rules) especially. Other aspects of lobbying rules
the indirect ones especially and of lobbying activities are not covered.
Table 1. Ideal types of lobbying regulation systems (Source: [7], p. 428)
Weekly regulated systems
Medium regulated systems
Highly regulated systems
Registration
regulations
Rules on individual
registration, but few details
required
Rules on individual registration;
more details required
Rules on individual registration
are extremely rigorous
Spending
disclosure
No rules on individual
spending disclosure, or
employer spending
disclosure
Some regulations on individual
spending disclosure; none on
employer spending disclosure
Tight regulations on individual
spending disclosure, and
employer spending disclosure
Electronic
filling
Weak online registration
and paperwork required
Robust system for online
registration; no paperwork
necessary
Robust system for online
registration; no paperwork
necessary
Public access
List of lobbyists available,
but not detailed, or updated
frequently
List of lobbyists available;
detailed, and updated frequently
List of lobbyists and their
spending disclosures available;
detailed, and updated frequently
Enforcement
Little enforcement
capabilities invested in state
agency
In theory, the state agency
possesses enforcement
capabilities, though infrequently
used
State agency can, and does,
conduct mandatory
reviews/audits
Revolving
door provision
No cooling-off period before
former legislators can
register as lobbyists
There is a cooling-off period
before former legislators can
register as lobbyists
There is a cooling-off period
before former legislators can
register as lobbyists
The index was developed and interpreted subsequently by Chari, Hogan and Murphy in
their papers (starting from 2006) and finally in a book on lobbying regulation [6] where the main
criterion was to classify countries and states regulating lobbying into three groups (strong,
medium, weak) according to the strictness of the rules. Kubová and Pitrová [12] expanded it and
updated it for the Joint Transparency Register introduced in 2011. Again, all authors aimed only
at countries that have statutory regulation of lobbying and lobbyists. The other “indirect”
provisions that can be linked to the lobbying or deeper qualitative aspects of lobbying rules are
not in the centre of evaluation and indices. Furthermore, this approach pays more attention to
strictness of rules, rather than to the question of transparency.
The second approach we use is transparency measures recommended in connection to
lobbying activities. It is a wide range of principles and standards that vary according to the
organization that has published them. All of them are a starting-point for framework design of fair
lobbying and definitely a source for further discussion about the parameters of lobbying
transparency and/or more general a level playing field in a broader scope of the decision-making
process. Table 2 summarises the areas of activities and principles that are considered as crucial
in terms of the transparency of lobbying.
All of the recommendations in the documents mentioned in Table 2 describe the key
principles, standards and measures that can be introduced in order to support lobbying
transparency not only rules and their interpretation, but also indirectly the transparency of
lobbying contacts and lobbying activities of all participants. Although this approach is more
qualitative, no specific complex evaluations (rather than measuring) have been published until
now. Thus such evaluation offers an advantage in the evaluation that can be applied to the other
rules and instruments influencing transparency of lobbying activities other than a single bill on
lobbying. The only exemption in this regard is that TI [20] tried to incorporate some evaluation in
this course.
Table 2. Transparency principles (Source: [1], [2], [17], [20])
International
organizations
Documents
Organisation for
Economic Co-
operation and
Development
(2010)
10 Principles for
Transparency and
Integrity in Lobbying
Access Info Europe,
Open Knowledge,
Sunlight
Foundation,
Transparency
International
(2015)
International
Standards for
Lobbying Regulation:
Towards greater
transparency, integrity
and participation
Access Info Europe
(2015)
Lobbying
Transparency via the
Right to Information
Transparency
International
(2015)
Lobbying in Europe:
Hidden Influence,
Privileged Access
3 Results and Discussion
No model fits all [19], [22]. There are more reasons behind the authors’ motivation for
making a comprehensive list of key categories. First, the lobbying rules cannot be narrowed for
lobbying bills only, but other measures and instruments that finally regulate participants’
behaviour have to be added. Second, if standards and recommendations are introduced, each of
them has to be evaluated in terms of deeper qualitative analyses the initial binominal values
(yesno/existingnon-existing) have to be replaced by a limited discrete scale reflecting more
specifically the quality but leaving space to reflect different countries backgrounds (law system,
laws, informal institutions, context etc.) until now there is limited use of it. Third, when the
recommendations exist, their operation and efficiency are to be evaluated rarely, as well as the
question of if and to what extent they are fulfilling the main goal set in the beginning
(transparency of lobbying mostly). The evaluation and criteria within categories can be used in
this respect.
