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Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India

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Domestic violence is a serious issue in India with 37% of women reporting being beaten at some point in their lives in national surveys. While this is likely to be an undercount given the stigma associated with intimate partner violence and women’s lack of access to the justice system, it is noteworthy that conviction rates continue to be extremely low even for the those cases that end up in the Courts. Drawing from critical legal anthropology and feminist jurisprudence, I argue that legal language, procedures and discourses attempt to normalise domestic violence by deploying discursive strategies such as consistent and pervasive use of the passive voice diminishing perpetrator responsibility, trivializing violence by avoiding the use of violent attributions in describing violent acts, and shifting blame to victims. Of the 787 cases registered under Section 498(A), disposed by the Bombay High Court between 1998 and 2004, just 6% obtained a conviction where the victim was alive, and 35% to 39% were convicted where victims had committed suicide or had been murdered. Conviction rates were extremely variable with many judges acquitting all the cases that they tried and just two judges convicting a third or more of the cases brought for trial. This disparity was further consolidated by procedural inconsistencies including the treatment of evidence, extent of documentation required to prove a history of abuse, the classification of interested witnesses and retractions by medical examiners, who were seldom cross-examined. The findings present a very troubling picture for gender justice in India, suggesting that what we need are not additional laws but a gender-aware approach to the implementations of existing laws.
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Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
Law, Social Justice & Global Development
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of
Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
ARTICLE INFO
Issue: 2016 (2).
This article was published on: 16 Jan, 2017.
Keywords: Gender, Domestic Violence, Law, Feminist Jurisprudence, India.
ABSTRACT
Domestic violence is a serious issue in India with 37% of women reporting being beaten at some
point in their lives in national surveys. While this is likely to be an undercount given the stigma
associated with intimate partner violence and women’s lack of access to the justice system, it is
noteworthy that conviction rates continue to be extremely low even for the those cases that end
up in the Courts. Drawing from critical legal anthropology and feminist jurisprudence, I argue that
legal language, procedures and discourses attempt to normalise domestic violence by deploying
discursive strategies such as consistent and pervasive use of the passive voice diminishing
perpetrator responsibility, trivializing violence by avoiding the use of violent attributions in
describing violent acts, and shifting blame to victims. Of the 787 cases registered under Section
498(A), disposed by the Bombay High Court between 1998 and 2004, just 6% obtained a conviction
where the victim was alive, and 35% to 39% were convicted where victims had committed suicide
or had been murdered. Conviction rates were extremely variable with many judges acquitting all
the cases that they tried and just two judges convicting a third or more of the cases brought for
trial. This disparity was further consolidated by procedural inconsistencies including the treatment
of evidence, extent of documentation required to prove a history of abuse, the classification of
interested witnesses and retractions by medical examiners, who were seldom cross-examined. The
findings present a very troubling picture for gender justice in India, suggesting that what we need
are not additional laws but a gender-aware approach to the implementations of existing laws.
AUTHOR
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay is a cultural anthropologist by training and is currently
an Assistant Professor at the Azim Premji University, Bangalore.
Copyright: Journal of Law, Social Justice & Global Development, University of Warwick, UK:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/priorities/internationaldevelopment/lgd/
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
2
INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence (DV) is a serious problem in
India with nearly 39% of women reporting physical,
sexual or emotional abuse at some point in their
lives (Gupta 2014). However most cases of DV are
never reported to the police, as evidenced through
the reporting gap between the National Family and
Health Surveys, a representative, anonymous
reproductive health survey in India and the
National Crime Records Bureau, a central
repository of all crimes in India (Ghosh 2013).
While reported cases of DV have been increasing
with a 55% increase between 2005 and 2009, there
has been a commensurate decrease in the rates of
the police filing a formal complaint by 2%, and
arrests from a low of 2.19% to 1.95%. The slight
increase in conviction rates for DV, up from 19.58%
to 21.02% is negligible, and much lower than the
average convictions obtained for all crimes (41.7%)
and crimes against women (27.8%)
1
.
In the last three years, there has been an
expansion of women’s protections in India through
the legal system; for example new laws have been
passed to prosecute sexual harassment at the
workplace, acid attacks and stalking. These have
been partly as a result of the extensive
recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee,
constituted after the brutal gang rape and murder
of a Delhi student Jyoti Singh in 2012 inside a
moving bus
2
. Simultaneously and perhaps as a
backlash, there have been demands from Men’s
Rights Organizations to repeal some of the more
progressive laws, for instance Section 498(A), that
protects women from DV, by arguing, that most of
these cases are false and women are using these to
extract alimonies during bitter divorce battles and
to secure favourable child custody arrangements
(Basu 2016; Oxfam 2013)
3
. Men’s rights groups and
conservative groups such as Repeal498A.org and
Save the Indian Family are discomfited by the
expansion of laws to guarantee women greater
rights in India, and argue that they allow for
1
Source: http://feministlawarchives.pldindia.org/wp-
content/uploads/498A-Report-for-NCW-final.pdf
2
Source:
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Justice%20verma%20commit
tee/js%20verma%20committe%20report.pdf
3
For further details see websites such as
http://www.saveindianfamily.org/; http://mensrightsassociation.org/;
http://menrights.org/
“persecution of men at every level
4
, including
through “fake” rape cases, prosecuting mothers
and sisters’ of husbands during “fake” dowry
harassment and DV cases and other criminal
offences against women. However just 10% of
cases filed under Section 498(A) were found to be
false in 2009, a much lower percentage compared
to other criminal cases and just 0.03% of women
who were subjected to DV in 2008, reported it to
the police (Swayam 2011). Continuing in the same
vein, in this paper I empirically examine domestic
violence
5
in India using a mixed-methods approach
that permit us to (a) to interrogate whether the
claims of fake cases are real or imagined and (b)
establish the relationship between the low rates of
convictions for DV offences and discourses
advanced during the adjudication of these cases.
These questions will illuminate the contestations
that result from the tensions between the forces of
patriarchy and the demand for greater rights for
women.
India’s commitment to gender justice needs to
be discussed both in the contexts of domestic
demands for more gender-equitable laws from
women’s rights groups as well as India’s
international obligations as a signatory to the
CEDAW and other international instruments. For
instance the General Recommendation number 19
at the 11th session of the CEDAW in 1992
specifically addresses issues of violence against
women including domestic violence through the
following measures: (a) criminal penalties where
necessary and civil remedies in cases of domestic
violence; (b) rehabilitation programmes for
perpetrators of domestic violence; (c) parties
should report on the extent of domestic violence
and sexual abuse, and on the preventive, punitive
and remedial measures that have been taken”
6
. Yet
as this article demonstrates the extent of
criminality in DV offences are often contentious
because of the tensions between feminist
4
Source: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/men-are-persecuted-at-
every-level-says-founder-of-mens-rights-organisation/15146083
5
I use the term domestic violence loosely to define abuse that a
woman is exposed to in her marital household perpetrated by a
husband or any of his relatives. Section 498 (A) includes both
emotional and physical abuse that may or may not be related to dowry
demands.
