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Co-Producing a nicer neighbourhood:
Why do people participate in local
community development projects?
Vanleene, Daphne, Joris Voets, and Bram Verschuere
PREPRINT
An updated version of this paper has been accepted for publication in Lex Localis
To cite this article: Vanleene, D., Voets, J., & Verschuere, B. (2017). Co-producing a nicer
neighbourhood : why do people participate in local community development projects? LEX
LOCALIS-JOURNAL OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT , 15(1), 111–132.
https://doi.org/10.4335/15.1.111-132(2017)
ABSTRACT:
Co-production is often considered a solution to improve service quality and production efficiency, yet
research on the reasons why citizens participate in the creation and/or implementation of public services
is still limited to specific sectors. In this article, we study the different citizens’ motivations discussed
in the literature. We distinguished two categories of motivations, personal and circumstantial, which are
subsequently divided into even more specific motivations. By means of a guided survey, we collected
data on these different motivations in a Belgian case in the unstudied setting of community development.
The results show that even in a community development case, where material incentives are used to
entice citizens in a vulnerable socio-economic position to participate, the reasons behind co-production
are still more diverse and complex than simple benefit maximization
KEYWORDS: co-production; citizen motivation; community development; local government; Belgium
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INTRODUCTION
Citizen engagement is increasingly popular as it is assumed to be part of the solution to tackle various
societal issues, such as an aging population, health and social inequality, in a fragmented society and a
context of declining budgets (Durose 2011, Brandsen, Trommel, and Verschuere 2014). Co-production
takes citizen engagement to the next level, beyond being informed or engaged in the decision-making
process (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In co-production, the citizens’ engagement requires direct
and active input to the service delivery process, alongside the employees of an organisation (Brandsen
and Honingh 2015).
Studies like those of Sundeen (1988) and Jakobsen (2013) show that there are many reasons for local
governments to encourage co-production: it is a source of improved service quality and production
efficiency (Ostrom 1996), it increases social capital, and the most obvious and frequently mentioned
motivation is that it is an opportunity for budgetary reductions (Sundeen 1988). However, these are
potential benefits as seen from the governments’ perspective.
As citizens are crucial for co-production to work efficiently, it is imperative to explore their perspective
as well when setting up a co-production project. The purpose of this article is to consider the citizens’
viewpoint, we thus address the research question: What are the citizens’ motivations to engage in co-
production? Previous research has shown that through co-production citizens’ self-esteem and their
sense of hope and purpose can be restored or enhanced (Alford 2002, van Eijk and Steen 2014). The
literature also shows that the motivations to voluntarily and actively contribute to the service delivery
are often divided into those that can be explained by people’s individual characteristics, and those where
the project’s setting influences the co-production (Alford 2002, Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff
2012).
But while research on why citizens are willingly co-producing is steadily growing, it is still limited to
specific sectors like the education or health care sector (Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers 2014). We
present a case study analysing the co-producers’ motivations in a largely unstudied setting, namely
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community development. Head (1979) defines community development as “a process designed to create
conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and
fullest possible reliance upon the community's initiative (Head, 1979:101)”. The aspect of ‘active
participation’ used in its definition provides us with a link to co-production: participation of local
residents is essential and perhaps even be self-evident, as the changes directly impact their direct living
environment (Frieling, Lindenberg, and Stokman 2014). Hence, in the community development setting
we study here (case description cf. infra), front-line workers, both from local government and non-profit
organisations, team up with the residents in developing and/or implementing public services, focusing
on economic and social progress in the neighbourhood.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: WHY DO CITIZENS CO-PRODUCE?
Academic research has recently made great advances on the subject of motivations of co-producers
(Sharp 1978, Alford 2002, Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012, van Eijk and Steen
2014, Alford 2009, Bovaird et al. 2015, Fledderus and Honingh 2016, Van Eijk and Steen 2016). The
motivations identified in the literature can be organized in two main categories, namely personal and
circumstantial motivations. Personal motivations are, as the name implies, based on the citizen’s
personal criteria and character, while circumstantial motivations refer to the circumstances and setting
of the co-production project (van Eijk and Steen 2014).
1.1 Personal motivations
In the literature, personal motivations are most often divided into two separate incentives: the extrinsic
and the intrinsic motivations (Alford 2002).
Extrinsic motivations
The tangible benefits such as money, goods or services are rigorously discussed in the literature and
termed ‘extrinsic personal incentives’. Largely inspired by the public choice theory, this type of
incentive is considered, especially from an economic perspective, to be the main reason why people co-
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produce (Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012). The concept assumes that people are benefit-
maximizers who only co-produce if it is in their own interest (in case the benefits outweigh the costs)
The co-producer expects to be rewarded through material means for his input (Alford 2002). These
material means can be monetary (e.g. a voucher or free goods) or non-monetary (e.g. safety)
(Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012). Another type of extrinsic incentive is related to the avoidance
of sanctions (Asquer 2012). These sanctions can be material or non-material: citizens are penalized by
reducing or suspending their benefits when they do not cooperate (=material) or by using the citizens’
fear of social condemnation and moral values (= non-material) (Alford 2002).