For this reasons the authors propose a catalogue of currently used measures dealing
directly or indirectly with lobbying regulation that support the transparency principle in general.
All measures are grouped in four logical categories [14]:
1. Direct rules focusing on lobbyists in term of lobbying activities and their behaviour, both legal
and self-regulation. Those include:
register of lobbyists conditions and initial requirements to be met prior to and/or during
the registration process, including basic information on lobbyists;
Codes of Ethics / Codes of Behaviour for lobbyists with effective penalties;
regular disclosure of lobbyists activities, especially identifying the date of the contact,
matter of lobbying contact, the institution and person contacted, the client/employer of
the lobbyist; sometimes financial data will be required;
open calendars of meetings with all decision-makers.
2. Indirect provisions rule subject of lobbying (the targets of lobbying). This category mostly
includes:
Codes of Ethics / Codes of Behaviour for Members of Parliament, Ministers, Employees in
the Civil Service;
revolving doors provisions (pre- and post-employment separation);
open calendars of meetings (appointment diaries) of all decision-makers;
Conflict of Interest regulation;
declaration of (financial) assets, income and/or fact-finding trips.
3. Sunlight principles and/or anti-corruption tools are indirect also, but they are supposed
primarily as a measure with a different goal rather to be linked only with lobbying and they
include:
clear and transparent rules on legislative process limitation of individual MPs’ changes,
pork barrels;
rules on Governmental decision-making and decision-making in the public sector;
rules on consultations with public, civil society, interest groups, professional bodies etc.;
legislative footprint and/or other declaration of consulted bodies/organizations;
programme of proposed legislative work;
Open Government Data (OGD 2007);
regulation of political parties financing (limits for lobbyists donations and expenditures);
freedom of information act.
4. The monitoring and sanctioning system. Here only general statements can be made
enforcement of the rules should be effective, and the penalties should force subjects to comply
with the rules. The key issue is monitoring of activities and there are two approaches to be
selected (and combined) a lot of information can be published and provided to the public, so
public scrutiny of the activities is one source of monitoring. Second, there can be a special
independent body established that collects all data and publishes only selected information to the
public.
In the next step, it is necessary to assign available resources and data that govern and/or
characterize the measures and identify specific measures and key elements of the measure, which
directly relate to lobbying transparency (Table 3) and supportive measures supporting lobbying
transparency indirectly or in a general way (Table 4). The suggested category, data/information,
and measurements and key elements should be a subject of expert discussion.
Category
Data, information
Measures and key elements of transparency
Lobbyists
Register
Registers of
lobbyists/lobbying
Public accessibility; Types of lobbyists regulated; Number
of lobbyists registered vs. estimation of unregistered;
Basic data provided.
Codes of Conduct
Codes
Annual reports of
lobbyists
associations
Bans on unethical dealings.
Regulation of investigation in terms of breaching the
Codes.
Disclosure of activities
Declarations of lobbyists
Declaration of politicians
and POH
Timely published data.
Data on what, who, why and whose interest is
represented; list of clients.
Open calendars
Lobbyists web pages
and/or declarations
Timely published data on event, persons, subject, results
(if any); Electronically accessible for public.
Subjects of lobbying
Codes of Conduct
Members of Parliament,
Ministers, Employees
in the Civil Service
Ban on paid (and unpaid) representation of interest
groups; Declaration of conflict of interest before voting;
Provisions for how to interact with lobbyists.
Table 3. Lobbying transparency catalogue direct lobbying measures (Source: constructed by authors)
Table 4. Lobbying transparency catalogue indirect measures (Source: constructed by authors)
This emerging approach to transparency in lobbying, which should result in a methodology
for measuring/evaluating the transparency of lobbying, allows a qualitative evaluation of a
transparent public area in its complexity. Due to the evaluation of relatively discrete categories, it
will be possible to identify potential weaknesses and focus attention on them in practice. Another
important benefit is the creation of a universal approach and comprehensive key measures, on
the basis of which it will be possible to compare countries among each other.
Revolving doors
Internal rules of
authorities
Pre- and post-employment rules.
Conflict of interests
Conflict of Interest Acts
Manual for civil servants
Civil Service Act
Obligations to declare assets; Basic rules on integrity;
Independence of the central authority; Rules for gifts and
hospitalities.
Disclosures of
politicians/senior
public employees
Civil Service Act
Independence of the central authority from political
influence.