6
Source:
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/reco
mm.htm
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
2
jurisprudence and the continuing hold of
traditional ideas of gender differentiated behaviour
that mandates that women treat marriage as a
sacrament, even enduring abuse and violence. As a
result, perpetrators of DV are often acquitted, with
conviction rates as low as 6%, which this study
demonstrates. There are almost no rehabilitation
programs for perpetrators of DV and while NCRB
records DV, given that marital rape is not a crime in
India, there are no legal enumerations of the
extent of sexual violence in marriages. However
surveys like the NFHS, a nationally representative
survey with nearly 100,000 women aged 15-49
indicate that 1 in 10 women report being subject to
sexual violence in the last 12 months, with younger
women reporting higher percentages (NFHS-3,
2005-2006).
At the 58th Session of the meetings of the
CEDAW held with Indian delegates and expert
committee, specific questions were asked with
reference to the non-criminalization of marital
rape. The responses of the delegates were vague
and inadequate stating that “marital rape is not
considered rape in the Indian constitution” (IDSN
2014, CEDAW 58th Session)
7
. Despite the
obligations imposed by the CEDAW, DV in India is
often treated as a private, family matter, especially
in the absence of dowry related violence. Police are
often reluctant to file cases, frequently asking
couples to resolve their differences amicably,
outside the criminal justice system. The
overreaction of the criminal justice system has
been so acute that Delhi and Madras High Courts
have passed orders, in contravention to the Indian
Penal Code that the police do not file complaints
unless there are “visible signs of abuse” on the
complainant (Reddi 2012). Currently complaints
filed under Section 498(A) are non-bailable, non-
compoundable and cognizable offences
8
. However
7
Source: http://idsn.org/wp-
content/uploads/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/TB/CEDAW_review_o
f_India_-_minutes__July_2014_.pdf
8
Non-compoundable offences are classified under Section 320 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, CrPC. India. These offences are serious
and no compromise can be reached between the victim and the
accused under the assumption that these crimes not only affect the
private party, but also society at large. Rape, domestic violence,
murder, grievous hurt all lie within the ambit of non-compoundable
offences. Cognizable offences are those where the police officers can
arrest without a warrant (non-cognizable offences require the
procurement of a warrant from a magistrate), produce the accused in
a court of law, investigate the crime, make a chargesheet through
which the magistrate can demand that the accused be arrested, if the
he/she is out on bail (Source: http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-
169/Report154Vol1.pdf)
there is a bill pending in the Parliament to make
the law non-compoundable, implying that the
complainant can withdraw the case at any time.
One can only imagine the pressure on women by
their families, to withdraw complaints of DV, if this
bill were to be passed
9
.
2.0 Methodology and Context
The analysis presented in this paper draws
from a year of fieldwork in Mumbai during 2005/06
that employed a mixed-methods approach
including archival analysis of the documents
generated as part of trials in the Bombay City, Civil
and Sessions Court in South Mumbai, statistical
analysis of cases and observation of court
proceedings, in conjunction with ethnographic
fieldwork in a slum in one of the most deprived
wards in north-eastern Mumbai
10
. Documents
reviewed here include judgments, post-mortem
reports, First Information Reports (F.I.Rs), Spot
Panchnamas (reports prepared at the scene of
crime) and Inquest Panchnamas (reports prepared
during autopsies), medical records, dying
declarations, witness testimonies including
statements of relatives, and other documents
produced during the trial. Seven hundred and
eighty seven cases for which records could be
obtained for, form the basis for the numerical
analysis in this study
11
.
Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code
prosecutes domestic violence offences and
includes within its remit husbands and in-laws of
complainants. This analysis suggests that legal
language, procedures and discourses, disguise
brutal violence normalizing or trivializing these acts
through the deployment of specific discursive
strategies. Using a feminist and critical
anthropological lens I argue that strategies such as
the consistent use of the passive voice that
9
Source: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
others/government-plans-to-amend-anti-dowry-harassment-law/ and
http://www.498a.org/contents/general/Malimath%20Committee_Sel
ectedSections.pdf
10
In several Indian cities, the Sessions Court adjudicates on matters
related to criminal cases. There are three Sessions Courts in Mumbai,
two in the Southern part of the city and one in the western part of the
City. Cases on appeal from District Courts in other parts of
Maharashtra are tried in the Sessions Court.
11
I had to manually examine all the handwritten registers that are
supposed to record every case disposed in the Sessions Court. The
register contains five columns that has information on the name of the
judge, the section(s) under which the cases are filed, the case number
(which records the year it was filed), the outcome of the case
(pending, acquitted, convicted, transferred) and details of the
conviction.
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
3
diminishes perpetrator responsibility, routinisation
of violence by the avoidance of violent attributions
in describing violent acts, and the portrayal of
victims as aggressors undermines the element of
violence in domestic violence cases that ultimately
discourage convictions for these offences
12
.
Procedural flaws also contribute to the low
conviction rates including the differential standards
and treatment of evidence by different judges,
sloppy investigations of crimes and the
embellishment of non-dowry related cases with a
dowry clause that ultimately results in the case
losing its credibility
13
. In the selection of case
studies, I have excluded dowry related violence
because typically trials related to dowry violence
conclude quickly and are often accompanied by
stringent punishments; however the extent of
‘criminality’ involved in marital violence where
dowry plays little or no role is heavily contested
14
.
The findings from this study must be reviewed
taking into account that this is just the tip of the
iceberg; the reporting rates and subsequent
conviction rates for domestic violence cases are
extremely low in India. The incidents that are
reported to the police usually involve extremely
serious cases of domestic violence and often the
victims are already dead. Data from the National
Crime Records Bureau (NCRB 2010) indicates that
despite only a slight difference in reported
domestic violence (6.8% in Maharashtra and 7.9%
overall for India), the conviction rate is much lower
at 2.1% for the state and much higher nationally at
19.1%
15
. When NCRB data is compared to NFHS-3,
12
Camiss (2006) finds similar processes at play with victim testimonies
not being accorded the seriousness it deserves and DV cases being
tried in Magistrate’s Courts in the England and Wales rather than the
Crown courts.
13
A study in Tamil Nadu in Southern India revealed that in some
instances, the police employ a two-tiered approach to crimes involving
wife abuse- prosecuting them when they are part of harassment
related to dowry, and trivializing them when they are unrelated to
dowry demands (Kethineni & Srinivasan, 2009). In some cases, the
police embellish domestic violence cases with the anti-dowry laws
under the (mistaken) assumption that domestic violence coupled with
dowry would enhance the possibility of a conviction. However this
ultimately weakens the original case, because in the absence of
credible evidence for dowry related harassment, judges are
predisposed to disregard the case in its entirety, even if the evidence
for marital abuse is strong.
14
I have included dowry related violence in the statistical examination
of cases when they are read with Section 498(A). For a description of
the offences which are often registered with domestic violence cases,
please see Table 2.
