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Widening the evaluative space for ecosystem services: A taxonomy of plural values and
valuation methods
Paola Arias-Arévaloa, Erik Gómez-Baggethunb,c , Berta Martín-Lópezd, Mario Pérez-Rincóne
a. Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Autonomous University of
Barcelona (UAB), Edifici Z, Carrer de les Columnes, 08193 Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del
Vallès, Barcelona, Spain (ariaspaola@gmail.com)
b. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, (NMBU), Department of International
Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Universitetstunet 3, 1430 Ås, Norway
(erik.gomez@nmbu.no).
c. Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA), Gaustadalléen 21, 0349 Oslo, Norway
(erik.gomez@nina.no).
d. Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Faculty of Sustainability, Institute of Ethics and
Transdisciplinary Sustainability Research, Scharnhorststraβe 1, 21355 Lüneburg, Germany
(martinlo@leuphana.de).
e. Universidad del Valle, Instituto CINARA, Community, Environment and Sustainability
Research Group, Ciudad Universitaria Meléndez, Edif. 341, Cali, Colombia
(mario.perez@correounivalle.edu.co).
Abstract
Researchers working in the field of ecosystem services have long acknowledged the
importance of recognising multiple values in ecosystems and biodiversity. Yet the
operationalisation of value pluralism in ecosystem service assessments remains largely
elusive. The aim of this research is to present a taxonomy of values and valuation methods to
widen the evaluative space for ecosystem services. First, we present our preanalytic positions
in regards to values and valuation of ecosystem services. Second, we review different value
definitions that we deem relevant for the discussion of ecosystem services valuation. Third,
we propose a taxonomy of ecosystem service values based on different conceptions of human-
nature relationships. Finally, we present a taxonomy of different methods that can be used to
recognise plural values in ecosystem services. This taxonomy for a plural valuation of
ecosystem services can help ES scientists and practitioners with the aim of representing
people’s multiple and context specific ways of valuing nature. The taxonomy can also serve to
pay broader attention to ES values that are overlooked or misrepresented in assessments that
restrict their focus to monetary valuations.
Key words: Ecosystem Services, Incommensurability, Monetary and Non-Monetary
Valuation, Value Pluralism
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Introduction
The concept ecosystem services (ES) is used to refer to the benefits people obtain from
ecosystems, such as; fresh water, food, climate regulation, recreation or aesthetic experiences
(de Groot et al., 2002; MA, 2005; TEEB, 2011). The ES framework is concerned with the
development of science-policy tools that are founded on the ES concept (see MA, 2005;
Turner and Daly, 2008). Nowadays, the ES framework is increasingly used by diverse
stakeholders, including scientists, policy-makers, NGO's and practitioners, for purposes that
range from decision-making support to advocacy for biodiversity protection (Barnaud and
Antona, 2014). The ES framework focuses on the importance of biodiversity and ecosystems
for human well-being (MA, 2005), and hence from the outset has had a clear emphasis on
nature’s instrumental values (Reyers et al., 2012). Since instrumental values refer to the value
an entity holds as a means to achieve specific ends, it implicitly assumes that the entities
bearing such values may be replaced and compensated for, as long as their substitutes can
perform the same functions (Muraca, 2011; Zimmerman, 2015). The emphasis on
instrumental values suggests that two ES that provide the same impact on economic welfare,
or human well-being, can be interchanged. This emphasis partially explains why the ES
framework is often associated with the practice of monetary valuation and commodification
(Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011; Abson et al., 2014; Nieto-Romero et al., 2014).
Yet, using the ES framework does not necessarily entail the use of monetary valuations
(Ruckelshaus et al., 2015) nor markets as the preferred governance mechanism (Schröter and
Oudenhoven, 2016).
The influence of the ES framework on environmental and conservation policy has grown over
recent years (Kull et al. 2015). This situation begs the question as to how non-instrumental
value can be integrated into the ES framework (Jax et al., 2013). In fact, initial ES definitions
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tended to stress that ecosystems and biodiversity sustain and fulfil the requirements for
achieving human wellbeing, often in an attempt to confer nature a higher moral place beyond
instrumental values (Deliège and Neuteleers, 2015). Furthermore, many influential
contributions within the ES framework have advocated the need to integrate plural values of
ecosystems and biodiversity. For example, the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (MA,
2005) distinguished utilitarian monetary values of ES from other non-utilitarian values (i.e.,
ecological, socio-cultural and intrinsic values). Similarly, the initiative The Economics of
Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity (TEEB) recognises that ES valuation involves dealing
with conflicting valuation languages that can involve incommensurability (Pascual et al.,,
2010, p.193). Finally, the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES) also recognises multiple value systems, including intrinsic, instrumental and
relational values (Díaz et al., 2015, p.11).