However, as previous research has shown, sanctions are at best ineffective, at worst even
counterproductive (Alford 2002). Indeed, citizens do not experience co-production positively when
threatened, so sanctions can be considered bad generators for those complex positive actions that are
essential to co-production (Alford 2009). For the ‘reward’-incentives, Alford (2002) found a similar
constraint. As people are not conditioned as the dog in the Pavlovian experiment, they will not solely
co-produce because of a material reward. On the contrary, it seems that although the motivations behind
co-production can very well develop from self-interest, these benefits are often found to be far more
complex than purely material (Alford 2002, Asquer 2012). There is one exception to this finding, in
circumstances of what Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff (2012) call ‘mundane tasks’. When citizens
are asked to perform relatively simple, frequent and short tasks, without costing them too much time or
effort, the extrinsic incentive will motivate as there is no other, direct, benefit linked to co-production
(Asquer 2012).
So essentially, extrinsic incentives do not seem very effective and the self-interest incentive has severe
limitations in explaining why people co-produce. Even economists from public choice schools have
accepted that other values, besides the extrinsic incentive, can influence a person’s actions (Verschuere,
Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012, Pestoff 2006).
Intrinsic motivations
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The second cluster of personal incentives are the intrinsic motivations. Here, rather than relying on
rewards or sanctions, one is motivated by an interest or enjoyment of performing the task. Co-production
is considered as valuable or gratifying in itself. (Alford 2002, Schneider and Bowen 1995).
The first type of intrinsic motivation is the solidary incentive, created by Sharp (1978). This concept,
also called ‘sociality’ by Alford (2002), is the reward and enjoyment that comes from associating with
others . Here the citizens’ willingness to participate is directly connected to their desire to belong, to
socialize, to be a member of a group, have a sense of identification and be well-regarded but also the
simple fun and enjoyment of working together (Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012, Alford 2002).
Sharp (1978) also identified a community-based influence, labelled the expressive incentive. This
motivation refers to the intangible rewards that create a sense of satisfaction of having contributed to a
worthwhile cause. This influence leads to co-producers who consider themselves to be traditional
volunteers, with their main motivation being ‘doing something for their community’ (Boyle, Clark, and
Burns 2006, Alford 2002). Though they are aware of the reciprocal benefits, it rarely turns out to be
significant. Steen (2006) explains the combination of the expressive motivation and the benefits of co-
production as ‘impure altruism’. After all, it should be reasonable to consider that people can be
motivated through more than only the expressive motivation, this one ‘pure’ altruistic motivation
(Govekar & Govekar, 2002 as referred to by Steen 2006). Thus the term ‘impure’ altruism implies that
an altruistic person, expressively motivated, can also consider the benefits for others as well as
themselves when deciding to co-produce.
The third intrinsic incentive mentioned by multiple authors is the normative purpose (Alford 2002,
Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012). This incentive coaxes the citizen to co-produce
because it is ‘the norm’ to do so, i.e. their belief system claims it is right or logical to participate in
public services (e.g. their religion but also their belief in democracy or their citizen-duty).
The fourth intrinsic motivation, identified by Steen and van Eijk (2012), is a result of this ability to think
rationally about participation, because it also leads to an assessment by the citizens of the effectiveness
of their input and actions. Citizens involved in co-production will consider whether or not their goals
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have been reached and if the outcome is desirable. Even if the actual outcome is not the expected one,
it can still be considered a success, as during the participation new insights can develop that influence
the citizen’s assessment (van Eijk and Steen 2014).
1.2 Circumstantial motivations
Next to personal motivations, the circumstances or context of the co-production project itself explain
the extent to which citizens co-produce. The circumstantial motivations are linked to how easy it is for
citizens to co-produce and how important the issue or service is for them.
Ease of involvement
Verba et al. (1995) made a powerful statement to point to the importance of the extent to which it is easy
or not for citizens to participate:
“In thinking about why some people are active and others are not, we find it helpful to invert the usual
question and to ask instead why people do not take part in politics. Three answers immediately suggest
themselves: because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked. (Verba, Scholzman
& Brady, 1995 p. 15)”
With this quote it becomes obvious that these circumstantial influences become necessary conditions.