15
The crime rate is calculated by dividing crimes under Section 498(A)
by the mid-year population (based on census data). There is a large
disparity in conviction rates across states with some states convicting a
it appears that in Maharashtra 23% fewer cases are
reported to the police, compared to the national
average
16
. Just 6 % of the 787 cases reviewed in
this study involving domestic violence that were
tried in the Bombay Sessions Court obtained a
conviction. However the conviction rates are
extremely variable, with some judges not
convicting a single case brought to their attention,
while others convicting 33% of cases. Subsequent
sections in this paper will explore reasons that may
contribute to such large variations in conviction
rates including the role of progressive judges in
facilitating gender-just outcomes, a critical
evaluation of legal procedures and discourses for
Section 498(A) cases, inconsistencies in what
constitutes clinching evidence and finally the
impact of low conviction rates on the normalization
of DV as well as reinforcing claims that DV cases
lack authenticity.
3.0 Can Judges And Courts Be Instruments Of
Social Reform?
It is instructive to bring in Rosenberg’s theory
of courts and judges as instruments of social
reform based on the landmark Supreme Court
judgements such as Roe V Wade and Rosa Parks in
the United States into our current discussion
(Rosenberg 1991; 2008)
17
. Rosenberg theorises two
models of the Court: the Constrained Court and the
Dynamic Court; the notion of the Constrained
Court derives from the belief that courts are unable
to effect social reform in the absence of
concomitant support from the legislature as well as
the wider society. In contrast a Dynamic Court can
be an instrument for transformation because
courts are free from electoral pressures and thus
they can act in the face of public opposition for
greater equity. Indeed there are instances when
judges (and by extension) courts appear
constrained by cultural scripts that allow for the
trivialization of domestic violence, and examples
when judges act in opposition to these scripts
ensuring justice
18
.
third of cases brought to its attention while others convicting very few
cases.
16
For further discussions on the gap between domestic violence
reported in national surveys such as the National Family and Health
Surveys and cases registered with the police that make its way to the
National Crime Records Bureau, see Ghosh (2013) and Gupta (2014).
17
The Indian constitution can be usefully compared to elements within
the American constitution (Galanter 1992).
18
For a discussion of these, see the Shah Bano case (1985) which
awarded a divorced Muslim woman alimony in contravention to
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
4
While Section 498(A) contains a long list of
actions which are deemed violent, analysis of
verdicts suggest that adjudicators often allow their
attitudes towards modernity, patriarchy and
familial obligations to influence their assessment of
the extent of criminality and brutality involved in
these cases (Basu 2012; 2016). Further, while many
judges demand extensive medical and forensic
documentation before convicting perpetrators, a
few judges convict based on eyewitness
testimonies, dying declarations and precedents,
and the lack of medical documentation proving
prior abuse is not deemed necessary to obtain
convictions. Thus what counts as evidence in one
judge’s court may not stand scrutiny in another
judge’s, exposing inconsistencies involved in the
evidentiary processes as well as judges’ subjective
treatments of domestic violence cases.
3.1 A Feminist Critique of Legal Procedures,
Discourses and Outcomes
Whereas the notion of a Dynamic Court
suggests that courts are capable of instituting
reform and there exist examples of such
transformative jurisprudence in India, there are
also multiple ways, by which the criminal justice
system fails victims of domestic violence, including
substantial scholarship that suggest procedural
failings, prejudices of the police and poor
investigations contribute to low conviction rates in
India
19
. Procedural shortcomings that fail litigants
Islamic Personal Laws in India, though this was withdrawn due to
political and religious pressure (Agnes 2001), Vishakha v/s State or
Rajasthan (1997) which broadened the definition of sexual harassment
and recognised it as a violation of fundamental rights, Om Prakash v/s
Dil Bahar (2006) where the Supreme Court ruled that even in the
absence of medical evidence, a rape accused could be convicted,
based on the sole testimony of the victims. The Justice Verma
Committee report is also another example of the Dynamic Court which
led to amendments in the criminal law allowing for specific crimes to
be prosecuted, recommended a suite of safety measures for women
and suggested stringent punishments for crimes against women
contingent on the seriousness of the offence.
19
Studies indicates that the criminal justice system often fails victims
of domestic violence not just by failing to convict perpetrators, but
from the time the cases are registered, until the case comes up for
trial, consciously and constantly attempting to discredit the victim, so
that the complainants can be discouraged from going to trial
(Geethadevi, Raghunandan and Shobha, 2000; Jejeebhoy and Cook,
1997). A study of police stations and women’s protection cells
revealed that biased, shoddy and corrupt investigation by the police as
well as deliberately preventing domestic violence cases from being
brought to trial by telling women that their injuries are ‘simple’ and do
not need state intervention, are some of the ways by which the system
fails victims of domestic violence (Mitra, 2000; Prasad, 1999; Solanki &
Post, 2001). For further discussion on the lack of state accountability in
delivering gender justice see Agnes (1993), Kapur (2005), Kishwar
(1999), Moore (1998) and Sunder Rajan (2003).
are often overt and easily substantiated; for
instance, in this study I find in at least half the 40
cases reviewed in-depth, instances of suppression
of evidence, intimidation of witnesses and victims,
and deliberate delays in hearing and similar
strategies. It should be noted that these are not
exclusive to domestic violence cases and may also
occur with other offences (Bhushan and Pranati
2007; Gangoli 2011; Thakur 2012)
20
.
However some interventions by the defence
with the tacit or direct complicity of the judicial
system, assume a form that is often covert and
intangible. These are deliberately deployed in cases
that have a gender dimension; for instance,
systematic invalidations of victims’ claims of
violence through the use of specific discursive
devices such as the passive voice to diminish
perpetrators’ responsibility, shifting blame from
aggressors to victims, and insertions of claims
about victims’ mental health without any medical
substantiation. As one of the case studies in this
study illustrates a woman whose death was initially
ruled suspicious, then accidental, was finally
declared to be “mentally unbalanced” and believed
to have committed suicide in the absence of any
evidence
21
. While the law claims that everyone is
equal, feminist critiques of legal processes and
legal discourse force us to question the neutrality
of the law
22
. In the following sections, I will offer
examples using case studies that will explicate the
ways in which legal discourse trivialises domestic
violence as well as the statistical impact of
20
In at least half of the 40 case files examined in-depth for this study,
this was the case.
21
Pinto (2014) in her work on mental health facilities in India gives
examples of women left in mental health institutions by their
husbands or other kin as a result of a marital dissolution, regardless of
the medical diagnosis of their conditions. It is not uncommon for
institutions to collude to declare women mentally unfit, often at the
behest of their marital families.
22
See Baxi 2010, 2014; Frug 2014; Menon, 1998; MacKinnon, 2001 for
further discussion. Feminist scholars have argued that laws have often
been used to reinforce the social subjugation of women; for instance,
MacKinnon argues that liberalism supports state intervention on
behalf of women as abstract persons with abstract rights; but in reality
‘the state is male in the feminist sense’; abstract rights only ‘authorize
the male experience of the world’ (MacKinnon in Harding, 2004:169).
Frug makes three claims about the relationship between women’s
bodies and the law that reflect the deeply patriarchal spaces that
women inhabit: (a) legal rules allow for “terrorization of the female
body” and “a body that has learned to scurry, cringe and to submit”
(2014:129) (b) legal rules authorise the “maternalization of the female
body” and therefore any act that is seen to be in opposition to this
nurturing function (sex work for example) is penalized while those in
alignment of this function are rewarded (c) legal rules permit the
sexualisation of the female body, particularly evident when women’s
sexual background are brought into question during sexual assault
cases.