Some scholars have endorsed the perspective of recognising multiple values in ES beyond
instrumental ones (Costanza and Folke, 1997; de Groot et al., 2002; Farber et al., 2002;
Polishchuk and Rauschmayer, 2012; Reyers et al., 2012). ES valuations within this
perspective have integrated different disciplinary approaches as well as introduced diverse
positions on how ‘value’ should be defined and expressed. Hence, ES valuations have
spanned across different value domains (e.g., ecological, cultural and monetary) and levels of
societal organisation (e.g., individual and shared values) (Chan et al., 2012; Martín-López et
al., 2014; Kenter et al., 2015). Many influential contributions on ES valuation have grounds in
ecological economics (e.g., Costanza and Folke, 1997; de Groot et al., 2002; MA, 2005;
TEEB, 2011), a field where value pluralism and incommensurability are considered
foundational principles for environmental valuation (Martínez-Alier et al., 1998; Martínez-
Alier and Muradian, 2015; Gómez-Baggethun and Martín-López, 2015). Value pluralism is
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based on the recognition of different and often conflicting value domains, that are neither
reducible to each other, nor to some ultimate value (O’Neill et al., 2008; Chang, 2001; Mason,
2015). Furthermore, the principle of value incommensurability implies the recognition of
plural values of nature and also that these values cannot be measured with a single value-
indicator, such as money or energy (Neurath, 1973; Martínez-Alier et al., 1998).
Even if the recognition of plural values has been a mainstay in much conceptual literature on
ES valuation, the operationalisation of value pluralism and value incommensurability in ES
assessments has remained largely elusive. Monetisation still is the dominant valuation
language (Christie et al., 2012; Abson et al., 2014; Nieto-Romero et al., 2014) and is often
conceived as a pragmatic language to communicate with political and business institutions
(Spash, 2013). However, scholars have called attention to the minimal use of monetary
valuation of ES in decision-making (Kushner et al., 2012; Laurans et al., 2013), and have also
noted that stakeholders, including policy makers, demand other valuation languages beyond
the monetary (Ruckelshaus et al., 2015). Ecological economists, and their antecedents, have
criticised the use of monetary valuations as an expression of nature’s multiple values and
noted that monetary valuations are often conducted without a critical perspective on its
consequences (see Kapp, 1972; O'Neill, 1997; Martínez-Alier et al. 1998; Gustafsson &
Frolova, 1998;; Farrell, 2007; O'Neill et al., 2008, Spash, 2006; 2013). Joining this position,
scholars working on ES have also stressed the drawbacks and potentially negative
consequences of an ES framework biased towards a monetary framing. For instance,
monetary values of ES cannot account for limited degrees of substitutability, non-linearities
and critical thresholds of ES and hence can guide decision-making towards the acceptance of
ecological losses that cannot be substituted or compensated (Boeraeve et al., 2015).
Commensurability assumptions have raised ethical concerns regarding the way monetary
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valuation masks non-instrumental ES values such as ecological and cultural values (Luck et
al., 2012; Jax et al., 2013). Monetary valuation has been associated with a push towards ES
commodification, i.e. the expansion of market trade to previously non-marketed ES (Gómez-
Baggethun and Ruíz-Pérez, 2011). ES commodification has been criticised on the grounds
that it can promote unequal access to resources (Pascual et al., 2014), erode intrinsic
motivations for conservation (Rode et al., 2015) and some entities should not be for sale.
This paper presents a taxonomy of plural values and valuation methods that can serve to open
up the evaluative space for recognising the plural values of ES. This aims to advance the
dialogue regarding how to speak coherently about the ontological and epistemological
complexities of ES values. First, we present our preanalytic positions regarding ES values and
ES valuation. Second, we review different disciplinary approaches to the conceptualisation of
‘value’ that enter into the discussion of ES valuation. Third, based on multiple metaphors for
human-nature relationships, we provide a taxonomy of ‘value domains’, and ‘articulated
values’, relevant for ES valuations. Finally, we present a taxonomy of different methods for
construing and constructing ES values (i.e., value articulating methods).
Premises regarding values and valuation of ES
In this section, we state our premises regarding: 1) the object of valuation, 2) the objective
and subjective nature of ES values and 3) the framing of ES values by social and political
contexts. Before starting let us define our terminology. ‘ES values’ are taken to mean the
multiple and incommensurable ways in which ES are important for people. ‘Ecosystem
services valuation’ is defined as the process of analysing, assessing or understanding ES
values and how these values are comparable in relation to coexistences, synergies or trade-
offs (Gómez-Baggethun and Martín-López 2015). ‘Value domains’ refer to the different ways
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in which ES are important for people affecting how they engage with nature (Centemeri,
2015). ‘Articulated values’ signifies the concrete expressions of value domains, stemming
from valuation processes (Farrell, 2007).