After all, without the possibility of finding the co-production project, the citizen will not think of the
option of participating. Also, as Van Dooren and Thijssen (2015) explain from a supply-driven
viewpoint, without the necessary resources (time, money and skills) citizens cannot or will
disproportionally co-produce. This all leads to the first question: how easy is it for citizens to get
involved? From the literature, the ease of involvement can be unpacked in three elements or factors: the
transaction costs, the citizens’ competence, and the professional support (Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012).
The first circumstantial motivation is directly related to the time and effort citizens are required to put
in, referred to by Pestoff (2012) as the transaction costs. The lower these costs are, the easier it is for
citizens to participate. These costs are also connected with the second circumstantial motivation, namely
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the (feeling of) competence of the citizen. As each co-production project requires different levels of
resources (e.g. time), knowledge and/or skills, citizens need to have access to resources and knowledge
that will allow them to partake in the project (Webler and Tuler 2000). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
(1995) noted this as well, stating that the non-participants were held back by resource constraints.
Besides that, citizens need to believe they have the skills required to co-produce, or at least can learn
these skills during the project, a concept called ‘internal efficacy’ (van Eijk and Steen 2014, Marschall
2004). The importance of efficacy was reiterated by Denters and Klok (2010)’s study in a deprived
neighbourhood, where the research on (non-)participation showed the citizens’ lack of confidence in
their own personal skills restrained them from participating.
The third circumstantial motivation for of the level of involvement is the professional support in the
project. After all, whether co-production is perceived by citizens as an ‘easy’ task may depend on the
nature of the task and/or their competence, but it also relies on the efforts of the government to provide
sufficient information and aid to the citizens, by being present for them both physically and mentally.
Such support can be provided through frontline workers who can reinterpret the formal governmental
rules to fit the people involved, thereby enhancing willingness to co-produce (de Graaf, van Hulst, and
Michels 2015, Durose 2011). But support can also mean that citizens are given the tools they need to
participate (Wagenaar 2007). Those ‘tools’ can vary wildly: a literal toolbox with knowledge (Jakobsen
and Andersen 2013, Jakobsen 2013), but also less literal, by providing crèches after work to allow
citizens ample time to co-produce. Such support should also be provided actively: professionals need to
mobilise citizens via direct invitation, and not simply by providing the option without any further action
on their part. In disadvantaged neighbourhoods in particular, professionals need to go even further than
merely inviting people to co-produce. Getting citizens to engage in co-production requires innovative,
more personal ways to approach and entice them (de Graaf, van Hulst, and Michels 2015, Frieling,
Lindenberg, and Stokman 2014).
Salience
The circumstances explaining why citizens co-produce or not are not only related to the ease of
involvement, but also depend on the salience of the service. ‘Salience’ deals with the question as to
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whether or not the service is truly of importance for the citizen or their loved ones and if the service
affects them, their lives and life chances directly or indirectly. When citizens feel that the service is
important, they will be more likely to get involved and be motivated in the co-production of services
(Pestoff 2012). After all, people who are happy with the situation or service will find it less important
to participate than those who are unsatisfied (Simmons and Birchall 2005). This is also called demand
driven co-production, where co-production is used as the answer to government failure, when a need or
service is left unfulfilled (Van Dooren and Thijssen 2015). Thus it is less likely that insignificant projects
will continue to find engaged co-producers, because citizens need to want to participate, they need a
sense of attachment or necessity to the project.
The extent to which citizens have an interest or stake regarding the issue that is being co-produced is
one of the most important drivers (de Graaf, van Hulst, and Michels 2015, Bovaird and Loeffler 2012).
The studies by Fung (2004) and Denters and Klok (2010) exemplify this. In the deprived
neighbourhoods they studied, residents who were considered incompetent and thus are assumed to have
a greater threshold to surpass to get involved, still participated because it was a highly personal issue for
them. Marschall (2004) also noted that US citizens who care about a particular issue (e.g. safety,
education) will notice and participate faster in comparison to residents who simply do not care.
Another example of the significance of how the salience of the issue or service influences co-production
is offered by Blakeley and Evans (2009). Their study shows that people will pull out of the project once
their short-term interest or goal has been achieved, highlighting the importance of length, i.e. the
durability of that service offered if the aim is to entice participation. This stresses the necessity to
distinguish between enduring and non-enduring tasks. Many social services belong to that first category
and therefore have an important impact on the life of the people receiving them. Typical examples are
preschool services, education, elderly care, handicap care, as well as preventive and long-term health
care. The salience of these services guarantees a high involvement and interest of their clients in the
further development of the services. The ability of users to leave these services is also slim, as they are
locked in for a long time. Therefore they have to use their involvement and voice as a way to influence
or better the services (Pestoff 2012).