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
5
normalising domestic violence, comparing the
conviction rates of judges to highlight disparities.
4.0 Legal Discourse- The Indian Penal Code and
Section 498(A)
23
Section 498(A) is an example of
transformative feminist jurisprudence in India,
introduced as a result of intense pressure from
social activists working towards gender justice and
against dowry deaths
24
. On the 25th of December
1983, a new cognizable offence, cruelty by husband
or in-laws came into being, which obligated the
police to arrest husbands and in-laws once a
complaint had been registered by the victim or any
of her relatives. Additionally from 1983 to 1986,
there were some notable amendments undertaken
including changes to the Indian Evidence Act
(Section 113), the Dowry Prohibition Act [Section
304(B)], which made the offer and receipt of dowry
a cognizable offence, and the introduction of
further provisions to protect women from
domestic violence in the marital household.
Section 498(A) states,
‘Whoever, being the husband or the relative of
the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to a fine. For the purpose of this
section, "cruelty" means-
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
23
In October 2006, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act (PWDA), a new law came into force. The act defines domestic
violence as (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life,
limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved
person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b)
harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a
view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security;
or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person
related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b);
or(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to
the aggrieved person. The passage of this law was a watershed
moment in Indian feminist activism because it offers protection to not
only married women, but also women in non-marital partnerships that
involve cohabitation and prosecutes offences committed by one’s
natal family in the case of crimes such as “honour killings” where a
woman and often her partner are killed if they have transgressed
religious or caste boundaries in the choice of partners. Since this law
came into force after the completion of fieldwork, this analysis does
not cover the PWDA.
24
For further discussion see Danda and Parashar (1999), Deshpande
(1984), Kapur and Cossman (1996), Jaising (2001), Solanki & Post
(2001), Sunder Rajan (2004).
life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security
or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.]’
The law stipulates that the victim or her
relatives can file a complaint with the police on
grounds of cruelty and brings within its remit the
following actions: persistent denial of food, forcing
perverse sexual relations on wife, constantly
locking her out of the house
25
, denying her access
to children thereby causing mental torture,
physical violence, taunting, demoralizing and
putting her down with the intention of causing
mental torture, confining her at home and not
allowing her normal social intercourse, abusing
children in their mother's presence with the
intention of causing her mental torture, denying
paternity of the children with the intention of
inflicting mental pain upon the mother, and
threatening divorce unless dowry is provided.
4.1 The Limits Of Defining ‘Cruelty’
‘Cruelty’ in the legal parlance brings within its
purview the most serious instances of physical
and/or mental emotional abuse and does not
necessarily capture the frequent and chronic
violence that many women experience in their
daily marital interactions
26
. While behaviours such
as slaps, kicks, shoving and pulling hair could all be
legally defined as ‘cruelty’, in practice, without
medical documentation it becomes virtually
impossible to establish ‘cruelty’ of the variety
which would attract the provisions of this law.
Furthermore, emotional abuse which is within the
purview of Section 498(A) is nearly impossible to
establish through documentation, unless
psychological support has been sought by the
victims, which may happen in a tiny fraction of the
25
Although a woman has the customary right to remain in the
matrimonial home for as long as she is married, there is no law that
guarantees this right. If pressurised to leave her matrimonial home,
she can request an injunction protecting her from being evicted.
However these injunctions and restitution of rights are extremely
complicated and difficult to enforce (Basu 1999). Therefore lawyers
often advise women, to not leave their matrimonial homes, even if she
is being abused.
26
For a discussion of the ways in which women’s ‘suffering’,
particularly emotional suffering is negotiated and articulated in the
context of marital dissolutions within Indian courts see Sen (2010).
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
6
cases, as evidenced in this study and others (Ghosh
and Choudhuri 2011) . However as the case studies
will reveal an established pattern of physical,
sexual and/or emotional abuse is sometimes
neither necessary, nor sufficient, to convict under
Section 498(A). While some judges display a
nuanced understanding of ‘cruelty’ and
acknowledge that standards of cruelty are relative,
others demand extensive medical documentation
before they are willing to convict.
4.2 Eroding the Seriousness of Abuse and Violence
The case studies reveal that far from being
neutral, judges often allow their gendered
subjectivities and prejudices to slip into their
professional judgements of cases. Constrained by
regressive ideas about obligations of daughters-in-
law, the judiciary assumes the role of an enforcer
of patriarchy, deploying language to minimise the
seriousness of domestic violence offences. Drawing
from critical legal anthropology we observe that
law and legal proceedings constitute discourses,
acts and processes that are at once powerful and
contentious. The legal process can be seen as a
paradox- it is simultaneously an arena that
oppresses and engenders subtle acts of
dominations as well as allows for protest and
resistance that permit participants to challenge
hegemony despite its naturalization in the social
order
27
. In the examples selected here it is
observed that while in some cases the ‘iron cage of
legal instrumentality’ (Riles 2006) as well as judges’
predispositions disallow convictions, in a Dynamic
Court where a judge is unimpeded by gendered
cultural scripts, justice can be delivered.
The four case studies presented at length in
this article were selected because they met the
analysis criteria: none of them were read with
Section 304B (anti-dowry law), they represented a
range of socio-economic circumstances, from being
very poor to being middle class, and all involved
serious domestic violence offences where victims
were either hospitalised or dead. I will refer to
judgements of lower courts where relevant but will
27
A comprehensive review of critical legal anthropology is beyond the
scope of this paper; however for discussions please see (Adelman,
2004; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Comaroff & Roberts, 1981;
Goodrich, 1987; Hirsch, 1998; Lazarus-Black, 1997; 2001; Lazarus-Black
and Hirsch 1994; Lazarus-Black and Merry 2003; MacMartin & Wood,
2005; McEvoy & Conway, 2004; Philips, 1998; Sunderland, 2004;
Wodak & Meyer, 2003; Yngvesson, 1993).
primarily focus on verdicts delivered at the City,
Civil and Sessions Court. The first case is produced
at length and in verbatim to demonstrate the
strategic utilization of discursive strategies to
diminish the seriousness of violent acts. In the
second case, a lack of a documented history of
abuse leads to a suspicious death being ruled as a
suicide, despite the absence of evidence to support
the judge’s verdict. In the third case the very
presence of a documented history of physical and
mental abuse does not lead to convictions, and in
the fourth case convictions are obtained despite
the lack of a documented medical history of abuse
because the judge displays a contextual
understanding of the social, cultural and economic
constraints that victims of domestic violence often
encounter in their quest for justice.
Case Study 1
Ramesh Raghavji Shah (husband, accused number
one), Raghavji Anandji Shah (father-in-law, accused
number two) and Laxmibai Raghavji Shah (mother-
in-law, accused number three) V. The State of
Maharashtra (Filed 1986)
The facts of the case were as follows: Rashila’s
husband had started physically abusing her soon
after their marriage. Although she claimed that her
husband and in-laws demanded a car and
jewellery, the documents did not suggest that
dowry was the cause of the violence. She fled to
her natal family a number of times but was
persuaded to return to her matrimonial home,
under assurances that she would not be abused.