The recognition of plural values in the ES framework involves the integration of plural and
complex objects of valuation (Klain et al., 2014). People can refer to the importance of an ES
(e.g., global climate regulation), but may also refer to the importance of nature as a broad
concept, a particular ecosystem (e.g., a forest) or components of biodiversity (e.g., endemic
species). While nature, ecosystems, biodiversity and ES are different concepts, both in science
and policy these categories are increasingly conflated under the broader umbrella of the ES
framework (Díaz et al., 2015).
Muraca (2011) and Chan et al., (2016) argue that the values attributed by humans originates in
the relational domain of subjects and objects of valuations. From this analytic perspective, ES
values do not originate in human’s attributions (i.e., subjectivist approach) nor are they
inherently located in nature (i.e., objectivist approach). It is through valuation processes that
humans, via reflection, recognise the importance of nature and ES (Muraca, 2011), making it
explicit through the articulation of ES values. In ES valuations, the valuing agents or value
providers may include individuals, social groups or communities (Kenter et al., 2015). On this
basis, ES values and valuations can be regarded as socially constructed. The choice of a value
articulating method influences policy conclusions because it frames which data is relevant,
how it should be produced (Farrell, 2007), and who can participate and in which role (Vatn,
2005). This position frames values and valuations as contingent in regards to the social and
political context in which they are immersed. It further recognises ES values and valuations as
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being shaped by power relations among valuing agents (Martínez-Alier, 2002, Farrell, 2007;
Douai, 2009). These agents frame:
i) how value is defined;
ii) what type of ES values are included in ES valuations; and
iii) which value articulating methods are used.
In the following sections we will provide a taxonomy of value definitions, value types and
valuation methods as a pluralistic answer to address these three concerns.
Value definitions for ES valuation
In its broader meaning, the word value is usually related to the notion of importance (Dietz et
al., 2005). Although in the ES framework value is often equated to monetary value (Christie
et al., 2012; Abson et al., 2014). We identified six definitions of value that need to be
considered within the discussion of plural values of ES, and these are specified in Table 1.
These definitions have been the subject of major (inter)disciplinary debates and our aim here
is to only briefly present them.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Value definition 1 derives from philosophers and ethicists who have developed theories
supporting the concept of intrinsic value. We take intrinsic values as defined by Callicot
(1987) to embrace the notion that biodiversity and ecosystems have value in themselves
independently of their usefulness for humans. This argument has been a normative postulate
of conservation science for decades (Soulé, 1985). However, some authors have questioned its
relevance for ES conservation on the basis that intrinsic value represents an abstract and non-
operational concept (Justus et al., 2009).
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Value definition 2 comes for scholars in fields of social psychology (e.g., Rokeach, 1973;
Schwartz, 2005), political ecology (e.g., Kallis et al., 2013) and environmental law (e.g., Bell
et al., 2013). They refer to value as guiding human realisation and orienting judgements and
actions (Schwartz, 2005). From this perspective, ES values are principles and convictions that
guide the ways in which humans relate to each other and nature on ethical and political
grounds (Chan et al., 2012, 2016; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2016). For example, the principle
of intergenerational altruism encompasses the concern for sustaining a healthy environment
for future generations to inherit.
Value definition 3 comes from neoclassical economics which employs the concept of
‘monetary value’. This rests upon the idea of price as the measure of exchange value and the
assumption that exchange value measures utility (e.g., Peace and Turner, 1990). This
utilitarian and chrematistic perspective explains choice through the rational actor model,
which portrays humans as calculative and self-interested beings. Monetary values are
assumed to be morally neutral from the individual’s viewpoint and as providing a suitable
objectification of human valuation. Ecological economists have discussed the limitations of
the neoclassical economics approach both as an explanation of human behaviour and for
understanding of human-nature relationships (see Kapp, 1972; O’Neill, 1997; Gustafsson &
Frolova, 1998, Vatn, 2000; O’Neill et al., 2008; Spash, 2008; 2013).
Value definition 4 contrasts with the neoclassical economists’ individualistic rationality and
instead uses the notion of shared values. This has been used to refer to the ES values people
hold as citizens (Sagoff, 1986). This concept relies on a social constructionist perspective
(Durkheim, 1981), which argues that individuals act based on institutions, or patterns of
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thinking, roles and social norms (Vatn 2005). Shared values are generally derived through
deliberation (Kenter et al., 2015). They may also be expressed in monetary terms (Spash,
2007); for example, exploring ‘societal willingness to pay’ for the protection of a particular
ES (Kenter et al., 2015).
Definition 5 comes from ecology. The term ‘ecological value’ has been used to refer to the
degree to which an entity or process contributes to ecological features (de Groot et al., 2010).
For instance, ecological resilience relates to an ecosystems’ capacity to maintain its integrity
in the face of disturbances (Holling 1973; Folke, 2006). In ecological economics, a critical
level of ecological integrity is considered a precondition for any socio-economic system to be
sustainable in the long term (Costanza, 1991; Martínez-Alier and Muradian, 2015).