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1.3 Synthesis and research goal
This review of motivations for co-production shows that there are many factors to explain why citizens’
are likely to engage in co-production or not. The interesting questions then are which factors matter
most under which circumstances, and more importantly which combinations of factors come into play
in different settings or for different issues or services. Instead of focussing on single motivational factors,
this article draws on the whole set to study which factors and combinations matter (most) when looking
at co-producers and their motivations in one single case.
To achieve this, we draw on the four motivational categories listed above, which are translated into ten
testable hypotheses (see table 1 below). These hypotheses provide answers to our research question:
What motivates citizens to co-produce?
Table 1: Hypotheses
[INSERT TABLE 1]
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Community development in Ghent
In this study, we opted to test these hypotheses in a single case study, namely a deprived neighbourhood
in the city of Ghent. According to an environmental analysis done by the local government’s health
department in 2012, this is one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Ghent where there are more people
receiving benefits, more low-incomes, more unemployment and more single-parent families compared
to the rest of the city’s districts (Staes 2012). Here, professional front-line workers from
‘Samenlevingsopbouw Gent’ (a local non-profit organisation which defends and supports vulnerable
groups) work side by side with the neighbourhood’s residents in developing and implementing public
services through a cluster of smaller projects aimed at regenerating the neighbourhood and a sense of
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community. As presented by Denters and Klok (2010) and Fung (2004), these high levels of deprivation
can be what motivates residents to participate, indicating the importance of circumstantial motivations.
The projects are linked by a complementary currency ‘Torekes’, , that is offered to citizens in exchange
for co-production in their neighbourhood. Among these projects there is, for example, a social grocer
where citizens who cannot afford essential food, cleaning and personal care products, can buy those at
30% less than the normal retail price, as well as with ‘Torekes currency’. Another is ‘De Site’, located
on an old industry floor in the same neighbourhood, ‘De Site’ is where most of the community building
unfolds. The location holds a city field, a football square, an office, a bicycle repair shop, a community
oven, several coops of chickens, a playground and some 200 small gardens for city farming. The rent to
acquire one of the 200 plots is also paid with the ‘Torekes’ currency, encouraging the citizens to
participate in local initiatives to earn the complementary currency. The choice for city farming as a way
to regenerate the neighbourhood can be explained by the fact that it answers most to the needs of the
inhabitants, both socially (they can meet others, converse, engage and work) as well as physically
(healthy food produce, a healthy environment and plenty of activities) (Debruyn and De Bisschop 2013).
Meanwhile the products from ‘De Site’ city field are used in a neighbourhood restaurant or sold at the
social grocery where citizens can volunteer their time to work in the kitchens or behind the till, in
exchange for ‘Torekes’.
This is an example of co-production that fits the common definitions (Brandsen and Honingh 2015,
Parks et al. 1981, Ostrom 1999), because paid employees, the front line workers of
‘Samenlevingsopbouw Gent’, are working together with citizens to create or implement a public service,
here specifically the regeneration of the neighbourhood. The co-production of the ‘development of the
community’ is occurring both in the implementation of specific services (like city gardening, upkeep of
community fields, …), as well as in the designing of these services through meetings with the co-
production partners.
It is a particular case to study (motivations of) co-production, as research so far focused on co-production
in more ‘obvious’ sectors like the education or health care sectors (Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers
2014). It also gives the researchers the opportunity to focus on a group of co-producers that are rarely
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under scrutiny: people living in deprived neighbourhoods, often low-SES citizens. Studying such a
project may help to increase our knowledge of how barriers for co-production that specific social groups
face can be overcome (Brandsen and Helderman 2012, Van Dooren and Thijssen 2015, Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Following the economic rational choice assumption that people are solely
motivated to participate because they have a material interest to do so (Alford, 1998; Verschuere et al,
2012), and as a complementary coin is used as an incentive to get citizens to participate, we assume that
the material motivation will stand out. This single-case study can thus contribute to the existing literature
by challenging or confirming the existing assumptions, that co-production can develop from self-
interest, but perhaps also that motivations are far more complex than purely material (Alford 2009,
Asquer 2012).
3.2 Data collection and analysis
In a preliminary data collection phase, the researchers learned about the co-production projects through
thorough website and document analysis and visitations in the neighbourhood (Yin 2009). Once the case
was selected, coordinators were contacted for exploratory interviews. These interviews informed us of
the best time and place to conduct our field research as well as offering a professional’s point of view
on the co-producers’ motivations. Here, the community worker in charge of the complementary currency
project, already mentioned two of the motivations found in literature. The community worker explained
the necessity of material rewards for some low-SES co-producers and (sometimes) had no other source
of income. But also the social motivation was mentioned, as he referred to retired citizens who, by co-
producing, hoped to find the company and sociality they missed when being alone at home. Following
this preliminary phase of information-gathering, we could then turn to the quantitative data collection.