After a year and a half of being married, Rashila
went to live with her parents on a semi-permanent
basis because her husband did not stop being
physically violent. However reconciliation was
organized by their Caste Panchayat and she was
persuaded to return to her husband
28
. One of the
most important conditions of this mediation was a
reduction in contact with her natal family including
reducing the frequency of her visits to her parental
home in Bombay. On the evening of 4th of May
1986, her husband hit her on the chest while she
was undressed and when she tried to scream
thrust the four fingers of his right hand which
28
Mediation in domestic disputes are often taken up by caste
panchayats to facilitate reconciliation between couples, thus avoiding
divorces in India (Kethineni 2014)
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
7
caused serious injuries to her oropharynx and then
tried to throttle her. She somehow managed to
escape and her in-laws rescued her and took her to
the hospital. The case was filed under Section
498(A) as well as Section 307, which is a charge of
grievous hurt and complaints were registered
against her husband as the primary accused and
her mother-in-law and father-in-law as the co-
accused. The case lasted for for 15 years, finally
resulting in the conviction of her husband under
Section 498(A), but not Section 307. He was
sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for a month
and ordered to pay a fine of Rupees 5000 (roughly
100 USD). It should be noted that during the 15
years it took to deliver the verdict, significantly
longer than the average time of 9 years for the
cases selected, the charges against the in-laws
were dropped on account of their deaths.
Additionally the extent of their involvement in this
particular act of violence was not clarified in the
documents, thus even alive, it is unclear whether a
case could have been made against them.
Diminishing Perpetrator Responsibility
Language is specifically deployed to
diminish perpetrator responsibility. Note the
excerpt below reproduced from the verdict, which
describes the incident that led to Rashila being
hospitalized and the case being tried under Section
498(A).
‘On the evening of 4th May 1986 after
return of the entire family from an outing
at about 10.45 p.m. the complainant and
accused No.1 retired to their bedroom. On
the accused No.1 … asking the complainant
to take off her clothes she complied.
Thereupon accused No.1 inflicted a couple
of blows on her chest and when she
shouted for help the accused No.1 thrust
the four fingers of his right hand deep into
her mouth and pressed her neck with the
other hand. In the course of struggle, the
complainants head struck against a
wooden cot resulting in [a] bleeding injury
above her right eye-lid. The father-in-law
accused No.2 who was in the adjoining
room hearing the commotion forcefully
opened the door and finding the
complainant naked asked her to dress up
and thereafter he asked her to wipe off the
blood stains on the floor. Hearing the
shouts of the complainant several
occupants of the building collected in
the chowk and some of the them … rushed
to the flat and prevented the accused No.1
from further assaulting the complainant
29
’.
A number of important points emerge:
firstly, the use of the passive voice, which is
employed consistently throughout the judgement.
The effect is to diminish the notion that the
accused actively tried to injure the victim (the head
struck the cot rather than the perpetrator bashed
his wife’s head on it). Secondly a distraction is
inserted, the nakedness of the victim. It is unclear
why the victim’s state of undress is necessary since
there are no explicit references to sexual violence
or psychological humiliation in any of the
documents. It appears to have been employed not
out of a legitimate need, but for voyeuristic
reasons, not dissimilar to the types of discourses
advanced during rape trials (Baxi 2009; 2014). The
fact that there was blood on the floor which
needed to be “wiped off”, alludes to the extremely
serious nature of the assault, corroborated by
medical certificates. It is worth noting that the
incident probably occurred when the accused and
the victim were engaged in sexual intercourse,
although there is no specific mention of sexual
violence in the documents.
Labelling the Complainant as an Aggressor
In this case and in several others, it is not
unusual for defence lawyers to portray women as
aggressors rather than victims. While these tactics
of the defence are not surprising, what is unusual is
for these to bleed into the verdicts of judges. The
trial judge at the Lower Court had acquitted all
three accused on the grounds that he disbelieved
that the victim was subjected to ‘cruelty’ as
defined by Section 498(A), despite the seriousness
of her injuries. Section 307 which carries a higher
sentence was not applied because the judge played
on the technicality of the phrase ‘pressed her neck’
instead of ‘strangulation’. While in Hindi the two
terms are used by the same phrase (gala dabana),
the passage below casts doubts on the intentions
of Rashila’s husband.
29
PW is an abbreviation for Prosecution Witness.
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
8
So far as the charge under section 307 of
I.P.C is concerned the learned trial Judge
has disbelieved the testimony
of the complainant on the
ground that the medical evidence does not
support the prosecution case that
accused No.1 attempted to strangulate or
throttle his wife Rashila Shah. Moreover
Rashila Shah in her testimony has not even
remotely referred to any attempt made by
accused No.1 to strangulate her and it is
only when she was called to
explain the circumstances in which she
sustained injuries she stated that her
husband had pressed her neck and further
reference is made by the learned trial
Judge to the statement of the complainant
at Exh.10 wherein the complainant has
stated that the injury alone was to the right
eye consequent upon her fall on the cot
in the course of grappling with her
husband i.e. accused No.1. In view thereof
her testimony before the Court that the
accused No.1 caused her eye injury
by dashing her against the cot is an
improvement. Furthermore the learned
trial Judge seems to have been swayed to
believe that it was the complainant who
was aggressor in view of the fact that
accused No.1 … had suffered nail scratches
at the hands of the complainant which has
been borne out by the medical certificate
at Exh.38; and also ‘from the surrounding
circumstances it was clear that things
happened on the spur of the moment’.
The excerpt above reinforces the earlier
observation regarding the pervasive use of the
passive voice which diminishes perpetrator
responsibility as well as highlights a number of key
issues: firstly, the assault is described as ‘grappling’
which dilutes the vicious nature of the assault.
Thrusting four of his fingers into her throat, which
abraded her tonsillarpillar (oropharynx) could
hardly be classified as ‘grappling’; secondly it is not
unusual to portray women as aggressors when they
try to defend themselves, although the Sessions
Court judge reprimanded the Lower Court Judge
for this characterisation; thirdly describing the
violence as an act ‘that happened on the spur of
the moment’ makes it seem un-premeditated,
conferring an organic quality to it, forcing us to
view it as an accident, rather than a planned attack
that is meant to inflict physical harm.
Reducing Natal Family Contact
The view of a conflict squarely lays blame
on a daughter-in-law’s unwillingness or inability to
fully integrate with her marital household due to
enduring ties with her natal family is not atypical in
domestic violence arbitration (Basu 2012; 2016;
Kowalski 2016). In Rashila’s case too, reconciliation
organized by the caste Panchayat made this an
important condition. During couples’ mediations
organized by women’s organizations, it was clear
that reducing natal family contact was one of the
most frequent terms of arrangement during
reconciliation. Imposing this condition on a young
woman further isolates her from her natal family,
potentially exacerbating and not reducing the risk
for abuse and also underscores the tensions
between what is perceived as a problem of
modernity - women demanding greater parity in
marital negotiations and frequent contact with
their natal families, and traditional views of a
woman’s responsibilities to her husband’s family.