Finally, definition 6 refers to how some philosophers have defined values as ‘ways of
concern’ or the different ways in which people care about something (O’Neill et al., 2008). In
an environmental valuation context, people’s ways of concern about nature emerge from the
various ways people engage with nature (Centemeri 2015). For instance, a community can
consider a forest important because it provides inputs for their productive activities (e.g.,
wood and fibres) but also because it is a sacred place.
By framing the notion of ES values as the different ways in which nature, ecosystems and
biodiversity are important for people, the ES framework can conceptually integrate concerns
related to diverse definitions of value including: intrinsic value, principles, monetary values,
ecological values and shared values. Some of these definitions are not mutually exclusive. For
example, the principle of altruism as a motivation for nature conservation may be endorsed
from a citizen perspective (i.e., shared value); moral concerns towards ecosystems (i.e.,
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intrinsic values) can be framed from a citizen perspective (i.e. shared value) and as a guiding
principle for environmental decision-making.
Linking metaphors of human-nature relationships to ES values
The ES concept alone cannot account for the multiple ways in which people engage with
nature (Raymond et al., 2013; Klain et al., 2014). Stakeholders have reshaped or rejected the
ES concept when it does not represent the ways in which they relate with nature. For instance,
non-western participants in the IPBES have played a key role in the integration of alternative
metaphors representing their cosmological visions, e.g., ‘nature gifts’ instead of the ES
concept (Borie and Hulme 2015; Díaz et al., 2015). Stakeholders have used the ES concept in
very different ways to shape local policy agendas beyond ES commodification (Barnaud and
Antona, 2014; Kull et al., 2015). By allowing multiple metaphors on human-nature
relationships, scholars concerned with the valuation of ES can advance the recognition of
plural values and thus propose alternative policy pathways. In this section we present three
metaphors on human-nature relationships: ‘gaining from nature’, ‘living for nature’, and
‘living in nature’ (O’Neill et al., 2008). These are summarised in Table 2.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The metaphors of human-nature relationships ‘gaining from nature’ and ‘living for nature’
where chosen in order to represent two opposing value domains on which the discussion of
ES valuation has revolved: instrumental and intrinsic values (Justus et al., 2009: Reyers et al.,
2012; Chan et al. 2016). The metaphor ‘gaining from nature’ relates to the view that human
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welfare and economic productivity depend upon the benefits humans obtain from ecosystems.
This metaphor encompasses the importance of nature and ES as being merely a means
towards the maximisation of economic utility (i.e. instrumental value domain) and its
articulated monetary values. Provisioning services (e.g. food, water and fibres) are examples
of ES that have been valued primarily for their instrumental value. However, even within the
ES provisioning category, the appraisal of ES importance for people is often strongly
influenced by the way they are intertwined with cultural and ecological values (Chan et al.,
2012; Reyes-García et al., 2015). The metaphor ‘living for nature’ relates to the view that
humans share the environment with other non-human species which deserve concern for their
own sake and which have a right to exist. Hence, this metaphor encompasses the intrinsic
value domain and its articulation as human’s moral duties towards biodiversity and
ecosystems. Biodiversity and the so-called ES of ‘nursery habitats’ and ‘gene pool
protection’, may be valued grounded on moral concerns and thus can be accommodated
within the intrinsic value domain.
The third metaphor, ‘we live in nature’, was taken into account to integrate an intermediary
position for those ES value domains and articulated values that cannot be classified as
instrumental or intrinsic (Muraca, 2011). This third metaphor stresses a mode of engagement
in which people are relating to a dwelled-in nature (see Centemeri, 2015). In other words,
nature is the space where connections among the biophysical, social and cultural worlds take
place in a relational way, i.e., through relations (Muraca, 2011;2016; Chan et al., 2016). For
example, the importance people attribute to a forest as a place where social relations can be
enhanced where the forest cannot be substituted by another place where social relations can
be enhanced (e.g., a football stadium). What is of concern is the context-specific relation of
people with that forest for purposes of social enhancement. The number of relational values
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that may emerge from human-nature relationships can be numerous. Hence, the metaphor ‘we
live in nature’ will encompass more value domains and articulated values than the other two
metaphors.