Each hypothesis (see table 1) was translated into three statements that supported the motivation. Only
the second extrinsic hypothesis, on material sanctions, was inapplicable to the case as there are no
material sanctions for non-participants in our case, and was thus left out. As longer surveys tend to
increase non-response the statements were limited to relevant details that may impact motivation
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2004). All statements were presented on a seven-point Likert scale.
This scale, used to measure attitudes, requires respondents to choose how much they agree or disagree
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with the statement (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2004). It is important to note that some of the
statements could be considered applicable to more than one hypothesis, as some of the motivations could
be closely related (e.g. participating out of solidary motivations, or out of fear of immaterial sanctions).
We avoided misinterpretation through the build-up of the sentences. For example, non-material
sanctions are phrased negatively contrarily to the positive statements about solidary motivations, and by
arranging them into similar categories within the survey. This ordering of statements according to their
category also makes it easier for respondents to follow the line of questioning (Saunders, Lewis, and
Thornhill 2004).
A draft of the survey was then presented to the community workers. With these professionals’ feedback
the survey was adapted to ease co-producers’ participation. As in our community development case
ethno-cultural minorities take part, the survey was translated to Turkish by a community worker in order
to include those co-producers who cannot speak or read Dutch as well. The survey was conducted on
several “workdays” in Spring 2014. This allowed the researchers to find an assembled group of co-
producers, as contacting all residents was impossible within the proposed time frame. We discovered
that community development in a deprived neighbourhood as a research setting posed particular
challenges. As the majority of citizens are in a vulnerable socio-economic position, we were required to
gain their trust by returning week after week as well as assist respondents through the data collection
process (by reading and explaining the statements). The professionals’ aid before and during the data
collection helped us to be prepared and perform a representative study that covered all types of co-
producers, including the Turkish-speaking, the illiterate and the distrustful citizens.
From the approx. 8300 residents in the neighbourhood (Ghent n.d) about 300-350 people participated
in the co-produced community development project according to the professionals (figures for the year
2014). In the end, our survey was completed by 37 respondents, 11 men and 26 women. Hence, our
survey reached about 10% of the co-producers in the project. We observed that in this community
development project more women participated than men, and respondents were selected accordingly
(justifying the overrepresentation of female respondents in our sample). The majority (54%) of the
respondents were of Belgian nationality and completed the survey in Dutch (59.5%), this is
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representative for the neighbourhood where 70,4% has the Belgian nationality. The average age of the
co-producers was 42, with 24% of the participants within the category 35-44. Almost half (48%) was
unemployed and the average participant had been working for ‘Torekes’ for 14 months. The tables below
show the descriptive statistics of our sample of respondents.
Table 2a: Age and Months of participation
[INSERT TABLE 2A]
Table 2b: Gender, Age, Employment, Language
[INSERT TABLE 2B]
The acquired quantitative data was analysed in three steps in the statistical program SPSS. First, a data
reduction was needed. This was done by computing the summated scales of the three statements
belonging to a theoretical cluster. By doing so we obtained, per respondent, a score on nine indexes that
related to our nine hypotheses (as previously mentioned one hypothesis was excluded as there are no
material sanctions implemented in the case study). This data reduction was accompanied with a
reliability test, using Cronbach’s alpha, the most common measure of internal consistency. We applied
the test to all 9 indexes, defining “reliable” as Cronbach’s α ≥ 0.6. The internal consistency of ‘Social
motivations’ and ‘Salience’ is rather low, a fact that should be taken into account when reading the
results of the study (see Annex 1).
Secondly, a Paired Samples T-test was used to compare the related means of the nine indexes. This T-
test tests the null hypothesis (the difference between the two related means is 0)
1
. We perform the Paired
Samples T-test on the total sample (see Annex 1).
Lastly, we use the ANOVA test to measure whether or not there are significant differences of means
when comparing the subgroups in our sample (gender, age, employment, language). The ANOVA test
1
For example, when comparing hypothesis A and E, the null-hypothesis would be: “There is no statistically
significant difference between A and E.” In the SPSS data we find the statistically significant difference between
the two by comparing sig. (probability) value to .05 and .01. So, if p≤0.05(*) and p≤0.01(**) then we reject the
null hypothesis of no difference, but if p>0.05 we retain the null hypothesis of no difference.
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delivers identical results as the T-test, but can provide information when studying more than two groups
(such as different age categories). The test compares the amount of variation between groups with the
amount of variation within the group
2
.
RESULTS
4.1 Total Sample: Which motivations drive citizens to get involved?
When studying the results for the total sample of respondents, the question is: what drives the
respondents to co-produce? Figure 2 displays a graphic representation of the mean scores per index.
There are nine theoretical indexes, each depicting a motivation that drives citizens to be involved, to co-
produce. Scores range from 1 (no motivational factor) to 7 (very important motivational factor).