Appointment diaries
politicians/senior public
employees web pages
and/or declarations
Timely published data on event, persons, subject, results
(if any); Electronically accessible for public.
Category
Data, information
Measures and key elements of transparency
Sunlight principles
Rules on legislative
process
Rules of procedures of chambers
Bulletin/plan of legislative works.
Rules on decision-
making
Rules of procedures
Obligation of public bodies to consult with citizens
and other stakeholders before a decision is made;
equal access; administrative footprint (information
from politicians’ electronic diaries related to
executive decision-making).
Rules on consultations
Rules for consultancy
Obligation of public bodies to consult with citizens
and other stakeholders before a decision is made;
Online platform for civic participation; Equal access;
Request of a meeting with a politician/civil servant
by email.
Legislative footprint
Politician’s electronic diaries
Meetings with lobbyists; Time spent on the
elaboration of laws.
Open Government Data
Public bodies web sites;
National Online Catalogue of
Open Data; open data
barometer
Global Open Data Index
Legal definition on open data.
Data sources relevant for policy analysis; Proactive
publication of information.
Equal access to information and documents for all
citizens.
Political parties funding
Political parties funding act and
campaign financing rules
Transparent banking accounts; Donations by
names; Online publication of electoral founding;
Disclosure of annual reports on the internet;
Independent auditing mechanism; Account of all
campaigns.
Freedom of information
Freedom of Information Act
Global Right to Information
Rating
Centre for Law and Democracy
Systematic monitoring of access to information;
Explicit reasons for withholding information;
Proactive disclosure.
Providing information for re-use.
Monitoring and sanctioning system
Sanctions
Lobbying Acts
Conflict of Interest Acts
Body and/or mechanism for continuous monitoring
of lobbying activities; Publicly available
information; Bans on lobbying activities;
Financial and/or criminal penalties.
4 Conclusion
This paper is a particular step of a broader research study and introduces a preliminary
stage of specific measures and key elements of the categories that directly relate to transparency
of lobbying rules and activities. The new approach combines two well-known previous ways that
were tried in the past to examine and evaluate lobbying and transparency, but they have not
introduced the specific complex evaluation. In the previous step the measures of transparency,
which lead to “fair and ethical” lobbying and the same level of access for all stakeholders to
decision-making or seeking government contracts, were identified. On this basis, a catalogue
of currently used measures dealing directly or indirectly with lobbying regulation that support
the transparency principle was created. This article provided categories, data/information, and
measures and key elements of transparency of activities, which might be influenced by hidden
interests and/or lobbying, for the discussion. The future research will expand the existing
measurements and evaluation of transparency of lobbying by developing missing indicators that
will tackle some of the weaknesses of the existing ones and/or rather fill a gap in qualitative
evaluation of lobbying according to the principles of transparency.
Acknowledgements
This paper has been elaborated as one of the outcomes of research projects supported by
the Czech Science Foundation, project No. 16-08786S “Impact of Transparency of Lobbying on
Democratization and Its Consequences” and project No. 16-11210S „Corruption Opportunity
Space in the Czech Republic“.
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... Most of them refer to the so-called sunshine principles. Sunshine principles are one of four categories of the lobbying transparency catalogue created by Laboutková and Vymětal (2017). These principles cover indicators such as participation/equality of participation; access to government information/open government data; disclosure of political funding; obligation of public bodies to consult with citizens and other stakeholders before a decision is made; online platforms for civic participation; systematic monitoring of access to information; data sources relevant for policy analysis; proactive publication of information; equal access to information and documents for all, and others (Table 1). ...
... 382 Generally, transparency in lobbying reflects the level of disclosure, accuracy and comprehensibility of information (Laboutková and Vymětal, 2017). However, theoretical papers have revealed that transparent lobbying creates high costs for rule implementation and higher costs associated with the implementation of incentives for agents, which leads to the maximisation of the principal's interest rather than the agent's (Moe, 1984). ...