The metaphor ‘living with nature’ can encompasses two value domains: fundamental and
eudaimonistic values (Muraca, 2011). 1 The fundamental value domain refers to all systems of
relations and processes that are conditions to protect the life supporting system (Muraca,
2011), or those that contributes to ecological resilience. The fundamental value domain also
refers to all systems of relations and processes that are conditions that allow people to define
themselves and provide sense to their existence (Muraca, 2011). Or in other words, those
conditions necessary for enhancing social resilience.2 Articulations of the fundamental value
domain may include ecological resilience, livelihoods and subsistence, mental and physical
health, identity, cultural heritage, sacredness values, symbolic values, social cohesion and
sense of place. The eudaimonistic value domain relates to those entities and processes that are
conditions for a ‘good human life’, they are not driven by merely egoistic preferences, instead
they extend to notions of what one considers meaningful actions in the context of a virtuous
life e.g., meaningful occupation, aesthetic values, cognitive development, recreation and
leisure, inspiration, altruism and environmental justice.
Although fundamental and eudaimonistic values can be related to human goals, they differ
from instrumental values in that they are related to higher ends such as the preservation of life
on Earth, the spiritual embedment with nature, or the fulfilment of a ‘good human life’.
1 Eudaimonia is a central concept in ancient Greek moral philosophy and in any modern virtue ethics. This
concept has been interpreted as ‘flourishing’ or as a non-hedonist concept of ‘happiness’, and also as ‘well-
being’ (Hursthouse, 2013).
2 Social resilience has been defined as the “ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and
disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change” (Adger, 2000: 347)
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Intrinsic, eudaimonistic, and fundamental values of ES emerge from non-instrumental
relations with nature and these value domains often express a sense of collective meaning
(i.e., shared values). Thus, ES monetary values cannot represent intrinsic, eudaimonistic and
fundamental values of ES.
The classification presented in Table 2 aims to provide a heuristic tool for ES valuations that
are conceptually open to integrate plural ES values. However, it does not intend to draw clear
boundaries between ES value domains and their articulated values or to dictate a universal
way of classifying them, and the classification of the articulated values of the fundamental
and eudaimonistic value domains is speculative. The classification in Table 2 also intends to
highlight the fact that multiple value domains can co-exist in the object of valuation and they
are also often intertwined. For example, a peasant community can state water is important
because it is fundamental for sustaining their life (fundamental value domain), they may also
recognise that water has a value in itself (intrinsic value domain) and lastly, because it is an
input for crop production (instrumental value domain).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 shows how the proposed classification of value domains (i.e. instrumental, intrinsic,
fundamental and eudaimonistic) can be broadly related with the commonly used classification
of ES values in ecological, socio-cultural and economic values (TEEB, 2011; Gómez-
Baggethun and Martín-López, 2015). It also shows how the proposed value taxonomy of ES
values can be aligned with the sustainability perspective of nested ecological, socio-cultural
and economic systems in ecological economics. This perspective implies that human
flourishing and development should remain within ecological boundaries in order to not
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degrade the ecological life support system (Costanza, 1991; Martínez-Alier and Muradian,
2015). Finally, Figure 1 shows that monetary values do not represent ‘the value’ of nature.
The embeddedness of the economic system in the socio-cultural system further conveys the
notion of monetary values as a category that cannot be conceived as independent from the
socio-cultural context (Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Douai, 2009).3 ES valuations can rely on
deliberative valuation methods aimed towards the identification and classification of ES
values.
Value articulation: Diversifying methods for ES valuation
Various value articulating methods (Vatn, 2005; Farrell, 2007) have been applied for ES
valuation from the perspective of the beneficiaries’ subjective appreciation. Table 3 provides
an overview of ES valuation methods and classifies them along three different axes: i)
monetary and non-monetary valuation methods, ii) qualitative, quantitative and mixed
valuation methods, and iii) consultation approach (i.e., group-based, individual-based or non-
consultative).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The most widely applied methods are those of monetary valuation (Christie et al., 2012)
including: market price-based approaches, market cost-based approaches, revealed preference
methods, stated preference methods, benefit transfer, economic field experiments and
deliberative monetary valuation. Non-monetary valuation of ES (sometimes referred to as
3 The monetary bias of the ES framework can be framed as an example of the embeddedness of the economic
system in the socio-cultural system. This bias resulted from the dominance of two political trends under which
the ES discourse expanded in the late 1990’s: the neoliberal ideology, supporting markets as the most efficient
regulatory tool and ii) ecological modernization, which conceives technology as the solution for environmental
crisis (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Kull et al., 2015).
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socio-cultural valuation) covers a collection of methods that aims to reveal the importance of
ES by using other metrics than money (Kelemen et al., 2014; Castro et al., 2014). Non-
monetary valuation methods elicit information about the emotional, symbolic, cognitive or
ethical importance of ES. These methods include quantitative (e.g., surveys of preference
assessments); qualitative (e.g., semi-structured and in-depth interviews), mixed methods (e.g.,
Q methodology) and deliberative methods (e.g., citizen juries). Valuation methods determine
how values are articulated into concrete qualitative or quantitative expressions, including
premises about what is possible to do in regards to decision-making (Vatn, 2005; Farell,
2007). For example, individual monetary valuation methods often stress market-based
instruments as solutions for environmental problems (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian,
2015). When choosing a particular valuation method, ES practitioners should take into
account how that method actually answers the questions: what is value and how are values
generated and held?