Retraction of Statements
While the Sessions Court Judge did not find
sufficient evidence to prosecute the accused under
the more serious charge of Section 307, he did
convict under Section 498(A) because of the
retraction of statements by the attending doctor as
well as the Judge’s belief that the accused did not
‘intend to murder’ and ‘the quarrel became
physical when the accused started boxing the
victim on her chest’. In his original statement the
attending doctor had termed the injuries
‘dangerous’ and reported that the victim’s life
would have been in imminent danger, had she not
been rescued. However during cross-examination
he retracted his statement and testified that both
injuries could have been ‘self-inflicted’. Retraction
of statements by witnesses, doctors and
investigating officers were common occurrences
for the cases reviewed and also is the case
generally for many criminal cases in India
(O’Flaherty and Sethi 2009) and unsurprising given
the length of time it took, for this particular case to
come to trial at the Sessions Court in Mumbai. This
retraction was instrumental in establishing the
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
9
lesser charge of grievous hurt, rather than the
more serious offence of attempt to murder.
Case Study 2
Patil V. The State of Maharashtra (Filed 1997)
The facts of the case were as follows: a twenty
three year old woman Swati had been married for
three years and lived with a two year old son, in a
joint family comprising her husband, his parents,
older brother and older sister-in-law. On the 4th of
December 1995 her mother received a phone call
from her mother-in-law saying that Swati was ‘ill
and had been taken to the hospital’. She rushed to
the hospital and found Swati dead. [The a]utopsy
report concluded that Swati had died from
organophosporus poisoning, an ingredient
commonly found in insecticides and death was
ruled not accidental. However her family, in
particular her mother was dissatisfied with the
investigation and ten months after Swati’s death
on the 27th of October 1996, Swati’s mother
requested that the police investigate her death as
‘suspicious’. The police treated this request as an
First Information Report (FIR). and arrested Swati’s
in-laws, husband and sister-in-law and seized her
Streedhan. All the accused were charge sheeted on
the 25th of February, 1997, 14 months after the
death of Swati and were booked under Sections
498(A), 306 (Aiding and abetting suicide) and IPC34
(Common Intent) to which they pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution had four witnesses
Swati’s mother, maternal uncle, sister and the
Police Inspector who investigated the crime and
made the following arguments: Swati had a two
year old son at the time of her death and suicide
was completely out of character; secondly, her in-
laws notified her natal family only after Swati’s
death; thirdly, none of her in-laws or her husband
attended her funeral and her final rites were
performed by her parents instead of her husband,
despite Hindu norms that a married woman’s final
rites are usually performed by her husband. Swati’s
mother’s suspicions were confirmed when her in-
laws refused to respond to her questions
surrounding the event and her brother-in-law
instead taunted her by saying ‘…the amount we
spent on your daughter’s sickness we would have
had four marriages in the cost’.
Inadequacy of Evidence, Sloppy Investigation or
Judicial Bias?
In this case, the combination of a lack of
evidence and a closer examination of evidence that
was presented, poor investigation and judicial bias
led to the acquittals. While the F.I.R. says ‘…during
investigation it was transpired that that the victim
was subjected to cruelty by the accused and in-
laws and therefore committed suicide…’, it does
not identify Swati’s mother or another natal family
member as specifically to have made the
statement and this omission on the part of the
police was used by the defence lawyers as proof of
a ‘cooked-up case’. Secondly the dying declaration
was declared inadmissible on the grounds that
Swati was brought to the hospital in a semi-
conscious state and the judge rejected it on the
grounds that it would be prejudicial to the accused.
The dying declaration is a statement that the victim
records prior to her death in a hospital, in the
presence of the medical examiner, the doctor
treating the patient and an independent witness, at
a time when she is lucid. Thirdly the witnesses in
Swati’s case were deemed “interested witnesses”
and their corroborating statements were not taken
seriously by the judge.
At this point it may be worth reviewing the
record of the judge, who tried this case. Of the 787
domestic violence cases reviewed here, he tried 52,
of which he did not convict a single case (Table 1).
While this could be coincidental, one cannot help
but have misgivings regarding his views on
domestic violence if a single case brought for trial is
not deemed worthy of a conviction. The argument
in favour of judicial bias is strengthened further
given that the judge stated that the delay in the
filing of the FIR indicates that Swati’s family ‘were
angry because of Swati’s premature death and
therefore cooked-up this case against her in-laws’.
A lack of a documented history of abuse in his view
is suggestive of the absence of abuse. He pointedly
asks why Swati had ‘failed to confide in her
parents’ and pronounced that because ‘there was
no documented history of harassment’ it indicates
‘she had a happy married life’.
At no point in his judgment does he discuss
the post-mortem report and reflect on a vital piece
of evidence that Swati was, in fact three months
pregnant at the time of her death. The fact that the
prosecution also do not use this information to
build their case is mystifying. While the initial post-
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
10
mortem report had concluded that the ingestion of
the poison could not be accidental, during cross-
examination the medical examiner retracted his
statement and testified that the ‘ingestion of
poison could be accidental’. This inconsistency
benefited the defence who succeeded in portraying
Swati as a ‘mentally unbalanced woman’ who was
‘not a victim of harassment by her in-laws or
husband’. While the case was ruled as a suicide, no
evidence was presented to prove that Swati was
indeed ‘mentally unbalanced’. Whereas it may
appear that a documented history of abuse is
adequate to obtain a conviction, the third case
study indicates that even with extensive medical
documentation and eye witness testimonies,
judges often do not convict perpetrators.
Case Study 3
Case Study 3- Shaikh V. The State of Maharashtra
(Filed 2000)
The three accused the husband, the mother-in-
law, and the elder sister-in-law were charged under
sections 498 (A), 306, with IPC 34. The victim
Nazma was a young woman who had died from
complications associated with severe burn injuries.
The complaint was filed by her father. The trial
papers indicated that due to a considerable
difference in living standards between the victim
and her in-laws, she was often taunted by her
mother-in-law and the eldest sister-in-law that
‘because she came from a slum she did not know
how to cook food and wash clothes properly’. They
also warned Nazma against getting pregnant
because they wanted her to establish a separate
household which her husband could not afford to
do at that time. When she reported the abuse to
her mother, she was assured using the familiar
refrain: ‘These are minor things which occur in
every house. Do not worry so much about it’
30
. She
often visited her parents and these turned into
longer stays when the abuse became too frequent
or severe. She had repeatedly confided in her
mother that her husband was physically violent
during fights. When she became pregnant, her in-
30
It is interesting to note that tropes used by families to ensure that
the marriage remains intact are very similar to the ones used by judges
to undermine brutal domestic violence. The quote here is not a
witness statement or a testimony from a deposition but the clerk’s
paraphrasing of what the mother had said to the victim which found
its way into the court documents.
laws pressurised her to abort the child, which she
refused. Subsequently they fired the domestic help
forcing her to do physically arduous work
throughout her pregnancy, resulting in her
delivering a still-born child. She recovered for a few
days at her parents’ but went back under (false)
assurances that she would not be abused.
In the weeks prior to the incident, she
missed two of her regular visits to her parents’
house. The evening of the incident she visited them
extremely upset and reported that in the previous
week her brother-in-law and sister-in-law had
jointly beaten her along with her husband. That
evening her husband came to take her back and
she returned on the assurance that they will not hit
her. The same night her mother rushed to the
hospital to find the victim with over 40% burn
injuries but conscious. She told her mother she was
beaten so badly that she lost consciousness and
when she regained sense she discovered that she
was on fire which her in-laws were trying to douse.