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To evaluate lobbying, lobbyists and especially the transparency of lobbying activities seem to be difficult. Although there are some tools trying to measure effectiveness of lobbying regulation and/or quality of lobbying, they lack to cover the lobbying issue in its complexity. Moreover, they do not specifically focus on transparency in lobbying. This paper is a first part of broader research on transparency in lobbying and its aim is to develop methodological fundament presented earlier. Following this, for any later evaluation it is necessary to design indicators of transparency in lobbying, or more precisely in this paper, to design indicators dealing with one side of lobbying contact – the lobbyists only. For that reason, analysis of existing rules, documents, recommendations, research papers, experience and also expert critique of lobbying is used; there is a strong empirical background used for deriving all indicators. The author finally identifies 31 relevant indicators that are divided into four groups – Register, Codes, Disclosures, Open diaries – that mostly take the binominal value yes/no. All presented indicators are presented as preliminary and opening the space for next discussion about measuring this phenomenon. Only well discussed and clear indicators (together with those not developed yet) can create a solid base for the evaluation of transparency in lobbying on real countries’ data later on.
... Despite a real reluctance of political representation to enforce statutory regulation of lobbying there are a number of factors (besides regulation) that contribute to the transparency of lobbying. Laboutková and Vymětal (2017) have created a catalogue of currently used measures dealing directly or indirectly with lobbying regulation that support the ...
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One of the factors that contribute to confining corruption opportunity space is transparent lobbying as part of a broader approach to governance, based on the principles of openness, transparency, participation and disclosure. The problem of lack of transparent lobbying is closely related not only to corruption but to increased inequality of access by voices representative of a wide range of interests to public decision-making. This issue is also one of the relevant issues of Europeanisation that comes to attention in the European public space; lobbying is an important source of information for European decision-making processes, which speaks in favour of creating transparent rules for its functioning. Despite a real reluctance of national political representation to enforce statutory regulation of lobbying there is however a number of factors (besides regulation) that contribute to the transparency of lobbying. One of them is Open Government Partnership initiative which takes a more comprehensive approach to openness via seeking ways to make the government more transparent, responsive, accountable, and effective. The paper focuses on two research questions: Under what circumstances may open government affect the transparency of lobbying and thereby reduce the corruption opportunity space? Does the Czech Republic use the potential of its membership in Open Government Partnership well? The analysis is completed by data from Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. The performed research uses descriptive, analytic, comparative and interpretive techniques. http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/b6Z7GvUwYvv7virfT4pj/full
... Transparency of lobbying reflects the level of disclosure, accuracy and comprehensibility of information (Laboutková and Vymětal, 2017). However, it creates high costs for the implementation of rules as well as costs associated with the implementation of incentives for agents, which lead them to the maximisation of the principal's interest rather than their own (Moe, 1984). ...
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The benefits of transparent lobbying are often discussed. The theoretical grounds result in a statement that they may contribute to the democratic environment and the efficient allocation of public funds. But the real perception of lobbying has not been investigated. Therefore, this study focuses on the perception of transparency of lobbying in sample organisations in the Czech Republic. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the perception of the premise that adequate lobbying and transparency of lobbying has the potential to be viewed positively by stakeholders. Data for the study was gathered from a sample of businesses, non-profit organisations, and other institutions in the Czech Republic. Totally, 73 organisation/institution members took part in the survey. One respondent per organisation/institution was questioned. The results show that 80% of respondents perceive transparency of lobbying positively. Remaining 20% of respondents partly disagree with the positive impacts of transparent lobbying. Moreover, statistically significant differences were found between three observed groups (business, non-profit and other institutions). Non-profit organisations perceive transparency of lobbying statistically significantly better than respondents from business and other institutions. This article may be considered as a case study of perception of transparency of lobbying in the Czech Republic. Other studies may conduct further research on the found direction in terms of information flows.
... The measures of quality of democracy, however, contain other indicators that determine the circumstances of the transparency of the decision-making process. Most of them refer to the so-called sunlight principles as one of the four categories of The lobbying transparency catalogue created by Laboutková and Vymětal (2017) like participation/equality of participation; access to government information -open government data; financing disclosure of political parties, obligation of public bodies to consult with citizens and other stakeholders before a decision is made; online platform for civic participation; systematic monitoring of access to information; data sources relevant for policy analysis; proactive publication of information; equal access to information and documents for all. ...
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Lobbying evaluation attract scholars for nearly two decades but the transparency issue is not in the main focus. This article tries to use the authors' conceptual framework for evaluation of transparent lobbying understand in the broader way as a part of the decision making on the case of the Czech Republic. The methodology defines four different areas aimed on lobbyists, targets of lobbying, sunshine principles and oversight and sanctioning and consists of 158 indicators. The Czech case clearly shows that some provisions focusing on targets of lobbying can solve the transparency in a partial way only and that those can't serve as a substitute of rules for lobbyists.