First, by discriminating between monetary and non-monetary methods, we highlight how the
valuation methods broadly respond to the question: What is value? The bulk of the literature
on monetary valuation often rests on a neoclassical economics and strongly emphasises
instrumental values. As stated earlier, intrinsic, fundamental and eudaimonistic value domains
represent non-instrumental relations with nature and a sense of collective meaning (i.e. shared
values); therefore, they might be better addressed by non-monetary valuation methods.
Second, by discriminating between whether a method is based on individual or group
consultation, we broadly delineate a response to the question: How are values generated and
held? Valuation methods based on individual consultation rely on methodological
individualism (Weber 1968), which analyses collective forms as the result of the sum of
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individual actions (e.g. aggregation of individual willingness to pay). On the other hand,
group based consultation through deliberative methods generally considers shared values to
be fundamentally different from the sum of its parts. Deliberative methods may allow
participants to reflect on the values at stake and to share their knowledge, views and
perceptions with other participants (Zografos and Howarth 2010; Kenter et al., 2015).
Valuation methods can be combined to depict a more complex picture of why and how people
value ES. For instance, the sacredness value of an ecosystem (a fundamental value) may be
elicited through in-depth interviews, where people can express ‘why’ they conceive the
ecosystem to be sacred. For example, some Berber shepherds of the High Atlas in Morocco
have attributed sacred values to the communal pastoral areas because the existence of a patron
saint that is also connected with the internal regulations of when, how and by whom the
communal pastures are used (Dominguez et al., 2010). Surveys, on the other hand, may be
used to address ‘how’ sacred values relate to socio-demographic conditions. In the example of
the High Atlas, beliefs underpinning sacred values may be weaker among younger
generations due to the on-going acculturation and abandonment of local belief systems
(Dominguez et al., 2010).
Conclusions
Understanding the importance of nature, ecosystems or ES for people involves dealing with
multiple and, often, conflicting valuation languages. Plural values, representing different ways
of engagement with nature, may be integrated not only in environmental valuation but also in
the more specific field of ES assessments. Beyond attributing instrumental and intrinsic
values, people can value ecosystems and biodiversity because they are fundamental in human-
nature relationships and because they fulfil a ‘good human life’. The ES framework can
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enhance the integration of value pluralism in ES valuations by integrating relational values
such as fundamental and eudaimonistic values.
The taxonomy of plural values presented here classifies ES value types across different
conceptualisations of human-nature relationships, thereby providing an open conceptual
framework that is able to accommodate a diverse set of ontological and epistemological
perspectives. This taxonomy may orient ES practitioners to identify the broad types of values
that may emerge on the ground. In a context where monetary valuations remain the dominant
valuation language in ES assessments, our taxonomy of plural values and valuation methods
may also aid in clarifying which values of ecosystems and biodiversity are overlooked or
misrepresented when expressed merely by monetary values.
Articulating value pluralism in the ES framework implies stressing the ES concept in a
heuristic understanding that enables integrating different visions on humans’ engagement with
nature. This process implies a departure from ES as the only object of valuation and the use of
other scales of nature and metaphors of human-nature relationships. This has been the case for
the IPBES conceptual framework, which has integrated Western and non-Western visions on
human-nature relationships. In this context, our taxonomy on plural ES values and valuation
methods can support the advancement towards understanding and recognising the multiple
ways in which humans relate to and care about nature.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the 7th Framework Program of the European Commission
project 'Operationalization of Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services’ (OpenNESS) (FP7-
Grant agreement: 308428). Paola Arias-Arévalo received funding from the Colombian
Administrative Department of Science, Technology and Innovation-Colciencias
(Convocatoria 529-2011) and Erik Gómez-Baggethun received partial funding from The
Research Council of Norway through the projects ‘Tailoring the ecosystem services approach
Forthcoming+in+Environmental,Values,©The+White+Horse+Press+http://www.whpress.co.uk+
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18+
to landscape level management’ (TESL) and ‘Integrating value diversity in the assessment of
urban ecosystem services to inform nature-based solutions in cities’ (SIS-URBAN). We thank
F.Robayo, A. Suarez and W. Hossack for the English language revision. Thanks are also due
to R. Sedano, C. Ordoñez, J. Rojas, M. Peña, R. Muradian and two anonymous referees for
discussions and for helpful comments on earlier versions. We are also grateful to C. Spash for
the editing process.
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Table 1. Value definitions to be considered in ecosystem services valuation
Value definitions
Discipline
References
Examples
1)
Intrinsic
value
Biodiversity and
ecosystems are
considered ends in
themselves.
Philosophy,
deontological
ethics
Callicott,
(1987);
Rolston,
(1989)
An endangered
species
conservation
because it has
the right to exist.