As the figure shows, we can establish a distinct division between two clusters of indexes:
The 1st cluster which contains the greatest motivators for these citizen-co-producers, are: Expressive
motivation (mean =5,57), Ease of involvement (mean =5,40), Effectiveness of participation (mean
=5,15), Salience (mean =5,00), Normative purpose (mean =4,96) and Solidary motivation (mean =4,91).
The 2nd cluster of the least influential motivations are, in this case study, quite notably all the extrinsic
motivations: Immaterial sanctions (mean =3,36), Material rewards (mean =4,13) and Immaterial
rewards (mean =4,35).
Figure 1: visualization of the different motivations for co-production, total sample
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
In order to find these statistically significant differences between motivational factors, we conducted
paired sample T-tests. These tests showed that the Expressive motivation was the most important
motivation for our co-producers, having positive significant differences with almost every other
2
We will compare the p-values of the ANOVA test to the significance levels, p≤0.05(*) and p≤0.01(**), which
will show us whether there are clear significant differences within the personal characteristics, age, gender,
nationality and employment.
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motivation (see table 3). From the table, it also becomes apparent that immaterial sanctions is the least
motivating of all our motivations, showing the most significant (negative) differences with the others.
Table 3: Significant differences T-test
[INSERT TABLE 3]
4.3 Sub samples: Are there distinctly different motivations due to the citizens’ profile?
We also analysed subsamples of the co-producers by comparing indexes based on personal
characteristics such as age, gender, language and employment status, as seen above in table 2a and 2b.
First of all, there was no significant difference when comparing male and female respondents’ answers.
Hence, in this case, gender did not influence the motivations of people to co-produce. However, when
considering age categories, there was a significant difference for the motivations material rewards (p=
.024) and ease of involvement (p=.036). Once we perform a post hoc test, two significant differences
between the groups becomes clear: The age group 55+ (mean = 5,4) was significantly more motivated
by material rewards than those in the group 18-34 (mean = 3,4). And age group 55+ (mean = 6,4) was
also significantly more motivated by ease of involvement compared to group 35-54 (mean = 5).
When considering the employment of our respondents there was a significant difference in the
motivation of material rewards (p =.006). Here we find that “inactive” co-producers (mean = 4,6) are
more motivated by material rewards than the “actively employed” co-producers (mean = 2,5).
Lastly, there are some significant distinctions found between the Dutch-speaking and Turkish-speaking
citizens. Turkish-speaking citizens were more influenced by material rewards (mean = 5,1) and
immaterial sanctions (mean = 4,2) and Dutch speakers (mean = 3,4 and mean = 3 respectively). While
Dutch speakers (mean = 5,7) were more influenced by the effectiveness of the participation than their
Turkish counterparts (mean = 5,4).
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Table 4: ANOVA-test
[INSERT TABLE 4]
DISCUSSION
5.1 Limitations
This small-scale study looked at motivational drivers to explain why residents are involved as co-
producers in a community building project in the city of Ghent, Belgium. We acknowledge some
limitations that should be taken into consideration when discussing the findings. The main limitation is
that we deal with a relatively small sample size of 37 respondents. The reason is that we have a small
single case study of a particular nature as research focus: co-production of community development in
a deprived neighbourhood. From conversations with the coordinators, and our own experience in the
field, we discovered many of the neighbourhood’s residents were hard to identify, their status varying
from renters living in poor housing conditions, illegals passing through, or homeless with a network of
friends in the neighbourhood. All factors that increased the difficulty to find regular co-producers.
Community volunteers guessed about 200 co-producers appeared more than once, yet not all were
accessible within the study’s timeframe. Some of the participants of the project did not want to be part
of the study, either out of fear for repercussions, or not willing to do the effort to fill out questionnaires
or simply because they were radically against anything to do with what they perceived as ‘bureaucracy’.
Still, with the help of ‘De Site’ employees we were able to find 37 respondents who were assisted and
guided while going through the statements. This brings an important methodological issue to the surface:
studying co-production projects like these (community development in deprived areas and
neighbourhoods), in which the majority of participants are low-SES citizens, may require special efforts
of researchers to assist respondents very carefully in the data collection process. From conversations
with the community workers, we can surmise that our sample of 37, and their personal characteristics,
is representative for the co-production project.
17
5.2 Conclusion
Despite these limitations, we are able to present some conclusions. The evidence from our single case
study shows that extrinsic personal motivations are the least influential triggers for people to co-produce.