She struggled for a month and five days, prior to
succumbing to her injuries.
Corruption in the Criminal Justice System
It seems anomalous that in the absence of
any evidence for suicide, the case was registered
under Section 306 which is a charge of abetting a
person to commit suicide rather than Section 307
which would have been a greater charge of
attempt to murder. Technically, this should have
been an uncomplicated case; there was an
extremely well-documented medical history of
abuse including the birth of a stillborn child
brought on by forced physical labour six months
prior to her death, and ample testimonies from
parents, investigating officer and other prosecution
witnesses, as well as details of the history of abuse
including that her brother-in-law had hit her twice
and threatened to set her on fire
31
. One of the
prosecution’s primary witnesses, the attending
doctor, told the court that at the time of
hospitalization, the victim was lucid and gave a
statement that clearly implicated her husband and
in-laws. The landlord confirmed that she had been
burnt at her home and the investigating officer
testified that the victim had told him that her
31
There are many studies that have established that between
domestic violence causes negative reproductive health outcomes for
women as well as increased risks of contracting infections such as
HIV/AIDS and other STIs (Diop-Sidibe et al 2006; Heise et al 1994;
Sinha et al 2012).
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
11
husband and in-laws subjected her to “mental
cruelty” using the Marathi word tras (trouble) to
describe her ordeal.
The judge ruled that the statements of the
medical examiner and the investigating officer
contradicted each other because while the medical
examiner confirmed that the victim had been
physically abused by her husband and in-laws, the
investigating officer reported that they inflicted
mental cruelty on her and he declared them
inadmissible. It was his opinion that the fights and
quarrels constituted ‘minor wear and tear of family
life and were not serious enough to invite the
rigours of section 498(A)’ and called the parents
‘interested witnesses’ on whose testimonies he
could not convict. The judge drew an artificial
difference between emotional abuse and physical
abuse; it is obvious that physical abuse naturally
involves emotional abuse while emotional abuse
may not involve physical violence, but may have a
physiological impact on victims. Insisting that
Nazma abort her baby and forcing her to do
physically arduous tasks during her pregnancy
constitute both physical and mental abuse and not
‘minor wear and tear on family life’, as the judge
would lead us to believe, in his attempts to
normalize violence
32
. Though speculative, it is likely
that Nazma’s family’s financial disadvantage and
the perpetrators’ economic advantage played a
role in the procurement of lawyers as well as the
subsequent judgement in this case
33
.
Case Study 4
Case study 4- Bhujbal V. The State of Maharashtra
(Filed 1999)
The fourth example is presented to demonstrate
that a few judges prosecute and convict family
members under Section 498(A) despite little
medical evidence. These judges demonstrate a
nuanced understanding of the structural, economic
32
The normalizing of violence and the avoidance of violence
attributions has been studied in-depth in the study of light sentences
of sex offenders in Canada by Macmartin and Wood (2005). The study
found that violent attributions were used rarely and sexual
explanations were preponderant, despite consensus among forensic
experts that sexual assaults are largely the result of power differentials
between perpetrators and victims and are not crimes of passion.
33
Corruption in the Judiciary has been widely reported in Indian and
international media. Transparency International in its most recent
report has also indicated that judicial corruption in India is common.
http://www.transparencyindia.org
and social constraints that female victims of
domestic violence often encounter which
perpetuates a culture of silence discouraging them
from discussing these matters with even close
family members or friends. An illustration of this
understanding can be seen in the verdict of Bhujbal
V. The State of Maharashtra. In this case the victim,
a garbage collector had committed suicide unable
to endure the daily beatings her husband subjected
her to. Further her husband had remarried,
without divorcing her (illegal under the Hindu
Marriage Act) and she was subjected to emotional
abuse by his second wife. They were booked under
Sections 498(A), 306 and IPC 34.
Judge Basu used the following rationale to justify
her decision
‘It has also been brought on record that
Sanjeevani the deceased was not taken to any
doctor for treatment after accused number
one, the husband assaulted her. On the basis
of this evidence the lead advocate for the
accused argued that the oral evidence of all
these witnesses cannot be relied on in the
absence of any documentary evidence. I do not
agree that only because there is no medical
evidence, oral evidence of all these witnesses
which is clinching evidence can be
discarded (italicized for emphasis). The
evidence of these witnesses shows that they
were hopeful that the relations between
accused number one and the deceased… would
improve and therefore might not have thought
it necessary to lodge in police
complaints. Similarly as stated above deceased
and witnesses (are) from poorer strata of
society and it might not have occurred to
witnesses or the deceased to take treatment
for assault. Further the fact that both accused
stayed at home while Sanjeevani [the
deceased] worked for 12 hours can be
constituted as mental harassment. There is no
absolute standard of cruelty irrespective of
persons concerned. What is to be seen,
examined and considered is whether with
references to the man and the woman
concerned, considering the circumstances,
patterns of life, background, behaviour, and
other factors, it would be cruelty in their
case. The standard is individual and specific, so
far as they are concerned. Naturally the
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
12
consequences would therefore be that no
formal straitjacket regarding the standard of
the cruelty can be laid down’.
Judge Basu convicted the accused under all
three charges. In addition to her astute reasoning,
she used the precedent of Laxman Irayya Yengati V.
The State of Maharashtra
34
.
This verdict highlights a number of important
issues: firstly an acknowledgement that there is no
absolute scale of cruelty; secondly, the presence of
medical documentation is not critical for conviction
if other supporting evidence such as witness
testimonies are available; thirdly there appears to
be great latitude in the classification of ‘interested
witnesses’, extent of documentation required to
establish abuse and the impact of judges’ personal
views on the degree of seriousness with which
domestic violence is treated
35
. Judge Basu had a
conviction record of greater than 50% of all
domestic violence cases involving murder or
abetment to suicide and contributed to more than
33% of the total convictions for 1998-2004 (Table
2). She and Judge L Rao were exceptions to the
pattern of convictions obtained for domestic
violence cases that were reviewed in this study.
5.0 Statistical Impacts of Normalising Domestic
Violence
So far we have focussed on the discursive
processes by which domestic violence becomes
normalised. Naturally, the subjective constitution
of serious domestic violence also has large
statistical impacts. Table 1 highlights disparities in
the conviction rates of judges, clearly
demonstrating that the majority of judges are
disinclined to convict. There is great variability in
judges’ conviction records with some acquitting all
the cases brought for trial.
34
The judge in this case (1989) said "Wife is not a chattel to be beaten
at whim and caprice of the husband. The beating by the husband to his
wife cannot be undermined and ignored. It is not necessary for
proving cruelty that there must be many incidents of beating. Proof of
some incidence is more than sufficient to prove physical cruelty”.
35
Indeed my own experiences with women in a slum community
indicate that often abused women do not even confide in their parents
or their siblings, rarely seek medical assistance for their injuries and
unless dowry harassment is involved, do not report their husbands or
in-laws to the police.