2)
Principles
Stable references
that guide human
realization and thus
orient human
judgements and
actions.
Social
psychology,
political ecology,
environmental
law
Schwartz,
(2005), Kallis
et al., (2013),
Altruism
towards future
generations
3)
Monetary
value
Utility
measurements
through prices.
Neoclassical
economics
Peace and
Turner,
(1990)
Willingness to
pay for a
particular ES
4)
Shared
values
Values people hold
for biodiversity,
ecosystems and ES
as citizens.
Sociology,
political science
Sagoff,
(1986);
Kenter et al.,
(2015)
Aesthetic value
of a landscape
5)
Ecological
value
Degree to which an
entity or process
contributes to
ecological attributes
Ecology, among
others
Farber et al.,
(2002); de
Groot et al.,
(2010)
An Ecosystem’s
ecological
resilience
6)
Ways of
concern
Distinctive ways in
which it makes
sense to care about
nature and the
provided ES.
Philosophy
O’Neill et al.,
(2008)
A forest’s
sacredness value
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Table 2. Classification of ecosystem services values across different metaphors of
human-nature relationships.
Metaphors
of human-
nature
relationship
Value Domain
Articulated
values
Definition
Examples of valued
ecosystem services†
Gaining from
nature
Instrumental
Ecosystems and
biodiversity
seen as merely
a means to
achieve utility
Monetary
value
Biodiversity and ecosystems
contributions to utility,
which are measured through
prices
Erosion protection
Fibres, fuel and
other raw materials
Genetic material
Biochemical species
and or resources
Ornamental
resources
Living for
nature
Intrinsic
Biodiversity
and ecosystems
have value in
themselves
Moral duties
towards nature
Moral duties towards
biodiversity and ecosystems
Nursery habitat
Genepool protection
Ecological
resilience
The capacity of ecosystems
of maintaining their
integrity in face of
disturbance
Climate regulation
Water regulation
Soil formation and
regeneration
Biological regulation
Livelihood,
subsistence
Critical ES to achieve
livelihood goals
Food
Water
Mental and
physical
health
Physical benefits perceived
from ecosystems’ regulation
of water, air and diseases;
and mental benefits due to
nature exposure
Air quality
regulation
Natural hazard
mitigation
Waste treatment
Opportunities for
recreation and
ecotourism
Identity
Biodiversity and ecosystems
are considered references to
determine people’s sense of
personal and social identity
Cultural heritage and
identity
Living in
nature
Fundamental
Conditions to i)
protect the life
supporting
system, ii)
allow people to
define
themselves, and
iii) provide
sense to their
existence.
Cultural
heritage
Landscape’s tangible and
intangible features which
are historically significant
(e.g., buildings monuments,
traditions, stories, traditional
ecological knowledge, other
knowledge systems).
Cultural heritage and
identity
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Sacredness
Spiritual, religious or sacred
attachment to biodiversity
and ecosystems
Spiritual and
religious inspiration
Symbolic
value
Meanings associated to
ecosystems. These meaning
are conceived to be
inseparable of the
represented ecosystems but
are also valuable in them
selves
Cultural heritage and
identity
Social
cohesion
Human uses of biodiversity
and ecosystems as a context
for social cohesion
enhancement
Opportunities for
enhancing social
relations
Sense of place
Emotional attachment to a
place (feelings of belonging,
commitment, identity or
community)
Cultural heritage and
identity
Meaningful
occupation
Occupations related to
biodiversity and ecosystems
that allow people to fulfil a
‘good human life’
Cultural heritage and
identity
Aesthetic
value
Appreciation of the beauty
of nature, grounded on
sensations and emotions.
Opportunities for
aesthetic
appreciation
Recreational,
leisure
Appreciation of tourism,
recreational and leisure
activities in natural areas
Opportunities for
recreation and
ecotourism
Cognitive
development,
Appreciation of ecosystems’
features within special
educational and scientific
interest
Opportunities for
education and
science
Inspiration
Appreciation of the
inspirational values of
ecosystems’ features
Opportunities for
inspiration for
culture, art, design
Environmental
justice
Biodiversity, ecosystems or
ES are matters of concern
within a human rights or a
justice context
All ecosystem
services
Eudaimonistic
Entities and
processes which
represent
conditions for
leading a ‘good
human life’
Altruism
Concern for biodiversity,
ecosystems or ES in favour
of a present larger
community (intra-
generational) or future
generations (inter-
generational)
All ecosystem
services
† Ecosystem services are largely based on the classification of de Groot et al., (2010).
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Table 3. Methods for plural ecosystem services (ES) valuation
Consultation
approach
Method
Brief description
Group-
based
Individual
-based
Non-
consultati
ve
1. Monetary Valuation Methods
A. Quantitative
Market price-
based approaches
Uses prices of ES traded in markets (e.g., water, timber)
as a proxy for its monetary value.