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Lobbying transparency seems to have been a challenging topic for nearly a decade. For the purposes of the article, the authors focus on a contextual analysis of rules and measures that offers both a broad as well as comprehensive view of the required transparency of lobbying activities and the environment in which decisions are made. In this regard, focusing on the sunshine principles/sunshine rules (not purely limited to laws) provides a grasp of the whole issue in a broader context. From a methodological point of view, the exploratory approach was chosen and the coding procedure is mostly dichotomous. As a result, seven key areas with 70 indicators have been identified in terms of transparency of lobbying and decision-making.
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The transparency of relationships between political institutions and lobbyists is a prerequisite for legitimacy. It should be easy to scrutinize how decisions are made, the influences behind them and how taxpayer’s money is allocated. Therefore rules for lobbying are ultimately a question of legitimacy. Lobbying serves a necessary and useful function in democratic governance. Attention is put on the comparison of self-regulation with government regulation of lobbying and attempts to answer the question: what is necessary for strong effective lobbying regulation?
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A common initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission resulted in the unification of the rules governing lobbyists at EU level in June 2011. The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature as regards evaluation of the new system of the EU Transparency Register using the CPI methodology and to generate a numerical value for the scheme for further comparative purposes. Detailed analysis of relevant documents indicates that the current EU scheme’s index is 26, which mirrors its supposed low level of stringency. Thorough comparison with past regulatory schemes of the Parliament and Commission reveals that, surprisingly, it is the European Parliament which has made greater steps in lobby regulation, especially towards enhancing transparency in lobbying. Although the new scheme represents a compromise between both institutional approaches, regarding its individual elements, there is a clear dominance of the Commission’s approach, which can be regarded as the true leader of reform.
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As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the European and North American continents. Public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. The United States and Canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. Of all the shortcomings of the North American model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. Many European countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. Until recently, however, the European national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the North American counterparts. Surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in Eastern Europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe. This observation stands in stark contrast to the North American experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. The authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early European lobbyist regulations focused not on transparency as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with access to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. This focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many European governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. Propelled largely by example from a reluctant European Parliament and Commission, which are themselves attempting to convince Europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several European countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. In order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the United States and Canada. That is followed by an analysis of all of the European lobbying regimes. The oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in Europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on European and American lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. Like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. Finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the North American and European models of lobbyist regulation.
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n an age of corruption, sleaze and scandal associated with financial crisis and economic downturn across the globe, citizens want more transparency and accountability in politics. This book examines a principal means by which this can be achieved: the regulation of lobbyists. It provides innovative insights into lobbying regulations across four continents -- North America, Europe, Asia and Australia. What are these regulations about? What are the differences across the continents? How effective are the rules? How have they changed the lobbying profession? Using qualitative and quantitative analyses, the book compares and contrasts regulatory laws in the US, Canada, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, the EU, Taiwan and Australia. It examines how politicians, lobbyists and civil servants regard the legislation in place in different jurisdictions. It also considers what lessons and different "models of regulation" can be considered and adopted by those states without lobbying rules.
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This article highlights the key findings of a recent OECD survey on existing legislation and government regulations to shed light upon the “mystery” of lobbying. It also presents building blocks, based on acknowledged good practice, for developing governance arrangements to enhance transparency, accountability and integrity in lobbying. Setting standards and rules for enhancing transparency in lobbying, however, has proved to be very difficult because it can also be a politically sensitive issue. The article highlights approaches, models and examples of existing legislation and government regulations and offers insights on the evolution of lobby legislation in their particular socio-political and administrative contexts, as rules on lobbying have developed incrementally as part of a political learning process. Lobbying ist mittlerweile eine Realität in weiten Teilen der Welt und wird sowohl von politischen Entscheidern mittlerweile als ein wichtiger Bestandteil der politischen Entscheidungsfindung als auch von Unternehmen, Interessenverbänden und Nichtregierungsorganisationen als wichtiges Vehikel der Interessenartikulation angesehen. Dessen ungeachtet wird Lobbying auch zunehmend als eine Aushebelung demokratischer Entscheidungsfindung verstanden. Der vorliegende Artikel diskutiert auf Basis einer Umfrage der OECD in ihren 30 Mitgliedsländern und „Best Practice“-Beispielen, wie durch Modelle von „Good Governance“ Interessen artikuliert werden können, ohne demokratische Entscheidungsfindung zu unterwandern.