Table 1- Judges’ records of convictions (for cases
disposed by 2005)
All names anonymised
Names
of
Judges
Acquittals
(n)
Convictions
(n)
Convicted
(%)
Abc
50
1
2%
Def
87
11
11.02%
Ghi
11
0
0
Klm
41
4
8.88%
Nop
90
4
4.26%
Qrs
63
30
32.25%
Tuv
15
0
0
Wxy
20
2
9.09
Zab
52
0
0
Cde
1
0
0**
Fgh
1
1
50%**
Ijk
16
1
5.80%
Lmn
5
0
0
Opq
7
0
0
Rst
2
0
0
Uww
29
2
6.45%
Xyz
21
2
8.69%
Cba
2
0
0
Fed
0
1
100**
Ihg
27
1
3.57
Lkj
16
0
0
Onm
33
1
2.94
Rqp
3
0
0
Uts
20
1
4.76
Xwv
4
0
0
Azy
18
2
10
Bdf
1
0
0
Hjl
2
0
0
Npr
0
1
100**
Tvw
40
23
36.5
Adg
1
0
0
Hkn
6
0
0
Oru
4
5
45%**
Psw
5
0
0
Qtw
0
1
100%**
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
13
Total
787
693
94
11.94%
** indicates sample sizes too small to draw any
inference.
Table 2- Convictions Disaggregated By Type Of
Charge
Section
No.
% of
total
cases
Acquittal
Conviction
498(A)
637
81%
94%
6%
498(A) and
302 (Murder)
74
9%
61%
39%
498(A) and
306(Abetment
to Suicide)
55
7%
65%
35%
498(A) and 34
(Common
Intent)
1
0.10%
100%
100%
498(A) and
324
(Voluntarily
causing hurt
by dangerous
weapons or
means)
1
0.10%
0%
100%
498 A and 304
(Dowry
Harassment)
12
1.50%
83%
17%
498 A and 120
(Criminal
Conspiracy)
4
0.50%
25%
75%
498 A and 307
(Attempt to
Murder)
3
0.40%
100%
100%
Total
787
Table 2 indicates that the average
conviction rate for domestic violence when murder
or suicide is uninvolved is a low of 6 %. Table 3
underscores the lengthy durations to resolve cases
with just 7 % of cases resolved within two years, 34
% resolved between nine to 11 years and nearly a
quarter resolved in 12 to 14 years. The impacts of
such low conviction rates are multiple: firstly it
denies justice to victims of domestic violence,
secondly it perpetuates the notion that the
majority of domestic violence cases brought to the
attention of the courts are spurious and thirdly by
not convicting perpetrators it sends the signal that
it is possible to get away with abusing and
murdering wives
36
.
Table 3 Time taken for Cases to be resolved
Sectio
ns
0-2
yrs
(%)
3-5
yrs
(%)
6-8
yrs
(%)
9 -
11
yrs
(%)
12-
14
yrs
(%)
15 or
more
yrs
(%)
Total
498 (A)
7
17
15
34
24
4
637
498
(A) and
302
15
23
12
19
26
5
74
498 (A)
and
306
15
33
13
18
22
0
55
498 (A)
and
134
0
0
0
100
0
0
1
498 (A)
and
324
8
42
8
17
17
8
1
498 (A)
and
304
0
33
33
33
0
0
12
498 (A)
and
120
0
25
0
0
75
0
4
498 (A)
and
307
0
33
33
33
0
0
3
7.0 Conclusion
The large disparities in conviction rates
observed in this study cannot be explained as
natural statistical errors in the distribution. One
must then examine the discursive archives as well
as legal processes to explain this phenomenon. A
close reading of the discourses advanced during
domestic violence trials reveals that the laws
36
The notion that women ‘misuse’ Section 498(A) to extract hefty
alimonies from husbands and settle scores with in-laws is widely
prevalent both within and outside of the Judiciary. In fact in a
consultative exercise included as part of the 2012 Law Commission
Report, 100 of the 244 Judicial Officers consulted (including police
officers, Registrars and Directors of Judicial Academies and Officers
suggested it should be made a bailable offence. There is no evidence
to indicate that there is widespread abuse of this law and in fact a
recent study by Oxfam in Odisha conclusively established this to be
untrue. Justice Reddi the author of the reported that there was no
empirical data to suggest that Section 498 (A) is abused and laid out
some recommendations to prevent its misuse. While it cannot be
ruled out that a very tiny minority may misuse this law (or any other
law for that matter), nationally the poor conviction rates present a
dismal picture. Although interesting, a detailed discussion of this issues
is beyond the scope of this paper and will be discussed elsewhere.
Gendering Legal Discourse: A Critical Feminist Analysis of Domestic Violence Adjudication in India
Sreeparna Chattopadhyay
14
cannot be independent forces for change in a
context where most judges and lawyers display a
woeful lack of understanding of the inequities
inherent in gendered power relations. In fact a
recent Law Commission of India report has
revealed that the Delhi and Madras High Courts
have issued orders to the police to delay filing
F.I.R.s (unless there are ‘visible injuries’) until such
time that the ‘preliminary investigation is done and
reconciliation process is completed’
37
. This is both
deeply disappointing and alarming suggesting that
despite the lack of conclusive data on its misuse,
some judges and courts have pre-decided that
women are abusing this law and their desire to
keep the marital family intact supersedes their
desire to ensure justice for victimised women. This
is in no small part due to the pressures from Men’s
Rights Organizations as well as political parties
which are wedded to regressive and patriarchal
ideas of the Indian family
38
. This experience and
expediency based law-making carries several risks:
firstly a focus on injuries that are ‘visible’ thus
precluding any violence that is not immediately
physically evident, the risk of being constitutionally
unsound by transforming a non-bailable offence
into a bailable one and the suggestion that F.I.R.s
be delayed until reconciliation is completed,
presumes that reconciliation is both desirable and
possible. The matter is currently under
consideration by a sub-bench of the Supreme Court
which has taken a different view on this issue. The
future of 498(A) as well as the 2006 Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act hinges on this
decision
39
.
In conclusion, using the frameworks of the
Dynamic Court and the Constrained Court as well
as a critical and feminist analysis of legal discourse,
I delineate processes and deconstruct discourses
that can shed light on the reasons for the low and
highly variable conviction rates for domestic
violence. Legal rhetoric and language are
strategically deployed to systematically efface
37
Reddi 2012:42
38
Recently the Minister for Women and Child Ministry gave reasons
for why marital rape could not be criminalized in India including
poverty, illiteracy and sanctity of marriage in India:
http://www.thehindu.com/features/metroplus/woman-
uninterrupted-the-marital-rape-debate/article8370439.ece
39
Although more inclusive in its formulation, the PWDA has not
brought a reduction in domestic violence cases though the new law
has become an alternative for primarily urban victims of domestic
violence (Ghosh and Choudhuri, 2011; Ghosh, 2011).
women’s claims of violence and to minimise
brutality. Unlike other acts of violence, the extent
of criminality involved in domestic violence
continues to be contested within courts. While it is
possible for courts to be agents of social reform
and to deliver justice, unless the element of
violence within domestic violence is made salient
and treated with the appropriate degree of
seriousness, this will be difficult to accomplish. The
findings from this study present a very troubling
picture for gender-justice in India.
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