!
Market cost-based
approaches
− Replacement
costs
− Damage cost
avoided
− Production
function
Estimate the costs that are averted due to the ES
functioning: costs of replacing an ES (e.g., waste
treatment) or mitigating environmental damage (e.g.,
natural hazard mitigation by forests). The production
function estimates how much an ES contributes to the
delivery of a marketed good.
!
Travel cost method analyses individual choices in
markets related to ES. Travel cost methods use the costs
of travel to a natural area as a measure of the value of
recreation.
!
Revealed
preference
methods
− Travel cost
− Hedonic pricing
Hedonic pricing method reveals the monetary value of
ES (e.g. green areas) mainly through house prices.
!
Stated preference
methods:
− Contingent
valuation
− Choice modelling
Constructs hypothetical markets and asks willingness to
pay (WTP) to obtain a specified ES or willingness to
accept (WTA) giving it up. Choice modelling infers
WTP through trade-offs incurred when choosing
between alternatives with different levels of ES and
costs.
!
Benefit transfer
method
Estimate the monetary value of an ES by transferring a
measure estimated in a similar context.
!
B. Mixed (quantitative and qualitative)
Economic field
experiments
Experiments developed in naturally-occurring settings
aimed at analysing behaviour and decision making (e.g.,
choices influenced by reciprocity, norms, altruism and
uncertainty).
!
!
Deliberative
economic
valuation
Combines stated preference valuation methods with
elements of deliberative processes.
!
!
2. Non-monetary Valuation Methods
A. Quantitative
Surveys of
preference
assessments
Surveys aimed to rank or rate ES preferences. Used to
analyse perceptions, knowledge and values of ES
demand or use.
!
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Consultation
approach
Method
Brief description
Group-
based
Individual
-based
Non-
consultati
ve
Photo-elicitation
surveys
Visual elements (e.g. photographs, pictures) are
included in surveys to assess individuals’ perception of
ES supply and preferences towards landscape views.
!
Time use surveys
Captures individual’s willingness to give up time
(WTT) for activities that promote ES maintenance.
!
Psychometric
Surveys
Elicits data of individual attitudes, views, reported
behaviour, motivations and values towards ES.
!
B. Mixed (quantitative and qualitative)
Delphi Method
Uses expert opinion to reach an agreed conclusion. It
may involve quantitative and qualitative assessments.
!
Q Methodology
Analyses subjectivity (i.e. attitudes, shared perceptions,
and worldviews) through individual ranking of
statements. Common worldviews are elucidated through
factor analysis.
!
C. Qualitative
Semi-structured
and in-depth
interviews
In-depth interviews capture how people value or
understand something. In a semi-structured interview,
the researcher orients the conversation to specific topics.
!
Participatory
observation
The researcher gets involved with people in their natural
environment. Aimed at analysing people’s cultural
behaviours and interactions.
!
Participant diaries
Participants are asked to make regular records or
narrative descriptions of personal experiences. Aimed at
exploring thoughts, feelings and understandings of a
topic of interest to the research.
!
Photo-voice
Stakeholders take their own photographs of different
features of ecosystems and landscape (e.g. ES). Useful
to integrate the perceptions of marginalized social
groups.
!
!
Focus groups
An externally guided group discussion about a topic.
Aimed at discovering different positions and to explore
how participants interact when discussing.
!
Deliberative methods
Citizen juries
Groups of representative citizens -randomly chosen- act
as jurors to consider issues of public importance.
!
Deliberative focus
group
Similar to focus groups but may take more than one
reunion and has an emphasis on consensus and
collective decision.
!
Participant action
research
People work collaboratively with researchers in
knowledge co-production. Aimed at finding solutions to
problems of common interest.
!
Participatory
Promote local knowledge and enable local people to
!
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Consultation
approach
Method
Brief description
Group-
based
Individual
-based
Non-
consultati
ve
Rural Appraisal;
Rapid Rural
Appraisal
make their own appraisals, analysis and plans.
Participatory
scenario planning
A tool for analysing future prospects of change in ES
and its trade-offs. Involves the participatory
identification of storylines, drivers of change,
uncertainties and scenario outcomes.
!
Mediated
Modelling
Combines dynamic system modelling with stakeholder
participation aimed at creating a shared model of
alternative outcomes.
!
Deliberative
mapping
Stakeholders create a map via consensus, indicating
valuable ES and landscape futures.
!
Sources: Christie et al., (2012), Castro et al., (2014), Kelemen et al., (2014), Gómez-
Baggethun et al., (2016).
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Figure 1. Correspondence of intrinsic, fundamental, eudaimonistic and instrumental
value domains with the frequently used framework of ecosystem services values
classification (ecological, socio-cultural and economic values).