Although rewards and sanctions are mentioned as motivators by the respondents in our case study, two
other clusters of motivations - the intrinsic personal motivations and circumstantial motivations – are
clearly more relevant drivers. This might come as a surprise, as this co-production project is largely
based on material rewards, using a complementary currency to encourage participation. However, this
conclusion is in line with the findings of Asquer (2012) and Alford (2002), who assume the minimal
influence of extrinsic motivations to co-produce. Alford (2002) explained the logic behind this as
follows: citizens do not experience co-production positively when threatened. These extrinsic
motivations are bad generators for the complex positive actions that essentially constitute co-production.
Hence, at least in our case, intrinsic personal motivations are strong drivers to co-produce. As van Eijk
and Steen (2014) explain, intrinsic motivations assist in enhancing a person’s sense of competence and
self-efficacy. In our case, normative motivations, where citizens are guided by their base values and the
solidary motivations, directly connected to citizens’ desire to socialize, are found to be important
explanations why people co-produce. This is also the case for effectiveness where citizens evaluate the
process of the engagement itself. Equally important motivators, next to the intrinsic motivation are the
circumstantial motivations. Our case study shows that salience, i.e. whether or not the service is truly
of importance for the citizen or their loved ones, and ease of involvement are very important to ‘make’
people co-produce. This can be explained in two ways. Firstly, in this particular project the citizens
already work closely together with professionals. They know the professionals on a first-name basis and
have little problem addressing them, so the gap is relatively small here. Secondly, as participating co-
producers, they have easy access to information and will be the first to be made aware of changes,
possibly even participating in the decision-making process. This concurs with the findings of Jakobsen
(2013) who found that active stimulation and engagement by government (or other professional partners
in the co-production process) may lower the threshold for people to participate in co-production.
18
We also controlled these results for some personal attributes of co-producers. Although we acknowledge
that we work with small-N subsamples here, there are some different motivational profiles depending
on the ‘kind of’ co-producer we deal with. For example, when considering age, we noticed 55+
respondents are significantly more motivated by material rewards than their younger counterparts
(between 18-34). These 55+ are also more motivated by the ease of involvement when compared to the
age group 35-54. And the “inactive” co-producers were more motivated by material rewards than the
“actively employed”. Lastly, comparing the different languages the survey was filled in, we found that
The Turkish-speaking citizens were more influenced by material rewards and immaterial sanctions.
While Dutch speakers were more motivated by considering the effectiveness of their participation.
To conclude, our study tried to discover the reasons citizens identify as motivations for co-production
in a local community development project. We thus attempt to help filling the gap in research concerning
co-production by vulnerable social groups. The case study provides evidence that the ‘typical
participant’ who is, as described by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) predominantly white, middle-
aged, middle-class and male, is not the only participant that local governments can engage with in co-
production. More specifically, in community development a diverse group of residents can be
encouraged to participate. However, our case study also adds to the evidence that citizens are not just
personal benefit maximizers, even if they consist of vulnerable groups. These community development
co-producers perceive far more complex reasons to participate. This must be kept in mind by policy
makers when considering a new co-production project or adjusting an old one in this field. Even when
the co-production project is based on a rewards-system, as is the case in the project we studied,
professionals should attempt to encourage citizens with other, intrinsic, motivations as well, perhaps
even more so. It might be the case that personal extrinsic rewards may lower the threshold for people to
co-produce, especially in the case of deprived neighbourhood regeneration projects. But perhaps it may
also be the case that beyond material motivations, the perceived intrinsic benefits are what keeps co-
producers coming back, making these community building initiatives more sustainable and effective.
The significant influence of the circumstantial motivations cannot be left out. Providing information,
knowledge and resources to co-produce and introducing salient projects in their neighbourhoods, could
19
also influence who and if citizens co-produce considerably. By engaging with those groups who are
excluded, lacking the competence to participate, local professionals can aid in strengthening the skills,
knowledge and capacity these vulnerable citizens need to participate (Durose 2011).The question on
who gets to co-produce might be one of many fruitful avenues for further research in community
development co-production projects.
20
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23
TABLES & FIGURES
Table 1
Motivation
Hypothesis
Reference
Material rewards
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are offered material rewards
in return.
(Alford 2002, 2009, Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012, Sharp 1978, Rosentraub and Sharp 1981)
Material
sanctions
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are threatened with material
sanctions.
(Alford 2002, 2009, Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012, Sharp 1978, Rosentraub and Sharp 1981)
Immaterial
rewards
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are offered immaterial
rewards in return.
(Alford 2002, 2009, Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012)
Immaterial
sanctions
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are threatened with
immaterial sanctions.
(Alford 2002, 2009, Asquer 2012, Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012)
Social motivations
Citizens co-produce (more) because they desire to socialize.
(Alford 2002, 2011, Sharp 1978, Verschuere, Brandsen, and
Pestoff 2012, Wagenaar 2007, de Graaf, van Hulst, and Michels
2015, Simmons and Birchall 2005, Rosentraub and Sharp 1981)
Normative
purpose
Citizens co-produce (more) because their belief systems claim it to be
right.
(Alford 2002, 2011, Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012,
Asquer 2012)
Expressive
motivation
Citizens co-produce (more) because it gives them a sense of
satisfaction to contribute to a worthwhile cause.
(Alford 2002, 2011, Blakeley and Evans 2009, Steen 2006,
Rosentraub and Sharp 1981, Sharp 1978)
Effectiveness of
participation
Citizens co-produce (more) when their goals are being reached and/or
the outcome is preferable.
(van Eijk and Steen 2014, Löffler 2009, van Eijk and Steen
2013)
Ease of
involvement
Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive it is easy to get
involved.
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Marschall 2004, Webler
and Tuler 2000, Denters and Klok 2010, Pestoff 2012, Jakobsen
2013, Sundeen 1988, Van Dooren and Thijssen 2015, Brady,
Verba, and Schlozman 1995)
Salience
Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive the service is of
enduring significance to them.
(Blakeley and Evans 2009, de Graaf, van Hulst, and Michels
2015, Bovaird and Loeffler 2012, Simmons and Birchall 2005)
24
Table 2a
Age
N
37
Mean
42, 62
Median
42
Mode
31
Std. Dev
15,410
Min.
19
Max.
68
Months Participating
N
27
Mean
13.56
Median
12
Mode
1
Std. Dev
14,241
Min.
1
Max.
48
25
Table 2b
Variable
Freq.
Percent
Gender
Male
11
29,7 %
Female
26
70,3 %
Age categories
18-34
14
37,8 %
35-54
12
32,4%
55+
11
29,7 %
Employment
Active3
8
21,6%
Inactive4
29
78,4%
Survey language
Dutch
22
59,5 %
Turkish
15
40,5 %
3
To achieve a higher N and thus more significant results, we combined the variables ‘student’ and ‘employed’
under one common denominator ‘active’.
4
We did the same for ‘inactive’ which comprises of the variables ‘retired’, ‘unemployed’ and ‘other’.
26
Table 3
Starting from left.
Material
rewards
A
Immaterial
rewards
C
Immaterial
sanctions
D
Solidary
motivations
E
Normative
purpose
F
Expressive
motivations
G
Effectiveness
H
Ease of
involvement
I
Salience
J
Material
rewards
A
=
(p=.421)
>
(p=.028*)
<
(p=.014*)
<
(p=.008**)
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.002**)
<
(p=.001**)
<
(p=.020*)
Immaterial
rewards
C
>
(p=.010**)
=
(p=.017*)
<
(p=.024*)
<
(p=.000**)
=
(p=.057)
<
(p=.002**)
=
(p=.036*)
Immaterial
sanctions
D
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.000**)
<
(p=.000**)
Solidary
motivations
E
=
(p=.745)
<
(p=.006**)
=
(p=.618)
<
(p=.036*)
=
(p=.697)
Normative
purpose
F
<
(p=.009**)
=
(p=.727)
=
(p=.248)
=
(p=.971)
Expressive
motivations
G
=
(p=.054)
=
(p=.454)
<
(p=.016*)
Effectiveness
of
participation
H
=
(p=.337)
=
(p=.627)
Ease of
involvement
I
=
(p=.057)
*= p≤0.05
**= p≤0.01
27
Table 4
Gender
Age categories
Employment
Survey
Language
Material rewards
Male=Female
(p=.415)
18-34<55+
18-34 = 35-54
35-54 = 55+
(p=.024*)
Inactive>Active
(p=.006*)
Dutch < Turkish
(p= .011**)
Immaterial
rewards
Male=Female
(p=.390)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.239)
Inactive=Active
(p=.549)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.340)
Immaterial
sanctions
Male=Female
(p=.370)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.059)
Inactive=Active
(p=.175)
Dutch < Turkish
(p=.019*)
Solidary
motivations
Male=Female
(p=.564)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.205)
Inactive=Active
(p=.733)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.929)
Normative purpose
Male=Female
(p=.457)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.205)
Inactive=Active
(p=.595)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.211)
Expressive
motivations
Male=Female
(p=.333)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.658)
Inactive=Active
(p=.864)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.578)
Effectiveness of
participation
Male=Female
(p=.587)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.658)
Inactive=Active
(p=.615)
Dutch > Turkish
(p=.037*)
Ease of
involvement
Male=Female
(p=.301)
35-54<55+
18-34 = 35-54
18-34 = 55+
(p=.036*)
Inactive=Active
(p=.960)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.256)
Salience
Male=Female
(p=.416)
18-34 = 35-54 =
55+
(p=.778)
Inactive=Active
(p=.789)
Dutch = Turkish
(p=.059)
*= p≤0.05
**= p≤0.01
28
Figure 1
